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erbia witnessed a second consecutive night of violent confrontations on Wednesday as anti-government protesters and supporters of President Aleksandar Vucic clashed in several cities, marking one of the most turbulent moments in more than nine months of demonstrations.

The unrest has intensified since Tuesday, when violent exchanges in the northwestern town of Vrbas left dozens injured, including 16 police officers, and resulted in multiple arrests. Similar confrontations spread Wednesday to the capital Belgrade, Novi Sad, Kraljevo, Kragujevac, Cacak, and Nis, prompting the deployment of riot police nationwide.

In Novi Sad, a city that has been at the heart of the protests, Vucic’s supporters threw flares toward anti-government demonstrators gathered near the offices of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). Protesters responded by smashing the building’s windows. Riot police quickly intervened, forming a security cordon to prevent further damage.

Interior Minister Ivica Dacic confirmed at least one police officer was injured during Wednesday’s confrontations and called for the “return of law and order.”

In Belgrade, thousands took to the streets in separate rallies. Riot police used tear gas in at least one part of the city to disperse anti-government crowds, while elsewhere they maintained a tense line between opposing camps. In the central town of Kraljevo, security forces physically separated rival groups to prevent further escalation.

From local tragedy to nationwide movement

The wave of protests began in November after a canopy collapsed at a train station in Novi Sad, killing 16 people. The tragedy sparked widespread outrage, with protesters blaming the disaster on corruption and negligence in state infrastructure projects.

Initially led by university students, the demonstrations have since swelled to include hundreds of thousands of participants from across the country, united in their demands for greater government accountability, early parliamentary elections, and the resignation of senior officials, including Dacic.

Vucic has so far refused to call early elections, dismissing the protests as politically motivated attempts to destabilize the country.

Counterdemonstrations stir tensions

In recent weeks, Vucic’s supporters have begun staging counterdemonstrations, often setting up camps outside key government buildings. On Wednesday evening, pro-government media reported that Vucic visited a camp of his supporters outside the presidency building in downtown Belgrade, describing anti-government demonstrators as “thugs.”

The president’s rhetoric has drawn criticism from opposition groups, who accuse the government of inflaming tensions and misrepresenting the nature of the protests. While most demonstrations since November have been peaceful, the past two days have seen a sharp increase in violence.

Protesters claim that government supporters initiated Tuesday’s violence in Vrbas, as well as incidents in Backa Palanka, Novi Sad, and Nis. In Vrbas, images from the scene showed SNS supporters throwing flares, rocks, and bottles at protesters, who responded in kind. Police intervened to separate the groups but reported dozens of injuries.

Police Commissioner Dragan Vasiljevic told state-run RTS television that the protesters “came to attack” the governing party’s supporters outside party offices — a claim the protesters dispute.

Political stakes

The unrest poses a challenge for Vucic, who has maintained a firm grip on power for 13 years. Serbia is a formal candidate for European Union membership, but critics say democratic freedoms have eroded under his leadership. At the same time, Vucic has balanced close ties with Russia and China, fueling unease among some Western allies.

The protests come at a sensitive time for Serbia’s foreign policy ambitions. EU officials have repeatedly emphasized that progress toward membership depends on reforms in governance, rule of law, and media freedom. Domestic unrest and allegations of heavy-handed policing risk further complicating accession talks.

Authorities have urged both sides to refrain from violence, but the political polarization shows no sign of easing. Dacic, the interior minister, vowed that police would “continue to secure order on the streets” and warned of more arrests if clashes continue.

Student organizers, meanwhile, have announced that protests will go on until their demands are met. “We will not be silenced by intimidation,” one student leader in Belgrade told reporters. “This is about the future of our country and the right to live without fear and corruption.”

As night fell on Wednesday, Belgrade’s streets were still heavily patrolled by riot police. Protest organizers said they plan to regroup on Thursday, while government supporters vowed to maintain their own presence in public spaces.

For now, Serbia’s political crisis appears set to deepen, with the potential for more confrontations in the days ahead.

(Source: The Associated Press)

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mid the continuously shifting geopolitics of the Balkans, an unprecedented call has been sounded by the leaders of Germany, France, and Italy, urging Serbia to “deliver on de-facto recognition” of Kosovo. This unified front presents a profound shift in the EU’s stance on the Kosovo issue and may have profound implications for the future of the region.

Kosovo proclaimed its independence from Serbia in 2008. However, Serbia has refused to recognize this claim, viewing Kosovo as an integral part of its territory. The international community has remained divided on this issue.

While a significant number of countries have acknowledged Kosovo’s sovereignty, several others, including Russia and China, have sided with Serbia in not recognizing the Balkan state.

Unprecedented move by the European Power Trio

This latest development is underlined by a joint statement from French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni. The trio’s call pushes Serbia towards recognizing Kosovo’s independence and is set against the backdrop of recent violent skirmishes, further aggravating concerns of renewed conflict in the Balkans.

The spotlight, for now, seems to be focused predominantly on northern Kosovo, where ethnic Serbs are in the majority. Tensions have escalated to alarming proportions, leading to a series of violent confrontations in recent months. The gravity of the situation is further highlighted by reports suggesting that the UK has dispatched troops to the region as part of a NATO peacekeeping initiative.

A call for mutual progress and reciprocity

While the call for recognition is paramount, the European leaders also emphasized the significance of swift execution of the Path to Normalization Agreement. Initiated in Brussels, this agreement envisages a framework for enhancing relations between the two Balkan states. The emphasis on ‘something for something’ – a principle suggesting mutual benefits and obligations – was clear in their message.

For President Aleksandar Vucic of Serbia, this puts him squarely in a dilemma. Historically, Vucic has been vocal about Serbia neither formally nor informally recognizing Kosovo. However, the renewed international pressure may force a reconsideration.

On the other side, Kosovo, under Prime Minister Albin Kurti, is expected to advance the creation of the Association of Serb Majority Municipalities, enhancing self-governance for local Serbs. This has been a long-standing demand and will be a significant step toward appeasing concerns and initiating reconciliation.

Future prospects for the Balkans and the EU

Both Serbia and Kosovo harbor aspirations of joining the European Union. The normalization of their bilateral ties is crucial to this objective. The EU has always stipulated that the two Balkan countries must amicably resolve their differences before they are considered for membership.

Europe has always been watchful of the Balkans, primarily due to the volatile history of the region. The EU’s role in mediating discussions between Serbia and Kosovo has spanned several years. However, with recent tensions threatening to spiral out of control, there has been a noticeable increase in engagement from major European nations.

Economic and political advantages await Serbia and Kosovo should they decide to heed the call from the European trio. EU integration promises not just political stability, but also a plethora of economic benefits. The message from the leaders hints at these potential windfalls, emphasizing the opportunities both nations stand to lose if the normalization process derails.

The statement from the leaders of France, Germany, and Italy can be seen as a watershed moment in the EU’s handling of the Serbia-Kosovo conundrum. Their unified call for recognition and mutual progress signals a clear direction for both nations. As both Serbia and Kosovo ponder their next moves, the international community awaits with bated breath, hoping for a peaceful and constructive outcome in this long-standing geopolitical puzzle.

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osnia and Herzegovina is made up of different ethnic and religious communities. The Serbs, as a prominent minority, have their own autonomous entity, the Republika Srpska, which makes up half of the Bosnian state, the other being the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Republika Srpska has its own legal authorities and institutions, but it still has to abide by national laws. However, this system does not appear to work as intended—especially when the largest minority demands secession.

The issue of secession has a legal and political background. Milorad Dodik’s recent legislation, which was passed on June 27, targets property ownership. His desire is to protect Serbian property as he fears that Bosnian authorities will either confiscate it or give it to Europeans seeking to buy property in Bosnia. Meanwhile Bosnian lawmakers are promoting the nationalization of state property since for them, real estate should not be under the jurisdiction of state entities but should belong to the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole.

The Serbian constituents of Republika Srpska are alarmed by such news: they want to take full control of the properties under their jurisdiction. The attitude signals the desire for independence, and Dodik is threatening Bosnia with an independence referendum which would allow it to secede from the country.

Bosnian Serbs’ strife for an independent foreign policy

Dodik’s motive for secession can be traced back to his vision of foreign policy. He believes that the West is responsible for dragging countries into wars, and follows a pro-Russian stance in most policymaking. For example, he blames the West for causing the war in Ukraine. This attitude stems from his political experience in the Yugoslav Wars, which he believes were instigated by the West. That is why he wants to keep Bosnia away from Western influence.

Dodik found an alternative in the policy goals of Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić. As of 2020, Vučić has been formulating new goals for his country’s foreign policy which he calls “Srpski Svet” (Serbian World). These policy goals include the expansion of Serbian influence in the Balkans. According to “Srpski Svet,” Serbia should have more influence in countries where Serbian minorities live and Serbia should become an independent actor which connects Europe and Eurasia.

Dodik is known as a pro-Russian figure and Putin often vocalizes his support for him. Vučić’s foreign policy agenda bears similarities to Putin’s “Russkiy Mir” (Russian World) wherein Putin promotes ethnonationalism and independence. However, Bosnia is governed by international law and EU regulations—a fact that Dodik interprets as his country being governed by foreign institutions, comparing the situation to that of the Russian minority which lives in the eastern provinces of Ukraine. If Bosnia does not change its pro-Western policy, he suggests Republika Srpska should secede.

Religious and ethnic distinctiveness of Bosnian Serbs

Domestic concerns have also been a powerful reason for promoting secession in the Balkans. Ethnic and religious divisions are in the political rhetoric of populist politicians. On July 30, Dodik denied the genocide of Muslims in Srebrenica and claimed that Bosniaks needed public support, reinforcing the myth of Serbian martyrdom. Dodik believes that Bosniaks are “second-class people” who have exchanged their original Orthodox faith for material gain.

The Republika Srpska holds public ceremonies in which Catholic Croats and Muslim Bosnians (Bosniaks) are cursed. These events glorify Serbian war criminals such as Ratko Mladić. Dodik deliberately keeps alive the nationalistic fervor of the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s fueled by his desire to keep Republika Srpska under his jurisdiction ethnically homogeneous. As a result, other ethnic groups such as Croats and Bosniaks do not settle in Republika Srpska.

Dodik also shuns the Serbs who volunteer to serve in the Bosnian army. Legally, Republika Srpska cannot deploy an independent armed force under international agreements and Bosnia’s multinational army is obliged to protect all citizens, regardless of religion and race. As a matter of principle, the army cannot be composed of a single ethnic group; however, Dodik argues in favor of a Serbian army to protect Serbians. An ethnicity-based regional army would drastically reduce Sarajevo’s control over Republika Srpska.

Dialogue for the future of Bosnian Serbs

Dodik does not limit his diplomatic ties to Russia and Serbia. Last year, he invited Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Croatian President Zoran Milanović to participate in a dialogue for his handling of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s internal problems. He was also invited by Erdoğan to the Turkish Parliament where he celebrated Erdoğan’s statements on reducing foreign influence in Bosnia.

Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán tried to persuade Dodik to integrate with the EU instead of becoming an independent foreign state. The two have a close relationship and Dodik pays close attention to Orbán’s proposals.

The mediation efforts by Orbán, Erdoğan, and Milanović, who are all familiar with the political culture of the Balkans, can help Bosnia contain the secession issue. While traditional actors such as Russia and the United States are on opposite sides, new mediators can find a middle ground.

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oday is the anniversary of one of the dark pages in modern history. Twenty-eight years ago today, at least 8,372 men and boys were subjected to genocide by Serbian forces led by Ratko Mladic. Tens of thousands of women, children, and elderly also endured torture, rape, and forced displacement. The white stones of the Srebrenica Genocide Memorial stand tall as a stark reminder of those dark memories.

History is often hailed as a repository of past events, serving as a crucial tool for actively recalling both positive and negative experiences. It allows us to glean valuable lessons that help us navigate the present complexities and aspire towards a better future. However, the case of Srebrenica presents a unique challenge, making it exceedingly arduous to internalize the past and extract meaningful insights due to denialism, historical revisionism, and the constant obfuscation of the facts. Such an environment perpetuates a culture of impunity for perpetrators and fosters collective forgetfulness. 

The work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has long been targeted by pro-Serbian actors. The latter circulated a narrative that Serbian war criminals were not tried because of their crimes but because of an anti-Serb conspiracy. This narrative has been amplified by various quarters to the extent that many people are now convinced the ICTY and ICJ were biased, which is deplorable since both concluded that the Srebrenica massacre constituted genocide. Accusations of politicization were frequently raised, such as when Russia criticized the verdict against Radovan Karadzic as a “politicized” decision by The Hague.

The Srebrenica Genocide Denial Report 

The 2022 Srebrenica Genocide Denial Report identified 693 new instances of denialism in the previous year, employing tactics such as denial, distortion of historical facts, minimizing the genocide’s significance by drawing on false equivalism, reducing the actual numbers, and even glorifying the perpetrators. While these instances were initially observed in the media and political spheres, they also extended to academe. 

The quest to whitewash Serbian genociders did not emerge in isolation. The origins of denialism, insensitivity, and cover-up of war crimes are intricately linked also to the ineffectiveness of international bodies entrusted with protecting civilians and pursuing justice for victims. One of the most disgraceful episodes was the disgraceful moment when Thom Karremans, the leader of the Dutchbat forces in the UN Peacekeeping Mission, was berated by Mladic and later shared a toast with him before departing without fulfilling his duty, leaving thousands under his protection to be mercilessly killed by Serbian paramilitaries.

The fragmented and dysfunctional political structure inherited from the Dayton Agreement has complicated things for Bosnia. The government is literally prevented by its Serbian political groups from pursuing justice. In 2021, the anti-denialism amendments to the Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Office of the High Representative (OHR) Valentin Inzko, using the Bonn powers, stirred controversy.

They aimed to prohibit and penalize denialism and the glorification of war criminals. In response, the Bosnian Serb leadership threatened to withdraw from key aspects of the country’s governance, including the tax system, judiciary, and military. This incident highlights the inherent fragility of the country’s political system. Milorad Dodik and other Serbian politicians criticized the OHR, highlighting concerns regarding sovereignty and democratic legitimacy. When it comes to implementing international court verdicts, Serbian politicians are suddenly transformed into champions of democracy. 

Denialism and revisionism

Denialism and revisionism persistently infiltrate the political landscape, morphing into new guises over time. The rise of far-right sentiments, combining a mixture of Islamophobia and blatant Serbian nationalism, added further vitriol to the mix. 

But collective memory is now more than ever in need of revival. It all begins in the pulsating heart of public spaces: the streets, squares, statues, and buildings, an “organized remembrance”, as Hannah Arendt once termed it. Shockingly, even after three decades, the names of Serbian genociders still enjoy public acclaim. Worse still, the Vilina Vlas Hotel, once one of the vile rape camps during the war, now caters to tourists. 

In the depths of the horrific atrocities that shook Srebrenica, the indescribable suffering endured by women in hotels and detention camps still haunts them today. For nearly three decades, they have been trapped in a cycle of social exclusion and victimization. Ajna Jusić, founder of the organization “Forgotten Children of War,” embodies their ongoing fight for basic human rights.

Living museums

These spaces must transform into living museums, preserving the collective memory and serving as powerful reminders of past pain. Sarajevo Canton’s plan to convert the Kon Tiki Motel into such a museum is a step towards honouring the resilience and struggles of those affected. These examples highlight how collective memory can fade, bringing forward the urgency of fighting public amnesia. 

As we approach the three-decade mark since the Srebrenica genocide, all those who care about humanity must keep the flame of collective memory burning bright. It is a call that echoes from politics to academia, from the streets to the media—a resounding plea for comprehensive remembrance. Delving into the depths of our past sheds light on humanity’s potential pitfalls and unlocks the essence of our existence. Let these words from Arendt’s “Between Past and Future” reverberate in our minds as concluding marks: 

“We are in danger of forgetting, and such an oblivion—quite apart from the contents themselves that could be lost—would mean that, humanly speaking, we would deprive ourselves of one dimension, the dimension of depth in human existence.”

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n March 23, EU Foreign Policy Chief Josep Borrell made an appeal to Serbia and Kosovo to fulfil all provisions of the EU-backed deal reached on March 18 between the two countries.

“The deal was agreed, it has to be implemented, and there is no room for picking and choosing,” the EU’s chief diplomat told journalists en route to the EU leaders’ summit in Brussels.

The Serbia-Kosovo dispute

Kosovo proclaimed its independence on February 17, 2008 in the wake of a war that ended Serbian rule with NATO intervention.

Most UN member states, including the U.S., UK, France, Germany, and Turkey, have recognized Kosovo’s independence.

However, Serbia does not recognize Kosovo and still views it as an integral part of its territory.

What is the deal about?

According to the deal, Serbia would not explicitly recognize Kosovo, but it would have to recognize official documents such as license plates, custom stamps, diplomas, and passports, and stop lobbying against Kosovo’s admission into international bodies.

Serbia has hitherto counted on its ally Russia, a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, and other countries that do not recognize Kosovo, to block its neighbor’s entrance to the UN.

Parties to the deal would also inaugurate offices in their respective capitals. In exchange, the Serbian minority in Kosovo would be allowed to form an association of Serbian municipalities, amounting to self-governance.

The deal was reached on February 27, 2023, in Brussels. An annex on the implementation of the deal was agreed upon on March 18, 2023 in Ohrid.

As per the annex, the EU committed itself to organizing a donor conference within 150 days to establish an investment and financial aid package for Serbia and Kosovo.

Many countries, including the U.S., UAE, and Turkey, and the EU welcomed the agreement to normalize relations.

Following talks

After talks in Ohrid, Serbian president Aleksandar Vučić told reporters that despite some areas of lingering disagreements, they had a decent conversation.

Vučić pointed out that they have reached a “sort of” agreement on implementing the deal, and that his country’s membership will be conditioned on the enforcement of the deal.

For his part, Kosovo’s prime minister Albin Kurti said the deal meant a de facto recognition of Kosovo.

Borrell said the EU will demand in the strongest terms that both countries abide by the deal if they wish to join the bloc.

Belgrade-Pristina dialogue

The EU initiated the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue in 2011 with a view of reaching a mutually acceptable solution for disputes between Serbia and Kosovo.

After border tensions in North Kosovo broke out last summer, Miroslav Lajčák, the EU special representative for the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue, submitted the EU’s recent blueprint for normalization in September 2022.

The normalization of relations between the two neighbors is set as a precondition by the EU before integration into the bloc.

Austria: No alternatives

At a joint press conference with Serbian foreign minister Ivica Dačić in Vienna on March 22, Austrian foreign minister Alexander Schallenberg stressed that there are no alternatives to the normalization agreement between Belgrade and Pristina and that the agreement was fully supported by the EU and the U.S.

Dačić indicated that the agreement did not imply a Serbian recognition of Kosovo and that his country will never let Kosovo into international organizations.

However, in a speech he delivered to the national parliament on March 23, Kosovar PM Kurti said that Kosovo has received guarantees from the U.S. and the EU on the implementation of the agreement to normalize relations.

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urkey’s influence in the Balkans needs to be examined in parallel with the question of how Ankara has become a reliable actor in the region. Here, one should point to the cultural and humanitarian diplomacy, which stands out as one of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) important foreign policy pillars. This doctrine has been at the forefront of the Turkish government’s vision for the Balkans.

In recent political history, Turkey-Balkans relations have been multidimensional and multilayered. While the Balkans have been a politically fragmented and economically fragile region, which was regarded by Europe as “other,” the religious, cultural, and ethnic ties of the region with Turkey, on the other hand, bestowed a unique dimension to Turkey’s relations with the Balkans.

What determines the Western perception of the Balkans is twofold: the Balkans’ overwhelmingly Orthodox Christian population and the long centuries under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. The Balkans have also had varieties of their own internal otherization problems. Dramatic ethnic conflicts took place after the disintegration of Yugoslavia, where Serbs forced the Muslim masses to assimilate through an ethnic genocide policy that resulted in the Bosnia and Kosovo Wars.

Turkey’s approach to the Balkans

The Balkans as a term in Europe largely signifies ethnic conflicts and regional rivalries of great powers. Due to its high geostrategic position, the Balkans fell victim to the great powers’ policies of disintegration and subjugation during the 1990s. Thus, the term “Balkanization” is widely used in English-language International Relations literature to refer to places which are inundated with conflict and instability.

Turkey, contrary to the major powers’ interest-ridden approach to the Balkans, initiated a refined foreign policy based on cultural and historical ties to foster socioeconomic, sociocultural, and eventually political-economic relations. Ankara took proactive steps in cooperation with capitals in the Balkans, and strengthened relations through mutually beneficial economic development projects, increasing trade volume and human capital, and providing educational opportunities.

Turkey’s official Balkan policy rests on the following four principles: high-level political dialogue; security for all; high economic integration; and protection of the region’s multi-ethnic, multicultural, and multireligious social structures.

Turkey is a balancing actor in the Balkans

During President Erdoğan’s visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro in September 2021, Milorad Dodik, an Orthodox Serbian nationalist and Serbian member of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidential Council, said that the countries of the European Union did nothing for Bosnia and Herzegovina, while Erdoğan did, and, for this, he should be accepted as a reliable person for the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

On another occasion, in January 2022, Dodik stated that the security and political future of Bosnia and Herzegovina depend on a dialogue of local politicians such as Serbian President Vučić and Croatian President Milanović with the support of Turkish President Erdoğan. Again, in January 2022, Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama described President Erdoğan as “a person who does what he says and says what he does” both for Albania and regional peace, development, and stability.

This is also indicative of another EU politics impasse. The rising far-right populism in EU countries, the lack of an all-encompassing political will, vision and determination, and leadership issues all narrow Europe’s view of the Balkans. This negative course causes reactions and suspicion towards European politics in the eyes of the Balkan political and bureaucratic elites and societies at large.

EU enlargement

All the above are reflected well in recent studies. The Eurobarometer survey, for example, reveals that 52% of the EU population is against enlargement. The rate is 62% in the Netherlands, 58% in France, and 57% in Germany. We can highlight here that France, Denmark, and the Netherlands constantly undermine Albania’s EU membership process.

Albanian PM Rama’s reaction to this situation shows the distrust that lies therein. Rama stated, “Albania will not cry at the door of Europe.” Likewise, the sense of distrust and disunity in Europe during the global pandemic is perhaps best encapsulated in Serbian President Vučić’s words: “European solidarity is a fairy tale.”

In comparison to the grey picture of Europe-Balkans relations, recent public opinion polls in the Balkans indicate a rising interest in Turkey. According to a study by the European Council on Foreign Relations in August 2021, for Serbia, Turkey is the third country to be trusted after Russia and China. The cooperation and trust relationship that Turkey has developed with Balkan countries by resting on its soft power in the last twenty years is of key importance.

The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB), the Yunus Emre Institute, the Maarif Foundation, the Turkish Red Crescent, the Turkish Religious Foundation, and various NGOs and international higher education institutions have played major roles in this.

Tensions between Serbia and Kosovo have returned to the forefront after on June 29 the authorities in Pristina announced their decision to impose a ban on cars with Serbian license plates crossing the Kosovo border. Following the violent reaction of ethnic Serbs living on Kosovo’s border, the Kosovo government has postponed the implementation of the order until September 1, 2022.

What is happening on the border?

New regulations proposed by the Kosovo government, which does not recognize identity cards and license plates held by Serbian citizens in Kosovar territory, escalated the tension between the two countries.

According to the new regulations, the owners of vehicles with the license plates “PR (Priština)”, “KM (Kosovska Mitrovica”, “PZ (Prizen)”, “GL (Gjilan)”, “UR (Uroševac)”, “PE (Peja)”, and “DA (Đakovica)”, which were issued by Serbia from June 10, 1999 to April 21, 2022 would have to get “RKS (Republic of Kosovo)” plates until September 30, 2022. This means that Serbian citizens entering Kosovar territory will be required to replace their license plates and personal identification cards with the new documents issued by Kosovar authorities.

As a response, ethnic Serb protesters living in the north of Kosovo blocked the access to two border crossings with Serbia on Sunday, July 31.

Serbia has been applying the same rule on IDs issued by the Kosovo government since 2011. Pristina reiterated its willingness to lift the restrictions if the Serbian government takes the necessary steps, but the proposal has been repeatedly rejected. This is due to the fact that Serbia does not recognize Kosovo’s self-declared independence.

As a preventative measure, the NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo (KFOR) stated that the troops are ready to intervene in Kosovo “if the stability is jeopardized,” in accordance with Resolution 1244 by the United Nations Security Council, which was issued in 1999.

Since the Kosovo War in 1999, security in Kosovo has been provided by KFOR in line with the United Nations Security Council Article 1244 on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia in 2008, a decade after the NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999. However, Serbia continues to view its former province as a part of the Serbian territory.

In 2013, Serbia and Kosovo initiated a reconciliation dialogue sponsored by the European Union to resolve ongoing issues between the two countries, but little progress has been made since then.

Path to independence?

Since its declaration of independence from Serbia on February 17, 2008, Kosovo has been officially recognized by 117 states, including the U.S. and most of the EU member states. Despite the initiations for UN membership, two permanent veto-wielding members, Russia and China, blocked the requests for membership by Pristina.

Although Kosovo, which was part of the Federal Republic of Serbia before the dissolution of Yugoslavia, was granted major autonomy in 1974 Constitution of Yugoslavia, this decision was overturned in 1989 by Serbian nationalist president Slobodan Milošević.

Kosovo’s autonomy was revoked during Milošević‘s presidency, bringing it under the direct control of Belgrade.

With the disintegration of Yugoslavia, Kosovo Albanians became uneasy with the rising Serbian nationalism and laid the foundations of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which later played a crucial role in the country’s independence.

After a decade of unrest, the conflict between the Serbian government and Kosovar separatists heightened in 1998. Over 13,000 Kosovars and more than 8,000 Albanians were killed in the war, and thousands were forced to leave their homes.

The attacks of the Serbian forces in Kosovo came to an end with the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia as a result of the operation that started on March 24, 1999, and lasted for 78 days.

Kosovo-Serbia dialogue

Tensions between Belgrade and Pristina have been simmering for over two decades due to the unresolved Kosovo conflict, which began in 1999, when the province gained de facto autonomy after the NATO campaign against former Yugoslavia.

In 2011, the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue process began for the first time under the mediation of the EU to improve relations between Kosovo and Serbia and ultimately recognize Kosovo’s autonomous status.

In April 2013, the EU-led talks between the two countries reached a historic agreement in Brussels, in which Serbia did not recognize the autonomous status of Kosovo yet partially agreed to Kosovo being governed as a sovereign state.

However, in practice, the terms of the agreement remained ambiguous, and the process came to a standstill after facing several setbacks.

The EU has been trying to mediate between Belgrade and Pristina since 2013. Yet, Belgrade and Pristina’s decade-long history of ethnic conflict frequently forestalled the reconciliation process.

After Kosovan authorities decided to postpone the new ID and license plate requirements to September 1, protesters removed the barricades that blocked the two crossings at the Serbian border.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine will have a tremendous impact on all European countries. Nations that are heavily dependent on Russian energy are expected to suffer particularly hard if the Kremlin, for whatever reason, eventually halts gas supplies to Europe. What will be the implications of the Russo-Ukrainian war in the Balkans?

Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian refugees have already entered the European Union. It is believed that more than seven million people will soon be forced to leave the war-torn country and go westward. Not all of them are expected to stay in the EU member states. According to reports, a few hundred displaced people from Ukraine have already arrived in Serbia – a Balkan nation that played a significant role during the 2015-2017 migrant and refugee crisis. The country’s officials estimate that the southeastern European country will eventually host more than 10,000 refugees from Ukraine.

Serbia, as well as other Balkan nations, is facing a large-scale emigration and brain drain. A significant influx of refugees from Ukraine could potentially reduce the consequence of a mass exodus that the so-called Western Balkans has been witnessing for years. It is highly uncertain, however, if displaced Ukrainian citizens have a desire to settle permanently in the region, or if they see the Balkans only as a temporarily shelter from the tragic events in Ukraine.

Politically, all Balkan nations that are not members of the European Union have already voiced their support for Ukraine’s territorially integrity, either voluntarily or under pressure from Brussels. The only country that has still not imposed any sanctions on the Russian Federation is Serbia. Moreover, to this day, Air Serbia continues to fly to Russia, being one of a few European carriers allowed to operate in Russian airspace.

Belgrade relies on Russia for its energy needs, and has developed close political relations with Moscow. At the same time, there are reports suggesting that the EU is demanding that Serbia immediately harmonize its foreign policy with that of Brussels, which means joining anti-Russian sanctions.

“Serbia is in an exceptionally difficult situation, there is less understanding than ever for the position of our nation. We are facing huge pressure,” said the country’s president Aleksandar Vučić.

In reality, Russian political and economic influence in the Balkans is not nearly as strong as many Western pundits tend to portray it. The Kremlin effectively controls sections of Serbia’s and Bosnia’s energy sectors. Russia’s Zarubezhneft owns oil refineries in the towns of Brod and Modriča in Republika Srpska – one of two entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina – while Russian state-owned energy giant Gazprom owns 51 percent of shares in Serbia’s NIS (Petroleum Industry of Serbia). In addition, in December 2021, NIS became the major shareholder in Serbia’s leading petrochemicals producer, HIP Petrohemija.

The problem for the Balkans is that many countries in the region remain heavily dependent on Russian energy.

Until recently, Russia’s Sberbank was operating in both Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, but on February 28, the banking agencies of Bosnia’s two entities took control of the two local Sberbank subsidiaries. On the very same day, Serbian AIK Bank completed the process of acquisition of Sberbank Serbia, which will additionally reduce Russian economic presence in the region.

The problem for the Balkans, however, is that many countries in the region remain heavily dependent on Russian energy. Serbia, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and North Macedonia are reportedly 100 percent dependent on Russian natural gas. Croatia, on the other hand, has been purchasing liquefied natural gas from other producers – namely the United States, Nigeria, and Qatar – which to a certain extent could play a role in the process of cutting reliance on Russian energy.

However, the war in Ukraine could have an impact on a deal that Gazprom signed with Croatia and Hungary on deliveries of natural gas via the TurkStream pipeline. In other words, if the conflict in Ukraine turns into a wider “energy war” between Russia and the West, and Moscow eventually stops selling gas to Europe – be it as a potential retaliation to the anti-Western sanctions, or as a result of the EU’s potential decision to stop buying Russian gas – the Balkan countries will undoubtedly face severe disruptions in energy supplies.

In November, Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to peg Serbia’s current gas price of $270 until May. But after that, if Serbia joins anti-Russian sanctions, the country will unlikely be able to purchase natural gas from Russia below the market price, which is currently above $3,000 per thousand cubic meters, and has reached its historic maximum. In the short term, it will be very difficult, if not impossible, for Balkan and other European countries to find an alternative to the Russian energy, which means that blackouts in Europe could eventually become a norm.

For now, both Russia and the EU are expected to refrain from such radical actions, given their mutual energy dependence. Politically, however, the process of “decoupling” between Moscow and the West has already gone very far, and sooner or later, all Balkan countries will likely find themselves on the western side of a new Iron Curtain.

People have migrated throughout history in search of basic resources and better living conditions. According to Francis Fukuyama, after the catastrophic world wars and the collapse of communism, the liberal democratic bloc declared itself victorious and idealism was born prophesizing that state boundaries would disappear and economies would be integrated.

Alas, no great war was in sight! However, this peaceful world vision developed a boil and a new wave of unprecedented global immigration emerged. As liberalism offered a perpetual peace, Europe, the most important representative of this theory in practice, became a top destination for emigrants who are in search of a better life. The EU has become one of the largest recipients of emigrants starting from the nearby Balkans.

Indeed, it is very difficult to account for a single reason that triggers migration from the Balkans. Reasons vary and combine economic, environmental, political, and social factors. However, generally, the academic literature on emigration studies underlines the economic reason as the primary and dominant push factor.

Migration comes along with a brain drain as the skilled labor force of poor countries gets poorer due to economic and political conditions and emigrates to richer countries for higher pay. Currently, Western Balkan countries and specifically Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Serbia are losing their well-educated youth.

According to Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Youth Studies, in 2018, one third of young people from the Western Balkans expressed a “strong” or a “very strong” desire to emigrate from their countries, ranging from 26% in Montenegro, 27% in Bosnia, 30% in Serbia, 34% in Kosovo, 35% in North Macedonia, and 43% in Albania. These figures are even higher in some other studies.

A population loss

The emigration from the Balkans is considered a permanent one. Balkan countries are now in jeopardy of losing a substantial portion of their population density and their demographic characteristics.

Migration has a very general effect on the Balkans. Economically, if the shortage of qualified workers continues, it will discourage foreign investments and directly affecting the GDPs of Balkan countries. Critical industries may not be able to find qualified staff, especially the health sector. Politically, emigrants are mostly young and educated, and don’t give credit to the old-fashioned political clichés and the incapable political leaderships, which hide behind nationalist rhetoric.

Migration from the Balkans in numbers

According to the Institute of Statistics (INSTAT) of Albania, there have been  around 400,000 emigrants between 2011 and 2020. According to Hurriyet Daily, about 1.7 million, roughly 37% of the population, has left the country in the past 30 years.

Currently, the Albanian population is 2,837,740 and the primary destinations of emigration are Italy and Greece. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Albania ranks 4th globally in the emigration of a skilled labor force and most youth dream of a future abroad.

Additionally, some officials and researchers don’t trust KAS numbers. According to them, KAS estimates are lower and the real numbers are higher. Also, interestingly, between 2014 and 2015, around 100,000 Kosovars emigrated to the EU, a massive emigration wave that was dismissed by the government of Kosovo at that time. The number of emigrants in 2019 was 34,911, and the chief destinations were Germany, Switzerland, Italy, and Austria.

It is hard to find an accurate data on Montenegrin emigration. According to data by the United Nations, in 2015 the population of Montenegro was 625,781. Additionally, based on UN statistics, the overall number of Montenegrin immigrants worldwide increased from 148,982 in 2010 to 153,009 in 2019. Germany receives the highest number of Montenegrin immigrants, and Italy and Luxemburg were among the most popular countries. However, in recent years, preferences have changed and intraregional migration has become more popular, especially to former Yugoslav states such as Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia due to the proximity and cultural similarities.

Lastly, the current population of Serbia is around 6,908,220. The UN estimated that emigrants from Serbia in 2017 reached nearly one million at a rate of between 30,000 and 60,000 a year since the breakup of Yugoslavia. The main destinations of Serbs are Austria, Germany, and Switzerland.

Urgent need to end brain drain

Can a common solution be found for the continuous emigration waves from the Balkans? First of all, the European Union should seriously step in and provide financial support in finding an applicable policy. Since the EU opened up for skilled labor from non-EU countries, it is partly responsible and should take responsibility for the brain drain in the Western Balkans.

Especially Germany, Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, and Switzerland should share the burden as they have benefitted the most. If the necessary precautions are not taken, Balkan countries will lose their youth and enthusiasm, and will end up empty villages within the so-called global village.

What is more, Western Balkan countries need to improve their databases on emigration. This is crucial to understanding the situation on the ground in order to formulate and recommend proper policies. Regular assessment is a must in line with accurate data and monitoring mechanisms.

The Western Balkan governments have to reverse this brain drain and encourage the sustainable return and placement of skilled emigrants in developing sectors such as IT, digitalization, robotics, design, etc. Countries could follow the example of Croatia.

I first entered Sarajevo after a long drive through the thick misty woods of Western Bosnia at the beginning of 1996, almost two weeks after the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed which was supposed to end the 3.5-year-long war through reconstruction and reconciliation.

I faced grave contradictions on the road from the Croatian city of Split to Sarajevo after waiting for three days to catch a UN aid convoy that would take me to the war-torn capital. The winding road passes through misty mountains and thick woods setting one’s mind at ease with beautiful tall trees and greenery.

But once we pulled over for a short break, I witnessed one of the most shocking experiences in my professional life when we had to walk on a carpet of AK-47 shell casings scattered throughout the forest. I could barely find a scrap of earth to step on that was not covered in shell casings. All I could hear was their creaky sound as the smell of gun smoke still hung in the air.

At that moment, I had a clear understanding that one of the worst episodes of mass murder in Europe had taken place in Bosnia, which witnessed the worst human rights abuses and atrocities, betrayal, and genocide during the war in 1992-1995 as part of the break of Yugoslavia.

The scene in Sarajevo was even worse as the city was completely besieged by the Serb troops for more than three years and was the theater of a killing field for Serbian snipers who shot everything that moved including the elderly, women, and children. A thousand six hundred children were killed by Serb sniper fire in the city during the war. The headquarters of the famous daily Oslobodenje was almost in ruins as it was targeted from the beginning of the war by Serb troops led by Ratko Mladić, known as the “butcher of Bosnia.”  Mladić was later found guilty of orchestrating genocide in Srebrenica, crimes against humanity, and war crimes by the UN International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).

At the beginning of 1996, Bosnians with broken dreams seemed ready for reconciliation and to rebuild their lives, thinking that the DPA would pave the way for such a process. Esad Mavrić, who was my fixer in Sarajevo, didn’t seem that optimistic as I delivered him some basic foodstuff like milk powder, sugar, rice, and some fresh fruits which were really hard to find for civilians. The siege by Serb forces had made it hard to cover basic daily needs and for parents to feed their children. “Having a peace agreement is better than having a war. But I’m not sure how long it will last,” he said.

Shortly afterward, we found out that his name was on the Serbian “most wanted” list, pushing us to cancel our planned trip to Srebrenica as the road to the city was filled with Serbian checkpoints. Srebrenica was handed over to the Serbian army about six months earlier on July 11, 1995. The city was supposed to be protected by Dutch soldiers mandated to protect civilians as United Nations peacekeeping forces handed it over to the Serbs. At least 8,500 Bosnian boys and men were killed, and more than 20,000 civilians were expelled by the Bosnian Serb forces from the area – a process that was later declared a genocide by the ICTY.

The Srebrenica genocide compelled the West to press for a ceasefire which paved the way for the signing of the DPA.

According to many, including former president of Bosnia-Herzegovina Alija Izetbegović, the basis of the treaty didn’t constitute a just peace. “The peace is more just than continuing the war and a better peace couldn’t be obtained,” he said.

Indeed, the DPA was designed to create new multi-ethnic and democratic institutions in a war-torn society in order to ensure respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms, and the rule of law; to provide for post-conflict reconstruction towards sustainable peace for Bosnia-Herzegovina; and to prevent the recurrence of the conflict or its potential spillover in the region.

The DPA introduced an entirely different form of governance. According to this, Bosnia-Herzegovina is a semi-presidential republic with three representative presidents that are directly elected and who exercise their jurisdiction on the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to the state structure and organization, Bosnia-Herzegovina is a complex state that consists of two entities and the Brcko District.

In terms of the political system, Bosnia-Herzegovina is a democratic state with the division of legislative, executive, and judiciary powers; rule of law; pluralism of political parties; general, direct, and secret voting; an independent media and judiciary; and respect for human rights. With regards to the relationship between central and local authorities, Bosnia-Herzegovina is a highly decentralized state with two highly centralized entities.

The Dayton Peace Agreement

The DPA may have stopped the war but, on the other hand, it also created a complex form of governance which might have complicated things even further leading to a new conflict – one that the world is facing now.

There was considerable debate and criticism of the DPA from the very start, in terms of structure, balance, and efficiency. Many argue that the DPA brought about unequal agreement among warring ethnic groups. The Bosnian Serbs who committed ethnic cleansing and genocide were rewarded with the ethnically cleansed “republic” while the Bosnians and Croats had to share a “federation.”

Therefore, the Serbs gained autonomous status, where the control belongs to them, whereas the Bosnians are politically and militarily checked by the Croats. Then, there has been poor implementation of the DPA in terms of freedom of movement, return of refugees, giving back the prewar voting rights of the people, and prosecution of war criminals. In fact, some argue that the DPA affected the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina into ethno-nationalist entities that acknowledged and effectively rewarded the ethnic cleansing process.

Although the DPA has partially facilitated the creation of a sustainable state, the major ethnic groups that were involved in the conflict remained unwilling to form a functional state in the name of Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially the Serbs with their “Greater Serbia” motto always present in their hearts and minds.

Since 1995, national political parties have been using fear, ethnic enmity, and exclusive nationalism in their electoral campaigns. Thus, the democratization process in post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina has been carried out by the nationalist parties locked in their ethnically separated constituencies which often obstructed the return of refugees and displaced persons.

Is the Dayton Peace Agreement Fractured?

In 2000, five years after the DPA was signed, the European Union, sidelining the U.S., became the leading international body to support the stabilization and association processes in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This seemed a turning point at the time since it raised hopes in Bosnia-Herzegovina for a full EU and NATO membership. But the need to reform military forces, the establishment of a defense ministry at state level, the introduction of a VAT taxation system, the restructuring of the judiciary and prosecution, and the establishment of courts were all blocked by ethnic aspirations from all sides.

In 2005-2006, attempts at constitutional and state structure reform proposed significant changes with regard to the power of the Council of Ministers and the Parliament Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, these and similar attempts at constitutional reforms were all seen through the prism of the country’s territorial reorganization rather than attempts for the creation of a functional state that is ready for EU and NATO membership. As a result, they were all rejected.