The impact of the war in Ukraine on Syria and Libya Russian military losses not only affect the Russian prospects for Ukraine, but also Russia's military presence in the Middle East.
The Trump administration supported projects that exclude Turkey from the Eastern Mediterranean natural gas equation, namely the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum and the East-Med project, and approved the creation of alliance zones that would limit Ankara's presence in areas such as Syria and Libya.
From Mossadegh in Iran, Rousseff in Brazil, Gaddafi in Libya, or several U.
The Ottoman Empire was facing the Italian invasion of Libya, a revolution in the Balkans, and was in a dire need of ending the military attrition it suffered at the hands of the Zaydis in Yemen The agreement maintained the Zaydis' influence in Yemen and granted the Zaydi imam the powers to supervise his Zaydi sect.
The Turkish lira is also now heavily used in Syria and Libya by citizens who do not trust the value on their own national currencies and wish to continue trade with Turkey.
Ukraine is an important supplier to many North African markets, including Egypt and Libya, as well as the EU and China.
Read: What Role Can Turkey Play Between Russia and Ukraine in Antalya?Furthermore, Russia and Turkey developed a model of damage control through high-level dialogue, compartmentalization of issues, and keeping cooperation intact, especially in Syria, Ukraine, and Libya, where Ankara and Moscow have different approaches.
Russia has previously used the private military company Wagner Group in Syria, Crimea, and Libya.
Read: Iran’s Bitter Choice and the Russia-Ukraine WarSecond, Russian private military companies such as the Wagner Group are sent to war zones to support pro-Russian figures such as Khalifa Haftar of Libya and attempt to encircle NATO for strategic leverage such as the Russian military presence in Africa.
In other words, the pandemic could not prevent conflicts across the globe, like those in Syria and Libya, while its consequences can devastate the order of the international political system.
President Erdoğan was able to strengthen both Turkey’s effectiveness and diplomatic power in many regional issues such as northern Syria, Libya, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Southern Caucasus.
Biden is starkly different than Trump, who had given a carte blanche to the aggressive and expansionist ventures of his “favorite dictators” in the Middle East, such as those in Yemen and Libya.
“Moscow has increasingly embedded itself in the Middle East region, in Syria, Libya and through OPEC+ so that none of the GCC states wants to spoil the relations with Russia,” said Nikolay Kozhanov, associate professor at Qatar University’s Gulf Studies Program, to Politics Today.
led the international community-imposed sanctions on Iran, Venezuela, or Libya – all three are members of OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries), and Iran is the second-largest producer of crude oil in the organization.
More specifically the tensions in Libya, Syria, and the Eastern Mediterranean, where the concerned parties are in direct confrontation, are likely to remain.
What does Saudi Arabia expect? In general, better Arab-Turkish relations could stimulate the development of a regional stabilization plan for dealing with the crises in Yemen, Libya, and Syria; create measures to deter Iran’s influence; and converge stances for reacting to the changing world order given the rise of China.
New-generation leaders of both social democrats and center right-wing moderates have confronted such problems as the West continued to make geopolitical and military mistakes in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Afghanistan, and elsewhere around the Mediterranean and the Near East.
The tension has primarily been between Turkey, Greece, and the GCA, and escalated with further delimitation agreements such as those between Lebanon and the GCA (2007), Israel and the GCA (2010), Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) (2011), Turkey and Libya (2019), and Greece and Egypt (2020).