In Turkey, one of the favorite songs of those defining themselves as “leftist” is Mills (Değirmenler in Turkish) by Bulent Ortacgil, of which the lyrics go: “You, me, against the windmills. Consciously, each of us as a vanished warrior. We flow into seas as rivers. Maybe the finest way ever is this way…”

The song is about an impossible love, which is relevant to the left wing in Turkey in the sense they consider their fight to be an impossible love, and although they know they will lose in the end, the fight is still noble to them.

This is a specific mentality, an ode to defeat that is internalized and which has almost become part of genetic codes for a certain political segment. To put otherwise, it is a victim mentality based on finding excuses for failure and defeat. There is a famous Winston Churchill quote, which was also often repeated by the late Turkish President Suleyman Demirel: “No excuse can replace success.”

When I look at the main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) nowadays, I recall Ortacgil’s Mills and this particular Churchill quote Demirel was fond of because there are roughly three blocs within the party. The first one is the core crowd gathering around CHP Chairman Kemal Kilicdaroglu. The second is the crowd around Muharrem Ince, who are looking forward to seeing a CHP defeat in the 31 March local elections, and the third is the group who either passed to the Democratic Left Party (DSP) or resigned from the CHP since they could not become candidates. If the CHP enjoys an election victory under the leadership of Kilicdaroglu on March 31, the second and third groups will resolve. However, if the opposite holds true and the party faces a defeat, the last two groups will revolt and even draw a part of the first group to their side in an attempt to call for an extraordinary meeting.

One does not need to be a clairvoyant or an analyst to know the CHP and the corridor whispers to be able to predict all these things. Everything is pretty obvious.

Developments within the CHP reflect Kilicdaroglu’s purge attempts within the party. Rather than having ideological concerns, his motivation is to consolidate power and undermine rivals. 

Although the CHP is currently focused on the local election, all the leading names in the party, including Kilicdaroglu, are currently eyeing what will happen on the morning of April 1. While determining the candidates almost by himself, his main concern has been to gain strength by April 1. This is why Kilicdaroglu did not nominate anyone who acted with Ince before and has been siding with candidates who have stayed loyal to him, even though some of these individuals are accused of corruption.

Lately, CHP member Gursel Tekin issued a quite nuanced and strict written statement and a group of CHP mayors resigned while some names passed to the DSP. Also, former chairmen known as “the lords of the CHP” convened and Bodrum Mayor Mehmet Kocadon resigned from the CHP and became a candidate for Mugla Metropolitan Municipality.

All these developments reflect Kilicdaroglu’s purge attempts within the party, but rather than having ideological concerns, Kilicdaroglu’s motivation here is to consolidate his power and undermine his rivals.

But of course, such developments will negatively affect the CHP’s vote share. In that case, Kilicdaroglu will probably argue that the CHP could not win since the groups divided the party and accentuated their own identities rather than the party identity. So, his excuse for defeat is already at hand. 

Why does the CHP fail to address larger masses?

Looking at from a more general perspective, it is evident in Turkish politics that the ruling party has won all elections since 2002, with vote shares varying between 35 and 49 percent, whereas the main opposition party has always remained between 20 and 25 percent.

The AK Party has occasionally suffered declines in its vote share. However, although such fluctuations have been experienced, the CHP’s vote share hardly changed, indicating the fact that the party failed to address groups other than its own base.

Kilicdaroglu’s excuse for a possible defeat is already at hand. He will argue that the CHP failed due to the group divisions in the party, which accentuated their own identities rather than the party identity.

Since he was assigned as chairman of the party, Kilicdaroglu has been scrutinizing underlying reasons of this situation. But while doing so, he has been acting like a surgeon, searching for a cure by applying trial-and-error method on a patient lying on the operation table.

We might quickly forget about such things, but still can try taking a step back and look at the general picture: We have seen a different CHP in each election period.

Do you remember the nationalist group transferred by Kilicdaroglu in 2011 to come to the forefront in the party’s image and discourse that included names like Emine Ulker Tarhan and Suheyl Batum?

Or, do you remember the leftist, socialist, and Alevi groups that came to the forefront by emphasizing Gezi Park protests during the electoral period in 2015?

And currently, in the run up to the local elections, Kilicdaroglu has once again changed the image of the party and addressed the electorate with a different message. This time, he is directly engaging in populist behavior, accentuating the rhetoric he adopted in the June 24 elections last year. While creating ambiguities and gaps in his party’s ideology, he is prioritizing winning and leaning towards a political opportunism that can be summed up with the motto, “No matter who you are, vote for me to undermine the AK Party.”

It’s not fair for me to give advice to the CHP, but in my opinion, the party’s biggest problem since the 1950s has been that they do not have a genuine or original opinion to present to Turkey.

During the periods when the center of politics was divided and the nation was led by coalitions, the lack of ideas was not evident on the surface. But in the last 16 years, whether we like it or not, this political center has shifted towards the AK Party and Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Kilicdaroglu is acting like a surgeon, searching for a cure by applying trial-and-error method on a patient lying on the operation table.

The problem is not just that the CHP does not have any ideas worth expressing to the Turkish people. More crucially, the CHP is under the illusion that its criticisms of the current government, at least some of which are quite accurate, are ideas, and has for a long time been under the spell of laziness that has restricted their ideas and discourse to these limits.

Today we know very well what the CHP is against and what it thinks should not happen in the country. But we do not know what it is for and what it can actually promise Turkey.

Criticism is obviously something that is in the very nature of being in opposition and is an extremely important element from society’s point of view. It is ridiculous to criticize the CHP for their criticisms towards the government and their works. The problem is not that the CHP criticizes, but that it does not say anything else. Due to this reason, the CHP is restricted to a discourse, the main limits of which are determined by the government.

As long as this basic parameter does not change, no matter how many times the CHP changes its strategy, it will not be able to achieve any meaningful change in its number of votes. The CHP does not need political engineering or clever strategies, but needs to come up with new ideas. In other words, the CHP needs to focus on politics rather than engineering, develop a political discourse and use strategies that bring this to the forefront.

But of course, such a new political idea that has failed to emerge in the last 16 years will not miraculously emerge right before the elections. Meaning that the CHP will experience an election just like the ones in the past. We will see whether the path that was chosen, namely “what if it works”, will work or not.

Then let us return to the beginning of this article. Everyone in the CHP, from its leader to its doorman, is not only aware of the criticisms I have expressed here, but feels them in their bones. Due to this, they compete with each other more than competing with their electoral opponents, and again, everyone in the CHP is more curious about the morning of April 1 rather than the eve of March 31.

Chair of the main opposition in Turkey, Kemal Kilicdaroglu paid a two-day visit to Berlin last week. Besides his lunch meeting with Turkey’s Ambassador to Germany, the leader of the Kemalist-left CHP came together with the members of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD).

Actually, it might be a potential opportunity and dynamic that Turkish social-democrats meet with German social-democrats in order to develop a mutual support in the light of universal social democracy. Such steps might be interesting and fruitful particularly in a country where social-democracy had a political success in the past and flourishing trajectory in a relatively global comparison. Surely, this phenomenon has been true for many years. However, is not valid now when one takes into account the result election results and polls regarding both the SPD and CHP. That is to say, similar to other Western countries, social-democratic and center-left parties face huge difficulties in achieving popular support among citizens.

Kilicdaroglu met some leading personalities of the SPD and delivered a speech during a panel organized by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation – a known establishment close to the SPD. Furthermore, the CHP chair published an op-ed article in the country’s most renowned “conservative” daily, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung – interestingly he did not prefer the country’s renowned left or left-liberal pieces.

Why did the CHP chair publish an op-ed article in one of Germany’s most renowned “conservative” newspapers, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, but not in a renowned left or left-liberal newspaper?

The main points I want to emphasize however are Kilicdaroglu’s statements he made regarding “democracy” and his expectation regarding Germany’s support during Turkey’s fight against terrorism. These two points are of great importance in my opinion because it’s interesting to address a Kemalist politician’s perception of “democracy” and his actual actions on the other hand. In addition, even though the CHP chair stressed that Germany should take into account Turkey’s sensitivities in its fight against terrorism, he unfortunately did not shy to come together with individuals who are sympathetic to the PKK.

Firstly, even though Kilicdaroglu criticized Turkey’s democracy standards both during his meetings and in his op-ed piece, there have not been any critical stances regarding his own party in general and regarding the democratic deficits in the process of, for instance, electing a new CHP chairperson. That is to say, even though Kilicdaroglu has not gained any real success since he became party chair in 2010, for instance by losing all elections since that date – exactly 9 – he still intends to retain that position while systematically preventing dissent voices among other CHP circles. But actually, and absurdly, neither the German media nor German social democrats addressed this fundamental problem.

Even though the CHP chair stressed that Germany should take into account Turkey’s sensitivities in its fight against terrorism, he unfortunately did not shy to come together with individuals who are sympathetic to the PKK.

Why? Wouldn’t it be more honest if the CHP started a democratization process within its own party? One has to emphasize that there is unfortunately a one-man hegemony in Turkey’s main opposition party. But despite these actual facts, the call for a change is permanently missing. One might understand the Kemalist-leftists insisting on continuing the status quo, but why do German SPD circles not problematize this lacking behavior in the name of democracy? Critical German circles should face these questions.

Furthermore, during his meeting with a SPD politician, Kilicdaroglu stated that Turkey moved away from “the values of Atatürk.” In this sense, the CHP’s criticism lacking stance with regard to Turkey’s initial era is also a problematic issue. There are no critical positions or statements with regard to the single-party era and several other problematic actions during this period. And here again, German social-democrats and German left-liberal media representatives deliberately maintain their silence while these voices are generally used to criticizing every little component in Turkish politics and political history in general.

Kilicdaroglu criticized Turkey’s stance of democracy, but wouldn’t it be more honest if he began a democratization process within his own party? For instance by leaving his seat after losing 9 elections.

The second point worth to address is Kilicdaroglu’s op-ed statements and his contradicting actions. While Kilicdaroglu wrote that Germany should take into account Turkey’s sensitivities in its fight against terrorism, he came together with controversial Left Party members, who openly stand for the abolishment of the PKK ban in Germany. As is known and despite lacking actual implementation, the PKK terrorist organization is officially banned in Germany since 1993. However, parliamentarians such as Sevim Dagdelen are supporting the PKK-friendly discourse in Germany, calling for the abolishment of the PKK ban and do not accept the PKK as a terrorist organization. The Left Party in general also stressed this call in its last federal election program of 2017 (Left Party election program 2017, p. 112). Thus, the question arises as to whether Turkey’s second biggest political party, which acts as the main opposition party as well, does not have any information about these facts? Or, did the CHP leadership deliberately take this step in order to achieve some –local elections motivated– goals in so-called HDP strong provinces?

During Kilicdaroglu’s two-day visit to Germany he did not problematize Germany’s ambivalent behaviors with respect to issues such as the PKK and FETO. Further, the CHP chair did not mention any concrete words regarding these problematic topics in his op-ed piece. He also met with members of the Left Party, which stands for the abolishment of the PKK ban, which is actually not in compliance with Turkey’s main strategic security interests. All in all, the likely purpose of Kemal Kilicdaroglu in creating this image or spirit of a universal social-democratic alliance in order to strengthen the party’s local elections campaign does not seem very convincing.

In the past couple of days, Turkey’s political agenda has mainly been shaped by the upcoming local elections scheduled for March 2019. Understanding the importance of the local elections from a foreign point of view might be difficult if one disregards some crucial points. Although there is still over four months until election day, it won’t be wrong to focus on the main dynamics of the upcoming elections in Turkey.

The local elections planned to be held on 31 March, 2019, will be the first elections subsequent to the final establishment of the Turkish presidential system on 24 June, 2018. The previous local elections in all 81 provinces of Turkey were held in March 2014 when besides the mayors of the Turkish provinces, all other leading local offices had been elected as well. Furthermore, the 2014 local elections symbolized a key importance due to the prior judicial coup attempts by FETO members, who infiltrated the Turkish judiciary for over years.

Despite several moves and FETO-related – or manipulated – media supported campaigns, Turkish citizens did not accept a tutelage-like scenario by FETO and thus the ruling AK Party, led by then Prime Minister Erdogan, won the local elections without any heavy losses. Actually, this day could be thought of the acceleration day of the end of FETO, which even in this subsequent process tried to execute a bloody coup on 15 July, 2016, which also failed due to the people’s will that prevented the putschists.

After re-joining the party, President Erdogan, who was once the Mayor of Istanbul, pushed for reform within the local cadres of the AK Party. 

In regards to the 31 March, 2019, local elections, there are some important points that have been taken into account by both the AK Party and the MHP. As one remembers, both parties had created an alliance during the 24 June presidential and parliamentary elections, which symbolized Turkey’s ultimate switch to a new system of government. Interestingly, despite some disagreements in the afterward concerning some certain policy issues, it became clear last week that both parties will once again cooperate during the local elections – this time in a limited range but still covering Turkey’s three provinces with the highest population. Thus, this time the alliance will focus on certain cities such as Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. It has to be stressed that approximately 25 million of Turkey’s total – 81 million – population, live in these three cities.

Following this path, during his speech on Saturday, MHP leader Devlet Bahceli stated, “No matter who the Justice and Development Party nominates in the three biggest provinces, we will provide full support. There has been no bargain, collusion or give-and-take in making our decision.” Bahceli also added by addressing the continuing importance of the presidential system while stating “Whoever aims to destroy the presidential system will find us standing against them. This is about the People’s Alliance, the presidential system and the composition of local administrations in line with that.”

Highlighting his support for an alliance during the local elections in Turkey next year, MHP chair Devlet Bahceli stated, “Whoever aims to destroy the presidential system will find us standing against them. This is about the People’s Alliance, the presidential system and the composition of local administrations in line with that.”

On the other hand, the AK Party, actually began the renewal of its local cadres in 2017 when President Erdogan was able to re-join the party after the constitutional ban. On the day he was able to join the party, President Erdogan stated, “We will update all of our provincial, district and town organizations by the end of the year (2017) because there is a fatigue. We have to overcome this. With more dynamic teams, we have to prepare for 2019 [elections].”

It was no surprise that once again Erdogan himself, who was the mayor of Istanbul between 1994-1998, had realized the urgent need for certain reforms within the AK Party with regard to the upcoming local elections.

By elaborating on the motivation of the opposition parties regarding the local elections, one should particularly keep in mind that the main opposition party, the CHP, is once again seeking some rationality absent alliances, as it had tried during the 24 June elections by bringing together all opposition parties under the same umbrella. By this, the CHP, aims to come together with the conservative Saadet Party, secular-nationalist Iyi Party and is trying to find other ways to cooperate with the Kurdish nationalist HDP. But whether these ambivalent moves will find a reflection and positive reaction among the CHP constituent is another question. The main point all opposition parties share is the rejection of the newly established presidential system. If the opposition parties gain any success in major cities such as Istanbul or Ankara, they will most probably trigger a questioning of the legitimacy of the presidential system.

The CHP is trying to come together with the conservative Saadet Party, secular-nationalist Iyi Party and is trying to find other ways to cooperate with the Kurdish nationalist HDP.

In addition, and interestingly, Kemal Kilicdaroglu – the CHP chair – who has lost 9 elections since he became the party’s leader in 2010, still insists on keeping his position and has ignored harsh calls made by close party circles for him to step down by actively preventing party conventions. Moreover, the party’s presidential candidate during the June 24 elections and potential new chairperson of the CHP, Muharrem Ince, is testing for new opportunities in order to achieve his main purpose to become the successor of Kilicdaroglu. For this, he currently seems to have a new short-term strategy, namely, becoming the CHP’s candidate in Istanbul. Whether this will happen and what Kilicdaroglu is planning will become clearer in the upcoming weeks.

Kemal Kilicdaroglu – the CHP chair – who has lost 9 elections since he became the party’s leader in 2010, still insists on keeping his position and has ignored harsh calls made by close party circles for him to step down by actively preventing party conventions.

All in all, it can be guessed that the campaigns regarding the local elections will be held in a rather general elections atmosphere as has been the case in previous local elections in Turkey.

Although two months have passed since Turkey’s June 24 elections, the main opposition parties are still struggling with intra-party conflicts. Despite all efforts to consolidate leadership before the upcoming local elections, the latest situation reflects that these conflicts will continue to escalate and de-escalate for quite a while. The latest developments in the CHP reflect the fact that the party administration refuses to face reality, which makes it impossible for the party to keep their votes together in the upcoming elections. So, the CHP administration may face a sharper opposition after March 2019.

Last week, the ongoing crisis within the CHP re-surfaced again. The party’s assembly convened in order to evaluate the outcomes of the presidential elections. Surprisingly, the presidential candidate of the party, Muharrem Ince, was not invited to this meeting. In other words, the party discussed reasons behind the failure in the presidential elections without inviting its presidential candidate – the person who, is most likely, to know the reasons behind this failure better than other participants.

Indeed, the agenda of the meeting was shifted to the possible outcomes of the ongoing intra-party opposition and their reflections on the local elections. Kemal Kilicdaroglu – leader of the party – explained the background of their discussions with Ince after the elections. He admitted that he accepted to hand over the chairmanship of the party to Ince after the party’s failure in the parliamentary elections. Nonetheless, he claimed that Ince’s attitude after the elections did not give him any confidence and that he was worried about the possible dissolution of the party within a week had he quitted.

Kilicdaroglu’s statements are in fact contradictory and far from the reality when we look at the background of the latest division within the party. Firstly, Kilicdaroglu did not explain which attitudes of Ince changed his decision to quit the chairmanship. It seems that these attitudes were not only related to Ince’s statements to reporters about a private conversation between the two. If Kilicdaroglu wants to convince supporters of the CHP about his position against Ince, he needs to put more effort in doing so.

Another contradiction with what Kilicdaroglu has been saying is about his stance against leadership change in the party. In his statements at the Party Assembly, Kilicdaroglu accepted his role in the failure of the party during the elections. Even though he accepted to quit the chairmanship, he changed his mind after Ince’s attitudes in the post-election period. However, Kilicdaroglu does not regard leadership change as a necessity to the party’s success. If Kilicdaroglu was really ready for a leadership change, there would be no trouble in finding a suitable candidate. This situation reflects that the issue of leadership change is a win-lose game for Kilicdaroglu against his rival Ince. If it was to be a principal issue, he would meet the requirements of the situation.

Despite his failure in fighting for party chairmanship, Ince is still active in bringing the opposition within the party together. After the meeting of the Party Assembly, Ince refused accusations made by Kilicdaroglu and accused him of lying to the public in order to protect his seat. In addition to Ince, the meeting also cause disappointment among party supporters. A majority of party supporters even announced that they will not go to the polls in the upcoming elections if Kilicdaroglu continues to blame the critical voices  harshly and accuse them of intentionally supporting the AK Party.

The latest meeting of the CHP drove a bigger wedge between the CHP leadership and the party’s supporters. If the party cannot find a cure to heal this relationship, it may face a larger intra-party split in the following days.

An analysis on Turkish elections was published in Foreign Policy, entitled “Turkey’s Opposition Lost to Erdogan, Then It Lost Its Mind.” The article reads: “Since June 24, when Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan celebrated his thirteenth consecutive electoral victory, his opponents have been in a headfirst free fall. Their sad state captures the fundamental problem of Turkish politics: The opposition is out of ideas and lacking in inspiration and its leaders care more about keeping their seats than keeping their country afloat.”

It is an entirely different discussion as to whether the opposition had a mind to lose, but it is obvious that their current situation is saddening. Ever since Kemal Kilicdaroglu became the chairman of the main opposition, Republican People’s Party (CHP), on May 23, 2010, he changed the Central Executive Board of the party nine times, organized five conventions, renewed the party assembly numerous times, and assigned a total of 300 new names throughout this period. But all these changes did not save Kilicdaroglu from facing nine election defeats within eight years. And this time, the party did not only lose the election but also took a heavy blow despite the CHP’s presidential candidate Muharrem Ince earning eight points higher than the vote share of his party in the presidential elections.

I assume that they are referring to these factors when they say that the opposition is out of its mind. On the night of the elections, the party’s deputy chairmen argued on televised programs that the presidential election would definitely make it to the second round according to the results they obtained. When Ince could not be reached for a long period after the results were announced, it was claimed that Ince was abducted by Erdogan, and most of the electorate believed this absurd claim. Ince said: “I was not abducted. Those claiming or believing such a thing must be schizophrenic.” A week later, the deputy chairmen of the party had to admit that they lied during the election night and were in fact already informed about the results after some party members exposed what happened that night.

However, it is true that Ince’s vote share in the presidential election was eight points higher than the CHP’s vote share in the parliamentary election, which naturally led Ince proponents to demand a change in the leadership and call for an extraordinary convention in the party. Kilicdaroglu blamed Ince by arguing that the latter only cares about his seat, to which Ince responded: “I do not care about my seat, but organizing a convention is essential.” Upon that, the party’s head office suggested holding the convention if 615 signatures could be gathered amongst the delegates. For a couple of weeks, several deputy chairmen of the CHP and Ince quarreled through Twitter. Kilicdaroglu proponents blamed Ince for being “rude and shallow” and being a “denigrator,” to which Ince responded: “If I am to get elected, I will be your chairman, too. I understand that you are under pressure.”

Two weeks later, Ince proponents announced that they gathered the required number of signatures to organize the convention. However, the head office stated that “Out of 618 signatures, four are duplicated, five do not belong to a delegate, 31 are revoked, 4 are forged, and 5 are not signed in the relevant date. Consequently, the sufficient number of signatures could not be collected and thus the convention will not be organized.” When the revoked signatures triggered speculations that Kilicdaroglu exercised pressure on the delegates, the head office said: “They revoked their signatures just as they signed, which is very natural.” After this statement, eight Ince proponents went on a hunger strike. They waited with placards reading “I love living and keeping everything alive. But I am hopeless. Either I die, or I will see the convention. The choice is yours.” But they ended the strike when the head office did not give any response.

Sad, isn’t it? The CHP and its leader Kilicdaroglu, who faced nine election defeats, did everything to hinder Ince’s competing in the convention although they had presented Ince as the presidential candidate only two months ago. Amid all the debates, Kilicdaroglu contented himself with changing the Central Executive Board for the tenth time.

Meanwhile, the oppositional Good Party (Iyi Party) Chairwoman Meral Aksener left the first party meeting after receiving a 7.29 percent vote share despite all the hype revolving around her in both the national and international media. On the next day, she announced that she had left her seat and would not become a candidate in the party convention. But she returned only a week later. The party members did not know that Aksener would leave, and they did not know whether she would run for chairperson when she returned, and now they are not sure if she will stay even if she becomes the chairwoman. According to rumors, Koray Aydin, one of the leading figures of the Iyi Party, will join the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) while several other members are said to join the CHP or the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party). According to another rumor, Aydin will not join the MHP but become the chairman of the Iyi Party while the other party members will either remain independent or join other parties.

This is the current state of the parties and their leaders who vowed to make a change and govern Turkey only two months ago.

The ongoing leadership crisis within CHP reached a deadlock after recent developments. Muharrem Ince, CHP’s candidate in the latest presidential elections, started to collect signatures from the delegates to conduct an extraordinary congress to run for the party’s chairmanship.  As a result of strenuous efforts, Ince and his team announced that they gathered 630 signatures and fulfilled the required threshold. In retaliation, current leadership of CHP made an official announcement and claimed that the number of submitted signatures were not enough to call for an extraordinary congress. All of these developments triggered an enormous crisis within the CHP and divided the party into factions.

It is obvious that the future of the party will be shaped in line with the positions and interactions among these factions. The biggest opposition faction in the party consists of those in favor of Muharrem Ince taking lead. Even if Ince’s supporters were passivized in the party by Kilicdaroglu during the election campaign, they became successful in convincing delegates to sign for the extraordinary congress. Whether they reach a certain number of signatures to conduct the congress or not, the results indicate that they have convinced almost half of the delegates. It is no longer possible to ignore these delegates demanding change in the party’s chairmanship. If CHP’s existing leading cadre chooses to ignore these demands, it can create an even bigger schism in the party structure soon. Moreover, if this group builds an influence over other dissatisfied delegates in the party-a small but effective group organized around Selin Sayek Boke and Ilhan Cihaner-, they may have a chance to recall a congress in the future.

Another possible strategy of this faction is applying to court to solve the signature crisis. Even if this strategy requires time and energy to succeed eventually, some prominent figures in the party have already supported applying to court. Nonetheless, the leader of this group, Muharrem Ince, announced that he did not prefer to apply to court because he wanted to protect the honor of the party. Thus, Ince and his group seem to prefer alternative methods in their continuing struggle.

One of the alternative methods discussed at this point is the splitting of CHP into two parties. Some supporters of Ince want him to establish another party as an alternative to CHP. These supporters defend the idea that it is not possible for CHP to seize power because of the settled perceptions about it. This group believes that if Ince founds a new party, he may have a chance to run for power. Nonetheless, it seems that Ince and his supporters will persist in their struggle within the party until the last minute.

Beyond all these factors, the most powerful group in the party is Kilicdaroglu’s supporters who are loyal to his chairmanship. It is a well-known fact that after coming to the chairmanship, Kilicdaroglu created his own team both among the leading cadre and the party delegates. Whether he is successful or not, this group loyally supports his leadership without any reservations. In other words, even if CHP’s votes showed a very significant drop in the latest elections, this group would remain supporting him without hesitation. Thus, it seems unlikely to see a change in the party’s chairmanship in the short term.

Regardless of whether he will ultimately be successful or not, Ince’s stance in the party will affect the party’s position in the upcoming term. If this crisis remains unresolved until the local elections, CHP would most probably continue losing votes. Will the factions within CHP come up with different strategies in the following days? Well, this is the matter of curiosity nowadays.

Since the elections held in Turkey on June 24, Turkey’s “social democrats” have been – once again – facing internal chronic problems. It was merely just a matter of time and how a new power struggle within Turkey’s main opposition and oldest political party – the Republican People’s Party (CHP) – would occur again.

Previously, my elaboration was that Muharrem Ince’s nomination as the party’s presidential candidate was only a strategic maneuver by the party leadership and Chairman Kemal Kilicdaroglu himself in order to exclude Ince in the long run from the party’s future. It was clear that Kilicdaroglu knew that neither his party nor the party’s alliance was going to achieve a majority in parliament. He was also aware that his party’s candidate was not going to win the presidential race. Indeed, Ince lost in the first round.

Nevertheless, Ince subsequently described himself as successful by comparing his 51-day performance with the performance of the CHP. Kilicdaroglu refuted these claims indirectly, while not addressing his party’s overall disastrous election results. In this sense, the current CHP chairman, who lost nine elections in eight years, still insists on keeping the party’s chairmanship, while accusing Ince without directly calling out his name.

Kilicdaroglu also slammed his party fellows ironically for “selfish interests,” stressing his criticism with the words, “some people eye for upper positions, which is unacceptable.” Furthermore, the demand for an extraordinary party congress by the so-called supporters of Ince has ultimately revealed the already known competition between Kilicdaroglu and Ince. Although supporters of Kilicdaroglu reject a congress by arguing that the party should focus on the upcoming local elections in 2019, others – and particularly CHP sympathizers on social media – are calling for “change.” Within these circumstances, party officials have been carrying an inner-party struggle for over two weeks.

But what’s the main problem in Turkey’s main opposition party, which used to be called a “social democratic” political party? If one focuses on the party’s membership and electoral profiles, one notices the striking fact that in contrast to its “social democrat” label, CHP voters prefer attributions and descriptions such as so-called Ataturk-focused ultra-nationalism and a historically well-known aggressive secularism (perhaps similar to the French laïcité). But, do these two components count as enough to describe the party as social democratic in a modern and contemporary sense?

Most of the CHP electorate do not have any problem with being described as “left-nationalist secularists.” However, in the sense of a universal understanding of social democracy, this kind of definition may not be well-fitting. In addition, when focusing on the country’s voter dynamics, it seems that elitist circles and capital owners in particular prefer the CHP as a harbor of political identity, and not as an instrument to pursue social democratic objectives – as it is usual in an average democratic country. With regard to its policies concerning, for instance, refugees, the CHP unfortunately resembles European far-right parties, aiming to forcefully send refugees back to their war-torn countries.

It seems that one of the main problems within the CHP and in particular some other Turkish parties, which insist on being an identity party, is the fact that regardless of losing elections, their party chairperson does not leave office. If one compares this phenomenon with, for instance, the German social-democrat chairpersons in the last 13 years, one notices that following losses in the general election, most of the leaders resigned. Just recently former SPD leader resigned due to his lack of success in the 2017 elections. This happened despite his “success” to form a subsequent coalition government with the Christian Democrats. The party decided that he ought to step down, which may not be imaginable for Turkey’s CHP – even though the Turkish social democrats permanently point to German or Western democratic standards. In such cases though, the practices of global social democrats are dis-regarded.

“Even if Ismet Inonu or Bulent Ecevit were to lead the party today, its votes would not exceed 35 percent”

In regards to the CHP, the main problem is not solely the person who leads the party. As one pro-CHP surveyor once stated>; “even if Ismet Inonu or Bulent Ecevit were to lead the party today, its votes would not exceed 35 percent.” This may be true due to the party’s historical and political “baggage.” Thus, what can be done to solve this chronic perception? If the CHP wants to overcome its permanent crisis, a comprehensive self-criticism regarding the party’s past, its existential meaning and its future goals seem indispensable. However, transforming the Kemalist and left-nationalist CHP into a modern social-democratic political party seems very difficult. This is because denying the party’s anti-democratic past is perceived as unacceptable for most CHP sympathizers. Though, Turkey’s societal dynamics and the majority of political preferences of the country’s voters regularly point out this fact.

Thus, perhaps a better option could be dissolving the party, as Atilla Yayla, professor for political science, proposed in 2013:

“The CHP does not allow, for instance, being democratic such as the German social democrats. Neither does it allow the transformation into a democratic social democratic party, nor does it give the opportunity to other movements to create a strong left-democrat party. Regarding such a party, there is no meaningful and legitimate place in a democracy. The CHP has to be closed down. I do not imply that the Constitutional Court should ban the CHP but the CHP should dissolve itself. The CHP should either transform itself into a foundation or a museum concerning the “single-party-regime.” Then, the void left from the CHP should be filled by real democratic social democrats who start a strong political movement.” (Atilla Yayla, August 1, 2013)

As the ballot boxes were closed at 5.00 p.m. in the June 24 presidential and parliamentary elections, everyone started waiting for the results impatiently. The elections marked a turning point in Turkey’s history since the new governance system was to be introduced after that. So, the voter turnout was around 87.5 percent. As from 6.30 p.m., early results of the counting started to be announced on television channels. Only a few hours later, it became certain that Recep Tayyip Erdogan would win the presidential race by a landslide and thus there would not be any need for a second tour of the presidential elections. But the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) administrators argued against this.

The pro-CHP broadcaster Halk TV only released the number of the opened ballot boxes and ignored the overall results for hours as opposed to other broadcasters. At 8.00 p.m., the CHP Election Monitoring and Coordination Committee members Bulent Tezcan, Tuncay Ozkan, Muharrem Erkek and Onursal Adiguzel organized a press meeting at the party’s head office. During the press conference, the CHP Deputy Chairman Tezcan said: “Muharrem Ince’s vote share is around 40 percent while Erdogan’s is 46 percent. Ince will win the election, we will disclose all the rigs.” The other members standing beside Tezcan during his speech did not utter a single word, but only threw strained glances with a crooked smile glued on their faces.

Two hours later, the same team issued another statement. The vote shares were not announced this time: “Some groups began celebrating too soon. We are closely monitoring the results. The figures show that the presidential election will wrap up in the second round.” And one hour later, an array of baseless allegations started to circulate on social media. Firstly, CHP supporters wrote tweets which suggested that Fox TV’s broadcasting was cut off, which were shared and retweeted by thousands of people.

In the midst of these rumors, Fox TV’s live broadcast was ongoing. After a while, a second tweet that would be shared by thousands were tweeted. This tweet claimed that even the Justice and Development Party’s (AK Party) Supreme Electoral Council members resigned in the face of the rigged elections while Erdogan called Ince and threatened him to walk out of the presidential race by telling him that his wife was abducted. Ince did not make any public appearance in the meantime. So, the CHP electorate rushed to the party’s head office and started waiting anxiously.

Then, a new development was announced by Fox TV, which supported Ince throughout the electoral process. Fox TV anchorman Ismail Kucukkaya said that he wrote to Ince on WhatsApp to ask his whereabouts, upon which Ince answered: “The man has won.” By that time, the other broadcasters had already announced Erdogan’s victory, being the latest of his unremitting victories since the first election he ran for in 1994, in which he was elected as Istanbul Mayor. As a result, President Erdogan’s vote share was 52.6 percent while Ince’s was 30.6 percent.

The following day, Muharrem Ince appeared before the press: “First of all, I would like to begin with the false news running on social media. They are all lies. The claims such as the abduction of my wife and a group of colonel’s hostage-taking me are the products of a bunch of schizophrenic minds. But taking them seriously is another problem. There is no such a thing. There are 10 million votes between [me and Erdogan]. We are not evading, we are not being threatened. Erdogan is the winner of the elections.” Ince also congratulated Erdogan, adding that he aimed to double his vote share in the future.

However, Ince’s announcement did not change the situation. Many CHP proponents, who, considering their social media profiles, are most probably university graduates and professionals, started spreading another rumor on twitter: “Ince’s statements have already showed that he is being threatened.”

The CHP Chairman Kemal Kilicdaroglu was also incensed. Apparently, he was furious at Ince, whose vote share in the presidential election was seven points higher than the CHP’s vote share in the parliamentary election. He defended the exact opposite of the bare truth in his statement: “The AK Party is the only losing party in the elections. The party has become a lame duck. Also, a dictator cannot be congratulated.” Kilicdaroglu, who has lost eight elections during his chairmanship, answered the resignation calls as follows: “In our party, we have no place for those who only care about remaining in office.”

A series of confessions began to be made within the party following Ince’s statement. They explained the backdrop of the party deputy chairs’ announcements during the election day. One of the most striking statements were issued by Hakan Bayrakci, the president of pro-CHP surveying company SONAR: “The results were evident in the polls but they would have crucified me had I declared that Erdogan would win.” The latest poll announced by Bayrakci before the elections suggested that the presidential race will wrap up in the second round.

The trauma experienced by the CHP electorate since the election day is surely in the realm of psychiatry. However, an odd picture is revealed considering the reason for the CHP deputy chairs’ announcements, the claims of rig and the following confessions, and some groups call upon people to take to the streets.

The main opposition party CHP faced with the rise of an intraparty opposition after the elections. Indeed, this phenomenon is not new for the CHP. After every failure in parliamentary and presidential elections, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the chairman of the party, was criticized harshly and was put under pressure for resignation. Nonetheless, the party delegates, who were appointed by Kilicdaroglu, re-elected him in each congress despite criticisms. The opposition in CHP got into action again after the June 24 elections with the demand of changing the party leadership.

Despite all the similarities, there is a significant difference between the latest mobilization of the opposition movement and the previous ones. The opposition movement now has a popular candidate for leadership who attracted the masses more than Kilicdaroglu: Muharrem Ince. Even if Ince was defeated by President Erdogan in the presidential elections, he got 30.6 percent of the votes which is approximately 8 percent higher than what the CHP got in parliamentary elections under the leadership of Kilicdaroglu. Some prominent names of the party interpret these results as an indicator of the de facto leadership of Muharrem Ince in the CHP.

Actually, Ince already ran for the chairmanship of the party against Kilicdaroglu twice. His first candidacy for chairmanship was in 2014 but he got only 415 votes against Kilicdaroglu’s 740 votes. The second one, on the other hand, was more recent. Just two months ago from the decision of snap election, Ince once again became a candidate for chairmanship of the party against Kilicdaroglu. During his short-term candidacy process, Ince blamed Kilicdaroglu for threatening delegates who supported him and forcing them to withdraw their signature to support Ince’s candidacy for chairmanship. At the end of the congress, Ince was defeated by Kilicdaroglu again.

While Ince was maintaining his criticisms towards Kilicdaroglu, the decision of snap elections totally changed the direction. Even though Kilicdaroglu worked hard for the joint candidacy of Abdullah Gül, he nominated Ince as the presidential candidate of the CHP at the end of the process. By this way, Kilicdaroglu passivized his main rival in the CHP. Ince’s failure in the elections would mean a decline in his competition against Kilicdaroglu. Additionally, while Ince was conducting his election campaign, Kilicdaroglu dissolved the names close to Ince in the CHP and prepared the candidate list for the parliamentary elections in accordance with this aim.

Nevertheless, Ince gained high popularity among the masses during the campaign process. He obtained sympathy among not only supporters of the CHP, but also the supporters of other parties. In the same period, Kilicdaroglu lost his authority within the party supporters. For instance, the CHP announced that Kilicdaroglu and Ince were going to organize joint meetings in some provinces. However, Ince’s supporters in the party reacted against this decision that they perceived an action damaging Ince’s image among the masses. As a result, these joint meetings were canceled.

After the elections, Ince underlined his success by highlighting his 30.6 percent – a figure the CHP has not reached in 41 years. He also criticized Kilicdaroglu. First, Ince stated that rather than persuading other parties to support the candidacy of Gul, Kilicdaroglu could have announced his nomination for the presidential elections earlier. Secondly, Ince criticized Kilicdaroglu for not congratulating Erdogan and his approach to the results. In this point, Ince stated that Kilicdaroglu should try to find the reasons of the decline in the votes of the party rather than emphasizing the decrease in the voting rates of the AK Party. All these indicators show that Ince may run for the chairmanship of the party again. Whether the support of the delegates will be enough for Kilicdaroglu to keep his chairmanship will be clear soon.

Two weeks ago, I pointed out that the opposition parties have to decide whom they will nominate as their candidate for president in the upcoming elections and what their ambitions are regarding the elections on June 24. Now, it seems that at least the presidential candidate issue has been solved among the opposition parties. In the process of finding a presidential candidate, the most discussed option was to nominate a person who will run as a common candidate of all major opposition parties. However, several maneuvers and attempts to persuade each other ultimately failed, which then consequently caused a situation in which all opposition parties nominated their parties’ own candidate and even each party’s leader with one exception – the Republican People’s Party, CHP.

Even though CHP’s MP Muharrem Ince challenged the CHP’s incumbent chairman Kemal Kilicdaroglu, who lost eight elections in eight years, twice, he has been nominated as the party’s presidential candidate. Interestingly, Ince had stated during the last party congress in February that, “the CHP’s chairman is the party’s natural presidential candidate… If you want to rule the party while someone should rule the country, then, why are you the chairman?”

Nevertheless, it seems that in contrast to other opposition party leaders, the CHP chairman did not dare to compete as a candidate against the AK Party’s candidate, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. While all major Turkish political parties nominated their de jure or de facto party leader as their presidential candidate, the CHP preferred a strange move that does not aim to win the elections but rather to guarantee Kilicdaroglu’s political future. It’s likely that the CHP leader does not want to risk his position as both a future MP in the new assembly and party chairman. Kilicdaroglu’s move to nominate Ince may though hamper his future ambitions. As Burhanettin Duran stressed, independent from the election results, Ince may cause serious troubles for Kilicdaroglu. Actually, it’s very unlikely – but – if Ince gains any success as a presidential candidate, he will directly try to control his party by challenging Kilicdaroglu’s one-man party leadership.

Besides these political anomalies among the left-nationalist secularists of Turkey, one statement by Ince during his speech at his nomination ceremony was striking. Ince said he would not only represent the CHP’s supporters but all of Turkey’s 80 million citizens. By this, Ince removed his CHP lapel pin to put on a Turkish flag pin as a symbol for neutrality by stating, “We will be impartial/unbiased. We will be independent.” On the other hand, he called his party supporters by saying, “This time we want the ruling power!” Consequently, all the CHP supporters echoed in the hall “power, power, power…”

First of all, it’s quite absurd to have the ambition to win the executive presidency in a presidential system by stressing the party as “we want…” while on the other hand promising to be unbiased or impartial. Thus, the question arises as to how an unbiased president will appoint his ministers? Or even more concrete, how does a Kemalist MP since 2002 plan to rule the country without preferring his party fellows in the next five years and who will believe in these dubious statements?

Moreover, in both democratic presidential and semi-presidential systems, the head of state is the executive lead of the government, who, as a consequence, actively rules the country by following a concrete government program. For instance, neither Mr. Trump as an example of the presidential system nor Mr. Macron as an example of the semi-presidential system are impartial personalities. In addition, Mr. Macron is the de facto leader of his presidential party “En Marche!” holding the majority in the French parliament, too. Stressing an alleged unbiasedness to any party means that the party or the person has no concrete perception of what will be done in the next period.

As I already addressed above, the CHP has to decide what the party actually wants to achieve. Either winning the presidential elections –and the parliamentary majority– to govern the country under the new system by offering Turkish citizens a certain program, or, trying to bring back the old system in which previous presidents also used alleged “impartial” discourses, but preferred strong pro-tutelage positions. Nevertheless, at the end of the day, Ince may challenge the incumbent CHP leader Kilicdaroglu due to his –rather unlikely– limited success during the presidential election. This would be a miscalculation by Kilicdaroglu who wants to get rid of Ince by nominating him as the party’s presidential candidate. On the other hand, in the case of a rather obvious unsuccessful experience for Ince, that is to say, if the CHP loses the presidential race, Kilicdaroglu will most probably still stay in the new parliament as the party’s leader while Ince will quit his political career. The next month and a half will show us more.

Every government needs a main opposition party to which it has to pay regard while taking any action or decision. The incompetence of the main opposition is surely an unfortunate situation for Turkey.

Having a legitimate, open and official opposition in a country is a vital indicator of democracy. In terms of concentration of power, every country has a government; the oppositions also exist in a similar fashion. Yet, in antidemocratic countries, the oppositions are obstructed and declared illegitimate through various methods. For this reason, it’s not the presence of a government that distinguishes democracy from other regimes; in fact, it’s the existence of an open and legitimate opposition that validates democracy.

In this respect, we might assert that oppositions as well as the government should have certain features in a democracy. The opposition’s duty is to keep the government in check within democratic boundaries and give the public the hope that a solution exists for each problem. This is where the government and opposition should stand. Having an open and legitimate opposition allows democracy, which is perceived as relatively unstable when compared to antidemocratic methods in the short-term, to be more stable than its alternatives on the long run.

CHP: more than an opposition

For a long time, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) has been carrying the mantle of the main opposition. Administrators of the party don’t seem troubled by this because securing more or less the same percentage of votes in every election allows the party to acquire a number of seats in the parliament and ensures them a presence in politics without too much effort. It seems that the CHP has grown accustomed to this mode of existence and doesn’t want to be disturbed. Or, maybe the party does want to break away from being the main opposition party but possibly is unable to break the cycle it created.

However the party congress held recently didn’t provide any hope for the possibility of breaking this vicious cycle. It’s the same old story for CHP and this saddens me greatly, as I believe that it is one of the most important political parties of Turkey and could contribute immensely to our democracy and our country.

What issues plague the CHP? I believe their issues could be discussed under two categories: procedures and principles.

CHP and procedures

Democracy is usually defined over the essence; however, these definitions are inadequate most of the time. They are even misleading sometimes. Exaggerated emphasis on the essence and every movements’ attempts to identify with democracy prevent democracy from consolidating. In order to annul this handicap, we should understand that democracy is about both procedures and principles; as it has always been the case in Turkey, we shouldn’t disregard and neglect the rules pertaining to procedure.

CHP’s democratic records are full of procedural failures. The party has pursued policies and acted in a way that cast justifiable suspicion upon its allegiance to democracy’s procedural rules in the last ten years.

Historically the CHP always sided with the junta after every coup in Turkey. The party either supported coups openly or was pleased by their realization implicitly. CHP finally distanced itself from coups during late Bülent Ecevit’s chairmanship. Unfortunately, his efforts couldn’t change the encoded values of the party; moreover, during the February 28 coup, Ecevit himself relinquished his anti-coup stance, rendering all of his efforts vain.

The CHP mentality always perceives coup d’états as a tool against democratic politics in its own favor. In recent years, the party has expanded the spectrum. CHP didn’t openly side with democracy in the fight between the legitimate government and the Gulenist criminal cult (FETO) that has been going on since February 7, 2012. It supported the Gezi Park violent protests, which was the rejection of democracy’s procedural rules by its own voter base, and incited the public. Moreover, CHP Chair Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu didn’t oppose the December 17/25 juristic coup and the party utilized the illegitimate tools FETO acquired through illegal means to attempt to depose the government.

Kılıçdaroğlu played the illegal and fabricated tapes in the Parliament. Even the July 15 coup wasn’t enough to sober up the CHP. With a late and hesitant statement, Kılıçdaroğlu expressed his opposition to the coup. A short while after, he renounced his stance. He put aside the actual coup, illogically distorted the term and called it a “civilian coup”; furthermore, he accused the government of perpetrating the coup and continues to advocate this claim, no matter how baseless it is. For this reason, CHP has to sincerely reaffirm its allegiance to democratic procedures and rules pertaining to it, showing the public that they are trustworthy.

CHP and principles

Indeed, CHP is a political party; however, this doesn’t ensure being democratic. Communists and fascists also had political parties. Therefore, the main issue is whether CHP is democratic or not.

We can’t answer this question just by looking at CHP’s party congresses, the number of candidates for chairmanship or whether certain administrators are elected by delegates. In this respect, there is a mass confusion in Turkey. Intra-party democracy and democracy as a regime are associated and usually confused with each other. Democratic-ness is determined by inter-party competition rather than intra-party. Meanwhile, a political party’s actual discourses and actions are more indicative of its democratic-ness instead of its party manifesto.

CHP usually acts like it single-handedly owns democracy, but its mentality and ideology is plagued with a myriad of issues. Firstly, the party sympathizes with putschists. This is a matter of principle as well as procedure. It could be claimed that there are certain individuals or cliques within CHP that tend to advocate for illegitimate methods of acquiring power, such as coups or violent rebellions, because the public seem to have condemned the party to a permanent impotency. This has to be acknowledged. However, there is more.

CHP’s ideology is not compatible with democracy. Let’s put the discussions about whether Kemalism is contradictory to democracy aside; the classical Kemalist understanding which dominates CHP doesn’t allow any space for principles, rules and procedures of democracy. In this respect, Kemalism is enthusiastic about creating the “ideal” individual and society through the power of the state; furthermore, it wouldn’t shy away from pruning the ethnic, religious and even the cultural majority. This actually summarizes CHP’s political history. Despite the need for an overhaul, CHP does nothing in this regard. The most CHP does is to pretend it interprets Kemalism in a way that is compatible with democracy through masterful rhetoric. Yet, it’s a challenge to persuade the public to believe this.

CHP is an ideological hodgepodge. The party’s antidemocratic mentality is also nourished by their understanding of social democracy. CHP believes social democracy is only about state intervention to economy; more importantly to the society itself. This is one of the reasons why Turkish social democrats are more antidemocratic than Turkish conservatives or even nationalists. If we leave extreme leftist parties and Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) aside, CHP has the most radical vision of a society among the three parties that have seats in the Parliament.

CHP definitely needs to shift its ideology, and thus mentality, towards democratization. Maybe expecting this to be an intra-party process is in vain and unjust. Unfortunately, such effort doesn’t exist in social democratic and Kemalist circles. Indeed, it’s becoming worse. Stuck between hatred toward Erdogan and a lack of new ideas, CHP is having a hard time putting distance between itself and violent methods. I’m not talking about the limited violence that was encountered during the Gezi Park violent protests; I’m referring to the violence employed by terrorist organizations. CHP is unable to distance itself from both PKK’s and DHKP-C’s violence. It’s unable to react in the same way as it reacted to Daesh. This situation renders CHP untrustable and dangerous in the eyes of the public.

Will CHP be able to break the vicious cycle, contribute to democracy, find solutions to problems and inspire hope in the public? I truly hope so, but it’s a tough challenge for the CHP.

On Tuesday 6 February, CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu called on the government to form contact with the Assad regime in Syria in order to resolve the country’s on-going civil war.

Kilicdaroglu’s comments came as Turkey deepens its operation in Afrin, which has cleared approximately 1,100 terrorists from the Turkey-Syria border.

Operation Olive Branch was launched in Afrin on 20 January in order to clear the Turkey-Syria border from terrorists and to set the conditions enabling Syrian refugees in Turkey the opportunity to return to their home lands.

The PYD/YPG has forced thousands of Arabs, Kurds and Turkmens from their villages, leading to a mass migration flow into Turkey.

In response to Kilicdaroglu, on Thursday President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said “What will we talk about to a murderer who has killed 1 million of his citizens?”

The Syrian regime, despite the ceasefire, continues to shell Eastern Ghouta. On Wednesday regime attacks in the region left 33 dead – of which 13 were children.

“You can go arm in arm with terrorists when necessary… But, we haven’t so far walked with those taking that path with the permission of terror organizations, and we will not do so in the future.”