Following the Istanbul elections on June 23, Turkey’s policymakers will now focus on politics and on particular foreign policy issues of current significance. The upcoming days will most likely show some striking developments in the field of foreign policy, as the S-400 missile case, tensions between the U.S. and Iran and the G20 Summit will be of great importance.

However, before that, a final elaboration from a systematic point of view should be made regarding the political system in general and the recent mayoral elections in particular. The Turkish public went to the ballot every year since 2014 due to both extraordinary situations, such as early elections held in 2015, the failed coup attempt in 2016, the referendum in 2017, and the snap elections in 2018. Added to this list was the re-run of the Istanbul elections on June 23. These experiences give us political scientists a lot of data to analyze Turkey’s continuous political perception of the previous parliamentary system, while the dynamic transformation is continuing into the new presidential system, which was adopted in 2017.

In the new system, the country’s executive organ is led by a single office, namely the Turkish presidency. According to the previous constitutional requirement, the Turkish prime minister had to share the country’s executive organ with the president, which in the past had caused several system-based difficulties and even crises between the two offices. One of my first observations is that despite official opposition regarding the Turkish presidential system by most opposition parties – except the MHP – it seems that opposition circles have increasingly become used to the current system, which eventually enables opposition parties to form a so-called “bloc” or “alliance” in order to win certain offices of great importance.

Of course, the recent mayoral election in Istanbul, where in a de facto manner only two candidates, namely the Nation Alliance’s and the People’s Alliance’s candidates, became actual rivals, cannot be counted as a presidential election. Ekrem Imamoglu’s success was due to the “bloc” formed between former frustrated Kemalist/secular voters and voters that changed their minds, which is an outcome of Turkey’s presidential system, which enables alliances/blocs based on political realities.

In order to become Turkey’s president, one needs either more than 50 percent of all the votes to win in the first round or the majority of votes to gain victory in the second round. This necessity led to alliances during the 2018 presidential elections, which were formed between the AK Party and the MHP and on the other hand between the CHP and its rather heterogenous allies.

To underscore what I’m trying to explain in this week’s column, one has to stress the similar perception, which had been the case in the re-run of the mayoral elections on June 23, and which had eventually been elaborated as a de facto second round for Istanbul’s mayoral office. Under these conditions, it would be perhaps an interesting outcome and even future projection or change to consider an official second-round vote system, in particular for metropoles such as Ankara, Izmir, and Istanbul. By this, it might be a step to 1) boost Turkey’s presidential system through a similar voting system, and 2) increase the acceptance rate for the system itself.

Thus, Turkey’s dynamic political and its own path of democratic experience, which definitely must not be limited to exaggerated comments by foreign correspondents/journalists in Turkey and who are nowadays broadcasting in a very extreme and absurd Imamoglu-backing bias, offers a very good opportunity to examine the recent results in a more comparative and of course, system-based context.

The June 23 Istanbul Election ended with the success of the Nation Alliance candidate, Ekrem Imamoglu. After long-lasting discussions and controversies, Istanbul chose its mayor who will serve for the next five years. Last night also proved that despite all aggressive stigmatizing campaigns, Turkey’s democracy is still very powerful, and that all actors and parties can come to power when they get the support of the electorate.

It is important to analyze the results of the June 23 Istanbul elections in detail. In the cancelled Istanbul elections, the difference between the votes of the two candidates- Ekrem Imamoglu and Binali Yildirim- was only 13,000. The AK Party insisted that the recount of all votes in Istanbul may change the results of the election. Nevertheless, the CHP did not accept the recount of all votes. After a long-lasting and highly-debated process, the YSK cancelled the elections due to presiding officers at ballot stations who were not civil servants, which is against the law.

The increase in Imamoglu’s votes cannot be explained with the change in voter turnout.

On the June 23 elections, the difference between the votes of two candidates skyrocketed to 806.415 according to the unofficial results. Why did the slight difference on March 31 show a significant increase on June 23? Firstly, statistics show that Imamoglu increased his votes especially in 11 districts in Istanbul. While Yildirim got more votes than Imamoglu in these districts on March 31, Imamoglu received the majority on June 23. In total, Imamoglu received 572,120 more votes in Istanbul on June 23.

The increase in Imamoglu’s votes cannot be explained with the change in voter turnout. While voter turnout was 83.88% on March 31, it only increased to 84,44% on June 23. Nonetheless, the number of valid votes was approximately 200,000 higher compared to the March 31 elections. It is obvious that Imamoglu received the support of these 200,000 people in the first place.

Another determinant of the increase in the votes of Imamoglu was the supporters of other political parties. There had been 29 mayoral candidates on March 31 and most of these candidates withdrew their candidacy in favor of Imamoglu. Even though the Felicity Party did not withdraw its candidate, the comparison of the March 31 and June 23 elections show that approximately 56,000 Felicity Party supporters voted for Imamoglu or did not go to the polls on June 23.

All parties should be more careful in understanding the dynamics of the new system in the long-term.

The results of the June 23 elections show a significant decrease in the votes of Yildirim. Compared to the results of the March 31 elections, Yildirim lost approximately 220,000 votes on June 23. Although this number is taken into consideration with the almost stable voter turnout, it is seen that most of these voters changed their decisions and vote for Imamoglu on June 23. It is possible that these voters were not convinced about the cancellation of the Istanbul elections.

All this data shows that the consolidation of all parties against the AK Party is the main reason behind the success of Imamoglu on June 23. This situation is, indeed, directly related to the new pre-electoral alliance system, uniting all parties in a common goal. Thus, all parties should be more careful in understanding the dynamics of the new system in the long-term.

On last Sunday evening, the two candidates in the Istanbul mayoral election race, Binali Yildirim and Ekrem Imamoglu, came together for a three hours-long televised debate. As a highlight right before the re-run election today on June 23, 2019, the debate gathered millions of voters from all over Turkey to watch the potential future mayor of Istanbul. There was no actual winner of the televised debate, but Yildirim reflected more successfully on mayoral issues.

This evening will show by which dynamics and factors the voters of Istanbul were persuaded and on which grounds they elected their new mayor. Unfortunately, on the other hand, the televised debate – just like all other news on Istanbul – was not accurately discussed in the Western media. A simple look at the news and headlines of some media outlets in the U.S., UK, France and Germany reveal the journalistic bias.

The Western media have portrayed Ekrem Imamoglu as an ideal candidate for Turkish politics and have disregarded serious questions and accusations that he faces. They’ve turned a blind eye and a deaf ear to his previous failures, which Imamoglu is consistently asked about. Interestingly enough, Binali Yildirim, the experienced statesman and the joint candidate of the AK Party-MHP alliance, is not given equal attention by the Western media. Even when he is given attention, it’s usually in a negative tone. It is absurd that Yildirim’s previous achievements during both his term as the country’s Minister for Transportation and Communication (2002-2013, 2015-2016) when Turkey’s main highways and high-speed train networks were re-constructed, and his term as the Prime Minister (2015-2018), are not taken into consideration by these media outlets.

Instead of addressing Yildirim’s personality, success and failures, career path, massive infrastructural projects he took, which were not common for Turkey, nearly all Western media outlets editorialized news on Yildirim by silencing him. On the contrary, Imamoglu was presented in the media in a very positive way, disregarding any standards about a minimum level of objectivity. Moreover, he was falsely placed vis-à-vis the AK Party chair and President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, as the de facto rival of the Nation Alliance’s and CHP’s candidate. No need to say that this is not the case.

It is true that President Erdogan has also been delivering speeches along Binali Yildirim regarding the Istanbul mayoral elections. However, this does not mean that journalists from the Western world should disregard the AK Party’s mayoral candidate and his projections for the future of Istanbul. By this, it is weird to observe that most of the pieces that appeared in the Western media about the Istanbul elections focused on Erdogan rather than Yildirim and used a negative discourse, continuing their habit that has been accustomed for about 7-8 years now.

For instance, pieces from France’s leading media platforms and dailies portrayed Imamoglu as a “new hope of Turkish politics” (“nouvel espoir de la politique turque”) while openly disregarding the criteria of objectivity with regard to his rival Binali Yildirim (I,II). Similarly, the British media (III,IV) openly described Imamoglu “as a unifying power to take on Erdogan” without challenging and stressing various accusations towards Imamoglu. Furthermore, particularly media platforms in the United States, openly took positions supporting the CHP’s candidate, and, where also Imamoglu – a person running for being elected as a local politician– received the chance to publish a (Washington Post op-ed) article appealing to international audience (V,VI).

Of course, main support in the Western media still comes from Germany, where nearly every single politician who challenges the governing AK Party – no matter whether ultra-conservative, ultra-nationalist, Kurdish-separatist, etc- received media support without critical journalism. This happened and continues to happen during the 23 June election campaigns. For instance, titles such as “Istanbul candidate Imamoglu: Erdogan’s successor?” (VII) and its content or  articles mainly addressing the CHP’s candidate and President Erdogan (VIII,IV,X,XI) are not delivering satisfactory content about the recent election campaign, which at the end of the day was a quite fruitful period from a socio-political and democratic point of view.

People in Istanbul will decide on who will govern their metropolitan municipality for the next five years. Journalists and editors in Western media outlets continue their manipulative and biased behaviors and thus set a good example for the next generations about how this profession should not be done. Lacking any criteria for objectivity unfortunately is a fact of our post-truth world, no matter what the cost of losing ethical journalist credibility can mean in the long run.

For the re-run of the Istanbul mayoral elections to be held on June 23, the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) mayoral candidate Ekrem Imamoglu’s slogan is “Everything will be fine.” There is a Turkish expression: “The only thing better than this is an apricot in Damascus,” which means that it does not get any better than this. Imamoglu draws such a unique political profile that even our post-truth world hasn’t experienced so far.

His case is reminiscent of a well-known children’s novel, Pinocchio. Once upon a time, there was an old carpenter Geppetto who lived on selling the toys he made and whose only yearning was to have a child. At the moment he lost all his hopes to have one, a miracle happened. One of the wooden puppets started talking to him. Feeling blissful, he clasped the puppet in his arms and said: “You are like a real boy. I will call you Pinocchio.”

Just like Carlo Collodi’s fictional character Geppetto’s wish to have a child, the CHP has been yearning for creating a political hero for decades. Although the party has never come to power alone except for the single party period that continued until 1945, it has been the actual power in Turkish politics due to its ideological stance until recently. As the popular support given to the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan has grown from 30 percent to around 50 percent during his 17 years in power, the governing mechanisms in the country have been normalized in line with democracy. As a result, the CHP started aspiring to win elections and come to power through usual ways. But it was not easy to erase from the collective memory, especially the memories of Muslim conservatives and Kurds, the years when the CHP was ruling the state from behind.

Just like Carlo Collodi’s fictional character Geppetto’s wish to have a child, the CHP has been yearning for creating a political hero for decades and found one: Ekrem Imamoglu. 

Since becoming CHP chairman in 2010, Kemal Kilicdaroglu has lost two referendums, three general elections, two local elections and two presidential elections. In the face of successive failures, the party even tried to nominate a former AK Party politician and proposed the party’s presidential candidacy to former president Abdullah Gul. The irony is, they gave a fight to hinder his presidency with the support of the military and the judiciary back in 2007. But this strategy failed, too. This time, reminiscent of Geppetto’s puppet who comes to life, the CHP caught a success story for the Istanbul mayoral elections thanks to effective teamwork. During the 31 March election that was cancelled by the Supreme Election Council (YSK), Imamoglu enjoyed a vote share that is unprecedented in the party’s history. However, it is very doubtful whether he will be able to achieve the same success in the re-election on June 23.  

It is no longer a secret that politics has a marketing aspect. Today, political leaders work with large staff while deciding on all their acts and manners. Since his first appearance in the election campaign, Imamoglu has drawn a profile that has a secure distance from Kemalist ideology in line with Turkey’s sociological fabric. The features that would not catch attention in any candidate from other parties, such as his performing religious rituals and the visits he paid to the mausoleum of Mehmet the Conqueror, were highlighted in Imamoglu’s case since such acts do not comply with the conventional characteristics of the CHP. But at some point, he started exaggerating giving the implications that he is religious. Although many women in Turkey perform their religious rituals despite not wearing hijab, all female members of the families Imamoglu visited for iftar dinner during Ramadan were wearing hijab. Aside from all the broadcasts and photos from iftar dinners, he served a video to social media on sahur time, the time when a meal is eaten before starting fasting in Ramadan. In the video, he started his speech by saying “I don’t actually like talking on sahur time but…” He also visited a family who named their son after Tayyip Erdogan and said that they will vote for İmamoglu.

Politics has a marketing aspect. But, at some point, Imamoglu started exaggerating giving the implications that he is religious.

Receiving the support of Muslim conservatives alongside the CHP base, İmamoglu also endeavored to address the outlawed PKK’s proponents, jailed nationalists, political Islamists, agnostic/atheist community, Sunnis, Alevis and all the other ethnic and religious identities one can ever think of. He has always portrayed a calm, affectionate and genial profile; but exaggerated the marketing aspect in most cases. People started questioning his image upon that. A left-wing journalist satirized the picture as follows: “Yasin (a sura in the Quran), March of Izmir (which is embraced by nationalists and conventional Kemalists in the country), Bella Ciao, Mehteran, Abdullah Gul, Mustafa Kemal, the pro-Kurdish HDP leader Selahattin Demirtas, PKK… All in one place. He is the hope of Kemalists, PKK/HDP, FETO, ostensibly leftist liberals… He is the hero of our time, which scares me.”

A former AK Party politician also said: “Imamoglu becomes what he is supposed to be in every case,” whereas another leftist journalist asked: “Does anyone know about his ideas on any subject?” After a while, Imamoglu, who refrains from remarking a single word about domestic or foreign policies of Turkey and slurred over such questions (he seems to be right considering his utterly eclectic supporter group!), penned an opinion article for Washington Post. The article titled “How I won the race for mayor of Istanbul — and how I’ll win again” unavoidably caused some reactions. People questioned why he wrote such an article as if he was a candidate for the U.S. mayoral elections. And his image suffered a huge blow after it was revealed in the media that he insulted a governor when he was not allowed into an airport’s VIP lounge.

People started questioning Imamoglu’s image. Does he become what he is supposed to be in every case?

Politics means propaganda, and propaganda tools unavoidably comprise some illusive aspects. Imamoglu has managed to be convincing for quite a long time. For instance, he promised to build a Mecidiyeköy-Mahmutbey metro line in Istanbul through a google ad, which circulated for days and did not face any problem. But, while his image was suffering blows, it was reported that the test drive of this very line has already been made and the line will be opened soon. As this information surfaced, they adopted another strategy and started referring to Imamoglu’s works as Beylikduzu district mayor. In the press meeting when Kilicdaroglu announced Imamoglu’s candidacy, he said: “When I saw that green valley in Beylikduzu, I said to myself: ‘this is how a mayor should work.’ If he improved this place to such an extent with such limited facilities, he can do wonders with the giant budget of the Istanbul metropolitan municipality.”

But after that, it was revealed that 75 percent of the Green Valley was built and opened by former district mayor Yusuf Uzun, while Imamoglu only contributed to the building of the walls, a cafeteria and a pool. Another incident that shook his reliability happened this week. As known, Imamoglu and AK Party’s mayoral candidate Binali Yildirim will participate in a live televised debate on June 16. Regarding the debate, Imamoglu said: “I have heard that Mr. Yildirim asked for going over the questions beforehand.” The moderator, a journalist whose affiliation with the CHP is no secret, refuted his claim: “I haven’t prepared any questions. And Mr. Yildirim has not made such a request,” while Yildirim said: “He should prove it if he has an evidence, and apologize if he doesn’t.” Imamoglu’s answer was: “I probably misunderstood.”

For three months up until the March 31 election, “everything was fine” for Imamoglu, but with this trajectory, “everything might not be so fine” on June 23 despite all the support from his party’s allies, the Iyi Party, HDP and other political parties. The number of people who are questioning his image has been growing.

In Turkey’s largest city Istanbul, 8 million and 850 thousand voters went to polls in the March 31 local elections. During the vote count, the difference between the vote shares of the two alliances’ candidates was very small but the People’s Alliance still seemed ahead. Then, the People’s Alliance mayoral candidate Binali Yildirim announced that they won the Istanbul election. Half an hour later, the Nation’s Alliance candidate Ekrem Imamoglu issued a statement: “According to the data we’ve obtained, our vote share is 50.36 percent while our opponent’s is 46.70 percent based on the votes counted in more than 80 percent of ballot boxes.”

After the results turned out to be in favor of Imamoglu, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan also made a brief statement. Before departing from Istanbul to Ankara to deliver his traditional balcony speech, Erdogan said: “As the AK Party (Justice and Development Party), we have won the election by landslide as we have always been the first party by landslide since the election on 3 November 2002. Of course, the AK Party and the People’s Alliance have won or lost some municipalities, this is how democracy works. So, the results are required to be accepted.” Hinting Istanbul and Ankara Metropolitan Municipalities, Erdogan also remarked: “Although we have lost the metropolitan municipalities, we have achieved a great success in district municipalities of these metropolitan cities.”

Several hours later, the Nation’s Alliance candidate Imamoglu issued another statement and said that he has won the election by receiving 29 thousand more votes. On the following day, Turkey’s Supreme Election Council (YSK) Chairman Sadi Guven said: “We have shared the official reports of the results obtained from more than 80 percent of the ballot boxes, poll sheets and final district reports with the parties. 31.102 ballot boxes have been registered in the system, while 84 ballot boxes have not been registered yet due to objections. Accordingly, Ekrem Imamoglu’s vote number is 4.159.650 and Binali Yildirim’s is 4.131.761.” In other words, although the gap between the number of votes was not 29 thousand as Imamoglu claimed, he still won the mayoral election with a difference of 27 thousand 889 votes.

So, what happened next? Why did the AK Party’s provincial organization claim beginning from the first night of the election that there have been some irregularities in the election and filed objection appeals and complaints regarding the election results once the official objection process started? Did they really think of smearing the opposite side by making up lies and rumors about gerrymandering as claimed by the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP)? Could the party venture to do that while Imamoglu and his bloc was maintaining a successful operation of shaping minds even before Imamoglu received his election certificate? The Western capitals who were looking forward to Erdogan’s defeat were blissful, and the media represented Imamoglu as a victor. For what or in spite of what did the AK Party and its ally Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) claim that the election was rigged? How did the process lead to the final decision of the YSK that ruled the cancellation and rerun of the Istanbul mayoral election? 

Why did the AK Party’s provincial organization claim beginning from the first night of the election that there have been some irregularities and filed objection appeals and complaints regarding the election results once the official objection process started?

Vote counting procedures in Turkey operate in an almost a perfect way. The vote number of each candidate in every ballot box is reported by the balloting committee and its lead officer. After all the votes are counted, the ballot committee conveys the reports to the district electoral board. At that point, the district electoral board compounds the reports submitted by all the ballot boxes into a single report. Finally, they are conveyed to the provincial electoral boards by a team consisting of the district electoral board president and at least two members of the board. A copy of each report is delivered to the political parties and independent candidates simultaneously.

According to the election law; during the ballot counting, reporting, and compounding the data into a single report by collecting all the ballot box reports in the district electoral board, the candidates and observers representing political parties can monitor the whole process. Meanwhile, sorting and compounding activities are made openly. All these steps are under the responsibility of the district electoral boards. The boards comprise two government officials and political party representatives and are chaired by the judge of the highest seniority in the district. In other words, the political party representatives participate in this process as either board members or observers.

As of the election night, the AK Party filed appeals to several district electoral boards on the grounds that the final report was registered wrong, seals were missing in some ballots, and unlawful voter registration was made in some districts. For instance, in the ballot box no 1487 in Arnavutkoy district, Binali Yildirim’s vote number was registered as 1 in the final report although his actual vote number in the ballot box has been found to be 182. In 3 districts and 4 ballot boxes, the voter lists, final reports and vote counting sheets were missing. While the CHP argued the presence of “errors of fact” for such problems, the AK Party claimed that such errors are dubious.

The AK Party filed appeals to several district electoral boards on the grounds that the final report was registered wrong, seals were missing in some ballots, and unlawful voter registration was made in some districts.

As a result of the appeals filed by the AK Party, the difference between the two candidates fell to 19.700 as the deficiencies and errors were corrected. As the AK Party resumed filing objection appeals, the vote difference narrowed in favor of Yildirim. In the first phase, the objections filed for 39 districts were accepted by only 6 district electoral boards. In the second phase, the objections filed for all the districts were conveyed to the provincial electoral board to ask for the recount of all the votes. But the provincial electoral board refused the AK Party’s appeal and accepted the recount of only invalid votes. Meanwhile, the party appealed to the YSK for the recount of all the votes, which was also refused.

Eventually, in line with the accepted objections, “the ballots cast for metropolitan municipality in only 6 of 33 districts” and “the invalid votes in 33 districts” were recounted in the glare of cameras and all the political parties. So, 10 percent of the ballots in Istanbul, which has 8 million 850 thousand voters, were recounted. According to the statement of the YSK issued on April 17, the vote difference between the two candidates fell to 13.729. AK Party’s candidate Yildirim organized a long and comprehensive press conference with broad participation, including the foreign press. He said during the conference: “If we have won 16 thousand votes after the recount of the 10 percent, you can easily calculate the result if all the votes are recounted. This is enough to demonstrate that the election has been rigged; the votes were unfortunately registered irregularly in favor of the opposite side, indicating an organized gerrymandering. The results of the election would be different had all the votes been recounted and the CHP had consented to that.” He went on to ask: “If there really is a very small difference between our vote shares, then why did the gap not remain the same but changed in my favor after 10 percent of the ballots were recounted?”

After a long-lasting controversial legal process, Turkey’s Supreme Electoral Board (YSK) finally announced its decision on the Istanbul elections. According to the YSK’s final order, the March 31 mayoral elections in Istanbul have been cancelled due to presiding officers at ballot stations who had to be civil servants according to the law. The YSK has also found some other misconducted activities. As a result, the mayoral elections in Istanbul will re-run again on June 23, 2019.

At this point, it is crucial to examine the AK Party’s allegations on the Istanbul elections and why these allegations were effective on the final decision. After the March 31 local elections, the first results showed that Ekrem Imamoglu (CHP candidate), had approximately 27,000 more votes than the AK Party’s candidate. After the AK Party requested for a re-count in some districts due to miscalculations affecting the result, invalid votes had been re-counted and the difference between the AK Party’s Binali Yildirim and Ekrem Imamoglu decreased to approximately 13,000.

If the candidates of other political parties withdraw their candidacy in favor of either the AK Party or the CHP, this will be one of the main determinants on the election results.

The second part of the AK Party’s allegations was related to the illegal appointments of presiding officers at ballot stations. The AK Party also claimed that restricted voters, who could not vote in the elections according to the law, had voted in the elections. After the YSK’s preliminary investigation, it was approved that approximately 1000 restricted voters had voted in the election.

It is now certain that voters in Istanbul will re-cast their votes to elect the new mayor of Istanbul on June 23. The previous eighth candidates of political parties will run in these elections. Binali Yildirim for the AK Party, Ekrem Imamoglu for the CHP, Necdet Gokcinar for the Felicity Party, Muammer Aydin for the DSP, Selim Kotil for the BTP, and three other candidates from the DP, the Patriotic Party, and the TKP. These candidates can withdraw their candidacies on two occasions – either death or personal resignation. This means that small parties could force their candidates to resign in favor of another candidate in the upcoming elections.

The voter turnout in Istanbul was 83,88% and 1,704,325 voters did not go to the polls. Even a slightest increase or decrease in these numbers will determine the next mayor of Istanbul.

Another eye-catching issue for the following days is how political parties and candidates will mobilize their voters. Firstly, if the candidates of the Felicity Party, the DSP, the BTP and others withdraw their candidacy in favor of the AK Party or the CHP, this will be one of the main determinants on the election results. Secondly, voter turnout may be another determinant on the election results. During the March 31 local elections, the voter turnout in Istanbul was 83,88%, slightly lower than the average of the country, and 1,704,325 voters did not go to the polls. It is obvious that even a slightest increase or decrease in these numbers will determine the next mayor of Istanbul.

All these determinants show that Istanbul will go to the polls in a closely contested election on June 23. Since the difference between the votes was very low, the parties and candidates will try to broaden their sphere of influence to get the position. Furthermore, small parties and their support for the candidates of the AK Party and/or the CHP will be one of the hot topics of discussion in the election process. In any way, Turkey is about to witness another critical election in the following days.

Turkey is still discussing the results of the March 31 local elections. As a result of the AK Party’s official application, the Supreme Election Council (YSK) has decided to re-count the invalid votes in 39 districts in Istanbul. The council took the same decision for 20 other provinces where other parties also made applications for the votes to be re-counted. For instance, while the AK Party applied for a re-count in Istanbul, Ankara, Adana, Antalya, and some other provinces, the CHP made an application for Bursa, Malatya, Giresun, Artvin and others.

Obviously, the re-count of votes in Istanbul has taken the center stage in the post-election period. Since the process itself is ambiguous and complex, it’s crucial to analyze different dimensions of mayoral elections in Istanbul. The first dimension of the Istanbul elections is its unique character compared to other previous elections. When the official results were announced by the head of the YSK soon after the elections, the difference between AK Party’s Binali Yildirim and the CHP’s candidate, Ekrem Imamoglu, was only 28,027. There has never been such a slight difference between votes of candidates in Istanbul before. Thus, the re-count of valid and invalid votes would have an enormous effect on the final results. As a result of the re-count of votes in Istanbul, the difference between Imamoglu and Yildirim, as I write this piece, has decreased to 13,000. This low margin between the two candidates has triggered discussions and objections in the post-election period.

The CHP itself applied to the YSK many times for a re-count of votes. CHP made an official application for the re-count of votes in Yalova in the 2014 local elections, and as a result, its candidate won the elections with a slight difference.

Another crucial dimension of the elections in Istanbul is the inconsistent approach of some political parties. As had occurred in the previous elections, political parties always make objections to the results, even if there was a huge margin between the candidates. In the case of Istanbul this time, the close results between Imamoglu and Yildirim has caused anger and frustration on the CHP side. Nevertheless, the CHP itself applied to the YSK many times for a re-count of votes. For instance, while the first official results were indicative of an AK Party victory in Yalova in the 2014 local elections, the CHP made an official application for the re-count of votes, and as a result, the CHP’s candidate won the elections with a slight difference.

Nonetheless, the CHP has strongly condemned the re-count of invalid votes in Istanbul even though the party has utilized this legal right on multiple occasions. This illustrates that political parties in Turkey still suffer from internalizing the fundamental values of democracy and the rule of law. The last dimension of the elections in Istanbul occurs at this point: Political parties want to adopt the rule of law according to changing conditions. In all previous local elections, there have been lots of delays in delivering the certificate of election – as is happening now due to the ongoing legal process. However, none of the previous examples raised tensions as much as the case of Istanbul, since political parties adopted the rule of law and accepted the YSK’s final decision.

President Erdogan has recently underlined that almost all the voting was marred by irregularities in Istanbul. It is obvious that the current discussions on the results in Istanbul will continue to remain high on the political agenda in the upcoming days. All parties will determine their strategies according to the YSK’s final decision, which may indicate the re-count of all votes, a repetition of the elections, or the victory of one of the candidates. We will wait and see.

Turkey held one of the most important local elections this past week. The election campaigns were mostly shaped by Turkish foreign and security policies concerning the Syrian crisis, the PKK, and the fight against terrorism. The AK Party won the popular vote although it lost the major strongholds to the main opposition party. Istanbul, traditionally ruled by conservative parties since 1994, and the capital Ankara were lost to the opposition bloc, which was represented by a coalition called the National Alliance (In Istanbul, the re-count of votes are still ongoing and an official declaration will be announced by the YSK). It seems that the AK Party will continue dominating the Turkish political landscape via the 45% majority vote that it scored recently, which is unchallengeable by any other single party alone at this stage – It must be noted here that the People’s Alliance, consisting of the AK Party and MHP (Nationalist Movement Party), won the majority of the votes by 52%.

Winning Istanbul in 1994 was the first step of President Erdoğan’s long-term journey in the Turkish political sphere, in which he became the first political leader in Turkish politics who has stayed in power for more than 16 years. However, whether or not he has lost his first love, Istanbul– which he frames as Islambul, remains unclear not only because of the election result but also due to the changing nature of politics in Turkey. The result depends entirely on which side of the coin you look at to make sense of the result of the local election.

President Erdoğan remains Turkey’s most powerful leader while others’ approval individually is not more than 20% and more importantly, his ruling AK Party maintains its dominant party position in Turkish politics. While his rating is somewhat high especially compared to others, the results of the local election are taken seriously by him and high-level AK Party members on whether the AK Party should rethink its political strategy and narrative regarding current Turkish politics. This was highlighted by the President in his traditional balcony speech just after the local election while the result of Istanbul was unclear. He strongly underlined that the political message that his supporters wanted to give him was understood. He stressed that Turkey has serious challenges in its foreign and security policy, including the fight against terrorism and other regional issues such as Syria, and underlined that his term would continue for more than four years, where he and his ruling party would use their abilities to reshape Turkish politics regarding what AK Party supporters and the rest of the society would like to see.

After the election results on Sunday, President Erdogan strongly underlined that the political message that his supporters wanted to give him was understood. 

President Erdoğan and his ruling party are aware of the reality that there is a mutually constitutive relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy. The subject of survival was articulated heavily during the election campaign where it held the dominant narrative. The concept has been a dominant reference point of Turkish domestic and foreign security policy for more than two centuries. However, in current Turkish foreign policy, the AK Party and President Erdoğan should focus on firstly, a comprehensive foreign and security policy strategy, rather than emphasizing the concept of survival. In international politics, survival is an integral part of understanding state behavior, and most believe that it is the ultimate behavior of state; and that states should seriously seek for the best strategy to survive. It is true that Turkey has many challenges stemming from its own geopolitical landscape and long-time allies, namely the U.S, but Ankara should rethink its foreign and security policies beyond the concept of survival.

The reason is simple; the future of the AK Party at home will be determined by its performance in its foreign and security policy, or vice versa. More to the point, the success of the AK Party came to be as a result of its ability to adjust the domestic-international balance simultaneously. It took Turkey’s EU journey into account: The EU agenda was one of the important determinants factors behind the rise of the “Turkish model” in the Middle East and beyond while domestic politics became free from military tutelage.  

The concept of survival has been a dominant reference point of Turkish domestic and foreign security policy. But now the AK Party and President Erdogan should focus on a comprehensive foreign and security policy strategy.

There are three reasons why Turkey should be serious about its foreign and security policy. The first one is economic reasons, which President Erdoğan also emphasized would be the most important priority in the government’s agenda. The economy has been a crucial component of Turkish foreign policy for sixteen years which Turkey has enjoyed being a “trading state” where the concept is based on trade-driven integration strategies rather than security-driven foreign policy, especially in its surrounding regions. Under the shadow of current economic pressure, Turkish foreign policy has to recalculate its strategy and should find a new modality regarding how to recalibrate its economic relations to overcome the current economic upheaval. Turkey is still one of the most energetic countries in the MENA region with its dynamic economy, large population, the relative weight of its diplomatic influence over the regional issues and rising defense industry. There can be no ultimate strategic gain for Turkey without maintaining its economic rise in foreign affairs, and there is no economic gain without maintaining its diplomatic engagements.       

The second reason is political stability, which President Erdoğan has been underlining its strategic importance to consolidate Turkey’s rise in international politics since he came to power. The post-local election period poses opportunities, as well as challenges, for Turkey’s gradual rise. The structural and political consolidation of the presidential system is the most challenging one. From a structural side, the institutional regulations in the post-parliamentary order are still dynamics where many institutions need to be properly relocated and redesigned. From a very political perspective, it is possible to argue that the election dynamics in Turkey have significantly changed; which indicates the possibility of an achieved bipolar balance despite the continued dominance of the People’s Alliance.

The local election emphasizes that there are many ways in constituting an alliance system between different parties irrespective of their ideological differences. From a truly pragmatic reading of politics; it reminds us of the well-known saying: “the ally of today could be your rival tomorrow.” Therefore, political stability under President Erdoğan for the next four years is strategically important, where domestic and international balance will mutually facilitate one another to keep political stability in Turkey since both the AK Party and MHP, strongly support the continuity of the People’s Alliance. The foreign and security policy of Turkey will be certainly influential not only to consolidate political stability but also to maintain the alliance between two parties.        

There has been increasing radical-extremist political ideologies across to Europe which influences Turkey’s EU perspective but, securitizing Europe is not a good strategy for Turkey’s long-term interests.

The third reason is the combined foreign and security domain, in the scope of the upcoming practical issues in Turkey’s external affairs. First and foremost, re-energizing the Turkey-EU relationship, which has been poisoned by the rise of anti-Turkish politics and increasing unwillingness to have Turkey join the EU, particularly since 2013, is crucial. The EU has been the main determining factor, if not only one, behind the consolidation of Turkish democracy, including civil-military relations and basic human rights. Turkey and the EU should learn how to compartmentalize their relations. Under the current geopolitical upheaval stemming from BREXIT to Trump’s unwillingness towards both NATO and the EU, Turkey remains a strategically important powerhouse, especially with its crucial engagement with Russia, and political and military engagement to the Syrian conflict. Turkey, on the other hand, should not homogenize or categorize Europe only with reference to Islamophobia, far-right extremism, or Turkofobia. Yes, it is true that there has been increasing radical-extremist political ideologies across to Europe which influences Turkey’s EU perspective but, securitizing Europe is not a good strategy for Turkey’s long-term interests.

In addition to the EU/Europe, the Turkey-U.S. relationship is under significant challenges. The U.S. administration since 2013 has been repeatedly undermining Turkey’s national security interests by supporting the PYD-YPG in Syria and currently is threatening in retaliation for Ankara’s decision to move ahead with the purchase of a Russian air missile system. The foreign and security issues are not limited to the U.S. Turkey should be careful with regards to the PKK issue in Syria, but at the same time should not forget that the Middle East is bigger than the PKK. It does not necessarily mean that Turkey should not prioritize the PKK, as it is a high-level national security threat. Rather, it means that Turkey should consider the Middle East and its interests from a wider geopolitical perspective.

The EU has been the main determining factor behind the consolidation of Turkish democracy, including civil-military relations and human rights. Turkey and the EU should learn how to compartmentalize their relations.

The region is significantly transforming, the nature of actors in the region are dramatically changing and the geopolitical competition among the regional actors is getting more antagonizing. The regional system sends clear signals that Turkey should respond with caution. What Turkey needs to do in the post-local election period is to redraw its foreign policy priorities from a very pragmatic and practical way, refocus its reformist agenda in foreign policy, and obtain a balanced strategy.  

Last Sunday, more than 47 million Turkish voters went to the ballots for Turkey’s local elections in order to elect their new mayors, city council members, and “mukhtars” (neighborhood officials), who will serve until 2024. There will not be any parliamentary, presidential, or local elections for the next 4 years. Interestingly, the last time that there was a long gap between subsequent elections was between June 2011 and March 2014. Since then, elections were held in March and August 2014, June and November 2015, April 2017, June 2018, and finally, recent elections were held on 31 March, 2018.

It can be estimated that in the upcoming days and even weeks there are going to be many discussions on why certain goals were achieved in some provinces and why expected success was not delivered in others. This goes for both the People’s Alliance and Nation Alliance. There will be much material for long discussions due to the fact that the results, for example, of Istanbul, are still very controversial.

However, despite these issues, some important points have to be emphasized, which are needed in order to understand the complexity of Turkish politics. As I often try to state, it’s not that easy to get a clear picture of the complicated dynamics of Turkish democracy, which has been developing its own tradition not just from 1921 or 1923, but even before that since 1908 (or even 1876), when the parliamentary tradition had been introduced in Turkey. Since then, Turks have gradually (with some interruptions in between) developed their entrenched understanding of democracy and their electoral experiences that cannot be reduced to inadequate analyses by contemporary foreign observers and Western journalists who lack expertise.

In order to somewhat understand the preferences of Turkish voters, one might compare some recent developments that have perhaps “surprised” many Western observers with strong prejudices and lack of knowledge regarding the country’s democratic dynamics.

First, Turkey’s President and the AK Party’s chairman Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who made efforts for his party to gain success in the recent local elections, stated on Sunday evening that “politics that lacks people will lead to fascism, dictatorship and oppression in the end.” This stance symbolizes quite a normal issue in Turkey, according to which every legal political party or movement has the chance to win elections by democratic means. But foreign media might be surprised due to previous manipulated broadcasting reflexes. Turkey is, despite its different kinds of discourses, an entrenched democracy where the ballot box is the only means that is respected by all citizens. Therefore, once again, one will note that the accusations of “authoritarianism” in the country have been proved false. That’s the only reason why all Turkish citizens – whether secularists, Kemalists, nationalists, or conservatives – will accept the factual results of the elections. There is no other option in the light of Turkey’s democratic tradition.

President Erdogan: “politics that lacks people will lead to fascism, dictatorship and oppression in the end”

The second issue is the mis-perception of people who are generally demonized by Western media as pro-government or being close to government circles, while disregarding all other “secular and Kemalist” circles. But if we just look at many Turkish journalists, who’re allegedly opponents or at the best, “natural,” media representatives, one clearly notices that most of them supported the CHP and HDP candidates across Turkey – without any criticism and so on. To see this, one only needs to read a couple of columns or social media threads.

A very obvious example of this is the recent case of journalist Erdem Gul, who was elected as CHP’s mayor of Istanbul Adalar municipality. Gul was a journalist who was, and currently is, promoted by Western media outlets as an alleged symbol of critical, free, and independent press. However, similar to the former Editor-in-Chief of the secular Hurriyet newspaper, Enis Berberoglu, who became a CHP MP, most of the journalists who are critical of the AK Party are sympathetic towards the CHP – a left-nationalist party, which is not even able to change its current chairman despite several election losses.

The third issue is about the CHP’s Ankara and Istanbul candidates, who are trying to distance themselves from the party’s original perception. It’s not a secret that CHP’s Ankara candidate has roots in MHP circles and that the CHP was not able to nominate an original candidate from the party’s own cadres. More, it was an interesting election step by the Kurdish-nationalist HDP not to nominate a leftist or Kurdish-nationalist candidate both in Ankara, Istanbul or Izmir. That is to say, the HDP provided direct support to a Turkish nationalist, namely Mansur Yavas.

Understanding the dynamics in Turkish political life is not that easy. It might be difficult for Western observers to understand why the AK Party gained the southeastern Turkish city of Sirnak, where the HDP usually receives high support. Sirnak rejected the PKK’s (and the HDP’s) calls and elected the AK Party’s candidate. A final example might be stressing the case of Tunceli, where neither the CHP nor the HDP were able to win the elections. The Communist Party of Turkey’s candidate became the new mayor of Tunceli. More interestingly, the Kurdish and Alevi dominated city of Tunceli neighbors the city of Elazig, where the nationalist MHP won the elections. This interesting picture shows how difficult it is to elaborate on Turkey’s political structures and depicts the rich potential of its democracy.

CHP’s Ankara and Istanbul candidates are trying to distance themselves from the party’s original perception. It’s not a secret that CHP’s Ankara candidate has roots in MHP circles and that the CHP was not able to nominate a candidate from the party’s own cadres. 

Another fundamental point, which is quite alien to foreign observers, might be the traditional and nearly “fanatic” voting behavior in traditional CHP “castles” such as Izmir, Bakirkoy, Besiktas, Kadikoy, and Sisli in Istanbul, or Cankaya in Ankara. In all these well-educated and wealthy districts, which are highly populated, most secular-Kemalist voters do not vote according to the profile of the candidate, his or her previous achievements, or the quality of service. The main thing that matters among these “radical” voters is, on the one hand, voting for the CHP’s candidate (regardless of who the candidate is) and on the other, the obvious anti-Erdogan stance in general. If one compares this radical tradition with AK Party dominated districts, it can be seen that supporters of Erdogan are more oriented on the quality of service of the candidates.

We will continue to analyze the elections by focusing on the final concrete results and future projections.

Turkey has to some extent left the 31 March local elections behind. The country’s long-lasting democracy has shown great success in reflecting the people’s will and respect to democratic rule in local governance. Unlike western countries, which tend to have low voter turnout, 84,6% of Turkish citizens casted their votes on Sunday. This wholeheartedly proves the internalization of democracy by all social and political groups in Turkey.

What do the election results tell us about Turkey’s political atmosphere? There are a few points worth stressing here. Firstly, the election results showed once again that the People’s Alliance sustained a political majority. The AK Party and the MHP substantially preserved their votes. The total number of votes these parties received were close to the results of the June 24 presidential and parliamentary elections. The AK Party reached the highest percent of votes in its local election history. Thus, the first prominent outcome of these results is the unrivaled power of the AK Party in Turkey’s political arena. Furthermore, the results proved that the People’s Alliance is favored by both voters of the AK Party and the MHP.

The People’s Alliance – the AK Party and MHP – preserved the majority of votes in Turkey’s local elections. The total number of votes these parties received were close to the results of the June 24 presidential and parliamentary elections. 

Second is the issue of the relative decrease of AK Party’s votes in metropolitan cities. As a result of this decrease, the AK Party lost Ankara, Antalya, Ardahan, Artvin, Bilecik, Sinop, Burdur, Bolu and Kırşehir to the CHP. Nonetheless, the success of the CHP in these metropolitan cities is related to pre-electoral alliances that the party established with the Iyi Party and the HDP. Especially in Ankara and Antalya, the support of the HDP enabled the CHP to gain a majority of the votes.

Nevertheless, although the CHP won mayoral elections in these cities, it failed to obtain the majority in provincial council elections. In almost all metropolitan cities, the AK Party and the MHP obtained a majority of the representatives in councils. This situation required cohabitation in the governance of metropolitan cities.

The third prominent result of the local elections is the reliability of elections in Turkey. Although Turkey’s opposition bloc had always made allegations of fraud or corruption in election results, they were never able to prove these claims. The success of the CHP in metropolitan cities shows that Turkey conducts free and fair elections and opposition parties can win if they garner the support of the masses.

Since there is a minor difference between the votes of AK Party and CHP candidates in Istanbul, the AK Party has applied to the Supreme Electoral Council (YSK) for the re-count of votes in some ballot boxes. Although the opposition parties see this as an intervention by the AK Party, political parties in Turkey can make this recount application to the YSK as a legal right. For instance, as a result of the CHP and HDP’s application, local elections in Yalova and Ağrı had been re-counted in 2014. More, there have always been some objections about the results of ballot boxes, which cause delays in the official declaration of election results. Thus, the current ongoing legal process is not an exception for these elections.

Although the CHP won mayoral elections in Ankara, Antalya and Izmir, it failed to obtain the majority in provincial council elections. In almost all metropolitan cities, the AK Party and the MHP obtained a majority of the representatives in councils. 

Another eye-catching result of the local elections is the significant decrease of HDP votes in the eastern and southeastern provinces of Turkey. The HDP lost a significant number of its electoral base in the region. The party lost four major cities; Şırnak, Ağrı, Bitlis, and Tunceli. One of the reasons behind this failure is the successful performance of government-appointed trustees in the region. due to the cooperation between the PKK and HDP municipalities, the state appointed trustees over the last two years. The election results proved that people in the region appreciated the services provided by these trustees in these municipalities. As a result of this appreciation, the AK Party increased its votes and gained three prominent provinces from the HDP. This result also means that people of the region are against the domination of the PKK.

The last point in terms of the prominence in local elections is the dominance of nationalist and conservative politics in Turkey. One of the reasons behind the CHP’s success in metropolitan cities is due to its this character of mayoral candidates. For instance, mayoral candidates in Ankara, Antalya, and İzmir all come from a right-wing background and were able to enhance the votes of this bloc. This means that the main determinant of Turkey’s political climate is nationalist and conservative political understanding. In other words, if a party wants to win, it will not be able to ignore these dynamics in the future anymore.

Within the past two weeks, Turkey’s governing AK Party revealed a significant number of mayor candidates for the upcoming local elections. After negotiations between the AK Party and the MHP on forming an alliance again, both parties have accelerated their preparations for the elections. As these elections are a crucial turning point for the AK Party and the consolidation of the new political system, the candidate selection process was important to establish a successful election strategy.

President Erdogan’s three-term rule, which limits running for office for a maximum of three terms, with the purpose of providing dynamism and rejuvenation in party cadres has been implemented for the first time in local elections. Due to this reason, 91 mayors of provinces and counties currently serving could not be re-nominated. The first round of candidates were announced by President Erdogan on 24 November. These included the candidates of 40 provinces, consisting of politicians, NGO leaders, governors, and former ministers. President Erdogan underlined again that competency and the merit of the candidate compose the criteria that the AK Party has used in the candidate selection process.

As the upcoming local elections are a crucial turning point for the AK Party and the consolidation of the new political system, the candidate selection process was important to establish a successful election strategy.

The second round of candidates were announced soon after, on 27 November. The most striking names in this second group were the candidates of Ankara and Izmir. The deputy chair of the AK Party, Mehmet Ozhaseki, was nominated for Ankara, while the former Minister of Economy Nihat Zeybekci became the mayoral candidate for Izmir. Ozhaseki and Zeybekci are well-known politicians throughout the country and their nomination was a sign that the AK Party is paying more attention to these metropolitan cities. Nevertheless, even if the candidacy of Binali Yildirim for Istanbul is almost certain, it is yet to be announced to the public.

The candidates for Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir form the cornerstones of the AK Party’s election strategy. As Bahceli announced, the MHP will not nominate candidates in provinces that the AK Party has, and will support the AK Party’s candidate in order to maintain the solidarity of the coalition formed during the June 24 elections. As a result of this, the People’s Alliance has already significantly gone ahead of the game. The AK Party nominated three high-profile politicians to attract the voters in these electoral districts, and these candidates have been welcomed by the MHP. Thus, the candidate selection strategy of the AK Party in these provinces received successful reflections by both parties.

President Erdogan’s three-term rule, which limits running for office for a maximum of three terms, with the purpose of providing dynamism and rejuvenation in party cadres has been implemented for the first time in local elections.

Nonetheless, the AK Party is aware of the rejuvenation demands among the masses. In accordance with this purpose, the party has made significant changes in its candidate profiles. For instance, only 10 out of 40 among the first group of candidates are currently serving mayors of their electoral districts. This shows that the AK Party is paying attention to the mobilization in local administration.

The rest of the AK Party’s candidates will be announced throughout December along with the party’s election manifesto. It is possible to see some joint candidates as part of a cooperation between the AK Party and the MHP. Negotiations on the possibilities and limitations of the alliance are being conducted precisely. The concrete results of these negotiations will be seen in the following days as the rest of the candidates are announced.

With only six months left, Turkey’s local elections are almost around the corner. The ongoing debate on local elections still focuses on the candidates, political parties, and possible alliances that could be formed.

While the Turkish electorate can expect to see pre-electoral alliances in local elections, there is also a heavy discussion on the possible candidates that parties can put forward – especially in metropolitan cities. It is important to understand the transformation of the “urban” in the last decade in order to understand the boundaries and limitations of politics in governing the urban. Under new circumstances, in order to be successful in urban areas, political parties have to focus on new dynamics.

Before digging deeper into the issue, it is crucial to understand the effect that neoliberalism has had on the urban, since its reflections on politics is crucial. On January 24, 1980, Turkey woke up to a new day in which some discussions leading its economic system change would be taken. The changes would also transform the political, social, and cultural sphere of Turkey.

The stabilization program taken then was different to previous austerity packages due to its comprehensive and long-reaching liberalization schedule. This program proposed limiting the public sector, privatizing the economy, and liberalizing international trade. From then onwards, the Turkish economy adapted to the neoliberal system. As a hegemonic force, neoliberalism also shaped the ideological and operational parameters of urbanization in Turkey.

These changes also transformed the cultural and mere everyday life of society, especially in urban areas. While the urban structure changed in the neoliberal context, both center and peripheral areas in cities were exposed to great transformation. The gap between individuals and politicians began to disappear and politicians had to propose practical solutions to existing problems rather than proposing abstract solutions in cities. Indeed, this is one of the main reasons why Recep Tayyip Erdogan was successful in the 1994 municipality elections in Istanbul. While his rivals focused on dealing with insignificant issues, he preferred to focus on basic but necessary issues and proposed comprehensive solutions to them.

As a result of a newly emerging phenomenon, individual engagement with urban life was also transformed. People began to expect detailed proposals from politicians in order to reflect the problems of the entire city rather than just their neighborhood. Due to the fact the people began to define themselves through their living places, cities also became part of their identity. This situation helped the emergence of a new culture in politics.

People increasingly began to vote for candidates rather than political parties. Even if they are to support a different party in the general election, they can easily vote for a candidate from another party in local elections. Thus, local elections and the governance of the urban have become an issue of politics above politics.

The new political identity in the urban is also a result of a multilateral process. Spatial practices in relation to people’s perception of their environment in day-to-day interactions are also important to understand individual reactions on these issues.

This emerging phenomenon brought some issues to the forefront – environment, urbanization, ecosystem, and infrastructure. When examined, it can be observed that all political parties, regardless of their ideological position, underline the importance of these issues on their agenda.

Consequently, even if the so-called “death” of neoliberal policies has been highly discussed since the Wall Street Crisis in 2008, its effect on urban politics is still valid. Obviously, governing the urban in a neoliberal context forces political parties to prepare more creative programs in local elections. Since the party candidates in cities have not yet been announced, it is possible to expect a great rivalry between them. Nevertheless, all candidates have to take these issues of urban politics into consideration in order to be successful.

By February 2018 pre-electoral alliances became one of the game changers in Turkish politics. Even though all legal amendments and regulations regarding pre-electoral alliances were designed for the projected elections in 2019, the decision to hold early elections on June 24 completely changed this direction. Thus, the June 24 parliamentary elections brought new opportunities for collaboration to political parties on a legal basis.

Nowadays, Turkey has been discussing the possibility of pre-electoral alliances in local elections. Last week, chairman of the MHP – Devlet Bahceli – announced that they are open to discuss the issue of pre-electoral alliances in local elections – even though this will not be easy to formulate. While Bahceli indicated his reservations based upon a concern for the rules and nature of local elections, he brought this issue to the forefront again. President Erdogan responded positively to Bahceli’s call and stated that this could be a topic to discuss in the following days.

As has been underlined by the leaders of the AK Party and MHP, framing the rules of alliances in local elections will be different to parliamentary elections. Indeed, there are several variables that affect the formulation of alliances in local elections. Firstly, local dynamics play a fundamental role in local elections. Voters consider close-knit relations and candidate profiles more seriously in comparison to parliamentary elections. Turkey’s political culture is shaped through regionalism, which is a crucial determinant on voting behavior. People tend to vote for candidates rather than political parties and the votes of political parties show a change in local elections. For instance, since its establishment, the AK Party has always received a lower vote in local elections when compared to the vote share in parliamentary elections.

The second variable that affects the formation of alliances is related to the lack of legal infrastructure. The amendment adopted in February only regulates pre-electoral alliances in parliamentary elections. Both presidential and local elections were excluded. Thus, there is need for a new amendment that regulates official alliances on a local level. When it comes to examples from the world, we see that there are regulations on pre-electoral alliances in local elections in federal states such as Mexico and Brazil. Turkey should pay attention to frame possibilities and limitations to formulate a legal basis under a unitary structure.

For all these reasons, parties should take these factors into consideration before framing the rules of alliances in local elections. Until now, all discussions have concentrated on the positive and negative effects of alliances on the election results in metropolitan cities. Nonetheless, if there is need for a detailed framework, these questions should also be asked: how will alliances be formed in the AK Party-dominated and the MHP-dominated electoral districts? What will be ways of forming alliances in districts where voting rates between the two parties are close? Do these parties prefer to have a common candidate not running under a party banner? How will the CHP, HDP, Good Party, and the Felicity Party formulate their election strategy if forming official alliances becomes possible? What will be the strategy of these parties, especially in metropolitan cities? These questions are fundamental in designing pre-electoral alliances in local elections.

All these variables reflect that there is a need for maximizing gains and minimizing costs when determining the rules of pre-electoral alliances. All these parties should seriously calculate how alliances will reflect their voting rates. Finally, political parties should pay attention to design electoral stimulations for each district and make categorizations in order to see their total gains and losses.