S

audi Arabia said on Tuesday that its national security was a “red line” and backed a demand for United Arab Emirates forces to leave Yemen within 24 hours, marking Riyadh’s strongest language yet toward its Gulf ally amid escalating tensions in the war-torn country.

The warning came hours after a Saudi-led coalition carried out an airstrike on the southern Yemeni port of Mukalla, targeting what it described as unauthorized foreign military support for UAE-backed southern separatist forces.

Yemen’s Saudi-backed presidential council head, Rashad al-Alimi, ordered Emirati forces to withdraw and announced the cancellation of a defense pact with the UAE, accusing Abu Dhabi of fueling internal conflict through its support for the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a separatist group seeking autonomy in southern Yemen.

“It has been definitively confirmed that the United Arab Emirates pressured and directed the STC to undermine state authority through military escalation,” Alimi said in a televised address, according to Yemen’s state news agency.

Saudi Arabia urged the UAE to comply with the withdrawal demand. The UAE’s foreign ministry did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

Gulf stock markets fell following the flare-up, reflecting investor concern over rising tensions between the two longtime allies.

Mukalla strike and separatist advance

The Saudi-led coalition said the airstrike on Mukalla port caused no casualties or collateral damage. Two sources told Reuters the strike targeted a dock where cargo from two vessels had been unloaded.

Coalition officials said the ships arrived over the weekend from the UAE port of Fujairah without authorization, disabled their tracking systems, and unloaded weapons and combat vehicles intended to support the STC.

Yemeni state television aired footage showing black smoke rising from the port and burned vehicles in the area.

The STC, backed by the UAE, has recently made significant advances in southern Yemen, breaking years of military stalemate and seizing control of large areas, including parts of the strategic Hadramout province, which borders Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia had warned the STC against further military moves in Hadramout and demanded a withdrawal, a call the group rejected.

Deepening rift among allies

The UAE was part of the Saudi-led coalition fighting Yemen’s Iran-aligned Houthi movement from 2015. Although Abu Dhabi began reducing its troop presence in 2019, it has continued to wield influence through local allied forces, including the STC.

The recent STC offensive has brought Saudi Arabia and the UAE closer to direct confrontation, exposing fractures within the coalition that once fought the Houthis together.

In response to the escalation, Alimi imposed a 72-hour no-fly zone and a sea and land blockade on ports and crossings, with limited exemptions authorized by the coalition.

The STC’s leadership in Hadramout rejected the withdrawal demand, calling the Mukalla strike “a blatant attack on Hadramout and its people,” and described the UAE as an ally that should not be abandoned.

Yemen’s internationally recognized government accused the STC of staging an armed rebellion and serving Houthi interests, while praising Saudi Arabia for acting to prevent eastern Yemen from descending into chaos.

The Houthis continue to control northern Yemen, including the capital Sanaa, while the conflict remains fragmented among rival factions despite years of international efforts to end the war.

(Source: Reuters and Aljazeera)

Regional security perceptions of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) concurred regarding regional crises and wars in the Middle East since the Arab uprisings, making the two countries work hand in hand in the economic and military fields. Cooperation of the Saudi and Emirati decision-makers rose to the occasion  during the 2017 Qatar crisis, the marginalization of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Yemen war against the Houthi militia since 2015, and lobbying activities in the U.S. against the Iran Nuclear Deal.

However, following the latest failure of the OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) negotiations at the beginning of July 2021, growing discord between the two state actors began attracting attention. On July 5, 2021, the OPEC meeting was cancelled without designating a new date. The disagreement emerged over the UAE’s disapproval of extending the oil production cuts from August 2021 to December 2021. However, on July 14, 2021, Saudi Arabia greed with the UAE to have a higher production baseline of 3.65 million barrels a day from April 2022. In return, the UAE side accepted the earlier decision of the OPEC to extend the production cuts until December 2021.

The OPEC crisis came at the same time as Saudi Arabia’s announcement to amend regulations to exclude the import of products made in free zones, which is the primary income of the UAE. Furthermore, the kingdom decided to impose a travel ban and suspended flights to/from the UAE to stop the spread of the Delta variant of the COVID-19 virus. All of these Saudi decisions, which seemed to come at once against the UAE, signaled the change of the threat perceptions of Saudis and Emiratis regarding regional security.

The recent deterioration of the UAE-Saudi relations did not come out of the blue for Saudis. It happened when Saudi decision-makers realized the emerging security realities in the region, which cannot be dealt with only through economic and military cooperation. Notably, after the decision of the UAE to downsize its military in Yemen in May 2018, Saudi Arabia understood that the humanitarian crisis there would fall on the kingdom’s shoulder. Following the OPEC crisis, Saudis and Emiratis adopted a new narrative shaped by the clash of perceptions based on drastic differences over strategic calculations in the regional security.

Following the OPEC crisis, Saudis and Emiratis adopted a new narrative shaped by the clash of perceptions based on drastic differences over strategic calculations in the regional security.

The traditional Saudi foreign policy of putting political and economic conditionalities to its neighbors in order for their relations to continue began to work against the UAE, undermining its image as a regional ally of Saudi Arabia.

The UAE’s elusive regional perceptions, particularly concerning its economy, forced the Saudi decision-makers to develop a multiple-ally perspective through building trust relations with other regional actors like Qatar, Oman, and Iraq. Likewise, Saudi Arabia underlined the “Gulf unity” in the Al-Ula GCC Summit in January 2021, despite the fact that the summit was facilitated by Kuwait and the U.S. as a sign of the kingdom’s intention to reconstruct its international image as a regional actor favoring stability and peace in the region instead of leading regional crises and wars.

The traditional Saudi foreign policy of putting political and economic conditionalities to its neighbors in order for their relations to continue began to work against the UAE, undermining its image as a regional ally of Saudi Arabia. The most recent demand by the latter was to ask international companies based in the Middle East to move their headquarters to Riyadh if they wish to continue their contracts with the Saudi government.

At this point, the impact of Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ) on the domestic and foreign policies of MBS, as well as his access to U.S. decision-making circles, should be noted. As a young prince who spent his life in Riyadh beside his father, King Salman, MBS does not have sufficient diplomatic experience to build relations with international actors.

The threat perception of the UAE decision-makers regarding the tourism sector had been directed to Qatar, particularly after it was selected to host the 2022 World Cup back in December 2010.

Even though MBZ has been the primary supporter of MBS’s development plans as part of their personal relationship, the economic impacts of the pandemic on the UAE’s tourism sector transformed the UAE’s perception of this relationship. Saudi Arabia’s development projects like NEOM, Amaala, AlUla, and the Red Sea projects began threatening the UAE’s regional status of being a tourism and business hub.

The threat perception of the UAE decision-makers regarding the tourism sector had been directed to Qatar, particularly after it was selected to host the 2022 World Cup back in December 2010. During the 2017 Qatar crisis, the UAE successfully influenced the Saudi government to impose an air, sea, and land blockade on Qatar by publicizing the initiative as a Saudi-led intervention.

Overall, backing MBS’s development plans helped MBZ pursue the UAE’s economic and military interests without being the principal responsible actor – instead he led the process from behind the scenes.

The primary area of the divergence in regional interests was in Yemen when the southern separatists backed by the UAE ousted the Saudi-backed Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi’s government from Aden in September 2019. Following this, the UAE downsized its troops in Yemen which left the Saudis alone on the ground and portrayed MBS as the principal architect of the humanitarian crisis of Yemen in the international arena.

The rapidity with which cooperation transformed into a standoff was a lesson concerning the UAE’s regional security policies towards the kingdom for the Saudi government, and particularly for MBS. The policies of the UAE changed, especially when it comes to preserving its economic interests.

The realization by Saudi officials of the UAE’s changing regional security perceptions reconstructed the country’s threat perceptions vis-à-vis the UAE. Accordingly, Saudi Arabia attempted to establish closer ties with Iraq and Oman, to reconciliate with Qatar, and even started a diplomatic dialogue with Iran. As part of its new perspective based on building multiple alliances, Saudi Arabia mentioned establishing a more cordial economic relationship with Oman, like developing an industrial zone in Oman for transporting commodities and goods between two countries.

More significantly, MBS redefined Iran as a respectful neighbor and emphasized the possibility of forging a reconciliation. Since his appointment as the minister of defence of the country in January 2015, MBS has fostered hostile rhetoric towards Iran, such as calling the country extremist, and accusing it of supporting terrorist organizations and interfering in the domestic affairs and stability of countries in the region. In contrast, from the point of view of the UAE, Iran does not constitute a significant concern as it has enormous commercial interests in the country.

The changing tone of MBS’s rhetoric towards Iran demonstrated the kingdom’s intention to decrease the number of its enemies while sending messages to its old or existing allies about the kingdom’s shifting perceptions of regional security dynamics. These shifting perceptions can transform old enemies into possible partners, and vice versa, depending on the commitment of the latter to a mutual understanding of the regional dynamics of the kingdom’s development strategies at home.

Another significant departure in the foreign policies of the Saudis and Emiratis is their threat perception towards the Muslim Brotherhood and their understanding of the regional implications for the normalization process with Israel. Although Saudi Arabia declared the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization in 2014, the kingdom did not perceive it as an existential threat at home.

On the contrary, according to Emirati decision-makers, the Muslim Brotherhood-inspired organizations that adopt political Islam constitute a direct threat to the survival of the Gulf ruling families. To illustrate, the UAE showed a similar concern to the rise of political Islam in Libya by supporting Khalifa Haftar, the commander of the Libya National Army (LNA), with advanced weapons.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE)-Saudi Arabia alliance has been one of the most durable alliances in Middle East politics in the last years. Despite the fact that the two countries have enjoyed strong relations during the past decade, the current form of strategic alliance dates back to 2015 when Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah passed away and Salman bin Abdulaziz came to power. Major players in the alliance have been King Salman’s son Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) and the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ).

The UAE-Saudi alliance involved Egypt and Bahrain over a short period and turned into a political axis. Even though it has many weaknesses, the UAE-Saudi alliance remained solid and somewhat unified in regional and foreign policy issues from Yemen to Libya, the hostility towards Turkey, Iran, and Qatar, and the warming relations with Israel.

Signals of change in Saudi Arabia

Hostility towards Turkey takes the lead in the foreign policy priorities of the axis countries. This situation became more acute following the coup attempt in Turkey in 2016. So much so that it has been debated internationally whether this axis financially supported the coup plotters in Turkey.

During the Riyadh and Abu Dhabi-led blockade against Qatar in 2017, Doha’s cooperation with Turkey was cited as a reason and the two countries stipulated that Turkey’s military base in Qatar needs to be removed. While the UAE-Saudi Arabia axis continued its anti-Turkey policies, it also followed similar policies in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Horn of Africa, Libya, Syria, Iraq, and lately in the Maghreb region.

However, members of this alliance do not have an entirely overlapping motivation in confronting Turkey. Indeed, while the UAE has adopted a stern anti-Turkey position in many respects, Saudi Arabia has demonstrated a somewhat more conciliatory attitude on certain issues than Abu Dhabi. Saudi government officials have different opinions on Turkey and the Saudi has government adopted a softer and warier policy.

Despite divergences, the history of bilateral relations between Saudi Arabia and Turkey shows that the leaderships of both countries have somehow succeeded in protecting the bilateral ties. However, following the assassination of Jamal Khashoggi in Saudi Arabia’s consulate in Istanbul and Turkey’s insistence on bringing those responsible for the murder to justice pushed some actors inside the Saudi government to take a firmer stance against Ankara.

Therefore, the hostility towards Turkey in Saudi Arabia has been local and limited to certain cliques in the Saudi government circles and, hence, should not be generalized to the entire Saudi leadership.

Preparation for the Biden administration?

With Joe Biden winning the 2020 U.S. presidential election, there have been some positive signs by the Saudi government towards Turkey. After the deadly earthquake in Izmir in October 2020, King Salman ordered aid to be sent to Turkey, using the expression “Our brothers in Turkey” – a noted, and important, improvement in bilateral relations. Unlike the UAE, Saudi Arabia was among the first countries to offer condolences to Turkey.

Following this step, a phone call between King Salman and Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan took place before the G-20 Summit, which was held online under the term presidency of Saudi Arabia. The two leaders exchanged views about improving bilateral relations, solving existing problems, and opening the door for dialogue that would further mend ties.

Another indicator was the statements by Prince Faisal bin Farhan, Saudi Arabia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, during a speech, where he stated that the relations with Turkey are “just perfect.” Faisal bin Farhan clarified that the informal boycott against Turkish products in Saudi Arabia was voiced in semi-official sources and argued that there was not even an unofficial boycott of Turkish products.

UAE remains stern against Turkey

Despite the positive developments between Turkey and Saudi Arabia, the UAE strategy towards Turkey does not show any signs of a constructive attitude to date. Even though the Emirati State Minister for Foreign Affairs, Anwar Gargash, made some positive comments on the Turkey-UAE relations, Abu Dhabi has not taken any concrete steps toward Ankara. On the contrary, during the past months, the UAE intensified and strengthened diplomatic relations with Greece, Armenia, and the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC), all of which have problems with Turkey.

UAE officials hosted Armenian President Armen Sarkissian and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, and held talks with them on the development of relations and the protection of common interests. The UAE’s improving relations with Armenia pushed the country to adopt a more pro-Armenian policy in the recent Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the rapport with Greece in the East Mediterranean shows that the UAE targets Turkey when it comes to regional politics.

The cooperation declaration and various agreements signed between Greece and the UAE following the meeting between Mohammed bin Zayed and Kyriakos Mitsotakis indicate that they are not reflections of a responsive policy but rather resonate from  a long-term consensus that could trigger further instability in the region.

The latest UAE attempt was to establish cordial relations with France along with Greece, Armenia, and the GCASC. The UAE supported France’s destabilizing policies in the Eastern Mediterranean, Nagorno-Karabagh, and Libya, and stood against Turkey on all fronts.

Saudi Arabia’s and the UAE’s differing policies toward Turkey are a clear divergence between the alliance. Besides this, both countries are breaking up their partnership over Yemen. Mistrust first surfaced in February 2020, when the UAE withdrew its military presence from Yemen and did not adopt a wholesale aggressive rhetoric against Iran in the region.

The UAE supported France’s destabilizing policies in the Eastern Mediterranean, Nagorno-Karabagh, and Libya, and stood against Turkey on all fronts.

This caused a disturbance in Saudi Arabia and undermined the nature of the alliance. In addition, the UAE’s decision to normalize relations with Israel, pulling Bahrain and Sudan along, substantiated the divergence, caused further discomfort, and attested to the loss of a mutual vision on regional leadership between the two. The UAE’s normalization with Israel increased the pressure on Saudi Arabia.

However, Saudi officials know well that if they sign the normalization deal with Israel, their regional leadership quest will suffer an incurable loss of prestige. The Israeli normalization was another reason Saudi Arabia was disturbed by the UAE.

Given the divergences between the UAE and Saudi Arabia, their formidable alliance seems to be weakening. The UAE has suffered serious damage to its prestige in the eyes of the Arab people for initiating normalization with Israel and this may gradually bring about its isolation in regional politics.

The Saudi–UAE alliance concurrently targeting Turkey, Iran, and Qatar illustrates regional dimensions of rivalry and balance politics. Long before the recent rapprochement between the GCC countries, Saudi Arabia already refrained from a strict boycott on Qatar in 2017 and left the door open for dialogue to solve the political crisis in the Gulf.

However, until recently, the UAE has refused and resisted any dialog concerning the Gulf. Even the Saudi Arabia-initiated normalization with Qatar in early January 2021 was not embraced by the Emirati leadership. Despite Emirati unwillingness, Riyadh was keen on lifting the blockade on Qatar and Abu Dhabi had to follow suit.

Finally, Saudi-UAE divergence on Turkey is another dimension. Turkey’s perspective on the new alliance politics in the MENA region is that it expects the UAE to abandon confrontational language and actions and to adopt a constructive and cooperative attitude. The Turkish government is showing signs that it is willing to give cooperation with the UAE and Egypt a chance similar to the positive approach adopted recently toward Saudi Arabia.

In late December 2020, several of Silicon Valley’s most prominent giants, including Microsoft, Google, GitHub, and LinkedIn, asked to join Facebook’s lawsuit at a U.S. federal court against the infamous Israeli spyware firm NSO Group Technologies (“NSO” stands for Niv, Shalev, and Omri, the company’s founders).

The lawsuit, filed in 2019, seeks unspecified damages and demands that NSO be denied access to Facebook’s services after NSO has used highly sophisticated spyware called “Pegasus” to hack into the phones of at least 1,400 individuals at the request of government officials. This includes politicians, diplomats, activists, journalists, and dissidents, some of whom have been arrested, tortured, or murdered as a consequence.

Such a lawsuit by a U.S. tech giant against an Israeli spyware firm with close ties to the Israeli government is unprecedented. Facebook has been notorious in terms of taking Israel’s side and cracking down on Palestinian content. Facebook has been blocking posts and accounts of Palestinian activists critical of Israel or supportive of the resistance to its occupation, while overlooking Israeli incitement against Palestinians – a 2019 study found that Israelis incite hatred of Arabs on social media once every 66 seconds.

Last May, Facebook even hired a former Israeli government official and censorship expert on its Oversight Board, which determines what content to permit or water down.

The reasons why the social media giant along with the world’s biggest tech companies would suddenly sue a prominent Israeli company is clear: NSO is out of control. Its malicious hacking services, which are virtually unconstrained, have become a major security threat in cyberspace.

Aiding Arab Dictatorships and Brutal Regimes

A few days before other tech giants joined Facebook’s lawsuit last December, the cybersecurity watchdog, Citizen Lab, reported that NSO had hacked into the personal phones of 36 journalists, producers, anchors, and executives at the leading Arab media network Al-Jazeera.

Described as the largest concentration of phone hacks targeting a single organization, this NSO spyware operation was conducted on behalf of the governments of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. It was less than a year after NSO falsely claimed that it will respect human rights and take steps to prevent its tools being used to commit abuses in the future.

NSO’s hack of Al-Jazeera’s phones was merely the latest incident on an extensive list of spyware attacks carried out with impunity by the Israeli firm whose operations are heavily surrounded by secrecy and conducted in the dark. For instance, a 2017 report called “Gobierno Espía” found that NSO stood behind at least 80 hacks between 2015 and 2016 that targeted high-profile Mexican journalists, lawyers, and activists who reported on or campaigned against corruption.

Mansoor’s arrest was shortly after his phone was hacked by NSO on behalf of the UAE’s repressive government, using what’s known as a “zero-day exploit.”

In 2017, an eminent human rights activist in the UAE, Ahmed Mansoor, was arrested by Emirati authorities and sentenced in a sham trial to 10 years in prison on the charge of “using social media platforms to threaten public order.” Ever since, Mansoor has been subjected to brutal treatment, such as denial of medical attention and imprisonment in solitary confinement for inhumanely long periods.

Mansoor’s arrest was shortly after his phone was hacked by NSO on behalf of the UAE’s repressive government, using what’s known as a “zero-day exploit,” a vulnerability unknown to the software owners that hackers can exploit to gain a backdoor access to someone’s device without their knowledge or actions, such as clicking on a spam link.

The Saudi government used NSO’s services to spy on and track the senior Saudi journalist and critic Jamal Khashoggi who was then mercilessly murdered at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in 2018. In the same year, Amnesty International said that NSO was helping the Saudi regime to spy on a member of the organization’s staff.

Amnesty petitioned an Israeli court to revoke NSO’s export license given the damage it is causing; however, the court dismissed the case and argued that Israel’s Ministry of Defense maintains meticulous oversight procedures over defense exports. In October 2019, Facebook took preventative action and blocked the accounts of 100 NSO staff and their families. However, a Tel-Aviv court was quick to order Facebook to unblock some of those accounts.

Netanyahu’s Sacred Cow

So how does NSO wreak havoc freely, unconstrained, and with full impunity? Generally, Israel’s Ministry of Defense claims to maintain stringent criteria for issuing permits for the export of cyber intelligence technologies that come after a strenuous process of extreme vetting. Israel’s defense establishment claims that it then continues to oversee such projects even after a permit is issued. However, NSO is one of a number of cyber firms that get a free pass on their dangerous and destructive exports to repressive regimes.

Israel’s private spyware firms like NSO are the informal arm of Netanyahu’s government that are employed “off the record” to do the dirtiest work , such as espionage and interference in foreign countries. For instance, according to the 2020 report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, an Israeli cyber intelligence firm, called Psy-Group, ran a $2 million voter suppression operation in support of Donald Trump’s 2016 campaign. The operation was paid by George Nader, an advisor to UAE de facto ruler Mohammed bin Zayed.

Similarly, NSO’s criminal and immoral operations have been an Israeli state-sanctioned bridge towards Israeli-Arab normalization with the UAE and Bahrain, two of the firm’s biggest clients. Recently, NSO helped the government of Morocco spy on a prominent Moroccan journalist a few months before official normalization between Israel and Morocco was announced.

Clearly, Israel’s cybersecurity industry is its competitive advantage to maintain relevance and significance in the international arena and gain the favor and support of client governments. However, with Israel unwilling to hold NSO to account, the company has become an unstoppable force of destruction; a tool that bolsters the power and hegemony of some of the world’s most repressive and brutal regimes; and a source of terror to activists who now fear that absolute cyber insecurity will become the region’s new normal.

Facebook’s lawsuit offers a glimmer of hope to stop NSO’s unconstrained assault on the right to privacy and security in cyberspace.

The conflict in Yemen began in September 2014 when the Houthi rebels commenced their gradual, but violent takeover of the capital city Sana’a. This led to a coup that forced President Abdurabbuh Mansour Hadi out to his home town and temporary capital city, Aden in February 2015.

By March, Saudi Arabia formed a military coalition, including the United Arab Emirates, to oust the rebels, restore the government and to bring stability to the region. The coalition became notorious for violating human rights, bombing civilians and destroying vital Yemeni infrastructure.

Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE agree that the Houthis are the main threat to regional security. Despite the rebels’ military capabilities have never been enough to change the balance of power in the region, their strong links to the Iranian regime turns the Houthis into a threat by proxy.

The group, which is based in the northern province of Sa’ada, which borders Saudi Arabia, has the capability to attack major Saudi cities, including Jeddah. Rockets fired from Yemeni territory are regularly intercepted, however in situations where they aren’t, the Houthis are able to inflict damage.

On November 23, 2020, the Houthis claimed responsibility for attacking an Aramco oil company distribution station in the city of Jeddah. Houthi spokesman, Yahya Sarea, warned foreign companies and residents in the neighbouring kingdom, saying they should exercise caution as “operations will continue.”

“The strike was very accurate, and ambulances and fire engines rushed to the target,” Sarea said, explaining that the Houthis used an Iranian-made Quds-2 type winged missile to carry out the attack.

Such attacks not only harm Saudi Arabia, but demoralize the rest of the Gulf Arab countries as weaknesses in their military powerhouse begin to show. Therefore, restoring relative stability and disarming the Houthis in Yemen is paramount to both Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Where differences begin

Whilst Riyadh and Abu Dhabi agree that a stable Yemen is important to regional security, a problem therein lies in what a stable Yemen looks like and where they are able to secure their separate political and economic interests.

The UAE entered the coalition understanding the way in which Aden is significant to Abu Dhabi’s economic and strategic standing in the region. Having a strong presence in Aden means the UAE would have the luxury of the Bab al-Mandab strait, along with easier access to the Indian Ocean and more control over the Red Sea.

Spreading its sphere of influence to the Socotra Island means the UAE would be able to strengthen its commercial and military projection in the Indian Ocean, as it has shown interest through quietly pumping investment into the island and arming secessionists.

The southern separatists seek renewed independence for southern Yemen, which was ruled as a separate state until 1990.

The UAE also heavily backed local resistance forces in Aden and other parts of the southern regions to liberate them from the Houthis. However, areas from the northern areas such as Taiz, which has a reputation for being a Muslim Brotherhood stronghold, did not receive as much help from the UAE, despite it being besieged by the Houthi rebels.

On August 6, 2019, two fighters from the UAE-backed Southern Security Belt were killed during clashes with pro-Hadi government forces. A day later, the STC deputy leader, Hani bin Breik, marched on the Maasheeq Palace in Aden and called on secessionists to overthrow Hadi’s government in the coastal city.

It became clearer than ever that the UAE is fuelling a “war within a war” inside Yemen; not only distracting from the original aim of ousting the Houthis, but putting its interests in Yemen before achieving the aim of the Saudi-led coalition.

From the outside looking in, the coalition was divided which was creating yet more bloodshed in Yemen in addition to the casualties the indiscriminate coalition airstrikes have caused.

Reconciliation and hope for the future

In a bid to restore relative stability, the two sides signed a power-sharing agreement in Riyadh on November 5, 2019. The ambitious Riyadh Agreement aimed to create a 50-50 cabinet and to work together to restore the Hadi government back to Sana’a.

The unity government was initially supposed to be formed in 30 days, but it took more than a year. By December 19, 2020, the government was formed.

The unity government can be as successful as long as the reasons behind its formation remain stronger than the divisions that continue to haunt northern and southern Yemen. It’s impossible to say that the newly formed government will solve a problem that created wars between the two populations and caused southern separatists to believe that northern Yemen was occupying the south.

In order to nurture a strong unity government that goes beyond temporarily sustaining peace, grievances of both populations need to be heard and longer-term solutions must be brought to the table by creating a democratic space and ample conflict resolution. The unity government must be seen as a stepping stone to lasting stability, not an ultimate achievement.

Women, local leaders and religious and tribal figures need to be included and sustainable vision for a well-represented and localised Yemeni government must be on the table for a fruitful post-war vision. As it stands, the unity government is all-male, creating a cabinet that excludes women for the first time in 20 years.

Can the explosion create more divisions?

On December 30, 2020, an aircraft carrying members of the recently formed unity government landed at Aden International Airport, only for the passengers to be met with explosion and gunfire as they disembarked.

The attack left 25 people dead and 110 others injured, but none of the passengers were hurt. At the wake of the attack, there were concerns how such an assault could affect the unity government.

Both the Hadi government and the STC blamed the Houthi rebels of the attack. Yemen’s Prime Minister Maeen Abdulmalik sustained accusation that the Houthis were behind the explosions.

“Preliminary investigations indicate that Houthi militias stand behind this crime,” Saeed said as the newly reshuffled Cabinet met for the first time in Aden on December 31, 2020, adding that “intelligence also indicates that some Iranian experts were prepping for such an operation over the last few months.”

Yemenis are not going hungry. They are being starved.” This statement from the UN Under-Secretary-General Mark Lowcock accurately describes the famine in Yemen which is a man-made disaster brought about by five years of civil war.

The areas worst affected by acute food insecurity are the Marib, Taizz, and Al Jawf governorates in the north, and those of Al Bayda, Abyan, and Hadramaut in the south.

After the Houthis, a hardline Shia sect backed by the Iranian regime overthrew the internationally recognized government in Sanaa in 2014 and took control of most of the north, an Arab coalition led by Saudi Arabia began airstrikes against areas held by the Houthis in March 2015. The bombings still continue; ceasefires are violated and civilians suffer as the infrastructure and health facilities are destroyed.

More than 1,900 of the country’s 3,500 health facilities are currently either not functioning or partially functioning with insufficient staff and equipment, leaving half the population without adequate healthcare. Yemeni forces, the Houthis and the Saudi-led Arab coalition have attacked over 100 medical facilities. Water and sanitation systems have also been destroyed.

According to the UN, as of November 5, 2020, there have been more than 900,000 suspected cholera cases and 2,192 associated deaths have been reported. More than half of the suspected cases are children. People have also been affected by malaria, dengue fever, shortages of clean drinking water, severe flooding, and locust swarms.

Lack of adequate food supplies leading to hunger, malnutrition, and famine is the greatest humanitarian tragedy caused by the war.

Yemenis, many of whose health conditions have already deteriorated, now face the COVID-19 pandemic. As of August 30, the government confirmed 1,950 cases and 564 COVID-19-related deaths, but the UN has warned that the actual number of cases and deaths is much higher.

The World Health Organization’s (WHO) prediction of a worst-case scenario, namely that 93% of a population of nearly 30 million would be infected with the virus, is about to become a reality.

An estimated 4.3 million people have fled from their homes since the start of the conflict in 2014 and approximately 3.3 million remain displaced. The camps of internally displaced persons are fertile ground for the spread of COVID-19 and other diseases such as cholera and scabies.

Lack of adequate food supplies leading to hunger, malnutrition, and famine is the greatest humanitarian tragedy caused by the war. In March 2020, UNICEF estimated that 2 million children under the age of 5 suffer from acute malnutrition.

The magnitude of the crisis is illustrated by the fact that one child dies every 12 minutes.  In May, UNICEF described Yemen as “the largest humanitarian crisis in the world” – a country where 80 percent of the population, which amounts to over 26 million people, were in need of humanitarian assistance.

In 2018, Save the Children reported that over 85,000 children had died since the beginning of the conflict as a direct result of famine. Since then, entire communities have been decimated by hunger. Nearly half of all Yemeni children suffer stunted growth because of malnutrition which also impairs their cognitive development.

However, aid agencies say that in 2019 and 2020, they spent vast amounts of their time and energy struggling to get approvals countrywide to provide assistance in accordance with humanitarian principles and without the authorities’ interference.

In late 2019, the UN-commissioned report by the University of Denver Assessing the Impact of War on Development in Yemen confirmed that more Yemenis had died of hunger, disease, and lack of health clinics than from fighting; the figure was estimated at 131,00 people.

War in comparison was responsible for 100,000 deaths – a figure published by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) which tracks confirmed fatalities of war.

Between 2015 and 2019 international donors gave the UN-led aid response in Yemen $8.35 billion, including $3.6billion in 2019 that reached almost 14 million people each month with some form of aid. This was up from 7.5 million people in 2018.

However, aid agencies say that in 2019 and 2020, they spent vast amounts of their time and energy struggling to get approvals countrywide to provide assistance in accordance with humanitarian principles and without the authorities’ interference.

Partly in response to the obstruction of aid, donor support to UN aid agencies collapsed in June 2020, particularly from Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the United States. As of August 28, aid agencies received only 24 percent of the $3.4 billion they requested for the year.

While funding the aid efforts, the Unites States, United Kingdom, France, Canada, and others have sold arms to the Saudi-led coalition, worsening Yemen’s humanitarian crisis. The U.K. has given £1 billion in aid to Yemen but has licensed £6.5 billion worth of arms to the countries bombing it.

The funding crisis has had a dire impact on Yemeni civilians, including the halving of food assistance to 9 million people and the suspension of support to healthcare services, which the UN says has put the lives of millions on the line.

But there is money in Yemen to assist humanitarian efforts.

A UN Panel of Experts reported in June 2017 that the Houthis had earned up to $1.14 billion from fuel and oil distribution on the black market and that fuel was “one of the main sources of revenue for the Houthis.” However, for the warring factions, humanitarian aid is not a priority.

All parties to the conflict in Yemen have stood in the way of humanitarian aid delivery, demanded that taxes be levied, and aid rerouted so that it would benefit their respective militias.

In September 2020, Human Rights Watch published a 65-page report titled Deadly Consequences: Obstruction of Aid in Yemen During Covid-19 which details systematic interference in relief operations by the Houthi authorities, Yemen’s internationally recognized government and affiliated forces, the UAE, and the Southern Transitional Council.

The Houthis have a particularly egregious record of obstructing aid agencies from reaching civilians and diverting aid to their supporters and fighters.

In 2019 and 2020, aid workers had to push back against Houthi officials insisting they hand over their cars, computers, and cell phones at the end of projects.

But obstruction of aid agencies in government-held areas in the south and east is also on the rise. In July 2020, Lowcock said that aid agencies reported an “uptick in violent incidents, targeting humanitarian assets and [that] local authorities were adding new bureaucratic requirements.”

In March 2015, in violation of the laws of war, the Saudi-led coalition imposed a naval and air blockade that severely restricted the flow of food, fuel, and medicine, on which the vast majority of the population depends.

Yemen’s humanitarian crisis is not a by-product of Yemen’s institutional and political failures. It is solely the result of a protracted military conflict and only an end to the conflict will bring an end to the humanitarian crisis.

The country cannot fight a war on two fronts: the military conflict and the fight against famine and disease. The Yemenis have different political agendas: the Houthis want to continue creating an Islamic state while most southerners want to be independent from the north and establish their own state.

But they are united in their common condition of poverty, hunger, and disease. Ending the fighting and solving the humanitarian problems together can help to end the political stalemate and the pointless war which has no winners except those who trade in arms and the warlords who buy and sell people’s lives.

The Club Champions League, the final game of the CAF (Confederation of African Football), took place on November 27, 2020. The game was played between the two biggest Egyptian teams, Al-Ahly and Al-Zamalek in Cairo Stadium and ended by the crowning of Al-Ahly as the African champion for the 9th time. A crowd of fans of both teams would normally be expected to fill the stadium.

However, this was not the case since the Egyptian public and hardcore fans known as “Ultras” have been banned from Egyptian stadiums since 2012. This ban has been part of the anti-revolutionary policies by the military regime in Egypt. These policies especially targeted the Ultras due to their effective social mobilization capacity during the January 25 Revolution that took place in Egypt in 2011.

The political involvement of the Ultras in Egypt was not a spontaneous reaction during the January 25 Revolution. Rather, it was a process that started with the very establishment of the Ultras in 2007. The Ultras of the two clubs in Egypt, Al-Ahly and Al-Zamalek, are called “Ultras Ahlawy” and “White Knights” respectively. From their establishment, both groups condemned police brutality and the dictatorship of the Mubarak regime. They were also influential during the 2011 events, thanks to their discipline, commitment, and their overriding principle of following the orders of their leaders.

In addition, their financial independence gave them a certain freedom and kept them away from any state control. When Mubarak stepped down and the military took control of the country in February 2011, the state aggression against the Ultras started to increase and was crystalized in two major massacres: Port-Said, on February 1, 2011, and the Egyptian Air Defence Stadium massacre on February 8, 2015. These two incidents were followed by mass arrests of members of both groups who were tried in the courts.

The Influence of Turki Al-Sheikh on Egyptian Football

The counterrevolutionary policies of the Egyptian state under President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi have been supported by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates as part of their anti-Arab Spring policies. The Ultras were targeted by this Saudi- and UAE-supported witch hunt that is related to the presence and position of Turki Al-Sheikh in Egypt.

Turki Al-Sheikh is a Saudi adviser of the royal court and is the current chairman of the General Authority for Entertainment in Saudi Arabia. He started to appear on the Egyptian football scene in December 2017. Since then, he was announced as the honorary president of Al-Ahly. Later on, he resigned, refused an offer to preside over Al-Zamalek, but still invested huge amounts of money in transfers for both clubs.

Fans who directed criticism towards Al-Sheikh have had to apologize publicly following legal actions taken against them.

Furthermore, he became involved in many disputes between the clubs and their players, and bought the Egyptian club Al-Assiouty Sport, changed its name to “Pyramids FC,” and then sold it to Emirati businessman Salem Al-Shamsi. Reports of Turki Al-Sheikh’s involvement in Egyptian sports have heavily criticized his policies and their impact on the efforts of the Saudi government under Mohammad bin Salman to influence Egyptian sports

The founders and the early members of the Ultras in Egypt are currently either imprisoned, exiled, or have preferred to disappear from the public scene following the oppression they experienced. In addition, for the past eight years sports fans in general have been banned from interacting with football clubs.

Sport fans in general have been banned from interacting with football clubs for eight years. Thus, the reactions of the new generation of football fans, in general, and Ultras, in particular, can only be observed through social media.

A general observation of social media reveals that Turki Al-Sheikh became the central topic of discussions even after his “official” withdrawal. The attitude he showed towards football fans was problematic as he took legal action against some of them and shared their names publicly on his Facebook account over claims of personal insult allegations.

His position on players such as Abdullah Al-Said and transferring him to the rival team, Al-Zamalek, or the dispute with Al-Ahly’s former captain, Hossam Ashour, and his retirement plans have been hot topics among football fans on social media networks. Al-Sheikh joined controversial Al-Zamalek chairman Mortada Mansour in his attacks and criticisms against the Ultras.

As a result, the discussions of football fans across social media became mainly concerned with Al-Sheikh’s actions. Discussions within groups of fans of one team or between rival fans focused mostly on the problems that Al-Sheikh was involved in, and his influence on both the big clubs and Egyptian football in general.

Al-Sheikh and his interventions in the policies of football clubs were used by rival fans as a sarcastic reference point and to mock each other and belittle their managerial boards. Meanwhile, various political and social events took place when Turki Al-Sheikh was the honorary president of Al-Ahly Club in Egypt and an investor in Egyptian football.

These events include calls made by former military-affiliated contractor Mohamed Ali for protests against the Egyptian regime, or for protests against more recent events such as the demolishing of unlicensed houses, carried out by the Sisi regime.. In addition, a social media campaign was launched against sexual harassment by survivors who started publicly shaming abusers and were supported by celebrities and social media influencers.

These events would have seen a huge reaction from the Ultras, both at the stadiums and on social media, had they taken place eight or nine years ago. Nonetheless, fans on social media networks merely expressed their reactions to the matches and to the actions of Turki Al-Sheikh. Al-Sheikh has already sold Pyramids FC and is currently the owner of the Andalusian club UD Almería. However, Al-Sheikh is still present and influential through his financial support to both Al-Ahly and Al-Zamalek, and his continuous engagement with different media channels and talk shows in Egyptian media.

Al-Sheikh’s presence helped the current Egyptian regime to continue to oppress the Ultras as an effective group of the January 25 Revolution and as a presence that continues to pose a threat to its existence.

Fans who dared to become involved in such political, social, or public discourse have experienced firsthand the state’s reaction towards the Ultras. Fans who directed criticism towards Al-Sheikh and the atmosphere he created in Egyptian football, have had to apologize publicly following legal actions taken against them. These actions of Al-Sheikh, alongside securitizing the Egyptian sports, managed to push football fans away from such sensitive social and political causes. It also served the Saudi-Emirate plans carried out against groups involved in the Arab Spring revolutions.

Thus, the presence of Al-Sheikh helped to immobilize fans across social media and threatened anyone who openly talked about his corrupting influence. Al-Sheikh’s presence helped the current Egyptian regime to continue to oppress the Ultras as an effective group of the January 25 Revolution and as a presence that continues to pose a threat to its existence.