The U.S. wants to cooperate with Turkey on all issues related to the Syrian conflict and sees it as critical to end the civil war. The U.S. Syria envoy James Jeffrey points to the Manbij agreement as a good model for broader cooperation. He is reassuring Turkey that the PYD and YPG members are leaving Manbij and that they will not participate in local councils and the police force, as Turkish policymakers have demanded. Progress, however, in Manbij has been slow and Turkey has yet to declare that the YPG members have left to go east of the Euphrates. It is also not clear in what areas specifically this model can be replicated. Some progress is obviously better than none and the U.S.’ willingness to work with Turkey is an encouraging sign, both for stability of northern Syria and also for the end of the broader conflict. Nevertheless, we need to keep in mind that Turkey continues to be concerned about and feel threatened by YPG control and presence east of the Euphrates as well.

The envoy’s remarks about “pulling the plug” on the Astana process was met with criticism both by Turkey and Russia, who believe they have been making progress contrary to outside views about the lack of tangible results. The failure to create a constitutional committee to draft a new constitution has suffered from the dynamics of the conflict at play since the beginning. The opposition remains fragmented and Assad’s supporters, Russia and Iran, remain invested in the continuation of the regime. Determining the composition of the committee has been extremely difficult not only because the guarantor states cannot agree on who will be participating in the constitution writing process but also because of the fundamental dynamics of the conflict.

The only other alternative is for the U.S. to fundamentally shake up the dynamics on the ground and create a different game where other actors may be lured to a framework that excludes Iran.

In other words, if the balance of power is not significantly changed between numerous sides on the ground, there will be no party that is able to impose its will. By refusing to empower the Arab opposition in concert with Turkey, the U.S. has contributed to this fragmentation. It is not a matter simply of diplomatic negotiations over picking the constitution writers but it is also about creating a committee that reflects the power dynamics on the ground for drafting a constitution acceptable to all sides. In this process, the U.S. should actually support Turkey’s efforts and empower the opposition representatives at the negotiation table instead of calling for the replacement of the Astana process with that of the UN process. The Astana process has been effective in creating de-confliction zones and a forum for those with military presence on the ground to have sustained dialogue. It has not produced a political solution so far but it can contribute to it by engaging one of the most crucial actors on the ground, i.e. Iran.

The U.S. has already declared pushing Iran out of Syria as a major policy goal in Syria and Jeffery’s comments about the end of the Astana process appear to reflect that objective in mind. The Trump administration has been talking about confronting and rolling back Iran’s influence in the region, however it does not currently have a clear plan to achieve that. The only other alternative is for the U.S. to fundamentally shake up the dynamics on the ground and create a different game where other actors may be lured to a framework that excludes Iran. This, however, will be extremely difficult given Iran’s investments in Syria and willingness to commit its military and human resources on the ground. Absent a serious American investment to isolate Iran in Syria, Iran will continue to be part of the discussion as it can act as a spoiler militarily, politically, and diplomatically.

The good news is that the U.S. recognizes the crucial role of Turkey in all these goals, however the bad news is all these goals are unlikely to be achieved simultaneously. 

The U.S. balancing act between supporting the PYD and providing reassurances to Turkey to be able to cooperate on the resolution of the Syrian conflict is not an easy one. Moreover, the U.S. hopes to push Iran out of the equation in Syria while achieving a political solution to the civil war, as well as, an “enduring” defeat of Daesh. Granted that the complexity of the terrain has a lot to do with this complicated picture, but the lack of clarity and the mismatch of the U.S. goals with its investments on the ground is the enduring story from the Obama to the Trump administration. The good news is that the U.S. recognizes the crucial role of Turkey in all these goals, however the bad news is all these goals are unlikely to be achieved simultaneously. 

On Thursday last week, the Pentagon dismissed claims of a U.S. exit from Syria as being “rumours,” conveying instead that the fight against Daesh in Syria was not over.

According to senior U.S. officials, President Donald Trump had instructed military leaders to withdraw U.S. troops from Syria, suggesting that U.S. strategic goals in Syria do not include longer-term stability or reconstruction efforts. Trump had also previously suggested that the Syrian war was a mistake during his campaign period, as well as more recently indicating that a U.S. military exit will happen “very soon.”

Nonetheless, while Trump maintains Syria as being a financial drain on the U.S. economy and burden on interests not in line with his ‘America First’ policy, mostly blaming the previous administration for not having crossed the stated “Red Line In The Sand,” Pentagon spokesperson Dana White, on Wednesday the following day described a U.S. plan to withdraw troops from Syria as “rumours,” with the fight against Daesh not yet over.

Contrary to Donald Trump’s statements of a rapid U.S. military exit within six months, sources have cited an increase in military presence in northern Syria, reporting that two more military outposts have been set up in the Manbij region. It is estimated the U.S. now has up to 11 military bases in northern Syria.

While President Trump’s remarks have been contradictory, it seems the military leaders with experience in the failures of Iraq and Afghanistan hope to stay with suggestions of their being a ‘robust post-conflict’ agenda. Some high ranking U.S. military leaders have insisted that “once the small [Daesh] footholds have been cleared out in eastern Syria, the U.S. will require a footprint after the fighting stops to deter further attacks against the United States.”

The U.S. financial and military aid towards the PYD/YPG in northern Syria has caused much friction between Turkish-American relations. Being a Syrian offshoot of the PKK, an outlawed terrorist organization recognized by Turkey, the European Union and the United States, the U.S. have used the YPG in their ‘fight’ against Daesh, but more importantly to decrease Russian and Iranian influence in the region, at the expense of supporting an organization also linked to terrorism.

With recent Turkish counter-terrorism operations in Afrin, north-western Syria, clearing what had become a strategic location for YPG cross-border attacks on the provinces of Hatay and Kilis, Turkey has made it clear they will now be directing their efforts towards other YPG/PYD controlled areas, most specifically the U.S. held region of Manbij. Causing apprehension towards a possible confrontation between Ankara and Washington, a Turkey-U.S. working group was set up to alleviate concerns and cooperate on a peaceful solution. The first meeting was held on March 8, 2018.

However, diplomatic sources recently signified that the next Turkey-U.S. working group meeting on Manbij will be put on hold until May. Waiting until Mike Pompeo replaces former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, the impromptu shift in the White House has dampened Turkish-American cooperative progress and caused speculation on whether Pompeo will continue, or even adhere to Tillerson’s ‘constructive’ steps in finding a solution between the two NATO members in Manbij.

Where an immediate U.S. military exit has been no more than rhetoric to appease domestic concerns, as well as provide ground for Trump to demand payment from those that wish for the U.S. to maintain presence in Syria, signalling out Saudi Arabia, French President Macron has kept close contact with the White House. After having welcomed the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to the Elysee Palace two weeks ago it was proposed Macron looks to send an unspecified number of troops to the French bases in Manbij and assist the PYD who make up an overwhelming percentage of the SDF.

External intervention becoming ever more likely after the Douma chemical attack on civilians, with Trump and Macron calling for a “strong, joint response” towards the Assad regime, British cooperation and involvement has also come to light, with Trump securing a $500 million deal in relation to the drone development and maintenance project entitled the ‘Falcon Project.’

Although it may appear Trump’s rhetoric sympathizes with U.S. military personnel, striving for their ‘return home,’ the Pentagon, alongside the high ranking military leaders intent on countering Russia and limiting Iran in the region will maintain their presence in Syria for the time to come. Alienating Turkey, U.S. insistence to further build a military presence while assisting the PYD has paved the way for Turkey to nurture stronger bi-lateral relations with Russia and build collaborative relations with Iran based on mutual concerns of terrorism.

While Trump personally may want a Syria exit soon, it is evident that his personal opinions bare no weight within the interests of the Pentagon. It is also debatable whether elected individuals in the U.S. actually have a say with regards to foreign policy interests.

Over the past years, the U.S. military involvement in the Syrian crisis has become a widely discussed topic across the globe. The recent announcement of President Trump to withdraw American troops from Syria has not only further complicated the situation for the international actors involved in the crisis but also enabled speculations about the future of the Turkish-American confrontation in Syria. In fact, such a decision can bear either dire consequences, or yield positive outcomes for Turkey. It is important to investigate the implications of Trump’s unsettled withdrawal decision for Turkey, and evaluate this new development in relation to the Ankara-Washington disagreement over the issue of American support for the YPG. Unfortunately, it is still unclear whether Trump’s unexpected decision will facilitate Ankara’s strategy in Northern Syria or not.

Despite the fact that Ankara has not made an explicit announcement on this issue, Turkey is likely to appreciate the American act of pulling out of Syria, if the timing and methodology simultaneously correspond with Turkey’s strategy against the PKK in the country. If so, one might question what the Turkish strategy towards the PKK-YPG in Syria is. Turkey’s strategy is first and foremost to minimize the territorial control of the PKK-YPG in the country and restore U.S.-Turkey relations. The acceptable end scenario for Ankara is to create a new “territorial space,” in which the PKK-YPG cannot obtain any sort of military force that can politically or militarily influence the northeastern part of the country. This ‘space’ can only be achieved if the U.S. stops backing the PKK-YPG. Otherwise, the Turkish-American relations may enter an irreversible direction since Turkey seems to be willing to carry out its military action against PKK’s region under U.S. protection. At this stage, the latter is not what Turkey wants to do in the near feature. In that case, the recent statement of President Trump to withdraw American troops from Syria is a crucial move that can influence Turkey’s short-term game plan in Northern Syria. There are two important but interrelated scenarios about Trump’s post-American Syrian strategy that can destabilize Turkey’s strategic concerns and more importantly create more chaos in Northern Syria. The irony here is that Trump himself is faithfully echoing Obama’s hands-off policy in Syria which is the main driving factor behind Turkish-American confrontation.

The first scenario is about timing. The preference to downgrade U.S. involvement in Syria in the fight against Daesh is problematic if the Trump administration really wants to restrain Iranian influence over Syria. The strategy of disengagement makes sense only if it is applied at the right time. The Obama administration made a similar mistake in Iraq in 2011, with a post-American Iraq easily slipping into Iran’s hands. The power vacuum that emerged after the U.S. retrenchment from Iraq was one of the driving factors behind the rise of Daesh. The timing of the U.S. withdrawal might also provide more space for the Assad regime to gain leverage, which is not an intention of the original U.S. strategy in Syria. It is needless to say that Russia will become a more significant actor in a post-American Syria. Overall, it is expected that an uncontrolled and untimely American withdrawal from Syria may bring extra costs for Turkey in Syria.

The second scenario relates to methodology. A critical assessment of such a striking development is essential for Turkey in assuring long-term military leverage against the PKK threat in the region. In this regard, the methodology that the U.S. pursues in pulling out its ground troops is really a matter of Turkey’s policy towards a post-American Syria. But, nobody thinks that the U.S. will completely remove itself from Syria, even Trump himself. Thus, many questions still remain regarding the direction of American military presence in the country.

If the U.S. maintains its military presence to protect the current structure of the SDF as it is now, for which the PKK-YPG is the primary military component, then Turkey’s ‘military deterrence’ oriented strategy vis-a-vis the PKK presence in Syria will remain. The main strategy for Turkey is only acceptable in the condition of the demobilization of the PKK. The latest attempt of the U.S. to transform the Syrian Democratic Forces into a political party to be named as Syria’s Future Party does not bring any solution to Turkey’s concerns for the future of Syria. Ankara sees the new party as an extension of the U.S. strategy to attribute another label to the PKK. Ankara, in fact, perceives this move as an attempt to cover up the PKK’s terrorist motivations. Turkey believes that a comprehensive strategy should consist of a broad communal consent, in which the PKK-centric political project cannot be sustainable.

The strategic value of the U.S. disengagement from Syria for Turkey is not apparent since Ankara did not expect that the U.S. would change its overall strategy. Ankara still thinks that Trump’s act is not realistic and applicable in the near future. It is also interesting to witness that President Trump’s military withdrawal incentive irrationally contradicts the claims put forth by CENTCOM in favor of furthering American military presence in Syria, especially in Manbij where Ankara and Washington are most likely to confront against each other in the near future.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Vladimir Putin, and Hassan Rouhani, the presidents of Turkey, Russia and Iran, met in Ankara on April 4 and they, once again, pledged to work together to conclude the everlasting war in Syria. The summit was the second of its kind following the Sochi meeting of last November and will be followed by another tripartite summit in Tehran. While the three countries diverge on a number of issues regarding Syria from the future of the Syrian regime to their threat perceptions, “Syria’s territorial integrity is sine qua non” for them as Erdogan said in the joint conference after the summit in Ankara. All three actors pursue to keep Syria’s territorial integrity intact despite their different rationales, methods and instruments for this goal. More, all three actors give each other the benefit of the doubt as they go through serious tests of their commitment to the tripartite cooperation.

While Turkey desires a future Syria with no piece of it under the PYD’s control, it wants Turkey-backed actors, such as the National Army (formerly the Free Syrian Army), to have its fair share of power in the new status quo to be built. The least Turkey expects to achieve is to contain the PYD zone and place a security belt between its forces and the Turkish territory. The most it expects, on the other hand, is to establish a new government in Syria which will include Turkey-backed actors in charge. Turkey’s best-case scenario has no place neither for Assad nor for the PYD in the whole or part of Syria.

Iran, on the other hand, is the strongest advocate of returning to the pre-war status quo in Syria. The most it expects to achieve is to hand the Assad regime the perfect control over the entire country so that it can have its proxy power to trouble its long time regional rivals such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, and if circumstances dictate, Turkey. This way Iran seeks to have a contiguous sphere of control from Iran to Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. The members of this bloc would not only choose to cooperate and build an alliance with Iran but they would also be ruled by rulers with deep and genuine allegiances to Iran. These countries, in Iran’s best-case scenario, will also be protected not only by their national armies but also by Iran’s militia forces being planted into their armies. While this is the perfect scenario for Iran, the least it can be satisfied with is to maintain Assad’s rule at least in Damascus if not in Idlib, Raqqa, or Haseke.

Russia, as the key actor that coordinates Turkey’s and Iran’s diverging perspectives on Syria, desires to drive U.S. out of Syria in its best-case scenario and contain the U.S. sphere of influence in the east of the Euphrates in its not-so-good but acceptable scenario. Russia has no commitment to Assad as an individual leader or to Iran’s project of building the new Persian Empire. Assad’s presidency or Iran’s militias in Syria are nothing more than simple instruments to contain U.S. expansionism within Syria.

While a level of discrepancy surely exits amongst the future projections of these three countries, their prospects of Syria are not entirely incommensurable. They are for sure willing to work together in order to keep Syria as a single unified country against the U.S. attempts to carve out a chunk of it to be handed to the PYD. While Turkey-backed rebels and Iran-backed regime forces are on the opposite sides on the ground, Turkey and Iran, as the sponsors, have the capacity to tone down the conflict and start a negotiation process between the rebels and the regime.

A version of territorial power-sharing between the Turkey-backed rebels and Iran-backed regime can maintain the conflict in low intensity until all three parties reach an agreement over the future of Syria. Such an arrangement relies on the idea that Turkey and Iran – with Russian backup – will be satisfied with the less of two evils rather than pursuing their best-case scenarios immediately. For Turkey, the lesser evil is Assad ruling a part of Syria rather than the whole, while the PYD remains Turkey’s main concern. For Iran, the lesser evil is Assad ruling part of Syria rather than none while Israel and Saudi Arabia remain as Iran’s main concerns. For Russia, the lesser evil is accommodating Iran and Turkey’s diverging concerns rather than pushing for an all-Russian initiative.

After all, that’s Russia’s only shot to be able to balance U.S. presence in Syria. Among such diverging priorities, Turkey, Iran and Russia will need to give each other the benefit of the doubt rather than assuming the worst, which, in this case, would be spoiling the accommodation process and pursuing their maximalist, or best-case scenarios at the cost of the other two.

In an opinion written for Newsweek, Turkey’s Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu described the situation in Syria not only as the “worst humanitarian crisis since World War II” but as a conflict that “encouraged the emergence of a global terrorist threat.”

Sharing a 566-mile-long border with Syria, Turkey has inevitably been the country most affected from the Syrian Civil War. Maintaining an open-door policy to those who have fled the atrocities in Syria, Turkey has become the largest refugee hosting country in the world. According to figures published by the Syria Regional Refugee Response, there are 3,424,237 registered Syrian refugees in Turkey. Bearing in mind that not all refugees are registered, this figure is estimated to be a lot higher.

The Syrian Civil War has also brought to the frontline Turkey’s humanitarian assistance. As the Foreign Minister comments in his op-ed, Turkey has spent over $30 billion to meet the needs of 3.4 million Syrian refugees seeking assistance in their northern neighbor. Opportunities such as free access to medical care, education, the right to join the labor force have been designed and given in order to help Syrian refugees “better integrate into their host society.”

State-funded terrorism

It’s not enough to highlight how Turkey has approached the conflict in Syria from a humanitarian perspective. While Ankara has opened its doors for refugees – not only for victims in Syria but from all over the Middle East – the Turkish administration is responsible for maintaining and preserving its national security.

As stated by Mevlut Cavusoglu, “On the security front, the Syrian regime’s brutality and the void created by the gap between the rhetoric and action of the international community have given rise to the most severe terrorist threat that has affected the entire international community.”

Highlighting the fact that “the terrorist threat targeting Turkey from Syria is not over,” the FM also emphasizes that the “solidarity and cooperation of the United States” is far from satisfactory. This is due to the fact that not only has the U.S. administration failed to support Turkey in its fight against terrorism, but the Trump administration continue to supply arms to the PKK affiliated YPG terrorist organization in Syria.

“The PKK affiliate’s presence lingers in northern Syria and to our dismay it is empowered by US-led efforts aimed at countering ISIS.”

Not only is the PYD/YPG well-known for its poor human rights record, which is reflected in reports published by independent international human rights organizations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, but the terrorist organization poses a major threat to the national security of Turkey. Ankara has repeatedly called for the U.S. administration to stop the facilitation of arms and weaponry and to recognize the legitimate actors in the political solution. Cavusoglu’s remark for this form of state-funded terrorism is highlighted as he states “the fight against terrorism cannot be won by siding with one terrorist organization against another.”

“The US must step back from this grave mistake and not allow itself to be blackmailed by the terrorist outfit.”

Geneva, Astana, Sochi processes

Following the failure to generate a solution to the conflict during the Geneva process, through the Astana talks, in which Turkey, Russia and Iran act as the guarantor states, “the violence in Syria has been reduced and the ceasefire regime was reinforced through a de-escalation scheme.”

While the Astana talks produced some result, the Turkish FM indicates that “the Geneva process needs to be resuscitated.” Claiming that “paying lip service to its primacy as the essential platform in the political process takes us nowhere,” Cavusoglu also touched upon the Congress of National Dialogue to be held in Sochi, which he states “could serve as a complementary exercise in this regard.”

During the Presidential Summit held in Sochi on November 22, 2017, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan underlined two conditions for the success of the initiative: a clear and strong link with the UN-mediated Geneva process, and the participation of the genuine members of the opposition with a clear rejection of anyone affiliated with terrorist organizations, including PYD/YPG.

As Cavusoglu states, if these two conditions are met then the Sochi Congress could complement the Geneva process and “create a functional synergy.” In order for such an initiative to be successful, all actors ought to be reminded of their responsibilities – including the U.S. Therefore, the end to the Syrian Civil War “commands near universal consensus,” and “the time to make it happen is right now.”