Some local security sources spoke to Anadolu Agency on condition of anonymity that the YPG/PKK terrorists force civilians to dig two-meter deep, two-meter wide and kilometers-long ditches in order to block the entrance of Turkish military forces into Afrin.

Turkey has been watching the YPG by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which show how the terrorist organization prevent residents to leave the city. Another video footage captured by Turkish UAVs show how a mine planted by the YPG killed civilians as they tried to leave the city.

As part of their defense strategy, the YPG/PKK had started digging ditches, building tunnels, making barricades, and planting bombs much earlier. It is commented that the ditches and tunnels in Afrin seem professional and this evokes the question if the YPG received a foreign support or training to build them.

Since the first day of the operation, both Turkish military and political authorities have repeatedly pointed out that the operation is targeting only YPG/PKK terrorists in order to establish security and maintain stability along Turkey’s borders as much as to protect civilians from the YPG cruelty, already known to thousands of locals who were forced to leave their houses by force of arms.

Turkey marks significant developments in the defense industry. Undoubtedly, the project of developing indigenously-developed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) is among the country’s leading innovations. Manufacturing and using indigenously produced drones contributed to Turkey’s counter-terror fight to a great extent in recent months. Therefore, the developments in UAV technologies and their place in the defense industry constitute a considerable object of interest. SETA Foundation’s Strategy Program Director Hasan Basri Yalçın and researcher Abdullah Erboğa conducted an interview with Haluk Bayraktar, the General Manager of Baykar Makina, which presents important information regarding Turkey’s position in the field.

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The requirement of building a national and domestic defense industry has been highlighted in Turkey for a long time and we have lately observed that Turkey has achieved rapid progress in terms of developing UAVs. What kind of a transformation has Turkey experienced in the defense industry? Was there any critical turning point?

In Turkey, major steps were taken in the defense industry during the early Republican period. A number of national entrepreneurs and businessmen such as Nuri Demirağ, Vecihi Hürkuş, Şakir Zümre and Nuri Kılligil formed a convention in this respect. These names used to embrace their jobs as a mission. During the late 1940s, their initiatives were interrupted with the Marshall Plan aid that was introduced after Turkey’s strategic decision was shaped by the U.S. during World War II. Instead of the national entrepreneur/businessman model, the businessman model based on distributing important foreign brands was preferred. The question as to why Turkey does not yet have a domestic automobile partially stems from such choices made at the time. With the Marshall Plan aid, our military was equipped with donated foreign armored vehicles, tanks and weapons instead of domestic weapons.

The interrupted phase resumed with the Cyprus incidents in 1974, as during this period Turkey was subject to an arms embargo. It was during this era that the “make your own plane” campaign was re-initiated. Turkish Aerospace Industries Inc. (TAI) and Turkey’s leading defense systems producer ASELSAN were among the facilities established during this period. The period from the 1970s to early 2000s can be defined as the period of direct procurement and utilization from abroad. Meanwhile, joint production and montage activities were seen in certain projects.

In addition to manufacturing plants being found, a joint montage line of F-16 jets were also established with TAI in 1984. ASELSAN was established in 1974 as a consequence of the embargo imposed following the Cyprus Operation. Following ASELSAN’s establishment, while the U.S. continued to donate radios to Turkey, these were not used solely in order to encourage the operations of ASELSAN. There was another turning point as of 2004. It is argued that the hood event was the main factor triggering this since the turning point did not occur solely with the effect of a civilian initiative. Some military factors were also in play and we were direct witnesses of this period.  From the 1990s onward, the “network centric warfare” strategy gained prominence across the world and software and electronic components came into prominence in platforms. This reflected the possibility that those weapons might be used against us unless an investment was made within our own means. With advancing technologies, this situation became even more clear. Everything was mechanic a century ago, and electronic software dramatically changed the modes in the industry.

The turning point occurred in 2004 due to the fact that major bids corresponding to several billion dollars were on the agenda during the previous five years, such as bids on UAVs, tanks and helicopters. All of these were canceled and a domestic and original development model began to be implemented in 2004. The model was implemented in the field of UAVs in the most outstanding way. So, Turkey’s current position in the field of UAV technologies is the result of gradual process. Although it was really interrupted – for instance we confronted numerous obstacles as Baykar – a will was certainly displayed in this respect and we are now living the outcomes of this will.

UAVs in Counter-Terrorism

UAV technologies have developed at a rapid pace – is this because they are more producible or did the field emerge as a strategic necessity in the context of counter-terrorism?

Both factors have been effective. UAV technologies do really create the effect of force multiplier in operations as combatant force cannot properly be employed unless the targets are pinpointed. In addition, the conditions stemming from asymmetrical warfare environments increase the need for UAVs. It also presents a couple of advantages in terms of production and technological improvement. Each move made in this scope can take you to the cutting edge since UAV technologies experience a paradigm shift in aviation industry. While the previous century was based on a platform-focused aviation, the current focal points of the sector include themes like electronics, software and artificial intelligence.

Military systems are the top platforms. Below them are main subsystems, material technologies and their components. This field is required to encompass both military qualifications and military standards. For instance, if you are developing tanks, an enterprise cannot randomly step up to develop tanks. It is not easy to compete in a field that has remained steady since the Second World War. But an enterprise can develop domestic and independent UAVs, as we did, and can yield successful results. Thanks to the initiatives we made around a decade ago, we can develop and manufacture our local UAVs in our country and put them into the service of our military.

Is this because tanks are more complicated?

Rather than being complicated, it is a system that was developed a long time ago and so therefore it is not very easy to make groundbreaking moves in this field. As UAV technologies are newly developing, no specific standards or qualifications are requested for it. No one puts emphasis on certain qualifications in this field across the world as technology is always ahead of legal regulations. Besides being a newly-developing technology, UAVs do not have established main sub-industries when their subsystems and components are viewed. For example, in the automotive sector, all components can be found in the market from alternators to the most basic ones. It is a stable sector unlike the newly-developing UAV industry and for this very reason, it enables a great deal of flexibility. So many components from civilian sectors can be incorporated into the UAV industry. We call this “off-the-shelf material.” For example, suppose that you are developing the flight control system of an UAV.  It is a computer system that stabilizes the aircraft and enables it to automatically follow the routes identified and uploaded by you. You develop a software to create this system. Also, you need to work on the computer’s electronic equipment design and architecture. You create this design and architecture, and gather the components forming the computer such as its processor, diode and transistor. While you devise an authentic board design, you can purchase the components off-the-shelf since you have access to them for civilian and commercial purposes. This thus allows for the rapid improvement of the UAV industry.

Do you think there has been a critical point in the international arena where the need for UAVs has increased? Such as the Gulf War and the Second Iraq War to give examples from the past. Do you think the progress of UAV technologies accelerated at a certain point?

When you consider the literature, an example of this are the target drones used by the U.S. in Bosnia. There are also reconnaissance drones. Prior to that, drones were used in the Beqaa Valley by Israel. Israel is intensively employing such technologies in wars. We know that they were used in the most intensive way in the aftermath of 9/11. In a sense, this is due to the fact that the opportunities offered by technology make it possible to utilize UAVs in such operations.

While not that common in the Gulf War, AWACS (the E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System) was used in Kosovo.

During the Gulf War, the U.S. did not have an established UAV technology yet. Especially following the results obtained through GNAT UAV in Kosovo, its upgraded version Predator was predominantly used in that area. Meanwhile, Turkey was among the first countries importing GNAT UAVs. We purchased ten of them in 1994 but did not use GNAT or I-GNAT systems in the following years. Their average duration of flight is around 100 hours, which is incredibly low. They were not used then possibly due to the fact that our military structure and outlook on this technology was different.

New Generation Wars and UAVs

There was the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) issue during the 1990s. From now on, military conflicts will arise not because of the problems caused by the industrial revolution but of the problems arising from information revolution. The network centric warfare will be out in the open and all systems will operate interdependently, which is called “system of systems.” Such a state was commonly seen during the 1990s and early 2000s, but there is a claim suggesting that firepower is still effective especially with the start of proxy wars. Which period do you think UAVs belong to?

Considering the phenomenon of network centric warfare, UAV systems encompass many different technologies including communication, sensor, processor, command and control technologies. As a matter of fact, the progress made in these technologies make us effective. For example, sorting out some communication systems allows one to develop satellite communication and a broadband communication system that is higher than the line of sight. This makes you acquire the ability to transmit images with very high resolutions. Or, the sensor you develop becomes portable in drones. In other words, UAVs will have the same function with AWACS. Consequently, technology and practice are parallel to each other. This is the point where network centric warfare comes into play. It enables regarding each component in the battlefield as a communication instrument or a sensor while enabling the reciprocal transmission of data at certain hierarchic layers.

UAV technologies are the direct outcome of network centric warfare as UAVs do not mean anything alone. For example, the aircrafts developed by Bayraktar are flying day and night, both inside and outside the country borders. From the moment, they take off, all the data is gradually transmitted to all centers and monitored by the top level. When an engagement decision is issued, it is conveyed to the base that flies the relevant jet. So, the system operates within a hierarchy of network centric warfare. Imagine a ground control station that flies a drone by itself. It has a pilot and a payload operator. It flies the drone, and while monitoring it, the image is simultaneously conveyed to various centers including brigade command and general staff, and each of them issue a decision on their own level. Then these decisions are transmitted to the system from a certain base.

The practices in the concept of network centric warfare depend on how far the developed technologies comply with this structure. Currently, our UAVs use a home-grown virtual globe, namely the Geographical Analysis System (CAS) developed by Piri Reis company. This is a software-based mapping technology. About a decade ago, the country did not have such a chance: Let’s say you are launching operations in a certain region. As teams change, you did not have a chance to analyze and filter the data of the previous team, which impedes the formation of strong ties. Now we have a software system operating above servers. All data is live. Everyone involved in the process enters their data and each one has the opportunity to see everything live. This is actually a component of the network centric warfare.

Turkey’s UAV capacity

How would you assess Turkey’s position in UAV technologies from a global perspective?

From 2004 onwards, Turkey displayed a will in this field that was reflected to the specifications of the Undersecretary of Defense Industries (SSM), which is the procurement authority. The necessity of being home-grown and authentic is asked in all the critical components as part of the specifications. Some criteria were adopted and implemented in this respect. For example, purchasing a component from a local supplier who buys it from abroad is not considered national. We started with micro UAVs and thought that starting from such a point was the most crucial factor.

As a matter of fact, this is another dimension represented by UAVs. In the previous century, aviation was completely based on aircrafts, air vehicles and platforms, but this has changed with the advent of UAVs. It has evolved into a technology solely focusing on electronic software and guidance and control systems. To give an example, we are currently developing all the components of UAVs including their flight control systems, frames, server systems that operate ailerons, batteries, power systems and ground command and control. Aeronautics and aircraft engineering constitute only 10 percent of this. In other words, designing the airframe is 10 percent of the overall job.

To explain our position, I can say that Turkey is among the countries that use UAVs intensively. Also, aircrafts keep developing as long as they fly. You can develop them. But an aircraft waiting in hangar cannot take you anywhere. It causes you trouble. In this sense, Turkey has significant experiences.

I think Turkey is among the top five or six countries that can use UAVs effectively in operational terms. Thanks to the contribution of the companies that have developed this technology in an authentic way like we have done, this experience has come to the fore. We started from the bottom of the ladder, and have come to our current position by gradually growing. Of course, we will keep our progress. Technology is a race. But one of the most important factors that will contribute to this progress is the experience of using them in the field. This factor will take us even further. Experience, identification of necessities, and additions on the system based on the feedback we have: These are the factors that improve us. No improvement can be achieved without practice.

What is the exact process? Does the military request a specific technology from you or do you develop and serve the technology to the army? Can the political and bureaucratic bodies rapidly respond to the technological improvements?

Bayraktar Mini UAV is the first system we developed. The SSM was the first one demanding Bayraktar Mini UAV. They invited us and other companies according to an invitation method based on competition and everyone developed and presented an aircraft model through their own means without any research and development support. We ranked first and the grounds of Bayraktar Mini was thus laid. For example, Malazgirt rotating-wing UAV is a project we kicked off with our own initiative. We also took initiative in many other things such as Bayraktar Tactical Bloc 2 without any demand from the procurement authority. We call it embracing duty as a mission. It happens very often. The structure in Turkey needs to change, and it is gradually changing. Currently, the military is the consuming body while the the SSM is the procurement authority. And the industry is the producer. The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) has ten years procurement plans. Strategic plans and project necessities are determined based on these plans. The military reveals project needs by working within the structure and conveys the Project Definition Documents to the SSM. The documents state the needs and the SSM endeavors to meet the needs by means of the defense industry.

But to what extent is this technologically effective? How far are the country’s industrial infrastructure activities and competence concerned while determining the needs? This has many restrictions in terms of technology. Which feature is on which level? Which one needs more focus? To which one is our industry more inclined? As a matter of fact, various spheres across the country including industry and academia are required to take part in the process. In the U.S., there are test centers called battle space. Students, academics and entrepreneurs are invited to take part in exercises with the military. While we were testing Bayraktar Mini ten years ago in southeastern Turkey, military officers told us: “No one interacted with us like you did.” However, engineers must cooperate with the military as they need to see and feel the military’s necessities. If the military and engineers remain detached from each other, the process would not work out. We actually need a transformation in this structure. Currently, there is an array of procedures implemented in Turkey that begin with the manufacturing of the product after the needs are identified. They are currently more flexible and dynamic than a decade ago. As far as I see, the SSM can take on much more initiative. Such factors are also important in advancing the projects.

UAVs and the Regional Balance of Power

Among the regional rivals of Turkey such as Iran, Israel, Egypt and Russia, who are the actors we can compete with in the region?

Iran and Israel started their UAV works before us. They have been making a great deal of investment in the field. In some technological aspects such as guide control algorithms and navigation systems, we are more advanced than these countries. The triple-redundant flight control system we developed and the results we obtained clearly demonstrate that.

For instance, a triple-redundant flight control system has been used in a tactical UAV for the first time in the world. This is such a flight control system that the drone can manage its own taxiing, departure and navigation from the moment it departs hangar. It also has various automatic modes. The landing process is completely automatic and takes place with a triple-mode redundancy. The system automatically determines which landing mode is to be used according to the degree of the wind-force. It applies the brakes after it lands and then returns to hangar. This kind of automation is not available even in airliners yet. Bayraktar is the one who firstly employed this system in the UAVs of such size.

What about Israel’s Heron drones?

Turkey ordered 10 Herons from Israel in 2005. Some delays occurred in their delivery and the first delivery was made in 2010. But many malfunctions were subsequently encountered in the logistic process. Bayraktar TB2 UCAVs, on the other hand, have been in inventory since 2014 and they are currently much more advanced than Heron drones, which are procured for operational activities. This is due to the fact that it is an authentic system developed in line with latest technological advancements.

The U.S. provides a great deal of technological support to Israel. But we have observed that we are far more advanced especially in flight control algorithms and systems. To express more tangibly, Bayraktar TB2 has been in the air for 15.000 hours and it has been operating only for two years. Despite that, many results have been obtained. It is a fully automated system that manages all the phases of the flight on its own. Even the first prototype we developed in 2009 had automatic taxiing, departure and landing modes, while none of them was available in Heron. Heron drones were hired during these years, which were remotely controlled by Israeli pilots. The problems grew after those pilots left the country following the Gaza flotilla raid. In this sense, I can safely express that Turkey is far more advanced than these countries particularly in flight control systems.

Is there a distinction between the vehicles designed to be combatants and the ones that were subsequently used as combatants? For instance, do Bayraktar and other Turkish companies directly plan the vehicles as combatants?

As a matter of fact, Bayraktar TB2 was designed as a reconnaissance aircraft. What they demanded from us was an aircraft that reaches an altitude of 18.000 feet, carries 35 kg weight and flies for 10 hours. We developed an aircraft with further technical features and came up with a system that can reach an altitude of 27.000 feet, carry 100 kg, and fly for 24 hours so that it can carry ammunitions. But of course, it was not developed within the concept of offensive combat. Its airframe can make long-time flights. It also collects and transmits real time data and makes engagements in certain cases. When the types developed for offensive combat are considered, we need air vehicles that are much quicker, a little more maneuverable and with far more carrying capacity.

Does this transition require a qualitative or a quantitative distinction? Or is the distinction much sharper than this?

It is a very smooth and natural transition. There is no difference in terms of technology. It is actually a normal progress. So, what I said is aerodynamically true. There is no radical difference when you look at the subject through the lens of electronics or software.

Does this new platform require a new structuring?

It required a new hull. Also, we need to take certain steps regarding the turbine engine technology as a country. Our target is to become independent especially in critical components.

Domestic Engine Production

How can we solve the engine issue?

We do not have any problem with that since Bayraktar TB2 has a piston engine that can be procured from everywhere. But this is not the case for turbine engines, which have some constraints. Turkey is already investing in turbine technology with the support of the SSM. Also, it must be noted that the aim of developing home-grown and authentic drones is motivated by the will of improvement without depending on external sources. The whole system of Bayraktar TB2 was developed by Turkish engineers. As for the airframes, electronic systems, guidance and ground control systems, we can produce them as many as we desire whenever we wish. This is why they are national – 93 percent of it is home-grown. The average rate of this in the defense industry is currently around 50 percent. It is noteworthy that such an important technology is around 90 percent domestic while the average domesticity rate in the defense industry is around 50 percent. This is due to the fact that a considerably high added value can be provided when its electronics and software are developed.

Being domestic is crucial for the defense industry. This aspect is not so important for other civilian sectors such as the automotive sector. But in the defense industry, being domestic is really of critical importance since foreign producers can deny anything to you when defense is in question. There are many instances to that. Therefore, Turkey has taken certain platform-based steps with regard to critical components and now we are advancing in the field of main subcomponents and subsystems as well as the field of material technologies. We will keep our progress and hopefully reach the point we aim.

But still Turkey cannot procure combatant UAVs.

Piston engine, or internal combustion engine, is not a critical component for Bayraktar TB2. This product is manufactured in many places of the world since the technology for it has been in the market for a hundred years. Although being domestic is significant, there are some priorities for that. For instance, as Baykar, electronic software was a pivotal priority for us. Consequently, we endeavored to develop all the critical electronic and software components as completely home-grown in the first phase and now we are yielding the outcomes of this endeavor. In terms of engine, there is a serious need for tribune engines in the country. The SSM has been initiating and supporting programs in this respect. We are trying to come up with solutions that would consolidate our independence.

Suppose that you decide to make a combatant UAV, but it is not certain how long it will take for the tribune developing company, which was awarded the contract by the SSM to develop this. Do such situations affect your projects?

Sure, they do. But they have certain road maps. The SSM released the roadmap for UAVs for the first time. Maybe you have read about this. There is a road map encompassing the period until 2035 which also touches upon the engine issue. They are also engaging in activities of coordination regarding this. So, the SSM is trying to make a coordination, exerting efforts to prevent programs from conflicting each other.

What kind of advantages do the combatant UAVs offer in the concept of asymmetrical war?

They offer very important advantages. Above all, they can stay in the air for a long time. They can exercise assignments in dangerous spots for long durations without being located. In this sense, they bring a great advantage.

What if satellite technology would be more advanced? Do you have any plans regarding the use of satellite technology?

We are not using satellite in our current communications system as we are communicating in the line of sight by installing antenna systems in certain centers. You can think of it as a base station. Satellite communication is not so necessary for the vehicle we developed.

What kind of experiences have you gained from the Operation Euphrates Shield? Is there any point you find important in this context?

Over the course of the Operation Euphrates Shield, Bayraktar TB2 vehicles offered support to our troops from the air as far as the weather conditions allowed. Of course, we have gained some important experiences. For example, the project of central command and control system emerged as a result of this.

Turkey’s border security cannot be maintained only by the physical presence of border posts along the border of the country, but needs a holistic approach that requires an efficient border management system and intelligence capacity for pre-emptive measures on both sides of the border.

The Limits of Authority

Turkish law assigns three military forces to securing the borders. The Turkish Army is responsible for the protection of land borders while territory under water at the coasts is directed to Turkish Coast Guard Command and air space is under the coverage of the Turkish Air Force. But Turkish law flags the Ministry of Interior as the authorized body for the border affairs through provincial Governors. Customs, on the other hand, is under the Ministry of Customs and Trade. Hence the laws pertaining to border affairs involve three different ministries, which may make coordination more difficult, although their lines of authority are clearly demarcated. But the issues of centralization and the unity of command to cover all borders are concerns, especially if the Turkish General Staff is added to this list, since the law also gives it authority in some respects.

Border Security Architecture

Turkish borders are far longer than many European borders, and have a complicated terrain. Hence the usual approach by the European Union to secure borders does not meet the realities of the Turkish border coverage. For this reason, Turkey is confronted with numerous challenges to design a new sui generis architectural structure to secure her borders in accordance with new threats, security needs, and geographical positions and domestic/foreign policy choices. Turkey needs to tighten security measures and augment the current structure along the Syrian and Iraqi borders because of the demographic facts, contradictory political strategies of outer powers, and the presence of secessionist groups.

Initially, a promising border security architecture needs to be constructed upon the regional characteristics of Turkey’s borders and its neighbourhood. The issues include illegal immigration, human trafficking, goods and drug trafficking, infiltration by terror networks, communication between divided families and tribes, reconnaissance and surveillance activities of neighbouring states, potential conflicts over disputed islands and isles, and containing crises surrounding Turkey in their countries of origin.

Aside from static factors (like geography) and a global power struggle in the Middle East, there are also other dynamics or newly-emerging factors forcing Turkey to improve security at its borders. For instance, since the 1990s Turkey has long been faced with illegal immigration stemming from migrants and refugees fleeing from conflict zones such as Iraq, Syria, Iran and Afghanistan in order to reach Europe. These problems, which no state actors aside from Turkey face, require a determined stance at the borders with active and pre-emptive undertakings to respond to all the listed concerns.

Contrary to the security picture, the relevant Turkish law limits the border security units by having them stay in designated zones except in exceptional circumstances, meaning securing the area requires an active and flexible border security strategy. An active border security strategy should have a holistic and flexible nature based on a functional decision making process that addresses concerns far beyond the borders. Regarding these static and dynamic risk factors, Turkey should reconstruct the border architecture with more ‘preventive’ security measures which would go beyond the formal distance limits determined in the applicable law.

More precisely, Turkey needs to adopt and implement a much more ‘proactive border security strategy’ than ever before, in order to meet current and urgent needs for detecting and deterring security threats. The border units must have the capability of confronting threats, mainly emanating from international terror networks.

A “proactive border strategy”

Accordingly, national law as well as the implications of cross-border legislation should be reviewed and a “proactive border strategy” should be reformulated after determining and describing the focus and scope of the new border policy, instruments to be developed for tasks and tools to be used for control mechanisms. Likewise, this new architecture must allow dispatching through a central control center while possessing an enriched and authorized structure in terms of intelligence tools, technologically-oriented border control systems, deeply echeloned and retaliation capabilities. What is intended with the word ‘integrative’ when speaking of new border architecture is not to demarcate borders by land, sea or air but rather taking border incidents in all their three-dimensional aspects; hence using the accurate and efficient tools that are available to the state.

By adopting such a holistic approach, no matter what kind of challenges are being confronted, the crucial thing is determining the engagement rules which will be then comprehensively enforced by all government bodies, in the light of previously defined policies and strategies of the Turkish state. However along with the provincial governors who are the national authorities responsible for the administrative tasks in implementing border management policy, it is necessary to create a new organization that can coordinate the entire capabilities of the state. Hence a centralized border organization, like a Directorate of Border Security, is a vital need to track all reported events, create a rapid decision-making mechanism and guide the relevant border units in accordance with the policies and strategies of the Turkish Government. Thus, a management system for land, sea and air borders appears to be a pre-condition for efficient coordination and integration of efforts.

The second issue appears to be the intelligence organizations and assets possessed by border units. Within the overall framework of border security management, deploying the assigned (frontier) personnel in watchtowers or on monitoring/surveillance activities run by these personnel at the borders is not merely inadequate but also potentially risky. On the other hand, considering the wide terrain which a border battalion is in charge of, technology-focused solutions must be taken into account with a broader perspective of border security.

Turkey has modernized the equipment used by its border units/troops, and also has procured and deployed armored vehicles equipped with long-range detection and tracking systems in recent years. Furthermore, Turkey has developed various projects related to the procurement and use of unmanned aerial vehicle systems (UAVs) on the borders as well as accelerated procurement of foreign and domestically produced surveillance balloons. As a result of these developments, many positive steps have been taken towards implementing a comprehensive border security strategy. These efforts have without doubt contributed to securing the border and augmenting force protection of Turkish border units.

Technology-focused solutions

As for intelligence-driven border security, it is an undeniable fact that technology-focused solutions are crucial in intelligence-related systems. Due to the high insecurity level in risk-based environments, border guards/units on all levels should be legally authorized and equipped with high-tech intelligence systems in order to detect, deter and prevent threats effectively. In particular, the threat of infiltration or attempted attacks on Turkish troops by terrorist organizations harboring separatist tendencies deployed across the Iraq and Syria borders can be diminished by establishing an integrated and effective working intelligence mechanism.

Ground radars and thermal cameras, for instance, can be used for short range surveillance tasks. Mini-UAVs can fly up to 15 km while tactical and operative level UAVs are allotted for strategic collation tasks. But border units should see far beyond these limits to identify threats by exploiting high-tech intelligence assets of various intelligence disciplines to verify or falsify suspected border threats long before they are close to Turkish borders. The integration and coordination of border units’ intelligence gathering will provide early warnings to all positioned border units before any potential attack occurs.

The threat of terror emanating from Syria and Iraq especially calls for Turkey to prevent infiltration and attacks by these networks using effective intelligence systems. To construct such an intelligence system, Turkish border units need to extend their surveillance capacities 50-100 km at both sides of the border at battalion level for tactical purposes. Furthermore, strategic intelligence systems need to be procured that can be directed to 200 km at least. These assets are not only ground radars, but all sorts of intelligence assets. An integrated all source intelligence system; say combining assets of imagery, open source, human, measurement and signature, signal intelligence at tactical and operative level appears to be the essential system needed for border security.

In order to secure the homeland, it is key to ensure border security, to prevent the illegal crossing of humans and goods. Hence current border security needs to be bolstered with a new security architecture. The current border security of Turkey is functional and adequate, but needs to be improved by, first, an efficient management system that coordinates the involved institutions of four ministries. Secondly, high-tech products rather than human-based solutions, mainly intelligence capabilities, appear to be an urgent field requirement to detect border threats before they are too close to combat. A multi-disciplinary intelligence perception is needed to build such a system.

Turkey has long been in search of strengthening its border security and protecting its military bases, and for sure high value facilities, scattered in the mountains of south eastern Anatolia. Terrorist organizations based in Iraq and Syria, including the PKK/KONGRA-GEL/PYD/YPG/DEASH, frequently attempted to infiltrate Turkish territory either for attacking Turkish citizens or in a quest for gaining local support in the region. Turkey deployed its military and security forces along the border to prevent such undertakings while equipping troops with high-tech surveillance systems.

However, Turkey failed to enrich its UAV inventory via foreign procurement through Western, in particular Israeli, aviation firms as the primary suppliers, at the beginning of the 2000s. This era was a disappointing period for Turkey as the country had to confront a highly politicised Western defence industry. Without doubt, the invasion of Iraq, by US-led coalition forces, was a clear challenge for Turkey’s quest to procure intelligence and security assets. Turkey’s democratic choice not to participate to the invasion of Iraq hampered its desire to acquire these assets to counter terror threats. Persistent Threat Detection Systems (PTDS), or in Turkish military literature “surveillance balloons,” were one of these kinds of assets.

The initial efforts to acquire PTDS for the Turkish Army’s inventory were based on importing these systems from foreign suppliers, mainly US-based manufacturers. But the project could not be finalized until because of bureaucratic challenges stemming both from the US and Turkish decision-making mechanisms. A security expert claims that, in order to defend against casualty risks, there was an increasing demand on military intelligence assets to provide security for outposts facing imminent terror threats. This concern encouraged young and talented officers as well as non-commissioned officers of Turkish Armed Forces Intelligence School to build their own surveillance balloons by recycling scrapped equipment with a budget of just 1,100 TL (about $450 at the time). They had aimed to construct a cost-efficient system with simplified operating procedures that could be operated by regular soldiers with basic training.

Initially, dedicated Army soldiers conducted an experiment with a weather (meteorology) balloon on which they mounted re-purposed camera parts. They attached the balloon to a simple ground station with a cable that was bought in a local market. Although this first try was a failure, it was a big step. They replaced the balloon with the one made of a stronger fabric and upgraded the equipment with something more functional. The aim was simple: to have the altitude of the balloon be fixed at maximum of 500 meters and monitor any individual within a distance of 6 km. After unofficial consultations with the young soldiers, the Turkish technology giant ASELSAN agreed to sponsor the local amateur project.

ASELSAN provided old domestically manufactured equipment such as video cameras at no expense. With the aid from ASELSAN, a more sophisticated surveillance balloon could now be designed with a higher altitude and increased payload capacity. One problem left to be solved was having the balloon continue its surveillance task even if it was shot by light rifles. The shooting test was very successful after a private Turkish company in Ankara, OTONOM, manufactured a persistent and long lasting balloon. The balloon, which stayed aloft despite seven bullet holes in it, was also stabilized against harsh weather conditions by integrating additional fixing materials and software. Actually, the adventure of Turkish soldiers in building a surveillance balloon has pushed domestic private companies to start partnerships and pool their manufacturing capabilities to meet the needs of the Turkish Armed Forces. Hence, the project was in the hands of these companies afterwards.

The ASELSAN and OTONOM partnership produced surveillance balloons named “Global” (Küresel), a small balloon with 500 meters altitude, and the “Water Drop” (Su Damlası) with a maximum altitude of 1,000 meters. Apart from the ASELSAN-OTONOM partnership, Turkish satellite and cable network firm TURKSAT also developed another surveillance balloon with 800 meters altitude, which might be described as a medium-size PTDS in the defence market. TURKSAT, making deals with the foreign firms, enriched the competition in the emerging balloon sector.

The payloads of these Turkish surveillance balloons can be enhanced depending what the surveillance mission requires. Standard payloads include day and night cameras, laser pointers and radio relay systems. It is possible to integrate them to early warning systems used by ground troops in order to compliment, in other words “cueing,” other information collection efforts by integrated software. Furthermore, acoustic radar can also be mounted to detect explosions and movements of any sorts of vehicles. ASELSAN offers a great inventory of surveillance systems that can be integrated to any sort of these balloons.

Another option for the Turkish Army is the procurement of the PTDS from the Western defence market. In this context, Turkey is about to acquire two PTDS assets from the U.S. Army as a pledge. The U.S. Government granted two PTDSs from Lockheed Martin to the Turkish Army for countering illegal border crossing, especially by DEASH terrorists. The deal entails U.S. donation of the two PTDS assets at no expense for Turkey, but leaves maintenance responsibilities to Turkey. These PTDSs, most probably, will be have been used previously in Iraq or Afghanistan, and can be described as old and worn out. In order to maintain these systems, Turkey will need to meet their costs, and will be dependent on importing spare parts from abroad for them. Besides, the huge size of the balloon requires a huge amount of helium gas to run it, which reveals another challenging problem for the Turkish Army. However, this dependency creates an unwillingness within the circles of the Turkish Army to include these systems into its inventory or at least accept using them for urgent short-term needs until they are no longer functional.

The exploitation of the U.S. PTDS in Afghanistan is an indicator for whether it will meet the needs of the TAF and to see its efficiency. The PTDS was a distinguished intelligence asset for monitoring urban areas with its sensitive payload.  On the other hand, similar to small surveillance balloons, the PTDS of Lockheed Martin was strictly limited by harsh weather conditions; mainly wind, humidity, atmospheric pressure, cloud, and atmospheric electrical charge (including thunderstorms). Due to these shortcomings, the balloons were often grounded and fixed to command trailers. As in Afghanistan, harsh weather conditions along the border of Iraq and to some extent Syria, will hinder the effective exploitation of the U.S. PTDS.

Although the same weather conditions will certainly effect the functionality level of the Turkish surveillance balloons, their loss would be much more tolerable because they are domestically manufactured and cheap. The affordable cost of Turkish systems makes them more attractive than other PTDS products in the Western market. For instance, the cost of a PTDS manufactured by Lockheed Martin is around $15 to $20 million, which is prohibitive when it comes to usage in the rugged terrain conditions of Turkey. Thus, in order to cover the harsh terrain, security forces would probably demand additional PTDS assets over time. A comparison of terrain features of the U.S.-Mexican border and the Turkish-Iraq border illustrates this dilemma. The U.S. border is rather flat, so PTDS can serve for detecting illegal border crossings. On the contrary, the Turkish border with Iraq is full of rugged creeks, therefore several PTDS assets cannot provide either physical or border security since imagery intelligence (IMINT) assets require line of sight. Hence Turkey needs cost-efficient of surveillance balloons that could cover wide ranges that excludes the expensive PTDS.

As the Turkish Army’s priority is not solely based on border security, but also the force protection of ground troops, the needed surveillance balloons should be positioned for monitoring roads, neighbouring villages, and key terrain in the vicinity of military bases. For this purpose, the Turkish Army needs to procure small, mobile, easy to use surveillance balloons in large numbers. Basic military tasks such as target acquisition, directing fires, and location capturing ought to be the main capabilities of the surveillance system. The Turkish surveillance balloons offer such functions using simplified software. Software can be enhanced depending on the regional needs of Turkish Army in comparison to complicated and fixed software. Another advantage of the Turkish PTDS is the small number of operating personnel it requires. Just three personnel for each shift can run the system, which makes the entire 24 hour crew just nine personnel. On the other hand, the U.S. PTDS needs at least 10-12 personnel for each shift to run properly, corresponding to 30-36 operators over a 24-hour period, excluding team leaders.

Consequently, the indigenously developed surveillance balloons by ASELSAN-OTONOM, and to some extent TURKSAT, seem appropriate for the operational needs of the Turkish Army in comparison to the ones of outer market. They are mobile, small and simple systems to conduct surveillance and reconnaissance tasks in potential combat zones. Turkey’s technology is respondent to develop surveillance balloons and export to the other countries in need. Additionally, coast guard, police and gendarmerie forces, can also acquire these Turkish surveillance systems to complement existing threat detection systems, in order to monitor critical urban areas while countering crime.

Turkey’s fight against PKK terrorism dates back to early 1980s, and since that time, despite suffering from various unpleasant experiences, the Turkish military has made considerable progress towards enhancing skills, knowledge and expertise in many areas in dealing with counter-terrorism operations. On the other hand, despite all the advanced conventional war-fighting capabilities or highly sophisticated weapons systems acquired, none of these favorable conditions should be taken for granted, for it would mean neglecting needs and capacity assessments for the success of future military operations in both rural and urban terrains.

These assessments are critical to preparing and supporting the armed forces for the challenges of changing operational situations that will likely occur under any scenario in future conflicts.

Identifying and meeting the perceived and actual needs of the military remains as crucial as ever for establishing a much more comprehensive, timely, and effective response to prevent terrorist attacks.

In particular, the military’s technology readiness for implementing countermeasures to protect its aircraft is a key issue, especially considering the most recent Man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) attack by the PKK.

On 13 May 2016, PKK militants dressed in camouflage fatigues shot down an armed AH-1W Super Cobra helicopter capable of close air support using what appears to be either a SA-16 or SA-18 MANPADS missile.  The helicopter had been dispatched to provide support to soldiers at the Çığlı base, in the Çukurca district of Hakkari province, near the Iraqi border.  PKK militants had killed six soldiers at the base, and the helicopter’s downing martyred the two pilots on board.

This is not the first time that PKK militants have successfully used such portable and shoulder-fired systems to hit military helicopters. Over the decades-long war between Turkey and the PKK, the PKK has downed one AH-1W Super Cobra, one AS-532 Cougar, as well as an S-70A Black Hawk.  On May 18, 1997, the AH-1W Super Cobra and AS-532 Cougar were shot down on 18 May, 1997, in the very same Çukurca district as the most recent attack, using a SA-7B (9K32M Strela-2M). The S-70A Black Hawk, meanwhile, was downed by an RPG-7 (rocket-propelled grenade) in Northern Iraq, on February 24, 2008.

A Highly-Effective, Cheap, and Easy to Use System to Bring Down Aircraft

The SA-7/14/16/18 – like their US-manufactured Stinger counterparts, which were used highly effectively in the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan – is designed to meet the low altitude air defense needs of ground units.

Armies have always wanted an air defense system with a low cost, that can easily be used and requires minimal training, and is maintenance free for use on the battlefield. Two generations of MANPADS have been manufactured, and both can be used by a single soldier alone, but need two soldiers to carry them.

A basic MANPADS consists of the launch tube, the missile, and battery.  Several generations of the weapons exist, with the earliest types being guided by the user simply firing toward the target, and later ones, including the SA-7/14/16/18 and Stinger series, using the heat signature left by aircraft engines to hone in on their targets. Other, more sophisticated MANPADS are also used, some requiring aircraft to “paint” a target so the missiles can close in on them, and others guided during flight by an operator on the ground, yet these require extensive training and additional resources to be present on the battlefield.

The 13 May PKK attack likely used a heat-seeking SA-16 or SA-18 MANPADS.

The “kill box” – the cylindrical area it can hit a target with the shooter at the center – for the most advanced MANPADS is approximately 10,000 meters in diameter and 5,000 meters high.

They are highly effective weapons: with well-trained personnel shooting a target within the kill box, the systems have a 95% kill ratio against fixed wing aircrafts, and a 98% kill ratio for rotary wing aircrafts like helicopters.  Even older generations, like the Stingers used against Soviet aircraft in Afghanistan in the 1980s, had high kill-ratios: according to US military assessments, of 340 missiles fired, 269 hit their targets.

An SA-18 MANPADS takes just 5 or 10 seconds after being activated to fire, and can fly for the next 17 seconds at speeds more than three times the speed of sound  approximately 1,200 km/h at sea level).

The target’s only option after the missile is fired to try and evade it as quickly as possible.  Countermeasures like firing flares to confuse the missiles’ heat seeking systems have become increasingly ineffective, especially since the 3rd generation of MANPADS, because of the speed of the missile itself and the short amount of time it takes to reach the target.

Missiles also tend to have proximity fuse mechanisms, so that if the target take evasive action and change its flying direction, the missile’s on-board computer will decide not to wait for a collision before detonating, exploding the warhead as near as possible to the target. The missile’s warheads are thus designed to explode in fragments, to create as wide a zone of destruction as possible in cast the target is not actually hit directly.

The weapons systems are also quite cheap, with some costing less that $10,000 to manufacture, making it a good choice for bringing down a $2 million MI-17 helicopter.

Easily Proliferated and A Natural Choice for Non-State Actors

The Russian-made SA series MANPADS are especially selling to many countries, and easy to find in the open weapon market. There are some training simulators for western products, but a typical MANPADS is very easy to use after one real try.

So we have a weapon system that is cheap, easy to use, easy to find, maintenance free, and can be used against all aircraft for low altitude air defense purposes. MANPADS weapons are combat-proven systems, especially since the Afghanistan and Kosovo Wars. With these qualities, non-state actors like the PKK will prefer MANPADS for their arsenal for future needs.

The only military option against this threat is to eliminate its supply routes, and develop some supporting technology against MANPADS.

Within this context, a critical discussion needs to be had on the possibility of using unmanned aircraft, UAVs, to enhance low-altitude air defense capabilities. With MANPADS so easily available, and so often being used by the PKK, a greater shift needs to be made towards UAVs, which will not have the same human cost as a conventional aircraft if shot down, and can be used to monitor and counter militants on the ground more effectively.

The Turkish Army’s bitter experiences, such as the PKK’s recent attack near the Çığlı military zone, highlights the unanticipated consequences of shortfalls and limitations in countermeasure abilities against MANPADS, and draws attention to the need to strengthen capabilities for detecting, locating, identifying, and defeating targets through UAVs.