Efforts towards normalization in bilateral ties between Turkey and Israel have been underway for some time. The process of normalization is expected to bear fruit with Israeli President Isaac Herzog’s planned visit to Turkey on March 9-10. The Israeli president’s acceptance of the invitation by the Turkish leadership to visit the country after more than a decade of frosty relations merits attention and deliberation.

The normalization of Turkish-Israeli relations is dictated by regional and global pressures as well as driven by mutually expected opportunities both at regional and global levels.

The Middle East as we know it? No more

Turkish-Israeli normalization is taking place within the context of a structural change in the regional environment of the Middle East. All prominent players in the Middle East such as Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Israel as well as the UAE and Qatar–who happen to be also traditional U.S. allies–are going through a period of reckoning and due adjustment for more strategic autonomy, which is not a result of their own choice. Now, all regional players feel the urgency of safeguarding their interests with limited expectations from Washington.

The abrupt withdrawal of the U.S. from Afghanistan was a wake-up call for all traditional American allies in the region: the U.S. is not omnipresent there anymore to provide unwavering security in the Middle East, and since Obama’s “Asia Pivot” its focus is rather on the Asia-Pacific. The corollary is that regional actors must act together and take care of their own security and survival.

Thus, regional actors in the Middle East cannot afford to be involved in an unending geopolitical struggle with each other, especially when the Iranian threat is looming. Iran is becoming a commonly perceived threat among the traditional U.S. allies both with its potential for regional expansion in light of the renewed nuclear talks with the U.S. and with the actual attacks by Iranian proxies, showcased by Houthi attacks against the UAE, the tanker attacks in the Gulf in the past, and the ongoing missile attacks on Saudi oil facilities.

Opportunities, like systemic pressures, are driving the wave of normalization, too. The diversification in the interests and priorities of certain regional powers–Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE especially on specific cases such as Yemen, the OPEC, the Ethiopia-Renaissance Dam, etc.–that since 2013 used to move in concert with one each other and Israel on almost all issues, opened up a lot more options for all: no actor is hostage to any specific camp, coalition, or alliance anymore. “Out of the box” options such as aligning with Turkey became viable for all actors.

With the thaw in relations between Qatar and the rest of the Gulf and Egypt as well as Turkey’s active signaling of its interest in normalization with Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE, the regional environment became much favorable to cooperation rather than conflict.

The Biden administration’s withdrawal of support from the EastMed project has been a watershed moment for the normalization of relations between Turkey, on the one hand, and Israel and Egypt, on the other. The project functioned as a divisive force between Turkey, Israel, and Egypt due to the Greek and Greek Cypriot input. The realization of EastMed’s unfeasible nature paved the way for other feasible alternatives such as the pipeline project between Turkey, Israel, and Egypt.

Changes in international politics

The COVID19 pandemic and its impact on the global economy has taken a toll on each and every national economy. The world is yet to recover from the disruption in supply chains and food security became extremely important as many regions are experiencing partial food crises. This makes geopolitical struggles a luxury, especially in certain regions. Connectivity became much more important, and concerns for the Chinese domination of the world’s supply chains require the creation of alternatives.

The Turkish-Emirati normalization, for example, has a distinct aspect of ameliorating the problems created by the pandemic. With envisaging investments in logistics, agriculture, health, and manufacturing, Turkey and the UAE are poised to ride this wave efficiently. Likewise, Turkish-Israeli normalization is also well suited for cooperation especially in agriculture and energy among other areas.

There is growing tension and confrontation between the Western alliance and Russia over Ukraine, which will have an inevitable impact on the energy security of Europe as the Nord Stream 2 project has already been suspended. Along with LNG supplies from the U.S., Qatar, Canada, Algeria, and the pipeline gas from Azerbaijan, the transfer of Israeli gas to Europe via Turkey will be extremely valuable. This would also cement a stable and long-term Turkish-Israeli cooperation.

Iran, the common denominator?

Alliances are formed against a specific threat. Although it is too early to talk about an “alliance formation” between Turkey and Israel, Iranian expansion across the Middle East and its capacity to inflict damage on other regional actors from the Persian Gulf to Israel and from Yemen to Syria makes it a common source of concern for both Turkey and Israel. Israel already has a routine of targeting Iranian assets in Syria via airstrikes and Turkey’s performance against Iran-backed militias in Syria over a decade is beyond question.

Turkey is the greatest bulwark against Iranian expansion and aggression in northern Iraq and northern Syria. The common interest in curbing Iranian expansion could motivate Turkey and Israel towards rapid and greater cooperation. Israel cannot counter Iran solely by allying with the UAE or even Saudi Arabia–Turkey’s support is crucial.

Risks and prospects

It wouldn’t be wrong to argue that both Ankara and Tel Aviv bided their time to mend ties in the past. While Erdoğan and Netanyahu were at the steering wheel of their respective countries, it was extremely difficult to normalize ties. Netanyahu’s provocative and aggressive policies would dynamite any effort towards rapprochement anyway. Therefore, change in the Israeli government was an opportunity, very well seized by Ankara, to kick off the process, which helped both sides break the undesired deadlock.

Normalization is not a road without bumps. The Israeli government’s precarious coalition creates doubts regarding its longevity in power, which makes the Israeli presidency a much more reliable interlocutor for long-term planning in bilateral relations. Plus, the right-wing components of the Israeli government, and the aggressive and provocative policies towards Al-Aqsa Mosque, East Jerusalem, and Gaza might put the Turkey-Israel normalization in jeopardy in the future.

Notwithstanding the risks, the Turkey-Israel normalization could prioritize focusing on issues and areas of great potential rather than on disagreement points. Disagreements are already dwarfed by the greater potential of cooperation in many areas, so compartmentalization is easy.

The transfer of Israeli natural gas to Europe via Turkey could be the backbone of a solid partnership. In the best-case scenario, normalization in Turkish-Israeli relations might even relieve Turkey from the bipartisan anti-Turkish lobby in the U.S. Congress, which has been a disruptive force in Turkish-American relations for the past decade.

Ever since the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) signed an agreement with Egypt in 2003 on the delimitation of an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the Eastern Mediterranean and declared concession areas for the purpose of oil and gas exploration in 2007, a high tension has grown over the possible maritime boundaries and related activities.

The tension has primarily been between Turkey, Greece, and the GCA, and escalated with further delimitation agreements such as those between Lebanon and the GCA (2007), Israel and the GCA (2010), Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) (2011), Turkey and Libya (2019), and Greece and Egypt (2020).

Some of the actual tension has always been associated with the resource-related activities considering that there are not fully agreed maritime boundaries by all sides in the Eastern Mediterranean. The regional states have therefore confronted each other not only over the possible maritime boundaries but also other related activities.

The Eastern Mediterranean Pipeline Project, known as the EastMed Project, has been one of these activities ever since it was initiated. First pronounced in 2016 by Greece with the EU’s encouragement and funds to finance the preliminary works (the EU pledged 36.5 million euros for research and technical planning), the project gained an official status with an intergovernmental agreement signed between Greece, Israel, and Cyprus (GCA) on January 2, 2020 in Athens, Greece.

The pipeline was planned to run for about 1,900 km, starting from a midpoint between Israel and the island of Cyprus in the sea,  in the Israeli section of the Levantine Basin, and eventually reaching Italy via the island of Crete and Greece with the Poseidon and IGB pipelines, a gas interconnector pipeline which connects gas supplies coming from both Bulgaria and Greece.

It was said that it would carry at least 11 billion cubic meters of gas per year and cost around 6 billion euros to construct. It is being developed by IGI Poseidon S.A., a 50/50 joint venture between the Greek gas company Public Gas Corporation of Greece (DEPA) and the Italian gas company Edison. The project is aimed to be completed by 2025.

The IGB pipeline project was regarded by the related or supporting states as not only a means of transporting the extracted gas from the Eastern Mediterranean to Europe but also a means of achieving strategic goals.

These strategic goals belong to Greece for a couple of reasons. Firstly, the IGB Pipeline Project is a means of establishing a partnership with regional states such as Israel and Egypt as well as non-regional states such as the United States and EU countries over the resources of the Eastern Mediterranean. The Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis made a statement upon signing the agreement saying, “Today we did not simply sign a beneficial agreement. We sealed our resolve for a strategic connection between our countries in a region that now more than ever needs growth and security.”

Despite Turkey’s objections, Greek efforts seem well approved as the project has been supported by regional states such as Israel, Egypt, Jordon, and the Palestinian Authority, and by some non-regional states such as the U.S. and France.

Egypt had already worked for the creation of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum on July 25, 2019 with the participation of seven countries, namely Egypt, Jordan, the GCA, Greece, Italy, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority, and further signed an agreement with the GCA on September 19, 2018 to construct a line linking Egypt and Cyprus’s Aphrodite gas field to Egypt’s gas liquefaction stations.

The Israeli reason for joining the forum seems to be commercial. On the signing of the agreement, former Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu said, “This is a historic day for Israel… Just days ago, we started pumping [the] Leviathan [gas field]… We have huge quantities there. This means a lot of money will come into the economy. That is good for peace because we have agreements with our Arab neighbors.”

For the EU, the reason for joining the East Mediterranean Gas Forum was also commercial alongside the aim not to depend heavily on Russian gas. Competition to provide gas to Europe is fierce, as the continent seeks to rid itself of coal and high greenhouse gas emissions. Despite the various pipelines coming to Europe such as the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) or the shipments of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the U.S., there is still a gap in the market.

The U.S. had been supportive of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum from the very beginning. Frank Fannon, then assistant secretary for the Bureau of Energy Resources (ENR), was present at a meeting in Athens in August 2019 when the project was agreed upon. The primary reason for the U.S. supporting the forum seems to have been to diminish the European countries’ dependency on Russian gas. It is also alleged that the U.S. has used the EastMed project to counter Turkey for some “unproved acts” such as its relations with Russia.

The U.S. withdrawal of support from the EastMed project

Despite the above-mentioned compelling reasons for supporting the project, recently, the U.S. has officially withdrawn its support from the project. In a statement by the U.S. Embassy and Consulate in Greece, it announced, “The United States continues to strongly support regional efforts that enhance and promote cooperation and regional stability, including the 3+1 mechanism in which the Republic of Cyprus (ROC), Greece, Israel, + the United States participate… We are shifting our focus to electricity interconnectors that can support both gas and renewable energy sources. We support projects such as the planned EuroAfrica interconnector from Egypt to Crete and the Greek mainland, and the proposed EuroAsia interconnector to link the Israeli, Cypriot and European electricity grids.”

The U.S. State Department sources have been cited as saying that the EastMed pipeline project should be abandoned altogether. The inevitable question is why the U.S. decided to shift its focus away from the EastMed Project. To answer this, it is possible to identify a number of reasons.

The EU aims to reduce the use of natural gas in Europe by 25% by 2030 and for it to be abandoned completely by 2050.

One of the most frequently stated reasons is the fast-growing focus on green energy. Due to the universal trend towards green energy to meet the Paris Agreement on Climate Change targets (COP21), the future of fossil resources seems blurred beyond 2030. The abovementioned statement by the U.S. notes that “at a time when Europe’s energy security is–more than ever–a question of national security, we are committed to deepen our regional relationships and promote clean energy technologies. We are shifting our focus to electricity interconnectors that can support both gas and renewable energy sources.” The Biden administration is looking “critically at new fossil fuel infrastructure projects to ensure U.S. support is not directed to carbon-intensive sources and does not result in future stranded assets as we accelerate the clean energy transition.”

Similarly, the EU aims to reduce the use of natural gas in Europe by 25% by 2030 and for it to be abandoned completely by 2050. It is noted that even Israel announced that it will stop searching for natural gas and will focus on greater use of renewable energy sources (RES). In fact, Greece is doing the same, setting the production of 61% of its electricity from RES as a goal.

Turkey and Greece have many differences which gain new dimensions through regional and international incidents. It is a curious question whether there could ever be a path toward a long-term dialogue between the two nations and a sustainable solution to their differences. So far, to promote dialogue and peaceful settlement, third parties such as the EU, the U.S., and NATO have played important roles. Some observers argue that the Greek-Turkish NATO partnership has kept the bilateral problems under control, while others think that the post-World War II order and the U.S. role in Greek-Turkish disputes have worsened the situation.

A number of experts believe the EU still has the potential to push Greece and Turkey to reach a solution and others argue that the EU created further tension and turbulence by recognizing the membership of the Greek Cypriot government as representative of the whole island before a resolution to the conflict had been reached. What is certain, however, is that the role of third parties in Greek-Turkish disagreements will determine to a great extent the success of the bilateral talks. Regional and global actors will play a decisive role in the disputed matters according to their interest definitions or priorities.

Exploratory talks between Turkey and Greece started after a crisis between the two countries at the end of the 1990s. Talks and rapprochement were stimulated when Turkey’s EU initiative for accession was supported by Greece. Turkey and Greece have held 60 rounds of talks over 14 years. However, rivalry in the Eastern Mediterranean turned the Aegean crises into a larger problem premised on the delimitation of maritime borders and especially in relation to the islands near Turkey’s coast.

Bilateral relations deteriorated in the 2010s, not because of the delimitation of the maritime borders, but due to the July 15, 2016 coup attempt in Turkey and the Gülenists who sought refuge in Greece. After the coup attempt, exploratory talks were hindered by Greece’s refusal to extradite the Gülenists to Turkey. Moreover, other regional problems poisoned the bilateral disagreements, such as the Syrian civil war and the flow of immigrants to the Aegean Sea and the region of Evros in Greece.

These new problems are no longer excluded from the agenda of the bilateral relations. Greece continued the EU-ization of Greek foreign policy priorities and Turkey rejected any kind of fait accompli. In this context, Greece’s naval exercises with the inclusion of numerous third actors as a show of strength and Turkey’s exploration ships in the Eastern Mediterranean will be regarded as the continuation of previous problems and are seen as having a multilateral character.

Recently, the most prominent issue in the Eastern Mediterranean has been the drilling activities around the island of Cyprus. Officially, this is out of the frame of exploratory talks between Greece and Turkey, but there is no doubt that the issue of Cyprus has always been poisonous for Greek-Turkish relations. In 2003, the Greek Cypriot leadership signed a maritime deal with Egypt for gas exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The deal aimed to create an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) that complicated the Cyprus problem of how to share sovereignty between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Greeks belittle the Cyprus problem reducing it to “occupation” in reference to the 1974 Turkish operation on the island after the brutal murders of Turkish Cypriot civilians by the Greek Cypriot militias backed by the Greek military junta with an idea of uniting the island with Greece. The real cause of the problem has been kept hidden: what will the rights of the Turkish Cypriots be?

In the 1960 constitution, Turkish Cypriots had the same rights as Greek Cypriots as constituent citizens of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC). Problems were exacerbated when the Greek side argued that the number of Greek Cypriots were higher than their Turkish counterparts, and therefore Turkish Cypriots should not have equal rights and that this should be addressed by introducing several amendments in the founding constitution.

Despite the existence of EU mechanisms, the exclusion of Turkey from all multilateral platforms and a maximalist insistence on using these platforms and mechanisms to achieve Greek national priorities are still the dominant attitudes in the Eastern Mediterranean. This irreconcilable attitude was reflected in the use of maps such as the Seville Map to decide the delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in international summits – a move that triggered Turkey’s reaction.

The most recent example of Greece’s efforts to exclude and marginalize Turkey from international platforms is the Philia Forum.

In 2006, the concept of “Blue Homeland” (Mavi Vatan) which includes Turkey’s EEZ was introduced by Admiral Cem Gürdeniz. With the studies of Turkish Navy Commander Cihat Yaycı, in 2010, the concept became a doctrine (of the Turkish Republic). The first application of Blue Homeland came in 2017 when Turkey started to send seismic exploration ships to the region. The peak in the tensions in Greek-Turkish relations came when Turkey signed a delimitation agreement with Libya on November 28, 2019. Today, Turkey’s Eastern Mediterranean policy depends on the Turkey-Libya EEZ deal that challenges  the Mediterranean Energy Plan of Israel, Cyprus, and Greece.

In 2013, the EastMed pipeline project was designed under the European Commission Regulation without referring to any probable cooperation with Turkey and Turkish Cypriots. This was taken as another sign of how Greece tries to use its EU membership to its national advantage. The most recent example of Greece’s efforts to exclude and marginalize Turkey from international platforms is the Philia Forum. The Greek government aims to utilize Turkey’s tensions with several regional countries in order to delegitimize and minimize Turkey’s rightful demands and rights in the Mediterranean.

As part of this strategy, the Greek government wants to find a solution to the delimitation issue with other neighboring countries such as the agreements with Italy on June 6, and with Egypt on August 6,  2020. The Albanian-Greek EEZ border had several problems despite continuous efforts since 2009. In 2018, the Tsipras government tried to push the negotiations with no success. On October 20, 2020, Albanian and Greek authorities confirmed that they had reached an agreement to take the issue to The Hague.

As a result of the rising tension in the Eastern Mediterranean, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg took the initiative to reduce the risk of incidents between the Greek and Turkish navies. With the support of Germany, Turkey and Greece resumed exploratory talks in Istanbul on January 26, 2021 with the hope to create a base for bilateral negotiations after months of tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. After a five-year break, the 61st Round of Exploratory Talks were launched in the hope of supporting the EU efforts to promote a positive agenda in Turkish-EU relations.

Turkish Deputy Foreign Minister Sedat Önal and retired Greek diplomat Pavlos Apostolidis represented their countries at the negotiation table. However, both sides approach each other reluctantly and do not act in good faith. To gain diplomatic benefits, both try to project the image of a peaceful actor towards the international community. Some analysts say diplomats know how to solve the problems in the Aegean Sea while others claim no progress is being made. However, making progress in the exploratory talks is now a matter of a deeper question.

The relations between Greece and Turkey are part of the EU-Turkey relations. Greek officials state it clearly, and believe that the European Union can provide a solid victory for Greece by implementing sanctions against Turkey. On the other hand, Turkey wants a positive agenda – but the question is at what expense. Turkey accuses the EU countries of being unjust but is equally aware that the solution will come through an international meeting which must include all actors in the Eastern Mediterranean. So, the lack of trust and the existence of many different actors with a range of different priorities make the exploratory talks less promising in terms of reaching a comprehensive resolution in the near future.

Third parties play an important role in the game and according to Turkey it is not a fair game. This is the main reason why Turkey is active in the field with military exercises that manifest its decisiveness to preserve its maritime borders. However, the beginning of the exploratory talks shows that both Greece and Turkey do not want to increase the tension further. This creates a motivation to back the dialogue channels. To this day, the only reliable method to solve the existing problems between Turkey and Greece is peaceful negotiations through fair international summits with the participation of all relevant actors.

No doubt, Turkey’s relationship with the European Union has not been a rose garden. The first contact dates back to the 1960s and the Ankara Agreement, and over time led to the establishment of a customs union. The gradual institutional rapprochement culminated in 2005, when the negotiations for full Turkish membership began.

The process immediately exposed fractures within the European block, attributable for the most part to the existence of a certain criticism towards Ankara. The admission process introduced significant issues to the political debate in Turkey, aiming primarily at a more democratic governance.

However, from the very beginning, the accession path has been affected by a lack of cohesion and a lack of a joint perspective from the European side, mainly due to the divergent stances of some member states.

Hence, the negotiations progressed only slowly, and the unresolved Cyprus issue in conjunction with the double standards by member states led by Germany and France contributed to undermining the principle of pacta sunt servanda.

Though since 2004 Ankara has continued to support the solution offered by the Annan Plan, it has faced not only the intransigence of the Greek administration, but also the full annexation of Cyprus as a member state of the European Union, which, in turn, has vetoed most of the significant chapters by causing to halting the negotiation process.

If those were the assumptions, nowadays the relations with the European Union experience growing tensions leading to a mutual crisis of confidence. What we have witnessed in the recent months in the Eastern Mediterranean and over the main European negotiation tables are nothing more than the products of those unresolved issues and stances that have little to do with realpolitik.

Although the European Union acts and operates according to the principle of unity and solidarity in itself, a careful analysis reveals that the treatment of Turkey has been different.

On the one hand, there is a tendency by a block in the EU to dominate the European debate and its key issues with reference to a self-assumed political and moral superiority expressed chiefly by Emmanuel Macron who tries to monopolize the European rhetoric and represent France as the leader of the liberal world.

On the other hand, there are mediating attempts based mainly on strategic and consistent considerations. French President Macron, along the lines of the traditional anti-Turkish sentiment, has not skimped on granting support to Greece and Cyprus over the critical issue related to the delimitation of territorial waters, which recently has seen an escalation of tones and maneuvers in the Mediterranean.

Among the representatives at the table only Greece accepted the proposal to punish Turkey, while Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Malta opposed more severe sanctions against Ankara. Therefore, in preparation for the Special European Council on October 1-2, which convened specifically to assess the situation in the Aegean Sea, a more intense collaboration has emerged between Paris, Athens, and Nicosia, while the other coastal states opted for a constructive approach based on dialogue.

In this frame, Rome plays a key role by proposing a positive agenda towards Turkey. Since the very beginning, Italy has supported Ankara’s EU accession, which is considered of great importance from both a strategic and a political point of view. At that time, the so-called Friends of Turkey, including Italy, Spain, the UK, and Sweden, was established with the explicit aim of balancing the existing negative approaches.

However, more recently, in the resolution following the meeting of the Council of Europe on December 10-11, EU leaders reaffirmed the EU’s strategic interest in the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Turkey and stressed the importance of keeping channels of communication between the EU and Turkey open.

A positive EU-Turkey agenda is on the table, provided by Turkey’s readiness to resolve differences through dialogue and to act in accordance with international law.

The offer of a positive EU-Turkey agenda remains on the table, provided Turkey shows readiness to promote a genuine partnership with the union and its member states, and to resolve differences through dialogue and in accordance with international law. This approach confirms that Italy, Spain, and Malta – supported as well by Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Germany – have succeeded in prevailing a softer line towards Ankara.

The reasons behind this dialogue-based orientation are manifold. First, there is a subtle acknowledgement of the legitimacy of certain Turkish requests and of the importance of Turkey as a valuable partner, proving how much Europe and Turkey need each other. In a time of uncertainty and several crises, Turkey stands as a crucial gateway in the containment of threats and risks for Europe.

The fight against terrorism, arms trafficking, and human trafficking are some factors underlying the existence of a strong complementarity. Moreover, Angela Merkel on behalf of the whole EU, was one of the main architects of the Refugees Deal signed with Turkey in 2016, whose aim was to stem the irregular migratory flow across the Mediterranean and the Balkans. Despite the numerous vicissitudes and certain non-compliances on the European side, the agreement has been effective in containing irregular immigration, demonstrating once again that Turkey is a partner Europe can count on.

For the same reasons, a certain degree of support and sympathy are expressed by Hungary and Poland, whose relations with Turkey are very positive. In other words, a further deterioration in the relations and in the mutual trust could generate a snowball effect that the whole EU, considering the fragility of some internal mechanisms of control and on the migrants’ reception policies, would not be able to cope with.

As a matter of fact, the Mediterranean is an area of shared historical and strategic interest where Ankara as a smart power is acting in an increasingly assertive way. After all, the Turkish presence in scenarios that suffer from the decision-making vacuum left by the European powers, has led to a certain level of stabilization.

In Libya, alongside Fayez al-Sarraj and the government legitimately recognized by the UN, Ankara has effectively established itself as a peacekeeping force, protecting the interests of European countries as well. All EU states support the UN-recognized government of al-Sarraj with the exception of France which stands close to the warlord Haftar and therefore had to complain about the presence of Turkish soldiers in Tripoli.

In the frame of the Berlin Conference of January 29, 2020, Italy and Germany contributed toward mediating and channeling Turkish expectations to the European tables. Speaking of the alignments and divisions on the fields, Italian Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio reiterated, “We must accept the Turkish presence in Libya.”