New realities have surfaced on the ground in Syria after the US and Turkey inked their mutual agreement. The partial withdrawal of the US’s troops from Syria led the PKK/PYD to cooperate with the Assad regime,m an alliance designed to restrain Turkey’s intervention by inviting regime forces to areas of critical importance. The PKK/PYD’s also attempted to keep the US’s support at the south of Turkey’s security corridor, in order to reduce the burdens of its new pledges to the Assad regime and Russia. The balance in Syria has clearly changed from its previous position. Less interested actors, such as European states, are still late to perceive the overall picture. And although Turkey has often been accused of an ‘axis shift’ due to its collaboration with Russia, this allegation may also be applied to other actors in the region who face new decisions. Hence both ‘friends and foes’ will have to reassess each other and determine to whom they can lean on. In order to understand the overall picture in Syria, the positions of each actor should be individually scrutinized.

The U.S.

The US was keen to provide support to the PKK/PYD and benefit from them as a tool in their plans to redesign a narrower Middle East, from Iran to Syria. But the US devastated its own policy after a long awaited decision by President Trump, most probably because of the PKK/PYD’s lack of capacity despite the billions of dollars spent by the US government.

However, internal political dynamics confused the overall process, President Trump made a U-turn in order to reiterate the ‘America First’ narrative of his election campaign. The way Trump sees the Syrian case is actually smart and pragmatic. The US has gained nothing from its relationship with the PKK/PYD, who falsely claimed credit for defeating Daesh, while the role of US Special and Air Forces in this victory has always been underestimated.

In parallel to the Iranian case and the energy politics in the Middle East, President Trump projected long term goals of the US that required him to erase the PKK/PYD folder from his cache. Although he still confused whether to embrace or repel Turkey based on his contradictory tweets, the wider politics of the Middle East, along with the Mediterranean and Black Sea region pushed President Trump to review his engagement with Turkey.

Russia

Russia’s approach has been to emphasize the Adana Agreement of Turkey and Syria which allows Turkey to intervene between 5 to 10 kilometers into Syria in case there exists a terror threat inside Syrian territory. The goal of Russia’s recent discussions at the Tehran, Moscow and Ankara summits were to have Turkey and the Assad regime engage with each other in favor of Russian interests. Such an expectation appears impossible for Turkey since Turkey expects the Genova Process to find a political solution, one that could see Assad removed pending constitutional amendments and the facilitation of free elections. Hence Russia can only push one button: choose the PKK/PYD or the Genova Process.

However, Russia does have the ‘luxury’ of including the PKK and its affiliate organizations in a new Syrian apparatus after the US’s withdrawal. The PKK/PYD’s rapprochement with both the Assad regime and Russia facilitated the expansion of Russia’s sphere of influence in shaping what will be the ultimate outcome of the Syria crisis. Meanwhile, Russia provided a shield to the Assad regime to achieve more territorial gains while the PKK/PYD terror network has been left humiliated by the imposed conditions, destined to compromise with Assad.  After all, the main question for Russia appears to be if it needs to stick with the Turkish cause as was agreed to before Operation Peace Spring or allow the PKK/PYD to serve in Syria unless the US Government changes the Syria policy one more time. On the other hand, the Genova Process seems to be a wise option for Russia in order to achieve a cost-effective resolution to the overall crisis.

Turkey

The PKK/PYD has exhibited how incapable it is, and how it must lean on another actor for its own protection and survival. The release of Daesh (ISIS) prisoners proved it cannot handle its responsibilities. The success of Turkey’s military operation has marginalized its status in the eyes of its sympathizers and has tarnished its dream of building an autonomous region in Syria. The PKK/PYD has now subjected itself to a higher authority and clearly demonstrated its inability to sustain an armed movement except for the use of terror strategies. As the reality of the PKK/PYD is being understood by both Russia and the US Government, Turkey is now in-between both countries to find a wise solution to the decade-long Syria conflict.  

Turkey’s political balance needs to be understood to determine its preferred course. It is a fact that the big picture of the Middle East and global politics requires Turkey to align itself with Russia. But long-term conditions will push Turkey to mend its ties with the US. However, the parameters are not that easy. Turkey need to enjoy the support of both parties to destroy the PKK/PYD threat and at the same time deescalate tense inter-state relations facilitate smoother regional politics with the USA.

At the final stage, Turkey’s growing relations with Russia and the US, along with the moderate opposition under the authority of the Syrian Transition Government, are relations which will offer new opportunities for de-escalation of the Syrian conflict. Turkey will be a bridge between the big players and effective local actors. Then should we not we think about a trilateral summit between the US, Russia, and Turkey to end the Syrian crisis?

After Turkey and the Syrian opposition started a joint military operation against the YPG terror group in northeastern Syria, many new developments are beginning to reshape the situation in the region and the future of Syria. One of the most important will be the summit to be held today between the Turkish and Russian presidents in Sochi. While many are awaiting the outcome of the summit, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov’s recent remarks about the possibility of amending the Adana agreement raises the question if this might be one of the outcomes today’s meeting. Sergei Lavrov stated: “This is the existing international legal framework that has been recently confirmed by both parties, including in the context of current events. If the parties, in the course of contacts, consider it necessary and mutually accept to clarify or amend this agreement in any way, this will be their decision, we will certainly accept and support it,”

In his following remarks, according to Sputnik News Agency, Lavrov underlined that “all Kurdish structures on Syrian territory should be solidly covered by the Syrian legislation, the Syrian constitution, so that there are no illegal armed groups on the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic, and so that there is no threat to security of the Republic of Turkey”

The Adana protocol signed by Turkey and Syria in 1998 outlines that the Syrian government will recognize the PKK as a terror group and will ensure the total destruction of PKK networks and operations in Syria, it also allows Turkey to cross five kms into Syria if necessary.

Russia has long argued for the reactivation of the Adana protocol to facilitate direct contacts between Damascus and Ankara, knowing that direct contact will change the diplomatic and political environment dramatically in favor of Russia and the Assad regime it backs. However, the Turkish government argued that direct contact with Damascus is only possible after a genuine political transition process and the election of a new government in free and fair elections.

Currently, the new dynamics in Syria have forced Turkey and Russia to find a new pathway forward. With the US withdrawal and the joint Syrian-Turkish military operation, the dynamics in Syria have changed dramatically. The Assad regime signed a deal with the YPG to control the front lines and borders with Turkey and the Syrian opposition, and to prevent their further incursion. After the entry of the regime into Manbij and Ayn al Arab, the operations in those areas were halted. During his announcement of the Turkish-American agreement for the safe-zone in northeast Syria. The Turkish Foreign Minister also said that Turkey will discuss the removal of the YPG from these areas with Assad backed by Moscow.

However, Ankara is frustrated that the Assad regime has not cracked down on the YPG in the areas it entered after a deal with the US. Most notably, the region of Tal Rifaat is of great importance as a present example. Not only did the residents who fled the region after its capture by the YPG not return, but the YPG has continuously attacked Turkish soldiers and the Syrian National Army from Tal Rifaat.

Turkey knows that the regime is unlikely to crackdown on the YPG and will likely use it as a tool against Turkey, and that Syrian refugees won’t return to regime-held areas. This would mean that the Turkish safe-zone project might fail to achieve its objectives. The recent deal with the American side allowed Ankara to gain important leverage ahead of the summit in Sochi, but no one can foresee what the two presidents will agree on in today’s summit. At the end of the day, the outcome of the summit will be determined by the personal relationship between Erdogan and Putin as well as their negotiation skills.

Turkey’s main opposition party has held a conference in Istanbul on Syria recently. While the conference was mostly conducted with the participation of academics and journalists interested in the issue, its aim was to bring together middle level officials from the Syrian government in an informal platform. However, the conference could not achieve its intended impact since it did not include broader participation and the outcome of the conference was one sided.

Before understanding the reasons behind holding the conference, it is necessary to evaluate the critical junctures of the CHP’s Syria policy. After the Syrian civil war erupted in 2011, the CHP’s approach to finding a resolution to the conflict was to support a power-sharing mechanism bringing together all parties, including the Assad regime. From the CHP’s perspective, involvement of representatives of the Assad regime was crucial to a peaceful transition. In accordance with this, the CHP made three formal visits to Assad from 2011 to 2013.

However, after the war escalated and reports by international organizations proved that the Assad regime used chemical weapons against civilians in 2013, the CHP ended meetings with the regime and adopted a relatively neutral approach compared to their previous one. Even with the rising nationalism in Turkey after 2016, the CHP kept this approach towards the Syrian conflict. For instance, the party supported cross-border military operations in Syria although it had reservations on the issue.  

Nonetheless, the party has been experiencing another shift in its Syria policy and the conference reflects this change. Since the last year, the CHP had again started to underline the importance of Assad’s involvement in the negotiation process. Because of this, the party invited representatives of the regime to the conference, but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not give them permission to enter Turkey.

It is not exaggeration to say that since the CHP has strengthened its position in domestic politics, it has also started to deal with foreign policy issues more. The party’s relative success in the latest local elections accelerated the CHP’s quest for a new strategy in foreign policy. Thus, the CHP’s recent shift in its Syria policy should be evaluated within this framework.

Nevertheless, the party did not completely leave its relatively neutral approach in Syrian conflict. Since a potential cross-border military operation is on the table, the CHP did not invite any official YPG representatives to the conference. But at the same time, the party did invite some pro-YPG experts such as Professor Amy Austin Holmes to hear their perspectives.

After the conference, the invitation of Amy Austin Holmes caused a crisis for the party, and the decision to invite her was harshly criticized especially on social media. Beyond this issue, the most problematic issue of the CHP’s initiative was the final declaration of the conference.

As the report states, the party sees the safe zone as “demographic engineering” which may deteriorate the future relations between various ethnic groups in the region. According to the report, the stakeholders should count on peace building rather than further escalation of the conflict to find an effective solution. Furthermore, the party clearly stated that they want the Turkish government to work with the Syrian regime for a resolution of the conflict. Another problematic issue was the final declaration report’s lack of attention to the YPG’s threat to Turkey’s security in the region.

All of these factors show that CHP’s new approach to Syrian policy will get a negative reaction from the public including its own voters. Since the YPG threat is still alive and Turkey will prioritize its security, the CHP’s new policy may get even more negative reactions from the public.

Today in Istanbul, four governments — Turkey, Russia, Germany, and France — are meeting for a summit over Syria, attempting to consolidate the Sochi Agreement signed by Russia and Turkey over Idlib, and re-invigorate the international political process. There is little reason to think that these talks can succeed on either front.

Turkey was drawn into the “Astana process” with Russia and Iran at the end of 2016. One of the key aspects of this political track was the creation of four “de-escalation” zones, three of which were then systematically liquidated by the Bashar al-Assad regime and its backers in Iran and Russia. By July of this year, only the Idlib de-escalation zone, the last province in insurgent hands, remained. The pro-Assad forces gave clear indications that Idlib was next and this assumption took hold. Having destroyed or humbled nationalist rebels across the country, and deported jihadist insurgents to Idlib, packing them in among a desperate, displaced population, the regime coalition was able to frame the apparently imminent offensive in “war on terror” terms.

On 17 September, a deal between Turkey and Russia was reached in Sochi as part of the Astana process that called off the pro-Assad offensive, for now, and created a demilitarized zone (DMZ) in Idlib. The zone cut ten miles into the insurgent zone, where Turkey has “observation posts”, and leaves the Assad-Iran forces surrounding Idlib. The responsibility was put on Turkey to clear the DMZ of heavy weapons by 10 October and by 15 October to remove the “radical terrorist groups”—namely Tandheem Hurras al-Deen, al-Qaeda’s new faction in Syria; Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), al-Qaeda’s former branch in Syria and the predominant insurgent force in the province; and the smaller jihadist groups that are dependent on HTS like the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP).

It was unclear that HTS would comply with this arrangement, though they did through an ambiguously-worded eleventh-hour  statement. HTS announced that it was taking a “balanced” approach that prevented a sanguinary offensive by the regime coalition, yet at the same time they were not going to be dragged into a political process dominated by the regime’s allies.

The Turkish government has been engaged in a campaign to split apart HTS, drawing its reconcilable elements into the mainstream opposition, grouped with the Free Syrian Army (FSA) factions under the banner of National Liberation Front (NLF), while isolating and eliminating the extremist hard core. HTS understands this danger, and the danger of de-escalation, which has allowed the re-emergence of the protest movement—against Assad and the jihadists. To counter this, over the last two months, HTS has arrested scores of activists to try to dismantle civil society and bring the province under its sole control. The Turkish struggle with these al-Qaeda-linked and al-Qaeda-style jihadists poses a serious threat for the country  since their networks cross into Turkey itself. There is a risk of domestic terrorism from a Turkish crackdown on extremists in Idlib.

There is also a major trap-door in the September agreement for Turkey: assuming the jihadists are neutralized, the pro-Assad coalition remains poised to attack Idlib and might well take advantage of the reduced resistance either to launch a full-scale offensive or to impose a “reconciliation” (surrender) agreement in the province. While Turkey might, in theory, be open to a reconciliation agreement, it has to be known that such an accord would not prevent the wave of refugees and the scattering of terrorists inside Turkey that Ankara so badly fears. It would also invite in an Assad-Iran system that has close relations with Ankara’s sworn enemies, the YPG/PKK, perhaps bringing the Kurdish terrorists into another border area.

The primary factor determining whether a pro-Assad offensive is viable is whether Russia provides air support. The regime itself, as Russia knows better than most, is in tatters. But politically, the ongoing presence of HTS, a fact for the foreseeable future, could provide a pretext more or less at the time of Assad’s choosing. The dilemma for Moscow, finally made to choose sides, is that its feeble position leaves it trying to bluff its way into influence. Moscow has been able to temporarily delay an attack by Assad and Iran to preserve its relations with Turkey, since such relations are the easiest way to undermine and potentially fracture the NATO alliance. If and when the Assad-Iran ground force moves against Idlib, however, it is very unlikely the Russians will withhold airstrikes—they have already begun them, after all, if only to keep the pressure on Turkey, even as negotiations continue.

One way to prevent a regime coalition offensive in Idlib would be if the U.S. stepped in. If the U.S. could come to a more balanced position between Turkey and the PKK it could allow for a so-called “NATO zone” that would put nearly half the country out of reach of the pro-Assad coalition, and place Turkey’s territorial holdings in Syria under the political protection, if not the military protection, of the United States. This scenario remains unlikely since the U.S. has committed itself to the PKK. Over the summer, Russia was able to correctly read U.S. statements of support for rebels in the Deraa area of the south as hollow and managed to convince Israel to hold fire as Assad and Iranian militants seized the border zone. Similarly, while the U.S. and Turkey remain divided, it allows Russia to play one off against the other and advance its cause and that of its client regime.

This situation renders the efforts by Germany and France to energize the peace process moot. The Geneva process has in any case been significantly reshaped along Astana lines by the Russians so that it now favours “peace” on Assad’s terms, and, whether Russia lends an assist or not, the Assad regime—supported by Iran—retains a maximalist position that intends to reconquer every inch of Syria’s territory. The Europeans have no ability to stop this militarily and the belief that “reconstruction” funds do or can offer leverage over the regime is pure fantasy. Firstly, any funds fed into the Assad-held zone will be syphoned off to reinforce a patronage system of organised criminality and sectarianism. Secondly, a regime that has endured the last seven years of warfare will not be swayed from its course — let alone pushed from office  by money. At most, the Europeans could offer political support to Turkey, potentially making it more awkward for Russia to back an attack, though over time attention will fade and Idlib’s fate will likely be settled by force.

Yesterday the Turkish Ministry of National Defence announced that the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the demilitarized zone of Idlib was completed. The announcement noted that the Syrian opposition and other anti-regime groups had withdrawn heavy weapons from the demilitarized zone and underscored that “operations were ceaselessly underway to establish sustainable and enduring peace in Idlib within the framework of the consensus reached in Sochi.”

The announcement from Turkish Defence Ministry came after Lavrov discussed the progress in demilitarization of Idlib at a news conference in Moscow. Underlining that Turkey plays a pivotal role in the creation of a demilitarized zone, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov voiced confidence of the Idlib demilitarization process, noting that it was progressing well.

These reciprocal remarks come as the October 15 deadline for the completion of the demilitarized zones is drawing closer.

Sergey Lavrov told reporters in a news conference that: “The deadline for demilitarized zones to be fully functional expires on October 15. A day or two do not play any role, in any case, the quality of these works is more important”.

Turkey and Russia had agreed to jointly establish a demilitarized zone in Idlib which is seen as the last remaining stronghold of Syria’s opposition. The leaders of the two countries, President Erdoğan and President Putin met at Sochi in September and reached a consensus on the demilitarization process of the Idlib region.

The memorandum of understanding signed between the two countries called for the stabilization of Idlib and aimed to eliminate the threat of terrorism by forbidding acts of violation. The agreement stipulated the establishment of a  disarmament zone spanning 15-20 km in Idlib.

The pact had maintained that the opposition groups in Idlib would remain where they were currently located, while Russia and Turkey would jointly conduct patrols in the area to prevent potential new conflicts.

Mutual voicing of this renewed confidence by the two countries provides a positive outlook for the region ahead of the 15 October demilitarization deadline. With Syria only just starting to emerge from the atrocious conflict that was launched in 2011, with increased concerns over the refugee crisis haunting European leaders, some of whom are discussing the potential of shutting down airports after having shut down sea ports and turned away many boats carrying refugees midway in the Mediterranean sea and with Turkey taking the real lead in responsibility of the refugee crisis with over 4 million refugees, maintaining stabilization in Syria is of utmost importance for all the parties concerned.