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n a move that has stirred international attention, the Russian government is poised to present a bill to the State Duma which, if passed, would institute a mandatory “loyalty agreement” for all foreign visitors to the country. Under the proposed legislation, visitors would be required to pledge not to criticize Russian state policy or Soviet history, and to respect what are described as traditional Russian family values, culture, and the environment.

This proposed “loyalty agreement” is part of a wider push by the Kremlin to reinforce national interests and traditional values in the face of what it perceives as Western liberalism. The legislation was disclosed by the state news agency TASS and is reported to be in an advanced stage of development, with officials from the interior ministry, the government, and the presidential administration involved in its crafting.

Lieutenant General Valentina Kazakova, leading the Main Directorate for Migration within the interior ministry, informed TASS that discussions are ongoing and that the bill will soon be submitted to the State Duma.

Implications for historical narratives and family values

A particular point of contention in the legislation is its stipulation against “distorting the historical truth” about the Soviet Union’s role in World War II, specifically its victory over Nazism — a narrative that President Vladimir Putin has frequently paralleled with contemporary geopolitical conflicts, notably the annexation of Crimea.

The legislation’s emphasis on “traditional family values” echoes the conservative stance taken by the Russian government in recent years, which has seen a crackdown on LGBTQ rights and gender-affirming treatments, and restrictions on reproductive rights. This has been supported by the Russian Orthodox Church and is justified by authorities as necessary to combat Russia’s declining birth rates and to improve the demographic situation.

The bill also seeks to safeguard Russia’s cultural heritage and natural resources, requiring visitors to refrain from activities that could be perceived as showing disrespect to Russia’s ethno-cultural diversity and environmental conservation efforts. This comes at a time when Russia, home to nearly 200 ethnic groups, has been accused of leveraging its ethnic minorities in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, leading to a disproportionate number of casualties from these communities.

Response from minority groups and scholars

The proposed legislation has been met with concern by minority groups within Russia, who already report feeling marginalized and exploited, particularly in the context of the Ukraine conflict. Scholars and critics who have documented the authoritarian aspects of Stalin’s regime have faced increasing marginalization, with many losing access to Kremlin-controlled media and being labeled as “foreign agents.”

As the 2024 presidential election approaches, President Putin has framed the current geopolitical tensions as an existential battle to protect Russia’s “sacred” civilization. This legislation, therefore, is seen by some as a means to consolidate this narrative and to fortify Russia against what the Kremlin perceives as the decadence of the West.

Should the bill pass, it will undoubtedly have significant implications for freedom of expression, historical interpretation, and human rights in Russia, potentially affecting the country’s relations with the international community. It also raises questions about the treatment of foreigners within Russia’s borders and the broader implications for global diplomatic relations.

Source: Aljazeera English

The Haydar Aliyev Centre for Eurasian Studies at Ibn Haldun University in Turkey held a webinar on the impact of the war in Ukraine on Central Asia on March 30, 2022. The webinar included Prof. Luca Anceschi, an expert on Eurasian studies who teaches at the University of Glasgow, UK; Akbota Zholdasbekova, an associate professor at L.N Gumilyov Eurasian National University, Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan; Emil Dzhuraev, co-founder and fellow at Crossroads-Central Asia, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan; and Prof. Yaşar Sarı from Ibn Haldun University, Istanbul, Turkey.

Response from state and civil society in Central Asia

Speaking of Turkmenistan’s official position, which is unclear at present on the Russia-Ukraine war, Luca Anceschi noted that Turkmenistan “is a country where war is not debated in the public press. Whatever the news makes internationally, doesn’t make it in Turkmenistan because the government decides what goes and what doesn’t go into the news. The country has been engaged very publicly in the presidential transition as well.”

He added, “This is a very inwards-looking country; it’s a country that only cares about themselves, not because the people are like that but because the regime forced them to do so.”

Emil Dzhuraev elaborated on the issue of the official position of Central Asian countries on the Russia-Ukraine war. According to Dzhuraev, “All Central Asian countries, in one way or another, expressed a position of neutrality.” Countries are using the cover of official state neutrality in order to escape the ire of parties involved in the ongoing war.

One can also see the evolution in these neutral positions when countries like Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have showcased their greater sympathy towards Ukraine. “However, that doesn’t mean an open condemnation of the aggressive actions by Russia,” said Dzhuraev.

While addressing the response of civil society in Kyrgyzstan, Dzhuraev said, “There have been public protests and demonstrations in support of both countries [Russia and Ukraine],” but “there is a lack of information, if not ignorance about what the matter really is” among the people. Because of the strong presence of Russian state-controlled media from which a large part of Kyrgyz population gets their daily news, “there is an urgent need for countries [Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan] to consider their information security question.”

Dzhuraev argued there is a prevailing division of allegiance between young and older Kyrgyz. According to Dzhuraev, old generation Kyrgyz are pro-Russian due to the “imprint of many years in close affinity with Russia under the Soviet Union.” He also noted the role of Russia’s “propaganda campaign that has been working successfully with Putin in the center in Kyrgyzstan.”

In this regard, Dzhuraev stated that the “lump-sum value of remittances has come down during the COVID19 restrictions to 20%, which is less than normal.” He added that during the Russia-Ukraine crisis, “one could expect even a sharper decline in remittances.” He further stressed the debates which are emerging in Kazakhstan around Kyrgyz migrants in Russia and the fear of their possible recruitment in the war against Ukraine.

A large number of goods that Kyrgyzstan receives from EU markets and other countries apparently come through Russia. Dzhuraev put emphasis on revisiting the “question of whether Kyrgyzstan can refigure its supply routes for imports of essential goods such as medicine, food items, technology, etc.”

Central Asian countries “treading a fine line”?

Countries in Central Asia are maintaining the position of neutrality. An Uzbek Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson clarified that Uzbekistan maintained neutrality regarding the war in Ukraine. Uzbekistan hasn’t recognized the pro-Russian separatist-controlled districts in Ukraine’s Donbas, known as the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. The same is the case with Turkmenistan, which maintains a position it calls “positive neutrality.”

Turkmenistan seems to uphold its long-standing principle of “permanent neutrality” by avoiding all public comments on the Russia-Ukraine war. Kyrgyzstan’s foreign minister reiterated the country’s commitment to the principle of territorial integrity.

Dzhuraev concluded that “the Central Asian positions of neutrality should be read actually as covers for stances against the war. Central Asian countries have appealed to resolve the crisis on the basis of international law, and there is no doubt that international law would certainly be on the side of Ukraine and condemning Russia.”

According to Dzhuraev, “Neutrality should be read as the timid signs of siding with Ukraine as far as these countries can afford.”

While speaking on the relations of Kazakhstan with Russia and Ukraine, Zholdasbekova maintained that they “will be coming to more neutrality.” She further stated that “we believe in a bright future, and we believe that our great principle of multivectorism will still serve us after Russia’s aggression.”

Press freedom in Central Asia

Dzhuraev pointed out Russia’s tendency to “write Kyrgyzstan into a position of support of Russian actions by Russian sources.” It happened when Kyrgyzstani president Sadyr Japarov talked with Russian president Putin over the phone. After the call, Russia’s media agency reported that the Kyrgyz president supports Russia’s actions in Ukraine. However, as Dzhuraev said, “From Kyrgyzstan, there was no such word, not even close to that.”

Many cases are also coming to the surface regarding the declining press freedom in the Central Asian countries, particularly Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Recently, Kyrgyzstan authorities raided the broadcaster Next TV and detained its director over their published posts covering claims by a former head of Kazakhstan’s intelligence agency that Kyrgyzstan has secretly agreed to provide military support to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

“These kinds of troubling signs are there in Kyrgyzstan, but the press and civil society are fighting for their freedom and rights every day while dealing with numerous trials/changes against them,” said Dzhuraev.

Speaking of the existence of free press in Kyrgyzstan, Zholdasbekova gave the examples of a few instances where news channels were banned because of content. According to Zholdasbekova, “There is no limitation to what you are watching, but sometimes when channels become too aggressive, they somehow might be closed without any explanation.”

As diplomatic and military tensions increased between Russia and the West in and around Ukraine, European security came to the fore again as the focal point of the debate over the past year. Russia has been blamed for attempting to change the post-Cold War security order in Europe as Moscow demanded legally binding security guarantees from the U.S. and its NATO allies at the end of 2021.

The U.S. and NATO have already given some written answers to the Russian side, but the Kremlin says its demands have yet to be met or have even been ignored by the West. In the current situation, the parties entered a cul-de-sac of (in)security, where a zero-sum game for both Russia and the West is unavoidable – unless they decide to ignite another world war.

In this whole picture, the future of European security architecture seems somewhat blurry in the years to come. On the one hand, Russia wants to augment disagreements, hereby enhancing geopolitical fault lines among the EU member states in order to reduce Europe’s common decision-making capacity. On the other hand, NATO, which comprises most EU countries, so far could not agree on a security pact to deter Russia.

However, there are third parties in Europe that have been affected the most by these decades-old geopolitical and military rivalries between Russia, the U.S., and NATO. Needless to say, first and foremost, this includes Sweden – namely Europe’s and Russia’s upper north on the edge of the map. As the largest country in population and the strongest by virtue of its historical and political peculiarities among the Nordic countries, Sweden is well known for its non-alignment with a military bloc in its foreign affairs – if not for its political neutrality. Sweden has been a member state of the EU since 1995, but is not a member of NATO.

The Swedish leadership has adopted this policy since the postwar period. The country has focused on creating a welfare social state model, which greatly succeeded in the 1970s and ’80s, and was identified with former prime minister Olof Palme, who was assassinated in 1986. Palme and his fellow social democrats assumed a path of independence, assuring that Sweden does not interfere in military conflicts as part of its foreign policy, and utterly objected to NATO membership during and after the Cold War.

This time, however, the country has become an object of Western policy-making in security spheres, especially as non-conventional security threats have been challenging Sweden for decades, mostly due to the wrongdoings of the U.S., NATO, and the EU in the Middle East and North Africa. New-generation leaders of both social democrats and center right-wing moderates have confronted such problems as the West continued to make geopolitical and military mistakes in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Afghanistan, and elsewhere around the Mediterranean and the Near East.

In the current situation, while Moscow and Western capitals have been accusing each other of escalating the crisis and tension over Ukraine’s break-away regions in the southeast Donbas basin, non-NATO countries near Russia like Sweden and Finland, have started to feel the ages-old security dilemma vis-à-vis the so-called Russian threat on their borders. Looking back in history, since the 18^th century, these two countries together with the Baltic trio and Poland, have had negative experiences with Russia and these problematic past relations and path dependency still negatively influence the formal and informal cultures, institutions, and mentalities in these countries and among their people(s).

Non-NATO countries near Russia like Sweden and Finland, have started to feel the ages-old security dilemma vis-à-vis the so-called Russian threat on their borders.

As for Sweden, the post-Westphalian superiority of the Swedish Kingdom in the north was lost to Russia at Poltava during the Great Northern War of the early 18^th century. In many ways, Russia’s resurgent post-Soviet foreign policy under Vladimir Putin resembles for the Swedes today the age of Peter the Great in the early 1700s – a time when the fear of Russia, namely rysskräck, or “Russophopia,” emerged and was later institutionalized to this day.

From the Russian side, this path dependency is also seen as one of the main sources of the Russian threat rhetoric in Sweden, but nevertheless, it does not necessarily explain the whole picture with regard to the NATO debate in the country. Rather, there are also other arguments which either recommend or discourage the government on armament and military spending. These debates have been used by both social democrats and moderates in order to maintain political neutrality or military non-alignment, as well as to pay attention to the increasing security needs of the country in the Baltic and the Arctic where in recent years Russia has been muscling its military might.

Hence, NATO supporters have gradually gained ground and the erstwhile “peaceful” social democrats became hawkish advocators of militarization; in October 2020, the minority government approved to increase the defense budget by approximately 40% for 2021-25. This move has also brought lots of claims from inside and outside the country. While some say the Swedish government and the media have been using the “Russian aggression” narrative as a pretext to enhance military spending, other arguments reject this approach and blame the Kremlin for the alleged pro-Russian propaganda and disinformation, which accuses the Swedish establishment of reinventing and spreading “Russophobia” across society.

Sweden has been divided over NATO membership; however, according to recent surveys, the general public tends to give support to the country’s bid to join the alliance with a slim majority.

In brief, both claims attempt to securitize Sweden’s long-lasting NATO debates, and it seems the situation will be continued as long as the tension soars between the West and Russia in the months and years to come. It is clear that both at state and society levels, Sweden has been divided over NATO membership; however, according to recent surveys, the general public tends to give support to the country’s bid to join the alliance with a slim majority.

One way or another, the so-called Russia threat discourse constitutes the backbone of these debates in Sweden, and the country is coming closer to the Western alliance, not only in political terms, but also with a full-fledged military partnership. Stockholm has been already cooperating with NATO through the Partnership for Peace program since 1994 and it is likely that the security challenges posed by Russia will trigger a NATO debate in favor of the advocators.

Quo Vadis? Sweden’s litmus test on Ukraine

A priori thoughts suggest a possible Swedish NATO membership, but in praxis the Swedish leadership has so far not formally applied to the alliance. Yet, Sweden, in particular, and Scandinavia, as a whole, have lost the principle of non-alignment in foreign and security policies and tended to lean on the U.S.-led NATO bloc against Russia’s recent assertiveness in and around Eastern Europe. From the former foreign minister Carl Bildt to the incumbent Ann Linde, the Swedish foreign policy decision-makers have already expressed Stockholm’s show of support to Kiev on the current security deadlock between Russia and the West.

In Moscow, however, Stockholm’s pro-Ukrainian stance has also been deemed as its intention to access NATO – a move that the Kremlin fundamentally opposes for security reasons.

In Moscow, however, Stockholm’s pro-Ukrainian stance has also been deemed as its intention to access NATO – a move that the Kremlin fundamentally opposes for security reasons. Thus, the Russian Foreign Ministry has warned NATO over possible Swedish and Finnish bids to join, although both countries’ membership issue was not mentioned in the security guarantees which Moscow has demanded from the U.S. and the alliance.

Following the Russian move, the Swedish side did not publicly state their intention to join NATO, but both Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson and Foreign Minister Ann Linde stated that it is up to Stockholm whether to join NATO as they signalled closer cooperation with the security pact.

What did France’s President think he was doing by visiting Putin in Moscow? On the anniversary of the EU adopting the Maastricht Treaty – heavily backed by France – a lot has changed in the world. But Macron hasn’t changed his own vision of France and is still living in the 90s where the Republic had more clout on the world’s stage and Russia was just rebuilding itself after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The long table stunt was pure genius by Putin, who knows a good media opportunity when it walks in the room. The ruse, to make Macron look pathetic, servile and very much a servant at the master’s table paid off as Macron was blindsided by the media arrangements, too obsessed with his moment in the global media spotlight.

Compared to other world leaders who visited Putin – Merkel, Trump and just recently Erdogan – Macron was certainly treated with a certain contempt, which reflects exactly how the  Russian leader regards the EU project and Macron himself. Lightweights.

Macron paid a heavy price consequently to agree to the long table photo shoot which served as an example of how out of touch he is and how desperate he is to promote himself as a world leader, weeks ahead of the Presidential elections in France which will probably reinstall him as the country’s premier.

He believes in a European pillar within NATO and that France should lead such a farcical vanguard, which is really what the visit to Putin was about. He undermined NATO entirely and even went as far as to support Russia’s presence in Eastern Ukraine all in exchange for the meeting itself which he really believed would make him shine at home with the voters and embolden his banal ideas of an EU army, led by France which supposedly would deter Putin.

The Russian leader’s threats are very real and Macron’s visit and the hilarious memes which followed gave Putin even more kudos.

All nonsense and wildly deluded. In reality what we saw by the move was that it merely enshrined Putin even more and affirmed him as a powerful leader of a mighty super power which, unlike the West, does not have a reputation of talking big but then retreating when someone calls its bluff. Putin is not Obama. The Russian leader’s threats are very real and Macron’s visit and the hilarious memes which followed gave Putin even more kudos and placed Russia where it has wanted to be but failed for twenty years – in a superior position where the West is actually listening to its security concerns. Macron just walked straight into a media trap and gave Putin exactly what he wanted: a snapshot of the West on its knees with cavernous, weak, ambitious leaders begging for sympathy.

Macron is part of a political elite which since Maastricht has treated Russia with contempt. In particular, the EU’s role in pushing Kiev to mull NATO membership was foolish and has led to the present crisis. The photo itself of the long table will be logged in the annals of history as the key moment where Russia no longer takes the EU and the West seriously as the tipping point now is in Russia’s favor.

Putin will be delighted by how the meeting went. Macron really got nothing accept mockery on the internet, while the EU and NATO had to just look on as puerile spectators while he made everyone look like second rate players.

Aside from the memes on the internet which just made Macron look stupid, there are some important messages there which Putin’s media people manipulated. The main message is that Russia has the advantage however the Ukraine debacle turns out. It is the lion, surrounded by mice.

The winner takes it all. And Putin is winning even more now after Macron gave him this latest media coup.

Macron’s embarrassing charade merely supported this. A French president who has delusional views about his own status in the world organizing himself a personal visit to see the Russian president doesn’t make France look like the super power that it would like to project of itself, more like a corrupt, minor EU member state which allows its president to manipulate its own media, led by a man who clearly doesn’t have any respect for the fourth estate.

France today is struggling to come to terms with its new demise and Macron’s visit just underlined this as he walked away a loser. The winner takes it all. And Putin is winning even more now after Macron gave him this latest media coup.

Another message from Putin is that he is neither scared nor bothered by the threat of sanctions from the West, which is really what the whole row is about. Sanctions alone will be difficult on Putin and in particular his close circle of tycoons who have huge investments in London. But as Biden has proved, secondary sanctions imposed on a handful of countries which buy oil from Iran, are very hard these days to implement and Putin has made it clear that, if necessary, he will trade sanctions for an invasion of some sort, if the West doesn’t engineer a way of Ukraine talking down NATO membership.

Of course, if Putin sent his own troops into those regions, Macron may well be delighted as this would give even more gravitas to his idea of an EU army. The problem of course is that the French leader doesn’t want to send French troops to a war zone with Russia, as he has proved by speeding up his own withdrawal of troops in Mali, once the presence of Russian mercenaries just recently emerged. But it will be that iconic picture of the long table which will haunt Macron as the Russian media machine will be the victor. As Churchill once said, history is written by winners. And that snapshop of the long table makes it quite clear who the winners and losers are.

On August 23, 2021, Kyiv hosted the first convention of the International Crimea Platform, which has been presented as a “consultative and coordination format with the aim of peacefully ending the Russian Federation’s temporary occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol and to restore control of Ukraine over this territory in full accordance with international law.”

The event assembled representatives of 45 countries and international organizations leading many analysists and experts to name it as “the most notable international event ever hosted in Ukraine.”

Speaking about its history and background, it needs to be pointed out that the idea of carrying out such an event is all but new. At this juncture, part of the credit should go to Ukraine’s former president Petro Poroshenko (2014-2019), whose presidency coincided with, perhaps, the most gruesome period of Ukraine`s post-1991 history.

Poroshenko had expressed the idea in 2016, standing behind the creation of the unsuccessful (for a variety of reasons) Geneva+ format. Subsequently, Volodymyr Zelensky returned to the idea, seeking to make it one of the focal points of his personal meeting with Russia’s president Vladimir Putin in 2019.

Yet, Russia refrained from any dialogue on the subject, firmly stating that Russia’s “sovereignty” over Crimea is undeniable and will not be a matter of discussion. There is a very little doubt that Ukraine`s president seriously counted on a different response from Moscow, but nevertheless, Zelensky was not put off by this unsuccess and pursued the issues.

Russia refrained from any dialogue on Crimea, firmly stating that Russia’s “sovereignty” over Crimea is undeniable and will not be a matter of discussion.

In effect, given the lack of any serious domestic successes, he would make it one of his prime (foreign) policy goals. In September 2020, in his address to the United Nations General Assembly, Zelensky announced a plan to move on with a “Crimea Platform,” making it an instrument “for the coordination of international efforts aimed at securing Crimea’s return to Ukraine.”

Before addressing some event-related specificities and implications, it is important to outline the platform’s key goals and its structural framework briefly. With regard to the former, the main goals were explicitly voiced by the head of Ukraine`s diplomacy Dmytro Kuleba in five main points that include the following:

– Strengthening international efforts for the non-recognition of Crimea’s current status.

– Using – and potentially broadening – international economic, political, and social anti-Russian sanctions.

– Confronting violations of human rights in Crimea – see the suppression of Tatars and other minorities.

– Ensuring the freedom of naval transportation.

– Overcoming the economic and ecological consequences of Russia’s occupation of the peninsula.

Despite the “strategic nature” of its partnership with Kyiv and Kyiv’s explicit support during the recent conflict over Karabakh, Azerbaijan also refrained from participation. Similarly, Turkey was represented by Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, while the Ukrainian authorities had hoped for President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s participation. On its side, China chose not to participate at all, allegedly ignoring the invitation.

Finally, the much-hoped-for appearance of the U.S. delegation also failed to meet expectations: instead of Joe Biden, the U.S. was represented by Jennifer Granholm, United States secretary of energy. For obvious reasons, neither Russia nor representatives of Crimea took part in the event. Quite predictably, Russian officials condemned the forum as an incarnation of Russophobia and a tool created to generate anti-Russian sentiments in Europe.

Second, while it would not be an understatement to argue that the platform has had some important informational meaning – as noted by Kuleba, the forum signified Ukraine’s ability to draw international attention to the issue of Crimea, returning it back from “oblivion” – it is not at all evident that the platform will ever be able to overcome awareness-raising status and achieve practical results by attaining the declared goals.

The forum also did not bring about any new developments: the international community, at least the largest part of it, did not recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea even before the platform was launched; international sanctions on Russia have not been lifted; and no new solutions to the “Crimean problem” were voiced during the event.

The third issue is that of utility and reaping (potential) benefits. Despite the fact that some Ukrainian experts have contended that the platform could have the prospect of becoming the “most effective leverage against Russia” with a potential of going well beyond the de-occupation of Crimea and spreading to “Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and any other hybrid problem,” both the probability of this scenario and its value to Ukraine are rather dubious.

Even if the value is attained, and the status and international recognition of the platform go beyond what was observed at the end of August in Kyiv, there is serious doubt whether this development would be of major value to Ukraine. While it seems very dubious that Crimea is to return to Ukraine any time soon (or ever) given Russia`s military buildup and determination to strengthen its sway over Crimea, the best-case scenario is that the platform could transform into a major irritant for Russia.

This said, if this scenario indeed materializes, the Crimea Platform most likely will be used by more powerful parties/countries for their own purposes as a tool to apply pressure on Russia, if and when necessary. This will leave Ukraine as a bystander, at best, and, at worst, as a loser.