Brexit Archives - Politics Today https://politicstoday.org/tag/brexit/ Sat, 11 Nov 2023 06:20:50 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.4.8 The EU’s Two-Dimensional Thinking about Integration is Myopic: Interview with Hans Kundnani https://politicstoday.org/eu-integration-interview-hans-kundnani/ Sat, 11 Nov 2023 06:20:50 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/eu-integration-interview-hans-kundnani/

Eurowhiteness may come off as unpalatable to many pro-Europeans, but it raises valuable questions about the place of culture and race in the European project.

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n Eurowhiteness, Hans Kundnani, Associate Fellow in the Europe Programme at Chatham House, challenges a sanitized and linear history of the EU, prompting the reader to rethink Europe’s peaceful image against its imperial past. He goes on to tackle myopic assumptions about the European project throughout the book.

Kundnani argues that pro-Europeans, who cradled cosmopolitanism and renounced nationalism, have failed to perceive the reality of European regionalism. This provocative critique dissects both the civic and ethnic elements that shape European identity by highlighting Europe’s interaction with the “Other” and linking “Europeanness” and “whiteness.” 

Eurowhiteness may come off as unpalatable to many pro-Europeans, but it raises valuable questions against a backdrop of a rising far-right in Europe. Especially in the wake of the 2015 refugee crisis, the complex relationship between European identity and race demands urgent reflection.

Q. What are some of the myths that cause blind spots in understanding the European identity?

I would mention two in particular. The first is the idea that the EU is a cosmopolitan project. Cosmopolitanism usually has something to do with the whole world, and Europe is not the whole world. There’s a tendency by pro-Europeans and the EU to mistake Europe for the world. For example, when they talk about European integration, they sometimes seem to think that they’re talking about global integration, but they’re not.

Similarly, when they say “I’m a European or I’m a European citizen,” they seem to think they’re saying I’m a citizen of the world, but they’re not; They’re saying I’m a citizen of this particular region that has a very particular history and relationship with the rest of the world.

This is what I call in Eurowhiteness “the of myth of cosmopolitanism in Europe”, and related to that is the idea to think European integration is good for the whole of the world, but that may not necessarily be the case; It may be good for Europeans or may not be good for Europeans, arguably. But even if it is good for Europeans, it’s not clear if it’s good for the whole world.

The second myth would be that the EU is a peace project, and that is not entirely wrong. However, the way that pro-Europeans talk about it is sometimes simplistic; that after 1945 Europeans rejected war, and since then Europeans stand for peace. In reality, Europeans did not reject war in general in 1945. They only rejected war with each other.

In 1950 as the Schuman Declaration, which can be seen as the beginning of the idea of the EU as a peace project, is made by France’s then-foreign minister Robert Schumann, France is simultaneously fighting a brutal colonial war in Indochina.

Similarly, seven years later, when the Treaty of Rome is signed, France fought a brutal colonial war in Algeria. This demonstrates that Europeans are continuing to fight colonial wars until they’re defeated or exhausted.

Europeans like to think of themselves as being uniquely peaceful. The real story is more complicated, and in particular, as I say, to the extent that Europeans have rejected military force, it is military force within what has become the European Union, not even within Europe at large, that is being rejected.

Read: Superstates: Empires of the Twenty-First Century

Q. Has the EU’s focus shifted from peace to power?

I wouldn’t say it has shifted from being about peace to being about power. I think it was always about power as well as peace. In particular, it gets to what I was just saying about the idea of the EU as a peace project.

If you go back to the interwar period pan-European movement, which is the inspiration for the post-War European integration project, it is very clear that at that time already that the European integration project is about power and the perception of European decline accelerated by fighting one other.

The idea is: If we want to maintain our position in the world – and at that time this is a position of colonial domination- we have to stop fighting with each other. Not so that we can end European colonialism, but so that we can continue it. So in other words, European integration would take the competitive element out of European colonialism, allowing its practice collectively.

Part of the point of European integration in 1950s was for France and Belgium to consolidate their colonies in Central and West Africa at a time when they were no longer able to on their own. In particular, they needed an injection of West German capital.

The idea of geopolitical Europe goes back to the 1920s. It only seems new because pro-Europeans like to tell a story of Europe through the aforementioned myths. It only seems like a shift because we’ve forgotten the real history of how European integration began.

Q. Does the EU still export the European social model and the general welfare state?

Social market economy and the welfare state are no longer what the EU can to claim export anymore. It may have done once, but even in Central and Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War we observe that this is not the case. In fact, the former communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe had much more generous welfare states when they were communist countries.

What happened as they joined the EU during the enlargement process is that those welfare states were dismantled as part of their transition to democracy. There are obviously lots of things that you can criticize about the communist systems in those countries, such as the lack of political freedom and so on, but they did have welfare states.

What has happened now is a further stage in which the EU is putting pressure on member states to dismantle the welfare state. For example, during the euro crisis, the austerity Germany imposed on Greece dismantled what was left of the Greek welfare state.

Read: The Resettlement of Refugees: A Test for European Values

Q. Your book suggests that civic ideas of Europe are being replaced by ethnic-cultural ones. What is the connection of the neoliberalization of Europe to identity politics?

What I try to show in the book is that there have always been both of the elements of civic and ethnic-cultural idea in the history of what I call European regionalism- which is similar to nationalism on a larger continental scale. I’m suggesting that we can think of the history of ideas of Europe in the way we think about the history of nations. Therefore, regionalism is like nationalism.

The earliest ideas of Europe are predominantly ethnic-cultural. For example, in the medieval period, Europeanness is synonymous with Christianity. From the modern period onwards, you begin to get civic ideas of Europe. Then, in the post war period is when the EU came closest to evolving into a purely civic regionalism. Particularly, in the period from the 60s to the 90s-2000s, there was an idea of Europe centered on the social market economy, the welfare state and depoliticized mode of governance which European integration had produced.

I think what’s happened is that the social market economy and the welfare state have been hollowed out by neoliberalism in the EU. Meanwhile, there has been a backlash against the depoliticised mode of governance where the older civic idea of Europe is no longer persuasive in the same way it was before.

The way I understand neoliberalism is not just financialization, but it’s also the depoliticization of economic policy. In other words, it’s taking economic policy out of the space of democratic contestation. Although, to some extent, this has happened in the whole world in the last 30-40 years through things like the World Trade Organisation rules, the EU has taken it further through the creation of the single market, and also the Eurozone and the fiscal rules. Therefore, it’s very difficult now to pursue a left wing economic policy in the Eurozone because the fiscal rules don’t allow you to do it.

My argument is basically that when you take economic policy out of the space of democratic contestation and no longer have big fights between left and right about economic policy, your democratic politics shifts to cultural questions.

The point of democratic politics is to reconcile different interests and to have fights about questions where people in your society have different ideas or different interests. I think a healthy democratic politics is one where you do that about economic issues because there are real differences between the interests and different ideas as well.

What has happened now is that the center left parties and the center right parties converged in the center around neoliberal economic policy, which the EU has constitutionalized. Therefore, the way parties can differentiate themselves from each other now is around cultural questions.

In terms of what Europe says to the rest of the world, there was a time it would say it stood for the social market economy and the welfare state and now it says it stands for European civilisation.

A good example of this is the phrase “the European way of life,” which used to be used by French socialists, specifically, to refer to the social market economy and the welfare state and the idea of solidarity that it was meant to embody, saying “that’s what we in Europe stand for as opposed to the United States.”

Now when you look at the way that the phrase is used, it is in more civilizational terms. In the current European Commission, the Commission of Ursula Von Der Leyen since 2019, a European Commissioner for promoting the European way of life and his job is to keep migrants out, which makes it very explicit that migrants- only migrants from the South, not migrants from the east- are a threat to the European way of life. That is a very explicit expression of civilizationalism where the European way of life is defined in terms of culture and civilisation, not in terms of the social market economy and the welfare state.

Read: The Fear of Decline: Cultural Pessimism in Europe

Q. In your book you imply that the center right is increasingly mimicking the far right. Is there a pro-European version of the great replacement theory, if so, what is it?

There is an idea that the EU represents a European civilisation which is being increasingly threatened. This is basically a far right idea that has now been taken on by the center right in Europe.

For example, a couple of weeks ago, Eric Zemmour was doing a rally in the South of France with the young far right leader Marion Maréchal, and the slogan on the lectern at which he was speaking was ‘Defend our civilization.’  The way the far right is thinking about Europe is there’s a European civilisation that is threatened right now. The far right tends to talk about this in the context of migration. That is, it’s the migration of non-white and non-Christian people that is threatening European civilisation.

For example, Valérie Pécresse, the Republican candidate in the French Presidential election in 2022, was talking about white replacement theory or alluding to it in terms of migration. However, in addition, what the centre right tends to do is not talk so much about migration as a racial threat, but more in foreign policy terms as a threat to European civilisation. Macron has given speeches where he’s quite explicit about this.

In other words, international politics is a clash of civilizations, like how Samuel Huntington argues, and Europe is a distinct civilization. Moreover, for someone like Macron, the West is not one civilization, which is what Huntington thought but that Europe is a distinct civilisation, separate from the United States as well.

Where I see a connection with great replacement theory is that this is almost the international political equivalent of the great replacement theory. It’s not about migration but it’s that if Europe does not unite and defend itself, it will be also replaced by other civilizations. Macron has basically said that.

Q. What are some key takeaways from history regarding Europe’s interaction with those who it sees as the “Other”?

I try to show in Eurowhiteness that there’s a long history of defining Europe against various different “Others” at various different times and it’s constantly shifting. But roughly, I would say, in the medieval period when Europe is pretty much synonymous with Christianity, Jews are defined as the primary internal other and Muslims as the primary external other, excluding the divide between Western Christendom and Eastern Christendom.

Then, in the modern period, I try to show how there is a new complex modern idea of Europe, which is partly to do with the European enlightenment and the scientific revolution. It is a rationalist, secular idea of Europe rather than a religious one. At the same time, the idea of Europe also emerges in the context of the encounter of Europeans with the populations of Africa and Asia, and especially the Americas, and that’s the context in which the idea of whiteness emerges.

So, the modern idea of Europe is not just a rationalist one as opposed to a religious one, it’s also a more racialized idea of Europe that is closely connected to the idea of whiteness. What I think happens in that context is that non-white people around the world are the “Others” against which Europeans define themselves.

In the 20th century and particularly after World War I, you have the new idea of Europe as a geopolitical bloc, which I mentioned earlier. European civilisation or the European spirit, as they talked about it at that time, is being threatened by the United States on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other hand. In that context, Russia and also the United States are respectively an “Other.” What I think we’re seeing today is a mixture of all of those “Others.”

Read: The Future of Far-Right Parties in Europe

Q. In the context of the current European enlargement talks, how does Eurowhiteness influence the accession process for Eastern European countries and Turkey?

Enlargement is back and it has very quickly become the central priority for the EU, including the question of how to reform the EU in order to get it ready for enlargement. But it is quite extraordinary that there’s all these discussions regarding enlargement and the topics surrounding it such as reform and the countries awaiting membership, namely Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and even the Western Balkans, and Turkey has never been mentioned at all.

I was watching a discussion online that the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), a foreign policy think tank, was having- a 90-minute long discussion about exactly these questions and Turkey was never mentioned. Nobody thought to even bring it up. This is an answer to your question of how eurowhiteness plays into the EU enlargement.

It’s apparent that this time is very different from the “big bang” enlargement in the 2000s. Enlargement is now thought about in a much more civilizational way. Ukraine is in and Turkey is out.

When it comes to the Western Balkans the situation is complex, given not just their histories but also the different populations that they have.

The way I’ve described it in the book is that there’s a contrast between Europe’s borders to the east and Europe’s borders to the South. Europe enlarges to the East, but not to the South. And I think for Turkey and the Western Balkan countries, located in South East of Europe, they’re geographically somewhat in the middle, and so, it gets quite complicated.

I think we can see quite clearly how that plays out with Turkey in the way that I just described, which has largely to do with the fact that even if it’s a secular country, it’s seen as a Muslim country. The countries of the Western Balkans are even more complicated in that respect, because additionally there is the Russia factor, which is also to some extent an “Other.” In short, for the Western Balkans, I think, it’s gonna be a long, complicated process.

Read: Brexit and Re-discussing European Democracy

Q. How could the EU stop thinking in terms of less integration or more integration, which is a criticism you make in your book?

That question goes way beyond my book and is something I thought for a long time about, which is that so many of these discussions about European integration, especially as they take place in Brussels and among pro Europeans, are entirely through the prism of “do we have more integration or less integration.”

It’s a very linear way of thinking and the assumption is: more integration is good, disintegration is bad. Therefore, Brexit is bad, obviously. Whereas, I’ve always thought, long before I came to write this book, “well, maybe some integration is bad and some disintegration is good?”

In terms of what I mentioned earlier on the depoliticization of economic policy, if you constitutionalize right wing economic preferences, then from a left perspective that’s bad European integration.

I think fundamentally what the problem with the EU is around democracy, and in particular, the way in which it depoliticizes economic policy. So, I think the crucial question for the EU is not, “Do you have more Europe or less Europe? Do you integrate or do you disintegrate?” It’s how you deepen democracy in Europe, period. Therefore, the key question about policy should be: “Is it making Europe more democratic or not?”

Q. As a person who formerly identified as a pro-European, would you like to share your story of how your perception of the EU changed?

I think part of my perceptions of and interest in some of these questions has to do with my own background. I was born and grew up in Britain, which has a famously semi-detached relationship with Europe. On top of that, I have two parents who are immigrants to Britain. My father was Indian and my mother was Dutch. So in other words, I have one parent from a EU member state, which in some ways I think made me feel more European than a lot of Brits who just have two British parents, and one from a country outside of Europe. I felt a certain sense of being European, but not quite.

It started with looking at Europe from a slightly peripheral perspective, and then emerged when I was working at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), a pro-European foreign policy think tank, from about 2009 to 2015. When I first started working there, I was kind of a pro-European and I thought I understood the EU. In retrospect, I didn’t.

It was while I worked there that I learned more about the EU and I began to conclude that a lot of what I thought I knew about it, especially about its history, was actually myth created by the EU about itself. For example, the story I told you earlier about the colonial history has been completely written out of the story that pro-Europeans tell about themselves. My former colleagues at ECFR have no clue about any of this history until I tell them- and these are people who are experts on the EU.

I wrote an essay in the New Statesman, a British magazine, two years ago which Eurowhiteness expands upon. What inspired me write the book was the reactions to this essay. My former boss at the ECFR, Mark Leonard, wrote a response to the essay claiming that the EU is a post-colonial project.  At ECFR, they didn’t know this is the real history; which shows, as I say, how successful the EU is in mythologizing itself.

The more conversations I have about the book and I realize that a lot of what I write in the book is much clearer to people outside of Europe than it is to people within Europe. For example, if I say that Europeanness has something to do with whiteness, I think, to most people outside of Europe it is kind of obvious, but it’s horrifying to a lot of people within Europe. They’re outraged when you even try to connect the two things.

Hence, the title of the book angers a lot of people. A part of the reason I insisted on that title was exactly to say that there is a connection between Europeanness and whiteness, and I want us to talk about it. Most people don’t want to do that, at least within the pro-European bubble in Europe.

Q. Do you think that the EU is still on a civilizing mission?

A Polish academic, Jan Zielonka, who was at Oxford for many years, has an analysis of the civilizing mission of the EU in Central and Eastern Europe as part of the enlargement process, which he calls a ‘post-modern civilizing mission’, and I think he’s absolutely right.

But I remember, for example, having that discussion with my former boss at the ECFR when I was working on Eurowhiteness a couple of years ago, and he said that when pro-Europeans refer to a civilizing mission, it’s ironically. Well, it’s not. It’s an actual civilizing mission.

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]]> The Link Between Brexit and Turkey’s Dashed Hopes of Being an EU Member https://politicstoday.org/the-link-between-brexit-and-turkeys-dashed-hopes-of-being-an-eu-member/ Sat, 16 Mar 2019 09:22:43 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/the-link-between-brexit-and-turkeys-dashed-hopes-of-being-an-eu-member/

For older, experienced EU hacks, such as the author, there were no great surprises to the loaded gun which Brussels handed Britain – a deal which would surely have made its population worse off and an example to the rest of the EU who might have contemplated leaving – and the fake EU accession process for Turkey.

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Turks must have been following the beleaguered negotiations between the EU and the UK for the last two years with some interest. Ultimately, even those in the UK who voted to remain in the EU have had to admit that they were shocked by how disingenuous the entire program on the EU’s side was as ultimately it led a naïve Theresa May into a trap whereby she – and the British parliament – were led with the choice between perishing in the frying pan or making a leap for the flames.

For older, experienced EU hacks, such as the author, there were no great surprises to the loaded gun which Brussels handed Britain – a deal which would surely have made its population worse off and an example to the rest of the EU who might have contemplated leaving – and the fake EU accession process for Turkey.

For that is surely what it is and has been. The only consistency with the talks, which started informally in 1999 when I was working in Brussels, is that they have never ever been sincere in that behind the façade of the EU serenading itself on the international circuit, with Turkey’s help, all EU negotiators in Brussels who really matter (in other words in the European Commission rather than obscure MEPs who you’ve never heard of) know perfectly well that the political resistance against Turkey joining the EU has never been greater than it is today. For years, France and Germany, have humoured the EU process of engaging with Turkey, while behind closed doors have remained firm against Turkey’s membership.

All EU negotiators in Brussels, who really matter, know perfectly well that the political resistance against Turkey joining the EU has never been greater than it is today.

And post Syrian war and its exodus towards Europe, this resistance has never been more stoic than today. In both Germany and France, for slightly different reasons, there is a fortuitous reaction against Muslim immigration.

The EU has an immigration problem which is fueling populist parties and – once again – the carrot and stick approach by Brussels towards Ankara to reform its human rights dossier has been revealed for being fake and nothing more than a conduit to assure European voters weeks ahead of EU elections in May that Turks will not be arriving by the millions into dilapidated job markets like in France.

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The recent report’s timing was interesting. Just a matter of weeks before MEPs begin campaigning in EU elections it magically appears in the European parliament, which ‘adopts’ it, although it may as well be the Istanbul telephone directory in many ways. The report is non binding and could be attributed to the views of one single MEP. And after the EU elections, this may well be the EU’s rhetoric when, no doubt, it does a U turn again – after pressure from EU member states – and begins to humour Ankara once again with the prize of EU membership.

But just as Britain was promised for decades that the EU was not to develop into a federalist super power and that it had nothing to fear about losing control of its immigration policy, let alone fishing waters, Turkey should not be fooled any more by this game of cat and mouse. EU governments know that, like the mere notion of the EU having a foreign policy, that the Turkey dossier is merely a remedial chapter of a bigger fantasy. Turkey is once again being taken for a ride, as, for the moment, it suits the EU executive to stand over it and deliver its moral tutelage on how its expects to reform towards what the EU expects (although even this idea is banal and rank hypocrisy when you examine the mafia in Bulgaria running the country’s judiciary system and a similar story of unparalleled corruption in neighbouring Romania).

Ankara should learn the lessons of Brexit. The EU never plays fair, but always plays a game of dirty tricks and only has a one sided idea of negotiations.

In reality, it will not be down to EU institutions in Brussels whether Turkey ever becomes part of the EU club, but rather EU member states themselves. And Turkey may well take the opportunity to see the pendulum swing the other way again and show Brussels that it will no longer play the game. Turkey should make a lucid and timely statement this time round that it doesn’t want EU membership at any price and it will no longer humour the EU with the political game Brussels needs it to play.

Ankara should learn the lessons of Brexit. The EU never plays fair, but always plays a game of dirty tricks and only has a one sided idea of negotiations. What would Turkey get out of EU membership anyway? Access to a job market for millions of blue collar workers? Unlikely. More likely a permanent migraine which would cripple Turkish companies with thousands and thousands of EU regulations they would be required to adopt, new employment laws, minimum wage, reform of political system, tomes of environmental and health legislation – not to mention a ban on all trade deals Ankara would want to execute around the globe as its economy continues to develop. And let’s not even get onto the subject of arms procurement and Russian made S-400s.

No, the lessons of Brexit and the dirty tricks that the EU played – and played well – should be learnt by Ankara. This latest slap in the face should be seen in the cold light of day and should be taken as a line in the sand now for a new relationship with the EU. If Ankara is going to be a puppet that the EU plays when it entertains it – but then tosses aside when it is busier with other more important matters – then it is high time that Ankara shows Brussels that there is a high price to pay for such an arrangement. This latest news from Brussels with an MEP report stalling the process should signal from the Turkey’s side that the game is up. 

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]]> Theresa May’s Brexit Deal is Part of a Dirty Trick by Brussels to Make an Example of the UK https://politicstoday.org/theresa-mays-brexit-deal-is-part-of-a-dirty-trick-by-brussels-to-make-an-example-of-the-uk/ Wed, 28 Nov 2018 04:48:53 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/theresa-mays-brexit-deal-is-part-of-a-dirty-trick-by-brussels-to-make-an-example-of-the-uk/

The EU which doesn’t want the UK to leave the union at all, but prefers an arrangement whereby London stays close to the EU but has no part of the decision-making process in Brussels.

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Many in Turkey who are observing the Brexit fiasco must be asking themselves what are the implications towards their country – which has impressive trade relations with the UK  – if Brexit doesn’t happen and Britain exits the EU on March 29 with no deal. Some will also be asking themselves is there anything for Ankara to learn from the provisional deal which has been agreed by Brussels?

We should remember that the deal provisionally agreed by Brussels and the UK government is not the ultimate Brexit, but merely one which focuses on the withdrawal component of Brexit. And yet, it already stinks. Once again, Britain is being convinced that it has a ‘good deal’ for itself, when in reality, it is being sold a sack of rotting fish.

If Brexit doesn’t happen and Britain exits the EU on March 29 with no deal, some will be asking themselves if there is anything for Ankara to learn from the provisional deal which has been agreed by Brussels?

Britain’s fisheries rights after leaving the EU is where we should start to prove such a point. France’s Emmanuel Macron admitted as much when pushed to comment on whether the EU fisherman would still have access to Britain’s waters, as part of a new ‘trade deal’ between London and Brussels. Britain will have to pay such a price, he said, if it is to be granted special access to the EU single market for its goods and services (if they are to remain tariff free).

It’s a minor cover up of the truth both by the May government and Brussels that the withdrawal agreement fudges and deliberately refuses to cover. And it’s just one of many salient points which will steer MPs in London to reject the deal leading May to have to fend off yet another political crisis as the UK heads towards the March 29 Brexit date with no deal, offering two scenarios: one, WTO trade rules will kick in, which is bad news for both parties, but more so for Brussels as German and French companies which enjoy at least 100bn euros of sales to the UK. Or two, both parties will agree for an extension to negotiations of perhaps one more year, which would undoubtedly mean a better deal for Britain.

May has insisted that the EU will not come back to the negotiating table one more time, but in reality, they will do just that when its top officials see that Brexit is blowing up in their faces and threatens to wobble the already weak EU project, which is heading towards its own elections just a couple of months afterwards, with record low turn outs expected and further boosts to far right parties.

Not really a Brexit at all

The problem really is that the Brexit deal that Theresa May believes she has brilliantly negotiated isn’t really a Brexit at all. It is in fact a dream ticket for the EU which, in practical terms, doesn’t want the UK to leave the EU at all, but prefers an arrangement whereby London stays close to the EU but has no part of the decision-making process in Brussels.

The UK is expected to pay a 40bn pound divorce ‘settlement.’ And this is a deal which Theresa May is presenting as a good deal for the UK?

The EU mandarins in the European Commission want no disruption to EU trade with the UK, wants UK companies to comply with all EU laws, EU state aid laws and all EU competition laws to remain, insist that the UK can still not negotiate trade deals with other countries and wants full access to UK fishing waters. In return it will allow the UK to have control of its own borders and no longer pay an annual membership fee to the EU. On top of that, the UK is expected to pay a 40bn pound divorce ‘settlement.’ And this is a deal which Theresa May is presenting as a good deal for the UK?

Or is it perhaps one which preserves her political legacy, a prime minister whose heart was never really in Brexit in the first place?

It’s a rat trap. Here’s how

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EU leaders and European Commission officials are happy with this withdrawal deal as it serves the Brussels project almost entirely and delivers hardly anything in return to the UK. It also sets the stage for a huge trap which the UK will fall into, once we pass the March 29 deadline, in that the terms of the real deal, will be heavily tilted against the UK. It is already clear that the incendiary subjects, like UK fishery rights, will be hidden for the moment, until the UK moves ahead with the present draft.

This is how the EU operates. Hiding in the shadows and not playing a straight forward and fair game. After working in Brussels for 11 years, I learnt myself how the EU doesn’t like openness and fairness. I believe that the EU was trying to trick the UK into a deal which only ruin the UK and makes Brussels shine into the bargain. Brussels was never really sincere about being a straight forward negotiator but really playing a game of dirty tricks, forcing Britain to quickly start negotiations so as to kickstart a two year deadline and then waste all of that time in pretending to the UK team that they were open to genuine negotiation. In reality, we now know that the EU side was entirely disingenuous as May’s Brexit deal is a great deal for Brussels and a truly awful one for Britain.

This is how the EU operates. Hiding in the shadows and not playing a straight forward and fair game. After working in Brussels for 11 years, I learnt myself how the EU doesn’t like openness and fairness.

Brussels has always been worried over Brexit setting an example for other countries to follow and was always determined to capitalize on Brexit to demonstrate the futility of leaving the EU to other eurosceptic countries mulling the idea of leaving the EU. Now, red in tooth and claw, Brussels has what it craves: a weak Britain about to be pounded by a Brexit deal which in fact will cost it a fortune and keep it under the thumb of the EU.

Under the deal, if Britain wishes to stay in the ‘single market’ (continue trading with zero tariffs with the rest of the EU), then it will have to respect EU laws – a triumph of absurdity given that a big complaint from British business was that it was being beaten by non EU companies, who weren’t shackled by EU regulation, flooding the same market with cheaper goods. But the greater farce, which will have them laughing in Brussels for weeks and months to come, is that the deal that May has proposed will not let Britain negotiate trade deals with other countries around the world – a silver bullet if ever there was one, for a post Brexit government to counter the economic strains put on the economy in the first few years. Many in the UK don’t trust the EU to let Britain ever have the freedom to make its own trade deals – preferring that it doesn’t excel as a dynamic autonomous economy rivaling the old guard.

It’s almost a stroke of genius for Junker and his officials who must be toasting champagne in the Belgian capital after the EU Summit of November 25th where all EU leaders backed the Brexit deal.

The allure of the dreaded EU Customs Union and remaining in it which is the killer blow and the trap to Britain’s post Brexit prosperity and the EU knows it, which is why it has played this card. To deny Britain access to this without giving up its right to cut trade deal with whomever it likes round the globe, like China, U.S. or others ensures poverty, austerity and economic decline for Britain but much more importantly, provides the EU with a stellar PR campaign for its own longevity. It has, since its inception, always behaved like an autocratic, super state bully which is omnipotent, as a counterweight, to its member states democratic systems and what we are witnessing with the Brexit deal is just that: a weak Britain which has been tricked and bullied into a deal which will only serve the purposes of the EU.

It’s almost a stroke of genius for Junker and his officials who must be toasting champagne in the Belgian capital after the EU Summit of November 25th where all EU leaders backed the deal. But it is a shocking embarrassment for the UK that it has a prime minister who seems even weaker, more naïve and vain that Neville Chamberlain who came back from Europe in 1938 waving a document which he claimed would save Britain from the abyss. British MPs should not believe Jean-Claude Junker when he told a BBC journalist twice “This is the only deal…this is the only deal.”

To have control of immigration isn’t really a big deal as May fails to explain in her speech in Brussels on Sunday 25th that there will be a price for Britons wishing to visit, work or live in the EU. No longer having to pay 19bn pounds sterling each year (net) into the EU budget also isn’t that huge a deal given that half of it comes back with subsidies anyway; compared to the 40 billion pounds divorce bill which is also part of the deal and it becomes clear that the EU will still be taking money off cash-strapped Britain for many years, while preventing it from flourishing economically. But the absurd practice of Dutch fisherman fishing in UK waters and selling their catches to Britain might well continue as by the time May gets to this, it will be too late and the UK will have no leverage left. This is the finesse of the hand that the EU is playing and now, Britain holds its breath to see if its parliamentarians will grasp the nettle in early December when MPs will finally vote on May’s Brexit draft, with many pundits claiming that it will be rejected.

Ankara should take note that the EU seldom tells the truth, nor plays straight when it comes to its own sanctity and Turkey can hardly expect fair treatment if it decides to enter, while the UK is robbed on its way out.

Junker’s statement that it is the only deal on the table will then look farcical and we will see the European Union for what it is. The present Brexit withdrawal deal is merely the first barb of a venomous claw which will destroy the British economy and preserve Junker’s federalist wet dream in Brussels. It’s a deal which is almost entirely about the preservation of the European Union, which once again, Britain will pay handsomely towards. Ankara should take note that the EU seldom tells the truth, nor plays straight when it comes to its own sanctity and Turkey can hardly expect fair treatment if it decides to enter, while the UK is robbed on its way out.

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]]> EU fault lines: Brexit, Belt and Road Initiative and rising Germany https://politicstoday.org/eu-fault-lines-brexit-belt-and-road-initiative-and-rising-germany/ Wed, 03 Oct 2018 08:52:05 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/eu-fault-lines-brexit-belt-and-road-initiative-and-rising-germany/

The centrifugal forces in the EU are increasing and among the integration and enlargement dynamics of the EU, whether it be the North-South, East-West, Mediterranean-North, Widening-Deepening, Franco-German axes, the geopolitical fault lines were always present in the EU.

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On Monday, SETA in collaboration with one of its key publications, Insight Turkey, has organized a panel titled “EU and its fault lines”. The panel discussed the main dynamics shaping EU policies, the emerging regional actors and the influence of new World powers steering the currents in & around the EU. After each issue, Insight Turkey organizes a panel in accord with the themes of its latest issue, this panel followed its latest EU special edition focusing on the EU and featured three panelists authoring the journal as well as a guest keynote speaker.

The panel was moderated by Muhitttin Ataman, Editor-in-Chief of Insight Turkey, and keynote speakers who gave insight were Simon Bulmer from University of Sheffield, Çiğdem Yas from Yıldız Technical Univeristy and Ali Resul Usul from Medipol University.

Simon Bulmer discussed the rising position & role of Germany in a post Brexit EU. He covered the various challenges posed by a number of EU crises, the politicization and the breakdown of domestic crises and the outlook for Germany. He underlined that German power was always focal for European integration. From a historical perspective, European integration was partly important for managing and handling German power following the Nazi regime. Germany has had a pivotal role in handling various crises over the last decade including the Eurozone crisis, the Ukraine crisis, the Refugee crisis and the shifting dynamics in the wake of Trumpian politics amid an existing leadership crisis within the EU, EU’s struggle for democratic legitimacy and the rise of populism and anti-elitist sentiments that harbor Eurosceptic reactions.

Discussing the biggest foreseeable effects of Brexit, Bulmer noted that Germany will be much more exposed and be forced to take on a bigger responsibility with the loss of Britain, a major liberal trade ally, a leading EU budget contributor, and an important global player from the EU. “I have two main projections, two possible scenarios: Franco-German relations can gain momentum and revive. Or perhaps Germany can emerge stronger as a potential hegemon in the EU. It has the structural power but lacks the diplomatic leadership due to its domestic politics. And perhaps another option is the slow disintegration of the EU.” Bulmer noted.

Çiğdem Nas discussed the latest developments and crises in the EU, the effects of these crises on the EU-Turkey relations and whether a phase of normalization in bilateral relations was foreseeable. Since the 90s EU has been facing crises which are ongoing and still unresolved. In the beginning of 2000s where there was a peak in relations with Turkey, there was an optimistic outlook from an EU perspective since the EU at the time felt more optimistic of its own future. Çiğdem Nas underscored that the candidacy offer to Turkey may perhaps even have been based on the fact that EU at the time had less internal problems and the power to cope with and manage its existing problems. But later, especially after the 2005 veto of France and Holland on establishing a Constitution for Europe following local referendums, the public opinion was particularly telling in terms of the rise of Euroscepticism and there were doubting questions raised on the prospect of a more integrated and plausibly a Federal Europe.

Prof. Nas added that the 2008 global financial crisis that took a toll on Greece, the Ukraine-Russia tensions, Russia’s expansionist policies and refugee crises have all respectively triggered concentric pressures on Europe. EU’s internal problems and the weakening of mainstream parties who played a pivotal role in determining EU policies have had a direct impact on the enlargement process including the prospects for Turkey. “Turkey plays a crucial role in the refugee crisis and considering its failure to resolve this crisis, EU should comprehend the value of Turkey for its own interests” said Çiğdem Nas. Although many reports have argued that Turkey is allegedly distancing itself from EU principles, it is starkly evident that EU isn’t taking the necessary steps to keep Turkey close.

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Ali Resul Usul discussed the Chinese influence since the 2000s and underscored that there is a crucial China factor that must be taken into consideration and that the new Belt and Road Initiative will have multifold effects on EU and that EU’s reaction to  these forces is unforeseeable as of yet. “I claim that China as a global power has direct impacts in the EU, especially in southeastern Europe and western Balkan countries which is manifesting itself more evidently over the recent years and can spread further thus forming a new fault line within the EU” said Prof. Ali Resul Usul.

Prof. Usul emphasized that the EU project is a homogenizing project and that currently there is a certain level of homogeneity in itself. EU’s general motto is “United in diversity”. “There is an emphasis of plurality but there are also frictions and evident tensions between the homogenizing and disintegrating or centrifugal forces and centripetal forces. These tensions have been inherent ones and have existed since the onset of the EU” Prof. Usul noted.

The recent developments have had benefits especially for the centrifugal forces, Prof. Usul argued. The centrifugal forces in the EU are increasing and among the integration and enlargement dynamics of the EU, whether it be North-South, East-West, Mediterranean-North, Widening-Deepening, German-Franco axes, the geopolitical fault lines were always present. In 2004, the new fault lines and the existing fault lines became more complex with the significant enlargement. Many decision-making processes became difficult. “France didn’t want the integration of the eastern Balkan states, since France feared the natural and gradual shift in the centripetal force of the EU towards the East and despite its strong and continued resistance it had to eventually face what it feared”, said Prof. Usul.

Today, since the 2004 enlargement of the EU, the largest enlargement to date, there have been significant tensions with regards to integration between central and eastern EU states due to several factors: the financial crisis, the questions posed by the post Brexit phase, rising xenophobia and anti-refugee sentiments and EU enlargements which have all fueled Euroscepticism and strengthened centrifugal forces.

Following and amid these tensions, a global power, namely China enters the stage, Prof. Usul highlighted: “China has increased its influence in southeastern Europe, central and eastern Europe, the Mediterranean and a large part of the Balkan states and even candidate states and in turn these states have been bolstered to leverage on this Chinese influence and activities in the region utilizing this new gained strength against the centripetal European forces.”

The Belt and Road Initiative is a new and very significant issue with global ramifications but it is still too early to make clear-cut predictions since the Chinese authorities have not published any specific and definitive details of the project. While the EU currently has its hands full with local problems, it still hasn’t formulated a tangible policy to handle this Chinese influence. While on the one hand it welcomes foreign investments including Chinese investments, on the other hand it is still warily suspicious of China’s deeper intentions.

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]]> Multi-speed EU: Cure All Remedy or Dead End? https://politicstoday.org/multi-speed-eu-cure-all-remedy-or-dead-end/ Thu, 01 Mar 2018 12:03:22 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/multi-speed-eu-cure-all-remedy-or-dead-end/

Not only Brexit but the rise of populist movements almost everywhere paired with very vocal desires to have more say at home instead of furthering what is often perceived as an EU super state in the making may have Brussels perhaps think twice.

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About a year ago in early March of 2017 a debate kicked off in earnest which only half a decade earlier would still have resulted in its promoters at best being sidelined, at worst removed from the public eye in their respective political parties – at least with regards to this and probably all other EU-policy making related topics. Most definitely so in central and western Europe, less so if ever in the United Kingdom!

At stake back then: asking the no-no question in the Brussels’ corridors of power; a ‘no-no’ automatically resulting in a reaction alike a father shaking his head whilst looking at his child who just did something wrong; in this context, a response of disbelief to a rather risqué question along the lines of ‘is it not better to allow for a European Union at two, perhaps even more speeds?’

Now things could not have changed more dramatically. A certain air of alarm is surrounding Brussels’ power centers – that is certain. Not only Brexit but the rise of populist movements almost everywhere paired with very vocal desires to have more say at home instead of furthering what is often perceived as an EU super state in the making may have Brussels perhaps think twice.

If a personal reflection is allowed: me and my generation are most naturally deeply grateful for the fact that what used to be the EEC, then EC, thereafter EU guaranteed a safe, peaceful upbringing in the middle of Europe which only fifteen years before my baby-boomer generation’s first wave of millions of births was at war with each other! Yet there is growing unease amongst many segments of the European population and to label each and every citizen who doubts an ever closer political Union as being extremists is nothing but standard arrogance. Which in turn will only steadily increase the share of far-right and far-left movements’ votes, only aiding those intent on destroying a modern peaceful spanning all-Europe society!

So has multispeed become trendy?

Commentators same as politicians must reflect on public mood shifts as and when required. Hence, facts first: recent comments made by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and only last week by Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz, about whether it is not better for the EU to focus more on items best suited for a transnational solution, but leave some, or indeed many other policy making items to the regions and member states. Whilst this does not automatically imply a multispeed EU it is a repeat of what was said during the year 2017; together with my following quotes it at least hypothetically redefines the principle of subsidiarity.

Hence to put matters into a wider frame let us briefly travel back in time, first revisiting 7 March, 2017. As EU Observer duly reported on that day (euobserver.com; EU’s big four back ‘multi-speed’ Europe) leaders of Europe’s largest economies France, Germany, Italy and Spain whilst meeting each other, German Chancellor Angela Merkel was quoted as saying: ‘We need to have the courage for some countries to go ahead if not everyone wants to participate. A Europe of different speeds is necessary, otherwise we will probably get stuck.’

Moving on five months and arriving on 30 August, 2017, the same EU insight publication ran a story titled ‘Macron revives multi-speed Europe idea’ wherein the French President was quoted having said ‘We have to think up a Europe with several formats, go further with those who want to go forward, without being hindered by states that want – and it is their right – to go not as fast or not as far.’

But what could have triggered such a U-Turn?

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The EUR-Lex website, the EU’s very own Access to European Law – portal, defines a multispeed Europe as follows: ‘Multi-speed’ Europe is the term used to describe the idea of a method of differentiated integration whereby common objectives are pursued by a group of EU countries both able and willing to advance, it being implied that the others will follow later.’

Hence we detect a certain disagreement EU internally: the leading EU engines so to speak, both France and Germany, and now other nations, too, question the functionality of a one speed EU whereas the EU legal database itself still proclaims that even if a multispeed EU is declared it only means those not following now will follow later. Think Brexit and we realize that this was, and is nothing but wishful EU jargon thinking.

Neither integrationists wish to see a new feudal type of mini fiefdoms instead of a strong EU. Nor would Brexiteers or defenders of more powers being given back to the regions wish to see that scenario either. All want prosperity, trade, peace, stability, welfare besides many other core values same as my very own baby-boomer generation as mentioned above. But as it seems a pure integrative model without allowing for dissent to be heard and without accepting people’s wishes before far right (or far left) movements figuratively speaking collect them at the ballot box is no longer the best solution.

Looking over other future EU’s model’s shoulders

Brexit will not happen before March 2019, if a further negotiation phase is agreed upon not even before March of 2021. A new EU budget will enter into force only early in the third decade of the New Millennium, too. It is negotiated from 2018 onwards and enters into force post-2020.

If we then further consider cooperation on various regional levels, the Visegrad Four Group (Slovakia, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary) must be mentioned; one should further discuss the Nordic Council although it comprises non-EU member states as well; and perhaps a post-Brexit UK-Republic of Ireland (customs and border) deal is in the making – could an EU at various speeds yet modeled after existing regional forms of cooperation win the upper hand?

Phrased differently: unless there is another referendum in the United Kingdom which looks extremely unrealistic, Brexit is going to happen – so will there be a new version of a (trans-) continental Europe? A core including the Eurozone, a wider group with some political decision making agreements and trade but no complete harmonization and integration, and then a third layer or circle basically based on a free trade agreement? Or would this spell the end of modernization and peace and prosperity for Europe?

Best for EU, best for Turkey scenarios

From a candidate country’s perspective of a nation as big and influential such as Turkey one might actually suggest that whatever the outcome, Turkey belongs to the core group unless adopting the Euro will be mandatory for becoming a core group member; whether Turkey would want to switch to the Euro would need be discussed in great detail. At least with regards to Turkey-EU relations multi-speed would have turned into one speed, if everyone pulling in the same direction.

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]]> Neo-Protectionism and Trade Wars https://politicstoday.org/neo-protectionism-and-trade-wars/ Thu, 01 Feb 2018 08:51:48 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/neo-protectionism-and-trade-wars/

Approaches such as liberalism, mercantilism or protectionism should not be viewed from an ideological perspective but should be appreciated as basic policy instruments serving national interests.

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Published by the SETA Foundation and written by Sadik Unay and Serif Dilek, “Neo-Protectionism and Trade Wars” seeks to address neo-protectionist measures that have emerged following the Global Financial Crisis. Taking into account the changing trend of protectionism practices, which find themselves on the agenda in the context of the political and economic crises that have emerged on the global level, the analysis provides an extensive evaluation of “neo-protectionism” trends. The steps taken by industrialized countries during their development process reveal that “protective trade policies” are critical thresholds of success stories. As illustrated by the recent decision made by U.S. President Donald Trump to increase the customs duty on imports of solar panels and washing machines up to 30 percent, conservative policies will take up much of the global economy agenda.

In the last quarter of the 20th century, rather than approaches that require intense government intervention, free trade has increasingly been adopted for socio-economic development and growth. This also draws attention to the widespread adoption of murky protectionism. The analysis reflects on how the slowing down of the liberalization of trade caused countries not only to isolate themselves but also to adopt protectionist policies. It is emphasized that the discourse of liberal commercial integration in the enlargement periods of the world economy are transformed into cyclical demands of regulatory and protectionist demands in times of contraction and crisis.

The analysis underlines how there has been an increasing level of protectionist understanding within the G20 countries.

The analysis evaluates the rise of Neo-protectionism in the post-global financial crisis atmosphere, recent examples of its practices and trade and currency battles. Specifically, the analysis underlines how there has been an increasing level of protectionist understanding within the G20 countries. The on-going race between states in the fields of industry and new technology are inherently an extension of a multidimensional and global power struggle.

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Hence, it can be observed that in the post-global economic crisis, where the discourse of free trade in the global economy has abated and where right-wing movements have been increasing their power, “economic nationalism” approaches and neo-protectionist policies have increasingly been occupying the international agenda. The United Kingdom’s decision to leave the EU (Brexit), Donald Trump’s adoption of a more fierce foreign policy and his appreciation of an economic competition discourse, and the increasing centralization of right-wing movements in European politics reflects the fact that the desire to race for liberal values on the international sphere has dissolved.

Turkey ought to utilize neo-protectionist strategies in order to adapt and to survive trade and currency wars in an era in which science, industry and technology policies and public activism are on the rise.

This study by Unay and Dilek concludes that approaches such as liberalism, mercantilism or protectionism should not be viewed from an ideological perspective but should be appreciated as policy instruments serving national interests. The analysis highlights how in the new era the international system will increasingly witness trade, science, industry and technology wars, rather than being occupied with conventional warfare. More, the analysis illustrates how states have diverged from solely resting on hard power to adopting soft and smart power in their race to project their power. The authors suggest that similar to emerging economies, Turkey ought to utilize neo-protectionist strategies in order to adapt and to survive trade and currency wars in an era in which science, industry and technology policies and public activism are on the rise.

The PDF of the analysis can be downloaded at: https://www.setav.org/analiz-yeni-korumacilik-ve-ticaret-savaslari/

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]]> EU’s giant leap: set to launch army parallel to NATO https://politicstoday.org/eus-giant-leap-set-to-launch-army-parallel-to-nato/ Tue, 14 Nov 2017 13:32:43 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/eus-giant-leap-set-to-launch-army-parallel-to-nato/

In what has been considered as a “historic” moment on Monday, 23 members of the EU, led by France and Germany, signed a pledge to form a united army. The move has triggered major debate, with proponents calling it as complementary and opponents as competitive to NATO.

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Europe is set to form a new army whose membership would encompass, minus Britain, Denmark and a few others, all the European Union states. In what has been considered as a “historic” moment on Monday, 23 members of the EU, led by France and Germany, signed a pledge to form a united army. The move has triggered major debate, with proponents calling it as complementary and opponents as competitive to NATO.

EU Foreign Policy Chief Federica Mogherini stated that “23 member states engaging both on capabilities and on operational steps is something big.” Keeping the door open for those who did not join the army, Mogherini said Pesco, backed by the EU defense fund, “will enable member states to use the economy of scale of Europe and in this manner to fulfil the gap of output that we have.”

The member states’ signatures signify the political will but only legal endorsement, which is expected in December, can confirm the program’s force. Sources within the EU said that the agreement is not just going to be a bureaucratic co-operation, but real investment that will help develop Europe’s defense industry and spur research and development in military capabilities that the bloc needs most.

Though the campaign for joining forces had started in the 1950s, the timing of the agreement is ever more significant. It comes in the backdrop of Brexit, rising right wing forces in Europe, member countries’ dwindling support for NATO and more importantly Turkey’s lack of trust over its NATO partners and warming up of relations between Turkey and NATO’s arch rival Russia. Turkey is the largest man-power contributor to NATO.

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The proponent officials such as Mogherini hail the European army arguing that it will be complementary to NATO: “The EU has tools to fight hybrid warfare – the use of conventional weapons mixed with things such as propaganda and cyber-attacks – that NATO does not have at its disposal.”

German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel said that the agreement was “a great step towards self-sufficiency and strengthening the European Union’s security and defense policy – really a milestone in European development.”

Britain, which is set to leave the EU, did not veto the formation of a “permanent structured co-operation (Pesco),” as it has been named, though, as was expected, refused to sign the pledge. Denmark, Ireland, Portugal and Malta also abstained. The fact that Britain did not block the initiative to form a EU army – rather tacitly supporting its formation – is expected to attract furious response from the country’s Brexit supporters.

David Banks of Veterans for Britain had only a few days ago stated that British involvement in the European defense union would sharply undermine Brexit. He emphasized that any form of EU defense unity should not involve Britain as the force would allow the EU to oversee increasingly blurred lines between the armed forces of different states. As a supporter of Brexit, according to Banks, opposition to an EU Army was one of the few things which united “Yes” and “No” voters during the Brexit referendum.

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]]> What will the Presidential System Bring to the Turkish Economy? https://politicstoday.org/what-will-the-presidential-system-bring-to-the-turkish-economy/ Mon, 27 Mar 2017 05:58:57 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/what-will-the-presidential-system-bring-to-the-turkish-economy/

As we countdown the days towards the referendum, the process of changes that may come from the Presidency system have been discussed with various perspectives in a variety of different circles. What then will the presidential system, which will alter the politics of the country significantly, bring to the Turkish economy?

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As we countdown the days towards the referendum, the process of changes that may come from the Presidency system have been discussed with various perspectives in a variety of different circles. What then will the presidential system, which will alter the politics of the country significantly, bring to the Turkish economy? A system of governance, which the social and cultural codes of a country make it successful in terms of providing political stability, serving predictable and inclusive policies, and activating a well-functioning bureaucracy, is certainly of benefit for the economic development of this country.

When we look at the history of the Republic of Turkey, it can be seen that stability was not achieved during the various coalition governments, politics were far from predictable or even being inclusive, and the cumbersome bureaucratic structure deadlocked the political system. The bottlenecks of the 1970s, the 1994 crisis and the 2000-2001 crises all took place during the periods when a coalition government was in place. In the single-party government periods however, the Turkish economy had made significant gains.

It would be unrealistic to expect any level of success from coalition governments in a socio-cultural environment where, due to conflicts and disagreements, even siblings have played havoc with family businesses and sustainable partnerships are rare. In Scandinavian countries where coalition governments are relatively successful in economic terms, success points at factors such as a small and homogeneous population, high social trust and their geographical position. Nevertheless, the countries where the coalition governments successfully worked have had a solid and successful economic infrastructure built over the last fifty years and consequently quick decision making has become a secondary priority. An economy like Turkey, which has lagged behind in the race of economic development, does not have the luxury to move with such a slow pace.

Despite the fact that Turkey has been governed by one-party governments for the last 15 years, the current system does not guarantee this indefinitely. The closest example of this was in the June 7, 2015 elections. The AK Party – which received 41 percent of the vote, and 15 percentage points ahead of its closest rival – failed to establish itself as a single-party government. Thus, the presidential system offers an important opportunity for the Turkish economy to avoid the friction that comes with coalition governments.

In terms of the economy, another weakness of the current system is that both the president and the prime minister go through an election process, which means that both these positions of authority also come with the potential that may arise from holding important forces in their hand. The respectable relationship between the presidents and the prime minister for the last decade has been based on strong human relations. It is not realistic to expect that the relationship between the two forces will have the same consistency and amiability in every period. If these authorities equipped with high power implement contradictory populist economic policies based their electoral agenda, these contradictory policies will increase uncertainty. Needless to say, an increase in this kind of uncertainty can cause serious damage to the economy. However, as is the case with the incident where a former president threw a constitution booklet to a former prime minister, nonsensical agitation between the president and the prime minister can also spark an economic crisis.

The current system also makes it difficult for decisions to be made quickly and for the bureaucracy to function properly. This country had experienced periods whereby the head of the execution, the prime minister, could not even choose his own bureaucrat. In 2006, despite the fact that important candidates such as the late Adnan Buyukdeniz and Deputy Prime Minister Mehmet Simsek were available to be appointed to the central bank, they were appointed due to the ideological defenses of the then president. Likewise, many projects put forward for the development of the country were deliberately postponed for unacceptably long times due to the cumbersome bureaucracy, taking advantage of the poor president-prime ministerial relations as well as duality of administration as an opportunity to delay these major projects. In a governance system in which bureaucrats cannot reach the speed of the politicians, it is impossible to make economic development move quickly.

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The presidential system is critical in terms of Turkey’s role in the global economy. At the beginning of the 2000’s, Turkey was in a position of clinging onto the IMF. Thanks to the political stability and a decisively implemented economic policy, Turkey paid off all debts to the IMF. In addition to that, recent reforms in the IMF, along with Turkey and some other important emerging economies, has successfully seen them having a more important say, to a certain extent, in the governance of the IMF. As the share of developing countries in the global economy increases, this will also come with a power shift in the governance of international institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. Nevertheless, the inadequacy and inefficiency of the Bretton Woods’ institutions, to fully address the problems of the ever-changing global economic structure also pushes developing countries to find different alternatives. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which was founded under the leadership of China, and of which Turkey is a founding partner, is a good example of this situation. Consequently, it is no surprise that the foreseeable future will see a substantial increase in the number of institutions that are all encompassing and focused on solutions in the international arena.

It is also very likely that there will be major changes in the international trade system in the coming years. The Brexit, the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States and the growing anti-liberal discourse in the EU will significantly alter the current international trade agreements as well as the future of the World Trade Organization. In addition, after such a long period of time, negotiations on the future of the international trade system will most certainly stiffen. In order for Turkey to gain a better position in international economic institutions and to be in a better position within the global trade system, Turkey must not have to deal with the struggle of political instability and must shake off any weak political will.

Energy is another area where Turkey has achieved an important position within the global economy in recent years. At a time when global economic growth is weak and concerns for the future of traditional energy sources are rising, the transfer of energy resources from the East to the West is crucial. Turkey is an important actor playing a critical role in securing and supplying energy because of its geographical position and has the advantage of being a rare country that can sit on the bargaining table with almost all the big energy producing countries such as Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan and Qatar. The fact that such energy projects are very long-term projects necessitates a political will that will follow through these projects outside of the daily political banter. This follow-up will be very difficult to take place within a coalition government or in a setting where this contention between the president and the prime minister.

Another important aspect of securing political stability, predictable policies and strong political will, from a global economic perspective, is that it will contribute to the creation of an environment in which Turkey can extend its assistance and support to a wider geographical area. Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), has been one of the world foremost important foreign aid donors for the past ten years even though until ten years ago no one had even had heard of their name. Turkey is one of the few countries making an effort to offer a “humanitarian” solution without prioritizing their own national interests against human tragedies. The fact that Turkey can continue to expand this work corresponds with its strong system of governance.

Turkey is a country that aims not only to increase its own economic power by accelerating the economic development process, but also to make it more inclusive for the underdeveloped and developing countries in order for them to have more say in the global economic arena. For this reason, Turkey needs a new system of governance in order to achieve this goal. The Presidential system, which will be voted on in the constitutional referendum on April 16th, is a valuable alternative that can respond to and meet these needs.

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]]> How the Global and Turkish Economy will appear in 2017 https://politicstoday.org/how-the-global-and-turkish-economy-will-appear-in-2017/ Tue, 10 Jan 2017 06:30:42 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/how-the-global-and-turkish-economy-will-appear-in-2017/

After a tough year in 2016 everyone wants to be optimistic about this year. Although there are still some uncertainties, it is expected that the global economy and the Turkish economy could fare better in 2017.

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2016 had been perhaps the toughest year for the global economy since 2008, which was the year that Lehman Brothers collapsed and the world faced a truly global financial crisis. China’s slowing economic growth, Brexit, Donald Trump’s economic promises, the US Federal Reserve’s (Fed) interest rate decisions, and the increasing fragility of European banks descended over us like a nightmare for the global economy. To be honest, as an economist, it was even difficult for me to track the news flow in the global economy last year. The fluctuating course of the global economy effected Turkey too, inevitably. 2017 is already a candidate for a dynamic year for the economy.

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The most curious subject for the global economy for 2017 is the future of the American economy under a Trump presidency. Donald Trump is going to take charge of an economy with strong growth, rising inflation and a low unemployment rate. In the electoral period he promised to cut tax rates, increase spending on infrastructure and defense, and ease economic regulations. Considering his statements after the election and his newly established cabinet, it seems that he will strive to be a man of his word. But, of course, the actions of President Trump will be different from the promises of presidential candidate Trump. Even if Trump can do some of what he promised, his economic policies will increase both growth and inflation further.

The most curious subject for the global economy for 2017 is the future of the American economy under a Trump presidency.

In the final meeting of 2016, the Fed raised interest rates by a quarter percentage point to between 0.50% and 0.75%. The Fed forecasts three interest rate rises in 2017. The Fed will implement a tighter monetary policy to fight increasing inflation caused by Trump’s expansionary fiscal policy. But, it is not so clear whether a policy mix of expansionary fiscal policy and contractionary monetary policy will strengthen the U.S economy. This policy mix will cause the dollar to appreciate and the public debt to increase. A strong dollar will inevitably harm the export performance of the U.S. Therefore, this policy mix might increase both the trade and public deficit, exacerbating the twin-deficit problem of the U.S. So at the end of the day, it would not be so easy for the Fed to increase interest rate three times in 2017.

EU countries have not breathed a sigh of relief since the global financial crisis spread to the EU in 2010. Growth remains sluggish; unemployment is still high and some big banks cannot restore their balance sheets. To shore up growth, the European Central Bank (ECB) decided to continue its quantitative easing (QE) program until December 2017, but at a slower rate. The Fed and the ECB are using exactly the opposite policies. Therefore, the value of the dollar against the euro will continue to increase in 2017. This can give the EU a competitive edge in exports, which will bring higher growth.

EU countries have not breathed a sigh of relief since the global financial crisis spread to the EU in 2010.

It must be underlined that the effectiveness of the expansionary monetary policy of the ECB depends on the fiscal policy and the health of the banking sector. As Mario Draghi, the president of the ECB, underlined, expansionary monetary policy is not enough to revive economic growth, and thus expansionary fiscal policy should be used. So far EU countries, many of which have been using austerity policies since the global financial crisis began, are far away from using fiscal policy tools to boost growth. If expansionary monetary policy is complemented by expansionary fiscal policy, EU countries will grow faster in 2017. If not, this anaemic economic performance of the EU will continue this year.

The economic performance of EU countries also depends on the banking sector. The ECB’s negative interest rate policy is hurting Eurozone banks through profit margins. The Italian government set a 5 billion euro rescue package to bail out Monte dei Paschi Siena (MPS), which is the oldest surviving bank in the world. Although this package was adequate to rescue MPS, there is a concern that it will not be enough to stabilize the entire Italian banking system. There are some serious concerns about two big German banks as well, Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank. So, the European banking sector will be monitored carefully in 2017.

In 2017, Britain will grow faster than forecasters predicted during the referendum process.

In 2017, Britain will grow faster than forecasters predicted during the referendum process. Before the referendum many politicians, economists and analysts claimed that Brexit would cause a recession. But, so far economic indicators have shown that this is not the case. The way Britain will exit from the EU (whether it will be a soft exit or hard one) is critical for the future of the British economy. Brexit will cause headaches in some areas (e.g. the financial sector and labor market) in the short-run. But, in the long-run, Brexit can make the British economy stronger.

We should not skip China when talking about the global economy. China is still suffering from a transition from an export-led growth model to a consumption-led one. This is not an easy process. It seems that the Chinese economy will be on a more stable path this year. Parallel to 2016, it is expected that China will grow between 6-7% this year. But, it must be noted that growing debt and the shadow banking system are still two important challenges that the Chinese government should deal with.

After analyzing the global economy, let’s talk about the Turkish economy. The Turkish economy shrank in the third quarter of 2016 for the first time since 2009. This contraction occurred mostly due to the failed coup attempt and working day losses due to religious holidays. Economic growth is expected to pick up gradually in 2017. Leading indicators are showing that consumption and production recovered in the fourth quarter and the Turkish economy ended 2016 with a modest growth rate.

Monetary policy might not support economic growth in 2017. If the Fed increases interest rates aggressively, the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) will have no option but to tighten monetary policy by raising interest rates. This situation is not unique to Turkey. The Fed’s interest hike and the rise in the US bond market rates are reducing the demand for emerging market assets. For this reason, emerging market central banks will increase their policy interest rates in 2017. This trend already began in November 2016.

Economists and businessmen are more optimistic about the export performance of Turkey in 2017.

In a situation where expansionary monetary policy is not on the table, expansionary fiscal policy should step in to bolster economic growth. Thanks to restructuring of the public sector, Turkey has ample space to implement expansionary fiscal policy. A low public deficit and debt strengthen the government’s grip on this issue. The government should use demand-stimulating fiscal policies and put new structural reforms into practice to restore consumer and business confidence. Increasing domestic consumption and private investments is vital to nurture economic growth.

Economists and businessmen are more optimistic about the export performance of Turkey in 2017. But, export cannot be the main driver of economic growth this year. Restoring relations with Russia, depreciation of the TL and moderate oil prices are positive signs for the current account balance. Restoring relations with Russia since the second half of 2016 will continue to increase export and tourism revenues in 2017. Although the depreciation of the TL has not caused a high increase in exports so far due to weak global trade and high dependence of Turkish export goods on imported inputs, a weak TL is suppressing import demand. OPEC agreed to cut oil production for the first time since 2008. Although this will cause an increase in oil prices, under the assumption that all members of OPEC keep their promises, market analysts do not expect a sharp increase. It is expected that oil prices will fluctuate between 55 and 65 dollars per barrel in 2017. This may cause a slight increase in the current deficit, but this effect will not be so salient.

After a tough year everyone wants to be optimistic about this year. Although there are still some uncertainties (e.g. Trump’s actions as president, the future of the EU, geopolitical risk related to the Middle East), it is expected that the global economy and the Turkish economy could fare better in 2017.

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]]> With Brexit and the Trump Election, Turkey Has a Chance to Draw More International Students https://politicstoday.org/with-brexit-and-the-trump-election-turkey-has-a-chance-to-draw-more-international-students/ Mon, 26 Dec 2016 04:31:16 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/with-brexit-and-the-trump-election-turkey-has-a-chance-to-draw-more-international-students/

Recent political developments in the UK and the US point to an increased potential for push factors concerning the flow of international students and scholars, and, this may lead, although slowly, to the emergence of new centers of attraction in the world.

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The internationalization of higher education does not just increase the quality of educational institutions in a country, but also offers the potential to make remarkable contributions over a wide spectrum, from politics and economy to social and cultural areas. Countries, which are competing for regional and global influence, are putting into practice a variety of projects with significant budgets to become an important center both for international students and scholars. In this regard, the US is the still the most attractive country for foreign learners in the world.The importance of the economic gains of internationalization of higher education is obvious given the fact that the contribution of international students to the US economy was $30.5 billion in 2015, according to the US Department of Commerce. The flow of international students and scholars to the US is one of the leading traits, which make the country’s higher educational institutions strong, dynamic, and sustainable, while it offers great benefits for the country’s economy and public diplomacy. Other countries also put in place some important incentives to compete in this race and not lose their young and intelligent brains to others.

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Several factors, including the quality of education, living conditions, language of instruction, and employment opportunities before and after the graduation, influence the country choice for an international student. Perhaps the most important of these factors is the visa requirements and immigrant policies, which in many ways reflect the perception of foreigners in a country. Recent developments in the UK and the US, the two most preferred destinations for international students, indicate that there would be a decrease in the flow of students and scholars to these countries. It also implies that there would be fluctuations in the distribution of the ever-growing number of international students on the global scale. This essay will first briefly discuss the recent developments in the UK and the US and will address rising opportunities for Turkey in the higher education sector.In addition to the problems that emerged with the EU on student exchange programs and related projects in the aftermath of the Brexit vote, several new decisions of the UK government to reduce net migration to the country have already made international students and scholars there, or planning to go there, uncomfortable. Theresa May, the new Prime Minister, argues that UK universities should develop sustainable funding models that are not so dependent on international students. A tightened visa regime, tougher employment conditions for international students after graduating, and the inclination of the government to include these students in net migration figures – which it is desperately trying to reduce – have already begun to reveal some of its initial results. According to a report by the Universities and Colleges Admissions Service (Ucas), the number of undergraduate students accepted from outside the EU fell by 2.3% in 2016, the first fall since 2011. This statistic reflects the decrease in both applicants and the acceptance rate. It appears that the decrease in the number of applicants seems not only limited to the non-EU countries. Although all the figures are not yet available, the number of applicants from the EU countries to Cambridge University, which has an earlier application deadline, has already seen a 17% drop.

Considering that international students are contributing £7 billion a year to UK universities and the country’s economy, several leading names from the academic and economic sectors called for urgent action to remove the international students from official immigration statistics. They also urged the authorities to change their rhetoric and policies and claimed that if this was not done, the existing policy would cause great damage to higher educational institutions and to the UK economy. According to the experts, when there is low funding from international students it will not only have negative effects on research funds but will also effect the possibility of entering higher education institutions for English students from the most disadvantaged backgrounds. These students will face difficulties in finding scholarships.

Trump’s US presidential election win sparked a hot debate among political analysts to estimate its effects on local and international politics. Some others have already started discussing how it would influence the higher education sector in the US. Trump’s xenophobic views and call for a ban on Muslims entering the US have pushed experts into pessimism since they realized the negative impact of this rhetoric on the internationalization of the higher educational institutions in the country. While the experts warned authorities about the undesirable effects of this rhetoric, it is reported that some of the international scholars who are teaching at US universities have already begun to revise their careers plans.

In a report in University World News dated November 11, 2016, Philip G. Altbach and Hans de Witt, two renowned experts in the field of higher education, pointed to three potential risks to the internationalization of the US higher education system under Trump. These risks are: a fall in the flow of international students to the US, the US becoming less attractive for international scholars due to the political climate, and a fall in donations from international graduates, an important revenue income for the higher institutions in the country. It will not be surprising to see that when international students and scholars face more stringent visa policies and Muslims are increasingly scrutinized by security services, it will result in potential students looking to other destinations where they can feel more comfortable and welcomed.

While it is still early to predict to what extent these risks will materialize, it is certain that many other countries will update their higher education policies and expectations for internationalization. The flow of international students and scholars, often defined based on push and pull models and pull-in factors, is still prevalent in the US and UK. The two countries still host the largest number of international students in the world. Recent political developments, however, point to an increased potential for push factors both in the US and the UK. Given the large body of international students, this may lead, although slowly, to a new break in terms of the international network of higher education and the emergence of new centers of attraction in the world. It is not difficult to claim that the countries, which are in an advantageous position in terms of internationalization of their higher education institutions, will implement proactive policies to attract more international students and scholars.

Turkey, a regional and global actor with its strong economy and great transformation in the higher education system, has the potential to take a strong place in this new formation. The Council of Higher Education (YÖK) in Turkey is working hard to develop joint projects with higher education institutions all around the world. Support programs of the Ministry of Economy for overseas education fairs, the priority given by the Ministry of Development to internationalization in higher education in state planning, Turkish scholarships and other grants provided by the Prime Ministry for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB), and the Yunus Emre Institute’s branch offices in different regions of the world, have already made great contributions to the internationalization of higher education in the country. Turkey, which has no xenophobic record in its culture and historical trajectory when one compares it with the West, needs to develop a new stand that will turn the recent political developments in world politics to its favor. Turkey has the potential to become a safe and secure place for all international students and scholars, especially from Muslim countries. The current distribution of international students in Turkey, which varies greatly, reflects its potential and advantageous position in this regard.

Amidst perpetual perception boosting operations, Turkey should prepare itself for aggressive promotion campaigns that will explain to international students and scholars how Turkey is a safe destination for study, teaching, and research. Both public institutions and the Turkish academia have a greater responsibility than ever. The Office of Public Diplomacy should take a more active role in this process. To take the best advantage of this historic opportunity, it is more important now than ever that Turkish authorities urgently and systematically improve their policies to make the country a more attractive destination for international students and scholars.

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]]> Economic Implications of Brexit and Turkey https://politicstoday.org/economic-implications-of-brexit-and-turkey/ Mon, 26 Sep 2016 07:48:03 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/economic-implications-of-brexit-and-turkey/

The Brexit’s aftereffects on the Turkish economy will hinge mostly upon the Brexit formula to be devised. The new structure of UK-EU trade could include Turkey as an associated party or, alternatively, pave the way for a new bilateral agreement with the UK.

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The radical choice made by Britons to leave the EU in June 2016 was led by those who believed that an EU-independent UK would be better off. Nevertheless, the degree of rationality of the arguments put forward for the Brexit campaign still preserves its ambiguity. In this context, the fundamental question relates to the price to be paid by Great Britain in return for the sovereignty that it voted for. This is because the political as well as the economic dimensions of the historical decision create nontrivial concerns. What is more, concerns are not limited to the UK but also pertain to the EU and many non-EU affiliates.

In this regard, the Brexit process to be triggered by Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty will be critical in many respects. The formula that will emerge from the negotiations, which are expected to last two years, will determine the content of the post-Brexit conditions for the UK, thereby generating implications for the rest of the world.In this framework, when the impacts on the British economy are assessed, one can talk about the short-term dynamics, on one hand, and the medium/long-term effects on the other.

As for the short-run effects, the main focus can be defined as the loss of confidence created by the risks perceived both economically and politically. The sharp fall in sterling immediately after the referendum was, indeed, a primary indicator of this fact. Depreciation of the domestic currency has the potential to affect the foreign trade channel of the UK economy, by imposing a possible weakening in imports while providing a supposedly competitive advantage for exports.On the other hand, the loss of confidence might manufacture unpleasant effects for the service industry and in terms of the famous British finance sector in particular. Another inevitable short-term outcome of the referendum can be projected to be the loss of appetite of foreign capital due to the uncertainties that have emerged. Cancellations and delays of some international projects in the immediate aftermath of the Brexit decision can be well considered an apparent sign of such an inclination. In this sense, it would not be unfair to claim that the UK, presently the most favored European destination for global capital inflows, will long for its attractiveness, at least for a while, until the Brexit formula becomes clear. Moreover, ambiguities will cause inconvenience for domestic economic actors as well, leading to negative prospective reflections on decisions of investment and consumption.

Thus, all in all, projecting a slowdown in the UK economy in the short run seems reasonable. Yet, potential actions and stimulations to be planned by the government and the Bank of England might lessen the adverse effects to some extent.

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On the other hand, as the uncertainties regarding the process disappear over time, the British economy rather will be directed along the path drawn by the new conditions. Therefore, what will basically differentiate the medium/long run from the short run will be the substance of the Brexit formula that will undeniably stage a challenging course of negotiation. This is mainly because the disintegration process can cause damage to both sides owing to the dense nature of the ongoing economic relations.At this point, one can indeed talk about the existence of a dilemma for the EU and the UK. While the parties would reasonably prefer to proceed with the minimum harm possible to themselves, achieving such an objective will be difficult. As for the EU, offering generous entitlements to a member exiting the Union would pose serious political risks by encouraging those who might think of an exit in the future. For the UK, on the other hand, more economic integration would necessitate obeisance to EU rules and regulations, hence conflicting with the original targets of the Brexiteers in terms of sovereignty. This is why, from a rational perspective, the formula to be negotiated might rather be expected to deliver limited economic integration for the United Kingdom.Furthermore, it should be underlined that the new scenario will have consequences for relations between the UK and its non-EU partners. The British economy currently runs its trade relationships through more than 50 international agreements undertaken by the EU. Therefore, the destiny of the UK’s non-EU trade will depend on the Brexit formula to be agreed.

In brief, the next chapter of the British economy will rely upon the degree of its future economic integration with the EU and the deals that will be built upon this. In this context, there is no doubt that the UK will have to make serious efforts to minimize the relevant costs and attain the best privileges possible. This, however, could constrain its economy to a considerably low performance in the years to come.

Likewise, consequences of the Brexit process possibly will resonate in Turkey due to the country’s strong economic ties with the UK and the EU. The UK is currently one of the top destinations for Turkish exports and welcomes a wide range of goods from Turkey, including motor vehicles, clothing, electronics, machinery and articles of iron and steel. As for the short term, a prospective slowdown in the UK economy has the potential to affect imports from Turkey in a downward direction. Moreover, Turkish exports could encounter the risk of a reaction through the European economy, depending on the severity of the regional outcomes. In this context, the trade relations of Turkey with the UK and the EU might also be affected by the changes in sterling and euro in the near future. Besides, developments in the short run can be expected to have consequences for the Turkish tourism sector, for which the EU and the UK, in particular, are major sources.

The aftereffects on the Turkish economy, on the other hand, will hinge mostly upon the Brexit formula to be devised. In this respect, the new structure of UK-EU trade could include Turkey as an associated party or, alternatively, pave the way for a new bilateral agreement with the UK. The latter is a delicate matter due to Turkey’s subjection to the Customs Union, nonetheless. And last but not least, apart from the credit opportunities it provides for the Turkish private sector, the United Kingdom also stands as a foremost actor in terms of foreign direct investments (FDI) made in Turkey. The share of the UK in total FDIs in Turkey in the year of 2015 was %7 and enlarged to %8.2 for the first 7 months of 2016. Thus, the UK’s ongoing role as a prominent source of finance and investments should be expressed as another likely channel of impact for the Turkish economy. To cut a long story short, potential implications of the imminent negotiation process and the post-Brexit era are likely to be echoed in Turkey, as well.

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]]> Brexit and Re-discussing European Democracy https://politicstoday.org/brexit-and-re-discussing-european-democracy/ Mon, 11 Jul 2016 04:01:54 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/brexit-and-re-discussing-european-democracy/

Great Britain’s decision to leave the EU is not only a turning point in Europe’s history but also a huge challenge for the world’s economic and political system.

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Great Britain’s decision to leave the European Union is not only a turning point in Europe’s history but also a huge challenge for the world’s economic and political system. The importance of the event also shows how much Britain impacts the global balance.

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Many now wonder whether or not the EU and Great Britain will be able to preserve their unity. This is, of course, only one of the discussion topics in this complex matter.Another topic is democracy itself. The Brexit referendum has allowed citizens to express their feelings – and this is direct democracy. However, it is widely known that opinions may be manipulated by the wording of the referendum question, by the overall political atmosphere or by the arguments chosen during debates. Asking a question to millions and allowing them the choice of only a simple yes or no answer is no guarantee that the result reflects the will of the people.

Great Britain’s decision to leave the European Union is not only a turning point in Europe’s history but also a huge challenge for the world’s economic and political system.

The Brexit referendum has shown us, once again, the ambiguities of referendums. According to surveys, the older generation and more conservative people have voted to leave the EU, perhaps imagining that the UK will return to the power of its Victorian Era once it is liberated from its European obligations. Immediately after the announcement of the results, some “leave” voters expressed their regrets and tried to propose ways to reverse the decision. People have searched EU-related information on the web following the referendum, not before, which shows that many were not informed about what they were voting against. They have seen that their money is losing value, that international firms have expressed intentions to leave the country and that a number of citizens have applied for French citizenship – many are shocked by these developments.

Democracy in the Context of Ethnic Nationalism and Globalism

Brexit has proved that a referendum can be a very dangerous tool in a democracy. Politics is never black and white; it is always made up of shades of gray. If every issue was black and white, politicians would not be necessary. This, of course, does not mean that referendums should be prohibited, but it does mean that they must be organized in a more just, transparent and democratic way.

The UK’s decision has encouraged discussion of democracy and voting habits. It has also sparked a number of other debates: the future of Scotland, for example. There is now a widely held opinion that a second Scottish independence referendum will be held soon, and this time the supporters of a free Scotland will win. Scotland will then apply for EU membership. If this happens, will the Scots be seen as a secessionist ethnic group or will this be considered the use of the right to self-determination by a distinct nation?

The UK’s decision has encouraged discussion of democracy and voting habits. It has also sparked a number of other debates: the future of Scotland, for example.

Do people have the right to create their own independent state or can this only happen when great powers make the decision? In Scotland’s case, it is not the Scots but the English, by their decision to leave the EU, who have provoked the secession. This begs the question of whether the same scenario is possible in Spain or Italy.

In the past, many wars have been caused by this kind of secessionist desire. What is new is that today’s secessionists want to leave the states they are attached to in order to join a multi-state integration movement, namely the EU.

We do not know yet if Scotland will be able to declare independence and join the EU, but, if that happens, it could pave the way for the resolution of the Cyprus question. Can the EU act differently when divergent peoples ask for the same dispensation?

There is another problem: let us imagine that the UK has indeed been dismembered and Scotland has become independent. The UN is the main mechanism that can validate such a situation, but the UK is a permanent member of the Security Council. What if the UK uses its veto right to block Scotland’s wish to join international bodies, and what if, despite that, Scotland asks to be incorporated into the EU? In this case, and if the EU accepts Scotland’s membership, what can one say? That the EU has encouraged the falling apart of the UK? Or that the EU has protected the rights of a sovereign nation against the egoistic will of the UK ?

Democracy and Loose EU vs Tight EU

Since the foundation of the EU, one of the main debates has been about the level of integration: whether the EU will become a rigid bloc or a loose association of states. France and Germany have always defended the first view, while the UK has insisted on the second. As of today, some say that Brexit is the result of the EU’s inability to establish a tight union thus far, while others say that the EU is more than tight enough already, which is exactly what has pushed Britain to leave the union.

Since the foundation of the EU, one of the main debates has been about the level of integration: whether the EU will become a rigid bloc or a loose association of states.

Perhaps the problem is not about the tight or loose character of the union, but where and how decisions are taken. Immediately before and after the referendum, the term “EU” was searched on the internet massively by people in the UK. In other words, people who actually live under EU regulation are unaware of what the EU is, or they have forgotten its definition. EU mechanisms profess to act on behalf of the people, but it has gone unnoticed that the people feel that the EU institutions do not represent them. For most people, the EU is only what their politicians tell them.

England is the motherland of modern parliamentarian democracy. The EU has always said that it cherishes democracy, but, over time, the EU institutions have become unable to make people feel that they are represented in Brussels; this is why the English people have reacted. It is known that the EU insists that its members have impeccable democracy; but the EU mechanisms themselves have lost their democratic character. One of the reasons for this is that it is not the people who make the final decisions, it is the states. This is why, even if a state is democratic within its country, when it comes to the international scene, states act as realistic actors and their priority is only their national interest.

The problem is that the EU member countries do not have the same powerful economy, so, in the end, it is Germany that has become the major decision maker.

Another aspect of the debate is the market economy. The theory is that a liberal democracy cannot be imagined without a liberal economy. The EU has definitely adopted liberal economic rules and it has reduced states’ role over economic processes. But it has simply replaced those states with Brussels. Singular states have, indeed, small influence over the economy, but the EU is now the main regulatory actor. The problem is that the EU member countries do not have the same powerful economic situation, so, in the end, it is the country with the biggest economy that has become the major decision maker, and it is obvious that this player is Germany. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to talk about a real liberal economy. In fact, the EU is quite liberal within the Union, but extremely protective against the outside world. There are now agreements to weaken these protective walls, but these are being negotiated by states and put into practice by firms.

This is why big companies are, in fact, the real pivot of the EU’s economy, which creates distortion effects for diverse income segments and business sectors. Sometimes, states try to correct this situation, such as in France with the disputed law on working life; but this pushes angry people into the streets.

Democracy in the Context of Euroscepticism and Xenophobia

The UK example has shown us that those who do not want to remain within the EU are those who dislike other people, which is why all nationalist and racist parties in France, the Netherlands, Italy and Austria have applauded the Brexit result.

It is sad to think that the EU was once created so that nationalism and racism would be eradicated. It appears that a moment came when people began to question the purpose of the EU.

It is sad to think that the EU was once created so that nationalism and racism would be eradicated. It appears that a moment came when people began to question the purpose of the EU, and they asked themselves “who are we?” Moreover, they have begun to believe that values such as democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms are solid enough and do not require the EU’s protection.

Turkey has been the perfect target in this context as it is a candidate country. It has been seen as the “other” because it has not adopted these values, and the EU has done little to help in this. Turkey has been criticized because of its undemocratic character, but the way it has been criticized has been almost as though the EU wants Turkey to remain undemocratic.

When a group of people begin to call themselves “we”, they can no longer claim  to cherish European or universal values, because, if there is a “we”, there is certainly an “other” somewhere.

Brexit is not only about how many members the EU will retain or what can be expected in Britain’s future. It is about the big debate on democracy.

The “others” for the EU are Turkey, the Syrian refugees, Middle Eastern people or Muslims in general. A clear distinction has sometimes been made between European Muslims and Middle Eastern Muslims, such as with the building of a wall on the Greek-Bulgarian border. These walls are not only at the borders, but also in the mind. The “others” have also sparked fears.

Europeans are not only afraid of non-European people but also of those European citizens of Middle Eastern origin. The fear has turned easily into a discrimination.

Conservative English people have said “no” to the EU, believing that European institutions will bring many more foreigners to their country. Many more European countries may say the same. They consider democracy to be the right to not live with foreigner neighbors or to not see foreigners in daily life. Britain has caused this debate to grow stronger; after all, it is the motherland of parliamentarian democracy.

Brexit is not only about how many members the EU will retain or what can be expected in Britain’s future. It is about the big debate on democracy. It is a turning point for Europe and for the entire world.

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