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mid the continuously shifting geopolitics of the Balkans, an unprecedented call has been sounded by the leaders of Germany, France, and Italy, urging Serbia to “deliver on de-facto recognition” of Kosovo. This unified front presents a profound shift in the EU’s stance on the Kosovo issue and may have profound implications for the future of the region.

Kosovo proclaimed its independence from Serbia in 2008. However, Serbia has refused to recognize this claim, viewing Kosovo as an integral part of its territory. The international community has remained divided on this issue.

While a significant number of countries have acknowledged Kosovo’s sovereignty, several others, including Russia and China, have sided with Serbia in not recognizing the Balkan state.

Unprecedented move by the European Power Trio

This latest development is underlined by a joint statement from French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni. The trio’s call pushes Serbia towards recognizing Kosovo’s independence and is set against the backdrop of recent violent skirmishes, further aggravating concerns of renewed conflict in the Balkans.

The spotlight, for now, seems to be focused predominantly on northern Kosovo, where ethnic Serbs are in the majority. Tensions have escalated to alarming proportions, leading to a series of violent confrontations in recent months. The gravity of the situation is further highlighted by reports suggesting that the UK has dispatched troops to the region as part of a NATO peacekeeping initiative.

A call for mutual progress and reciprocity

While the call for recognition is paramount, the European leaders also emphasized the significance of swift execution of the Path to Normalization Agreement. Initiated in Brussels, this agreement envisages a framework for enhancing relations between the two Balkan states. The emphasis on ‘something for something’ – a principle suggesting mutual benefits and obligations – was clear in their message.

For President Aleksandar Vucic of Serbia, this puts him squarely in a dilemma. Historically, Vucic has been vocal about Serbia neither formally nor informally recognizing Kosovo. However, the renewed international pressure may force a reconsideration.

On the other side, Kosovo, under Prime Minister Albin Kurti, is expected to advance the creation of the Association of Serb Majority Municipalities, enhancing self-governance for local Serbs. This has been a long-standing demand and will be a significant step toward appeasing concerns and initiating reconciliation.

Future prospects for the Balkans and the EU

Both Serbia and Kosovo harbor aspirations of joining the European Union. The normalization of their bilateral ties is crucial to this objective. The EU has always stipulated that the two Balkan countries must amicably resolve their differences before they are considered for membership.

Europe has always been watchful of the Balkans, primarily due to the volatile history of the region. The EU’s role in mediating discussions between Serbia and Kosovo has spanned several years. However, with recent tensions threatening to spiral out of control, there has been a noticeable increase in engagement from major European nations.

Economic and political advantages await Serbia and Kosovo should they decide to heed the call from the European trio. EU integration promises not just political stability, but also a plethora of economic benefits. The message from the leaders hints at these potential windfalls, emphasizing the opportunities both nations stand to lose if the normalization process derails.

The statement from the leaders of France, Germany, and Italy can be seen as a watershed moment in the EU’s handling of the Serbia-Kosovo conundrum. Their unified call for recognition and mutual progress signals a clear direction for both nations. As both Serbia and Kosovo ponder their next moves, the international community awaits with bated breath, hoping for a peaceful and constructive outcome in this long-standing geopolitical puzzle.

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n March 23, EU Foreign Policy Chief Josep Borrell made an appeal to Serbia and Kosovo to fulfil all provisions of the EU-backed deal reached on March 18 between the two countries.

“The deal was agreed, it has to be implemented, and there is no room for picking and choosing,” the EU’s chief diplomat told journalists en route to the EU leaders’ summit in Brussels.

The Serbia-Kosovo dispute

Kosovo proclaimed its independence on February 17, 2008 in the wake of a war that ended Serbian rule with NATO intervention.

Most UN member states, including the U.S., UK, France, Germany, and Turkey, have recognized Kosovo’s independence.

However, Serbia does not recognize Kosovo and still views it as an integral part of its territory.

What is the deal about?

According to the deal, Serbia would not explicitly recognize Kosovo, but it would have to recognize official documents such as license plates, custom stamps, diplomas, and passports, and stop lobbying against Kosovo’s admission into international bodies.

Serbia has hitherto counted on its ally Russia, a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, and other countries that do not recognize Kosovo, to block its neighbor’s entrance to the UN.

Parties to the deal would also inaugurate offices in their respective capitals. In exchange, the Serbian minority in Kosovo would be allowed to form an association of Serbian municipalities, amounting to self-governance.

The deal was reached on February 27, 2023, in Brussels. An annex on the implementation of the deal was agreed upon on March 18, 2023 in Ohrid.

As per the annex, the EU committed itself to organizing a donor conference within 150 days to establish an investment and financial aid package for Serbia and Kosovo.

Many countries, including the U.S., UAE, and Turkey, and the EU welcomed the agreement to normalize relations.

Following talks

After talks in Ohrid, Serbian president Aleksandar Vučić told reporters that despite some areas of lingering disagreements, they had a decent conversation.

Vučić pointed out that they have reached a “sort of” agreement on implementing the deal, and that his country’s membership will be conditioned on the enforcement of the deal.

For his part, Kosovo’s prime minister Albin Kurti said the deal meant a de facto recognition of Kosovo.

Borrell said the EU will demand in the strongest terms that both countries abide by the deal if they wish to join the bloc.

Belgrade-Pristina dialogue

The EU initiated the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue in 2011 with a view of reaching a mutually acceptable solution for disputes between Serbia and Kosovo.

After border tensions in North Kosovo broke out last summer, Miroslav Lajčák, the EU special representative for the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue, submitted the EU’s recent blueprint for normalization in September 2022.

The normalization of relations between the two neighbors is set as a precondition by the EU before integration into the bloc.

Austria: No alternatives

At a joint press conference with Serbian foreign minister Ivica Dačić in Vienna on March 22, Austrian foreign minister Alexander Schallenberg stressed that there are no alternatives to the normalization agreement between Belgrade and Pristina and that the agreement was fully supported by the EU and the U.S.

Dačić indicated that the agreement did not imply a Serbian recognition of Kosovo and that his country will never let Kosovo into international organizations.

However, in a speech he delivered to the national parliament on March 23, Kosovar PM Kurti said that Kosovo has received guarantees from the U.S. and the EU on the implementation of the agreement to normalize relations.

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urkey’s influence in the Balkans needs to be examined in parallel with the question of how Ankara has become a reliable actor in the region. Here, one should point to the cultural and humanitarian diplomacy, which stands out as one of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) important foreign policy pillars. This doctrine has been at the forefront of the Turkish government’s vision for the Balkans.

In recent political history, Turkey-Balkans relations have been multidimensional and multilayered. While the Balkans have been a politically fragmented and economically fragile region, which was regarded by Europe as “other,” the religious, cultural, and ethnic ties of the region with Turkey, on the other hand, bestowed a unique dimension to Turkey’s relations with the Balkans.

What determines the Western perception of the Balkans is twofold: the Balkans’ overwhelmingly Orthodox Christian population and the long centuries under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. The Balkans have also had varieties of their own internal otherization problems. Dramatic ethnic conflicts took place after the disintegration of Yugoslavia, where Serbs forced the Muslim masses to assimilate through an ethnic genocide policy that resulted in the Bosnia and Kosovo Wars.

Turkey’s approach to the Balkans

The Balkans as a term in Europe largely signifies ethnic conflicts and regional rivalries of great powers. Due to its high geostrategic position, the Balkans fell victim to the great powers’ policies of disintegration and subjugation during the 1990s. Thus, the term “Balkanization” is widely used in English-language International Relations literature to refer to places which are inundated with conflict and instability.

Turkey, contrary to the major powers’ interest-ridden approach to the Balkans, initiated a refined foreign policy based on cultural and historical ties to foster socioeconomic, sociocultural, and eventually political-economic relations. Ankara took proactive steps in cooperation with capitals in the Balkans, and strengthened relations through mutually beneficial economic development projects, increasing trade volume and human capital, and providing educational opportunities.

Turkey’s official Balkan policy rests on the following four principles: high-level political dialogue; security for all; high economic integration; and protection of the region’s multi-ethnic, multicultural, and multireligious social structures.

Turkey is a balancing actor in the Balkans

During President Erdoğan’s visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro in September 2021, Milorad Dodik, an Orthodox Serbian nationalist and Serbian member of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidential Council, said that the countries of the European Union did nothing for Bosnia and Herzegovina, while Erdoğan did, and, for this, he should be accepted as a reliable person for the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

On another occasion, in January 2022, Dodik stated that the security and political future of Bosnia and Herzegovina depend on a dialogue of local politicians such as Serbian President Vučić and Croatian President Milanović with the support of Turkish President Erdoğan. Again, in January 2022, Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama described President Erdoğan as “a person who does what he says and says what he does” both for Albania and regional peace, development, and stability.

This is also indicative of another EU politics impasse. The rising far-right populism in EU countries, the lack of an all-encompassing political will, vision and determination, and leadership issues all narrow Europe’s view of the Balkans. This negative course causes reactions and suspicion towards European politics in the eyes of the Balkan political and bureaucratic elites and societies at large.

EU enlargement

All the above are reflected well in recent studies. The Eurobarometer survey, for example, reveals that 52% of the EU population is against enlargement. The rate is 62% in the Netherlands, 58% in France, and 57% in Germany. We can highlight here that France, Denmark, and the Netherlands constantly undermine Albania’s EU membership process.

Albanian PM Rama’s reaction to this situation shows the distrust that lies therein. Rama stated, “Albania will not cry at the door of Europe.” Likewise, the sense of distrust and disunity in Europe during the global pandemic is perhaps best encapsulated in Serbian President Vučić’s words: “European solidarity is a fairy tale.”

In comparison to the grey picture of Europe-Balkans relations, recent public opinion polls in the Balkans indicate a rising interest in Turkey. According to a study by the European Council on Foreign Relations in August 2021, for Serbia, Turkey is the third country to be trusted after Russia and China. The cooperation and trust relationship that Turkey has developed with Balkan countries by resting on its soft power in the last twenty years is of key importance.

The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB), the Yunus Emre Institute, the Maarif Foundation, the Turkish Red Crescent, the Turkish Religious Foundation, and various NGOs and international higher education institutions have played major roles in this.

Tensions between Serbia and Kosovo have returned to the forefront after on June 29 the authorities in Pristina announced their decision to impose a ban on cars with Serbian license plates crossing the Kosovo border. Following the violent reaction of ethnic Serbs living on Kosovo’s border, the Kosovo government has postponed the implementation of the order until September 1, 2022.

What is happening on the border?

New regulations proposed by the Kosovo government, which does not recognize identity cards and license plates held by Serbian citizens in Kosovar territory, escalated the tension between the two countries.

According to the new regulations, the owners of vehicles with the license plates “PR (Priština)”, “KM (Kosovska Mitrovica”, “PZ (Prizen)”, “GL (Gjilan)”, “UR (Uroševac)”, “PE (Peja)”, and “DA (Đakovica)”, which were issued by Serbia from June 10, 1999 to April 21, 2022 would have to get “RKS (Republic of Kosovo)” plates until September 30, 2022. This means that Serbian citizens entering Kosovar territory will be required to replace their license plates and personal identification cards with the new documents issued by Kosovar authorities.

As a response, ethnic Serb protesters living in the north of Kosovo blocked the access to two border crossings with Serbia on Sunday, July 31.

Serbia has been applying the same rule on IDs issued by the Kosovo government since 2011. Pristina reiterated its willingness to lift the restrictions if the Serbian government takes the necessary steps, but the proposal has been repeatedly rejected. This is due to the fact that Serbia does not recognize Kosovo’s self-declared independence.

As a preventative measure, the NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo (KFOR) stated that the troops are ready to intervene in Kosovo “if the stability is jeopardized,” in accordance with Resolution 1244 by the United Nations Security Council, which was issued in 1999.

Since the Kosovo War in 1999, security in Kosovo has been provided by KFOR in line with the United Nations Security Council Article 1244 on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia in 2008, a decade after the NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999. However, Serbia continues to view its former province as a part of the Serbian territory.

In 2013, Serbia and Kosovo initiated a reconciliation dialogue sponsored by the European Union to resolve ongoing issues between the two countries, but little progress has been made since then.

Path to independence?

Since its declaration of independence from Serbia on February 17, 2008, Kosovo has been officially recognized by 117 states, including the U.S. and most of the EU member states. Despite the initiations for UN membership, two permanent veto-wielding members, Russia and China, blocked the requests for membership by Pristina.

Although Kosovo, which was part of the Federal Republic of Serbia before the dissolution of Yugoslavia, was granted major autonomy in 1974 Constitution of Yugoslavia, this decision was overturned in 1989 by Serbian nationalist president Slobodan Milošević.

Kosovo’s autonomy was revoked during Milošević‘s presidency, bringing it under the direct control of Belgrade.

With the disintegration of Yugoslavia, Kosovo Albanians became uneasy with the rising Serbian nationalism and laid the foundations of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which later played a crucial role in the country’s independence.

After a decade of unrest, the conflict between the Serbian government and Kosovar separatists heightened in 1998. Over 13,000 Kosovars and more than 8,000 Albanians were killed in the war, and thousands were forced to leave their homes.

The attacks of the Serbian forces in Kosovo came to an end with the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia as a result of the operation that started on March 24, 1999, and lasted for 78 days.

Kosovo-Serbia dialogue

Tensions between Belgrade and Pristina have been simmering for over two decades due to the unresolved Kosovo conflict, which began in 1999, when the province gained de facto autonomy after the NATO campaign against former Yugoslavia.

In 2011, the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue process began for the first time under the mediation of the EU to improve relations between Kosovo and Serbia and ultimately recognize Kosovo’s autonomous status.

In April 2013, the EU-led talks between the two countries reached a historic agreement in Brussels, in which Serbia did not recognize the autonomous status of Kosovo yet partially agreed to Kosovo being governed as a sovereign state.

However, in practice, the terms of the agreement remained ambiguous, and the process came to a standstill after facing several setbacks.

The EU has been trying to mediate between Belgrade and Pristina since 2013. Yet, Belgrade and Pristina’s decade-long history of ethnic conflict frequently forestalled the reconciliation process.

After Kosovan authorities decided to postpone the new ID and license plate requirements to September 1, protesters removed the barricades that blocked the two crossings at the Serbian border.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine will have a tremendous impact on all European countries. Nations that are heavily dependent on Russian energy are expected to suffer particularly hard if the Kremlin, for whatever reason, eventually halts gas supplies to Europe. What will be the implications of the Russo-Ukrainian war in the Balkans?

Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian refugees have already entered the European Union. It is believed that more than seven million people will soon be forced to leave the war-torn country and go westward. Not all of them are expected to stay in the EU member states. According to reports, a few hundred displaced people from Ukraine have already arrived in Serbia – a Balkan nation that played a significant role during the 2015-2017 migrant and refugee crisis. The country’s officials estimate that the southeastern European country will eventually host more than 10,000 refugees from Ukraine.

Serbia, as well as other Balkan nations, is facing a large-scale emigration and brain drain. A significant influx of refugees from Ukraine could potentially reduce the consequence of a mass exodus that the so-called Western Balkans has been witnessing for years. It is highly uncertain, however, if displaced Ukrainian citizens have a desire to settle permanently in the region, or if they see the Balkans only as a temporarily shelter from the tragic events in Ukraine.

Politically, all Balkan nations that are not members of the European Union have already voiced their support for Ukraine’s territorially integrity, either voluntarily or under pressure from Brussels. The only country that has still not imposed any sanctions on the Russian Federation is Serbia. Moreover, to this day, Air Serbia continues to fly to Russia, being one of a few European carriers allowed to operate in Russian airspace.

Belgrade relies on Russia for its energy needs, and has developed close political relations with Moscow. At the same time, there are reports suggesting that the EU is demanding that Serbia immediately harmonize its foreign policy with that of Brussels, which means joining anti-Russian sanctions.

“Serbia is in an exceptionally difficult situation, there is less understanding than ever for the position of our nation. We are facing huge pressure,” said the country’s president Aleksandar Vučić.

In reality, Russian political and economic influence in the Balkans is not nearly as strong as many Western pundits tend to portray it. The Kremlin effectively controls sections of Serbia’s and Bosnia’s energy sectors. Russia’s Zarubezhneft owns oil refineries in the towns of Brod and Modriča in Republika Srpska – one of two entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina – while Russian state-owned energy giant Gazprom owns 51 percent of shares in Serbia’s NIS (Petroleum Industry of Serbia). In addition, in December 2021, NIS became the major shareholder in Serbia’s leading petrochemicals producer, HIP Petrohemija.

The problem for the Balkans is that many countries in the region remain heavily dependent on Russian energy.

Until recently, Russia’s Sberbank was operating in both Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, but on February 28, the banking agencies of Bosnia’s two entities took control of the two local Sberbank subsidiaries. On the very same day, Serbian AIK Bank completed the process of acquisition of Sberbank Serbia, which will additionally reduce Russian economic presence in the region.

The problem for the Balkans, however, is that many countries in the region remain heavily dependent on Russian energy. Serbia, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and North Macedonia are reportedly 100 percent dependent on Russian natural gas. Croatia, on the other hand, has been purchasing liquefied natural gas from other producers – namely the United States, Nigeria, and Qatar – which to a certain extent could play a role in the process of cutting reliance on Russian energy.

However, the war in Ukraine could have an impact on a deal that Gazprom signed with Croatia and Hungary on deliveries of natural gas via the TurkStream pipeline. In other words, if the conflict in Ukraine turns into a wider “energy war” between Russia and the West, and Moscow eventually stops selling gas to Europe – be it as a potential retaliation to the anti-Western sanctions, or as a result of the EU’s potential decision to stop buying Russian gas – the Balkan countries will undoubtedly face severe disruptions in energy supplies.

In November, Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to peg Serbia’s current gas price of $270 until May. But after that, if Serbia joins anti-Russian sanctions, the country will unlikely be able to purchase natural gas from Russia below the market price, which is currently above $3,000 per thousand cubic meters, and has reached its historic maximum. In the short term, it will be very difficult, if not impossible, for Balkan and other European countries to find an alternative to the Russian energy, which means that blackouts in Europe could eventually become a norm.

For now, both Russia and the EU are expected to refrain from such radical actions, given their mutual energy dependence. Politically, however, the process of “decoupling” between Moscow and the West has already gone very far, and sooner or later, all Balkan countries will likely find themselves on the western side of a new Iron Curtain.

People have migrated throughout history in search of basic resources and better living conditions. According to Francis Fukuyama, after the catastrophic world wars and the collapse of communism, the liberal democratic bloc declared itself victorious and idealism was born prophesizing that state boundaries would disappear and economies would be integrated.

Alas, no great war was in sight! However, this peaceful world vision developed a boil and a new wave of unprecedented global immigration emerged. As liberalism offered a perpetual peace, Europe, the most important representative of this theory in practice, became a top destination for emigrants who are in search of a better life. The EU has become one of the largest recipients of emigrants starting from the nearby Balkans.

Indeed, it is very difficult to account for a single reason that triggers migration from the Balkans. Reasons vary and combine economic, environmental, political, and social factors. However, generally, the academic literature on emigration studies underlines the economic reason as the primary and dominant push factor.

Migration comes along with a brain drain as the skilled labor force of poor countries gets poorer due to economic and political conditions and emigrates to richer countries for higher pay. Currently, Western Balkan countries and specifically Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Serbia are losing their well-educated youth.

According to Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Youth Studies, in 2018, one third of young people from the Western Balkans expressed a “strong” or a “very strong” desire to emigrate from their countries, ranging from 26% in Montenegro, 27% in Bosnia, 30% in Serbia, 34% in Kosovo, 35% in North Macedonia, and 43% in Albania. These figures are even higher in some other studies.

A population loss

The emigration from the Balkans is considered a permanent one. Balkan countries are now in jeopardy of losing a substantial portion of their population density and their demographic characteristics.

Migration has a very general effect on the Balkans. Economically, if the shortage of qualified workers continues, it will discourage foreign investments and directly affecting the GDPs of Balkan countries. Critical industries may not be able to find qualified staff, especially the health sector. Politically, emigrants are mostly young and educated, and don’t give credit to the old-fashioned political clichés and the incapable political leaderships, which hide behind nationalist rhetoric.

Migration from the Balkans in numbers

According to the Institute of Statistics (INSTAT) of Albania, there have been  around 400,000 emigrants between 2011 and 2020. According to Hurriyet Daily, about 1.7 million, roughly 37% of the population, has left the country in the past 30 years.

Currently, the Albanian population is 2,837,740 and the primary destinations of emigration are Italy and Greece. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Albania ranks 4th globally in the emigration of a skilled labor force and most youth dream of a future abroad.

Additionally, some officials and researchers don’t trust KAS numbers. According to them, KAS estimates are lower and the real numbers are higher. Also, interestingly, between 2014 and 2015, around 100,000 Kosovars emigrated to the EU, a massive emigration wave that was dismissed by the government of Kosovo at that time. The number of emigrants in 2019 was 34,911, and the chief destinations were Germany, Switzerland, Italy, and Austria.

It is hard to find an accurate data on Montenegrin emigration. According to data by the United Nations, in 2015 the population of Montenegro was 625,781. Additionally, based on UN statistics, the overall number of Montenegrin immigrants worldwide increased from 148,982 in 2010 to 153,009 in 2019. Germany receives the highest number of Montenegrin immigrants, and Italy and Luxemburg were among the most popular countries. However, in recent years, preferences have changed and intraregional migration has become more popular, especially to former Yugoslav states such as Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia due to the proximity and cultural similarities.

Lastly, the current population of Serbia is around 6,908,220. The UN estimated that emigrants from Serbia in 2017 reached nearly one million at a rate of between 30,000 and 60,000 a year since the breakup of Yugoslavia. The main destinations of Serbs are Austria, Germany, and Switzerland.

Urgent need to end brain drain

Can a common solution be found for the continuous emigration waves from the Balkans? First of all, the European Union should seriously step in and provide financial support in finding an applicable policy. Since the EU opened up for skilled labor from non-EU countries, it is partly responsible and should take responsibility for the brain drain in the Western Balkans.

Especially Germany, Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, and Switzerland should share the burden as they have benefitted the most. If the necessary precautions are not taken, Balkan countries will lose their youth and enthusiasm, and will end up empty villages within the so-called global village.

What is more, Western Balkan countries need to improve their databases on emigration. This is crucial to understanding the situation on the ground in order to formulate and recommend proper policies. Regular assessment is a must in line with accurate data and monitoring mechanisms.

The Western Balkan governments have to reverse this brain drain and encourage the sustainable return and placement of skilled emigrants in developing sectors such as IT, digitalization, robotics, design, etc. Countries could follow the example of Croatia.

Kosovars are used to early parliamentary elections. Snap elections have become the rule of political life in the country as no single government has been able to complete its full four-year term in office since the country declared its independence from Serbia on February 17, 2008.

However, there are good prospects that things might change after the upcoming early elections set to be held three days before the thirteenth anniversary of the country’s independence. It is widely expected that the coalition formed by the socialist opposition party Self-determination Movement (Lëvizja Vetëvendosje LVV) and by a civic movement led by the acting President Vjosa Osmani (Albanian: LVV-Guxo) (English LVV-Dare Coalition) will emerge victorious by a wide margin.

Indeed, according to three recent polls, support for the LVV-Guxo coalition hovers around 41-46%, which would translate into 50-56 of the total 120 seats of the Kosovo parliament. Provided that it also gets the support of the ten seats reserved in the constitution for the non-Serbian minorities (Ashkali, Bosnian, Egyptian, Roma, and Turks), in practice, this means that for the first time since independence a mainstream Kosovar party will be able to form a government without the support of another mainstream party.

The importance of this potential development for Kosovo cannot be overstated as a (quasi) single-party government can  bring forth a long-awaited political stability that is indispensable for domestic institutional building, advancing reciprocity in negotiations with Serbia, and last but not least, implementing a more coherent and uniform plan in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic.

Explaining LVV’s unusually high popularity

The unusually high degree of support for the LVV-Guxo coalition stems from two interrelated factors. First, the coalition’s popularity is connected to the plummeting legitimacy of the other three mainstream Kosovar parties.

As a direct impact of this flagrant mismanagement, Kosovo, having the youngest population in Europe, suffers one of the heaviest demographic hemorrhages in the region with Kosovars leaving their country in search of a better life in Europe and across the Atlantic.

Both the incumbent Democratic League of Kosovo (Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës, LDK) and the two parties that came out of the insurgent Kosovo Liberation Army (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës UÇK), namely the former President and Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi’s Democratic Party of Kosovo (Partia Demokratike e Kosovës, PDK) and the former Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj’s Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (Aleanca për Ardhmërine e Kosovës AAK), have ruled Kosovo together for two decades and have utterly failed to deliver any genuine and substantial reforms to the country.

They are now widely perceived as having used their glorious origins – the LDK being the party of the great Kosovar leader Ibrahim Rugova and the PDK/AAK being the successors of the rebel organization (UÇK) that fought for Kosovo’s independence – for merely “investing” in rampant state institutions , corruption, and organized crime.

As a direct impact of this flagrant mismanagement, Kosovo, having the youngest population in Europe, suffers one of the heaviest demographic hemorrhages in the region with Kosovars leaving their country in search of a better life in Europe and across the Atlantic.

This is why the charges coupled with the LVV’s main electoral message that pledges institutional reforms and to fight against corruption and organized crime resonated the most with the Kosovar public, and especially with the youth. In a sense, Kosovars want to dislodge “the old parties” from power and to give a chance to a party that has never ruled before.

Once the reformist Albin Kurti, the LVV’s leader, took over as prime minister in February 2020, he was not allowed to rule for more than 50 days.

A second and a more short-term reason for the unusually high popularity of the LVV-Guxo coalition is that the LVV is perceived as the only party that genuinely stands against the external engineering of Kosovo’s politics. The LVV emerged victorious from the October 2019 snap elections (winning 26% of the national vote), and after four months of political wrangling succeeded in striking a deal with the LDK for a coalition government.

However, once the reformist Albin Kurti, the LVV’s leader, took over as prime minister in February 2020, he was not allowed to rule for more than 50 days as his government was brought down in a no-confidence vote in parliament. The vote was initiated by Kurti’s coalition partner LDK, after overt pressure from the U.S. Embassy in Kosovo. Meanwhile, all this drama occurred in the midst of the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Serbia Factor in the Kosovo Early Elections

Kurti’s government was brought down simply because it stood in the way of then U.S. President Donald Trump’s plan to stage a largely theatrical “economic normalization agreement” between Belgrade and Pristina in the White House. The subsequent LDK-led coalition government of Prime Minister Avdullah Hoti was largely seen as a puppet government, not least because it was a minority government supported by the Serb List, the hegemonic Serbian minority party in Kosovo that is totally subservient to Belgrade and does not recognize Kosovo’s independent statehood.

Hence, LVV’s popularity stems from its position of “self-determination” (as the party’s name itself declares) and opposition to external intervention. However, given the  popularity the U.S. enjoys in Kosovo as the country that offered the greatest support to Kosovars’ efforts for independence from Serbia, perhaps the strongest political weapon of the LDK/PDK/AAK in these elections is their consistent accusations that the LVV is “anti-American.”

Kosovo’s “old parties” are also using the “anti-American” accusation to present the LVV to Brussels and, especially, to Washington as not being subservient to their directives. In this manner, they seek to win the backing of both the U.S. and the EU. Such a thesis undoubtedly strikes a chord with Brussels and Washington given the LVV’s and its leader Albin Kurti’s rebellious past. In the past, Kurti even denounced the UN-prepared Ahtisaari Plan that became the basis for Kosovo’s independence, contending that it violates Kosovo’s right for self-determination.

Regional Implications of a Potential LVV Victory

If the LVV succeeds in forming a government on its own (with the support of the 10 non-Serbian minority seats), then reciprocity measures will likely be re-imposed in the negotiations with Serbia. What gives further credence to this claim is the leadership change in the White House.

As pointed out by foreign policy analyst Edward Joseph, the Trump administration during its tenure skewed the negotiations notably in favor of Belgrade, forcing Kosovo to make more concessions (most notably agreeing to suspend its efforts to join international organizations). This is why Kurti, who opposed concessions, was removed in March 2020.

Now that Trump is gone, and in light of an imminent LVV electoral victory, greater equity is expected in the negotiations. In reality, however, this does not mean we are heading towards a breakthrough in the Kosovo-Serbia negotiations. To the contrary, negotiations may stall with the LVV in office. Of all Kosovar political elites, Kurti adopts the hardest line towards Belgrade and resolutely opposes any further concessions to Serbia.