Operation Peace Spring launched by Turkey last month with the aim of securing its border with Syria against the threat posed by terrorist organizations such as the YPG and Daesh aroused very strong reactions in the international community, and especially within the European Union.

Perceived as a sudden invasion, the EU immediately condemned Turkey for its unilateral action. A prompt reaction came firstly from the High Representative on behalf of the EU, calling on Turkey to ‘cease the unilateral military reaction’ and adding that ‘Turkish military action risks to protract instability in northeast Syria, providing fertile ground for the resurgence of Daesh”.

Actually, the EU’s top foreign policy official’s statement echoed what was previously declared by the President of EU Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, who asked Turkey to “stop operations’’ and stated that “if the Turkish plan involves the creation of a so-called safe zone, don’t expect the European Union to pay for any of it.”

Following these statements, reactions of the individual member states did not wait long. German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas said that ‘the Turkish offensive threatens to cause a new humanitarian disaster … Turkey is willingly risking further destabilizing the region and a resurgence of IS’ (Daesh)’.  The same security concern was shared by the UK and France, whose Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian urged Turkey to stop the operation as ‘it calls into question the security and humanitarian efforts of the coalition against Daesh and risks undermining Europeans’ security’. Moreover, several European countries summoned Turkish envoys to condemn the military action, Dutch Foreign Minister, representing the general political spirit of the EU, underlined the possibility of a “terrible humanitarian crisis that can trigger new refugee flows and harm the fight against IS and stability in the region.”

At the same time, the main squares of several European cities hosted protest against Turkey, where in some cases YPG flags, effigies of Abdullah Ocalan, and posters in favor of the outlawed PKK have appeared. It was clear an approximate media campaign began to demonize Ankara.

In fact, according to most European observers on Syria, Turkey would have conducted an operation of ethnic cleansing against the Kurds, confirming not only a prejudicial approach, but above all a certain difficulty in understanding the dynamics of the region. It also demonstrated on their behalf the failure of setting a clear distinction between terrorist organizations and the Kurdish population. Furthermore, a narrative of the forced repatriation of Syrian refugees hosted by Turkey has started to become viral.

Although this was the third Turkish operation across the border to guarantee its own security, coming after the operations Euphrates Shield in 2016 and Olive Branch in 2018, this time European leaders and the public opinion reacted almost univocally in condemning Turkey as an aggressor state, marking the apex of a bias and to some extent of a hypocritically contradictory approach.

Indeed, the EU bloc’s foreign ministers pledged to suspend weapons exports to Turkey, although consensus was delayed by the intervention of some voices in the EU such as the UK who supported a softer stance towards Turkey as because as “a key partner of the European Union.”  

Nevertheless, EU nations succeeded in banning arms sales to Ankara, marking the first time such a move was made against a partner and a NATO ally. In the same spirit of rare consensus, the European Parliament also voted on a resolution condemning ‘Turkey’s military intervention’ and urging Ankara to ‘withdraw all of its forces from Syrian territory’. The European Parliament also called for “appropriate and targeted economic measures against Turkey” and the freezing of preferential treatment for Turkish agriculture exports to the EU. Moreover, it further called upon the European Council ‘to introduce a series of targeted sanctions and to impose visa bans on Turkish officials responsible for human rights abuses during the current military intervention” adding ‘the suspension of the EU customs union with Ankara’.

Eventually, along with the statements by European MPs referring to the words of the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan as ‘weaponized’ by threatening Europe with refugees, some other measures aimed at freezing any new funds in support of Turkey for hosting almost four million of Syrian refugees was to be considered, even though it seems unlikely to happen.

As a matter of fact, Turkey’s hospitality towards Syrians has to be considered good practice and an example for the world as from the beginning of the war in Syria Ankara had been taking on the burden almost unilaterally, and much before the March 2016 agreement with EU entered into force. Indeed, it is recognized worldwide that Turkey is one of the biggest humanitarian donors and key policy-makers towards Syrian refugees. In recent progress reports, the EU itself underlined Turkey’s good progress on migration and asylum policies.

Despite migration and refugees being a thorny issue for the EU, it has not yet implemented any efficient policy on this issue.  While Turkey has been treated as a sort of useful tool in containing the flow of refugees and avoiding the spread of social tensions across Europe.

EU nations succeeded in banning arms sales to Ankara, marking the first time such a move was made against a partner and a NATO ally.

However, as in all marriages of convenience, problems arise when conditions are not met. Although the final purpose of the 2016 agreement has been widely honored, there are serious shortcomings in fully satisfying its terms. Ones which contradict the guiding spirit of the international law based on the principle of pacta sunt servanda or simply, deals must be respected.

In exchange for Turkey’s great effort of welcoming and accommodating Syrians fleeing the war, Brussels was to facilitate the visa liberalization process for Turkish citizens within the Schengen area, as well as providing large funds for humanitarian purposes. Both conditions have not been fulfilled by the EU while Turkey has continued to honor its commitments to Syrian refugees and to the European Union.

Along the current operation, fears of new waves of asylum seekers have alarmed Europe and especially those gateway states. Greece and Hungary underlined the need of not being caught off  guard in case new waves of refugees were to occur and called upon additional financial assistance by the EU to Turkey, acknowledging that the 2016 agreement has been the only effective mechanism in coping with the crisis. However, these are isolated voices and the issue is still extremely divisive within the Union. In this regard, the attitude of Brussels and its representatives resembles a capricious child, who gets without being satisfied, blames without taking responsibility, and refuses without proposing alternatives.

This is observed in the tension over the creation of the safe zone on the Turkish-Syrian border as strategically planned by Ankara. A main aim of Operation Peace Spring according to the Turkish government is to establish an approximately 30 km long safe area where a large number of Syrian refugees residing in Turkey would eventually return.

Despite being a complex issue and a fairly ambitious long-term goal, for Ankara this seems to be the only plausible solution to the growing number of refugees, particularly considering its frustration of not feeling sufficiently supported by the international community in responding to  the humanitarian crisis. In other words, Turkey felt alone in bearing the weight of millions of lives and investing billions of dollars in humanitarian aid, and the establishment of a safe zone is vital for enhancing Turkish domestic security finding a lasting solution to cope with the immigration issue, and to restore social cohesion. Nevertheless, the EU Parliament has ‘firmly rejected’ this ambition and it called for a UN-led security zone. The same idea has been endorsed by Germany’s defense minister who proposed sending German soldiers to Syria, an outcome which would further complicate the situation.

In short, Turkey’s operation brought to the surface all of the unresolved issues and tensions existing between Turkey and the European Union and further exacerbated their respective frustrations. Once again it seems that there is merely a chorus of condemnation rather than any attempt to find or implement sustainable solutions for both parties. In this context, ideologically oriented street protests seen in Europe are only one aspect of the serious gap in the relations between Ankara and Brussels, which over the years have been fed by a profound hypocrisy and zigzagging approaches by the EU which goes far beyond the logic of real-politik.

One of the main outcomes of the Sochi Summit between Turkey and Russia was the joint patrols along the Syrian-Turkish border with a depth of 10km. Since then, northeast Syria has witnessed many important developments, and joint patrols between Russia and Turkey commenced at the moment of writing. The future of Turkish-Russian joint patrols faces an important challenge due to the gap between the agreed mechanism and the capacities of Russia in Syria. Even if the Russians increase their military presence, they might still be incapable of maintaining joint patrols with the Turkish Armed Forces. The only possibility of such patrols for Russia would be to accept Turkish superiority in the region and to use Turkish strength against the YPG.

Going with the premise that Russia and Turkey are fully interested in conducting the ongoing joint patrols and fulfilling the deal, the main reason why joint patrols in northeastern Syria is a difficult task is quite similar to the reason why both nations could not conduct joint patrols in Idlib. Armed groups on both sides are of essential threat to one another. If the Russians enter Idlib, Turkey would have a hard time ensuring their safety and vice-versa. If Moscow wants to conduct joint patrols with Turkey and ensure the safety of such patrols, Russian forces accompanied by the Assad regime would need to convince the YPG terror group first. However, the latter is not so interested in this, especially after the Turkish-Syrian joint military operation against them. Even the Americans who were trusted by much of the YPG had a very hard time convincing the YPG for the temporary entry of the Turkish army in a much smaller area in depth and length. It is impossible that the YPG will accept Turkish patrols willingly along the entire Turkish-Syrian border strip.

The only option for Russia to facilitate the joint patrols would be to implement the Sochi agreement fully. Only if Moscow enforces the withdrawal of the YPG to 30km south of the Turkish border will joint patrols with Turkey be safe and durable. Some patrols might happen without the full withdrawal, but the risks are too high and it won’t be sustainable, especially when both sides enter non-rural areas. Therefore, the Turkish demand of joint patrols which was agreed upon in Sochi can be seen as a guarantor mechanism for the real withdrawal of the YPG from the safe-zone. There seems to be no way of having joint patrols with Turkey and providing camouflage for the YPG to remain in the zone simultaneously.

And it is exactly at this point that Russia may reach its limits in Syria. As the situation in Idlib is still fragile, the Assad regime is incapable of sending its battle hardened forces to northeast Syria. The Russian military assets are located at the west side of Syria. To build up a strong military presence in northeast Syria would be a huge task for the Assad regime and Russia’s logistics. For instance, the S-400’s air protection system does not cover the Russian forces in east Syria and the financial resources of the regime are limited.

Even if the regime and Russia could manage to build up a strong presence in northeast Syria, it seems that the enforcement of the YPG’s withdrawal from the safe-zone would almost be mission impossible for Russia. Vladimir Putin may have made promises he is incapable of keeping. The only way out for Russia would seem to be letting Turkey weaken the YPG to an extent which is manageable for the Russian military presence in Syria, or to clearly threaten the YPG with the strength of the Turkish Armed Forces.

On 9 October, 2019 the Turkish Armed Forces and the Syrian National Army launched a joint military operation in the east of the Euphrates against the YPG, the Syrian extension of the PKK terrorist organization. Turkish forces captured many areas in a short time, including Tal Abyad and Rasulayn. Right from the onset, there has been an extensive campaign against Turkey conducted by Western governments and media outlets. Many fake news stories were circulated on social and conventional media aiming to undermine the ethical ground of the operation. Baseless allegations such as bombing civilians or conducting ethnic cleansing were attributed to Turkey. Despite all this, Turkey continued its operation decisively and with the highest sensitivity for civilians. In fact, Turkey was the only country that has paid attention to the humanitarian needs on the field when compared with the US, Russia, and Iran. One can determine this quickly by looking at the post-operation pictures of the areas in which these countries operated.

Nevertheless, Turkey did not exclude any political solution which would meet its objectives. In this regard, on October 17, Turkey agreed with the US to halt the military operation temporarily. Accordingly, the YPG members were supposed to withdraw from the area that Turkey designated as the safe zone within 120 hours. Even though this plan did not function properly, US troops pulled back from the area. On October 22, Turkey turned to Russia and made another deal to maintain its border security in Sochi. The Sochi agreement paved the way for securing Turkey’s borders and was marked as a great diplomatic achievement. With these two agreements, the YPG’s dream of creating a separate state inside Syria collapsed. Even though Turkey eliminated the YPG threat on its southern border, and Iran announced its welcome of the new Sochi deal, Iran’s stance with regards to the operation tells a lot about its calculations in Syria and possible developments in the near future.

Iran’s objection to Operation Peace Spring

From the first minute of the operation Iran condemned Turkey’s actions. Many in Iran, ranging from government to ill-informed lay citizens, raised their objections to Operation Peace Spring. President Rouhani stated that even though he understood Turkey’s security concerns, there were other ways to solve problems such as dialogue. Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif emphasized the 1998 Adana Agreement and encouraged dialogue between the Turkish government and the Assad regime. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement asking Turkey to stop the operation and pull back. Many MPs in the Iranian parliament, especially from the Kurdish populated areas, harshly criticized Turkey’s action. Ali Larijani, the Speaker of the Parliament, canceled his scheduled visit to Turkey as did the former president of Iran Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Friday prayer leaders of the various provinces slated Turkey in their sermons. Some protesters gathered around the Turkish Embassy in Tehran and wrote hideous slogans on the Embassy’s wall. While others protesting around the country burned Turkish flags. Many artists, musicians, and film directors protested against Turkey on social media. 

It is possible to detect a shared language and the usage of a particular discourse about Turkey’s operation in these protests. The discourse was exactly the same which Western countries tried to disseminate. It is a gripping example of how quickly an anti-Western country can adopt to a biased Western discourse when it comes to Turkey.

Iran sacrificed its long term stability in the region for its short term geopolitical gains.

Even so, not all sections of Iran protested and objected to the operation. Some members of the parliament from the regions inhabited by Turkic Iranians intensively opposed the anti-Turkey rhetoric. They gave reminders about the PJAK’s terrorist actions against civilians and of the security personnel and Iranian people who lost their lives fighting the PJAK, the Iranian branch of the PKK terrorist organization. Many Turkic people living in Iran sided with Turkey on social media. Some football players of Tractor Sport Club, a football club of the Azeri city of Tabriz, and the majority of its fans expressed their support for the operation. Diversity of reactions in Iran to Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring wonderfully depicts the range of Iran’s ethnic heterogeneity and the role of ethnicity in political life.

Along with ethnicity, other factors also made a difference in Iran’s daily politics, such as religious sects, political positioning, and institutions. There are various elements and power centers which have voiced their criticism towards Turkey’s action. Although there are several centers of power influential in Iran’s general politics, this cannot be regarded as a polyarchy, as described by the influential political theorist Robert Dahl. According to Dahl, within democracies, there are many power centers which function as stabilizers. Therefore, one power bloc cannot assume power by itself but must share it with others. Dahl describes this as “rule by many”. However, the real picture of Iranian politics exhibits a hierarchy rather than polyarchy. Some institutions have more power than others. At the top of the system, the supreme leader steers the whole political process. Most of the time, he acts as an arbiter between different blocs, but at the end of the day, he has the last say on crucial matters. Therefore, the establishment, led by the Supreme Leader, could control the anti-Turkey discourse circulated among Iranians. However, events did not unfold in this way.

Iran’s U-Turn

In fact, in the last summit of the leaders in Ankara on September 16, 2019, Rouhani had acknowledged Turkey’s security problem in northern Syria and said Turkey had a right to protect its borders. However, he approached things differently when it comes to Operation Peace Spring. What could motivate Iran to act against Turkey’s security interests in Syria? Why would Iran oppose Turkey’s involvement in Syria?

Firstly, Iran sees Syria as a hallway to reach the Mediterranean Sea and Lebanon, where Hezbollah is based. In its geopolitical vision, Syria has an indisputable place. Secondly, Iran invested huge money and manpower in Syria from the beginning of the civil war in 2011. It is understandable from Tehran’s point of view that it does not want to lose influence in Syria. Put differently, Iran wants to see the fruits of this investment. In this context, Turkey is regarded as another stakeholder, and its involvement is seen as a challenge to Iran’s hegemony. And lastly, Iran is not happy with Turkey having a close relationship with Russia. Turkey got the support of Russia in Operation Olive Branch and in Operation Peace Spring. Even though Iran allied with Russia in 2015 to keep Assad in power, its long-term strategic goals differ. In Russia’s perspective, there is room for Israel’s security perceptions regarding Syria and Iran. But Iran’s security perceptions and vision for Syria require a limitation of Israel’s activities. That is why Hezbollah has such importance and Iran wants to keep Syria for Hezbollah’s focus.

Nevertheless, Iran has its own PKK problem as well. The PKK’s Iran branch the PJAK has been active for years in Iran and took several lives of Iranian people. If the YPG gained territorial sovereignty in Syria, Iran would be vulnerable to terror attacks like Turkey. This would put the region’s stability and security in jeopardy. Yet, Iran voluntarily closed its eyes to that reality. In other words, Iran sacrificed its long term stability in the region for its short term geopolitical gains described above. However, Iranian decision-makers fail to see that their short-term gains are also at stake in the light of the latest developments in Syria. With each passing day, Russia is becoming less keen to allow Iran’s activities and influence in the region. Russia allowing Israel airstrikes against Iranian forces in south Syria is an important manifestation of this. Moreover, losing Turkey’s support will add additional costs.

Iran’s attitudes undermine a possible Turkey-Iran alliance related to border security and general regional problems. Iran’s ambivalent policy fuels distrust of Turkey’s decision makers towards Iran. President Erdogan lately expressed his disappointment with Iran’s actions and reminded of Turkey’s support to Iran in the matters of sanctions and nuclear activities. As long as Iran continues to act in this way, there will be no concrete and constructive relations between the two countries. This would result in the further increase in regional problems, and Iran will most likely be even more isolated in the face of sanctions and other instruments that the West has been using against them for some long time.

As Turkey launched its Operation Peace Spring, an unfortunate phenomenon has been observed once again among European and German circles. Namely the continuation of a myth about the YPG. This begins with their practice of legitimizing the YPG as the representative of all Kurds – no matter whether they are living in Turkey, Syria or in Germany, and despite the strong evidence to the contrary.

Without taking into consideration the diversity within the Kurdish community, a false narrative is established in which YPG members, sympathizers and even its leading figures are only discussed within a positive and uncritical narrative. This disguises the true face of the PKK and its offshoot, the YPG in Northern Syria. A mistake rooted in both a lack of knowledge and an intention to shape public opinion, observable among politicians, artistic circles, media representatives, journalists and even think-tankers.

Most of the media outlets disregard or do not explicitly mention the fact that the PKK/YPG is officially listed as a terrorist organization by Turkey, EU, and the US. The term used to describe the terrorist organization in the media is the “prohibited Kurdistan Workers’ Party” which implies two incorrect meanings: First, Turkey’s supposed undemocratic political landscape where minority groups are not allowed political representation, and second the alleged legality of the PKK and its supposed leftist credentials. There are thousands of articles which either hide the PKK’s ethno-nationalist, separatist and armed character or mention that it is prohibited in the US, EU and Turkey without ever explaining why. It is by using this kind of language that a positive perception of the terrorist group is generally achieved.

If one focuses on the stances of German politicians and compares their approaches towards Daesh and to the YPG, particularly with the rise of Daesh (ISIS) in Iraq and Syria, it is noticeable that unfortunately one –secular– terror group was preferred in order to fight another terror group Daesh. This is despite the Western world’s powerful militarily superiority. The question is, if both are deemed to be abhorrent terrorist groups why was one of them acceptable, even to become an ally to the US and EU?

It appears the ethnic-separatist, neo-Marxist and totalitarian PKK/YPG is somehow deemed to be a lesser threat to Europeans and the West, who instead classify so called religiously inspired terrorism at the top of their hierarchy of evil.

In addition to the ideologically motivated stance of journalists and politicians with regard to the YPG, the most striking issue is the ambivalent behavior of academics’ and think-tankers’. Not for the first time, experts on the PKK/YPG were seen to disregard their own research on the YPG on television and radio. But why choose to disregard what you know? It would seem the societal, media and political pressure which underpins the YPG myth have led these academics to disregard their research, opinions and analyses regarding this terrorist group.

Academics spoke about the YPG as if it had no relation with the PKK while their own publications openly stress a PKK-YPG relationship. Unfortunately, popularity, professional “reputation”, financial dependence, and current political developments seem to trump academic integrity. Similarly, think-tankers, who are likely responsible to their sponsors have disregarded their own publications and have even made calls to support a terrorist organization.

Nevertheless, at the end of the day, more realist approaches appear to be winning favor. In this context, Germany’s defense minister and leader of the Christian Democrats recently proposed the establishment of an internationally controlled security zone in Syria in cooperation with Turkey and Russia. It is too early to tell whether these delayed proposals will have any effect on the current discourse and myths surrounding the PKK/YPG terrorist organization in Germany, the same applies to whether such moves will be taken seriously at all both domestically and internationally.

Countries such as Russia and Turkey will most likely reject such delayed calls after their history of disregarding previous efforts, particularly of Turkey. It should be remembered that during those times Western states took no responsibility but tried to put themselves in the foreground. Due to this, it seems rather unlikely that Turkey will accept certain states interrupting an ongoing process, particularly since the recent memorandum of understanding was signed between Turkey and Russia on north-eastern Syria. The picture will become clearer in the coming days and weeks.

As the basis of the international system, sovereignty is understood as the capability of a country to govern itself, prevent the intervention of other countries, and its recognition in the international arena. Beyond its traditional meanings, in his famous book Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy Stephen D. Krasner broke down sovereignty into four types. ‘Interdependence sovereignty’ is the one of them and it is the requirement that a state have effective control of its borders in order to maintain its domestic security. Krasner discusses this and says “if a state cannot regulate what happens across its borders, it will not be able to control what happens within”. In light of this approach, I invite the readers of this piece to think of Turkey’s position, a country which shares its southern border with a fragmented state in a desperate civil war, with terrorist groups close to its border, and facing the risk of a huge flow of further refugees from Syria, in addition to more than 3.5 million already living in the country.

Indeed, Turkey’s latest military operation should have been understood within the framework of border security. However, Operation Peace Spring launched by the Turkish Armed Forces in collaboration with the Syrian National Army generated an entirely different debate in the international arena—whether Turkey’s operation was an invasion or not. These discussions also focused on the supposed political ambitions of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan as a potential motivation for the operation. Putting these misleading perceptions aside, the collective support by the Turkish people for the military operation provides robust evidence of how people from different political backgrounds attach utmost importance to state sovereignty, especially when it comes to questions of national security. Interpreting the operation as an invasion misunderstands a major factor that drives Turkish foreign policy, that it is thoroughly about Turkey’s national security.

To clearly understand this, one should look back to the recent history of Turkish politics. A new security agenda for Turkey surfaced in the 1970s when the first Kurdish opposition groups emerged, and soon after evolved into an ethnic based separatist movement. This generated the PKK, which was recognized as a terrorist organization by the U.S. and EU and took over 40,000 lives in its 30 years of terrorist activity, the PKK terror group became a primary challenge for Turkey’s territorial integrity.

Despite the fact that since the 2000s, the root causes that brought forth the PKK were handled using democratic methods, the territorial integrity issue was not negotiable. Since the 1990s, in line with domestic policy, foreign policymakers responding to the PKK threat sought alliances in the Middle East and cooperated with the US to avert the possibility of an independent Kurdish state. Stances towards the PKK have become a main determinant for Turkish foreign policy. As was demonstrated when Syrian state support to the PKK brought the two countries to the brink of war in 1998.

Since 2011, the Syrian Civil War triggered an ongoing humanitarian catastrophe and turmoil in the region and led to an elevated security concern for Turkey. From the perspective of Turkish policymakers, the refugee crisis and the armament race among terrorist groups at Turkey’s southern borders put the country in a risky position, pushing it to apply stricter and more responsive security measures. The armament of the PYD and YPG, offshoots of the PKK, with the help of the US and European states particularly intensified Turkey’s security concerns. The unending war in Syria,  the insufficient intervention by international actors to address the crisis, and the persistent downgrading of Turkey’s efforts to address the Syrian refugee crisis by European states caused distrust between Turkey and its allies.

Moreover, Turkey had to witness the formation of a terrorist corridor in northern Syria that would pose a long-term security threats to its territorial integrity. Turkey’s concerns about this development and calls for a safe zone were left unanswered until the recent deal was announced with the United States. This signaled the first public affirmation of the need to prioritize Turkey’s security needs as a NATO ally. However, the territorial integrity and border security of Turkey are still largely disregarded by its allies, as reflected in the hostile responses of other NATO members to Turkey’s operation.

The constant conflation of the YPG, PYD and the PKK with the broader Kurdish community, as has been the practice of international media and commentators reveals a complete lack of awareness of regional realities in the simplest terms. The YPG’s ambition to capture territory from warn-torn areas under the Syrian war’s cover the darkness, fed turmoil in the region and caused millions of people to be displaced.

Turkey now hosts almost four million Syrian refugees. Despite the abundant number of refugees compared with other states, such Germany, Turkey has shown the most welcoming response to hosting refugees fleeing the Syrian crisis. However, the latest developments undeniably bring both domestic and international problems for Turkey. Between the build-up of the YPG and Daesh (ISIS) terrorist groups near Turkey’s borders and the huge refugee population, Turkey should have taken further steps to protect its security and ensure more effective control of its borders. Across domestic and foreign policy, responding to the refugee crisis and terror threat become a sovereignty problem of increasing concern to the Turkish public. The creation of safe zone and the push back of terrorists from its southern borders became an obligation.

The previous and recent military operation of Turkey occurred in such a context. Turkish officials repeatedly declared that the territorial integrity of Syria will be protected and the only aim of the operation was to prevent the creation of terror corridor and to establish a safe zone for refugees. Therefore, calling it an invasion falls short of explaining the conditions that brought Turkey to this threshold. Indeed, the latest operation of Turkey is a matter of self-defense. The recent pause in Turkey’s operation in response to the YPG leaving the 20 mile deep safe zone demonstrates that Turkey is sticking to its declarations. Degrading the operation to the level of a leader’s ambition, or portraying it as an invasion is both inaccurate and lazy. Unfortunately, this has become a frequent feature of Western media analysis of Turkish foreign policy. Regardless of the government, assessing foreign policy over time ensures more accurate assessment. Allowing a zone full of terrorists at its southern borders is an unacceptable condition for Turkey and any sovereign state would not accept it. Thus, the Operation Peace Spring is a matter of border security to protect the sovereignty of Turkey rather than the nonsense argument of invasion.

The Turkish Armed Forces commenced its third cross-border military operation against the PKK/PYD in northern Syria on October 9, 2019. As the first incursion into the eastern part of the Euphrates River, this operation began in the wake of a series of fruitless bilateral negotiations between the US and Turkey over a projected safe zone in northeast Syria. Turkey’s security concerns grew considerably following US assistance to the PYD, which had strengthened its ability to build a potential PKK/PYD-led statelet on Turkey’s borders. The vast majority of Turks and Kurds (except in HDP circles) regard this as an existential threat.

It is once the PKK/PYD’s strategy is analyzed that Turkey’s security concerns can be better understood. Firstly, the PKK/PYD should be regarded as a holistic threat and did not separately emerge. For this reason there is no distinction between the YPG (the armed wing of the PYD) and the PYD, and between the HPG (the armed wing of PKK) and the PKK. The threat facing Turkey comes from the combination of the PKK and PYD (PKK/PYD) emanating from their shared ideology, organization, and methodology.

Over the past few years, the PKK/PYD approached the Syrian Civil War in a pragmatic way to achieve its objective of securing a vast area in Syria and Turkey. This involved a new strategy composed of four different elements: affiliating with state actors in Syria by leveraging the fight against Daesh (ISIS), achieving territorial aspirations in Syria, radicalizing youth, and increasing violence in urban areas across Turkey.

The PKK/PYD’s first strategy was to seek out military and political support in order to gain international sympathy and legitimize its territorial aspirations. The rhetoric of fighting against Daesh was instrumental in putting diplomatic pressure on Turkey and causing a postponement of a possible military offensive against the PYD in Syria. The PKK/PYD has managed to maintain the U.S. support until Turkey conducted Operation Olive Branch in Afrin in 2018. This operation signaled for the first time that the PKK/PYD could not be too certain of the future longevity of its tactical relationship with the US.

The security threats of a potential PKK/PYD statelet in northern Syria were brought to the forefront after rocket and mortar attacks on Turkish territory from PKK/PYD held areas in northeast Syria. These attacks targeted the Turkish border towns of Suruç, Akçakale, and Ceylanpınar in Şanlıurfa, and Kızıltepe and Nusaybin of Mardin provinces over the last few weeks. Moreover, modern weapons, ammunition and explosives sourced from the U.S. forces in Syria were said to be smuggled into Turkish territory. Furthermore, as part of their territorialization project, the PKK/PYD caused a demographic change in northeast Syria, forcing local non-PKK affiliated Kurds, Arabs and Turkmens to flee to Turkey as refugees.

The third strategy of the PKK/PYD is to achieve self-determination by using intimidation and coercion tactics in southeast Turkey. The PKK committed violent acts both in rural areas and urban centers with the help of municipalities run by pro-PKK political parties. Despite the fact that the PKK’s urban atrocities, which were clearly manifested during the “trench wars” in 2016, were crushed by Turkish security forces, and pro-PKK municipality mayors and staff were jailed, but the PKK’s desire for a future resurgence in Diyarbakır, Mardin, Van and Hakkari remains. These strategies and the U.S. support for the PKK/PYD made Turkish intervention in northeast Syria inevitable.

Tactical aspect of Operation Peace Spring

Unlike the deployment of numerous fighter jets for intensive airstrikes as was the case during Operation Olive Branch in Afrin, Operation Peace Spring began with a limited number of aircrafts providing constant airstrikes, which forced the PKK/PYD to hold on to their positions.

Meanwhile, Turkish artillery shelled predetermined target locations in order to render the PKK/PYD’s ability to use in-depth defensive tactics impossible. Turkish and Syrian ground forces were also supported with precise airstrikes from combat drones while they maneuvered to encircle the urban towns of Rasulayn and Tal Abyad.

The high fire power and mobility capability of the maneuver forces helped the Turkish Commandos and Syrian National Army break through the PKK/PYD defense lines easily. Under this continuous fire and with the quick maneuver of Turkish operation forces the PKK/PYD could not succeed, and eventually failed to confront the Turkish operation forces. In retaliation, the PKK/PYD fired a series of mortar shells in Turkish border towns.

As of October 17, the Turkish Armed Forces have operated in the area between Rasulayn and Tal Abyad, an area around 120 km in length and 10 km in width. The area captured reached 30 km in width with a total area of approximately 1200 km2. Following Turkey’s military advance, U.S. forces withdrew from Ain Issa, 700 Daesh (ISIS) members were released from prison in Ain Issa by the YPG terror group, 702 PKK/PYD members were killed and 24 others surrendered to operation forces according to Turkey’s Defense Ministry.

In response to the operations, many European countries including Germany, France, the Netherlands and Sweden, declared a ban on weapons sales to Turkey. In a speech by President Erdogan, Turkey’s reaction to Europe’s hostility towards the operation might be to open the borders to allow Syrian refugees to enter Europe. The fear of hosting further refugees could urge European countries to have greater cooperation with Turkey and encourage the return of refugees back to their homes in northeast Syria. The area between Rasulayn and Tal Abyad was not chosen randomly by the Turkish government. Turkey aims to clear the PKK/PYD from an overwhelmingly Arab populated area. This was the first area where the demographic change was carried out by the PKK/PYD terror group when they seized the territory in 2015.

The US-Turkey deal over Northern Syria

While the operation was in the process of capturing Ain Issa, Rasulayn and the surrounding areas, an agreement was reached between the U.S. and Turkey in Ankara on the evening of October 17. The agreement meets Turkey’s operation objectives and there will be no further military push except for emerging contingencies that may develop. Although, the US handover of Manbij was anomaly in the western part of the Euphrates River, the race to control Manbij caused no major security instability in the region, and expected to result in further cooperation by Turkey with Russia in northeast Syria.

The deal with the U.S. has surely helped Turkey keep the U.S. involved in Syrian geopolitics in a manner that might give Turkey an upper hand to balance Russian influence in Syria’s constitution-making process. Beyond that, the successful implementation of the deal might pave the way for the dissolution of the PKK/PYD. However, a set of technical preparations are needed for the implementation of the deal. The technical elements of the deal are expected to relate to the following:

Withdrawal of PKK/PYD members in a timely manner: the locations of the withdrawal and re-location destinations should be determined.

Rules of engagement: this is related to Turkey’s disengagement rules.

Arms collections: this requires a technical study of the designation of the weapons, platforms and systems to be collected. In this regard, a concrete designation of the types of ammunition, explosives and vehicles and military systems is needed.

How to implement the safe zone: Turkey may need to re-calibrate its military missions in Syria for bringing quicker stability in the region. In this context, new recruitments and a changing power composition may cause a contention between the US and Turkey, as a further attachment of Syrian National Army and non-PKK SDF fighters to the Turkish forces is expected.

Sub-military missions: the missions may include patrolling, observation, surveillance, supervision, investigations of complaints and other implied tasks.

Turkey should focus on its legitimate cause of its counter-terrorism operation while also implementing its plan for a safe zone. It is expected that the PKK/PYD might try to shift its focus of violent acts to other areas amid the disorientation of the withdrawal process. There is the likelihood that Operation Peace Spring might be resumed in the projected safe zone area if the PKK/PYD withdrawal is not successfully implemented as promised by the U.S.

Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring was launched with the purpose of establishing a safe zone to remove the YPG terror group from southern borders of Turkey. Now, Turkey’s military operation has been paused for 120 hours as a result of the deal reached with the US yesterday evening. Observers noted during the course of the operation so far that the images of Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK’s imprisoned leader, left hanging over walls in the border towns of Tal Abyad and Rasulayn. This is a clear indication of the YPG’s tie to the PKK, its sympathy with Ocalan, and its shared aspiration to establish an ideologically Marxist and ethno-nationalist statelet in the region.

Since the operation was launched, Western media and politicians along with PKK sympathizers and nationalist Kurdish social media users, have harshly criticized Turkey. They presented Turkey as an invading or occupying force with no intention to leave Syria in the long run. They have further portrayed Turkey’s fight against the YPG as being against international law, although, in fact, the operation was supported by local Arab Muslims and regional Christian groups.

A deeper analysis of such criticisms by Western journalists and politicians reveal the fact that these are deeply biased responses devoid of any engagement with facts. Some have accused Turkey of targeting civilians while others have described Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring as part of an oft-repeated plot to establish a Neo-Ottoman Empire.

It is so strange that Turkey’s security concerns emanating from the PKK terror threat over four consecutive decades are not properly addressed, and that neither NATO allies nor Western journalists or think-tankers paid due attention to the subject except a few thoughtful exceptions (I>; II).

Analysts have embellished and insisted on the narrative that Turkey’s military operations will result in strengthening Daesh (ISIS) and the Assad regime ignoring that this would only happen against Turkey’s interests in the region.

The narrative about Daesh prisoners, for example, ignores the fact that the Turkish Armed Forces have fought against this terror threat more than any other country in the world through military and security operations inside and outside the country. While instead, Western governments have chosen not to support a NATO ally in the fight against Daesh, but preferred to back a terror group, as President Trump indirectly admitted in a recent statement.

Despite Turkey’s ambitions to establish the security conditions required so that more than one million Syrians may be resettled in the north of Syria, some Western critics have argued that Turkey’s recent operations might cause the number of Syrian refugees heading to Europe to increase. Most of the critics do not address and disregard the fact that the YPG itself has succeeded in changing Northern Syria’s demographics causing many to flee to across the border.

Most observers of Turkey find that unlike their own opinions, the majority of Turks support the operations against the YPG, including politicians from the main opposition party the CHP. Others have also stated that the operation has strengthened President Erdogan’s domestic position without analyzing the reasons. Analysts have tried to dismiss support for President Erdogan by explaining it away as a simple “rally round the flag”, however without looking at the Turkish context in particular, these theoretical approaches fail to explain the reality on the ground. Instead a greater focus by western analysts appears to be on how the operation will supposedly make Turkey much more isolated in the global context.

It is interesting to note the disappointment expressed by foreign observers highly critical of Erdogan that the new mayor of Istanbul (CHP), who they have often lauded as a “hope” for Turkey, is also supportive of “Erdogan’s operation”. Demonstrating once again their failure to understand Turkey’s complex social dynamics and also exposing the way in which highly rigid, ideological narratives dominate their readings of Turkish politics. Some deliberately do not want to understand that most Turks fundamentally reject any kind of cooperation with the PKK’s offshoots.

On the other hand, discussions in Europe and in Germany have also focused on the fact that there are no European instruments that can be used to effectively oppose Turkey’s actions in the Syrian context, except for the somewhat symbolic steps made by some European authorities to halt arms exports to Turkey. Ultimately in the words of the Foreign minister of Luxembourg’s recent tweet, “We as Europeans are not able to stop that. This has to be told honestly to the people”.

Turkey’s security concerns are for the most part disregarded while those of a terrorist organizations are tolerated and even supported. Leading Western countries, think-tanks, and media representatives who aware of the dangers of PKK affiliated organizations, do not hesitate to challenge Turkey in favor of the YPG. This however appears to be rooted in a reading of Turkish politics and foreign affairs that disregards facts and opinions inside Turkey, and the conditions on the ground in Northern Syria. Such a situation cannot continue forever, and as Turkey is an important NATO player in the region, it will only be a matter of time until the importance of Turkey as an ally will be once again rediscovered.

Turkey’s cross-border military operation, Operation Peace Spring, was launched on October 9, 2019. The Turkish Armed Forces secured some critical targets including Rasulayn and Tal-Abyad. After the operation started, numerous fake news stories and manipulative content were published targeting Operation Peace Spring and the endeavor was turned into a propaganda war. With the YPG forces about to quickly lose their power and domination in Northern Syria militarily, they have turned to the long-standing support of Western nations as a way out. And for this, they are relying on their well-oiled propaganda machine.

Which tools are being used by the YPG in the propaganda war? First of all, the YPG’s main goal is getting the support of Western countries and encouraging them to use their foreign policy tools. And indeed, they appear to be successful in gaining the public support of most Western countries. These countries now threaten Turkey with embargoes and military measures to end the military operation. Finland, Norway, Netherlands, Germany, and France have already suspended arm sales to Turkey. European countries are trying to force Turkey to terminate its operation in the region.

But why are European countries acting so harshly towards the operation? One of the answers lies in the imagined idea of Rojava. For a long time, Rojava, the YPG-led autonomous region of Northern Syria, has been imagined in Western media as a democratic and pluralistic society flourishing in the heart of a troubled Middle East. However, the reality on the ground was quite different, with the YPG carrying out a campaign of violence, intimidation and displacement in order to secure territorial gains. 

After the capture of Northeast Syria by the YPG forces in 2012, the PKK’s long-lasting democratic autonomy project was implemented in Rojava. At this point, it is crucial to understand what the PKK’s democratic autonomy project is. Since 2007, both the PKK and ethno-nationalist separatist Kurdish political parties have underlined that the solution to the problems facing Kurds requires the creation of an autonomous region enabling Kurds to govern themselves, without the intervention of any other actor. This project began to be implemented with the establishment of Rojava with this region becoming a laboratory for this project. But the terrible abuses carried out in the name of establishing Rojava speaks for itself. 

Instead, most Western media channels depicted life in Rojava as a place where women and other vulnerable groups directly participated in political processes, and where decisions are taken by consensus. Indeed, most of this coverage paid specific attention to the secular policies of Rojava and compared it to the practices of the Daesh.  For instance, the New York Times Magazine defined Rojava as a “Dream of Secular Utopia in ISIS’ Backyard” and underlined how secular education policies were being implemented in the region.

Because of this reason, Western media channels have also represented the YPG as freedom fighters who ended the brutality of Daesh in the region. The operation by Turkey was therefore perceived as the fall of the Rojava dream. This was reflected in the remarkable headlines and stories by some Western newspapers and journals such as “Rojava Betrayed. An End to our Dream of Revolution?” and “Turkish Attack on Syria Endangers a Remarkable Democratic Experiment by the Kurds”. Therefore, the long-lasting glorification of Rojava in the Western media strengthened the hand of the YPG in the propaganda war.

Secondly, the cooperation between the United States and the YPG was instrumentalized to urge the Trump administration not to withdraw its support to the YPG. Since the Obama administration, the US had been aiding arms to the YPG forces, this aid became formalized during the Trump administration in order to speed up military operations in Raqqa and ensure victory over Daesh. Thus, the US media are now accusing the Trump administration of betraying “the Kurds”, who are considered to be “the US allies who ended the Daesh dominance in Northern Syria”. Since the Trump administration is under pressure, President Trump has been trying to satisfy public opinion and decrease the domestic fall out by threatening Turkey with new sanctions. Nevertheless, almost all leading Western newspapers and journals are not convinced about the rationale behind Turkey’s operation in the region and this has empowered the hand of the YPG in its propaganda.

The first days of the operation and the success of the Turkish Armed Forces on the ground show that success in a propaganda war has not changed the real situation for the YPG. Because of this, the YPG has been trying to find a new ally to push back against the Turkish army. In order to seek a way out the YPG appears to have shaken hands with the Assad regime and Russia. When for so long the Assad regime has been blacklisted for its brutal role in the Syrian civil war, including the use chemical weapons on civilians, how such an alliance will impact the YPG’s image into the future remains to be seen.

On October 9, Turkey launched Operation Peace Spring for which it had been preparing for months. Understanding that diplomatic efforts with regional and international actors could not prevent the establishment of a planned corridor by the YPG terror group in northern Syria, Ankara decided to take a unilateral step towards eliminating the threats against its territorial integrity and national interests. Acting within the framework of international rights and obligations and with the legitimacy of international law, Turkey emphasizes that the primary objective of Operation Peace Spring is to prevent a terrorist controlled corridor along its southern border.

In fact, within the scope of this, Turkey’s multi-staged plan began to be  implemented three years ago, on August 24, 2016, through Operation Euphrates Shield. Organized with the wide participation of the Turkish Armed Forces’ air and ground troops, Operation Euphrates Shield played a critical role in minimizing some of the negative consequences of the Syrian Civil War. The Operation made significant progress in blocking the PYD, the Syrian branch of the PKK, and the YPG, the military wing of PYD, from establishing a “terror corridor” in the region. The push back against this organization that is supported by the United States, Turkey’s now unreliable ally, through all kinds of weapons and ammunition, was crucial for Ankara. Turkey believed that YPG constituted a permanent threat along its southern borders. Therefore, eliminating the terror group was of vital significance not only for the national security of Turkey, but also for the long-term interests of the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. Operation Euphrates Shield may be seen as a  milestone in the history of modern Turkey.

The second operation was carried out between  January and March 2018 under the name Operation Olive Branch that was the next step in the process. Through this operation, an important area in the West of the Euphrates, including the city of Afrin, came under the Turkish control and the groups supported by Ankara. The city of Afrin was a strategic location for the YPG and regarded as one of its strongholds in the region. With these two operations, Turkey proved its determination to eliminate all kinds of threats directed to its national security.

In the last stage of this initiative, Turkey launched Operation Peace Spring. It was announced that the Turkish Armed Forces have initially aimed to control the area between the towns of Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ayn. In the later stages, the operation aims to create a safe zone, which will be 480 km long and 30 km deep on the other side of Turkey’s border with Syria. With Operation Peace Spring, Ankara aims to free a total of 13,500 square kilometers from terrorist elements and to achieve four goals to ensure its national security.

The first and primary objective of Operation Peace Spring is to prevent the establishment of a terror corridor in Northern Syria. Turkey aims to not only make terrorist elements leave the area but to also create a peaceful safe zone along its southern border where the Arab, Turkmen and Kurdish civilian population of the region can live in peace. For this, the liberation of the cities under the YPG control was vital.

Turkey’s second goal is to send a message to the international community and regional actors that Ankara is determined to use hard power when needed. Through Operation Peace Spring, Turkey once again shows its determination in the face of any anti-Turkey policies by global and regional actors, and that it will not hesitate to resort to military options if its national interests are threatened. While Turkey considered both diplomatic and military options in finding solutions to regional problems, it also demonstrated itself to be a decisive power in responding to initiatives which may attempt to undermine Turkey’s rights in other conflict zones such as the Eastern Mediterranean.

Another important objective of Operation Peace Spring is to create a safe zone for the return of the Syrians. As President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated, Syrian refugees who want to return to their country will be able to return to the cities that will be liberated and built after Operation Peace Spring. This step will be in line with the demands of various social groups inside Turkey that have criticized the government for its handling of Syrian refugees. It is understandable that Ankara aims to prevent further polarization over Syrian refugees.

Finally, Turkey plans to safeguard the territorial integrity of Syria, which it has been defending from the beginning of the civil war. Through Operation Peace Spring, Ankara reemphasized its commitment to ensuring the territorial integrity of Syria, which is ignored by external players involved in the conflict. From the very beginning of the war, Turkey has  tried to cooperate with other actors to protect Syria’s territorial integrity and to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis. Turkey has taken initiatives to settle the issue with Russia and Iran. It should be noted that former US President Barack Obama supported the terrorist organization the YPG instead of cooperating with Turkey, and thus, the formation of a terrorist state in the region became a serious possibility. This development clearly threatens the territorial integrity of Syria. In order to prevent the partition of Syria, Turkey decided to take a unilateral step and launched Operation Peace Spring.

Turkey has recognized that there may be a greater threat to its own interests in the future if such an ethno-nationalist Kurdish state is established, and has taken a decisive stance to eliminate this terror corridor despite international pressure. Due to this determination, Turkey could turn a deaf ear to regional and global actors. In spite of the serious reactions and threats by the US administration, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stressed that Operation Peace Spring will continue until it reaches its goals.

Several international organizations such as the European Union and the Arab League raised concerns about the operation but Turkey’s response to these statements were harsh. In one of his speeches, President Erdogan gave a strong response to the condemning messages by countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Reminding listeners that Saudi Arabia was responsible for thousands of civilian deaths in Yemen, he stressed that Riyadh had no right to criticize Turkey’s operation against terrorist organizations. He also mentioned that Sisi, who came to power with a military coup in Egypt, was a “democracy killer” and that Cairo would not be successful in its smear campaign against Turkey.

It should be reiterated that most of the governments in the Arab world are regimes that do not derive their legitimacy from the people, and do not reflect the views and will of their public. The foreign policies of these regimes do not go beyond the desires of their Western allies. These regimes are taking a position against Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring as they think Turkey’s actions could threaten their own interests or their Western allies. Therefore, it would be misleading to think that the statements made by these countries have also been endorsed by the Arab masses. In contrast, the Arab people support the leadership of Turkey led by President Erdogan in the Middle East as public opinion polls show that he is the most respected and trusted leader in the region.

With Operation Peace Spring, Turkey has taken a vital step towards ensuring peace and stability in the region. Despite facing all kinds of threats and pressure, Ankara has shown the international community that it will never allow a terrorist organization on its borders. With its military capacity, technical equipment and operational capability developed in recent years, the Turkish Armed Forces are one of the most important actors that have contributed to launching Operation Peace Spring. The operation is also endorsed and supported by almost all political parties represented in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. Only the HDP, which has close links to the PKK/YPG terror group, did not support the operation. No doubt, Operation Peace Spring will take its place in the history books as a military operation through which Turkey’s future was saved by today’s leadership.

After Turkey and the Syrian opposition launched Operation Peace Spring against the PKK/YPG terror group to preserve Syria’s territorial integrity and address Turkey’s national security concerns, many states have taken steps against Turkey. The main tool used was sanctions against the Turkish government. At the time of writing, Czechia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway have imposed arms embargoes on Turkey. Additionally, the Trump administration announced a set of sanctions against Turkey including new tariffs and the targeting of Turkish officials, with possible sanctions from the US Congress as well. The absurdity of all of these sanctions is that Turkey is ready to accept any kind of sanction as the cost of inaction would be of much higher. The sanctions only weaken NATO and pushes Turkey away from the western alliance.

Turkey did not start this operation hoping that the Trump administration would greenlight it. This operation was inevitable. Northeast Syria was heading towards becoming a PKK statelet and a long-term threat to Turkey’s national security and territorial integrity. Diplomatic attempts by Ankara to find a joint solution with Washington failed as the American side have not acknowledged the most important concerns of Turkey and CENTCOM torpedoed any agreements from happening.

For Turkey, the YPG presence in northeast Syria poses a threat to Turkey through their possible cross-border attacks. In this manner, the security mechanism as the US side called it could address these concerns but actually this was the less important concern of Turkey. The oft repeated sentence that the US side “understands Turkey’s legitimate security concerns” was just not true. The US has not understood its longtime ally at all. Turkey wants to prevent the establishment of a PKK communist state along its southern borders at all costs. Turkey looks to the situation in Syria from a geopolitical standpoint of view and knows that the situation in Syria would harm Syria’s territorial integrity and pose a serious threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity in the long run, opening the gates for endless wars and chaos in the already chaotic Middle East.

A second concern of Turkey is related to the situation of the Syrian refugees, which is heavily underestimated by the west. The rise in hate speech, social tensions, economic costs and the political environment in Turkey has meant that Turkey can no longer carry this burden anymore, but Turkey has found itself in a deadlock. Syrian refugees will not return to areas held by the regime or the YPG, the EU will not allow refugees to cross into Europe, and the international community is not providing enough support to Turkey for hosting such a large refugee population. Lastly, the situation in Idlib could generate a further two million more refugees. A new inflow of refugees into Turkey would destabilize one of the last islands of stability in the Middle East. Turkey had no other choice but to establish a safe-zone in Syria.

Many other costs could have emerged if Turkey would not have intervened. In order not to surpass the limits of this article, I will finish with a last danger. The PKK/YPG is  indoctrinating a new generation in northeast Syria with hatred against Turkey, and like Daesh (ISIS) indoctrination in the region, would create a long term security threat for Turkey as well. Seeing the costs that Turkey could face by not intervening in Syria, attempts by other states to impose sanctions against Turkey are useless and won’t change Turkish opinion at all. These same governments who have not imposed any sanctions against Saudi Arabia over Yemen are only satisfying themselves by doing so.

Turkey will no longer tolerate the presence of a terrorist group on its southern borders as the country’s leading figures recently announced their determination to start a military operation as soon as possible. As has been globally observed in recent days, the U.S.-backing of the YPG/PYD has decreased at the U.S. presidential level despite the heavy criticism and pressure from both the Republicans and Democrats. The following days will most likely involve a greater clarification of positions towards Turkey’s planned military operations.

Besides the operation’s potential scope and its military purpose which will be discussed in detail, it is interesting to observe that most of the U.S. and Western voices in general take a position that blindly supports the YPG, which is the Syrian branch of the PKK terrorist organization.

Turkey’s alliance with the U.S. and NATO has 67 years of history. The country has positioned itself long ago in the Western alliance, viewing it as a strategic partnership in the fight against regional and global terrorism. Given this, it is not understandable why most Western politicians, media representatives and social media users directly or indirectly prefer the YPG despite Turkey’s serious security concerns.

Turkey’s struggle against the PKK terrorism is disregarded. Instead, the U.S. and other Western democracies describe “Kurds” as friends or allies. Referring to “Kurds” instead of the more accurate YPG/PKK, reinforces a false narrative because not every Kurdish person is a YPG/PKK member or supporter, and further implies that opposition to the YPG and PKK is in reality opposition to the Kurdish people themselves. The more accurate question is whether the West has ever truly been friends of the Kurdish people when they have themselves been facing PKK terrorism for more than 35 years. But this reality is ignored when PKK propaganda in the form of political liaisons with PYD/YPG is widespread.

Unfortunately, this attitude is of fundamental concern and should not be ignored while Turkey conducts military strikes in the upcoming days. There should be research to discover the roots of Western and even some domestic support for the PKK. This issue is perhaps not well addressed today, but for future readers and researchers, it is important to understand the current positions of Western democracies, their media and even their civil representatives in favour of the PKK/PYD.

How it is possible that democracies and their media hide, disregard, downplay the activities of a neo-Marxist and ethnic-separatist terrorist organization? How can a terrorist organization such as the PKK, which is regarded as a prohibited terrorist organization both in Europe and the U.S. enjoy comfortable support by Western powers? This happens despite several reports, opinion pieces, studies, and interviews with experts from the Western world that prove the obvious connection between the PKK and PYD/YPG.

I doubt that a realism-based approach is able to explain such irrational positions. Furthermore, the preferred arguments that “defeating Daesh terrorism has to be the priority” does not answer why a terrorist organization such as the YPG is actively preferred by Western policymakers and even supported by civilians in order to fight another terror organization such as Daesh. Actually, this narrative has been reiterated for more than six to seven years and therefore more people in the West are inclined to play down the PKK’s actual role as a terrorist organization while disregarding the fundamental concerns of an ally.

The direct or indirect support of the PKK through its offshoot in Syria has perhaps functioned until now but it is clear that this blind stance will not guarantee a long-term approach. It is not acceptable that an ethnic-separatist and neo-Marxist terrorist organization is normalized.

In Turkey, there is one political party, the HDP, and only a few supporters from among radical Marxist groups that declared their support for the YPG. Turkey’s main opposition party, the CHP’s current stance is not to support a Turkish military strike openly against the YPG in Northern Syria. But this should not confuse observers. Although there are sympathizers of Kurdish separatism among the ranks of the CHP administration, the party rejects the existence of the YPG/PKK and supports the fight against it. This also counts for all other terrorist groups no matter what their political agendas are. A high majority of Turkish citizens oppose the PKK/PYD, Daesh, FETO and all other terrorist groups, and this is a stance which should be reflected in the allies of Turkey, which at the moment appears to only be Spain.