Last Sunday, May 29, the first round of the Colombian presidential elections took place. In a country of slightly more than 50 million people, out of 39 million who are eligible to vote, more than 21 million exercised their right in a relatively calm environment, despite the high polarization and the permanent paranoia. All sides accuse their opponents of fraud and foul games, and are all together responsible for the tense atmosphere. None of the candidates reached the 50% +1 percentage required for victory.

Yet, leftist Gustavo Petro won 40.32% of the votes and Rodolfo Hernández, an engineer turned businessman and former mayor of Bucaramanga, Colombia’s sixth largest city, won 28.15% of the votes. The two will move on to a runoff on June 19.

The main surprise was the defeat of Federico Gutiérrez, the establishment’s man to maintain the status quo. Current president Iván Duque has a disapproval rate of 70%, leaving the country now highly economically vulnerable, with an inflation rate near a two-digit high, an unemployment of 12%, a high crime rate in cities, and an increase in violence in the rural areas.

Meanwhile, hundreds of community leaders and former guerrilla combatants who signed a peace deal with the government in 2016 were murdered by paramilitary factions as deep unrest hit several social sectors due to the Colombian government’s mismanagement of last year’s general strike.

Against this background, the message of the Colombian people was clear: we want change. Gutiérrez got 23.91% of the votes and immediately announced that he will support Hernández for president, confirming what many Colombians think, namely that Hernández is the establishment’s Plan B for clinging to power.

Petro, whose campaign has elapsed mainly in massive public appearances in Colombian cities and towns, proposes a government program focused on social issues. An increase in taxes for the 4,000 richest citizens, a cut in certain tax reliefs for big companies, financial support for the education and health sectors, a social approach to the war on drugs, strengthening the peace process which the current government shows contempt for, and a climate agenda that contains the exploration and production of oil—Colombia’s main source of income—in the midterm.

Petro, a militant of the leftist nationalistic guerrilla organization M-19 back in the ’70s and ’80s, is seen by almost half of the country as the “Colombian Hugo Chávez,” the late Venezuelan Marxist leader. Even though Petro showed support for Chávez in the past, he has distanced himself from his successor, Nicolás Maduro in recent years. Also, in a clear attempt to soften his image, Petro has met with entrepreneurs while he has been consistent in calling for the unity of alternative social and political forces in the country.

Hernández’s approach targets the bureaucracy. He promises cutting public spending (even announcing that he will donate his salary for social causes), and introducing a tax cut that could increase consumption and strengthen people’s purchasing power. Although his daughter, Laura, was kidnapped and murdered in 2004 by the leftist guerrilla ELN, he assures voters that he will seek peace negotiations with them, and give support to the Colombian agricultural sector.

Similar to Petro, he announced his plan to reestablish diplomatic ties with Venezuela, opposes the use of chemicals in coca and marijuana crops and the use of fracking during oil exploration, and endorses same sex marriage and adoption.

His critics view him as a demagogue or a populist, but this seems not to impact the view of the people he governed in Bucaramanga, where he overwhelmingly won on May 29. His claim that he is independent from the traditional political class does not appear to have completely convinced certain voters. He has also been involved in several controversial statements; on a radio show, years ago, he said, “I’m an admirer of a great German thinker named Adolf Hitler.”

Later he said he meant Albert Einstein. He also was filmed slapping a councilman who denounced him and his son for corruption while he was Bucaramanga’s mayor. His vice-presidential pick is the Afro-Colombian academic Marelen Castillo from the same Western region as Márquez.

Both candidates say their policy towards the United States will be based on friendly ties and mutual respect. Colombia was named “a strategic ally for NATO” during Ivan Duque’s presidency. Being its best “friend” in Latin America, the United States will be closely watching what happens in the June elections. Yet, whatever the outcome is, the U.S. will make sure it does not essentially harm Colombia’s traditionally submissive attitude.

One thing that unites Colombians is the general belief that the next four years will have to be revolutionary in terms of how the next president manages the country’s resources and politics. The Colombian people are very unhappy with the current administration. Life, beyond the pandemic, has become considerably harder for most Colombians: food prices soar, security deteriorates, and opportunities for a better future seem scarce.

The fact that Gustavo Petro and Rodolfo Hernández are in the home stretch in this crucial political moment is solid proof that Colombians are fed up with the political establishment. How this very same establishment will manage to maneuver in order to survive and perhaps even come out stronger from this juncture is yet to be seen.

The second pink tide in Latin America is ongoing as Mexico’s president Andrés Manuel López Obrador won the referendum on April 10, 2022.

López Obrador, who has been serving as president since his election victory in 2018, won the referendum conducted to decide whether he should step down or finish his six-year term in September 2024. In Mexico, presidents are limited to a single term of six years in office.

Although turnout rates were meager, López Obrador won almost 90% of the votes with only 18% of the eligible voters showing up on the day.

Before the referendum, his approval rating was 60%.

Opposition parties claimed that the president could use this landslide referendum to extend his six-year term. In a video message, López Obrador said, “I’m going to continue serving until the last day of my term. I’m not going to go past that because I’m a democrat, and I’m not in favor of re-election.”

Colombia turning to the left?

Colombia offered further proof of the rising left in Latin America with Gustavo Petro winning the primary presidential election with a landslide. Petro was defeated by Ivan Duque in 2018. Since then, the country has entered a complex phase, especially with economic inequality rising due to the COVID19 pandemic.

Colombia was shaken by mass protests in 2021. Polls show that many voters are dissatisfied with the current elected leader and Petro’s chances to be elected in the upcoming elections are increasing.

On May 29, 2022, the first round of Colombia’s presidential election will be held.

Will a former guerrilla member become a president?

Gustavo Francisco Petro Urrego was born in a small town in northern Colombia in 1960. His family migrated to a bigger town, where he later studied at the La Salle public school. Petro studied economics at the Universidad Externado de Colombia and after his graduation, he continued his education at Escuela Superior de Administración Pública (ESAP). Later, he earned his master’s degree in economics.

While at school, he got involved in politics and became a member of M-19, a Colombian guerrilla organization. During the 1980s, he was tortured and imprisoned for being part of the organization.

Later, the organization evolved into a political party in which Petro participated as a member in the 1990s.

In 1994, he was appointed to the Colombian embassy in Belgium as a diplomatic attaché for human rights, a position he held until 1996.

In 2002, Petro was elected to the Chamber of Representatives of Colombia, representing Bogotá, the county’s capital. Later, in 2006, he was re-elected as a senator in an election that saw the second highest voter turnout in the country.

His aspiration to become president started with the 2010 presidential election, where he ranked fourth in the election race, receiving 9.1% of the total votes.

Between 2012 and 2015, he served as mayor of Bogotá. During his tenure, there was a significant reduction in homicide rates, reaching a number that had never been seen in the previous two decades.

In the 2018 presidential election, Petro came second and lost the election to Iván Duque Márquez, the current president. However, he received eight million votes—the highest number ever to be won by a leftist candidate.

Petro is currently serving as a senator (2018-2022). In the presidential primaries on March 13, 2022, he received almost four million votes, double the number of votes won by his opponents. The 61-year-old politician became the presidential candidate for the coalition Historic Pact for Colombia by public vote.

In 2021, a poll published by Invamer showed that at least 75% of Colombians disapproved of Duque’s leadership style, making him the most unpopular leader in the country’s history.

Duque’s popularity crashed when social unrest across the country evolved into anti-government protests, killing 43 civilians in 2021.

The end of right-wing politics in Latin America?

Experts argue that the left is re-emerging in Latin America, especially after the COVID19 pandemic, which saw living conditions worsen.

After years of right-wing neoliberal dominance, many Latin American countries are moving towards left-wing politics. The movement is often referred to as the “pink tide,” which speaks of the regional change towards the left in Latin America after Hugo Chavez came to power in Venezuela in 2000.

The world is witnessing a dramatic revival of the 20^th-century bipolar geopolitical order featuring the Soviet Union, today’s Russia, on the one side, and the United States on the other. This power struggle has shown one of its ugliest faces in Syria and now is showing itself in Eastern Europe with the Russia-Ukraine war. As we slowly leave the nightmare of the COVID19 pandemic behind, a new global tension is born with the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

But, there’s a region where this rivalry between the U.S. and Russia might be writing a new chapter: Latin America. Latin America is a competitive territory, abundant in natural and human resources, that could be the dream of any world superpower.

On February 3, the Colombian Minister of Defense Diego Molano stated, “We know that men and units of the FANB (Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana) have been mobilized towards the border with technical assistance from Russia … and Iran.”

This happened amidst the tensions in the eastern Colombian region of Arauca, an enclave of borderline between Colombia and Venezuela, where clashes between the Colombian army and different subversive groups occur constantly and where in January alone at least 68 people were killed.

The day after, the Russian embassy in Colombia issued a statement condemning Molano’s statement as “irresponsible” and denying any involvement in military assistance to Venezuela that could harm Colombia.

But this was not the first time Molano makes a reference to Russia. In May 2021, Colombia was under one of the most turbulent revolts in the country when millions took to the streets to protest against the government’s handling of the pandemic, the critical social situation, tax reforms, and other essential issues.

Molano accused Russia of being behind cyberattacks against the Colombian government.

This extraordinary event, in a country where civil society used to be scared to raise its voice, shook the establishment and evidently made it unusually nervous. Molano then accused Russia of being behind cyberattacks against the Colombian government, an assertion immediately denied by the Russian government.

On December 8, 2021, Minister Molano signed another treaty with NATO turning Colombia into the first and only “global partner” in Latin America. The agreement’s purpose was to “improve our defense capacity” and to “articulate cooperation with allied nations.” This is something neighboring Venezuela didn’t receive well. Nor did its ally, Russia.

Sergei Ryabkov, deputy foreign minister of Russia, said that he would “neither confirm nor deny” the possibility that Russia might send military assets to Cuba and Venezuela.

On the other hand, Venezuela has strong diplomatic, military, and economic ties with Russia. Since Hugo Chávez became president of Venezuela, both nations have entrenched their relationships. Now with President Maduro, these ties have deepened. On February 16 of last year, Maduro received Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yury Borisov in Caracas, and expressed Venezuela’s support for any Russian move on Ukraine.

The main issue discussed in the meeting was the strategic military cooperation between Russia and Venezuela. As a precedent, in January, Sergei Ryabkov, deputy foreign minister of Russia, during talks with his counterparts in the United States said that he would “neither confirm nor deny” the possibility that Russia might send military assets to Cuba and Venezuela if the U.S. and its allies do not limit their military activities in Latin America.

Venezuela is estimated to have received around $17 billion in loans from Russia since 2007, spending an unknown but presumably considerable amount on the purchase of weapons from the Kremlin. In the oil industry, the main source of income for both states, Russia has played a considerable role by taking part in the trade of this commodity, finding clients that evade the U.S.-imposed sanctions on Venezuela, thus giving some oxygen to the South American nation’s fragile economy.

There are at least 20 areas of cooperation between Russia and Venezuela, mainly, energy, military, and transportation. Other countries, in the political orbit of Venezuela, like Bolivia and Nicaragua, also have good ties with Moscow. Cuba, the oldest Russian friend in the region, is no longer alone.

Is the United States losing its “backyard” in Latin America?

In light of this reality and Russian influence in Latin America, it is easy to guess that the United States may not be very pleased with the situation. Things may get even harder for the U.S. considering that in May this year, Colombians will elect a new president and leftist candidate Gustavo Petro seems the most likely to win. Petro maintains an approach based on resuming diplomatic ties with Venezuela. The Colombian people are increasingly reluctant to any form of confrontation with Venezuela and the popular support for Duque’s right-wing government is constantly seeing new lows.

The U.S. worries about the presence of countries other than Russia in Latin America – namely, Iran and China. Iran and China have been building stronger ties with Venezuela and other Latin American nations. Considering that countries like Chile, Mexico, Argentina, and Costa Rica have turned to the political left in the last few years, and that other regional giants like Colombia and Brazil may do the same soon, the task for U.S. diplomacy may require exerting more efforts in the years to come to assure that their eastern antagonists – the Russians – fail to conquer what they consider to be theirs. The Monroe Doctrine, which states that “America is for Americans,” could become obsolete in the decades ahead.

The fear of some Colombians and Venezuelans lies in what history has taught them: when empires fight, small nations suffer. Even though it is clear that the characteristics of Latin America are substantially different than those of the peoples of the Middle East or Eastern Europe, the textbook of empires has always been the same: find a puppet in a rich place, appropriate people’s wealth, conquer another wealthy nation, and let the locals be the ones whose blood spills.

Only time will tell if Latin America will become the next playground for mighty powers such as the U.S. and Russia, or if they find a third way that shields them from becoming history’s latest tragic example.

Colombian people took to the streets on April 28.  For Colombia, a country with a population of slightly more than 50 million, what happened that day was fairly rare: people got fed up with the establishment. A few weeks earlier, the Finance Minister Alberto Carrasquilla had announced the imperious need for a tax reform in which, among other measures, basic goods like salt, coffee, and chocolate would be taxed at a 19% rate. The country has been struggling under the COVID-19 pandemic, which has taken the lives of 88,700 Colombians so far, with lockdowns aggravating an already deteriorating economic situation.

According to DANE, the national statistics department, 22 million Colombians survive on less than $90 a month including 7.4 million who survive on less than $39. In 2020, 42.5% of the Colombian population were considered poor, a 6.8% surge from 2019. Colombia is a country where a member of congress earns 40 times the minimum wage, with an official unemployment rate of 15%, and an informal economy accounting for 50% of the country’s economic activity.

So, when the head of the economic team of Iván Duque’s government announced that even coffee, the symbol of Colombia’s economy, was a target for taxation, the common citizen decided they had had enough. In the past, most of the protestors had been organized by unions such as FECODE, the teachers’ union, or by CUT (Central Union of Workers), by calling on thousands to take to the streets, but the outcome was not even close to the level of protests this time.

However, this was not the only reason for the Colombian people’s reaction. Duque’s leadership regarding the enforcement of the peace treaty that his predecessor Juan Manuel Santos had signed with FARC, the country’s main guerrilla group, in September 2016, has been deficient: more than 900 social activists and 276 former combatants have been murdered since the treaty was signed.

Native communities, which make up around 4.5% of the Colombian population, have denounced that their ancestral territories have been affected by this lack of diligence.

Native communities, which make up around 4.5% of the Colombian population, have denounced that their ancestral territories have been affected by this lack of diligence. The drug trafficking business keeps violently disturbing these indigenous communities with no robust reaction from the national authorities. As a result, they too took to the streets massively.

In general, the people of Colombia demand the government adopt reforms in the police institution that include the dismantling of the special anti-riot force, accused of numerous abuses against Colombians; reform the health system which is basically privatized in Colombia; better economic conditions for both employees and entrepreneurs; more effective taxation for the extremely rich and an aid relief for those earning less; a guaranteed basic income for the poorer since the pandemic has been catastrophic especially for the most vulnerable; and also more resources for public education.

One of the main effluents during the strikes has been the students. Colombian youngsters face a future where the lack of job opportunities contrasts with the huge difficulties to access high-quality education. Relying on the official numbers of the Colombian Ministry of Education, only 52% of Colombian students acquire a technical or professional education after high school. Most of them seek refuge in jobs in call centers, delivery services, or other low paid jobs characterized by lack of social protection and social security.

It is the students, in fact, who feature heavily in the deadly toll of the violent repression that the Colombian police has practiced against its civilians. According to the Colombian human rights NGO TEMBLORES ONG, a month after the general strike started, there have been at least 43 homicides and 1,133 injuries due to the intervention of the police force, and 1,445 people have been reported arrested.

Not only this, 22 sexual assaults were reported and 47 eye injuries, with many losing an eye as a result of the actions of the regime’s security forces. In many cases, human rights lawyers have denounced arbitrary arrests where basic rights have been denied to those arrested. The number of missing people is in the hundreds. In other words, a national tragedy has occurred in just over a month in Colombia.

Armed civilians in Cali have been filmed shooting with automatic firearms at people marching in the streets.

Amidst this chaos, the one thing that has shined above everything is the absence of real leadership by the head of the state Iván Duque. A week ago, an international commission of human rights flying in from Argentina was prevented from entering the country and sent back from Bogota’s airport. The Colombia president has been asked by the public to meet with the protesters, but he has refused to do so.

Santiago de Cali or simply Cali, the country’s third most populous city, is a 30-minute flight from the capital. It is considered the epicenter of the strike and even though its population is around 5% of the country’s total, it accounts for 60% of the casualties. Armed civilians in Cali have been filmed shooting with automatic firearms at people marching in the streets.

All of this is happening in front of the police personnel with the evident complicity of the official forces. The police has focused exclusively on repressing the protests while these armed civilians remind Colombians of the nightmare of paramilitary squads, which sadly are far from being the ghosts the times past. Duque went to Cali twice. On both occasions, he met with the police forces and the civilians living in rich neighborhoods, where the armed citizens shooting at the protestors had been spotted.

The government’s attitude has been limited to basically accusing the popular movement of being subversive and terrorist, and blaming the former left-wing presidential candidate Gustavo Petro of inflaming the situation. The Colombian society is polarized between those supporting the right-wing ruler and those opposing him. Meanwhile, most Colombians think the country’s real boss is Álvaro Uribe, the former two-time president who is accused of standing behind thousands of extrajudicial killings during his 8-year term in office.

Now more than two weeks into the protests, the government decided to call off the proposed tax reforms from Congress. Finance Minister Carrasquilla, a stubborn squire of the regime, resigned. A few days later, a health reform which was on the path to becoming a law and which according to critics would transform the Colombian system into a copy of that of the U.S. in terms of privatization, was also dismissed. Three important achievements for the people indeed.