On March 28-30, Turkey provided good offices to Russian and Ukrainian delegates in Istanbul. No doubt, one meeting is not enough to yield any tangible results such as a long-term ceasefire or a permanent peace agreement. Such developments in negotiations require more than a series of meetings between the parties of the conflict.

However, it is important for the two sides to talk while the war is ongoing, also given the fact that there is no other hope to end the war. Another factor is the existence of a third party to bring Russia and Ukraine together, and Ankara has earned this role.

It comes as no surprise that Turkey can mediate, facilitate, and provide good venues between Russia and Ukraine given its mutual trust-based relationship with both countries. While Turkey enjoys a long-term, high-level defense cooperation in engine and drone technology with Ukraine, it also enjoys long-term strategic energy cooperation with Russia in the oil, gas, and nuclear sectors. Turkey’s relations with Russia and Ukraine also cover the areas of trade, tourism, and other investments.

However, strong bilateral relations with Russia and Ukraine are not the only factor that have helped Turkey earn this position. There are other countries in the world enjoying similar bilateral relations with both Russia and Ukraine, but Turkey differentiates itself by its capacity to play a diplomatic role.

A unique neutrality

Turkey has carefully crafted a unique neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine war, and gained the confidence of both countries. While President Erdoğan called on NATO to take concrete action instead of merely uttering words to deter the Russian aggression, he also criticized practices such as firing a Russian conductor in Germany and banning Russian literary works in Italy in the name of sanctions against Russia.

Likewise, despite condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine in strong terms, which was perfectly in line with Turkey’s long-held position on the annexation of Crimea, Ankara did not join in the chorus of imposing sanctions against Russia as a matter of principle. When the war started, instead of jumping on the bandwagon of the U.S.-led Western campaign to hurt Russia, and despite being a NATO member and under pressure from its allies, Turkey made its own way.

Even at the expense of paying a price, Turkey strives to adhere to its principle-based position for the sake of preserving its consistency in foreign policy and the trust it enjoys with its partners. Over the years, Turkey’s approach to sanctions against Russia has been a case in point. Furthermore, one of the central issues surrounding the Black Sea security and the war in Ukraine is the role of the Turkish Straits. As expected, Turkey remained committed to the Montreux Convention by blocking the passage of four Russian warships.

Turkish economic calculations

In fact, even a rumor in Turkey about a shortage of sunflower oil caused temporary panic buying. Since Turkey is struggling with high-level of inflation, the issue became sensitive enough that it had to negotiate the release of Turkish commercial ships carrying sunflower oil that had been stuck in the Sea of Azov.

The Russia-Ukraine war is hitting Turkey where it hurts most: the economy. The war has already driven up energy prices and this means a greater current deficit for Turkey as an energy-dependent country, as well as across the board price increases. For the fiscal year 2022, both lower energy prices and a huge tourism turnout are vital for the Turkish economy, which is in need of a vast amount of foreign currency.

Tourism is one of the leading sources of foreign currency for Turkey, and both Russian and Ukrainian tourists contribute immensely to the Turkish tourism sector. It is obvious that it would be a luxury for people whose countries are at war to travel for leisure. Thus, Turkey badly needs the war to end.

Because of its neutrality, credibility, and its extremely high stakes in the war, Turkey is well-positioned to pave the way for peace in Ukraine. That’s why relatively considerable advancements have occurred in Turkey such as the first direct meeting between Lavrov and Kuleba in Antalya, and the Russian decision to scale back military engagement in Kyiv and Chernihiv as a result of the talks in Istanbul.

It is certain that the Russian move to downscale its military engagement in Ukraine is nothing more than a tactical step; however, even the declaration of such a gesture is a success for Turkey, given the level of humility it takes from an extremely proud man like Putin.

Whether he is aware of it or not, what Putin urgently needs is an “honourable exit” as offered by Erdoğan—and Putin knows no one who is more reliable and trustworthy than Erdoğan. If one day, the Russia-Ukraine war ends with a declaration made in Turkey, it shouldn’t be surprising.

Following the United Nations Resolution 181, also known as the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine, on November 29, 1947, which called for establishing two states in Palestine, an Arab and a Jewish one, the only fact that has materialized on the ground today is a Jewish state for Israeli Jews. The Palestinian people are still struggling to build their own state 73 years down the road, living today as a diaspora, in refugee camps in neighboring countries, or in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with almost no rights.

Palestinians rejected the UN Partition Plan in 1947 because it gave Jews, most of whom were migrants and who made 33% of the population and owned nearly 6% of the land, 55% of Mandatory Palestine, while it gave Palestinians, who made 77% of the native population and owned 94% of the land, 45% of it. Jerusalem was designed as an international zone.

According to this UN plan, the rights of the native population, including their cultural and political rights, should not be harmed. Yet, what happened was the exact opposite: the majority of Palestinians became refugees and the newly established Jewish state took over 78% of the land.

Palestinians who remained in the Gaza Strip fell under Egyptian control and those who remained in the West Bank fell under Jordanian control. The Palestinian state was never established in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank because Palestinians, many of whom were refugees from what became Israel, never believed that Palestine is only the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

The discourse of major Palestinian political parties and later, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), following the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, was about establishing a democratic state in Mandatory Palestine where Muslims, Christians, and Jews would live in peace. This is still the official program of some leftist Palestinian parties such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).

The Palestinian state was never established in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank because Palestinians, many of whom were refugees from what became Israel, never believed that Palestine is only the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

The failure to materialize a one-state solution in Palestine meant that the PLO would adopt a stance that is more willing to accept a two-state solution. This is especially true with the Palestinian Declaration of Independence proclaimed in Algiers in 1988, which called for establishing a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders, namely the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

With a Palestinian population of five million in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and nearly 1.8 million in Israel, Palestinians have become the majority between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean. All attempts to erase the existence and identity of Palestinians have failed, and Israel today, considering its refusal of the two-state solution – which was born dead anyway – is faced with one reality: apartheid, where the minority governs the majority.

With a Palestinian population of five million in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and nearly 1.8 million in Israel, Palestinians have become the majority between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean.

Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas, whose presidency term ended in 2009, warned Israel during the 76^th UN General Assembly that an apartheid one-state reality is emerging in Palestine/Israel, and that if the latter does not end its military occupation of the Palestinian territories in one year, the PLO will withdraw its recognition of Israel.

“Circumstances on the ground will inevitably impose equal and full political rights for all on the land of historical Palestine, within one state,” he said. Neither Israel nor the majority of Palestinians take Abbas’s declarations seriously, and polls suggest his popularity is at its lowest levels.

The truth is that engaging with Israel in peace talks by counting on its goodwill gestures alone was a strategic mistake by the PLO in the first place. Israel has only utilized these negotiations and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority to advance its expansion plans, and to claim before the whole world that it is not an occupying power and that the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are “disputed territories.” Not only this, the PLO’s entry into peace talks with Israel has created a serious Palestinian political rift that Palestinians are yet to recover from.

The PLO should correct its strategic mistake of 1993 and call on all Palestinians, regardless of their location, to adopt a struggle on the premises of achieving equal rights. In practical terms, this includes Palestinians in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian diaspora, and those living in today’s Israel.

This struggle by definition includes the demand that all Palestinian refugees be allowed to return back – including to what is today Israel. This approach also means that Palestinians should be treated and act based on the notion that they are a unified collective that see their shared future together regardless of the divisions imposed on them, be they geographic or political.

Without a shadow of a doubt, calling for equal rights in Palestine means establishing one state that includes Israeli Jews who wish to live in peace. As time has proven, any other solution that ignores the historical injustices against the Palestinians and the question of Palestinian refugees is doomed to fail.

Today, Gaza’s population has hit the 2.25 million milestone, and in the third quarter of this year alone, 15,216 Palestinian babies were born in the Gaza Strip. The situation in Palestine is unsustainable and it is only a matter of time before things run out of hand. Then, it might be too late for Israel to keep Palestinians under control, because investing in apartheid is not a winning strategy.

Young Palestinians should take the initiative to give life to the aging political parties and leadership, and make sure that their voices are heard. Once they have embraced the younger generations, these aging Palestinian political parties and leaders should adopt a unified strategy based on calling for the granting of full rights to Palestinians and allowing refugees to return back to their homes and towns, based on UN Resolution 194.

This means that a one-state reality in Palestine, completely free of apartheid, is the only way out. Given that this is materializing anyway on the ground thanks to Israeli policies which are replete with apartheid, it seems a matter of time before Palestinians adopt a one-state solution approach with equal rights as the way forward.

On April 27-29, the foreign ministers of Turkey, Greece and Britain joined Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders in Geneva to discuss the future of the so-called Cyprus Problem. As promised, the Turkish Cypriot side, led by President Ersin Tatar, submitted a plan that envisions a two-state solution for Cyprus – a message very much different from the one presented by his predecessor Mustafa Akinci the last time the two sides convened for talks in Crans Montana some four years ago. To no surprise, the informal meetings concluded with no common ground to proceed with formal talks, with the prospect of any solution to the Cyprus Problem appearing further away than ever.

Back in 2017, both sides were in agreement with regards to the framework for negotiations. Both were touting a bizonal, bicommunal federal (BBF) solution that would have seen an autonomous Turkish Cypriot entity officially established in the island’s north, and an equally autonomous Greek Cypriot entity in the south. The two sides would have been ruled under a joint, rotational presidency while each side would maintain control over their respective internal affairs. Land swaps and compensation payments would have likely occurred to settle territorial disputes that arose when Cyprus was divided during a Turkish military intervention which came as a response to a Greek-inspired coup in 1974. Furthermore, a joint committee would have been established to ensure the equal sharing of the island’s natural resources.

There was strong momentum on both sides in the lead-up to those talks, which many considered to be the closest the two sides had ever come to a compromise, especially as all three guarantor powers – Britain, Turkey and Greece – had approved of these UN-endorsed proposals. But alas, it wasn’t to be, as the issue of guarantors itself became a point of contention.

There are conflicting reports as to why exactly the talks broke down in 2017. Some suggest that the Greek Cypriot side had insisted on tearing up the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, which grants the three guarantors conditional rights to militarily intervene in Cyprus. This was a demand the Turkish Cypriots were unwilling to accept. Other reports, however, suggest that Turkey was happy to negotiate a gradual withdrawal of Turkish troops from the island.

But instead of this concession being welcomed by Greek Cypriot leader Nicos Anastasiades, it was surprisingly rejected, much to the abhorrence of diplomats and observers who attended the talks. More detailed narrations about what happened in Crans Montana even suggest that Anastasiades himself indicated that he’d be open to discuss a two-state solution after Greek Cypriot elections in 2018.

Ersin Tatar has argued that a two-state solution is now the only way forward for Cyprus after 47 years of division.

Needless to say, the outcome of the Crans Montana talks rendered then-Turkish Cypriot leader Mustafa Akinci redundant. For many Turkish Cypriots, the collapse of these negotiations was the last straw, and in October 2020, they elected Ersin Tatar into office. Unlike his pro-reunification predecessor, Tatar vowed to put forward a case for a permanent division of the island, with the currently unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) officially giving up on the UN-backed federal plan.

Tatar has argued that a two-state solution is now the only way forward for Cyprus after 47 years of division, not to mention the additional 11 years since Turkish Cypriots were forced to boycott the once shared Republic of Cyprus parliament due to Greek Cypriot violations of the 1960 constitution. He also claims that a two-state solution would solve many of the ongoing problems between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots, and would allow them to establish warm diplomatic ties that would not only prove mutually beneficial to both communities on the island, but would likewise bring about greater prosperity to the entire Eastern Mediterranean.

Challenges to peace in Cyprus

President Tatar however has thus far failed to explain exactly how he plans to gain international recognition for the TRNC. He has repeatedly recited a timeline of unfortunate events to argue that Turkish Cypriots deserve sovereign equality, but even Turkish Cypriots themselves are not entirely convinced by his moral standpoint.

However, a lack of cooperation from the Greek Cypriot side would not necessarily spell ‘Game Over’ for the Turkish Cypriot campaign for recognition. As was recently seen in the Balkans, Serbia’s non-recognition of its breakaway neighbor Kosovo did not stop half of the world’s nations recognizing it as a separate state. Even EU member states were left divided over the recognition of Kosovo, and to this day five of the bloc’s 27 members do not recognize it.

When one looks at the Caucasus, the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia enjoy limited international recognition despite Georgia still claiming ownership of the enclaves. So, what have these states done right that the TRNC has thus far failed to do? Well, one thing that these nations have in common is that they all have at least one ally in the UN Security Council.

In the 37 years that the TRNC has been a self-declared independent state, it has only ever had one ally – Turkey. Pakistan and Bangladesh briefly recognized the TRNC in 1983, but they were quickly forced to back down after coming under international pressure. Despite its growing global influence, Turkey to this day has not been able to exercise enough soft power to get others onboard. So naturally, the Turkish Cypriots are looking for an ally in the UNSC to back their position – and what better an ally than Britain?

Lobby Efforts

Besides being a guarantor power in Cyprus, Britain, unlike the other four UNSC members, is home to a significantly large Turkish Cypriot diaspora. Census results are yet to be confirmed, but some estimates put the number of Turkish Cypriots in the UK as high as 400,000 – possibly three times more than the Turkish Cypriots living in the TRNC. A large proportion of Turkish Cypriots in Britain are British-born.

They hold British citizenship, speak English fluently, and some even hold influential positions. Many also maintain strong links to their homeland, and the majority can be considered to be relatively more conservative than their relatives back in Cyprus. They are perfectly placed to lobby local MPs to support the TRNC in the UK Parliament and even fight for wider Turkish causes such as Turkey’s military operations in northern Syria against the PKK, as well as Turkey’s maritime disputes with Greece in the Aegean. But again, it isn’t that simple.

There are believed to be just as many Greek Cypriots living in the UK as there are Turkish Cypriots, and both communities largely reside in the same constituencies as each other. The Turkish Cypriots in the UK therefore struggle to lobby their local MPs without being challenged by what is an arguably better organized, better funded and less polarized Greek Cypriot lobby.

It is also very difficult for British Turkish Cypriots to cooperate and coordinate their efforts with the migrant community from Turkey, firstly because of a lack of communication and understanding between them, and secondly because the mainland Turkish community is dominated by supporters of the HDP, which is claimed to have organic links to the PKK. Many of the migrants from Turkey to Britain prefer not to identify themselves as Turks, but rather as Alevis and/or Kurds, and they feel no affiliation with the Turkish Cypriot cause. As a result, Turkish Cypriots have only been able to elicit the support of a few politicians from a handful of constituencies that host a relatively uncontested community of Turkish Cypriots.

It seems, therefore, that the TRNC is not going to get Britain onside through lobby efforts alone. The TRNC is going to have to appeal to Britain’s sense of self by focusing on its geopolitical interests. A bottom-up approach through grassroots campaigning might be futile, but if the Turkish Cypriots can convince Britain that its own interests lie in recognizing the TRNC, a top-down strategy might stir enough MPs to switch allegiances.

There are already some big names who have signed up for the two-state solution, including former Foreign Secretary Jack Straw from the Labour Party, and former Conservative Party leader Iain Duncan Smith. The number of Turkish Cypriot allies in the British government could increase if the Turkish Cypriots are able to channel their voice through international bodies such as NATO so that they can be heard by strategic decision-makers in Britain’s security and intelligence circles. They would of course need Turkey’s help to do this.

Brexit Fever

There’s no guarantee that the aforementioned strategy would work, but it is certainly the right time to try. Britain has just exited the EU, and with Brexit fever still in the air, the UK and the EU are finding themselves increasingly at loggerheads with each other. Britain has two sovereign military bases in Cyprus – Dhekelia and Akrotiri. These bases are vital for securing British interests in the Middle East. But as the EU’s stranglehold on the Republic of Cyprus tightens and Britain’s influence in Cyprus becomes evermore irrelevant, the security of those bases comes under even greater threat.

Gone are the post-Cold War days where Western hegemony in the region was kept together by the United States. As the U.S. shows less and less interest in Mediterranean and its surroundings, a power vacuum is opening up into which various players are attempting to step in. France has particularly taken advantage of tensions between Turkey and Greece over hydrocarbon drilling to boost their presence in the area.

With its strategy in North Africa in tatters and its bases in Lebanon exposed to the dangers of what some may say is already a failed state, France is desperate to consolidate its standing in the region, and is doing so by riding the wave of European solidarity with Greece and the Greek Cypriots. France may even want to eclipse or replace Britain in Cyprus, a move that would leave Britain entirely dependent on Europe when it comes to securing its interests in the Middle East. This would leave Britain with no choice but to side with Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots to counter French attempts to wrestle its way to regional dominance.

But the question is, is Britain ready to take such an assertive stance? Sure, Britain will take any opportunity available to improve its relations and cooperation with Turkey, as recent trade deals between the two have indicated, but that doesn’t necessarily mean that it is prepared to go against the EU and its members so directly, at least not unless France’s hidden agenda becomes more overt. For the time being, there are just way too many geopolitical risks involved for Britain to challenge EU foreign policy in an aggressive manner.

The Biden Era and Cyprus Peace Talks

At the moment, Britain is grappling with its own domestic issues, primarily the economic downturn brought about by the coronavirus pandemic, as well as a lack of strong political leadership. Britain is also unclear about where it stands with its closest ally, the U.S. Former U.S. president Donald Trump was in no way a friend of the EU, and Brexit took place in a political climate of Trumpism, or neo-transatlanticism, as well as euroscepticism.

Moreover, even though relations between Turkey and the U.S. dropped to all-time lows while Trump was in charge, Trump as an individual was considered to be relatively more sympathetic to Turkey than others in his administration. But now that Joe Biden has taken over as U.S. president, the mood has changed.

In the U.S., the Democrats are seen as being more friendly to the EU than the Republicans are. Biden is therefore more likely to have a better relationship with his French counterpart Emmanuel Macron in comparison to the rocky relationship shared between Macron and Trump. Biden has also made no secret of his enmity towards Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his administration, having started off his presidency by giving Ankara a dose of silent treatment before then recognizing the so-called Armenian Genocide of 1915.

Britain may have freed itself from the strings of the EU, but in the era of Joe Biden, how far the UK can take its relationship with Turkey will be limited by U.S.-EU relations. Without firm assurances from the U.S., Britain cannot even begin dreaming of taking moves as bold as recognizing the TRNC to spite the EU.

TRNC and Limited Recognition

For now, it seems that Britain will continue to uphold a neutral stance when it comes to the Cyprus peace talks. As was demonstrated during the latest meetings in Geneva, Britain will remain committed to the UN-backed peace plan and, in the vague words of British Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab, will continue to urge both sides to use “creativity and flexibility” in talks – whatever that’s supposed to mean. Britain remains aloof and uninterested in Turkish Cypriot demands for equal sovereignty, no matter how much they kick and scream about how much they deserve it.

To the contrary, instead of punishing the Greek Cypriots for their part in keeping the Turkish Cypriots internationally isolated for half a century, Britain continues to boost its diplomatic, trade and military cooperation with the Republic of Cyprus. Rather than risk having their bases in Cyprus shut down by the Greek Cypriot government, Britain prefers to earn its keep by constantly reaffirming its ties with Nicosia and reminding them of Britain’s strategic and economic relevance to the island.

If the TRNC is to get any kind of international recognition, it seems like it’ll have to do so without the backing of any UNSC members. The TRNC is completely dependent on Turkey exercising whatever influence it has in the international arena if it is to gain even limited recognition. This leaves only a handful of countries who may opt to take the leap of faith and establish ties with the TRNC – Azerbaijan being the main, and perhaps only one. But Turkey must be careful not to invite too many guests to the party, especially countries that can easily be swayed by the EU to become gateways of foreign interference in Turkish Cypriot politics, lest these nations work to undermine Turkey’s own interests in the TRNC. That includes non-EU states that currently have good relations with Turkey but are susceptible to being coerced by Brussels into becoming EU vassals.

In this writer’s humble opinion, asides from Azerbaijan, other potential candidates to recognize the TRNC include Turkmenistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Somalia, Nigeria, Venezuela, Cuba, Libya and – perhaps as a real game-changer – Qatar. But that being said, the Turkish Cypriots will have their work cut out for them when it comes to convincing these nations to step out of their comfort zone for the sake of an estimated 150,000 people living on one-third of a semi-arid rock in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Q. In your book, Reconciliation and Social Healing in Afghanistan (2017), you shed light on the different attempts of peace-building in Afghanistan, particularly during the 1980s and the 1990s. What was different back then and why does it matter today?

The National Reconciliation Policy (NRP) was adopted in 1986 under the leadership of my father, Najibullah, and his government. At the international level, as the Cold War reached its peak, the NRP started gaining momentum in light of Perestroika. The new leadership in the Soviet Union was keen to end their “bleeding wound,” which is how they referred to their war in Afghanistan. The Soviet leadership under Mikhail Gorbachev was determined to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan and found a natural ally in the cadres of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), who supported the idea of an independent, free, neutral, and sovereign Afghanistan.

Hence, the NRP as an evolving process was composed of international instruments such as the Geneva Accords in 1988 and the UN Five-Point Peace Plan in 1991. Recognizing the role of Pakistan in backing the Mujahideen groups, the Geneva Accords ensured an agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and Pakistan with the Soviet Union and the United States as guarantors, which is still binding.

Q. Regarding past and present approaches to peace in Afghanistan, are there any major challenges that have persisted to this day?

The conflict in Afghanistan has been ongoing for more than 40 years. The division lines are no longer only ideological like they were during the Cold War, they are also ethnic and religious. The illegal trade of arms, drugs, and precious stones has also created strong and deep-rooted networks of criminals that also feed the conflict.

While the Geneva Accords guaranteed the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, they failed to achieve their main purpose of non-intervention and non-interference between two neighbors. Additionally, the agreement could not prevent the continuation of arms supplies from regional countries such as Saudi Arabia to the Mujahideen despite the two superpowers agreeing not to supply arms to their benefactors.

Q. What were the major loopholes in previous approaches to peace in Afghanistan in terms of their design and implementation?

The main loopholes of the peace process of the 1980s-1990s include: the lack of consensus amongst regional countries and the main conflict stakeholders in Afghanistan, the continued supply of arms to different parties in the absence of an international legal mechanism to oversee disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and the end of the war despite the government’s call and eagerness for such a mechanism to be established, the lack of accountable mechanisms on the part of the guarantors, the lack of independent, neutral monitoring mechanisms overseeing and documenting the developments and implementation of the accords/peace process, the refusal of the Security Council upon the request of the Afghan government to provide peacekeeping troops for the duration of the interim government until the elections took place and the continuing double games by the Afghan conflict stakeholders vis-à-vis their geopolitical interests.

Q. In this respect, how do you evaluate the continuing peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban in Qatar, Russia, and later in Turkey?

The current peace talks started with a lot of optimism in 2017; however, the process proved to have shortcomings in terms of following through. For example, the two-year process leading to the Doha Agreement excluded the Afghan government from negotiations and reduced its position to a passive observer while legitimizing the Taliban as a political group. The process was not transparent – neither the Afghan government nor the Afghan people know the so-called secret annexes of the Doha Agreement.

The mediator in negotiating peace, i.e., the United States, remains as one of the main conflict stakeholders in Afghanistan. The meeting in Moscow confirmed the fact that the participating countries and the stakeholders from outside and inside Afghanistan did not want the re-establishment of the Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan.

Q. How do you think the perspectives of the Taliban and the Afghan government can be reconciled so as to bring peace to Afghanistan?

The parties need to see the commonalities in their positions and desires for a shared future in their country. Currently, positions of power dominate the discussions and the focus is on who will be the winners or the losers. It is a tit-for-tat moment in which the Taliban want to assert themselves as the winners of the war against the U.S. and the Afghan government.

What is common between the Taliban and the Afghan government is their desire for power; however, it must be explored if their wishes for a ceasefire, disarmament, integration of their forces into the Afghan security forces, truth commission, and other forms of transitional justice can be shared. Unless the two sides show flexibilities in moving away from their explicit and implicit “red-lines”, meaningful engagement ending in a peace agreement will not materialize.

I believe that the U.S. asked Turkey to host the conference not only because Turkey is a NATO member, but also because of its unique position as an Islamic country in the region and its historical friendship with Afghanistan.

In addition, reconciliation between the two sides will not be possible unless the Taliban get out of the influence of Pakistani security establishment. This can only be possible when the fuel for fighting is extinguished by the regional and the global powers providing guarantees for a ceasefire, peacekeeping forces, and no-interference and non-intervention on the part of the regional stakeholders.

Q. How should the international community approach the peace resolutions in Afghanistan?

The way the international community can approach the peace process is to stand by the Afghan democratic institutions and design a multilayered mechanism whereby guarantees must be made including peacekeeping forces for the upcoming years, which will allow the Afghan government to build consensus through democratic means, develop its economy, and give voice to the marginalized.

Islam was, is, and will remain the main religion of Afghanistan, the way Islam is the main religion in Turkey, but Muslim countries can also adopt progressive, democratic visions for their citizens instead of promoting religious extremism or handing power to such extremist religious groups. Afghanistan can find this balance if its current institutions are safeguarded, and international guarantees end the proxy wars.

So far, every conference about the future of Afghanistan that has been held since Bonn 2001 has brought together elites that have negotiated their way to power instead of bringing people-centered issues to the agenda such as transitional justice, a truth commission, the demands of the victims of the war, DDR, the rights of women, and, above all, the sovereignty and unity of Afghanistan as a nation.

Q. You have just highlighted the importance of the efforts to bring a people-centered vision into the existing approaches to peace in Afghanistan. Could you elaborate on this?

In my book, Reconciliation and Social Healing in Afghanistan: A Transrational and Elicitive Analysis towards Transformation, I have analyzed at length how countries that have embarked on a peace process have established countrywide mechanisms to engage with non-governmental organizations, civil society, and people impacted by war at the social, economic, and political levels.

Najibullah’s government had established a successful mechanism called the “National Reconciliation Commission” that was present with offices and staff at the district level. However, they did not have time on their side and were in a constant state of emergency. Today, Afghanistan is in a worse situation because it lacks a nationwide peace structure, mechanism, and narrative. The government’s efforts in this process are neither people-centric, strategic, or inclusive.

Q. What role do you think civil society and women can play in the peace process?

The role women groups and civil society have in Afghanistan is key in bringing sustainable reconciliation because women have been the survivors of the 40 years of Afghan conflict. They often bring issues to the table that are related to their survival and the future of their children, i.e., the future generations of Afghanistan. Therefore, their inclusion on the negotiation table is a necessity for peace.

Since the start of the intra-Afghan negotiations on September 12, 2020, there is a genuine excitement among ordinary Afghans regarding peace talks and a possible reconciliation with the Taliban. The high level of optimism is partly driven by the fact that the U.S. and the international community are supporting the peace negotiations. On matters that allow it, the international community, led by the U.S., has been persuading both sides to offer a compromise to speed up the reconciliation process and end the tragic war in Afghanistan.

It is important to note that the United States’ role as a global power has been crucial in the intra-Afghan negotiations. Previously, the U.S. had no intention to engage directly with the Taliban and similarly the Taliban refused to negotiate with the Kabul government, considering it a puppet regime. The result has been a deadly stalemate and prolongation of a senseless war.

However, all sides of the conflict in Afghanistan are talking now, which is a very encouraging sign for peace and reconciliation in the war-ravaged country. One clear issue is that the Afghan conflict has no military solution. Fortunately, the U.S. has realized this vital fact. Most American generals, politicians, and military analysts agree that the Afghan conflict is in a stalemate with no military solution in sight.

Most American military leaders like retired U.S. Army Brigadier General Don Bolduc agree that it would be hard for the Kabul government to survive in the case of a U.S. pullout. Another positive development is that the Biden administration appears to be eager to find a political solution to the Afghan conflict.

On the other hand, to convince Biden to withdraw U.S. forces fully from Afghanistan and to honor the U.S.-Taliban Doha Agreement, the Taliban’s leadership on February 16, 2021 issued an open letter addressed to the American people. In this letter, the Taliban called on Washington to remain fully committed to the agreement that was reached in Qatar a year ago and paved the way for ongoing intra-Afghan peace talks.

In fact, the intra-Afghan negotiation which started on September 12, 2020 in Doha, Qatar seemed a failed attempt to find an agreed solution to the current Afghan war. In five months of consecutive talks, the Taliban and the Afghan government were not able to move forward with solving the current dilemma of Afghanistan. Here is why.

The intra-Afghan negotiations in Doha were not instigated according to the expected schedule, but even with their late commencement, so far, the Taliban and the Afghan government have only been able to work on the agenda of the dialogue. In addition, the talks were later affected by the results of U.S. elections which were won by the Democrats and which saw Joe Biden elected as the president of the United States.

In fact, both the Afghan government and the Taliban used delaying tactics to wait for the new U.S. foreign policy regarding the Afghan peace process. The United States’ new government announced that the Doha Agreement will be reviewed and reevaluated.

This announcement apparently indicated that the agreement may face challenges. As a result, the Taliban retreated from the talks and visited countries like Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, Pakistan, and even Russia while the delegation of the Afghan government was still in Qatar.

Recently, the Taliban political representatives in Doha have admitted that the monopoly of power is not a solution to the current stalemate. They have been willing to share power with other political groups inside Afghanistan. The Taliban have been in contact with various political groups in Afghanistan to work together on a post-peace plan for Afghanistan.

On March 18, the delegates of Afghan political groups including the Afghan government and the Taliban attended the “Troika” conference in Moscow. The one-day conference was part of larger efforts by regional powers to reach peace between Afghan political groups, the government, and the Taliban.

The conference aimed to attract regional support for the Afghan peace process and make Afghans discuss the current political and military stalemate.

The Taliban once more emphasized that the U.S. should honor the Doha Agreement and withdraw by May 1, 2021; they claimed that if Afghans sit around a table, they can easily find a solution to the current crisis in their country.

On the other hand, in March 2021, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken sent a letter to Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah who leads the High Council for National Reconciliation (HCNR) in which he signaled displeasure at the slow pace of peace negotiations.

Colm Quinn, a foreign policy journalist, rightly reports that the letter indicates three ways for future endeavors to bring peace to Afghanistan: to “move matters more fundamentally and quickly” towards peace, holding ministerial-level talks between representatives from Russia, China, Pakistan, Iran, and India together with the United States to discuss a “unified approach”; a senior-level meeting between the Taliban and the Afghan government hosted by Turkey to take place “in the coming weeks”; and a proposal to implement a 90-day reduction in violence intended to prevent a spring offensive by the Taliban.

A peaceful outcome for Afghanistan can only be reached with a deal between the Taliban and the remaining Afghan political parties including the Afghan government. The upcoming conference in Turkey plays an important role in putting an end to the conflict in Afghanistan and the United States.

Under U.S. President Biden, the Americans will support diplomacy, even if the ultimate goal of the U.S. national security strategy is to ensure that Afghanistan never becomes a safe haven for terrorists to attack the United States. In addition to the aforementioned conditions in Blinken’s leaked letter to Ghani and Abdullah, the Taliban is asking the U.S. to release their remaining prisoners, estimated at 7,000, and remove them off its blacklist.

Similarly, the American public is sick and tired of the Afghan war. Recent public surveys show that most Americans want U.S. forces out of Afghanistan. Among the American veterans, almost 70% favor the U.S. forces withdrawing from Afghanistan.

On the Afghan side, the desire for peace is obvious. Afghans have suffered enormously during the past 20 years of conflict. Almost, all Afghans across the country support peace negotiations with the Taliban.

Fortunately, there is growing regional support for a negotiated settlement. U.S. special envoy to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad’s trip to Pakistan, Russia demonstrated that Pakistan and Moscow and other regional countries will cooperate with the U.S. and Afghans regarding the intra-Afghan peace talks with the Taliban in Turkey. This is a sign of the region’s commitment to assist all Afghan parties to end the senseless war.

More than 60% of Afghanistan’s population is below the age of 30 as per the report by the International Organization for Migration. Thus, the role and responsibility of the Afghan youth within the context of the peace process cannot be ignored. The Afghan youth must be part of the process and must be consulted.

Finally, Afghans have a historical perspective. In their recent history of winning a war and losing peace, they have experienced both the Geneva Accords in 1988 and the Bonn Conference in 2001. Afghans and their representatives in Kabul know that if they don’t participate in the conference on Afghanistan in Turkey, foreign powers will chart their destiny. They know that if they don’t take charge of events, foreign powers (international and regional) will form a government which will not be in their best interests. Together, let’s make 2021 the year of peace for Afghans and Afghanistan.

Mullah Fazal, a leader of the Taliban, and Abdul Rashid Dostum confronted a verbal clash when Mullah Fazal called Dostum a “traitor” and “killer” during the Moscow conference on Afghanistan last week. Russia hosted a two-day summit on Afghan peace with the participation of Afghanistan (Taliban and the government), China, Pakistan, and the United States. Another higher-level international conference is set to occur in Ankara next month to quest a political solution to the Afghan conflict.

Amid these peace talks, Afghans are worried about the future of Afghanistan and their destiny whether the Taliban and the Afghan government peace negotiations would prevail. The concerns also include the retaliations between influential Afghans and former commanders who had fought each other for several years; if they would reconcile or the country would descend to another civil war.

Here are the three scenarios:

Scenario 1: Peace negotiations produce a flawed compromise.

The Taliban’s vowed Islamic system is entrenched as a so-called inclusive government where the Taliban would have more power. The Taliban would filter politicians and some government officials before merging them into an inclusive government. As a result, U.S. troops will withdraw from Afghanistan. Later, the Taliban would rectify the Afghanistan constitution and will bring dramatic amendments to it, which might not be acceptable to some of the castes and political parties. The revision will include adding and exercising fastidious Islamic law placing restrictions on women’s liberty, free media, public speech, and music which is already prohibited under the territory of the Taliban control.

This might create social and political disorder, and in the absence of strong security forces, the country will lead to vast insurrections. Since the Taliban have already vowed they would restore Islamic rule, it would raise the concerns and voices of the national and international human rights organizations over the rights of women and freedom of speech. The international community’s assistance is mostly contingent on human rights.

Thus, the international aid to Afghanistan would dry, and the Taliban (future government of Afghanistan) will not be able to carry the high costs of its military, which is currently $3.75 billion annually, to fight any future resistances against their administration. In addition, the Taliban would not recognize new titles given to their former foes with whom they have fought for several years. This includes deceased commander Ahmad Shah Masoud as the national hero of Afghanistan and Abdul Rashid Dostum as Marshal, who is also the leader of the Uzbeks in Afghanistan. This would create fractions, and resistances would emerge in different corners of Afghanistan.

Scenario 2: Peace talks fail

The peace talks would break when the parties stand on their ego, increase violence in order to gain more on the negotiation table, or run the talks based on pure sharia law. The Taliban will try to take power by force and will engage in a heavy fight with the national security forces across the country. A senior Taliban official told CBC News the Taliban’s options in Afghanistan. He stated, “at the moment the U.S. and Afghan governments have no plan B, only the Taliban have a plan A and B. Our plan A is a peaceful political solution, and Plan B, definitely a military takeover.”

Scenario 3: Peace negotiations prevail.

Taliban and the Afghan government produce satisfactory outcomes of the talks and agree upon forming a government acceptable to all parties. Both parties show flexibility and give sacrifices. For instance, the Taliban agree to equal power-sharing rather than surpassing. In addition, they abstain from implementing Sharia law; however, both sides’ demands are met to a possible extent which would lead to a win-win situation. The deal will also include a perpetual ceasefire that the Afghans yearn for for several years and would move toward strengthening the security forces and building a strong state.

In this scenario, the prospective government would decide about its relationship with the international community and the support of the US and NATO to the future government of Afghanistan. In this scenario, the Taliban and Afghan government deal would not bring nationwide peace. The low-in-rank commanders and militants would not accept the deal unless the Taliban are fully in power and the Sharia law is exercised in Afghanistan. Therefore, these militants would remerge under a different flag and brand with the patrons of some neighbor intelligence.

Last week, in an interview with Vice News, a Taliban commander in Afghanistan warns the US new administration. He asserts “we are totally ready to fight. We do not get tired of Jihad. Injuries do not sadden us. Martyrdom does not pain our hearts. We win if we get martyred. If we are tired, that is a success. We succeed by just being at war. We will enter Kabul in victory. This is our way.” On the other hand, ISIS will remain, and some of the lingering insurgents might join them. It is also possible that some new insurgent groups would form.

The third scenario is obviously ideal since the violence will drastically reduce. Neither the ISIS nor the newly formed insurgents would be strong enough to challenge the new government formed by the Taliban and the current government. Under this scenario, the international community would continue supporting Afghanistan. The new government will further strengthen the security apparatus and would gradually turn the country economically and security-wise stable, self-reliant, and ultimately at a permanent peace.