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proposed agreement being discussed by Iran and Oman to help end five months of conflict between Iran and the United States would give Tehran authority over commercial vessels entering the Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz, according to Iranian and regional sources, potentially marking one of the most significant shifts in Gulf maritime security in decades.

The proposal, if finalized, would grant Iran oversight of inbound shipping through the strategic waterway, through which roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil trade passed before the conflict disrupted maritime traffic. Regional officials said negotiations remain ongoing, with key issues still unresolved, despite Iranian officials reporting substantial progress.

There was no immediate comment from Washington on the reported proposal. U.S. officials have consistently maintained that they would not accept Iranian control over navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, despite President Donald Trump’s recent assertions that an agreement to reopen the waterway could be close.

The talks are taking place amid broader diplomatic efforts to end the conflict that erupted in late February, when U.S. and Israeli military operations against Iran triggered months of fighting across the region.

According to a senior Iranian source and two regional officials familiar with the negotiations, the draft arrangement would require commercial vessels entering the Gulf to transit through Iranian-controlled waters, giving Tehran an unprecedented administrative role over maritime traffic.

Some form of control

One regional official described the proposal as representing “some form of control” already conceded in principle, though negotiators remain divided over how that authority would be implemented in practice.

“The concession has already been made regarding some form of control over Hormuz,” one regional source said, adding that details regarding inspections and oversight remain under discussion.

Another regional source said Gulf states are seeking a framework in which regional countries would supervise any inspections of commercial vessels and ensure that any payments required from shipping companies remain voluntary.

A senior Iranian official said Tehran is seeking to levy fees of between 5% and 7% of cargo values on ships using the strait, while Oman has proposed charges closer to 3%. The United States, however, continues to oppose any transit fees, insisting that Hormuz remain an international waterway with unrestricted access.

Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi said negotiations with Oman had reached “fundamental understandings” and suggested an agreement was nearing completion.

Speaking to Iran’s official IRNA news agency, Gharibabadi said the proposed arrangement was designed so that commercial vessels would pass through Iranian territorial waters on both inbound and outbound voyages.

He added that discussions had reached “the verge of being finalized.”

However, regional officials cautioned that significant differences remain, particularly over whether Iran’s authority would extend equally to ships leaving the Gulf, as well as the legal basis for any administrative role Tehran would exercise.

Regional energy infrastructure

The negotiations come as Iran has simultaneously intensified its warnings to Gulf Arab states against supporting any renewed U.S. military action.

According to several regional sources, Tehran has privately warned neighboring Gulf countries that any future American attack on Iranian territory would trigger retaliation against critical regional energy infrastructure.

“The Iranian warning was unequivocal: if America targeted Iran’s infrastructure, they would retaliate by striking Gulf energy facilities and other regional targets,” one Gulf source said.

Since the conflict began, Iran has repeatedly targeted regional allies of the United States with missile and drone attacks while also disrupting commercial shipping through Hormuz.

Iran says more than 3,400 people have been killed since the war began, while the United States has reported the deaths of 18 military personnel.

President Trump has increasingly emphasized diplomacy after months of military operations failed to reopen the waterway fully or compel Tehran to accept Washington’s demands.

Addressing supporters in Las Vegas, Trump said he preferred a negotiated solution despite warning that military action remained an option.

“I’d rather make a deal because I don’t want to kill people,” Trump said. “I do not want to kill people, but at some point we’re gonna.”

The reported negotiations reflect a notable evolution in the conflict, which has increasingly centered on maritime access rather than direct military confrontation.

Iran has argued that previous flexibility in negotiations only encouraged greater pressure from Washington, leading its leadership to conclude that stronger leverage is necessary before meaningful talks can proceed.

A major strategic shift from the pre-war status quo

The proposed arrangement would also represent a major strategic shift from the pre-war status quo, when commercial vessels transited the Strait of Hormuz without paying fees or seeking authorization from Iran.

The waterway remains one of the world’s most strategically important maritime corridors, serving as the primary export route for Gulf oil and liquefied natural gas.

Despite optimistic statements from Tehran and Washington about the prospects for diplomacy, officials involved in the talks stressed that no final agreement has been reached.

Political disagreements over shipping fees, inspection authority and the precise definition of Iranian control continue to complicate negotiations, while broader questions surrounding the future security architecture of the Gulf remain unresolved.

The talks also come as Trump faces growing domestic pressure to end a conflict that opinion polls suggest remains unpopular with American voters ahead of November’s congressional midterm elections.

Oil prices fell in recent days after Trump suspended plans for renewed military strikes, citing ongoing diplomatic efforts that he said could eventually lead to the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.

(Source: Reuters)

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he Gulf region is one of the areas with which Türkiye has had the most intense foreign policy interactions in recent years. Since 2020, this rapprochement has intensified, and Türkiye’s partnerships with the region’s leading foreign policy actors have grown. Notably, its long-standing close relations with Qatar have evolved into a strategic partnership. Meanwhile, relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which were once defined by competition, have transformed into cooperative engagements.

Meanwhile, Ankara has also maintained contact with other countries in the region, including Kuwait, Oman, and Bahrain. These interactions have brought potential cooperation opportunities in various sectors, including the defense industry, trade, energy, and manufacturing, to the forefront. In line with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s approach of establishing direct contact with Gulf countries, reciprocal visits have increased.

From October 21 to 23, 2025, President Erdoğan undertook a Gulf tour covering three countries. Accompanied by numerous ministers, bureaucrats, and journalists, he visited Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman. There, he engaged in activities aimed at strengthening Türkiye’s relations with Gulf countries, particularly in areas such as the defense industry and energy. The signing of 24 cooperation and partnership agreements during the visit suggests that the relationship is evolving into a stronger partnership.

What makes Qatar, Oman and Kuwait different?

There are certain points that distinguish Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman—the three countries visited by President Erdoğan on his recent tour of the Gulf region—from other Gulf countries. First, these three countries differ from others in the region, such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain, particularly in terms of their foreign policy approaches and orientations. Notably, Qatar’s relations with Türkiye, its North African policies, and its moderate stance on the Muslim Brotherhood distinguish it from Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Conversely, unlike Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Oman and Kuwait tend to adopt a neutral and conciliatory stance in their foreign relations.

Another aspect that sets Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman apart from other Gulf countries is how they handle the Palestinian issue. Notably, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain normalized relations with Israel by signing the Abraham Accords in 2020. Recently, there has been discussion about the possibility of Saudi Arabia taking a similar step. In contrast, Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman have opposed Israel’s occupation policies in Palestine on many regional and international platforms.

These countries also use their diplomatic influence on the global stage to advocate for Palestinian rights. For example, Qatar has hosted Hamas members for many years and uses the Aljazeera channel to create international public pressure against Israel. Since October 7, Oman has strongly criticized Israel’s massacres in Gaza in official statements. This reaction is also evident at the societal level. In Qatar, Oman, and Kuwait, Friday sermons, television broadcasts, and civil society organizations have condemned Israel while expressing solidarity with Gaza and the Palestinians.

Qatar and Oman: Diverting from Saudi Arabia and the UAE

On the other hand, one could argue that Qatar and Oman have diverged from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain in their policies toward Iran. In fact, Qatar is closely aligned with Tehran due to its cooperation with Iran in the Persian Gulf and their similar policies on other regional issues. During the 2017 blockade, Iran and Türkiye provided Qatar with significant support, particularly by supplying food products.

Oman, on the other hand, is said to have the strongest historical and cultural ties to Iran of any country in the Gulf region. Recently, these two countries conducted military exercises involving land and naval forces. In contrast, Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Manama have adopted policies closer to those of the U.S. and Israel regarding Iran. Thus, they differ from Doha and Muscat in this respect.

Finally, it is known that all three countries closely cooperate with the United Kingdom in the defense industry. In this context, Türkiye has been planning to purchase Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jets for some time. Due to growing regional risks and security concerns, Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman have added 22, 15, and 12 Eurofighter jets, respectively, to their air forces in recent years.

Despite their security partnerships with the U.S. and the U.K., these countries have been striving to develop their own capabilities. According to reports, Qatar ordered 36 Eurofighters, Kuwait ordered 28, and Oman ordered 12. Considering that Türkiye has put the purchase of used Eurofighters on its agenda, President Erdogan’s choice of these three countries for his Gulf visit becomes more meaningful. Indeed, statements made after the visit indicated that the purchase of Eurofighter jets was specifically negotiated with Oman and Qatar.

From cooperation to strategic partnership

President Erdoğan’s Gulf tour from October 21 to 23 is significant because it elevates Türkiye’s relations with regional countries beyond traditional cooperation into strategic partnerships. Considering the nature of relations and partnerships in recent years, this has already been achieved with Qatar. Türkiye provided critical support to Qatar when it became the target of a political blockade initiated by its neighbors on June 5, 2017. As a result, relations between the two countries strengthened. Following the blockade, Türkiye established a military base in Qatar, becoming one of the Doha administration’s most reliable global partners.

Over the following years, Türkiye and Qatar continued to strengthen their relationship, particularly with regard to regional policies. They pursued common policies in regions such as the Horn of Africa and North Africa. Most recently, during Israel’s attacks on Gaza, Ankara and Doha pursued overlapping policies, calling for Tel Aviv and the Benjamin Netanyahu government to be held accountable under international law. Disturbed by Qatar’s stance, Israel bombed the offices of Aljazeera and the Qatar Red Crescent in Gaza.

Then, in September, Israel directly targeted Doha, the capital of Qatar, carrying out an attack against Hamas members there. Despite Israel’s aggression, Turkey continued to support Qatar. After the attack, President Erdoğan attended the Doha summit and expressed his support for Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani. As part of his Gulf tour, Erdoğan also made his second visit to Qatar within two months.

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ccording to the Qatar-based Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, discussions have taken place regarding the establishment of a joint naval force involving Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Oman. The primary objective of this coalition is to ensure the safety of navigation in the strategically significant Persian Gulf. China has actively participated in mediating the talks between Tehran, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi. On June 3, following this news, Rear Admiral Shahram Irani, Commander of the Iranian Navy, stated that several regional countries, including Iran and Saudi Arabia, will form a new naval coalition in the northern parts of the Indian Ocean.

During a television program, the Iranian Navy Commander stated that almost all littoral countries in the northern parts of the Indian Ocean are willing to support Iran and collaborate collectively to ensure security. He went on to say that while Iran and Oman have conducted numerous joint naval exercises in the past, other countries such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Iraq, Pakistan, and India are also keen on engaging in joint naval cooperation. Irani claimed that the “unjust” presence of foreign powers in the region would soon come to an end, and that the countries of the region would take responsibility for safeguarding it. Irani did not provide specific details about this development, and there have been no statements from the countries allegedly involved in the formation of this alliance.

On June 6, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin announced that Beijing is in favor of the concept of a joint naval force consisting of Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other regional countries. During a press conference, Wenbin stated that the preservation of peace and stability in the Middle East’s Persian Gulf region is crucial for the prosperity of the countries and people in the area, and plays a vital role in global peace, the advancement of global economic growth, and ensuring a sustainable energy supply. Wenbin highlighted China’s commitment to playing a positive and constructive role in promoting peace and stability in the region.

Response to Middle East NATO?

According to Iran’s state broadcaster, Press TV, the proposal to establish a regional naval alliance is seen as a response to U.S. and Israeli suggestions made last year to create a Middle East NATO. Commander Tim Hawkins, the spokesman for the U.S. 5th Fleet and Combined Maritime Forces, criticized Iran’s claim of forming a maritime security alliance, stating that Iran is the primary cause of regional instability and cannot claim to protect the waters it threatens. Hawkins mentioned that Iran has attacked or seized 15 international-flagged merchant ships in the past two years, and stated that the U.S. is reinforcing defenses around the Strait of Hormuz with its partners.

In contrast, the UAE government announced its withdrawal from the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) on May 31, expressing disappointment with the U.S. military’s perceived lack of response to Iran’s seizure of commercial tankers in April and May. Although UAE officials denied that their withdrawal from the CMF was a direct result of U.S. inaction against Iran’s maritime activities, a phone call on June 2 between UAE National Security Advisor Sheikh Tahnoun bin Zayed Al Nahyan and his American counterpart Jake Sullivan suggests uncertainty and tension regarding the course of action in the absence of U.S. security guarantees.

Abu Dhabi’s disappointment with the perceived weaker U.S. commitments has led to a shift in the UAE’s foreign policy, emphasizing diplomacy and partnerships with China and Russia to address regional threats from Iran. This approach may reflect both the recognition of declining U.S. influence in a multipolar geopolitical environment and a strategy to secure stronger American commitments.

GCC Challenges

The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) member states have faced challenges in establishing effective joint military structures and agreeing on a common vision regarding threats and challenges. Factors contributing to this include a lack of appropriate strategic culture and military power, significant divisions and rivalries within the GCC, concerns about Saudi Arabia’s dominance, and the presence of private interests.

Despite making joint declarations, the GCC states are not a unified entity, and a joint military operation in the event of a conflict would likely have a limited value. Decision-makers within the GCC primarily focus on the quantity and technological advancement of their military equipment, rather than their ability to use it effectively. As a result, the security of these countries is seen as fragile. The issue of the GCC states’ actual combat value, effectiveness, and ability to cooperate in warfare remains unresolved.

Despite significant military expenditures, the GCC states have heavily relied on Western countries for military protection and security. However, the perception of the United States as an unreliable security guarantor has led the Gulf states to seek closer ties with major powers like China and Russia. They have also increased diplomatic efforts to counter the perceived threat from Iran. Consequently, the possibility of security cooperation between Iran and the Gulf states is not entirely out of question. Nour News, a news website close to Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, suggested on Tuesday that Iran’s nuclear technology could even be potentially transferred to Saudi Arabia under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in accordance with international law.

Given that the countries involved have not denied the plan to establish a joint naval force, it can be inferred that discussions on this matter have taken place. However, it is important to note that the focus might be more on joint action or planning rather than forming a formal naval alliance. The Iranian Navy Commander’s statement regarding previous joint naval exercises by Iran and Oman, as well as the interest shown by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Iraq, and other countries in naval cooperation with Iran, could indicate Iran’s plans for joint exercises in the Gulf or Sea of Oman, similar to their annual exercises with China and Russia in the Indian Ocean.

Change in the course of relations

While the joint Iranian-Arab naval exercises will not be more than messaging, they will be an indication that Iran and the Gulf countries are making efforts to change the course of their relations. Although the details of this project have yet to be disclosed, it nonetheless is indicative of an important geopolitical shift that is taking place in the Middle East.

Both Riyadh and Tehran are looking for new options to manage regional equations, and Washington is no longer seen by the Gulf states as a security guarantor and a regional problem-solver. This includes China’s economic partnership plans in the region. Moreover, Washington’s pledge to build an alliance of democracies against autocracies in the aftermath of the war in Ukraine has also irritated some Gulf Arab countries.

The timing of an incident involving alleged “harassment” in the Strait of Hormuz amidst these ongoing developments is significant. On June 5, the U.S. Navy announced that its sailors, along with the UK Navy, had come to the aid of a ship reportedly harassed by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in the strategically important Strait of Hormuz.

In response to these allegations, on Monday, June 5, IRGC Navy Commander Abbas Gholamshahi stated that a distress call had been made by a Marshall Islands-flagged ship through the international channel, and Iranian forces had responded accordingly. Gholamshahi emphasized that certain hostile media outlets in violation of media ethics were attempting to spread misinformation, incite unrest, and legitimize the “illegitimate and unjustified presence of non-regional countries in the Persian Gulf.”

On July 11-12, Oman’s Sultan Haitham bin Tariq al-Said made his first overseas official trip since coming to power in January 2020, to Saudi Arabia. In the planned megacity of Neom, both King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman received Sultan Haitham, and the leaders discussed a variety of means of enhancing the Omani-Saudi relationship, including through the creation of a joint council to foster bilateral ties.

Historically, Oman has distinguished among its GCC neighbors through its independent foreign policy, with a special focus on mediation. Indeed, Oman has not participated in a number of GCC-wide initiatives, including efforts to stop protests in Bahrain in 2011 using the GCC’s Peninsula Shield Force, the war in Yemen, and it remained neutral during the GCC crisis between June 2017 and January 2021.

Although it has been a member of the GCC since its founding in 1981, Oman has always been outspoken against efforts to expand the reach of the regional body, in particular opposing the expansion of a common currency and monetary union, in addition to openly challenging Saudi efforts to upgrade the union in 2013.

Today, however, as Oman faces economic challenges following the drop in oil prices in 2014 and the more recent downturn spurred by the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as dwindling oil supplies, its posture towards its neighbors may change. The IMF in February said that Oman’s economy decreased 6.3 percent in 2020 and would experience a modest 1.8 percent growth in 2021.

Given this economic context, Oman became the first GCC state to announce plans to implement income tax beginning in 2022. It also received $1 billion in aid from Qatar at the end of last year. And in a bid to attract investors, Oman announced a reduction in income tax for small and medium businesses for 2020 and 2021 and will offer long-term residency permits for foreign investors as part of Vision 2040, which aims to diversify the state’s economy in the face of diminishing oil reserves.

It is perhaps unsurprising that Oman this summer has experienced protests, largely linked to unemployment among Omani nationals, especially young people – the same cause of protests that emerged in 2011.

Considering these challenges, it is perhaps unsurprising that Oman this summer has experienced protests, largely linked to unemployment among Omani nationals, especially young people – the same cause of protests that emerged in 2011. There are at least 65,000 unemployed Omanis, many of whom argue that expatriates are given preference for jobs, particularly in the private sector, even when Omanis have appropriate education for such jobs.

Of course, only time will tell how strong the bilateral ties between Oman and Saudi Arabia will prove to be. Thus far, the two countries have set up a coordination council, and the Saudi cabinet is said to have approved the drafting of agreements with Oman “in a slew of fields including commerce, culture, investment promotion and post and transport” – fields which would assist Oman’s economic position and likely help it create jobs that its citizens are increasingly demanding.

In addition, Oman is likely to work more closely with the Saudi leadership in its capacity in having joined UN-led efforts to mediate a ceasefire in Yemen potentially hosting the next round of Iran-Saudi talks.

Perhaps as important as what the council does or does not do in the future, however, is the fact that it has been established, signaling a potential recalibration of GCC relations, especially as the UAE-Saudi relationship has become strained in recent years. Indeed, in 2016, Saudi Arabia and the UAE established a similar body (the Saudi-Emirati Coordination Council) to facilitate bilateral ties, but the council met for the first time only in 2018.

In the past two years in particular, with the withdrawal of Emirati forces from Yemen in 2019, increasingly public differences in opinion about normalizing relations with Israel, and the most recent spat in OPEC+ about oil pricing and sustained production cuts, it is unclear where the coordination council stands and how effective (or relevant) it remains.

Despite uncertainty about what the newly established Omani-Saudi council may achieve, the Omani sultan’s visit to Riyadh, the first such visit by a leader in Oman in 10 years, signals an increasing and notable willingness to work alongside the GCC’s largest country – something which the Omani leadership has been more hesitant to do in the past. It will be instructive to see how other GCC states react to an emerging Omani-Saudi alliance and whether competition will emerge among the GCC states to engage with Oman.

In addition, the visit, importantly, demonstrates that Oman under its new sultan intends to remain an active mediator in the region, even while trying to address increasingly urgent economic challenges at home. Indeed, its efforts at mediation may grant Oman greater access to financial assistance from neighboring countries and regional powers alike, while carrying on the legacy of its long-serving Sultan Qaboos who pioneered Oman’s mediating role in the region.