I

n the aftermath of the tragic gun attack on a concert hall outside Moscow, Russia has cast doubt on assertions made by the United States regarding the involvement of the Islamic State militant group. The attack, which claimed the lives of 137 people and left 182 others injured, marked one of the deadliest incidents inside Russia in two decades.

The assailants, identified as four men, stormed the Crocus City Hall on Friday night, indiscriminately firing upon concertgoers just moments before the Soviet-era rock group Picnic was set to perform their hit song “Afraid of Nothing”.

Following the attack, four suspects, including at least one individual of Tajik origin, were apprehended and remanded in custody for terrorism-related charges. They were presented separately at Moscow’s Basmanny district court, confined within a cage and escorted by officers from the Federal Security Service.

Complicity on “the Ukrainian side”

While the Islamic State has claimed responsibility for the attack, the United States publicly endorsed this assertion, citing intelligence regarding an imminent threat that had been shared with Russian authorities earlier in the month. However, Russian President Vladimir Putin refrained from explicitly linking the gunmen to the militant group, instead suggesting that they were attempting to flee to Ukraine.

President Putin’s statements implied complicity on “the Ukrainian side,” alleging that certain individuals had been prepared to assist the gunmen in crossing the border. In response, Ukraine vehemently denied any involvement, with President Volodymyr Zelenskiy accusing Putin of attempting to deflect blame for the concert hall assault.

In a move that further underscores the divergence in narratives, Russia’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Maria Zakharova, questioned the validity of the U.S. assertion linking the attack to the Islamic State. Zakharova’s remarks, published in the Komsomolskaya Pravda newspaper, raised doubts about the U.S. narrative and suggested ulterior motives behind such claims.

US support

Zakharova insinuated that the United States was leveraging the specter of the Islamic State to obfuscate its own interests in Kyiv, alluding to past U.S. support for anti-Soviet fighters in Afghanistan during the 1980s.

The development comes amid heightened tensions between Russia and the West, particularly in the context of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 triggered a significant escalation of hostilities, drawing extensive support from the United States and its European allies for Ukraine’s defense efforts.

As investigations into the concert hall attack continue, the uncertainty surrounding the perpetrators and their motives deepens, while diplomatic exchanges between Russia, Ukraine, and the United States remain fraught with conflicting narratives and geopolitical implications. Meanwhile, the French government has elevated its terror alert status to the highest level in response to the Moscow shootings, reflecting the global reverberations of the tragic event.

Source: Reuters

“L

eadership is one of the most observed and least understood phenomena on Earth.” Nowadays, new terrorist groups have evolved into leaderless movements, yet we still see the traditional form of terrorist groups with organized leadership and hierarchy able not only to inflict immeasurable harm but also inspire the new generation of terrorist movements. Leadership is especially important when it comes to religious terrorist groups, whether it be Islamic terrorist groups or white Christian white nationalist groups.

In these groups, terrorist leaders are not just the leaders of their organizations; they are perceived by their followers as religious or spiritual leaders as well. Religious terrorist leaders are responsible for creating a group ideology and reconciling their group’s ideology with preexisting religious texts and teachings. Consequently, the leaders in religious terrorist groups tend to have an unparalleled influence on their organizations.

Terror in Transition: Leadership and Succession in Terrorist Organizations offers a rigorous theoretical perspective that extensively explores leadership and succession in terrorist groups throughout the period of their operation to track the opportunities that shape and maximize counterterrorism efforts. Drawing on extensive field research in Afghanistan, Somalia, and Pakistan, the book features detailed analysis of groups such as al-Shabaab, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and al-Qaeda in Iraq/the Islamic State in Iraq, as well as the KKK.

What is the role of founding leaders in shaping terrorist organizations? What follows the loss of this formative leader? What kind of leader is the successor? In their groundbreaking analysis, Tricia L. Bacon, associate professor at American University’s School of Public Affairs, and Elizabeth Grimm, associate teaching professor in the Center for Security Studies, School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, demonstrate that founders establish the whys and hows of the group. The founder explains and frames the group’s mission, and determines and justifies how the group seeks to achieve its objectives. Later, successors operate from within that base.

Bacon and Grimm argue that how successors position themselves in terms of the founder shapes a terrorist group’s future course. They breakdown the different types of successors: will they be a caretaker, signaler, fixer, visionary, or figurehead? They also examine how and why different types of successors choose to pursue incremental or discontinuous change: Some successors possess family bonds that strengthen their claim to authority. Others are outsiders who seek to escalate the group’s level of violence, and others yet are handpicked long before the leader’s death or arrest. These successors can also hold different aims, ranging from purifying the mission to restoring the group’s public image.

Succession is a critical juncture: it may potentially threaten the very survival of the group. Instability surrounding succession can place a group at its most vulnerable and is the precise time to explore options to weaken or defeat it. Therefore, Terror in Transition: Leadership and Succession in Terrorist Organizations comes as a valuable source that provides actionable recommendations for policymakers and counterterrorism practitioners.

Tricia L. Bacon and Elizabeth Grimm, Terror in Transition: Leadership and Succession in Terrorist Organizations (Columbia University Press, 2022) ISBN: 9780231192255, 312 pages

W

ho was the leader of DAESH, Abu Hussein al-Qurashi? What path did DAESH follow after Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi? What are the details of the MIT operation? Why are all DAESH leaders nuteralized in Syria? What is MIT’s operational capacity and what are its implications?

Who was the leader of DAESH, Abu Hussein al-Qurashi?

If we take the declaration of DAESH as a milestone, Abu Hussein al-Qurashi is the fourth leader of this terrorist organization. After the killing of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi on October 26, 2019, the second leader Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi was neutralized in February 2022 and the subsequent leader Abu al-Hassan al-Hashimi al-Qurashi was neutralized in October 2022, again by U.S.-backed operations. The last DAESH leader was neutralized by Turkey with a special team of the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT).

There is no detailed information on DAESH leaders after Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. As a matter of fact, there is no data even on the real name of Abu Hussein. However, according to a report by Anadolu Agency, he joined the organization in 2013 and rapidly rose in the ranks. This may be a clue that the younger generation in DAESH is more ambitious and proactive.

What path did DAESH follow after Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi?

On October 26, 2019, with the neutralization of DAESH leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the decline of DAESH, especially in Iraq and Syria, commenced. Although succeeding leaders tried to preserve the terrorist organization’s operational capacity, by 2019, it was long gone. With the killing of Abu al-Hassan in 2022, three DAESH leaders were neutralized within fifteen months. Although DAESH tried to carry out a restructuring process as it had done in the past (2010-2013), it has seemingly failed to do so.

In addition, not only the terrorist organization’s leadership but also its senior figures have been captured or neutralized. Despite these developments, the failure to rehabilitate the families and children of DAESH members, particularly in al-Hol Camp, and the refusal of their countries of citizenship to repatriate them have fostered the potential to create a new generation of DAESH members. Indeed, numerous local and international reports indicate a DAESH presence in these camps, especially in terms of ideological diffusion.

What are the details of the MIT operation?

It is known that the operation against Abu Hussein, the third leader to be neutralized after Baghdadi, was carried out on April 29. The public, both in Turkey and the world, was made aware of the operation by President Erdoğan’s statement on April 30. Afterwards, the details of the operation were shared through Anadolu Agency. It is reported that the operation against Abu Hussein lasted four hours and a call for surrender was made. It is understood that the operation was launched upon intelligence that Abu Hussein, who was in a building in the Afrin/Jindires region, was going to relocate.

The aim of the operation was to capture the terrorist organization leader alive. Examining the footage of the building where the operation was carried out, it is obvious that it was not subjected to aerial bombardment. The fact that the operation lasted four hours is proof that the MIT went to great lengths to capture Abu Hussein alive. It was also reported that Abu Hussein blew himself up to avoid capture. The previous leaders of DAESH, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Abu Ibrahim also blew themselves up with suicide vests. It is understood that this has become a common practice within the terrorist organization.

Why are all DAESH leaders neutralized in Syria?

It is a remarkable statistic that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and all subsequent leaders of DAESH have been killed in Syria. As is known, although DAESH is an Iraq-based terrorist organization, since 2012-2013, it has spread to Syria where it has taken root, especially in terms of its leadership. What is more, except for Abu al-Hassan, who was neutralized in Daraa in the south, all the other leaders were neutralized in northern Syria. This indicates that DAESH elements think that they can camouflage themselves more easily in the liberated regions.

Indeed, these regions have been the epicenter of chaos and war for years. However, the facts that the borders have not changed since 2020 and that the war has continued as frontline clashes have allowed local security elements and the MIT to turn their attention to targeted killings. As a matter of fact, in recent years, the MIT has carried out many counterterrorist targeted killing.

What is the MIT’s operational capacity and what are its implications?

The MIT’s neutralization of Abu Hussein is not widely discussed among the public, especially with Turkey approaching election day; however, it is certainly a sensational achievement. The last three DAESH leaders were killed by the U.S. with its decades of experience in the field, and this last neutralization showcases the MIT’s emergence on this stage and demonstrates its rapid progress. In addition to the MIT’s success against the PKK’s leadership cadre, especially in Iraq and Syria, the neutralization of Abu Hussein has made its targeted killing even more visible. The increasing number of unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) operations in Syria, especially after 2021, not only demonstrate the MIT’s operational capacity, but also its increasing dominance in Syria. The neutralization of Abu Hussein was a sign of this development.

The MIT’s success stories against terrorist organizations ranging from FETÖ to the PKK/YPG and DAESH are, in fact, among Turkey’s greatest institutional achievements. The MIT’s ability to capture terrorists from abroad, rescue hostages in Somalia, its contributions in Azerbaijan and Libya, and its neutralization of high-level terrorists in Iraq and Syria through targeted killing demonstrate its operational success. With the attention it has received from the international press, it is also evident that the MIT, like other intelligence services, has entered a process of international branding.

It has been ten years since popular protests in Syria against Assad’s regime started. Many European governments became involved in the armed conflicts in Syria and Iraq, while a number of their citizens became foreign fighters by joining the Syrian civil war as members of armed groups in conflict zones.

Some have joined different jihadist or militant opposition groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra and Daesh (ISIS), while others in Northern Syria are fighting in the ranks of the YPG, the Syrian branch of the PKK terror group.

An estimated 40,000 foreign fighters are members of the terror group Daesh (ISIS), including nearly 5,000 European citizens. According to the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), around 305 of them are Dutch. Among them, there are children who unwillingly bear the responsibility for their parents’ decisions.

The children are European citizens left to face their fate without any foreseeable future. Dutch sociologists, lawyers, and human rights activists have shared their concerns over these children’s situation and future in Iraq and Syria. However, European countries do not offer any help to protect them. What is the reason?

In June 2020, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands ruled that the Dutch government is not obliged to bring Dutch Daesh women and their children back from refugee camps in Northern Syria. The state has put forward the following reasons: First, the national security in the Netherlands and other Schengen countries, which would be endangered if they return.

Second, the security risks that Dutch officials and other parties would be exposed to when bringing them back from Northern Syria. Third, the Dutch international reputation in Northern Syria may be adversely affected by contacting state and non-state actors.

The chairman of the Dutch Supreme Court indicated that human rights treaties are not directly applicable in this case, since these women are outside Dutch territory. How legitimate is this provision? Does the application of human rights treaties end as soon as one crosses the Dutch border?

Besides the Netherlands, other Schengen countries are faced with the dilemma of the repatriation of Daesh women and their children. The German and French governments last year declared that they would bring the foreign fighters back and assess the situation on an individual basis. According to the Geneva-based United Nations Human Rights Committee, Belgium is expected to guarantee the return of its nationals. However, the Court of Appeal in Brussels ruled in February 2019 that a group of women and their children do not have to be repatriated by the state.

Child returnees from conflict zones

The retrieval of Daesh fighters is and will remain a difficult issue as it is an unprecedented incident. However, this cannot be said about the situation of the children who are in conflict zones. There have been development programs aimed at child soldiers in the Congo and other parts of Africa, where the return to society has had a positive effect on them.

There is, therefore, a possibility with the help of de-radicalization programs for European children to return from the Syrian civil war. According to reports from the UN Security Council, children in Syria are being used as suicide bombs and to carry weapons which makes them vulnerable to indoctrination. The children of European foreign fighters in refugee camps under the YPG’s control suffer even further because of the humanitarian crisis and the constant uncertainty they live in.

The right to family reunification

Under international law, children cannot be legally separated from their parents. When children arrive in the Netherlands, they have the right to family reunion. This means that the return of mothers could also be possible. Most conservative and right-wing politicians propose bringing back only unaccompanied children whose parents have died. But should the problem be solved by fighting inhumanity with inhumanity?

Regardless of how difficult the situation might be, European politicians should keep in mind that these women and children are human beings entitled to the basic human rights that apply to everyone on Earth. Leaving European nationals to face their own fates is wrong. International human rights treaties and laws provide a solid legal framework, but when it comes to the application of these laws and to people’s sensitivity regarding foreign fighters and their families, there is still a lot of work to be done.

Security experts admit that we are living in a new era of terrorism and that the terrorist organization Daesh (ISIS) is its most outstanding example. Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East organized a panel entitled “The Future of ISIS” to discuss Daesh’s legacy including its detainees and returnees, and strategies against a potential resurgence of the group in Iraq and Syria. The experts that participated in the panel discussed their views on the future of the terror group.

When Daesh jihadists declared the foundation of a so-called Islamic State in 2014, a battle between the Salafist-jihadi group and Al-Qaeda members broke out. According to Mohammed Abu Rumman, a Jordanian scholar and former Minister of Culture and Youth, the fight between the two extended all across the world, starting from Iraq and Syria and later crossing over to Yemen, Afghanistan, and North Africa. This included various Salafist jihadists some of whom affiliated themselves with Daesh while others felt closer to Al-Qaeda. According to Abu Rumman, even though both organizations have lost some of their influence, the fight and competition between them remains and is likely to continue in the future.

Daesh tried to build a strategy and ideology in Iraq, Syria, and other regions by branding itself a representative of Sunni communities. On the contrary, Al-Qaeda is more concerned with its struggle against globalization and its relationship with the United States, its “distant enemy.” According to Abu Rumman, the future of Daesh can’t be discussed without understanding the situations in Iraq, Syria, and Al-Qaeda together.

No Chance of an Insurgency in Iraq and Syria

According to Mara Revkin, a fellow at Georgetown Law’s Center on National Security and the Law, as a terrorist organization Daesh has few chances of staging a successful insurgency in Syria and Iraq. In order to survive, terrorist organizations must secure a political ground and economic resources for sustainable financing. Revkin explained that Daesh has neither political nor economic support.

The loss of its “caliphate” in Syria and Iraq was interpreted as a huge blow to the organization.

The loss of its “caliphate” in Syria and Iraq was interpreted as a huge blow to the organization. The group forfeited its technological bases and the territories it controlled, which were perceived as key areas for its continued presence. At the moment, this transnational terrorist group has been hindered from spreading violence and the changing dynamics have deprived the group of political and economic backing. Thus, the organization’s propaganda capacity has been doomed to fail.

Its limited activities, its internet and social media strategies, and losing its “caliphate,” turned the group into an underground organization and shifted its future plans. Abu Rumman noted that losses on the ground translate into a reduced presence on social media platforms, which are terrorist groups’ prime recruiting ground. A great contribution to this development was the declaration by the two social media giants, Twitter and Facebook, that they would not tolerate discourses encouraging violence on their platforms.

The Future of Daesh

The future of Daesh, in light of its ideology and presence in Syria and Iraq, is uncertain. Daesh lost all its strength including the local population’s support. Borzou Daragahi, a journalist and senior non-resident fellow at the Atlantic Council, argued during the seminar that their recruitment attempts constantly fail as the group has lost its legitimacy in the eyes of the local population, which stays away from the group.

In the future, it is less likely that Daesh will reorganize itself and establish strongholds in Syria and Iraq as it did in the past. The international community’s united fight against the terror group has effectively rendered a potential upsurge by Daesh impossible. This global effort is an exemplary case of  a global collaboration against a terrorist group.

Daesh (ISIS) violence has returned to Iraq and has started yet again to threaten the country’s stability. A couple of suicide bombings in central Baghdad on January 21, 2021, in which dozens of civilians were killed and wounded, made this clear.

The suicide bombings took place in the crowded Tayaran Square, a popular marketplace. The first suicide bomber pretended to feel ill and when people gathered around him, he blew himself up. After the first explosion, people gathered again to help the victims and then a second suicide bomber blew himself up, killing more people mercilessly.

The initial scenes bore the fingerprints of the terror group Daesh: It sends suicide bombers to blow themselves up amid innocent people. It is a shameful tactic they do not shy away from.

Baghdad has witnessed intense security deployment since December 2020 with al-Kazemi’s government trying to show its security might. Yet military checkpoints couldn’t prevent security breaches, some of which were aggressive and had major political and security repercussions for the country.

Daesh wanted to send several messages by this attack in a critical location and at an important moment. One message was to their supporters to let them know that the “Islamic State” still exists and is alive and kicking. Another message was meant for Daesh’s enemies to notify them that Daesh still poses a major security threat and is capable of targeting vital areas.

The announcement of the defeat of the “Islamic State” and the elimination of its political project by the end of 2017 wasn’t enough. There is a certain confusion surrounding the understanding of the project of the “Caliphate” and there is an underestimation of the strength of the organization, which makes Daesh capable of quickly adapting to field developments. Daesh enjoys a great deal of flexibility which allows it to shift its approach, and it has a decentralized leadership which allows the group to carry out various attacks in many areas in Iraq and Syria.

Daesh Moves Its Terror to the City

The suicide attacks against civilians show that Daesh has moved to another stage in which it uses its military tactics in a strategic way and based on the notion of “terror in cities.” This means carrying out two suicide attacks in the same place to inflict the highest number of casualties, or sending car bombs, or both. This approach is considered a key part of Daesh’s strategy to create sectarian tension and provoke reprisals between Shiites and Sunnis. The recent bombings confirm that Daesh may be preparing a lot of surprises in the near future.

Daesh’s return to the Iraqi scene was not surprising. The local causes and conditions that led to its emergence are still present, and are conducive to its return. Moreover, these reasons multiplied due to the continuation of political chaos and the complex regional conflict.

One can accept that security weaknesses can occur in any country in the world, including countries with effective security services. However, the repetition of the same security breaches in Iraq over and over again costs the country enormous human and material losses.

Suicide bombings didn’t recommence in Iraq purely due to the lack of efficiency in the security and military apparatuses, but rather there is a set of political reasons behind this development and as a result, the Iraqi security institutions were unable to perform their tasks efficiently.

Iraqi political parties made use of suicide bombings in an attempt to obtain popular support or used suicide bombings against political opponents, whether in a local or regional context.

Political conflicts make decision-makers lose their ability to implement proper measures due to the lack of a clear vision and external influence on the political decision-making process. For instance, the dialogue between Iraq and the U.S. was meant to bring good results, but the rejection of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq led to a clash of the U.S. and Iraqi policies.

The political parties made use of suicide bombings in an attempt to obtain popular support or used suicide bombings against political opponents, whether in a local or regional context.

As Daesh claimed responsibility for the recent suicide bombings, pro-Iran politicians rushed to make statements that both suicide bombers were Saudi nationals. Meanwhile, certain media circulated allegations that the suicide bombers were from the city of Mosul, which was also incorrect.

In fact, the politicization of the terrorist attacks and sectarian polarization serve the very goal that Daesh seeks.

When it comes to the role of the Iraqi government in combating suicide bombings, we see that political leaders are not serious enough to employ a comprehensive security strategy in confronting this type of terror attacks. This is due to a structural defect and a dysfunction within the Iraqi security services.

There is a lack of centralization in the decision-making when it comes to security issues arising from the conflict between government security agencies and irregular forces operating outside the state control. There is also a lack of intelligence sharing which weakens the ability of preempting threats.

Despite all the above, the Iraqi government’s intelligence services detected the plan of the twin suicide bombings in central Baghdad two months before it took place. However, those in charge of security did not take the information seriously.

The spokesperson for the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Iraq, Major General Yahya Rasool, stated that “the suicide bombers detonated themselves while being pursued by the security forces.” This is another piece of evidence that testifies to the lack of security that enabled the suicide bombers to reach deep into Baghdad without being stopped.

The most important question is how this impacts the political scene in Iraq. Suicide bombings came after the government’s announcement of postponing the parliamentary elections to October 10, 2021, to give the authorities more time to register voters and new parties.