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.S. President Donald Trump announced Thursday that Kazakhstan has agreed to join the Abraham Accords, marking the first expansion of the Middle East peace framework during his second term in office. The move, while largely symbolic given Kazakhstan’s existing ties with Israel, underscores the Trump administration’s renewed push to broaden normalization efforts between Israel and Muslim-majority countries.

“Kazakhstan is the first country of my Second Term to join the Abraham Accords, the first of many,” Trump wrote on his Truth Social platform. “This is a major step forward in building bridges across the world.”

He added that a formal signing ceremony would be held soon, saying, “Many more countries are lining up to embrace peace and prosperity through my Abraham Accords. This is real progress, real results.”

The announcement came hours before Trump hosted Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and four other Central Asian leaders for a dinner at the White House, part of a broader diplomatic engagement aimed at strengthening U.S. influence in the region amid China and Russia’s expanding presence.

A new phase in the Abraham Accords

The Abraham Accords, launched in 2020 during Trump’s first term, established diplomatic and economic ties between Israel and several Arab or Muslim-majority countries — the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan. The initiative was hailed by Trump as a major achievement in Middle East diplomacy and a cornerstone of his foreign policy legacy.

Kazakhstan’s inclusion adds a Central Asian dimension to the accords, but its significance differs from previous members. The country, a majority-Muslim former Soviet republic, already recognized Israel in 1992 and has maintained steady diplomatic and economic relations for more than three decades.

Still, U.S. officials framed the decision as a sign of renewed momentum for the accords and evidence that “Washington’s regional partnership model remains attractive.”

Vice President JD Vance said Kazakhstan’s entry “gives great momentum to the Abraham Accords,” emphasizing that “the momentum of the Abraham Accords is alive and well in the second administration.”

Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Marco Rubio said the new partnership would enhance economic collaboration between Kazakhstan and Israel. “Through this agreement, Kazakhstan joins a partnership that brings special and unique opportunities for development — in energy, technology, agriculture, and water management,” he told reporters.

Symbolism and strategy

While the practical implications of Kazakhstan’s move are limited, analysts say the decision carries strategic value for both Washington and Nur-Sultan. For Trump, it revives a diplomatic brand closely associated with his presidency, offering a visible foreign policy success amid shifting alliances in the Middle East and Central Asia.

For Kazakhstan, participation may strengthen ties with Washington and open doors for investment and technology transfer at a time when it seeks to balance relations among major powers — including Russia, China, and the U.S.

“Kazakhstan’s entry doesn’t represent normalization per se, but rather political alignment,” said Ariel Cohen, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. “By joining, Kazakhstan signals that it supports Trump’s broader regional strategy while positioning itself as a bridge between Muslim nations, Israel, and the West.”

The announcement also reflects Trump’s ambition to expand the Abraham Accords beyond the Middle East. His administration has long expressed interest in bringing additional nations — including Saudi Arabia, Oman, Indonesia, and, into the framework.

Eyes on Riyadh and Damascus

Trump has repeatedly said that adding Saudi Arabia to the accords remains a top priority. Riyadh came close to joining in 2023 before talks stalled over Palestinian statehood issues and shifting regional dynamics following the Gaza genocide.

Now, with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman scheduled to visit Washington later this month, speculation is mounting that Trump may attempt to revive the deal. “We have a great relationship with Saudi Arabia,” Trump said Thursday. “We’ll see what happens.”

Even more striking is the potential inclusion of Syria under President Ahmed al-Sharaa, who took power following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime earlier this year. When asked whether he planned to discuss the accords with al-Sharaa during their upcoming meeting on Monday, Trump was evasive but upbeat. “He’s doing a very good job,” Trump said. “It’s a tough neighborhood, and he’s a tough guy — but a lot of progress has been made with Syria.”

Kazakhstan experienced unprecedented developments in January 2022. Economy-driven protests, triggered by the rise of liquefied natural gas prices, turned into violent demonstrations in a very short time. In some regions, particularly in Almaty, the former capital and economic center, protestors looted private properties, government buildings were torched, the international airport was seized, and the state authority almost disappeared.

Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, president of Kazakhstan, reacted promptly and dismissed the government, declared a curfew and a state of emergency immediately thereafter, and invited the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) troops to the country. When the protests subsided in a short time, the state of emergency ended and a schedule for the withdrawal of troops was declared.

The events in Kazakhstan were considered by some as a “surprise,” while others viewed them as “expected.” A fair and balanced interpretation of the events shows that there were tensions due to socio-economic factors and that the protests should have come as no surprise. Despite this, no one expected the demonstrations to turn into organized violence in such a short period of time.

In any case, events in Kazakhstan seem to have calmed down for now and stability has been restored. However, it is clear that these events will have local and regional implications, some of which are closely related to Turkey.

Factors affecting Turkey’s approach to the events in Kazakhstan

The events in Kazakhstan occurred in a limited time particularly as Kazakhstan is one of the country’s main partners in foreign policy and plays an important role in the Turkic world and Central Asia. This made it inevitable that Turkey be prompt but sensitive in its reaction towards the developments.

Three interrelated factors shaped Turkey’s reaction: the normative dimension, the bilateral relations dimension, and the regional context including the Turkic world and the Organization of Turkic States (OTS).

As for the normative dimension, Turkey has faced and overcome several anti-democratic challenges and interventions that threatened its political system, democracy, and stability. Only in the last decade, the Justice and Development Party governments faced the violent Gezi Park protests in 2013, the December 17-25, 2013 judicial coup attempt, and the July15, 2016 foiled coup attempt.

Turkey’s reaction to the protests in Kazakhstan

The developments in Kazakhstan and the possibility of increasing instability put the bilateral relations of Ankara and Nur-Sultan at risk as the developments had the potential to cause negative consequences in the Turkic world and particularly for the OTS (Organization of Turkic States). Just two months earlier, on November 12, 2021, Turkey hosted the Eighth Summit of the Organization of Turkic States (Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States) in Istanbul and the organization changed its name to “Organization of Turkic States” with Turkey becoming the chair. At the same summit, member states approved the “Turkic World Vision 2040” that draws a roadmap for the next two decades. Kazakhstan was among the influential actors behind this name change and vision.

Once the protests turned violent and riots became commonplace in Kazakhstan, Turkey initially tried to analyze the situation, and with the responsibility of the OTS chair, acted as both a friend and partner.

On the fourth day of the protests, January 6, 2022, President Erdoğan initiated telephone diplomacy and spoke with Tokayev and other heads of OTS states. In his call with Tokayev, Erdoğan stated that Turkey is closely following the developments and reiterated Turkey’s solidarity with Kazakhstan. In his other phone calls, too, the president expressed the importance of Kazakhstan’s stability.

On the same day, the OTS issued a statement on the events taking place in Kazakhstan. The statement did not make any distinction between the Kazakh people and government, and expressed OTS’s readiness to support the people and government of Kazakhstan if needed. Meanwhile, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu had a phone call with his Kazakh counterpart Mukhtar Tileuberdi on January 7, and organized an Extraordinary Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of Turkic States on January 11 that reiterated the organization’s support for Kazakhstan.

Briefly, Turkey’s approach in the first three days of the protests was to evaluate the situation and possible future scenarios, and prepare for its response. Due to the sensitivity of events, Turkey didn’t make a distinction between the people (or protestors) and the government. Instead, Ankara preferred to embrace both the Kazakh people and the government, and expressed its strong support for the country’s stability. This stance was observed in the subsequent statements of both Turkey and the OTS.

Risks and opportunities in the new era 

The developments in Kazakhstan show how protests can turn into organized violence, becoming a major challenge even in a relatively stable country like Kazakhstan. Therefore, it’s inevitable that Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states will derive lessons from this turn of events.

The new era in Kazakhstan and Central Asia contains risks as well as opportunities for Turkey. The opportunities derive from the domestic politics of the Central Asian states and regional geopolitics. For instance, recent events in Kazakhstan revealed how fragile states are when the political processes and stability are not supported by economic and welfare policies. Likewise, the events reveal how the power struggle among the political elites or within the bureaucracy, particularly within the security sector, can be a major threat for the stability of the state.

There are also regional repercussions of these events. Russia has showed it is an effective and “preferred” actor in the region whether through the CSTO or its bilateral engagements. Without a doubt, the increase of Russian influence in Central Asia will have consequences on Turkey’s bilateral relations with regional actors and cooperation in the OTS.

The new era in Kazakhstan and Central Asia contains risks as well as opportunities for Turkey.

On the other hand, Turkey has the opportunity to develop a new approach in Central Asia through bilateral relations with the Turkic states, especially Kazakhstan, and the OTS. For instance, Turkey is in the position to offer more cooperation for training or restructuring internal security organizations as well as increasing intelligence and military cooperation. Since Turkey has experienced serious challenges before, the country can share its experiences with other Turkic states.

From the OTS perspective, member states should learn a lesson from the immediate call and response of the Russian-led CSTO. As a medium-term goal, therefore, the OTS can form an initiative to develop military cooperation among its member states that can be used as a peacekeeping force or an observation mission in the future. Such an attempt would be the basis for a possible collective military cooperation that could be functional during regional crises or in UN-led non-combat missions.

On January 15, 2022, military personnel deployed by the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) – a Russia-dominated international security organization that in addition to Russia itself includes Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan – started to leave Kazakhstan. This operation, officially dubbed a “peacekeeping mission,” involved the deployment of 2,500 paratroopers on the territory of Kazakhstan and became the first event of this type carried out by the CSTO since its creation in 1992.

The operation was launched after Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev forwarded his official request to members of the CSTO for assistance to deal with massive public protests that ultimately resulted in widespread violence and instability causing massive (in)direct economic losses and dozens of victims and that broke out in Kazakhstan in early January. Mass protests in Kazakhstan, Central Asia’s most stable country economically, started over the government’s unpopular decision to double gas prices, which affected the most vulnerable layers of the Kazakhstani society.

Having started in Zhanaozen (Mangystau Region) on January 2 – a region that has experienced public protests before – under mainly economic slogans, the protests soon spread to all major cities, despite the fact that Tokayev dismissed the government and ordered that gas prices return to their previous level. The protests reached their culmination in Almaty, where events took a particularly dramatic turn.

In his official statement, Tokayev called protesters “bandits and terrorists,” stating that “foreign states” had masterminded the protests and were organizing a de facto foreign invasion of the country. Tokayev’s opinion was immediately shared by leaders of both Belarus and Russia, where President Vladimir Putin classified events in Kazakhstan as “aggression of international terrorism.”

After several days of instability that witnessed, among others, multiple instances of vandalism, despicable violence, and full-fledged street fighting between the protestors and the Kazakh security forces, Tokayev managed to take control of the situation in all major cities and Kazakhstan started to return back to normal life gradually. While neither the circumstances of the tragic events have been fully revealed nor is it completely apparent how the Kazakhstani domestic milieu and foreign policy will evolve, three macro aspects should be highlighted.

First, the completion of the (para)military mission in Kazakhstan by the Russian-led CSTO is a vocal claim that this organization – unlike the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) or similar projects – is a living entity whose operational scope and ambitions are likely to expand. It is also quite clear that when attempting to increase its influence in Central Asia, Russia, in light of the absence of other trump cards, is likely to rely increasingly on its so-called security export mechanism, i.e., Russia’s use of (para)military help and assistance to other countries facing security threats and challenges.

Third, the current mission of the CSTO in Kazakhstan might not become the last instance when the organization`s resources are used in Central Asia. It is highly likely that with Russia`s growing interest and involvement therein, the macro-region, which is rife with ethnic-religious conflicts and permeated with disagreements that have recently (once again) resulted in a (para)military conflict on the Tajik-Kyrgyz border leading to multiple casualties, might soon become a battleground between powerful players once again.

Indeed, Central Asia is a resource-endowed and strategic geographic location which is indispensable for establishing steady logistical ties between the East and West, and that once again has turned into an intersection of the strategic interests of such powerful players as Russia, China, Turkey, Iran, India, Pakistan, and the United States as well as a space for the emerging risks and uncertainties posed by the Taliban rise to power in Afghanistan.

Central Asia is a resource-endowed and strategic geographic location which is indispensable for establishing steady logistical ties between the East and West.

In light of all the above, another important aspect needs to be underscored: on January 10, 2022, Alexander Lukashenko unequivocally, and somewhat unexpectedly, warned the Uzbek authorities that they have to consider seriously the prospect of a repetition of events similar to Kazakhstan’s on their territory. Apparently, this statement, which was firmly rebutted by the Uzbek political leadership that stated that the country has enough resources to deal with a similar crisis was meant to convey the idea (arguably, circulated from Moscow) that Uzbekistan should consider (re)joining the CSTO – Uzbekistan was once a member of the CSTO but left the organization on two occasions, in 2006 and 2012.

Interestingly enough, when following events in Kazakhstan, part of Uzbek intellectual circles and the policymaking community while generally supporting Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s confidence in Uzbekistan’s ability to solve problems independently still argued that in case the challenge would exceed these capabilities “Uzbekistan might ask the Russian Federation, as its ally, for help and assistance.”

Finally, it is quite curious to note that only several months ago Russia, whose economic potential and “soft power” in Central Asia are considerably lagging behind actors such as China that exerts influence via the Belt and Road economic mega project and Turkey whose influence is premised on ethnic-cultural and religious pivots, seemed to have very few competitive advantages in the macro-region. Today, the situation appears to be getting more complex and challenging.

The fact that the Kazakhstani president requested assistance from the CSTO – aka Russia – and not any other international organization, including, for instance, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),  is very telling. In the case other countries encounter similar problems, Kazakhstan might have cast a long shadow in the greater region.

Iran plans to join the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Although EAEU officials claim they have never received any formal requests from Tehran, the Islamic Republic hopes to become the sixth member state of the alliance very soon.

For Iran, the best way to counter the U.S. sanctions is to strengthen economic ties with the Eurasian Union – a supranational entity that was created on the basis of the Customs Union of Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus in 2014. Armenia and Kyrgyzstan joined the EAEU in 2015, which was when the enlargement process stalled. However, in October 2018, the Eurasian Union signed a free trade agreement with Iran. The trade balance between the bloc and the Islamic Republic has been growing ever since.

Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, the total turnover between Iran and the EAEU increased by two percent in 2020 and exceeded $2 billion. Food products and raw agricultural materials accounted for about 80 percent, or $939 million, of the volume of supplies from EAEU countries to Iran, more than half of which – $609 million – fell on grain.

In turn, similar goods accounted for most of the supplies from Iran to the union – 68 percent or $575 million. Moreover, according to Iranian officials, Iran’s exports to Russia, the de facto leader of the EAEU, have increased by 40 percent, and a financial trading hub and a logistics center were planned to track customs and contracting issues.

Iran’s parliament speaker Mohammad Baqer Qaliba visited Moscow on February 10 and said that Iran would “permanently join the EAEU in two weeks.” Given that Qaliba is a potential candidate in the upcoming Iranian presidential elections scheduled for June 18, it is debatable whether his rhetoric should be taken as part of the election campaign or as a serious announcement of Tehran’s long-term geopolitical goals.

In any case, there is no doubt that Iran, faced with the U.S. sanctions, is keen to join the Eurasian Union as soon as possible. However, it remains highly uncertain if this organization is ready to let Tehran into the post-Soviet integration space. Mikhail Myasnikovich, the chairman of the board of the Eurasian Economic Commission, said that the Eurasian Union wants Iran to have “a special view on cooperation with Eurasia.”

No doubt, faced with the U.S. sanctions, Iran is keen to join the Eurasian Union as soon as possible.

That, however, does not necessarily mean that Iran will join the EAEU anytime soon. Also, according to Iya Malkina, aide to the chairman of the board of the Eurasian Economic Commission, “There have been no requests for Iran’s accession to the Eurasian Economic Union.” Such a statement could mean that the Islamic Republic will have to deal with bureaucratic procedures and may have to wait a while to become a full-fledged member.

Tehran’s potential membership in the EAEU would undoubtedly improve Iran’s economic and political position in the global arena. Such an action would likely allow the Islamic Republic to neutralize, at least partially, the cost of U.S. sanctions. It could also force the Joe Biden administration to be more flexible in the future negotiations on Tehran’s nuclear program. Also, given that the UN Security Council embargo on conventional arms shipments to Iran expired in October 2020, the Kremlin and the Islamic Republic could eventually strengthen their military ties.

It is no secret that the Islamic Republic is interested in purchasing the Russian S-400 anti-aircraft system and SU-30 fighter jets. It remains to be seen, however, if Russia will agree to such sales. In the past, Russia refused to sell sophisticated weapons to Iran, bending to pressure from the United States and Israel. Indeed, it is Israel that would not look favorably upon the Kremlin’s supply of arms to Tel Aviv’s major regional opponent.

It is a well-known fact that Moscow is actively making deals with the Jewish state. The two sides reportedly reached a deal on a prison swap to free a Jewish-Israeli woman held in Syria in exchange for the release of two Syrian prisoners by Israel. There are also speculations that Russia and Israel are negotiating on not only humanitarian issues, but also wider regional arrangements.

The Kremlin is trying to secure its own geopolitical interests in the region while balancing between Tehran and Tel Aviv.

Indeed, in early February, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spoke with Russian President Vladimir Putin about regional issues and the continued Russia-Israel coordination in light of security developments in the Middle East. Although Moscow has often been accused of acting as an ally of Israel, despite its formal alliance with Syria where Israeli forces regularly conduct airstrikes on Iranian targets, the Kremlin is trying to secure its own geopolitical interests in the region while balancing between Tehran and Tel Aviv.

There are indications that Moscow seeks to establish an alternative pathway to the markets of the Middle East. That could be one of the reasons why the Kremlin strongly supports the construction of the Nakhchivan corridor – a land route connecting not only Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave located between Turkey and Armenia, but also Russia and Iran. A future rail link between Russia and Iran, passing though Azerbaijan and Armenia, is expected to have a serious impact on economic relations between Moscow and the Islamic Republic.

Furthermore, a rail link could help Iran strengthen its ties with other Eurasian Union member states. For instance, Armenia is hoping to benefit from Iran’s accession to the Eurasian Union. A delegation of Iranian majlis is expected to visit Yerevan soon to take part in a meeting of the Armenian-Iranian parliamentary group of friendship. Also, Kazakhstan’s experts believe that, from an economic perspective, Iran’s potential membership in the EAEU will have a huge impact on the economy of the Central Asian nation.

For Russia, Iran’s trump card is probably its sea, namely the Indian Ocean. In order to get an access to sea trade routes, Russia has fought bloody wars for centuries. With Tehran joining the Moscow-dominated Eurasian Union, the alliance would go beyond the post-Soviet borders and the Russian Federation would likely increase its influence in the Middle East.