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n an era marked by unprecedented global challenges, few issues resonate as profoundly as the quest for food security. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the grain shortage that followed showcased the grave vulnerability of existing systems. The imperative of ensuring that everyone, everywhere has access to safe, sufficient, and nutritious food looms large on the global stage. This month’s book bundle presents a curated selection of books that delve into food security, examining it from multiple angles, and offering insights, strategies, and solutions.

From the intricacies of international trade policies to the sustainability of food systems, and from the impacts of geopolitical conflicts to the strategic place of food, these books provide a comprehensive understanding of the challenges and opportunities in the realm of global food security.

Whether you are a policymaker, researcher, student, or simply a concerned global citizen, this collection provides valuable resources for understanding, navigating, and contributing to the discourse on global food security.

Food Security: Availability, Income and Productivity is a pertinent book that explores the pressing issue of global food security as our world population continues to grow. The author focuses on three key conditions necessary to achieve food security: food availability, adequate incomes, and increased agricultural productivity.

The book draws insights from history and contemporary contexts to thoroughly examine these conditions. It takes a close look at the obstacles preventing consistent food availability and discusses how to overcome these challenges. It also delves into the importance of ensuring sufficient incomes, highlighting programs like food stamps and food banks. Furthermore, the book provides valuable insights into the factors driving enhanced agricultural productivity.

Food Security caters to a broad audience, including agricultural experts, policymakers, and NGOs working in food aid. It’s also a valuable resource for students studying agriculture and public policy. The book not only informs but also encourages critical thinking about the complex task of feeding a projected nine billion people by 2050.

In a world where food scarcity is becoming increasingly worrisome, this book offers essential insights into the intricate web of food security. It provides a well-reasoned analysis that will contribute to ongoing discussions and efforts aimed at ensuring a sustainable food future for everyone.

William A. Kerr, Food Security: Availability, Income and Productivity (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2023) ISBN: 978 1 03531 270 2, 234 pages

Shadow Negotiators: How UN Organizations Shape the Rules of World Trade for Food Security by Matias E. Margulis is a groundbreaking exploration of the influence exerted by United Nations (UN) organizations within the World Trade Organization (WTO) despite their absence from the formal negotiation table. Margulis introduces the concept of “shadow negotiators,” illustrating how UN bodies strategically engage in political actions to shape multilateral trade negotiations.

The book’s primary focus is on the contentious issue of agricultural trade liberalization. It provides a detailed analysis of interventions by four UN organizations: the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Food Programme (WFP), the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food (SRRTF).

Margulis unveils the innovative strategies these UN entities employ to influence global trade regulations. Importantly, he emphasizes that their motivation isn’t rooted in competition with the WTO or ideological opposition to trade liberalization. Instead, it stems from their concern that certain trade rules could negatively impact global food security, running counter to their core mission of addressing world hunger and safeguarding the right to food.

Shadow Negotiators is a meticulously researched work that offers fresh insights into the often-unseen dynamics of international trade. It’s essential reading for those interested in the intersection of trade policy and global welfare, making a valuable contribution to the field of international relations and trade studies.

Matias E. Margulis, Shadow Negotiators: How UN Organizations Shape the Rules of World Trade for Food Security (Stanford University Press, 2023) ISBN: 9781503633520, 292 pages

Universal Food Security: How to End Hunger While Protecting the Planet by Glenn Denning explores the path towards a world where hunger and malnutrition are eradicated, and everyone can access healthy and abundant food for a productive life. The book emphasizes the need to transform our food systems, focusing on sustainability and environmental restoration, from production to distribution.

Denning, drawing from his extensive experience in over fifty countries, offers a practical guide to making healthy diets accessible to all while ensuring sustainability. He identifies key priorities, including sustainable agriculture intensification, robust market infrastructure, responsible postharvest practices, promoting healthy eating, and establishing social safety nets. The book underscores the pivotal role of practitioner-leaders in driving this transformation, highlighting the importance of education and development in instigating change.

But beyond the roadmap, Denning reminds us that the engine driving this transformation is practitioner-leadership, underscored by education and development. This book stands as a testament to the potential for meaningful change when individuals and institutions commit to reshaping our world, making universal food security not merely a dream but a tangible and sustainable reality.

Glenn Denning, Universal Food Security: How to End Hunger While Protecting the Planet (Columbia University Press, 2023) ISBN: 9780231197618, 448 pages

The Russia-Ukraine Conflict and Global Food Security explores the global food security implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which occurred during a period of already high food prices due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The book highlights the importance of the Black Sea region for global food production and Russia’s role in supplying natural gas and fertilizers.

The potential disruption of trade in this region posed a significant threat, with the potential to raise food prices and worsen poverty and hunger in vulnerable countries. The conflict primarily impacted trade in cereals and vegetable oils, fertilizer exports, and energy costs, potentially pushing millions into hunger and poverty.

The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) responded swiftly by providing information and policy advice. They established a blog series and online resources to disseminate critical information rapidly. This book compiles these blog posts, offering an overview of the crisis’s progression, international responses, and lessons for ensuring food security in the wake of disruptions.

This book provides essential insights into a rapidly evolving crisis with far-reaching implications for global food security, making it valuable for policymakers and researchers.

Joseph W. Glauber, Ed. and David Laborde Debucquet. Ed., The Russia-Ukraine Conflict and Global Food Security (IFPRI, 2023) ISBN: 9780896294394, 196 pages

Bread and Autocracy: Food, Politics, and Security in Putin’s Russia offers a compelling analysis of the pivotal role food has played in Russian politics from the 1917 Revolution to the present under Putin’s leadership. The authors, Janetta Azarieva, Yitzhak M. Brudny, and Eugene Finkel, argue that Russia’s transition from a grain importer to a global food exporter was a deliberate, long-term strategy aimed at enhancing national security and regime stability. This focus on food self-sufficiency sets Russia apart from other autocracies, as it prioritizes domestic food production over imports, highlighting its significance in maintaining autocratic rule.

The book’s relevance is heightened in today’s world, where food issues are once again at the forefront of global concerns and nations are emphasizing self-reliance. Bread and Autocracy provides a timely and comprehensive exploration of Russia’s unique approach to food politics, shedding light on its implications for both domestic and international affairs. It is a valuable read for those seeking a deeper understanding of Russia’s distinctive stance on food and its impact on political power. The book will be available in hardcover on September 1, 2023.

Janetta Azarieva, Yitzhak M. Brudny, and Eugene Finkel, Bread and Autocracy: Food, Politics, and Security in Putin’s Russia (Oxford University Press, 2023) ISBN: 9780197684368, 525 pages

On the lush hills of the Myanmar-China border stands an autonomous self-governing polity in Myanmar, the Wa State. It is de facto independent from the rest of the country and has its own political system, administrative divisions and army. Stalemate delves into the captivating history and contemporary political landscape of the United Wa State Army (UWSA), an insurgent force with 20,000-30,000 active forces that stands as Asia’s most formidable.

This narrative of ethnographic exploration paints a vivid picture of an upland community, often brushed aside as mere rebels or linked to drug trade, yet proficiently upholding a unique autonomy that navigates between two dominant states. Rather than sidestepping the neighboring states, the Wa polity actively engages with them, a dynamic that unfolds against the backdrop of sovereignty and statehood struggles.

Through the lens of Andrew Ong’s meticulous analysis, in Stalemate: Autonomy and Insurgency on the China-Myanmar Border readers are led through the political culture entrenched within Wa elites and the general populace, the complex web of UWSA’s international connections, and the intricate capital flows in conjunction with China, illuminating the orchestration behind Wa autonomy. Geopolitical strategy and involvement in the shadow economy is what breathes life into the concept of Wa autonomy. In fact, the book adeptly navigates through the multifaceted borderland geopolitics and the nuances of the shadow economy, highlighting how the United Wa State Army carefully treads this intricate path.

Blending anthropological insights with his personal encounters as a World Food Programme employee in Wa State, Ong delivers a contemplative on-the-ground portrayal of political dynamics in Wa. His objectives, intertwined and interwoven, unfold in three tiers. Primarily, he endeavors to enable readers to perceive the world through the eyes of Wa State’s inhabitants, gaining their perspective. Subsequently, he aims to foster comprehension of the disparities between Wa governance principles and international norms. Lastly, he prompts a reconsideration of conventional interpretations of disorder and stability.

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n Original Sin: Power, Technology and War in Outer Space, Dr. Bleddyn E. Bowen presents the sobering reality of space technology; its development to enhance the killing power of the state.

Bowen discusses the political, strategic, and social causes and consequences of the Global Space Age and sees it as an outgrowth of the international system actors within it. The book provides a global view of international politics of space and its increasingly multipolar environment, and masterfully links technopolitics to power politics.

 

Q. What is the original sin? How did nations first decide to pursue space power?

It’s tied up in the Thermonuclear Revolution, through the pursuit of military power. If it wasn’t for the perceived military benefits of being able to launch nuclear weapons, you would not have had the very large sums of money poured into these very temperamental, exotic new technologies in the 1940s and ’50s. The scenario would be similar for satellite technologies; they were very temperamental and unknown. The potential benefits were so huge that both superpowers’ military industrial complexes in the early Cold War put resources into it, and got the things working that then opened up access to space for all sorts of other applications as well.

The original sin refers to the military interest in developing those very first technologies that opened up the entire space. It started with the Sputnik shock. The launch of Sputnik in 1957 was the product of the Soviet missile arms and nuclear project. It wasn’t just to have a demonstration; Khrushchev did not plan that. It was very much Sergei Korolev saying, “Well, we might as well put a demonstration satellite up there.”

They were building those rockets to launch nuclear weapons. Korolev was told he could only work on the satellite in his spare time, so that the work did not interfere with developing them as missiles with nuclear weapons. So, Korolev and his teams worked on Sputnik in their own time, not on the main line of work. Even the very first satellite launch was just the tip of the iceberg of what was a massive military nuclear buildup.

Q. How has the use of space technology evolved from back then?

What we have today are just mature and advanced versions of the same basic technological system. They are often decades old. GPS is 50 years old. We just have a very advanced version of it today compared to 50 years ago. So, it’s about the spread and the increased availability of the services rather than a change in the technology as such.

It didn’t happen overnight, but by the 1990s most of the kinds of satellite service types that we use today had been developed in their earliest generations, or sometimes even the second or third generations.

Satellite TV, for example, came out of military command and control systems. The Tokyo Olympics were broadcast by satellite in 1964; it was the first major sports event to be broadcast by satellite. That’s an example where the actual service and technology have been there for a long time, but it’s far more ubiquitous now.

Satellite navigation is another one. Various parts of the military and civilian economy in the United States were already using the very first services of GPS in the late 1980s. Today, those services are just far more accessible to everyone rather than just specialized organizations.

Similarly, with satellite imagery; one of the applications was in 1960 when the first Corona spy satellite images came back. Those things have been around for a very, very long time; now, you have a lot more commercial companies doing that, which means the private sector, and even individuals who have the money can purchase those kinds of images now, and get them much more quickly as well.

However, I’m not optimistic about that future, because if anything of value is found that is economically feasible to develop or exploit, then selfish interests will probably prevail because the precedent is already there in Earth orbit. If you want to look at the actual competition for resources in space, it’s been happening for decades already in the geostationary satellite belt.

At geostationary orbit, 36,000 kilometers above the equator, there’s a finite space and finite radio frequency spectrum to use, and different countries have to file at the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) to get the right to use the particular radio communication frequency and the location to put their satellite. They are given a time limit to get their satellites up there and to start using it. Then, they must continuously use it and have a satellite there, or they lose the right to that slot and somebody else can bid for it. It’s pretty much on a first-come-first-serve basis.

The geostationary belt and Earth orbit are so valuable for military and economic purposes that there is no truly equitable method of governance there. It may occur in the future; politics is about possibilities. However, that’s the precedence we’ve set over the last 70 years, and it’s not encouraging. I don’t think we’re going to have profitable moon mining anytime soon. I think that might take another 100 years or more. But if the moon becomes economically very valuable, there aren’t many positive precedents to use sadly.

Q. Do actors hog up these strategic locations? Is there any regulation that prevents such an act?

In terms of geostationary satellite slots and frequency use, it is first come, first served, and if you don’t use it, you lose it. The filings on the ITU are constantly watched because if countries or companies file for a certain frequency, and if it was approved, they own that frequency. Some countries like to file for very large satellite constellations and people evaluate this as an attempt to hog the spectrum or a location.

It’s up to the countries within the ITU to resolve those disputes before final decisions are made. If the ITU fails to make enough decisions that people think are fair, then the organization itself risks becoming desolate. There has to be some level of coordination to avoid jammed and incompatible satellite usage. So, you could end up with a situation where nobody can use satellites in a certain area, because too many people are trying to use it at the same time.

Q. How does more countries or actors stepping into the space arena translate to international relations?

That is a difficult question. I won’t have a clear answer for you, because I’m observing it just like everyone else. The phrase the “democratization of space” is being thrown around a lot. I don’t like that phrase because I don’t think that having more countries doing things in space is necessarily democratic.

Space governance is usually more a reflection of power politics rather than any democratic process, and a lot of countries that are doing more things in space are not democratic countries themselves, and even within democratic countries there are questions over how involved the wider electorates are in space policy, or whether they are actually interested or informed about their countries’ space policies and activities. There’s a representation and engagement question there that we would ascribe to any system we would call democratic.

So, whilst there’s more population in space now, perhaps in terms of the number of different countries, and also large private companies doing things in space, I wouldn’t call it democratic. We don’t have a truly democratic governance structure for outer space. There are votes of the UN General Assembly, but it’s not really the same as the domestic democratic system.

On one hand, more countries are paying more attention to space now, because it affects everyone, so more engagement and more awareness is a good thing. On the other hand, it means that the ways that a lot of countries have been using the United Nations to try to govern space activities needs to be revisited in a way that recognizes that dozens more countries now have a stake in it. It’s not necessarily the West versus the rest, and it requires a shift in mentality for many of the older traditional space powers, including China, Japan, and India, just like Western Europe, the United States, and Russia.

The older, bigger traditional space powers are used to being able to do what they want to, without having to consider the rest of the world too much—that is less and less the case now. If they can’t change the ways they behave, or try to get agreements or consensus built in various forums, that may be an issue. Space is becoming more like governing the seas now, with a lot of smaller states much more involved and influential in any sort of UN-level agreement.

Q. Do different countries take similar or different paths in developing and utilizing space technology?

There are variations, especially in the way countries might want to present themselves. Yet, they share a lot of the same technological hurdles because it’s the same base technologies that you need to use. As I do in Original Sin, you can look at six or seven significant space powers and they all must get over the same technological hurdles to have their own access to space, their own launch vehicles, their own satellite industries, their own educated and trained workforce in space technology and sciences, etc.

Especially early on, when space knowledge and technology were not as widespread, there were many common challenges that had to be faced. But then, within that broad similarity, in terms of the technological challenges, you have the variations in the way certain countries go about doing things.

Japan, for example, didn’t really have that much of an explicit military connection to its satellite and launch vehicle deployment. The logic of autonomy and avoiding complete dependence on the United States was supported by the Japanese government, just in case Japan might need to develop its own nuclear weapons program in the upcoming years. Having a nuclear energy industry and a rocket launch industry, you got the fundamental infrastructure there to develop nuclear bombs and missiles, if you need to down the line. India’s major space efforts were presented in terms of social and economic development, much more so than the Soviet Union, China, and the United States.

Today, there are even more variations because there are already six established space powers: the United States, Europe, Russia, China, India, and Japan. Other countries can now cooperate or purchase services and pick and choose which aspect of space industries they want to develop or take part in. Take Nigeria, for example. It has dropped its old ambitions of having its own launch vehicle, its own rockets, and its own astronaut in space, and focused on satellites and using satellite data. That means, Nigeria has really important stakes in what goes on in space, but it can’t launch its own satellites and it still buys satellites. It still hasn’t gotten a full satellite manufacturing capability yet, but it operates and uses its own satellites.

Brazil has major Earth observation satellites in a joint program with China. It tried to have a launch program which failed, and they eventually gave up on it because it was just too expensive. Other countries, for a fee, would launch their satellites for them. Britain, for example, doesn’t have its own launch capability, but it does a lot in space science, engineering and research, integrated with the European Space Agency. It relies on the United States for security and intelligence applications in space and services, and is a world leader in small satellites manufacturing. It’s not comprehensive, but it’s got very targeted, niche strengths.

Finland has a commercial radar imagery satellite company, and is a big player in terms of the space economy and technology development in the particular area, but it doesn’t have its own rockets.

Just like any other aspect of military, technological, economic, or diplomatic power, space power has so many different applications. What matters is what kind of space technologies and industries each country actually needs because they will be different for each case.

Different countries today can tailor their space strategies and policies according to their economic and security needs, etc. The United Arab Emirates is particularly interesting. They are throwing money at space in lots of different areas; they are investing in defense security, economic infrastructure, and space exploration. They have sent a satellite to Mars and wanted to send a payload to the moon, but they still don’t want to build their own rockets.

Space is still so expensive and you need a lot of trained people and highly specialized skills. You need to have loads of people go into rocket science, which would take them out of other sectors of high-technology skills and training that they could otherwise be deployed at. Therefore, space power must be targeted in countries that are new to space or smaller countries.

Q. The Outer Space Treaty bans the placement of nuclear weapons in space but that’s not the case with conventional weapons. What measures can actors take to protect themselves?

This has been the case since 1967 based on Article 4 of the Outer Space Treaty. There’s not a lot you can do in terms of governance, because there’s no appetite for any more restrictions on other kinds of weapon bans in space. The Russians and the Chinese have tried to push a treaty on it, but it has not gotten anywhere. It is seen by many as a bad faith diplomatic exercise; it is not something that’s done with genuine intent to try to make space warfare less likely to happen.

There’s not a lot you can do other than to build more satellites, so that if something happens to one, there are more ready to take over, or to build terrestrial alternatives or backups. If the satellites go dark, there’s not a lot you can do because if a determined enemy wants to shoot down your satellite and they have technology capabilities, direct defense of satellites is very difficult.

Against electronic warfare or cyber warfare, there are more options for defense. However, it’s difficult for us on the outside to observe it. The forensics of that become very difficult. It’s hard to tell when something is a deliberate attack or just accidental.

They are highly proliferated and the cost to entry is lower, so smaller powers can do cyber operations. It’s difficult to stop a missile from blowing up your satellite but you have more options to respond to enemy jamming or a cyber attack, the effects of those can be reversed. So, in terms of governance, there’s not a lot you can do. On the other hand, militarily depending on the kind of attack, there are some things you can do in some areas.

In his compelling book When Disasters Come Home: Making and Manipulating Emergencies in the West,  David Keen delves into the profound impact of disasters that were once perceived as distant occurrences but are now striking at the heart of the prosperous West. With crises like global warming, migration challenges, threats to democracy, the Covid-19 pandemic, and the repercussions of the war in Ukraine converging, Western societies find themselves caught in a continuous state of fear and distraction.

Keen argues that these disasters should serve as a catalyst for reform, urging us to address the systemic issues that give rise to such catastrophes. However, he reveals how frequently they are exploited for political and economic gain, sidestepping the root causes.

The interplay of various crises, whether gradual or sudden, perpetuates a toxic political landscape that exacerbates the very problems it stems from and enforces a continuous state of crisis amongst society. Politicians often take advantage of the alarm to legitimize their contribution to the disaster-producing system by creating alternate realities and “lesser evil” arguments.

A troubling aspect is the tendency to vilify those striving to alleviate the emergencies or shed light on their underlying factors. Without amplifying alternative perspectives and voices, we risk being ensnared in a self-perpetuating cycle of emergency politics, hindering true resolution and manufacturing its own justification and legitimacy.

From the economy, politics, society and war to the environment, migration, and health, When Disasters Come Home highlights nine major high profile, six abrupt and three slow-burning disasters. Lastly, it also discusses the mass contemporary flight from reality as a disaster in and of itself.

Keen’s book offers a thought-provoking exploration of the complex dynamics between disasters, politics, and the imperative need for reform. Through his incisive analysis, he challenges readers to critically assess the interconnections and potential consequences of the current crisis-ridden world.

David Keen, When Disasters Come Home: Making and Manipulating Emergencies in the West (Polity Press, 2023) ISBN: 9781509550630, 288 pages

Written by Dilara Özer.

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eports about the death of the state amongst international relations scholars seem premature just yet. In this century, the world will conduct an extraordinary experiment in government. By 2050, forty percent of the planet’s population will live in just four places: India, China, the European Union, and the United States. These are superstates: polities that are distinguished from normal countries by expansiveness, population, diversity, and complexity.

Modern statecraft has attempted to adapt to the challenges of globalization, interdependency, and population increase, bringing piling responsibilities to the states. How can superstates manage the burden of their growing scale? Can such states be effectively governed at all? Looking at other model modern states offers only an incomplete picture; however, while there is not much experience to be drawn from today, empires may offer a guide.

Alasdair Roberts, professor of public policy at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, likens these superstates to the empires of the past. After all, it was the age of empires that gave way to the age of states, and later the hybrid polity superstates. In the coming decades, the least populous superstate, the U.S., will contain as many people as the vast British Empire did at its peak in 1914.

Roberts first attempts to decipher the nature of this ongoing experimentin light of new dilemmas of governance. He argues that, for the most part, superstates wrestle with the same problems of leadership, control, and creed that plagued empires for centuries. Yet, there are no simple solutions.

Could superstates be more durable? What are the pros and cons of a superstate in comparison to an empire? A postulate of empires is the assumption of their eventual death. Size and complexity led to fragility, and imperial rulers improvised constantly to put off the day of reckoning—leaders of superstates are doing the same today.

However, superstates now differ from traditional empires in the responsibilities that they bear, and most importantly in the obligation to improve life for ordinary citizens. They pursue radically different strategies for governing at scale that have profound implications for democracy and human rights. While technology provides more ease to superstates for surveillance and many other tasks, their populations are more restless and demanding, they need to govern more intensively and provide more services.

Roberts takes the reader through each superstate one by one to understand their unique challenges and complementing strategies, and reveals common themes amongst these giants in the process. He, then, takes the COVID-19 pandemic as a case study to analyze how these superstates reacted to a common problem in a different way and how they bared during a shock at the global level.

How should superstates be governed? What must their leaders do to hold these immense polities together? How can these superstates withstand the extraordinary strains and shocks of the contemporary world? If they survive, will they thrive? Superstates: Empires of the Twenty-First Century attempts to answer these and other questions by looking into history for ways to govern these sprawling and diverse polities.

With a groundbreaking twist in thinking about the art and methods of statecraft, Roberts considers the decisions leaders must make to devise and redevise strategies for governance at such a grand scale. Pragmatism, a little bit of reservation, and sometimes unorthodox policies may be necessary.

Alasdair Roberts, Superstates: Empires of the Twenty-First Century (Polity Press, 2022) ISBN: 978-1-509-54449-3, 224 pages

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here come times throughout history where military innovations or shifts in the character of warfare take great revolutionary leaps, allowing those able to reap their benefits first to position themselves at a substantive competitive advantage. Militaries that identify and exploit these periods of disruptive changes make major shifts in the balance of power, security, and prosperity for their nations. Those who fail to do so, or fail to adapt to change, risk exposing their country to danger. What will the next big thing in warfare be? And how can militaries successfully adapt to meet the challenge? The Origins of Victory: How Disruptive Military Innovation Determines the Fates of Great Powers provides an authoritative take and the necessary foundation for healthy speculation.

Military strategist Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr. discusses military revolutions—or shifts in the character of warfare—and specifically the most recent precision warfare revolution which is currently reaching its maturity.

According to Krepinevich, an even newer revolution is emerging. This is fueled by the advances of commercial and military-driven technology, such as AI 3D manufacturing, synthetic biology and quantum computing, and directed energy and hypersonic weapons, and is accelerated by the competition between the U.S., Russia, and China.

The precision warfare revolution was introduced by the U.S. military in the First Gulf War. It gave the U.S. a monopoly over this form of warfare for several decades, but now other powers such as China have these capabilities.

In this era of increased competition amongst great powers, The Origins of Victory, first gives a preliminary assessment of the disruptive changes occurring in general war to identify the existing characteristics of the precision warfare regime, and goes on to offer speculation of the overlapping successor revolution.

Second, The Origins of Victory examines the crucial factor of how military organizations have successfully anticipated and exploited disruptive changes in warfare faster than their rivals.

The book consists of two parts. In Part I, Krepinevich considers the characteristics of the emerging competitive environment through trends over the years and identifies the ones that may show yield in the future. He discusses the maturing precision warfare and the overlapping new revolution, as well as their implication for deterrence.

Is information technology accelerating creative destruction? How are large corporations counter-intuitively shooting the capitalist system in the foot? And how do we fix it? In The New Goliaths: How Corporations Use Software to Dominate Industries, Kill Innovation, and Undermine Regulation, James Bessen makes a compelling argument that competition, which has fueled innovation and progress under capitalism, is now threatened by powerful corporate giants like Walmart, Amazon, and Google.

Is technology to blame? In the digital age, software has allowed the increase of efficiency, variety, and flexibility, with far-reaching results in the economy. Yet, only the top firms and their high-level employees have access to key frontier technologies. Indeed, one can observe this trend amidst the mass purge of employees from these top firms. How did this change come about? Bessen dives into the topic of how earlier technologies leveled the competition and its benefits, and what is causing the disruption now.

One could argue that competing with big businesses is easier now than ever before with information technology becoming more affordable and more accessible; however, The New Goliaths points out that on the economic scale, it is the changing nature of how economic actors use information that makes a crucial impact.

“With great economic power came opportunities for abuse and political corruption,” Bessen writes and shows how these giants have tilted the odds in their favor by using proprietary information technologies. Over the years, these “new goliaths” have evaded regulation, slowed innovation, and increased economic inequality and social division. In turn, they have harmed workers, consumers, and citizens, and fueled politics of resentment.

The saying “Money makes the world go round” takes a more powerful meaning in a globalized capitalist economy. But what happens when the ones at the very top of the money chain are corrupted? In this month’s book bundle, we share with you three books that explore the influence of the rich and powerful, discuss how the world really goes round, and expose the staggering cases of how corruption hides itself often in plain sight with its effects rippling into the depth of systems, societies, and the lives of each one of us.

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he COVID19 pandemic revealed to many an eye-opening trend of wealth centralization: the rich are getting richer, and governments around the world are hardly able to protect those who are most vulnerable from the detrimental economic and social effects of a crisis. Who is the culprit?

The New York Times‘s award-winning global economics journalist Peter S. Goodman presents a page-turning exposé of the global billionaire class, the “Davos Man,” and its hostile takeover of the world. Davos Man documents billionaires’ exploitation of the COVID19 pandemic, which turned “taxpayer-financed bailout packages into corporate welfare schemes.” This global billionaire class instrumentalized its power to conceal the truth by hiring lobbyists, PR managers, and journalists in media.

Furthermore, Goodman uncovers the concealed impacts of their oligarchic control reaching into every branch of society and modern life, from wages to housing, healthcare to everyday products and taxation. He argues that their systematic plunder ultimately destabilized democracy by widening wealth inequality, leaving governing systems vulnerable, and triggering the rise of anti-democratic nationalism. He provides the answer to the problem of wider context: how did the liberal democratic order become a breeding ground for the right-wing hate?

Goodman not only provides a vividly written description of the realm of the ultra-rich but more importantly the realities of those who are dissipated by their appropriation all around the world including accounts from a blue-collar worker in Buenos Aires, a Bangladeshi migrant in Qatar, a doctor in Seattle during the COVID19 pandemic, an African immigrant in Sweden, a textile manufacturer in Italy, and an Amazon warehouse employee in New York City. Davos Man is a must-read for those concerned about inequality, economic justice, the resilience of societies, democracy, and the great challenges of our time.

Peter S. Goodman, Davos Man: How the Billionaires Devoured the World (Custom House 2022) ISBN: 9780063078314, 472 pages

The anonymous leak of the Panama Papers in 2016 revealed millions of financial and legal documents that show how ultra-high-net-worth individuals hide their money using complex webs of offshore vehicles. How were these structures set and who plays a role?

Spiderweb Capitalism uncovers the shadow economy and the mechanics behind the illicit movement of wealth across borders through the invisible, complex networks of lawyers, accountants, company secretaries, and fixers.

Sociologist Kimberly Kay Hoang traveled the globe to follow the money through a web-like supersystem and conducted hundreds of in-depth interviews with these ultra-high-net-worth individuals, private wealth managers, fund managers, entrepreneurs, C-suite executives, bankers, auditors, and other financial professionals to find an answer.

Hoang reveals the strategies behind spiderweb capitalism and examines the moral dilemmas of making money in legal, financial, and political gray zones as she traces the flow of capital from offshore funds in places like the Cayman Islands, Samoa, and Panama to special-purpose vehicles and holding companies in Singapore and Hong Kong and risky markets in Vietnam and Myanmar. How are these smaller markets interconnected in a broader system of global capitalism?

Spiderweb Capitalism sheds critical light on how global elites capitalize on risky frontier markets.  Hoang argues that spiderweb capitalism explains the rapid rise of foreign capital in risky markets with low levels of trust and cooperation. Economic growth in such markets is a consequence of tightly embedded relations between the economic elite and political elites that result in a variety of corruptions.

Contrary to the “economic mantra that development can only occur in economies with a strong rule of law,” Spiderweb Capitalism shows a paradox of global economic growth sustained through states where the line separating the legal from the corrupt is not always clear. Hoang’s research further reveals that old paradigms like First World/Third World and Global North/Global South are no longer useful for framing the global economy.

Spiderweb Capitalism is a unique and worthwhile read, not only uncovering the dynamics of a global system of corruption but also the sociological backgrounds of playing in the grey.

Kimberly Kay Hoang, Spiderweb Capitalism: How Global Elites Exploit Frontier Markets (Princeton University Press 2022) ISBN: 9780691229119, 288 pages

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n Philanthrocapitalism and the Erosion of Democracy, activist Dr. Vandana Shiva compiles essays and articles from more than 20 authors and organizations to show how ruthless capitalistic exploitation branded as philanthropic altruism forges a direct path to global destruction. According to David Orr, philanthrocapitalists are those who “promise to solve hunger, disease, poverty, and a rapidly destabilizing climate often by selling us more of the same things that made them very rich,” which oftentimes ignores the root causes and inequities.

How do global capitalists wield philanthropy to monopolize and privatize land use, food production, and the public health sector effectively? Through various initiatives, suborganizations, development schemes, and funding mechanisms. The book points out that the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation’s empire, in particular, is an intricate network of power and influence solidified by targeted and well-financed PR campaigns to shape public opinion in pursuit of profit and market expansion.

Philanthrocapitalism and the Erosion of Democracy criticizes the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and similar organizations’ many privileged relationships with private companies, governments, and the World Health Organization that allow them exclusively to set the global agenda on health. The book argues that simplified solutions based on technical and scientific developments introduced by these organizations are often narrow in scope and remain insufficient in solving complex problems. Furthermore, they corrode the integrity of democratic institutions guised under a banner of future-oriented innovation.

Philanthrocapitalism and the Erosion of Democracy reveals the destructive power of overly capitalistic systems that enable mass human suffering and environmental catastrophe via the entanglement of private investment and public policy, and aims to bring forward democratic discussions about transparency, accountability, and inclusivity.

Vandana Shiva, Philanthrocapitalism and the Erosion of Democracy: A Global Citizen’s Report on the Corporate Control of Technology, Health, and Agriculture (Synergetic Press 2022) ISBN: 9780907791911, 240 pages

Robert H. Latiff’s Future Peace, a sequel to Future War, specifically brings to attention a subtle, yet potentially destructive effect of technologies such as autonomous systems, advanced weapons, and AI: the provocation to violence. Against the backdrop of the brewing power rivalry between the U.S. and its adversaries, technology aggregates tension and catalyzes violence.

Future Peace touches upon the ethical, security-related, behavioral, and technical aspects of technology and warfare. It consists of four chapters: “A Giant Armed Nervous System” (referring to the military), “Urge to Violence,” “Stumbling into War,” and “Avoiding War.”

Latiff’s book comes as a warning to practice caution when adopting new weapons technology, and aids in understanding human and technical behaviors to attenuate its harms and decrease the chances of war. Not only does technology make war easier and speedier, hence enabling the rush to war, but hinders human reasoning. Such technical changes make the process of sound judgement difficult; for example, thinking and acting in a diplomatic manner. Furthermore, these changes enhance the potential for human error to get out of hand.

Latiff argues that it is vitally important to avoid entering conflict in the first place. He highlights the importance of the cooperative efforts of many segments of society, from the public and technologists to militarists and decision-makers. He implies that it is criminal negligence to leave everything to automation processes or politicians. Therefore, Future Peace also lays out long to short term recommendations to maintain peace and reverse the rush to war.

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utonomous features are not a matter of the future; they have been used in warfare for years. However, it is quite evident that with the advancement of technology and the weaponization of artificial intelligence, autonomous weapons systems are swiftly adapting and becoming accepted.

As these changes emerge, the question that is often raised by international organizations such as the UN, which set the norms of conduct in an effort to control and regulate the use of autonomous weapons, is “How will human beings maintain control of the use of autonomous weapons?” In their study, Ingvild Bode and Hendrik Huelss flip the script to reveal another perspective of this dynamic.

Bode and Huelss aim to explain how testing, developing, and using weapons systems with autonomous features shapes ethical and legal norms, and how standards manifest and change in practice. The authors also examine the consequences of autonomous weapons for international relations.

Bode and Huelss acknowledge the fear and risks that these developments bring but adopt the approach that autonomous weapon systems may push people away from taking immediate decisions on the use of force as norms adapt to the appropriate use of force.

In short, Autonomous Weapons Systems and International Norms analyses the normative repercussions of weaponizing artificial intelligence by examining them not as tools used by the military but as shaping forces. Chapters include “Autonomous Weapons Systems and International Relations,” “New Technologies of Warfare: Emergence and Regulation,” “International Law, Norms, and Order,” “Norms in International Relations,” and “How Autonomous Weapons Systems Make Norms,” and contain assisting tables and figures.

As the trend and debate of autonomizing weapons systems continues, Autonomous Weapon Systems and International Norms equips the reader with an understanding of the relation of human-machine interaction and the process of integrating new technologies into war.

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n War Virtually, Roberto J. González takes the reader behind the scenes to expose how scientists, programmers, and engineers developed technologies that automate war, predict conflict, and regulate human thought and behavior. Does this sound utopian? Not so when you factor in the persistent drive to arm for virtual warfare. In this quest, data comes a valuable commodity.

González evaluates autonomous weapons, robotic systems, predictive modeling software, advanced surveillance programs, and psyops techniques. He examines the foundation of the latest version of warfare in order to explain how it has taken its current form through contemporary military operations and their high-tech and cultural underpinnings.

However, War Virtually transcends the design, innovative, and transformative aspects of technology and warfare, and touches upon human engineering. González reveals the relations between U.S. intelligence agencies and Big Tech, and its implications. It is no secret that algorithms construct behavioral models for anticipating or even predicting human behavior, and, therefore, all of us risk having our digital lives become part of the military-industrial economy.

Adopting a critical approach, González examines how the U.S. military is weaponizing technology and data for new kinds of warfare, and questions the notion that technological advancements will lead to more efficient and less destructive warfare. In fact, he implies that such an aspiration comes at a great cost, and argues that in this world, there is little room for hubris.

War Virtually covers a large array of topics including automated battlefield robotics, social scientists’ involvement in experimental defense research, the blurred line between political consulting and propaganda in the internet era, and the military’s use of big data to craft new counterinsurgency methods based on predicting conflict.

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n Proto-Algorithmic War, Stefka Hristova offers a unique perspective on the Iraq War and the history of algorithmic and digital logic that came to be a crucial element of today’s warfare. She examines the military policy of the United States going into the Iraq War: the U.S. approached the war with the logic of digital and emerging algorithmic technology alongside the preceding numerical logics of the British Mandate in Iraq. In a sense, the Iraq War became an experiment in the early stages of development and utilization of such technology in warfare, and moreover war culture.

Hristova provides a case study of a comparative historical framework reaching back to the quantification techniques harnessed during the era of Mandatory Iraq (1918-1932) and analyzes the parallels and diversions between the numerical logics in both cases.

The author further evaluates the logic that moved beyond the British mandate for Iraq and reduced culture, society, and the physical body and environment into visual data-driven, sterilized, reproducible warfare, highlighting that it lacked cultural and historical context. Indeed, the actual experience of the Iraq War resulted in massive-scale death and destruction.

Proto-Algorithmic War offers an insight into the digitization and automation of war. Hristova aptly scrutinizes the ways in which the Iraq War attempted and often failed to see and incorporate population and territory as digital and further proto-algorithmic entities.

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en Buchanan and Andrew Imbrie use fire as an analogy to showcase how AI has a dual nature: destructive and constructive. Just like our distant ancestors learning to operate their newly discovered, full of potential tool, our responsibility is to understand and use AI potential wisely. With AI revolutionizing the world, democracies have a responsibility to harness that power constructively and come out on top. Transformation is on its way—can humanity use AI to light the way? Or will the fire burn wildly and ignite a new type of war?

In The New Fire, Buchanan and Imbrie help us understand AI better by breaking it down into its “sparks,” which are data, algorithms, and computing power. They further explain the tangible and potentially destructive consequences of these sparks such as disinformation campaigns, new hacking tools, and military weapons.

On a larger scale, The New Fire shows the urgency of democracies to adapt to the powerful tool that is AI, as autocrats may use it for domestic centralized control and asymmetric advantages in combat. In that sense, they argue that harnessing the power of AI is crucial for holding democracy in balance in the world. The New Fire also acknowledges that democracies have a harder time adapting to the age of AI given ethical and civil concerns, but that new ways could be forged based on the advantages of democracy.

Drawing on examples from geopolitical competition and its analysis, Buchanan and Imbrie show how AI can work for democracy while respecting civil rights. In the age of AI, this crucial topic may determine the choice of course between war and peace.

Written by Dilara Özer

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he climate crisis has become a new reality the world can no longer ignore. For many, change is necessary. Aaron Saad draws attention to the simple slogan “System change, not climate change” often seen at climate marches. The nature and scope of change remains a persisting dispute, which often becomes an obstacle to finding a viable solution and taking action. Ideologies, or in other words, our perception of right and wrong, and consequently how the future should be shaped, have a profound effect on the kind of solutions we choose to impose.

In Worlds at Stake: Climate Politics, Ideology, and Justice, Saad intents to show readers the range of options on climate responses, familiarize readers with the landscape of climate politics necessary for critical evaluation of climate policies, and ignite the readers’ potential energy to contribute to collective political power by helping them find their place in the climate struggle.

Saad takes the reader on a critical journey by using an exploratory approach on differing ideologies and climate justice. By laying out the limits and reaches of each ideology comparatively, the book aids the reader in imagining the realities that the corresponding ideologies may lead to. Saad believes it is not enough to solve the climate problem with a certain response, but that we should also be choosing a response that in the process creates a desirable world.

The essential groundwork is laid in the first part of the book, where the author delves into the concepts of ideology and climate justice. Saad highlights the major role that ideology plays in climate politics, and provides an understanding of what ideologies are and how they work. The following two parts are split into categories of system-preserving and system-changing frameworks respectively, offering an insight into answering the question of whether it is an entire system change that is necessary.

Could the existing dynamics in the system be utilized, tweaked, and refined to serve a better future? The second part of the book consists of the chapters “Neoliberalism and the World-Saving Market,” which discusses using the market forces of capitalism in bringing about change, and “Right-Wing Ideology and Climate Change Denialism”, and “Geoengineering,” which addresses using technology on a large scale to control the Earth’s natural systems.

Or, is it time for more radical changes that shake the system to the core? In the third part of the book, Saad discusses “Social Democracy and a Green New Deal, “Degrowth,” which is about the abandonment of a growth-centered economy to preserve ecosystems from human pressures, and “Ecosocialism,” or dismantling capitalism and designing an egalitarian society based on human needs, harmonized with ecology.

In the final part, Saad focuses on the climate movement, its recent tactics, and how they might change the world. Ultimately, Saad addresses incorporating ways of taking action into the discussion. Worlds at Stake offers a unique perspective and comes as a breath of fresh air to those who grasp the urgency of climate action but may feel unfamiliar with the topic or don’t quite know where they stand yet.

Aaron Saad, Worlds at Stake: Climate Politics, Ideology, and Justice (Fernwood Publishing, 2022) ISBN: 9781773635644, 192 pages

The magic moment in the life of a victorious guerrilla insurgency comes when it finally seizes the capital of the state for which it has fought, often at great cost and for many years, and the shattered remnants of the old regime flee or surrender.

But what happens then? Can the movement transform itself at a stroke from an army into a government? If so, what kind of government will it form? How successfully can it achieve those objectives for which it had fought, and resolve the multiple problems that power brings with it? Why do some movements manage this transition far more successfully than others?

For a start, will the liberation movement be able to form a government at all? This is not normally a problem, since it will have at its back a victorious army, with the capacity to enforce its will that this brings with it. Where it is a problem, as in Somalia and South Sudan, this is invariably because the movement was itself divided, with deep underlying weaknesses, and won out more because of the failures of the incumbent regime than of any strengths of its own. When, as in Angola, Mozambique or Zimbabwe, there were rival would-be liberators, victory over that regime is likely to be followed by a vicious settling of accounts between them.

But for the great majority of successful liberation movements, victory brings with it an overwhelming sense of entitlement, which justifies (at least for its members) the unfettered exercise of power, not merely in the immediate aftermath of the transition, but for long into the future. The experience of liberation war becomes deeply entrenched in the minds of those who have fought it, who have risked their own lives in the struggle, and who have often seen their comrades die for the cause.

This becomes the defining moment that gives meaning to their lives, and even though they normally hold elections to provide a legitimizing basis for their government, and win them with overwhelming majorities, they did not gain power through the formalities of liberal democracy, and feel under no obligation to give it up, should elections go against them.

Opponents are regarded, not as legitimate competitors for government office, but rather as traitors to the sacred cause.

At the same time, running a government is an activity very different from fighting a liberation war, and the sudden transition from one to the other calls for a transformation not only in what fighters-turned-rulers have to do, but also in how they have to think. In the field, everything is subordinated to the single overwhelming objective of victory, and the different elements in the struggle, including economic and social policies as well as military affairs, have to be seen in that context.

Running a government is an activity very different from fighting a liberation war, and the sudden transition from one to the other calls for a transformation not only in what fighters-turned-rulers have to do, but also in how they have to think.

Government, however, is about choices and priorities. It involves balancing alternative goals and means to attain them, which cannot simply be reduced to a single overarching objective. It also calls for reconciling the interests and demands of different groups within the population, some of which will normally have been associated with the ousted regime, but nonetheless remain central to managing the state and the economy, regardless of who is in power.

This in turn requires political skills of a kind that do not come readily to leaders whose previous goal has been the uncompromising pursuit of victory, and whose first resort in attaining that goal has been military force.

One critical variable at this point is leadership, and though this is certainly an important element during the struggle, the demands on leaders are significantly changed in the aftermath of gaining control over a national government. For a start, the unity imposed on the liberation movement by the need to combine for a common goal gives way to complex policy debates that arise from alternative priorities.

It is rare indeed for divisions not to arise between factions within the movement, sometimes going well back into the period of the struggle but now exposed by the new kinds of decision that need to be made. These may be ideological, between ‘hard liners’ committed to the original uncompromising objectives of liberation and ‘compromisers’ willing to adapt pragmatically to the changed circumstances in which they now find themselves; they may be ethnic, as individuals coming from different regions or belonging to different groups cluster together for reasons of patronage or protection; or on occasion, they may simply be personal.

The collegiality and comradeship that forged in the struggle likewise come under strain as the leader starts to operate within the framework of a state, and in particular gains an access to the international system and the massive resources that this has to offer, that is denied to those lower down the hierarchy. The cultivation of good relations with the populations among whom the liberation war was fought gives way to a world of aid donors and summit meetings, in which external actors almost invariably associate the state with the individual who officially leads it.

Put simply, some leaders are just better at managing the transition from struggle to statehood than others, and though this rarely affects their ability to cling onto power, since this is a vital skill for anyone who rises to the top of an insurgency, it certainly affects how they use that power, and the kind of post-insurgent state that emerges as a result.

One striking contrast between leaders of neighboring states who achieved their victories at precisely the same moment but then sharply diverged separates Meles Zenawi in Ethiopia, a man of extraordinary intelligence who readily recognized the very different demands of running a complex state within a rapidly changing global system, and Isaias Afwerki in Eritrea, who remained locked within the mindset of a liberation fighter.

The problems of leadership are intensified by the fact that guerrilla warfare is a young man’s game (and not a woman’s game at all), with the result that once established, leaders may remain in power for a very long time.

Fidel Castro remained the effective ruler of Cuba for almost half a century after seizing power in 1959, while Yoweri Museveni, who on coming to power in Uganda in 1986 proclaimed that African leaders stayed in office for far too long, is still there thirty-five years later.

Prolonged liberation war, whether directed against colonial or settler regimes or against a domestic dictatorship, leaves an indelible mark on those states and societies that have experienced it. When the would-be liberators are themselves at odds, as in Somalia and South Sudan, or Liberia and Sierra Leone in West Africa, it carries terrifying dangers of state collapse.

More often it leads to powerful and militarized regimes, often with a highly personalized leadership, in which the prospects for transition to democracy are slight, and the legacy of past guerrilla struggle continues to wield a disproportionate influence. Rarely indeed, for the mass of the population, does deliver the ‘liberation’ that it promised.