The PKK leader calling his terrorist organization twice to leave Turkey or leave armed engagement did not find a response by the KCK and Turkey witnessed thousands of terrorists attacks during the cease-fire period that began in 2013. The HDP’s pre-election campaign to disarm the PKK has also not panned out as Demirtş said HDP is not in the position to do so.

The cease-fire and PKK’s disarmament process beginning in March 2013 with imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan’s announcement has come to a halt several times and even almost ended owing to attacks on infrastructure, armed forces and civilians following calls on the Kurdish community by the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) for street protests. In addition, the contradiction between Öcalan and the PKK leadership in northern Iraq’s Qandil Mountains has been there to be seen, carrying out bloody attacks while Öcalan called for PKK disarmament.

Over the course of the cease-fire and the PKK’s disarmament process, the government remained composed and did not take any military action even though the PKK terrorist organization carried out attacks resulting in dozens of deaths.

Having been determined to bring the three-decade unrest in the country to an end, the government has taken many steps toward improving relations through reforms. The reward for the efforts, however, has so far been contradicting remarks by the political wing of the process as well as the PKK leadership, justifying bloody attacks and threatening the government from time to time.The chronology of statements from Öcalan and top PKK leaders in the Qandil Mountains explicitly show contradictions on the organization disarming with inconsistent statements at once disclaims the declaration and encouraging an armed fight against the Turkish state.

The period starting from July 11 with the unilateral declaration of the end of cease-fire by the PKK terrorist organization has witnessed the killing of more than 40 security forces personnel. The state has exercised its right to defense and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu has said it will resolutely fight until the terror across the country has ended.

Davutoğlu and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan have repeatedly indicated that Ankara has always been and continues to be in favor of carrying out the reconciliation process with the Kurdish people. For this, however, all armed factions need to leave the country for good and support along with justification for terrorist attacks needs to end.

Chronology of the period since Öcalan’s call for PKK to leave Turkey

March 21, 2013: PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan’s Nevruz message

“A door has been opened from armed struggle to democratic struggle… We have come to a point today where guns will be silenced and thoughts and ideas shall speak. Now it is time for our armed elements to move outside [Turkey’s] borders… This is not giving up the struggle, but the launching of a different struggle…”

April 25, 2013

The PKK officially announced that it would withdraw all its armed forces to northern Iraq. Speaking at a press meeting held in Qandil, which was relayed on TV channels, Murat Karayılan announced that the PKK would recess without precondition from May 8.

May 7, 2013

Selahattin Demirtaş’s announcement on the pullout: “The pullout will officially start tomorrow. We are estimating that it will last three or four months.”

July 2, 2013

Some protests were kicked off in Diyarbakır province’s Lice district on the pretext of road works and outpost constructions. One protester died.

Sept. 9, 2013

Cemil Bayık was assigned to chair the Kurdish Communities Union (KCK). The announcement issued by the KCK read, “The nine-month period without any clashes has been spent conducting some military works that cannot be performed in a state of war…”

Sept. 30, 2013

The government introduced the Democratization Package. In reply to that, the PKK organized the Patriotic Revolutionist Youth Movement (YDG-H), which acted as the PKK’s urban youth armed group. It also founded courts in cities, collected taxes and abducted people.

March 15, 2014

The KCK announced that the government was “no longer the addressee of the democratization move.”

March 21, 2014

The letter penned by Öcalan for the Nevruz celebrations: The letter was recited both in Kurdish and Turkish in Diyarbakır, by the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) Deputy Chair Pervin Buldan and the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) Istanbul Deputy Sırrı Süreyya Önder respectively. Öcalan wrote, “History showed us that if we don’t lead for peace with strong will, historical problems will go their own way and most probably will produce their own answers with very big losses. There is a burning question awaiting an answer: Will we continue with replicated coups or will we prefer absolute and radical democracy?”

June 1, 2014

A delegation from the HDP met the imprisoned Öcalan on İmralı Island. In the statement issued after the meeting, it was stated that Öcalan remarked, “the most important reality is the fact that the process has come to a new phase,” adding that hopes should be kept alive to make a serious start for the resolution.

June 8, 2014

In the province of Bitlis, terrorists blocking a road opened fire on security forces with rocket launchers and long-barreled weapons. A bomb attack took place in the district of Lice.

June 9, 2014

A national flag in the garden of Diyarbakır’s Second Air Force Command was taken down by a terrorist.

July 10, 2014

The “Draft Law to End Terror and Strengthen Social Integration,” which regulates the procedures and principles of the reconciliation process, passed into law after being approved at the Parliamentary Counsel.

Aug. 5, 2014

During the HDP’s İmralı visit, Öcalan said, “The 30-year-old war is about to end with a great democratic negotiation. The democratic negotiation process has a profound meaning in a historical and societal sense…”

Aug. 19, 2014

A statue of PKK member Mahsuni Korkmaz was erected in Lice. The court issued a decision to demolish the statue. Clashes broke out, one was killed.

Aug. 20, 2014

In Diyarbakır, a group of terrorists organized an attack on an outpost.

Aug. 24, 2014

Terrorists attacked a thermal plant located in Silopi district’s Görümlü neighborhood with rocket launchers and long-barreled weapons.

Sept. 18, 2014

The HDP issued a call to boycott schools on the pretext of education in their mother tongue. Dozens of schools were set ablaze in many provinces.

Sept. 22 2014

HDP deputy Aysel Tuğluk threw stones at military officers when police and military officers blocked the crowd heading to Kobani.

Oct. 3, 2014

In Tunceli province’s Pülümür district, some PKK militants attacked an outpost.

Oct. 8-9-10, 2014

Demirtaş’s Kobani call: After the call issued by Demirtaş, the Kobani incidents broke out. More than 50 people died. Clashes erupted in over 35 cities. Damage costing millions of Turkish lira was done. Öcalan said, “The reconciliation process will end if Kobani falls.”

Oct. 13, 2014

Some PKK militants were identified in Tunceli while leaking into a launch base area. A clash took place.

Oct. 21, 2014

During the HDP’s İmralı visit, Öcalan announced that a new phase started on Oct. 15 and tangible steps would be taken.

Oct. 25, 2014

Three undercover military officers were killed in Yüksekova.

Oct. 29, 2014

The HDP called on people to take to the streets again.

Oct. 30, 2014: In Diyarbakır, Necdet Aydoğdu, 24, a military officer, was killed by two masked assailants while he was off-duty, shopping with his wife downtown.

Nov. 24, 2014

Speaking to Fırat News Agency, Sabri Ok, a senior KCK member, remarked that there were no developments in their agenda regarding disarmament.

Dec. 20, 2014

Cemil Bayık said, “Laying down arms would mean death…”

Dec. 27, 2014

Major clashes broke out in Cizre. The bodies of four People’s Protection Units (YPG) members, who were killed in the clashes in Syria’s Kobani and Iraq’s Shingal regions, were transferred from Habur to Cizre. A confrontation between the YDG-H members, who were on duty at the tent for condolences in Nur, and some proponents of the Free Cause Party (HÜDA-PAR), turned into an armed conflict.

Jan. 23, 2015

A HDP delegation negotiated with Qandil. It was stated that the KCK thought the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) did not display the responsible approach required for the negotiation process.

Feb. 9, 2015

Parliamentary negotiations regarding the package known as the “domestic security package” in public, which comprises the law on police duties and authorities, the law on the gendarme institution, duties and authorities, the law on the civil registry services and the draft on altering some laws and statutory decrees, was postponed for the second time.

Feb. 15, 2015

Meeting the KCK administration in Qandil, the HDP delegation announced in a written statement that the KCK was disturbed by the Domestic Security Package and this would undermine the negotiation process.

Feb. 17, 2015

Demirtaş: “Öcalan issued a conditioned disarmament call.”

Feb. 28, 2015

Öcalan called on the PKK to lay down its arms.

March 21, 2015

Öcalan called to hold a congress to leave the armed fight: He called for the PKK to gather a congress with the aim of ending the armed conflict against Turkey in the Nevruz celebrations held in Diyarbakır on the condition of founding a truth and reconciliation commission comprising of deputies and a monitoring board.

April 11, 2015

In Ağrı, PKK members attacked military officers. Four officers were injured.

5 May 2015

Bese Hozat said, “Convening the congress is not on our agenda at the moment because the process has not worked and no step has been taken. Let alone negotiations, the dialogue process was removed. Negotiations have not been held with our leadership for a month, the delegation did not pay a visit to our leadership.”

June 7, 2015

The HDP imposed pressure on ballots in the eastern regions. Block votes were cast in hundreds of ballot boxes in villages.

June 12, 2015

After Demirtaş’s call that the PKK could lay down its arms with Öcalan’s call, the KCK announced, “We own the will of disarmament. Demirtaş or Öcalan cannot urge us to lay down our arms.”

The KCK: “We must clearly emphasize that the PKK’s will to end the armed fight against Turkey belongs completely to us. Everyone should know that the HDP is not the official party of the PKK. Consequently, the HDP does not have a right to issue such a call. Besides, it is not possible for Öcalan to issue a call in his present conditions in İmralı. Expecting the HDP and Öcalan to call for disarmament and putting pressure on that frame means the insistence on insolubility and it is not possible for our movement to recognize that. This attitude aims at neither listening to Öcalan nor blocking the HDP’s policy-making.”

June 29, 2015

Karayılan: “Let me put this clearly. If they intervene in Rojava, we will also intervene in them. Then the whole of Turkey will turn into a battlefield. The Turkish authorities should not forget the uprising of our people on Oct. 6, Oct. 7 and Oct. 8. It is well known that Öcalan, who did not approve of the great uprising of our people, was barely able to stop it. It is obvious that the people would not allow such an intervention. In brief, such a decision would be a strategic one for Turkey, and a new period would start for the Kurdish people. We will not beg to anyone on that matter. They can do whatever they want. If they attempt it, of course, we would reply to that as Kurdish people.”

July 11, 2015

KCK’s announcement on ending the cease-fire: “The cease-fire is over. The meticulous attitude of our liberation movement was exploited. The dams and vehicles used for dam constructions will be targeted by our guerilla forces. Every detainment from now on will be a reason for the reprisal of our guerillas. Our liberation movement will not accept the exploitation of the cease-fire conditions, and stands against the policies that leave the Kurdish question unresolved.”

July 12, 2015

The PKK opened fire on a minibus.

July 14 2015

KCK Co-Chair Bese Hozat wrote an article entitled “The new process: a revolutionary people’s war,” calling the conflict a revolutionary people’s war.

July 20 2015

ISIS attack in Suruç: An explosion took place in Kobani simultaneously with an explosion in Suruç. Thirty-two people were killed in the Suruç explosion.

20 July 2015

Military officer Müsellim Ünal was killed in a clash between the PKK and officers in Adıyamanç

KCK Co-Chair Cemil Bayık called on people to take up arms, dig trenches and create tunnels in their homes.

22 July 2015

Police officers Feyyaz Yumuşak and Okan Acar were shot dead in their houses in Şanlıurfa’s Ceylanpınar district.

In Adana, Kalem-Der member Ethem Türkben was killed by the PKK in front of his pregnant wife and three children.

23 July 2015

In Diyarbakır, a police squad heading to a traffic accident scene was ambushed. Polis officer Tansu Aydın was killed and one officer was injured.

24 July 2015

Turkey launched operations in northern Syria and northern Iraq.

According to the PKK terrorist organization’s media outlets, last week was PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan’s birthday. On this occasion, the PKK’s umbrella group – the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) – released a statement for those in prison who died during hunger strikes and for those that are continuing their hunger strikes in retaliation against Ocalan’s isolation in prison: “Leyla Guven, our comrades in dungeons and all across Europe are sacrificing their lives to pay back the leader Apo, who led to their actual birth.”

Of course, the statement does not say anything about how many lives it takes to “pay back.” But since being an Ocalan proponent means birth to them, the door is open to all supporters of the PKK and the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP). The statement continues, “Today, Kurdish women and youth are sacrificing their lives for Apo because of his contributions to women and youth. This reality goes for all Kurdish people, especially women and youth.” So, according to this peculiar reasoning, Kurdish people must die for Ocalan. However, apparently this rule does not apply to senior PKK figures such as Cemil Bayik, Duran Kalkan, and Murat Karayilan. These three seem to be “paying back” by encouraging death and murder instead of sacrificing themselves. Surely, there are various types of pay back in the organization.

Kurdish people must die for Ocalan. However, this rule does not apply to senior PKK figures such as Cemil Bayik, Duran Kalkan, and Murat Karayilan. These three seem to be “paying back” by encouraging death and murder instead of sacrificing themselves.

For instance, Selahattin Demirtas’s brother, Nurettin Demirtas, declared Seher Cagla Demir – (codename Doga – meaning nature in Turkish), also the perpetrator of the suicide attack in Ankara three years ago, which killed 36 civilians and left 349 injured, as a “hero.” In an article he wrote for Yeni Özgür Politika, he said: “Doğa is Heracles. Some people distort the subject by claiming that we valorize death and organize suicide attacks like Daesh. Doğa cannot be associated with death or suicide attacks. She is a hero, a lotus flower who cannot be stained by any means.”

Another example is from former Member of Parliament Sabahat Tuncel, who is currently paying back to Ocalan according to the terror group’s formula, in prison. She was also of the opinion that HDP owed to the PKK militants organizing suicide attacks. As can be remembered, she publicly praised the PKK militant Zeynep Kınacı, who walked into a group of soldiers during a flag-raising ceremony in Tunceli with explosives wrapped around her abdomen, pretending to be pregnant, and blew herself up, leaving 8 soldiers dead and 29 wounded. Tuncel said: “We owe our current freedom and political presence to this fight and friends like her. We must see her suicide against the system as part of our own fight.”

Following the HDP’s Hakkari deputy Leyla Güven and the statements issued by senior PKK names, six PKK proponents have died, or paid back to borrow the terror group’s discourse, as a result of hunger strikes or suicide. According to HDP Law and Human Rights Committee Spokesperson and Batman deputy Ayşe Acar Başaran, the 335 convicts who started hunger strikes as of 16 December, 2018 are currently in critical condition. According to the terror group, these 335 people are about to pay back their debt soon!

According to HDP Law and Human Rights Committee Spokesperson and Batman deputy Ayşe Acar Başaran, the 335 convicts who started hunger strikes as of 16 December, 2018 are currently in critical condition. For the PKK terror group, these 335 people are about to pay back their debt to Öcalan soon!

A European delegation with persons coming from Germany, Sweden, England, France and Norway were in southeast Turkey last week to observe the local election. They paid support visits to the “heroes,” including Leyla Güven. Each of them said that the isolation of Öcalan must end as it does not have any justification on humanitarian or legal terms. But none of them mentioned the terror group’s atrocities. None of them asked why the group does not end the hunger strikes and keeps calling people to die.

None of them issued even a tepid criticism to the endless obedience and submission of mayors and deputies, who used the means of civil politics to have their offices, to this brutal terror group. None of them spoke on the mothers shedding tears for their children abducted or recruited by the terror group. They also seem to accept PKK’s formula: Those not supporting the PKK are not Kurdish, only the PKK and HDP proponents are Kurdish, and they “owe” their identity to the organization and thus each one of them is a potential “hero.” Besides, this is only one aspect of PKK’s innumerable atrocities. I am not even referring to the thousands of civilians and Turkish and Kurdish soldiers who lost their lives in the terror group’s attacks. Looked through this lens, the positions of heroes and the indebted will become even more complicated adding the countries supporting the terror group. This is the true nature of violence and atrocity.

A number of HDP politicians and PKK convicts are continuing their hunger strike. HDP’s Hakkari MP Leyla Guven started the strike on November 7, 2018, and is still continuing. The total number of people joining the strike campaign reached over 300. The goal of the strike is to push the Turkish government to make the PKK’s imprisoned leader Abdullah Ocalan’s prison conditions better. The people joining the strike, together with the PKK and the HDP at the organizational level, argue that Ocalan is in solitary confinement and this situation should end.

In fact, Ocalan is not under solitary confinement. He was placed in Imralı Prison on 15 February, 1999, and has served his sentence there since then. He served his sentence alone until November 17, 2009, for security reasons but then other convicts were placed in the same prison. After sharing the same prison with five other convicts, Ocalan asked the prison administration to send the other convicts to other places for the reason that he did not have good relations with them – four of them were PKK members and one was a TIKKO member.

Ocalan was allowed to socialize with other convicts on the island under prison regulations. He also meets his family members, despite some periods of bans on family meetings. From 11 September, 2016, to January 2019, he was not allowed to meet his family members until he met his brother Mehmet Ocalan again in January. After the meeting, the PKK declared that the family meeting does not mean much and that Ocalan is still under solitary confinement.

HDP and its predecessors have long followed and supported Ocalan. Sometimes, they argued that Ocalan was being poisoned, sometimes tortured. Nevertheless, all the international investigations so far have falsified such claims. Ocalan is a convict serving his sentence. This is the plain reality. Most recently in past September, the European Court of Human Rights decided on the application of Ocalan’s lawyers, regarding the allegations of maltreatment and torture. The Court ruled that the claims were unfounded and lacked evidence.

HDP and its predecessors have long followed and supported Ocalan. Sometimes, they argued that Ocalan was being poisoned, sometimes tortured. Nevertheless, all the international investigations so far have falsified such claims.

What is the point of the PKK in initiating hunger strikes one more time then? Why does the organization seem to be bothered by Ocalan’s meeting with his brother? The answer is that Ocalan is a useful tool for the PKK. He has influence over PKK sympathizers but not much over the PKK’s new leadership centered around Cemil Bayık and Murat Karayılan.

The PKK leadership tried to mobilize the Kurds of Turkey on a few occasions over the past years. They called for resistance in Turkey to support the Kobani battle between the PYD and Daesh in Syria. The HDP also joined the call and asked its mass basis to start resistance in Turkish cities. As a result of the call, there was a wave of violent riots in some heavily Kurdish populated cities of Turkey during 6-8 October, 2014.

50 people died in the riots including four children. The PKK supporters killed Kurds who were seemingly affiliated with conservative Kurdish political and civil society organizations (more details here). The riots were suppressed by the operations of the Turkish security forces. The second call came a year and half later. The PKK and the HDP called Turkey’s Kurds to start urban warfare in the summer of 2015.

As of today, the PKK has lost much of its mobilizing capacity. The past year was quite smooth with regard to PKK terrorism. The call for hunger strikes for Ocalan seems to be the PKK’s only remaining option to make an impact.

The PKK sent armed people to the Kurdish populated districts of Turkey, the HDP municipality vehicles dug ditches and built trenches. It was a planned armed rebellion in heavily civilian populated areas, which caused a high death toll including thousands of PKK members, 793 Turkish security personnel, and 314 civilians. Eventually, this rebellion was also suppressed.

As of today, the PKK has lost much of its mobilizing capacity. The past year was quite smooth with regard to PKK terrorism (details here). Given the circumstances, the call for hunger strikes for Ocalan seems to be the PKK’s only remaining option to make an impact. The organization’s violent mobilization attempts all failed or when appeared, suppressed by Turkey. The PKK is quite limited in its choices to counter Turkey and trying to use the Ocalan card this time with hunger strikes. Nevertheless, despite the three months since the beginning of the strikes, neither Turkey’s Kurds nor the world public opinion are paying much attention to this call.

Last week, the Washington administration authorized up to $12 million of rewards for information leading to the identification or location of three senior members of the PKK terror group. Accordingly, Washington approved up to $5 million for information on Murat Karayilan, $4 million for Cemil Bayik and $3 million for Duran Kalkan. The U.S. listed the PKK as a terrorist organization 21 years ago, and handed the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan over to Turkey in 1999.

The three senior members of the PKK are now sought as part of the U.S. Department of State’s Reward for Justice program. To quote the program’s exact words, the “goal is to bring international terrorists to justice and prevent acts of international terrorism against U.S. persons or property.”  It is stated that while the law governing the program is aimed at terrorism directed against Americans, the U.S. also shares information with other nations whose citizens are at risk.

The program describes the three PKK members as follows: “Karayılan, Bayık and Kalkan are senior leaders of the PKK. The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), also known as Kongra-Gel is a regionally active terrorist organization and a U.S. designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).” It goes on to list some of the deadly attacks of the PKK over the past three years that killed 1200 people: “The PKK has targeted Turkish government officials, police and security forces and indiscriminately injured and killed civilians. In 2015 and 2016, the PKK expanded attacks across Turkey, metropolitan centers, and tourist destinations on Turkey’s Aegean and Mediterranean coast. In August 2016, the group claimed a car bomb attack against Sirnak police headquarters, killing 11 and wounding more than 70. In June 2017, the PKK attacked a military convoy in southeastern Turkey, killing over 20 soldiers. Since 2015, the group has been responsible for the deaths of over 1,200 Turkish security officials and civilians.”

Since the program primarily targets the terrorists posing a direct threat to the U.S., the reward announcement for the three PKK militants is justified as follows: “In 1993 the PKK kidnapped 19 Western tourists including an American and in 1995 two Americans were injured in a PKK bombing.” The methods the PKK uses are also explicated: “PKK uses its network and criminal activities across Europe to obtain weapons and materials. The PKK has used suicide bombers, vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), and other indiscriminate terror tactics. The PKK also recruits and indoctrinates youths, sometimes by abduction, and employs them as militants.”

It is no secret that the life expectancy of someone in the PKK is no longer than 7 or 8 years after joining the terrorist organization.

However, the criminal careers of these three PKK operatives and the PKK’s relations with the U.S., Russia, and various European countries are no secret, as it is already known that these countries overtly or covertly provide support to the PKK. The PKK’s relations in the Middle East and the fact that it forcibly recruits children in its guerrilla forces beginning from 12-years-old are also known. The terror group gives a “commander” title to 15-year-olds and makes them organize suicide attacks. It is also no secret that the life expectancy of someone in the PKK is around 7-8 years after entering the organization. Plus, the PKK engages in drug and arms trafficking and might be responsible for the murder of Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme, which has remained unsolved up to now.

Forcibly recruiting children in its guerrilla forces beginning from 12-years-old and giving a “commander” title to 15-year-olds as well as pushing them commit suicide attacks are among well know practices of the PKK.

Who murdered Olof Palme, the Swedish Prime Minister?

When the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan was tried following his extradition to Turkey by the U.S. in 1999, he confessed all these to a great extent during his plea. For instance, upon the chief judge’s question whether the article that urged killing Olof Palme published in the PKK’s media outlets affected his murder, Ocalan answered: “No. Huseyin Yıldırım is the one writing these articles. He is responsible for the foreign affairs of the organization. In his article, he threatens Olof Palme and says that he will see what would happen to him. I have received information that Palme was killed by PKK Rejini, which generally operates in Europe.”

Moreover, when Ocalan was asked about the PKK’s involvement in drug or arms trafficking, he said: “Arms trafficking was a vital need for our organization. I directed and approved it. But I am against drug trafficking, I urged [the militants] to racketeer those engaging in this. […] But despite my objections, some incidents happened out of my control. It is very hard for me to control every segment of the organization.”

The PKK does not deny its suicide attacks, mass murders, and involvement in arms and drug trafficking. They try to justify their criminal activities on the pretext that they are all done as part of their fight for freedom, democracy, humanity etc. Yet, reminiscent of the times when the U.S. extradited the PKK leader, the reward offered for the three senior PKK members seems to have caused a great surprise and indignation within the organization. However, they objected to only one item in the list of the PKK’s criminal activities. An article in the PKK’s newspaper “Yeni Özgür Politika,” which is published in Germany and circulates across Europe, reads: “Some 25 or 30 years ago, several tourists were kidnapped in violent conditions of warfare. But were they taken hostages; was any ransom asked for; or were they subjected to any kind of ill treatment?” I suppose this means to ask how come the U.S. gave up on backing the PKK.

During his years in office as Prime Minister, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan expressed his determination to resolve the Kurdish question at the cost of his political life. Considering the terror group PKK, which has been operating for the past 30 years and is condemned by all the political parties in Turkey, it was still hard to publicly suggest a solution on the subject back then. Firstly, 13 years ago, Erdogan delivered a speech in Diyarbakır province: “It is improper for major countries to condone the past mistakes since the problems are all ours. To be more specific, the Kurdish question is not a problem confronted by a certain part of the nation, but a problem that interests the entire nation, including myself.” In 2009, he said: “Whether you call it the Kurdish question, Southeast question or East question… No matter how we call it, we have initiated working on the question.”

With this, Erdogan embarked on the most venturous peace project in the history of the Turkish Republic, which is widely known as the Reconciliation Process. He kicked off works to negotiate with the outlawed PKK through their imprisoned leader Abdullah Ocalan, who was until then described as a “baby killer” by media outlets, the judiciary and the political parties that were dominated by the secular Kemalist tradition.

The Kurdish question was discussed thoroughly throughout the process, and every single taboo was faced. Introducing amnesty and building a new Turkey was being mentioned. A Committee of Wise People, which encompassed people from all segments and ideologies including nationalists, liberals, religious conservatives and seculars was formed. The Committee strived to explain the west and the east of the country to each other and convince people to the reconciliation process. Even the bases of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), who have recently formed an alliance ahead of the June 24 elections, listened to the suggestions. As the process went on, people stopped hiding their Kurdish identity and embraced it. Kurdish lessons were introduced in schools, and Kurdish political propaganda was allowed. In Nowruz celebrations that year, Ocalan, previously called a “baby killer,” addressed entire Turkey. All these developments were unimaginable for Turkey until then.

Everyone showed great enthusiasm to the process, but the first signs of the major problems in the process appeared during early 2015. After the general election held on June 7, 2015, PKK attacks abruptly gained speed with the influence of the new developments in Syria. In a short period, the reconciliation process was replaced by the ditches dug in cities and town centers, clashes and curfews. During this period, Turkey was simultaneously confronted with Daesh and PKK attacks. After a year, the military coup attempt organized by the Gulenist Terror Group (FETO) became the last straw for the Turkish nation.

Turkey faced a new fact particularly in the aftermath of the 2015 election: the ditches. Although the ditches were occasionally seen in several places before the election, the PKK systematically began digging ditches in many city and town centers following the election with the support of FETO operatives who infiltrated key state apparatuses and bureaucracy.

During the November 1 election held in the midst of this chaos, the pro-PKK Peoples’ Democratic Party’s (HDP) vote share declined and thus the party lost 21 of its 80 deputies assigned to the Parliament with the June 7 elections. The AK Party again came to power alone and the new government was eventually formed. Instead of the reconciliation process, the new government prioritized enabling public security. Stating that they regarded the ditches as a defense mechanism, HDP co-chairs expressed autonomy discussions in the shadow of terrorism.

In 2016, a bomb attack was organized to a military shuttle in Ankara that carried both military and civilian officers. 29 people were killed in the attack while dozens were injured. The PKK’s break-away faction, namely the Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK), claimed responsibility for the attack.

During the ditch terror they inflicted, half of the population in Sırnak’s Cizre and Silopi districts, Diyarbakir’s Sur district and Mardin’s Nusaybin district were directly affected by the incidents. The number of people migrating from the four districts reached 93,000. The people were so enraged that Murat Karayilan, a senior PKK figure, had to express that the ditch strategy in the cities was wrong.

Turkey will go to the polls on Sunday. Currently, the counter-terror efforts are ongoing both inside and outside the country. When it comes to how the HDP views the ditches after all the incidents, the party co-chair Pervin Buldan and the party’s presidential candidate Selahattin Demirtas gave the following answers with regard to the ditches that led to hundreds of casualties and displaced thousands of people: Buldan claimed, “People dug ditches in self-defense,” whereas Demirtas stated, “I do not have issued a single remark that shows support to the ditches. We should have been more insistent and courageous in our attempts to get rid of them.” (Demirtas issued a written answer as he is currently under arrest.)

The PKK terror group and all of its offshoots use women not only as suicide bombers, but also as propaganda tools in order to soften their negative images among global audiences. Since the beginning of the Syrian conflict, particularly female members of the PKK have become famous under the mask of their combat against Daesh in northern Syria. Accordingly, even their uniform, for example, became fashionable and were sold by H&M’s clothing retailer chains. At that time, some rumors about female terrorists were also quite sensational – such as male Daesh fighters being afraid to combat the female branch of the PKK, because they believed that those killed by women will go to hell. The Independent covered this story referring to a PKK-affiliated YPG female member. It does not matter whether it is true or not, it became obvious that it was just an ‘interesting’ story to cover for the media, as long as you ignore the bloody face of the PKK.

Although listed as a terror group by many Western states and Western-based institutions such as NATO and the EU, various Western media outlets have paved the way for the PKK and its offshoots to feature in their reports within a positive and overwhelmingly feministic image. It seems that it is not an aimless effort. Rather, it even may be a conscious editorial policy in order to moderate the image of the PKK and the YPG in the eyes of the global media audience and then open the matter of its illegal status to discussion (and reappraisal). Therefore, the PKK has chosen a feminist discourse in an effort to gain more support from the “free world.”

In 2015, for example, alongside many newspapers such as the Guardian, Daily Mail, even the BBC, made numerous reports about YPJ members and their “heroic” fight against Daesh in Syria. As an example, in 2014, the British broadcaster filmed a short documentary titled ‘Who are the female fighters of the PKK?’ and the following year it published a picture gallery headlined ‘PKK fighters prepare for battle with IS.’ While the first one claims that nearly 40% of PKK members are women with a lot of footage showing them singing, smiling and enjoying their lives, the second one focuses on the personal stories of female members. They literally resemble them as if they are at a girl’s school, although the topic in discussion is an organization that has carried out numerous bloody attacks on officials and civilians on European and Turkish soil.

In fact, this made-up image is not new. Under the rule of Abdullah Ocalan, who has been in prison since 1999, the PKK attempted to reinvent itself as ‘a social movement with self-administration at a local level, an alternative type of economy, ecologism and feminism as central pillars.’ In addition, Jenna Krajeski, an Istanbul-based journalist, conducted an interview with Sebahat Tuncel, a politician under investigation due to suspected links with the PKK, who named the group a feminist movement and its leader Ocalan a feminist. Moreover, a New York Times article, dated January 29, 2018, written by Nujin Derik, a female YPG member, again writes about how female members of the YPG were ‘instrumental in the defense of Kobane and the liberation of Raqqa – where a major objective was the freeing of the Yazidi women the jihadists had taken there as slaves.’ However, the other side of the medallion is completely different, as seen in the PKK’s misuse of females and its emotional exploitation of femaleness.

The other side of the medallion

The PKK has carried out suicide attacks through female members in many cases. Zeynep Kinaci is known to be the first instance of the PKK using a pregnant woman as a suicide bomber. She killed six Turkish soldiers on June 30, 1996. A few months later, Leyla Kaplan, while pregnant, triggered explosives at a police department in Adana. She reportedly witnessed beforehand a PKK male commander execute a young woman who had denied to carry out the bombing. In the 1990s, female terrorists had performed 11 of the PKK’s 15 suicide attacks in Turkey. The latest example was on January 28, when Avesta Khabur, a 20-year-old from the YPG’s women unit YPJ, blew herself up targeting a Turkish battle tank and soldiers in Syria’s Afrin. After the attack, her unit called her “a model of free Kurdish women,” likening her to prior female PKK suicide bombers.

It is such a contradiction for a self-proclaimed ‘feministic’ organization to use its women members as suicide bombers, whether they are pregnant or not. This is not just limited to these events. The women have also been abused by male members of the PKK. According to a report by the Interior Ministry of the Republic of Turkey, the PKK regards the family as an institution of the feudal system and Abdullah Ocalan expressed that women shouldn’t be limited to a single male.

Many high-ranking leaders of the group, including Ocalan, sexually abused women who were subsequently executed due to false accusations of being agents. In late 1984 (or early 1985), Saime Askin, a senior female member and harsh critic of sexual abuse in PKK ranks, faced execution in the group’s Lolan camp based in Iraq. Besides, the Report on Trafficking in Persons issued by the U.S. State Department claimed that the YPG, the Syrian wing of the PKK, continues to recruit and use boys and girls, including children under the age of 15. In a similar vein, the Human Rights Watch’s interviews reveal that many children appeared in the YPG’s “youth centers” without the knowledge of their families. Families later found out that their children were forcibly recruited by the YPG. Since 2012, the group has used boys and girls under the age of 18 at checkpoints and bases in the Afrin, Kobane and Jazira cities of Syria.

Apparently, the outlawed PKK uses women not only as suicide bombers but also abuses and even executes them if they oppose the decisions of their so-called “top leaders.”  Furthermore, the organization emotionally exploits ‘femaleness’ by instrumentalizing female members as means of propaganda. Its feminist discourse makes the group in no way innocent, but the female-dominated portrayal of the PKK has already earned sympathy in the Western world. The PKK’s bloody face against the Turkish state, Turkish and Kurdish civilians and even its own members who oppose the group cannot be justified by the media. Shouldn’t the international media take action against these human rights abuses instead of praising them? Doesn’t the indifferent attitude of the media agents, which falsely portray the women in the PKK, mean that they are playing an indirect role in crimes committed by the terrorist organization? These are questions that are worthy of extensive thought.

Immediately after the independence referendum held in northern Iraq, the PYD conveyed a congress on September 27-28, 2017. This event, known as the 7^th General Congress, was held in Rmelan. As was the case in previous PYD congresses, once again the name of the PKK/KCK leader Abdullah Öcalan was on the front line. It is known that the repressive-propagating methods of the PYD, including its establishment in northern Syria, is being directly coordinated and directed by Öcalan and the leadership in the Qandil mountains. During this two-day congress, co-chairs Salih Muslim and Asya Abdullah were replaced by Shahoz Hasan and Aisha Heso. As it can be observed from the organizational structure of the PYD and the mechanisms within this structure, the elections are determined solely by the representatives and the nominees who are appointed by the upper leadership bodies.

To briefly explain how tasks are distributed within structures of the PYD and how new task distributions occur, the following information will be useful. According to their own by-law that was published by the PYD, there are five main organs in the organization. While according to an established hierarchy the chairman is in third place of authority, above the party chairmanship, congress is declared as the supreme decision-making body. When the by-law is examined, it can be understood that the congress also dominates all levels of the organization. While according to the by-law, congress should be convened every three years, this rule has been infringed according to individual needs and interests. The most important tasks of the Congress are the determination of party chairpersons, the formation of parliament and the determination of those who will enter this parliament and the prescription of their duties. Looking at the establishment of the PYD organization, it does not hesitate to move directly in line with the directives of the KCK main leadership structures. As a matter of fact, the most recent congress has shown this in terms of its content and purpose.

As is the case with all other leading members of the PYD, the two newly appointed co-chairs appear to have been previously occupying various posts under the KCK structure. Although the 7th congress has not attracted much attention except from the people working in this area, the two selected leaders presented themselves on the international and regional level by attending the funeral ceremony of former Iraqi Kurdistan Patriotic Union (PUK) leader Jalal Talabani. The ideological approaches of the new co-chairs, who also met Masoud Barzani during Talabani’s funeral, can be evaluated by both the congress and the activities they were enduring previously when serving in the ranks of the KCK.

The following information about the two newly appointed co-chairpersons could be identified: Shahoz Ahmad Hasan, who filled Salih Muslim’s seat, was originally born in Hasakah. Hasan, who was known to have taken part in military activities in the Qandil Mountains until 2011, was assigned to continue his activities in northern Syria the same year. One of the first public works after his Qandil years was published on the PKK’s website. Shahoz Hasan wrote an article called “The Spring of the Peoples,” in which, praising the terrorist leader Abdullah Öcalan, he argued that the post-Cold War capitalist and imperialist system is going to collapse and that the imperialists are continuously going to lose in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the same time, there is no doubt that Hasan accepts Öcalan’s thoughts and ideas as the most important source of inspiration for the region’s future. Abdullah Öcalan, who is described as “the natural leader of all the Kurdish peoples,” also appears to be identified as a “source for the victories of the people of the whole region.”

After being sent to northern Syria by the Qandil leadership, Hasan began actively working in the PYD from 2013. While firstly being appointed to the leadership board of the city of Ayn al-Arab, which was under PYD control, he was then appointed as media officer of the Movement for a Democratic Society (TEV-DEM), which was later imposed by the PYD as an administrative element to govern northern Syria in the early periods of the crisis. Later, he became a member of the Syrian Democratic Council, which is the political wing of the Syrian Democratic Forces and established at the end of 2015 to help PYD’s military wing YPG through gaining support from Western countries, especially the U.S. Meanwhile, Hasan also received membership at the “Founding Assembly of Democratic Federalism of North Syria” whose co-chairperson is Hediya Yousef. From his listed experiences, it can be assessed that Shahoz Hasan has focused particularly on media issues throughout his experience in Syria. Within these various processes, Hasan, who as stated earlier, has publications praising PKK leader Öcalan, was no doubt a prominent figure in carrying out activities in order to disseminate the PKK/KCK ideology.

The other co-chair, Aisha Heso, draws a more unfamiliar portrait than Shahoz Hasan. Heso, a close associate with the Qandil cadre, was born in Afrin. It is believed that a relative with the same name as herself was killed during a clash with the Turkish Armed Forces in the Zap region of Iraq while fighting in the PKK ranks at the beginning of the 1990s. Prior to her role as co-chair of the PYD, Aisha Heso was a member of TEV-DEM’s high leading board, and head of its women’s structure. More, she had also previously served under the directives of the KCK and worked for “Yekitiya Star” (Star Women’s Union), which was established within Abdullah Öcalan’s ideological framework “gineology.” Yekitiya Star changed its name to “Star Congress” (shortly Star, Star Women Congress) with the outbreak of the Syrian civil war. Heso, who was appointed as the coordinator of this structure, is known to have protested against the lack of PYD representation in the Astana negotiations. Heso made some statements concerning the arrests of the People’s Democratic Party (HDP) deputies in Turkey. When making these statements, she was interestingly interviewed as a normal citizen, with her real identity and role kept in secrecy. Lastly, in July 2017, she made multiple comments about Turkey’s possible military actions in Afrin.

Thus, the two names that have been determined by Qandil for the leadership of the PYD – Shahoz Hasan and Aisha Heso – are merely puppet leaders. As the steps taken by the PYD clearly illustrate, the terrorist organization has never stepped out of KCK directives and it will never do so. While currently there are only rumors about the new duties of the out-going chairs Salih Muslim and Asya Abdullah, who have transferred their duties to Shahoz Hasan and Aisha Heso, it is considered highly likely that both figures will be appointed to future roles on an international level.

The Turkish government had commenced to negotiate with the PKK in order to resolve the most prominent issue that it inherited since the very first years of the Republic: the “Kurdish issue”. As a result of Erdoğan’s initiative in 2009, negotiations between the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) and the PKK started. After a while, transcripts of proceedings between MIT and the PKK in Oslo were published in a daily. At the time, nobody knew that these were leaked by FETO, which had infiltrated the state and established a parallel structure over 40 years. Only two things were known about this organization then: firstly, it was a religious congregation with a significant financial power that opened schools all around the world and possessed multiple media outlets and business associations. Secondly, they had racist tendencies towards Kurds that were made apparent by their media outlets and speeches by Fetullah Gülen.

Known for being comparatively more sensitive towards Islam than western parts of Turkey, not many in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions really liked Gülen’s congregation due to their racist tendencies. Moreover, the majority of Kurds who still preserved the medrese and dergah traditions (traditional educational and religious institutions) inherited from the Ottomans didn’t perceive the said congregation as “religious” and didn’t find its leader’s residence in the US ordinary. Even though FETO infiltrated the bureaucracy, military and universities in the region, they were only able to gain a few followers among the people.

On February 7, 2012, during the early hours of the day, a news flash: Istanbul’s Specially Authorized Prosecutor Sadrettin Sarıkaya who was conducting an investigation into the PKK-linked KCK organization, requested MIT Undersecretary Hakan Fidan to come to the courthouse on Thursday. I have to repeat this as it isn’t a situation that could be comprehended at the first. Try to think of this event occurring in the UK. The then Prime Minister Erdoğan and his government initiates a reconciliation and peace process and a prosecutor in Istanbul calls the head of MIT to the courthouse as a suspect!

http://thenewturkey.org/fetos-civil-administrators-and-their-trips-abroad-before-the-coup-attempt/

Istanbul’s Specially Authorized Prosecutor Sadrettin Sarıkaya personally called MIT Undersecretary Hakan Fidan, former Undersecretary Emre Taner, former Deputy Undersecretary Afet Güneş and two other former MIT employees and demanded they give statements as a part of the KCK investigations. The prosecutor was accusing Fidan and his colleagues of having committed a crime for being part of the negotiations with the PKK in Oslo. There was another interesting situation. On the same day, the Prime Minister was in Istanbul to undergo a medical operation, which the public did not know about. However, due to security concerns, the time of the operation was changed. For this reason, when Hakan Fidan called the Prime Minister he was able to talk with him. Erdoğan sensed something foul about the situation and told Fidan not to go to the courthouse and give a statement. Even though Erdoğan said on TV after the incident, “They would first arrest the head of MIT and then me. I had authorized the head of MIT. So, they should personally call me to the courthouse”, nobody – with the exception of those who were interested in the Kurdish issue – cared much about this statement. It was widely known that the prosecutor was close to FETO. However, the incident was perceived by many as the group’s exaggerated sensitivity towards the Kurdish issue rather than a Gülenist attack on Erdoğan and the state.

The Gezi Park incidents in June 2013 followed this event. The protests were initially started by people whose concerns were environmental and who objected to a construction project that was to take place in a park in Taksim. Yet, it didn’t stay as a protest by environmentalists. After a little while Kemalists, later joined by the Alevis, joined the protests alleging that “their lifestyle was under threat.” It became apparent that FETO had a finger in this incident. Gülen and his organization tried to provoke the protesters with their associates within the police force through the use of violence. Zekeriya Öz, a fugitive Gülenist and a former prosecutor, tweeted the following on this subject: “If the PKK had participated in the Gezi Park protests, those who are governing now wouldn’t be in their seats. I don’t know who ordered them, but the PKK didn’t join.”

There were other prominent Gülenists that were trying to spark new conflicts by provoking the protesters that were completely organized over social media. For instance, a renowned Gülenist fugitive Emre Uslu, who now lives in the US, tweeted that PKK militants turned a car over which had female passengers with headscarves in Maltepe, Istanbul (however, such an event didn’t transpire). Efforts to evolve street protests into a civil war through constant provocations were apparent. While Gülen’s media outlets openly supported the Gezi Park protests, the Gülenists changed their tune towards the end when a group in İzmir vandalized their school. Participating in the Gezi Park protests with various reasons and motives, the majority of the youth seemed unaware of this effort to exploit the situation.

We started to hear that a new wave of street protests similar to the Gezi Park protests were to take place in November. These could’ve been just a rumor, of course. Still, I had heard this from an academic who lived in the US and from a journalist that had ties with FETO. The Gülenist journalist had said “I don’t know if 10 or 15 soldiers will be killed, but something will happen and Erdoğan will go.”

6 months after the Gezi Park protests, on January 9, 2013, three women including Sakine Cansız, who was one of the founders of the PKK and who supported the peace process, were killed at the Kurdish Information Bureau in Paris. These killings took place right after the government announced that they were negotiating with Abdullah Öcalan for the resolution of the Kurdish issue. This incident pitted the two sides against each other. It was a sensitive and fragile issue as after all there were negotiations with a terrorist organization and the Turkish public’s top enemy Abdullah Öcalan. The person who was caught by French security forces had a trace of gunpowder on his coat. His name was announced as Ömer Güney. According to the information gathered from the French security forces, Güney was close with the terrorist organization to an extent that he could be deemed a PKK sympathizer. This information consolidated the theories that it was an intra-organizational execution. There was great outrage and this outrage poured onto the street. The funeral of Cansiz in Diyarbakır was attended by tens of thousands of people.

Eleven months after the murder, the December 17-25 operation that was conducted by the Gülenists within the judiciary, security forces and media aiming to depose the government with the accusation that it was corrupt took place. For the first time, regardless of their political views, all witnessed and became aware of the intimidating operational capacity of FETO. During those days, Gülenist media outlets started to spread disinformation that MIT was responsible for the murder in Paris. Moreover, they alleged that Ömer Güney was actually a member of MIT. Yet, almost nobody cared about this subject as there were more pressing issues present.

In January 2014, PKK-affiliate KCK stated that the murder of the three women was carried out by FETO’s members within the state and that Ömer Güney was actively engaged with Gülenists. Ömer Güney, who was to be tried after a two-year long investigation by the Paris Prosecutor’s Office, was taken to a hospital for an ailment in his brain. In January, just one month before his trial, he died. It was later discovered that Ömer Güney was visited by three individuals from Turkey and that those individuals were FETO members.

Then, the terrible event known as the Kobane incident took place. Using Daesh’s attack on Kobane and the alleged inaction by Turkey as excuses, the leader of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) Selahattin Demirtaş and his colleagues called for countrywide streets protests on October 7. I said to myself “this must be the second Gezi Park protest that was being discussed.” Protesters built barricades and engaged with the security forces. 50 died and 682, 139 of them police officers, were wounded. 1,113 buildings, including 25 district governor offices, 67 police headquarters and 29 political party offices, were damaged.

One of FETO’s media outlets, Zaman Daily’s Editor-in-Chief Ekrem Dumanlı visiting Diyarbakır’s Mayor Gülten Kışanak and their open support for HDP while the aforementioned events were taking place were intriguing. When news of the visits by HDP deputy Ahmet Türk and former HDP deputy Nazmi Gür’s paid to Fetullah Gülen in 2014 in Pennsylvania was heard, it astonished many. There were many news pieces on FETO providing intelligence to the PKK and deciphering the code names of state operatives within the PKK. How the PKK dug trenches in many cities, especially in Diyarbakır, in order to start a war despite the people’s objections was made clear after the July 15 coup attempt. The FETO-member military officers and pilots bombed the Parliament with F-16s that flew from Diyarbakır. FETO militants did whatever they could to both provoke the public and enable the PKK.

Two years after these events two HDP deputies, one of them in prison, made two statements. These two statements are unprecedented, considering HDP’s disposition in the last two years. In his interview with journalist Ruşen Çakır, HDP deputy Sırrı Süreyya Önder said the following: “October 6-8 Kobane events might have never taken place, because the ‘prevalent state perspective’ [AK Party] was foreseeing solidarity with Kobane. I will be extremely clear about this; the said solidarity was obstructed by FETO-affiliated generals whose roles in the July 15 coup attempt is apparent. They put an extreme pressure on Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. Now, generals who commanded the units in Sur, Nusaybin and Cizre are being tried as the perpetrators of the coup attempt. I have seen how these generals obstructed the solidarity between Turkey and Kobane-Rojava.”

Accused of “being a member of a terrorist organization,” “inciting to commit crime” and “inciting the public to unlawful meeting and demonstration,” HDP deputy Ayhan Bilgen made a similar statement very recently during the session of his trial at Diyarbakır 5^th Heavy Penal Court:

“October 6-8 was a demonstration of a civil war in this country. Who incited these conflicts must be investigated thoroughly. It should be investigated whether these were the same people who wanted to depose the elected government on July 15.”

The fog of war is slowly fading, yet unfortunately it isn’t possible to talk about a social base that would support the reiteration of a peace process, not in the short-term. FETO is an important component of this issue and so is the PKK. How these two terrorist organizations came together after years and their role in all that transpired must also be taken into account.

As the PKK declared the end of the 29 month long ceasefire in the Summer of 2015 and murdered two policemen in their sleep in their apartments on 22 July 2015, Turkey started its counterterrorism operations as a response (by the way, multiple news sources in Western media also tends to tell the story in the reverse order by starting it with the Turkish police and military operations against the PKK and then mentioning of the PKK violence as if it was a reaction to the operations). It is no secret that Turkey is in the midst of a tough counterterrorism policy after almost two years of efforts to find a political resolution to the problem. Yet, representing Turkey’s tough counterterrorism policies as targeting women’s rights in Turkey and stressing the PKK’s ostensive democratic struggle is far from the truth, no matter how often we hear it in Western media.Here, we follow the mainstream lead and omit the PKK’s definitive feature, terrorism. This is, of course, not a fair way to discuss the PKK, which, just in 2016 has murdered four AK Party politicians of Kurdish origin, threatened millions of Kurdish AK Party voters with the same end, killed over 150 Turkish citizens in 8 separate suicide bomb attacks, and killed hundreds of soldiers, police, and Kurdish village guards. The Kurdish origin of the murdered AK Party politicians and village guards must be stressed because the very same circles in the West are eager to depict the PKK terror as a war between Turks and Kurds. Putting all these biases aside, let us focus on the PKK and its democratic gender policies. Let’s see how the PKK liberates the Kurdish woman.

For the PKK, the Kurdish woman is oppressed under the patriarchic structure of Turkey’s Kurds living in rural areas of southeast Turkey, which is not an incorrect diagnosis. But the PKK’s problem with women’s liberation is not with its diagnosis but its treatment. The PKK promises Kurdish women freedom in its own ranks. So, it is not enough to seek equality but to do it in the PKK’s ranks. HDP MP Sabahat Tuncel summarized this point of view best in her speech a few years ago at a memorial event for Zeynep Kınacı, a PKK member who blew herself up in a suicide attack, killing 8 Turkish soldiers along with herself. In Tuncel’s words, “Comrade Zilan [the code name for Kınacı] is a significant name for the liberation movement. Comrade Zilan did not only detonate the bomb on her body against the system, but also against the male-dominated system.” Or you can listen to the life story of another Zilan in the PKK’s propaganda movie Bakur (2015) where she tells how she liberated herself by joining the PKK at the age of 14. It seems like the PKK does not only liberate women by arming them, but also children. This is the kind of gender liberation that the PKK envisages.

What comes next after cheering for PKK’s liberation of Kurdish women is its so-called radical democracy. These lines of depictions connect the PKK’s liberation of women to its radical democracy project. Nevertheless, to the surprise of the international audience whose primary source of information is the New York Times or other leading Western mainstream media outlets, the PKK, like pretty much all other armed organizations, is not and cannot be a democratic organization.

The PKK defines itself as an organization that is based on the principles of “democracy, gender freedom, and ecological life” in its so-called “constitution contract” (KCK Sözleşmesi). Yet, in practice, it is as democratic as Kim Jong Un’s Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The PKK in its practice and in its basic contract (KCK Sözleşmesi) is clearly a totalitarian organization. The disparity between the democratic principles of the contract and the organization’s practice does not require an evaluation. Here, we are talking about an organization relying on the tactic of terrorism that praises the right to live as “the most basic, inalienable right” while sending its suicide terrorists to blow themselves up among crowds in urban metropoles.

It is very unfortunate that we are living at a time when we have to debate with many Western colleagues that a terror organization like the PKK is not a civil society organization working to improve women’s rights or democracy.

Apart from the theory-practice dichotomy, the contract is a contradiction in itself. While repeatedly claiming to establish a radical democratic system throughout text, it also singles out the leadership/önderlik (the PKK’s founder Öcalan) with the right to “represent the entire society in every aspect.” The PKK simply replicates Kim Jong Un’s Democratic Korea in a non-state organization. The PKK’s radical democracy is a system of one man’s unquestionable authority. That is the reason why the organization has one male and one female co-leader for each position except for its top leadership.

It is very unfortunate that we are living at a time when we have to debate with many Western colleagues that a terror organization like the PKK is not a civil society organization working to improve women’s rights or democracy. It is like having an argument with somebody who takes the terror side of DAESH as an omissible detail and praises the organization just because they fix damaged roads and asphalt them and hence facilitate transportation in Raqqa. It is trivial to argue with a PKK sympathizer scholar, journalist or politician (that you run into easily in mainstream Western media, academia and parliaments) who think the PKK is a sweet organization that helps the cause of women. Yes, if you ignore the terror side of terror organizations, what is left is peaceful. PKK leader Öcalan’s celebrating of Women’s Day on every 8 March does not make his organization a civil society organization. The PKK is no FEMEN, it is a terror organization, and this is not an omissible detail but the part that needs to be focused on.

In a nutshell, in an average Western mainstream paper, this is how you read about the PKK: The PKK is an organization that works for women’s rights in Turkey (and they also happened to kill a few thousand Turkish citizens, send suicide bombers to metropoles, assassinated politicians, teachers, and imams both of Kurdish and Turkish origin, massacred Kurdish villagers who sided against them, and executed dissidents within the organization itself). Moreover, the PKK is a democratic organization (whose leader is declared to represent the entire society in every possible aspect and therefore his will is the people’s will and therefore he has the final decision-making authority). Not to forget, one of the culprits of the latest PKK attack in Dolmabahçe was claimed to be a woman, who liberated herself by detonating a bomb-laden car among crowds that killed dozens of people and injured more than a hundred.

The theoretical aspect of the settlement process embraced a threefold position.  The first represented “the rights-centered approach” and was based on the notion of political equality between Turks and Kurds as basic to the redefinition of citizenship in constitutional terms. The two other component of this position were intertwined and involved local administrative or political centrifigulism that can be described as local or regional self-rule, expressed in the PKK’s political discourse as “democratic autonomy.”The scope of self-rule can be formulated as a kind of shared sovereignty as seen in federal political structures or as a form of administrative self-rule, a variant of unitary political systems. The third form of centrifigulism may emerge at the regional level that may or may not require the sharing of sovereignty.The post-2013 process of settlement created a plural political environment conducive to the elaboration of all political options for the solution of the age-long Kurdish issue in a peaceful and democratic way. This contributed to the belief in the possibility of the successful resolution of the issue through democratic negotiations in both Turkish and Kurdish popular understanding. Thus, for the first time in Republican history “the Kurds’ right to secede” was uttered loudly and without any legal sanctions by Kurdish nationalist activists and political parties.

During the settlement process, a strategically motivated tactical approach was masterminded by the PKK-HDP side, however. The latter used the time span of the process as an opportunity for the consolidation of their hold on the Kurdish populace as their instrumental support base. The HDP through the political discourse of going beyond an ethnic Kurdish party and becoming a Turkey-wide political formation procured the support of the socialist Turkish left, and increasingly turned into a platform of anti-Erdoğan rhetoric as reflected in the 2014 presidential campaign of Selahattin Demirtaş, the leader of the HDP. The prevailing motto of Demirtaş’s political campaign was “We will not allow you to become president.” This was a kind of demonization of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the main political figure thanks to whose political will the Kurdish issue became a clause in the chapter of politics.

The campaign proved to be inconclusive, but powerful enough to sever ties between the “negotiating parties.” Added to this was the IS offensive against the city of Kobani that triggered the arousal of a pan-Kurdish feeling among Kurds. This was again used as an influential step by the PKK-HDP block in order to modulate the process for their sectarian political gains. In the end, when Erdoğan witnessed the political cost of the process, he declared that “there is no negotiation table anymore” and put an end to the process. Ready for a new phase in their military campaign, the PKK, who gained advantage of the process by transferring heavy weaponry and militants into city centers, murdered two police officers in their homes in Suruç in July 2015 and ended the ceasefire. PKK leadership has two new block-partners in this new war: on the one hand, the Russians, the Iranians and the Assad regime through the PKK’s Syrian branch, the PYD,  and, on the other, the military support of the US who saw the PYD as a substitute power for its own soldiers in the field war against IS. Again, all anti-Turkey calculations were masked under the pretext of the war on IS that ended up with generous support delivered to the PKK via the PYD.

On top of all this, the HDP adopted a political discourse during the PKK offensives in cities, namely Diyarbakir, Sur, Cizre, Silopi and Nusaybin, amenable to declaring it PKK’s legal wing. HDP municipalities allow their vehicles to be used by PKK militants to dig the trenches and build barricades in city streets. Thus emerged a non-peace positional equation which came into existence by the maximalist political stance of the PKK-HDP block, and AK Party’s turn to its statist shield nurtured by the age-long survival syndrome shared by the ruling Kemalist establishment in the past.

The dramatic rupture that led to the renewal of the conflict through violent means carried the sides back to their original positions: integration  through assurance of political equality vs some form of shared sovereignty, be it local self-rule, federation, or independence. The conclusion that can be drawn from the experiences of the settlement process is that the solution may lie somewhere in the middle; the implication of which calls for the creation of “a politically space” in the form of a negotiation space, not one of political opportunism. What is obvious is that an enduring solution is possible only with the support and will of the AK Party, and it is not possible if the PKK-HDP block opposes it. It is the AK Party that holds the capacity to introduce political, legal and economic standards, and it is the PKK-HDP block that may contribute to the process by not resorting to violence.

The PKK leader calling his terrorist organization twice to leave Turkey or leave armed engagement did not find a response by the KCK and Turkey witnessed thousands of terrorists attacks during the cease-fire period that began in 2013. The HDP’s pre-election campaign to disarm the PKK has also not panned out as Demirtş said HDP is not in the position to do so.

The cease-fire and PKK’s disarmament process beginning in March 2013 with imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan’s announcement has come to a halt several times and even almost ended owing to attacks on infrastructure, armed forces and civilians following calls on the Kurdish community by the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) for street protests. In addition, the contradiction between Öcalan and the PKK leadership in northern Iraq’s Qandil Mountains has been there to be seen, carrying out bloody attacks while Öcalan called for PKK disarmament.

Over the course of the cease-fire and the PKK’s disarmament process, the government remained composed and did not take any military action even though the PKK terrorist organization carried out attacks resulting in dozens of deaths.

Having been determined to bring the three-decade unrest in the country to an end, the government has taken many steps toward improving relations through reforms. The reward for the efforts, however, has so far been contradicting remarks by the political wing of the process as well as the PKK leadership, justifying bloody attacks and threatening the government from time to time.The chronology of statements from Öcalan and top PKK leaders in the Qandil Mountains explicitly show contradictions on the organization disarming with inconsistent statements at once disclaims the declaration and encouraging an armed fight against the Turkish state.

The period starting from July 11 with the unilateral declaration of the end of cease-fire by the PKK terrorist organization has witnessed the killing of more than 40 security forces personnel. The state has exercised its right to defense and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu has said it will resolutely fight until the terror across the country has ended.

Davutoğlu and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan have repeatedly indicated that Ankara has always been and continues to be in favor of carrying out the reconciliation process with the Kurdish people. For this, however, all armed factions need to leave the country for good and support along with justification for terrorist attacks needs to end.

Chronology of the period since Öcalan’s call for PKK to leave Turkey

March 21, 2013: PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan’s Nevruz message

“A door has been opened from armed struggle to democratic struggle… We have come to a point today where guns will be silenced and thoughts and ideas shall speak. Now it is time for our armed elements to move outside [Turkey’s] borders… This is not giving up the struggle, but the launching of a different struggle…”

April 25, 2013

The PKK officially announced that it would withdraw all its armed forces to northern Iraq. Speaking at a press meeting held in Qandil, which was relayed on TV channels, Murat Karayılan announced that the PKK would recess without precondition from May 8.

May 7, 2013

Selahattin Demirtaş’s announcement on the pullout: “The pullout will officially start tomorrow. We are estimating that it will last three or four months.”

July 2, 2013

Some protests were kicked off in Diyarbakır province’s Lice district on the pretext of road works and outpost constructions. One protester died.

Sept. 9, 2013

Cemil Bayık was assigned to chair the Kurdish Communities Union (KCK). The announcement issued by the KCK read, “The nine-month period without any clashes has been spent conducting some military works that cannot be performed in a state of war…”

Sept. 30, 2013

The government introduced the Democratization Package. In reply to that, the PKK organized the Patriotic Revolutionist Youth Movement (YDG-H), which acted as the PKK’s urban youth armed group. It also founded courts in cities, collected taxes and abducted people.

March 15, 2014

The KCK announced that the government was “no longer the addressee of the democratization move.”

March 21, 2014

The letter penned by Öcalan for the Nevruz celebrations: The letter was recited both in Kurdish and Turkish in Diyarbakır, by the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) Deputy Chair Pervin Buldan and the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) Istanbul Deputy Sırrı Süreyya Önder respectively. Öcalan wrote, “History showed us that if we don’t lead for peace with strong will, historical problems will go their own way and most probably will produce their own answers with very big losses. There is a burning question awaiting an answer: Will we continue with replicated coups or will we prefer absolute and radical democracy?”

June 1, 2014

A delegation from the HDP met the imprisoned Öcalan on İmralı Island. In the statement issued after the meeting, it was stated that Öcalan remarked, “the most important reality is the fact that the process has come to a new phase,” adding that hopes should be kept alive to make a serious start for the resolution.

June 8, 2014

In the province of Bitlis, terrorists blocking a road opened fire on security forces with rocket launchers and long-barreled weapons. A bomb attack took place in the district of Lice.

June 9, 2014

A national flag in the garden of Diyarbakır’s Second Air Force Command was taken down by a terrorist.

July 10, 2014

The “Draft Law to End Terror and Strengthen Social Integration,” which regulates the procedures and principles of the reconciliation process, passed into law after being approved at the Parliamentary Counsel.

Aug. 5, 2014

During the HDP’s İmralı visit, Öcalan said, “The 30-year-old war is about to end with a great democratic negotiation. The democratic negotiation process has a profound meaning in a historical and societal sense…”

Aug. 19, 2014

A statue of PKK member Mahsuni Korkmaz was erected in Lice. The court issued a decision to demolish the statue. Clashes broke out, one was killed.

Aug. 20, 2014

In Diyarbakır, a group of terrorists organized an attack on an outpost.

Aug. 24, 2014

Terrorists attacked a thermal plant located in Silopi district’s Görümlü neighborhood with rocket launchers and long-barreled weapons.

Sept. 18, 2014

The HDP issued a call to boycott schools on the pretext of education in their mother tongue. Dozens of schools were set ablaze in many provinces.

Sept. 22 2014

HDP deputy Aysel Tuğluk threw stones at military officers when police and military officers blocked the crowd heading to Kobani.

Oct. 3, 2014

In Tunceli province’s Pülümür district, some PKK militants attacked an outpost.

Oct. 8-9-10, 2014

Demirtaş’s Kobani call: After the call issued by Demirtaş, the Kobani incidents broke out. More than 50 people died. Clashes erupted in over 35 cities. Damage costing millions of Turkish lira was done. Öcalan said, “The reconciliation process will end if Kobani falls.”

Oct. 13, 2014

Some PKK militants were identified in Tunceli while leaking into a launch base area. A clash took place.

Oct. 21, 2014

During the HDP’s İmralı visit, Öcalan announced that a new phase started on Oct. 15 and tangible steps would be taken.

Oct. 25, 2014

Three undercover military officers were killed in Yüksekova.

Oct. 29, 2014

The HDP called on people to take to the streets again.

Oct. 30, 2014: In Diyarbakır, Necdet Aydoğdu, 24, a military officer, was killed by two masked assailants while he was off-duty, shopping with his wife downtown.

Nov. 24, 2014

Speaking to Fırat News Agency, Sabri Ok, a senior KCK member, remarked that there were no developments in their agenda regarding disarmament.

Dec. 20, 2014

Cemil Bayık said, “Laying down arms would mean death…”

Dec. 27, 2014

Major clashes broke out in Cizre. The bodies of four People’s Protection Units (YPG) members, who were killed in the clashes in Syria’s Kobani and Iraq’s Shingal regions, were transferred from Habur to Cizre. A confrontation between the YDG-H members, who were on duty at the tent for condolences in Nur, and some proponents of the Free Cause Party (HÜDA-PAR), turned into an armed conflict.

Jan. 23, 2015

A HDP delegation negotiated with Qandil. It was stated that the KCK thought the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) did not display the responsible approach required for the negotiation process.

Feb. 9, 2015

Parliamentary negotiations regarding the package known as the “domestic security package” in public, which comprises the law on police duties and authorities, the law on the gendarme institution, duties and authorities, the law on the civil registry services and the draft on altering some laws and statutory decrees, was postponed for the second time.

Feb. 15, 2015

Meeting the KCK administration in Qandil, the HDP delegation announced in a written statement that the KCK was disturbed by the Domestic Security Package and this would undermine the negotiation process.

Feb. 17, 2015

Demirtaş: “Öcalan issued a conditioned disarmament call.”

Feb. 28, 2015

Öcalan called on the PKK to lay down its arms.

March 21, 2015

Öcalan called to hold a congress to leave the armed fight: He called for the PKK to gather a congress with the aim of ending the armed conflict against Turkey in the Nevruz celebrations held in Diyarbakır on the condition of founding a truth and reconciliation commission comprising of deputies and a monitoring board.

April 11, 2015

In Ağrı, PKK members attacked military officers. Four officers were injured.

5 May 2015

Bese Hozat said, “Convening the congress is not on our agenda at the moment because the process has not worked and no step has been taken. Let alone negotiations, the dialogue process was removed. Negotiations have not been held with our leadership for a month, the delegation did not pay a visit to our leadership.”

June 7, 2015

The HDP imposed pressure on ballots in the eastern regions. Block votes were cast in hundreds of ballot boxes in villages.

June 12, 2015

After Demirtaş’s call that the PKK could lay down its arms with Öcalan’s call, the KCK announced, “We own the will of disarmament. Demirtaş or Öcalan cannot urge us to lay down our arms.”

The KCK: “We must clearly emphasize that the PKK’s will to end the armed fight against Turkey belongs completely to us. Everyone should know that the HDP is not the official party of the PKK. Consequently, the HDP does not have a right to issue such a call. Besides, it is not possible for Öcalan to issue a call in his present conditions in İmralı. Expecting the HDP and Öcalan to call for disarmament and putting pressure on that frame means the insistence on insolubility and it is not possible for our movement to recognize that. This attitude aims at neither listening to Öcalan nor blocking the HDP’s policy-making.”

June 29, 2015

Karayılan: “Let me put this clearly. If they intervene in Rojava, we will also intervene in them. Then the whole of Turkey will turn into a battlefield. The Turkish authorities should not forget the uprising of our people on Oct. 6, Oct. 7 and Oct. 8. It is well known that Öcalan, who did not approve of the great uprising of our people, was barely able to stop it. It is obvious that the people would not allow such an intervention. In brief, such a decision would be a strategic one for Turkey, and a new period would start for the Kurdish people. We will not beg to anyone on that matter. They can do whatever they want. If they attempt it, of course, we would reply to that as Kurdish people.”

July 11, 2015

KCK’s announcement on ending the cease-fire: “The cease-fire is over. The meticulous attitude of our liberation movement was exploited. The dams and vehicles used for dam constructions will be targeted by our guerilla forces. Every detainment from now on will be a reason for the reprisal of our guerillas. Our liberation movement will not accept the exploitation of the cease-fire conditions, and stands against the policies that leave the Kurdish question unresolved.”

July 12, 2015

The PKK opened fire on a minibus.

July 14 2015

KCK Co-Chair Bese Hozat wrote an article entitled “The new process: a revolutionary people’s war,” calling the conflict a revolutionary people’s war.

July 20 2015

ISIS attack in Suruç: An explosion took place in Kobani simultaneously with an explosion in Suruç. Thirty-two people were killed in the Suruç explosion.

20 July 2015

Military officer Müsellim Ünal was killed in a clash between the PKK and officers in Adıyamanç

KCK Co-Chair Cemil Bayık called on people to take up arms, dig trenches and create tunnels in their homes.

22 July 2015

Police officers Feyyaz Yumuşak and Okan Acar were shot dead in their houses in Şanlıurfa’s Ceylanpınar district.

In Adana, Kalem-Der member Ethem Türkben was killed by the PKK in front of his pregnant wife and three children.

23 July 2015

In Diyarbakır, a police squad heading to a traffic accident scene was ambushed. Polis officer Tansu Aydın was killed and one officer was injured.

24 July 2015

Turkey launched operations in northern Syria and northern Iraq.

The PKK leader calling his terrorist organization twice to leave Turkey or leave armed engagement did not find a response by the KCK and Turkey witnessed thousands of terrorists attacks during the cease-fire period that began in 2013. The HDP’s pre-election campaign to disarm the PKK has also not panned out as Demirtş said HDP is not in the position to do so.

The cease-fire and PKK’s disarmament process beginning in March 2013 with imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan’s announcement has come to a halt several times and even almost ended owing to attacks on infrastructure, armed forces and civilians following calls on the Kurdish community by the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) for street protests. In addition, the contradiction between Öcalan and the PKK leadership in northern Iraq’s Qandil Mountains has been there to be seen, carrying out bloody attacks while Öcalan called for PKK disarmament.

Over the course of the cease-fire and the PKK’s disarmament process, the government remained composed and did not take any military action even though the PKK terrorist organization carried out attacks resulting in dozens of deaths.

Having been determined to bring the three-decade unrest in the country to an end, the government has taken many steps toward improving relations through reforms. The reward for the efforts, however, has so far been contradicting remarks by the political wing of the process as well as the PKK leadership, justifying bloody attacks and threatening the government from time to time.The chronology of statements from Öcalan and top PKK leaders in the Qandil Mountains explicitly show contradictions on the organization disarming with inconsistent statements at once disclaims the declaration and encouraging an armed fight against the Turkish state.

The period starting from July 11 with the unilateral declaration of the end of cease-fire by the PKK terrorist organization has witnessed the killing of more than 40 security forces personnel. The state has exercised its right to defense and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu has said it will resolutely fight until the terror across the country has ended.

Davutoğlu and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan have repeatedly indicated that Ankara has always been and continues to be in favor of carrying out the reconciliation process with the Kurdish people. For this, however, all armed factions need to leave the country for good and support along with justification for terrorist attacks needs to end.

Chronology of the period since Öcalan’s call for PKK to leave Turkey

March 21, 2013: PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan’s Nevruz message

“A door has been opened from armed struggle to democratic struggle… We have come to a point today where guns will be silenced and thoughts and ideas shall speak. Now it is time for our armed elements to move outside [Turkey’s] borders… This is not giving up the struggle, but the launching of a different struggle…”

April 25, 2013

The PKK officially announced that it would withdraw all its armed forces to northern Iraq. Speaking at a press meeting held in Qandil, which was relayed on TV channels, Murat Karayılan announced that the PKK would recess without precondition from May 8.

May 7, 2013

Selahattin Demirtaş’s announcement on the pullout: “The pullout will officially start tomorrow. We are estimating that it will last three or four months.”

July 2, 2013

Some protests were kicked off in Diyarbakır province’s Lice district on the pretext of road works and outpost constructions. One protester died.

Sept. 9, 2013

Cemil Bayık was assigned to chair the Kurdish Communities Union (KCK). The announcement issued by the KCK read, “The nine-month period without any clashes has been spent conducting some military works that cannot be performed in a state of war…”

Sept. 30, 2013

The government introduced the Democratization Package. In reply to that, the PKK organized the Patriotic Revolutionist Youth Movement (YDG-H), which acted as the PKK’s urban youth armed group. It also founded courts in cities, collected taxes and abducted people.

March 15, 2014

The KCK announced that the government was “no longer the addressee of the democratization move.”

March 21, 2014

The letter penned by Öcalan for the Nevruz celebrations: The letter was recited both in Kurdish and Turkish in Diyarbakır, by the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) Deputy Chair Pervin Buldan and the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) Istanbul Deputy Sırrı Süreyya Önder respectively. Öcalan wrote, “History showed us that if we don’t lead for peace with strong will, historical problems will go their own way and most probably will produce their own answers with very big losses. There is a burning question awaiting an answer: Will we continue with replicated coups or will we prefer absolute and radical democracy?”

June 1, 2014

A delegation from the HDP met the imprisoned Öcalan on İmralı Island. In the statement issued after the meeting, it was stated that Öcalan remarked, “the most important reality is the fact that the process has come to a new phase,” adding that hopes should be kept alive to make a serious start for the resolution.

June 8, 2014

In the province of Bitlis, terrorists blocking a road opened fire on security forces with rocket launchers and long-barreled weapons. A bomb attack took place in the district of Lice.

June 9, 2014

A national flag in the garden of Diyarbakır’s Second Air Force Command was taken down by a terrorist.

July 10, 2014

The “Draft Law to End Terror and Strengthen Social Integration,” which regulates the procedures and principles of the reconciliation process, passed into law after being approved at the Parliamentary Counsel.

Aug. 5, 2014

During the HDP’s İmralı visit, Öcalan said, “The 30-year-old war is about to end with a great democratic negotiation. The democratic negotiation process has a profound meaning in a historical and societal sense…”

Aug. 19, 2014

A statue of PKK member Mahsuni Korkmaz was erected in Lice. The court issued a decision to demolish the statue. Clashes broke out, one was killed.

Aug. 20, 2014

In Diyarbakır, a group of terrorists organized an attack on an outpost.

Aug. 24, 2014

Terrorists attacked a thermal plant located in Silopi district’s Görümlü neighborhood with rocket launchers and long-barreled weapons.

Sept. 18, 2014

The HDP issued a call to boycott schools on the pretext of education in their mother tongue. Dozens of schools were set ablaze in many provinces.

Sept. 22 2014

HDP deputy Aysel Tuğluk threw stones at military officers when police and military officers blocked the crowd heading to Kobani.

Oct. 3, 2014

In Tunceli province’s Pülümür district, some PKK militants attacked an outpost.

Oct. 8-9-10, 2014

Demirtaş’s Kobani call: After the call issued by Demirtaş, the Kobani incidents broke out. More than 50 people died. Clashes erupted in over 35 cities. Damage costing millions of Turkish lira was done. Öcalan said, “The reconciliation process will end if Kobani falls.”

Oct. 13, 2014

Some PKK militants were identified in Tunceli while leaking into a launch base area. A clash took place.

Oct. 21, 2014

During the HDP’s İmralı visit, Öcalan announced that a new phase started on Oct. 15 and tangible steps would be taken.

Oct. 25, 2014

Three undercover military officers were killed in Yüksekova.

Oct. 29, 2014

The HDP called on people to take to the streets again.

Oct. 30, 2014: In Diyarbakır, Necdet Aydoğdu, 24, a military officer, was killed by two masked assailants while he was off-duty, shopping with his wife downtown.

Nov. 24, 2014

Speaking to Fırat News Agency, Sabri Ok, a senior KCK member, remarked that there were no developments in their agenda regarding disarmament.

Dec. 20, 2014

Cemil Bayık said, “Laying down arms would mean death…”

Dec. 27, 2014

Major clashes broke out in Cizre. The bodies of four People’s Protection Units (YPG) members, who were killed in the clashes in Syria’s Kobani and Iraq’s Shingal regions, were transferred from Habur to Cizre. A confrontation between the YDG-H members, who were on duty at the tent for condolences in Nur, and some proponents of the Free Cause Party (HÜDA-PAR), turned into an armed conflict.

Jan. 23, 2015

A HDP delegation negotiated with Qandil. It was stated that the KCK thought the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) did not display the responsible approach required for the negotiation process.

Feb. 9, 2015

Parliamentary negotiations regarding the package known as the “domestic security package” in public, which comprises the law on police duties and authorities, the law on the gendarme institution, duties and authorities, the law on the civil registry services and the draft on altering some laws and statutory decrees, was postponed for the second time.

Feb. 15, 2015

Meeting the KCK administration in Qandil, the HDP delegation announced in a written statement that the KCK was disturbed by the Domestic Security Package and this would undermine the negotiation process.

Feb. 17, 2015

Demirtaş: “Öcalan issued a conditioned disarmament call.”

Feb. 28, 2015

Öcalan called on the PKK to lay down its arms.

March 21, 2015

Öcalan called to hold a congress to leave the armed fight: He called for the PKK to gather a congress with the aim of ending the armed conflict against Turkey in the Nevruz celebrations held in Diyarbakır on the condition of founding a truth and reconciliation commission comprising of deputies and a monitoring board.

April 11, 2015

In Ağrı, PKK members attacked military officers. Four officers were injured.

5 May 2015

Bese Hozat said, “Convening the congress is not on our agenda at the moment because the process has not worked and no step has been taken. Let alone negotiations, the dialogue process was removed. Negotiations have not been held with our leadership for a month, the delegation did not pay a visit to our leadership.”

June 7, 2015

The HDP imposed pressure on ballots in the eastern regions. Block votes were cast in hundreds of ballot boxes in villages.

June 12, 2015

After Demirtaş’s call that the PKK could lay down its arms with Öcalan’s call, the KCK announced, “We own the will of disarmament. Demirtaş or Öcalan cannot urge us to lay down our arms.”

The KCK: “We must clearly emphasize that the PKK’s will to end the armed fight against Turkey belongs completely to us. Everyone should know that the HDP is not the official party of the PKK. Consequently, the HDP does not have a right to issue such a call. Besides, it is not possible for Öcalan to issue a call in his present conditions in İmralı. Expecting the HDP and Öcalan to call for disarmament and putting pressure on that frame means the insistence on insolubility and it is not possible for our movement to recognize that. This attitude aims at neither listening to Öcalan nor blocking the HDP’s policy-making.”

June 29, 2015

Karayılan: “Let me put this clearly. If they intervene in Rojava, we will also intervene in them. Then the whole of Turkey will turn into a battlefield. The Turkish authorities should not forget the uprising of our people on Oct. 6, Oct. 7 and Oct. 8. It is well known that Öcalan, who did not approve of the great uprising of our people, was barely able to stop it. It is obvious that the people would not allow such an intervention. In brief, such a decision would be a strategic one for Turkey, and a new period would start for the Kurdish people. We will not beg to anyone on that matter. They can do whatever they want. If they attempt it, of course, we would reply to that as Kurdish people.”

July 11, 2015

KCK’s announcement on ending the cease-fire: “The cease-fire is over. The meticulous attitude of our liberation movement was exploited. The dams and vehicles used for dam constructions will be targeted by our guerilla forces. Every detainment from now on will be a reason for the reprisal of our guerillas. Our liberation movement will not accept the exploitation of the cease-fire conditions, and stands against the policies that leave the Kurdish question unresolved.”

July 12, 2015

The PKK opened fire on a minibus.

July 14 2015

KCK Co-Chair Bese Hozat wrote an article entitled “The new process: a revolutionary people’s war,” calling the conflict a revolutionary people’s war.

July 20 2015

ISIS attack in Suruç: An explosion took place in Kobani simultaneously with an explosion in Suruç. Thirty-two people were killed in the Suruç explosion.

20 July 2015

Military officer Müsellim Ünal was killed in a clash between the PKK and officers in Adıyamanç

KCK Co-Chair Cemil Bayık called on people to take up arms, dig trenches and create tunnels in their homes.

22 July 2015

Police officers Feyyaz Yumuşak and Okan Acar were shot dead in their houses in Şanlıurfa’s Ceylanpınar district.

In Adana, Kalem-Der member Ethem Türkben was killed by the PKK in front of his pregnant wife and three children.

23 July 2015

In Diyarbakır, a police squad heading to a traffic accident scene was ambushed. Polis officer Tansu Aydın was killed and one officer was injured.

24 July 2015

Turkey launched operations in northern Syria and northern Iraq.