Who won and who lost the local elections in Turkey? The answer to this question depends on your perspective. For instance, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahceli said prior to the elections that their target was to receive 52 percent of the vote share for the People’s Alliance, and the Alliance received 51.6 percent. Also, considering that 51.41 percent of the electorate opted for “yes” in the 2017 constitutional referendum and 52.6 percent voted for Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the 2018 presidential election, it is obvious that the current ruling party in Turkey is preserving its power.

On the other hand, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) Istanbul mayoral candidate, Ekrem Imamoglu, won the recent mayoral election by receiving 54.3 percent with the support of the Iyi Party and the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP). Although this vote share has only been achieved in Istanbul and represents an alliance, no other CHP candidate has so far received such a high score. This vote share has also been marked as the highest rate a mayoral candidate has so far received in the history of Istanbul municipal elections. Beside this, the CHP’s Ankara candidate Mansur Yavas won the mayoral race in Ankara by receiving 50.93 percent of the vote, which was about four points higher than the ruling Justice and Development Party’s candidate Mehmet Ozhaseki.

The CHP has achieved quite a success in Turkey’s local elections. Does it mean the end of conservative politics in Turkey?

Since the CHP candidates won in Turkey’s capital city Ankara and most populous city Istanbul, it can be said that the alliance led by the CHP has achieved quite a success. So, is it possible to claim that the fears over the CHP persisting for years in the entire political spectrum aside from the CHP base have been overcome? Or, as many claim nowadays, has the heyday of the conservative politics led by Erdogan come to an end? My answer to the second question would be: “No, it has not. Muslim conservative values have been consolidated rather than decline all across Turkey, particularly in Istanbul and Ankara.”

First of all, Yavas is a former MHP member. So, he has a nationalist-conservative political background considering the stance of the MHP, which has been juxtaposed with the Western far-right movements for years in Europe (such a juxtaposition is problematic in many respects but this is the subject of another debate). He firstly became a mayoral candidate from the MHP for the local election held on 18 April, 1999, and was elected as the mayor of Ankara’s Beypazari district with 51 percent of the vote share. He was re-elected for the district in the 2004 election, and ran for Ankara mayor’s office from the MHP in 2009, but could not win the metropolitan race. When he was not nominated by the MHP in 2013, he passed to the CHP and ran for the metropolitan mayor’s office again from the CHP in 2014, but did not win then either. And finally, in the 2019 local election, he managed to become the mayor of Ankara. However, neither in his election campaign nor in any of his statements has he remarked a word that shows his allegiance to the CHP.  He has refused to wear the CHP badge and announced that he will not wear it. Yavas celebrated his Ankara victory with his friends by shouting Allah-u Akbar, demonstrating his belonging to the Turkish nationalist tradition.

Mansur Yavas celebrated his Ankara victory with his friends by shouting Allah-u Akbar and demonstrating his belonging to the Turkish nationalist tradition.

For the first time in the history of the CHP, a candidate has ceaselessly issued statements with religious and conservative underpinnings during his campaign. On his first day in office as Istanbul mayor, Imamoglu made an unprecedented act that was not seen even in the periods of the AK Party or late Necmettin Erbakan’s Welfare Party. He summoned a religious clerk to his office and made him recite the Quran. Also, maintaining separate time periods allocated to men and women for municipality swimming pools (one of the reasons for closing the Welfare Party in 1998 was allocating separate sections for men and women in swimming pools), and keeping the alcohol ban in the cafes and restaurants owned by the municipality were among the election promises of İmamoğlu. Although several names within pro-CHP media outlets and a few CHP politicians tepidly reacted to such promises during the first weeks of his campaign process, İmamoğlu has continued to pursue his politics with a religious and conservative emphasis for six months.

The CHP Chairman Kemal Kilicdaroglu did not appear in the media and abstained from issuing any public statements throughout the election campaign due to the fear that the CHP’s shadow might jeopardize Imamoglu’s image. Pleased with the election result, Kilicdaroglu hinted after the election that the same political rhetoric would continue. Brushing all the questions such as “Is this rhetoric sustainable?” and “What will the CHP base think after a while?” aside, it must be stressed that the CHP candidate received votes from the conservative Turkish and Kurdish people thanks to this new political discourse that propagated separate sections for men and women in pools, alcohol-free restaurants and cafes, freedom for different clothing styles, and prevention of any kind of discrimination against women in hijab in public and private sectors.

Ekrem Imamoglu received votes from the conservative people thanks to his political discourse that propagated separate sections for men and women in pools, alcohol-free restaurants, etc.

In this political atmosphere and the post-truth world (a world where lies comprise the only remaining truth, to quote an academic studying intellectual history), such acrobatic maneuvers of the CHP can work and have apparently worked in the recent period. It is dubious whether a normal political praxis will replace acrobatics and turn into a political stance, or whether the lifestyle of Muslim conservatives will stop being a space of intervention for the CHP. Nevertheless, it is undoubted that the successive election victories of the AK Party led by Erdogan for the past 17 years despite all the challenges in modern Turkey obliged the CHP to lean towards (at least ostensibly) to the values it has been against for 95 years.

The results of the Istanbul elections is still being discussed in Turkey. The clear-cut victory of Ekrem Imamoglu over Binali Yildirim has raised questions on the transformation of voting behavior. Why did a significant number of the Istanbul electorate change their voting preference in just 84 days? Is this change in voting behavior related to a long-lasting social and political transformation in Turkish society? Even though it is not an easy task answering these questions, there are some eye-catching issues that are crucial to find a satisfying answer.

The first critical point is related to the transformation of the profile of the electorate in the last decade. Contrary to a common myth implying that the number of young voters is increasing in Turkey, their number showed a decrease in the last decade. While the ratio of young people between the ages 15-29 consisted of 26.79 percent of the whole population in 2007, this ratio decreased to 24,34 percent in 2015. In parallel to this information, the ratio of young voters is also showing a slight decrease. Thus, it is obvious that the argument on rejuvenation does not explain the reason behind the change of voting behavior.

Contrary to a common myth, the number of young voters in Turkey showed a decrease in the last decade.

Nonetheless, a second more prominent point explains more about the change of voting behavior, especially in regards to the Istanbul elections. This point is the reaction that the electorate gave against the renewal of elections in Istanbul. The Turkish electorate has always been critical against the renewal of elections and the idea of snap elections. However, the ongoing dynamics in political, economic, and social affairs determine the way of reactions. For instance, in 2002, the electorate showed a noticeable reaction against existing political actors because of the ongoing economic crisis. During November 2015, the electorate favored the ruling party in the renewed elections in order to avoid uncertainty arising from political and economic instability, the future of the Kurdish question, and the war in Syria.

When it comes to the Istanbul elections, it is possible to say that the electorate was not convinced about the reason why the elections were canceled in the first place. Therefore, they reacted against the AK Party candidate, Binali Yildirim. Thus, rather than a long-lasting dissatisfaction with the government, the results of the election is substantially related to the post-March 31 period, along with pre-electoral alliances.

The electorate was not convinced of the reason why the elections were canceled, and they reacted against the AK Party.

The reaction given by the 220,000 AK Party supporters who voted for Binali Yildirim on March 31 and who did not vote for him on June 24 should therefore be evaluated within this framework. A certain number of the electorate did not accept the rationality behind the renewal of the Istanbul elections – although it was legally explained.

All political parties will most probably take all issues into consideration when discussing the change of voting behavior in Turkey. It is obvious that there is a need for further studies based on empirical data in order to understand the in-depth reasons behind this issue. It is crucial to understand whether there had been a long-lasting shift in voting behavior of whether the specific conditions of the Istanbul elections created a short-term change in the electorate. Even if the second option is more valid under these circumstances, all political parties need to take necessary measures in order to prepare for the first option.

Following the Istanbul elections on June 23, Turkey’s policymakers will now focus on politics and on particular foreign policy issues of current significance. The upcoming days will most likely show some striking developments in the field of foreign policy, as the S-400 missile case, tensions between the U.S. and Iran and the G20 Summit will be of great importance.

However, before that, a final elaboration from a systematic point of view should be made regarding the political system in general and the recent mayoral elections in particular. The Turkish public went to the ballot every year since 2014 due to both extraordinary situations, such as early elections held in 2015, the failed coup attempt in 2016, the referendum in 2017, and the snap elections in 2018. Added to this list was the re-run of the Istanbul elections on June 23. These experiences give us political scientists a lot of data to analyze Turkey’s continuous political perception of the previous parliamentary system, while the dynamic transformation is continuing into the new presidential system, which was adopted in 2017.

In the new system, the country’s executive organ is led by a single office, namely the Turkish presidency. According to the previous constitutional requirement, the Turkish prime minister had to share the country’s executive organ with the president, which in the past had caused several system-based difficulties and even crises between the two offices. One of my first observations is that despite official opposition regarding the Turkish presidential system by most opposition parties – except the MHP – it seems that opposition circles have increasingly become used to the current system, which eventually enables opposition parties to form a so-called “bloc” or “alliance” in order to win certain offices of great importance.

Of course, the recent mayoral election in Istanbul, where in a de facto manner only two candidates, namely the Nation Alliance’s and the People’s Alliance’s candidates, became actual rivals, cannot be counted as a presidential election. Ekrem Imamoglu’s success was due to the “bloc” formed between former frustrated Kemalist/secular voters and voters that changed their minds, which is an outcome of Turkey’s presidential system, which enables alliances/blocs based on political realities.

In order to become Turkey’s president, one needs either more than 50 percent of all the votes to win in the first round or the majority of votes to gain victory in the second round. This necessity led to alliances during the 2018 presidential elections, which were formed between the AK Party and the MHP and on the other hand between the CHP and its rather heterogenous allies.

To underscore what I’m trying to explain in this week’s column, one has to stress the similar perception, which had been the case in the re-run of the mayoral elections on June 23, and which had eventually been elaborated as a de facto second round for Istanbul’s mayoral office. Under these conditions, it would be perhaps an interesting outcome and even future projection or change to consider an official second-round vote system, in particular for metropoles such as Ankara, Izmir, and Istanbul. By this, it might be a step to 1) boost Turkey’s presidential system through a similar voting system, and 2) increase the acceptance rate for the system itself.

Thus, Turkey’s dynamic political and its own path of democratic experience, which definitely must not be limited to exaggerated comments by foreign correspondents/journalists in Turkey and who are nowadays broadcasting in a very extreme and absurd Imamoglu-backing bias, offers a very good opportunity to examine the recent results in a more comparative and of course, system-based context.

The June 23 Istanbul Election ended with the success of the Nation Alliance candidate, Ekrem Imamoglu. After long-lasting discussions and controversies, Istanbul chose its mayor who will serve for the next five years. Last night also proved that despite all aggressive stigmatizing campaigns, Turkey’s democracy is still very powerful, and that all actors and parties can come to power when they get the support of the electorate.

It is important to analyze the results of the June 23 Istanbul elections in detail. In the cancelled Istanbul elections, the difference between the votes of the two candidates- Ekrem Imamoglu and Binali Yildirim- was only 13,000. The AK Party insisted that the recount of all votes in Istanbul may change the results of the election. Nevertheless, the CHP did not accept the recount of all votes. After a long-lasting and highly-debated process, the YSK cancelled the elections due to presiding officers at ballot stations who were not civil servants, which is against the law.

The increase in Imamoglu’s votes cannot be explained with the change in voter turnout.

On the June 23 elections, the difference between the votes of two candidates skyrocketed to 806.415 according to the unofficial results. Why did the slight difference on March 31 show a significant increase on June 23? Firstly, statistics show that Imamoglu increased his votes especially in 11 districts in Istanbul. While Yildirim got more votes than Imamoglu in these districts on March 31, Imamoglu received the majority on June 23. In total, Imamoglu received 572,120 more votes in Istanbul on June 23.

The increase in Imamoglu’s votes cannot be explained with the change in voter turnout. While voter turnout was 83.88% on March 31, it only increased to 84,44% on June 23. Nonetheless, the number of valid votes was approximately 200,000 higher compared to the March 31 elections. It is obvious that Imamoglu received the support of these 200,000 people in the first place.

Another determinant of the increase in the votes of Imamoglu was the supporters of other political parties. There had been 29 mayoral candidates on March 31 and most of these candidates withdrew their candidacy in favor of Imamoglu. Even though the Felicity Party did not withdraw its candidate, the comparison of the March 31 and June 23 elections show that approximately 56,000 Felicity Party supporters voted for Imamoglu or did not go to the polls on June 23.

All parties should be more careful in understanding the dynamics of the new system in the long-term.

The results of the June 23 elections show a significant decrease in the votes of Yildirim. Compared to the results of the March 31 elections, Yildirim lost approximately 220,000 votes on June 23. Although this number is taken into consideration with the almost stable voter turnout, it is seen that most of these voters changed their decisions and vote for Imamoglu on June 23. It is possible that these voters were not convinced about the cancellation of the Istanbul elections.

All this data shows that the consolidation of all parties against the AK Party is the main reason behind the success of Imamoglu on June 23. This situation is, indeed, directly related to the new pre-electoral alliance system, uniting all parties in a common goal. Thus, all parties should be more careful in understanding the dynamics of the new system in the long-term.

On last Sunday evening, the two candidates in the Istanbul mayoral election race, Binali Yildirim and Ekrem Imamoglu, came together for a three hours-long televised debate. As a highlight right before the re-run election today on June 23, 2019, the debate gathered millions of voters from all over Turkey to watch the potential future mayor of Istanbul. There was no actual winner of the televised debate, but Yildirim reflected more successfully on mayoral issues.

This evening will show by which dynamics and factors the voters of Istanbul were persuaded and on which grounds they elected their new mayor. Unfortunately, on the other hand, the televised debate – just like all other news on Istanbul – was not accurately discussed in the Western media. A simple look at the news and headlines of some media outlets in the U.S., UK, France and Germany reveal the journalistic bias.

The Western media have portrayed Ekrem Imamoglu as an ideal candidate for Turkish politics and have disregarded serious questions and accusations that he faces. They’ve turned a blind eye and a deaf ear to his previous failures, which Imamoglu is consistently asked about. Interestingly enough, Binali Yildirim, the experienced statesman and the joint candidate of the AK Party-MHP alliance, is not given equal attention by the Western media. Even when he is given attention, it’s usually in a negative tone. It is absurd that Yildirim’s previous achievements during both his term as the country’s Minister for Transportation and Communication (2002-2013, 2015-2016) when Turkey’s main highways and high-speed train networks were re-constructed, and his term as the Prime Minister (2015-2018), are not taken into consideration by these media outlets.

Instead of addressing Yildirim’s personality, success and failures, career path, massive infrastructural projects he took, which were not common for Turkey, nearly all Western media outlets editorialized news on Yildirim by silencing him. On the contrary, Imamoglu was presented in the media in a very positive way, disregarding any standards about a minimum level of objectivity. Moreover, he was falsely placed vis-à-vis the AK Party chair and President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, as the de facto rival of the Nation Alliance’s and CHP’s candidate. No need to say that this is not the case.

It is true that President Erdogan has also been delivering speeches along Binali Yildirim regarding the Istanbul mayoral elections. However, this does not mean that journalists from the Western world should disregard the AK Party’s mayoral candidate and his projections for the future of Istanbul. By this, it is weird to observe that most of the pieces that appeared in the Western media about the Istanbul elections focused on Erdogan rather than Yildirim and used a negative discourse, continuing their habit that has been accustomed for about 7-8 years now.

For instance, pieces from France’s leading media platforms and dailies portrayed Imamoglu as a “new hope of Turkish politics” (“nouvel espoir de la politique turque”) while openly disregarding the criteria of objectivity with regard to his rival Binali Yildirim (I,II). Similarly, the British media (III,IV) openly described Imamoglu “as a unifying power to take on Erdogan” without challenging and stressing various accusations towards Imamoglu. Furthermore, particularly media platforms in the United States, openly took positions supporting the CHP’s candidate, and, where also Imamoglu – a person running for being elected as a local politician– received the chance to publish a (Washington Post op-ed) article appealing to international audience (V,VI).

Of course, main support in the Western media still comes from Germany, where nearly every single politician who challenges the governing AK Party – no matter whether ultra-conservative, ultra-nationalist, Kurdish-separatist, etc- received media support without critical journalism. This happened and continues to happen during the 23 June election campaigns. For instance, titles such as “Istanbul candidate Imamoglu: Erdogan’s successor?” (VII) and its content or  articles mainly addressing the CHP’s candidate and President Erdogan (VIII,IV,X,XI) are not delivering satisfactory content about the recent election campaign, which at the end of the day was a quite fruitful period from a socio-political and democratic point of view.

People in Istanbul will decide on who will govern their metropolitan municipality for the next five years. Journalists and editors in Western media outlets continue their manipulative and biased behaviors and thus set a good example for the next generations about how this profession should not be done. Lacking any criteria for objectivity unfortunately is a fact of our post-truth world, no matter what the cost of losing ethical journalist credibility can mean in the long run.

The real cause of the excitement in both Turkey and the West over the Republican People’s Party’s (CHP) Istanbul mayoral candidate Ekrem Imamoğlu has been the thought that he might manifest himself as a new leader and be an alternative to the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Although his performance until the March 31 elections led people to think this possibility, he has proved as from March 31 that he does not have such leadership qualities, and this situation will not change whether he is elected as the Istanbul mayor on the June 23 elections or not.

Of course, Istanbul mayor’s office is a critical position since the city has been the capital of many empires throughout history and reflects Turkey in a nutshell in the current context. Erdoğan became Istanbul mayor 24 years ago and found a chance to become a national leader who can show himself in world politics. He is undoubtedly the most powerful leader Turkey has witnessed as he received more than 50 percent of the vote share in the first round of last year’s presidential election despite being in power for 17 years.

İmamoğlu’s score in the mayoral election with the support of several other parties such as the Iyi Party and the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) unavoidably kept the opposition’s hopes alive since it was similar to the beginning of Erdoğan’s story. Although many names following the same trajectory disappeared from the political scene, such as Nurettin Sözen from the CHP, Ali Müfit Gürtuna from late Necmettin Erbakan’s Virtue Party and Bedrettin Dalan from the Motherland Party (ANAP), dissidents still thought “everything will be great” with İmamoğlu.

While many believed Imamoglu to hold leadership characteristics and be an alternative to Turkey’s President Erdogan, he has proved as from March 31 that he does not have such leadership qualities.

To that end, the CHP has engaged in an activity that is peculiar for political literature and distributed a 50-page booklet entitled “Radical Love Book,” which quoted the words of prominent names in Islamic philosophy and Sufi literature such as Yunus Emre, Rumi and Haci Bektash Veli. The cover of the booklet features a family with two children, with a mother who wears a hijab. The family carries a placard that reads “Love, brothers, sisters…” By employing religious motifs, the booklet warns about negative feelings such as arrogance, hate and grudge, and tells people how they should approach each other and meet on a common ground.

The messages given are not bad. The last page of the booklet reads: “This is an intra-party education material for the local election campaign and has been prepared to contribute to the discourse of the CHP party organization and party volunteers during the campaign process.” The introduction, which was penned by Seyit Torun, the CHP Vice President in charge of local administrations, reads: “I have met many honorable villagers who would not touch a handful of the rice they are entrusted to, they don’t generally vote for our party. […] Some pedantic people who have never seen or met these people insulted them by calling them ‘bribe-takers.’ They even called workers and villagers lazy although these people sweat and work very hard to make a living.”

İmamoğlu has managed to appeal to large masses in Turkey since his profile has been different from conventional CHP politicians and his tone is appropriate for 70 percent of Turkish society, as described in the booklet written by the advertiser İlyas Başsoy. While displaying this profile, İmamoğlu did not experience the handicaps a typical CHP member would have due to his family background. In a similar vein, the CHP also aspired to get away from its conventional stance. But this went so far that the CHP deputies reacted when a Justice and Development Party (AK Party) deputy addressed İmamoğlu as “the CHP’s mayoral candidate” during a televised debate. They said: “you deliberately underlined that he is from the CHP.”

Their election propaganda has definitely reached its target to a certain point. However, for political leadership, one has to have an ideological cause or a political agenda. Over the course of the campaign period, İmamoğlu abstained from remarking any political opinion. If he is a candidate to a grand metropolitan city as Istanbul, then he could have shared whether he had any projects on public works. However, in Turkey’s collective memory, being a CHP member means going against all kinds of operations.

Over the course of the election campaign, Ekrem Imamoglu abstained from clearly manifesting any ideological cause or a political agenda.

The CHP has always opposed the bridges built in Istanbul, new airports, private TV channels and the investments made in the telecommunications sector. This has been a major handicap for İmamoğlu, but the televised debate between the two mayoral candidates, Binali Yıldırım and İmamoğlu, might have presented him a chance to erase this past from people’s minds. The moderator of the debate was a pro-CHP journalist whose license plate is “CHP” and who is employed by Murdoch’s Fox Tv.

İmamoğlu’s opponent in the debate was a prominent and experienced politician who has marked significant projects in transportation, and who served as the prime minister, minister and parliamentary speaker. But as a requirement of the debate format, the new one is always put in a more advantaged position than the other. Despite this, the new one could not predicate his promises on any solid ground. While Yıldırım summarized in 3 minutes what his party have done so far and what they will do and mentioned Marmaray, Avrasya tunnel, highways, rail systems, metro and train lines, İmamoğlu began his words by saying: “We will conduct feasibility works for one year with every wing of the transportation sector,” and did not mention any projects. This means that he and his team did not even conduct a preliminary feasibility work for their promise, which shouldn’t have been the case.

Imamoğlu continued: “We will build a 500-kilometer cycle path, finish the incomplete projects. With an integrated approach, we will work with all the actors such as minibuses, taxis, and shuttle services.” He also promised that he will open 150 kindergartens in Istanbul, but his opponent reminded that he only built one kindergarten when he was Beylikdüzü mayor although he promised to build 11. İmamoğlu also said that a scholarship worth 400 TL will be granted to 75 thousand students for 8 months of the year, to which his opponent responded: “Municipalities cannot grant scholarships. They did it in the past, but İmamoğlu’s party, the CHP, brought it to the Constitutional Court 10 years ago and rendered municipal scholarships impossible.” On the next day, Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality issued an announcement: “Before its cancellation initiated by the CHP, a 122 million 290 thousand TL worth education fund was granted to a total of 202 thousand 750 university students between 2004 and 2008.”

Although the debate has not affected the opinion of the electorate according to the polls, İmamoğlu has proved once again that he does not actually have the leadership qualities people attribute to him. No matter what the result will be on the June 23 election, İmamoğlu could not go beyond drawing the image of a contractor successful in his job who constantly gives all-encompassing and embracing messages despite his inability to give any tangible promise for the future. Is it to early to speak about the future? I don’t think so.  

Turkey’s long-awaited live debate between the two mayoral candidates of Istanbul, Binali Yildirim and Ekrem Imamoglu, took place on Sunday night. Despite high expectations and controversies, the live debate did not end up with any shocking events or scandals. Thus, both candidates showed a decent performance and there was no unfair balance in their appearance at the debate.

After the live debates in the U.S., survey companies conduct an instant survey to show the true winner of the debate. Nevertheless, the format of the program in Turkey was not designed in a way that enabled being able to choose the winner of the debate. Throughout the program, two candidates never engaged in a face-to-face dialogue. Rather than being in direct interactions, the two candidates separately answered the questions of the moderator.

Imamoglu underlined that he had never allowed the sale of alcohol at social facilities during his mayorship in Beylikduzu province. These statements created anger and frustration among his supporters.

Although the public complained that the program was dull and that the moderator ought to have allowed the two sides to interact with each other, there were small incidents that raised tensions throughout the program. The most prominent incident was Ekrem Imamoglu’s statements on the ban of alcohol and gender-segregated pools. Imamoglu underlined that he had never allowed the sale of alcohol at social facilities during his mayorship in Beylikduzu province. He also stated that he built gender-segregated pools in Beylikduzu while he was trying to show his “respect to conservative values.” Nonetheless, Imamoglu’s statements created anger and frustration among his supporters and this issue became one of the most controversial outcomes of the live debate.

Even though a true winner of the debate cannot be declared, there is a public consensus that Binali Yildirim was more successful in answering the questions of the moderator. Indeed, Yildirim showed great success in explaining the reason of the cancellation of the Istanbul elections by emphasizing his demand on a re-count of votes rather than a cancellation. When it comes to Imamoglu, he could not clearly answer most of the questions asked by the moderator. Imamoglu could not make a satisfactory explanation on his humiliation of the Governor of Ordu and his intention to copy data from the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality.

Even though a true winner of the debate cannot be declared, there is a public consensus that Binali Yildirim was more successful in answering the questions of the moderator.

Nevertheless, both candidates have well-prepared projects on resolving the structural problems of Istanbul, such as transportation, traffic, and youth unemployment. Yildirim clearly identified how he was going to find resources to implement his projects on these structural problems. Imamoglu also provided information on his long-term projects on the resolution of green area problems and youth unemployment in Istanbul.

Both candidates had a consensus on the importance of the problem of Syrian refugees in Turkey. However, they had a different road map in the resolution of this issue in the long-term. While Yildirim underlined that refugees would return to their countries after creating conflict-free zones in Syria, Imamoglu spoke about a project on creating a distinct zone for Syrian refugees before sending them back to their countries. It is fair to state that both candidates failed to mention the rise of hate speech against Syrian refugees in Turkey.

It seems that the live debate between the two candidates did not create a huge impact on the electorate. Nevertheless, Yildirim’s performance on the live debate may create an effect on the previous AK Party voters who did not go to the polls on March 31. Beyond all these issues, the live debate was a triumph for Turkish democracy, which indeed, was the true winner of the live debate on Sunday night.

For the re-run of the Istanbul mayoral elections to be held on June 23, the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) mayoral candidate Ekrem Imamoglu’s slogan is “Everything will be fine.” There is a Turkish expression: “The only thing better than this is an apricot in Damascus,” which means that it does not get any better than this. Imamoglu draws such a unique political profile that even our post-truth world hasn’t experienced so far.

His case is reminiscent of a well-known children’s novel, Pinocchio. Once upon a time, there was an old carpenter Geppetto who lived on selling the toys he made and whose only yearning was to have a child. At the moment he lost all his hopes to have one, a miracle happened. One of the wooden puppets started talking to him. Feeling blissful, he clasped the puppet in his arms and said: “You are like a real boy. I will call you Pinocchio.”

Just like Carlo Collodi’s fictional character Geppetto’s wish to have a child, the CHP has been yearning for creating a political hero for decades. Although the party has never come to power alone except for the single party period that continued until 1945, it has been the actual power in Turkish politics due to its ideological stance until recently. As the popular support given to the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan has grown from 30 percent to around 50 percent during his 17 years in power, the governing mechanisms in the country have been normalized in line with democracy. As a result, the CHP started aspiring to win elections and come to power through usual ways. But it was not easy to erase from the collective memory, especially the memories of Muslim conservatives and Kurds, the years when the CHP was ruling the state from behind.

Just like Carlo Collodi’s fictional character Geppetto’s wish to have a child, the CHP has been yearning for creating a political hero for decades and found one: Ekrem Imamoglu. 

Since becoming CHP chairman in 2010, Kemal Kilicdaroglu has lost two referendums, three general elections, two local elections and two presidential elections. In the face of successive failures, the party even tried to nominate a former AK Party politician and proposed the party’s presidential candidacy to former president Abdullah Gul. The irony is, they gave a fight to hinder his presidency with the support of the military and the judiciary back in 2007. But this strategy failed, too. This time, reminiscent of Geppetto’s puppet who comes to life, the CHP caught a success story for the Istanbul mayoral elections thanks to effective teamwork. During the 31 March election that was cancelled by the Supreme Election Council (YSK), Imamoglu enjoyed a vote share that is unprecedented in the party’s history. However, it is very doubtful whether he will be able to achieve the same success in the re-election on June 23.  

It is no longer a secret that politics has a marketing aspect. Today, political leaders work with large staff while deciding on all their acts and manners. Since his first appearance in the election campaign, Imamoglu has drawn a profile that has a secure distance from Kemalist ideology in line with Turkey’s sociological fabric. The features that would not catch attention in any candidate from other parties, such as his performing religious rituals and the visits he paid to the mausoleum of Mehmet the Conqueror, were highlighted in Imamoglu’s case since such acts do not comply with the conventional characteristics of the CHP. But at some point, he started exaggerating giving the implications that he is religious. Although many women in Turkey perform their religious rituals despite not wearing hijab, all female members of the families Imamoglu visited for iftar dinner during Ramadan were wearing hijab. Aside from all the broadcasts and photos from iftar dinners, he served a video to social media on sahur time, the time when a meal is eaten before starting fasting in Ramadan. In the video, he started his speech by saying “I don’t actually like talking on sahur time but…” He also visited a family who named their son after Tayyip Erdogan and said that they will vote for İmamoglu.

Politics has a marketing aspect. But, at some point, Imamoglu started exaggerating giving the implications that he is religious.

Receiving the support of Muslim conservatives alongside the CHP base, İmamoglu also endeavored to address the outlawed PKK’s proponents, jailed nationalists, political Islamists, agnostic/atheist community, Sunnis, Alevis and all the other ethnic and religious identities one can ever think of. He has always portrayed a calm, affectionate and genial profile; but exaggerated the marketing aspect in most cases. People started questioning his image upon that. A left-wing journalist satirized the picture as follows: “Yasin (a sura in the Quran), March of Izmir (which is embraced by nationalists and conventional Kemalists in the country), Bella Ciao, Mehteran, Abdullah Gul, Mustafa Kemal, the pro-Kurdish HDP leader Selahattin Demirtas, PKK… All in one place. He is the hope of Kemalists, PKK/HDP, FETO, ostensibly leftist liberals… He is the hero of our time, which scares me.”

A former AK Party politician also said: “Imamoglu becomes what he is supposed to be in every case,” whereas another leftist journalist asked: “Does anyone know about his ideas on any subject?” After a while, Imamoglu, who refrains from remarking a single word about domestic or foreign policies of Turkey and slurred over such questions (he seems to be right considering his utterly eclectic supporter group!), penned an opinion article for Washington Post. The article titled “How I won the race for mayor of Istanbul — and how I’ll win again” unavoidably caused some reactions. People questioned why he wrote such an article as if he was a candidate for the U.S. mayoral elections. And his image suffered a huge blow after it was revealed in the media that he insulted a governor when he was not allowed into an airport’s VIP lounge.

People started questioning Imamoglu’s image. Does he become what he is supposed to be in every case?

Politics means propaganda, and propaganda tools unavoidably comprise some illusive aspects. Imamoglu has managed to be convincing for quite a long time. For instance, he promised to build a Mecidiyeköy-Mahmutbey metro line in Istanbul through a google ad, which circulated for days and did not face any problem. But, while his image was suffering blows, it was reported that the test drive of this very line has already been made and the line will be opened soon. As this information surfaced, they adopted another strategy and started referring to Imamoglu’s works as Beylikduzu district mayor. In the press meeting when Kilicdaroglu announced Imamoglu’s candidacy, he said: “When I saw that green valley in Beylikduzu, I said to myself: ‘this is how a mayor should work.’ If he improved this place to such an extent with such limited facilities, he can do wonders with the giant budget of the Istanbul metropolitan municipality.”

But after that, it was revealed that 75 percent of the Green Valley was built and opened by former district mayor Yusuf Uzun, while Imamoglu only contributed to the building of the walls, a cafeteria and a pool. Another incident that shook his reliability happened this week. As known, Imamoglu and AK Party’s mayoral candidate Binali Yildirim will participate in a live televised debate on June 16. Regarding the debate, Imamoglu said: “I have heard that Mr. Yildirim asked for going over the questions beforehand.” The moderator, a journalist whose affiliation with the CHP is no secret, refuted his claim: “I haven’t prepared any questions. And Mr. Yildirim has not made such a request,” while Yildirim said: “He should prove it if he has an evidence, and apologize if he doesn’t.” Imamoglu’s answer was: “I probably misunderstood.”

For three months up until the March 31 election, “everything was fine” for Imamoglu, but with this trajectory, “everything might not be so fine” on June 23 despite all the support from his party’s allies, the Iyi Party, HDP and other political parties. The number of people who are questioning his image has been growing.

One of Turkey’s well-known center-left parties, the Democratic Left Party (DSP), has once again drawn attention in Turkish politics due to its striking stance regarding the main opposition’s and the Nation Alliance’s mayoral candidate for Istanbul, Ekrem Imamoglu. As a post-1980 political party, which had been established under the leadership of former Turkish Prime Minister and CHP chairman Bulent Ecevit, the DSP symbolized a shift from traditional – and even radical – CHP preferences subsequent to the 1980 military coup. The party had also received its chance to lead the country between 1999-2002, which ultimately ended with an election loss against the newly founded AK Party. Since that date, the center-left DSP has not gained any success. However, it also chose not to close its doors to the politics.

Today, the DSP still remains on the agenda of Turkey’s leftist political circles as it has once again been during the 31 March election campaign. Many former CHP candidates, who had not been nominated as mayoral candidates and had been replaced with other names from the CHP leadership, in particular names close to the CHP chair Kemal Kilicdaroglu, consequently switched as a reaction to the DSP. This happened mostly as a sign of protest against the CHP leadership.

In contrast to the Kurdish-leftist HDP, the DSP announced its own mayoral candidate, Muammer Aydin, for the Istanbul mayoral election on 31 March and did not support Ekrem Imamoglu. Aydin received approximately 30,000 votes out of the eligible 10 million voters in Istanbul. Despite its very little meaning, taking into account the difference between the CHP candidate and the AK Party’s candidate on 31 March, the controversial election results showed a slight margin of just 13,000 votes. Thus, it becomes more obvious how important every single vote is with regard to the upcoming re-run of the mayoral election on 23 June.  

In contrast to the HDP, the DSP announced its own mayoral candidate – Muammer Aydin – for the 31 March elections and did not support Ekrem Imamoglu. 

Interestingly, the DSP’s candidate for Istanbul recently stated that he has withdrawn from the 23 June election by describing the election board’s (YSK’s) decision to re-run the election as unlawful. Consequently, supporters of Ekrem Imamoglu expected the DSP leadership to take a similar stance to the HDP, namely, not announcing its own candidate and supporting the CHP’s candidate. However, the DSP did not share this trend.

The DSP’s party assembly decided not to appoint a new candidate due to the resignation of its former candidate Muammer Aydin. However, party members have officially rejected supporting CHP’s Ekrem Imamoglu although some small parties – including the HDP – had already announced their support.

Despite the party’s decision, it is of course possible that DSP voters could still back Imamoglu in protest of the decision. However, the main points worth analysis are the reasons why DSP members chose not to back Imamoglu. Party chairman Onder Aksakal explained the DSP’s decision by stressing former DSP leader Bulent Ecevit’s heritage. According to Aksakal, the party would go against Ecevit’s heritage if it were to support the same candidate as other political parties, which are not compatible with the specific understanding of leftist politics represented by the DSP. By this, Aksakal implied other leftist parties such as the HDP.

If the DSP were to support Ekrem Imamoglu, it would go against Bulent Ecevit’s heritage as this is regarded incompatible with the DSP’s leftist politics.

As I occasionally try to address, the entire center-left in Turkey faces a difficult but fundamental problem. Even though there is a potential chance to broaden the electorate and even become a serious alternative within Turkish politics in the long-term by becoming a hope for center-left minded voters, the CHP’s expectations and wrong strategies always ends in electoral losses. Thus, it is actually an advantage that due to Turkey’s new presidential system, leftist and center-leftist parties are able to establish alliances. However, it is also becoming apparent that the “left-bloc” does not deliver a stable future projection.

Gathering all left-oriented political parties together does not guarantee a fundamental success along with a populist figure such as Imamoglu himself. Furthermore, it is a strong sign and remarkable element of Turkish democracy that small center-left parties such as the DSP have the courage not to support the CHP’s mayoral candidate due to the party’s own stance – despite continuing heavy pressures from several leftist and media circles. At the end of the day, it might even be the case the voters of small parties will decide whether Ekrem Imamoglu or Binali Yildirim will be elected as the new mayor of Istanbul.

As is known, Turkey’s Supreme Electoral Board (YSK) announced that the mayor elections in Istanbul will re-run on June 23, 2019. There have been and still are discussions on various reasons behind the decision, which has been addressed in detail by various analysts.

The AK Party and the CHP will have to re-organize themselves and establish a new strategy in order to broaden their electorate. Two of the previous 8 mayor candidates who competed in the March 31 elections (TKP and DSP’s candidates) have resigned in favor of the CHP’s candidate, Ekrem Imamoglu. The left-nationalist Kurdish HDP had already resigned its candidate during the previous election on March 31 in favor of Imamoglu. The HDP announced once again that it will continue its previous decision of supporting Imamoglu.

Under these conditions, it seems clear that Turkey’s entire political landscape will be shaped by an election atmosphere, when the election re-run is just limited to the election of the mayor of Istanbul. This is because Istanbul is Turkey’s most important city and therefore the results are of great significance for all parties, their future strategies and national projections. The creation of a political leader is not that easy in Turkey and there are certain illusions underpinned on social media. By this, I’m trying to stress the interesting increase of Ekrem Imamoglu’s popularity and his actual lack of strategy. With no doubt, Imamoglu is getting pushed into the foreground by both the Turkish public and certain media outlets, along with, interestingly, foreign media and political circles.

Although it’s only Istanbul re-electing its mayor, Turkey’s entire political landscape is shaped by an election atmosphere as the result will shape the future of all political party strategies. 

However, if one actually analyzes Imamoglu’s mostly preferred discourses, statements and his political orientations, one will notice that he is acting like a populist politician with an objective of maximizing his electorate. By this, Imamoglu does not care about his party’s traditional line, party base or political orientation, which actually conflicts with his current actions and discourses.

Subsequent to the initial election on March 31, even though it was not clear whether Imamoglu had actually won the elections and while the YSK had not yet announced any official statement, Imamoglu took a journey to Ankara in order to visit the Mausoleum of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. This is a very popular gesture in particular secularist Kemalist voters and political circles. This was a deliberate move and so was his signing of the official memorial book as “the Mayor of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality.” This act was a violation of the law due to the lack of official mandate, which he had not yet received from the YSK at that time.

Imamoglu acted in a similar way when he recently visited the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, subsequent to the YSK’s announcement that elections will be re-run on June 23. Imamoglu once again signed an official book in Northern Cyprus as “the Mayor of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality,” although he had already given back his official mandate due to the cancellation of elections.

While walking on the corridors of the municipality accompanied by cameras, Imamoglu showed that he will eat the same lunch as all employees do. This was interpreted as dishonest and unconvincing populism.

During his approximately three weeks in office as mayor of Istanbul, Imamoglu continued to behave and act in a populist manner. For instance, while walking the corridors of the municipality accompanied by cameras, Imamoglu had the goal to send the message that he will eat the same lunch as all employees do. This act was also interpreted as an act of dishonest and unconvincing populism.

It is well-known and a global preference that new politicians in particular are biased to populist moves, which is not problematic above all regarding parties such as the CHP or HDP. However, it is worth to analyze and focus on the issue of how Imamoglu and the CHP cadres in Istanbul, who are led by the controversial figure, Canan Kaftancioglu, will shape the party’s future. This question becomes a fundamental one due to several changes in the party’s general orientation, especially in the last couple of months, which also continued subsequent to March 31.

For instance, it was no secret that the HDP, which is the political branch of the PKK, openly supported the CHP’s candidate – although the CHP did not address questions concerning an obvious CHP-HDP cooperation. Not a single CHP politician both on the national or local level dared to criticize this cooperation or to take an open position. Furthermore, Ekrem Imamoglu did not seem to have any problem in admiring the former HDP chairman, Selahattin Demirtas’s political line.

Additional questions, in particular from conservative and nationalist circles who do not see Demirtas as a legitimate politician but rather as a political mouthpiece for the PKK, did not receive any concrete answers from CHP cadres. However, it is actually known that both traditional CHP voters and members challenge this friendly strategy while enduring the situation to the motivation of becoming the winning side in Istanbul. The same counts for the party’s Istanbul provincial chief, Canan Kaftancioglu, and her political views, which are definitely incompatible with traditional CHP notions. Kaftancioglu’s problematic stance regarding several leftist violent groups are disturbing many civilian politicians, also among CHP circles. Despite this, and her previous statements – even supporting a terrorist organization’s leader – Kaftancioglu recently made clear that her views have not changed.

While heading to the elections on June 23, some may argue that the CHP is transforming itself into a more “open” political party. In addition, it might also be suggested that in the long-run, the party will diminish its radical Kemalist-secular stance, which can be counted as one of the obstacles to universal democracy. However, it’s likely that by transforming itself from a Kemalist party into a populist, aggressive and radical-leftist welcoming party, the CHP’s credibility will still continue to decrease in the long-run.

By not addressing issues of national security, such as the PKK and FETO, the CHP does not seem fit to face potential challenges in a particular areas of concern. At the end of the day, the electorate will make its decision whether a rather populist figure such as Imamoglu and his quasi-co-candidate for Istanbul, Kaftancioglu, will be preferred. Or whether there will be a long-term request for the CHP to transform into a stable, social-democratic political party. The realization of the latter seems to be very difficult to deal with both in terms of content and method. It’s up to the CHP electorate.

Since its foundation, the AK Party has rightfully been designated as a ‘political party of public service’ as the AK Party’s leadership has always focused its political energy on Turkey’s public administration deficit. During the first decade of its political power, a steady economic growth had been accompanied with various ameliorations primarily in the fields of transportation and health. From the problem of overcrowded classrooms in education to the revolutionary changes for the benefit of disabled citizens, the AK Party’s politics of public service has achieved significant success in various fields of social life.

Thanks to its organizational and communicational capabilities, which were directly inherited from the Welfare Party, the AK Party has been in political power for 17 years. As Recep Tayyip Erdogan has successfully been taking the leading role, the rest of the AK Party’s cadres seems to be successful as well. However, the AK Party’s reliance on Erdogan’s leadership for winning general and local elections has concluded with the weakening of the AK Party’s organizational structure and the linkage between the electors and the political party.

The AK Party’s reliance on Erdogan’s leadership for winning elections has concluded with the weakening of the AK Party’s organizational structure.

Learning the need to remain close to the people from the AK Party’s political success, Ekrem Imamoglu draws himself away from the hate discourse of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and instead adopts a much more moderate political discourse that mainly relies on projects and services. Nonetheless, people will not find Imamoglu’s political discourse credible and convincing until the CHP itself abandons its discriminatory and exclusionist political discourse.

Although Imamoglu’s political promises influences Turkey’s young voters, mature voters hesitate about the CHP’s sincerity due to its negative political record. Being highly discontented about its political history, Turkish electors cannot easily be convinced to vote for the CHP even though they personally feel sympathy for its municipal candidate. Highly valuing the AK Party’s policies and public services, Turkish electors are inclined to vote for the ruling AK Party if only the linkage between the candidate and the electors could have been restored.

Populism or public service?

In the recent years, populism has become one of the most controversial and frequently-used concepts of politics. Amongst the leftist political parties, Bulent Ecevit was the most populist political leader. Holding up Ecevit as an example, Muharrem Ince appealed to populist political discourses both in his struggle for the CHP’s chairmanship and Turkey’s presidency. As soon as his candidacy for Turkey’s presidency was announced, Ince had adopted a populist language to convey his political message to large masses of people. Yet, his politics backfired due to the insincerity of his attitudes and expressions.

People still hesitate to vote for Imamoglu as the CHP never adopts a service-based political vision and neglects political sensitivities of the people in forming its alliances.

With reference to his inclusive and reconciliatory discourses, Imamoglu adopts a populist political attitude as well. As opposed to the CHP’s exclusionist political discourse, Imamoglu’s electoral campaign aimed at appealing to large masses of people, including the AK Party’s voters. In the printed bulletins, Ekrem Imamoglu has even adopted a cunning electoral strategy by emphasizing his surname ‘Imamoglu.’ In other words, he appears to imitate the AK Party’s political discourses which has always been criticized by the CHP for abusing the religious feelings of Turkey’s electorate. Nonetheless, people still hesitate to vote for Imamoglu, as the CHP never adopts a service-based political vision and always neglects political sensitivities of the people in forming its alliances with other political parties.

In contrast, the AK Party has succeeded to strengthen its political discourses by changing the sociology of Turkey’s electorate and creating a new class of electors, and taking the resolution of Istanbul’s urban problems (such as urban poverty, lack of infrastructure, population density) into the center of its political agenda. Yet, as the AK Party won both general and local elections thanks mainly to Erdogan’s strong leadership. The linkage between the people and the AK Party has weakened. As Turkey’s economic problems exacerbate, Turkish electors have begun to adopt a new electoral attitude that is separated from political ideologies and allegiances.

As Turkey’s economic problems exacerbate, Turkish electors have begun to adopt a new electoral attitude that is partly different from political commitments.

In such a political and economic milieu, Imamoglu strives to gain the support of Turkey’s public opinion by adopting a moderate and inclusive political discourse. Imitating Binali Yildirim’s moderate political stance and the AK Party’s public service-based political vision, the CHP aims at gaining the votes of those electors who are less political and who could have voted for different political parties. Nonetheless, the CHP’s political sincerity is still open to dispute.

Consequently, winning Istanbul’s municipal elections is almost equal to winning Turkey’s elections. Therefore, political discourses pertaining to Istanbul’s governance that are developed by the competing candidates for the local elections of June 23 will certainly shape Turkey’s political future.

After a controversial and long-lasting process, Turkey’s Supreme Electoral Board (YSK) cancelled the Istanbul mayoral election on May 6. As can be understood from YSK’s brief explanation, it cancelled the mayoral election since some polling stations were not appointed from among public officials. According to Turkish law, this situation is the reason for cancellation of the elections.

YSK is the supreme institution regulating elections in Turkey and its decisions cannot be appealed. When one examines the history of Turkey’s democracy, it can be clearly seen that YSK has played a crucial role in this process. The main reason behind YSK’s crucial role, in comparison with many political and social institutions, is that it was established according to Turkey’s own dynamics. YSK is an institution established in the period of 1946-1950, in the transition to a multi-party democracy. The most important feature of YSK is not only the control of elections, but the regulating of elections has been left to the judges. That’s why, the elections in Turkey, since 1950, have been regularly carried out although there have been a few exceptions.

YSK is an institution established in the period of 1946-1950, in the transition to a multi-party democracy.

As a legal judgment, the YSK’s decision will naturally be subject of discussion. Many lawyers and politicians expressed their positive or negative opinions about the decision. While the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and National Movement Party (MHP) have welcomed this decision, the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) and Iyi Party strongly criticized it. CHP Chairman Kemal Kilicdaroglu described YSK members who voted for an election re-run as “gang members.” Before the announcement of YSK’s decision, Engin Altay, who is CHP’s group deputy chairman, almost threatened YSK members. The words of Altay, ‘You cannot walk in Kizilay,’ were much debated. Kilicdaroglu also targeted 7 YSK members by announcing their names one-by-one during the party caucus. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Devlet Bahceli, have criticized Kilicdaroglu’s explanation. 

CHP Chairman Kemal Kilicdaroglu described YSK members who voted for an election re-run as “gang members” and announced their names one-by-one during the party caucus. 

Kilicdaroglu’s criticism is at a point that could damage the corporate identity of YSK. As Imamoglu, who is the CHP candidate in Istanbul, declared again and again on the 31 March election night, YSK is one of Turkey’s most respected institutions. In comparison with CHP’s previous allegations, YSK has duly performed its duties in local and general elections. In the 2014 local elections, YSK also cancelled the Yalova election because of CHP’s appeal, which later followed with a CHP victory. On the other hand, YSK not only cancelled the elections in Istanbul, but also gave the CHP mayors its mandates in places such as Ankara and Antalya.

The rerun election will be held on 23 June, 2019 in accordance with YSK’s decision. According to many polls and political analysts the main reason why Imamoglu won the Istanbul mayoral election is that he and CHP officials conducted a moderate campaign. But immediately after 31 March the attitudes of Imamoglu and CHP significantly changed and instead of this moderate position, Imamoglu maintained a more aggressive and impatient attitude. One example of such aggressive attitude can be observed in his reaction to the decision, which he described as a ‘treacherous decision.’ While he frequently declared his confidence in the YSK on the 31 March election night, after the YSK announced to rerun elections, he began to sharply criticize the institution. All explanations show us that the moderate style of Imamoglu is not based on a realistic foundation.

After 31 March, the moderate attitudes of Imamoglu and CHP have significantly changed and Imamoglu maintained a more aggressive and impatient behaviour.

All sides of political terrain must respect the YSK’s decision. The process of appeal is part of Turkey’s democratic culture and means of appeal are frequently used by the main opposition party, CHP. YSK’s decision on the mayoral election can be discussed in terms of both a legal and political dimension. However, there is a crucial point in this context; the objection and criticism to YSK’s decision should not reach to the dimensions that would harm the corporate identity the institution. Also, the targeting of YSK member by singing their names one-by-one may constitute a criminal offense. There must be a difference between criticizing a judiciary institution on the one hand and criticizing its decision on the other, let alone criticizing a political party for which the CHP always chose a harsh one. Specifically, it would be serious harm to the YSK to describe its members as ‘gang members.’ Instead of this accusation, all parties should respect the decision and design their electoral campaign and programs.

Before the objection process regarding the local election was completed, Ekrem İmamoğlu signed the book in Anıtkabir as Mayor of Istanbul only one day after the election and repeated almost every day that he is the new mayor of Istanbul. After 25 years, by a hair’s breadth, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) finally gained success with the support of the Iyi Party and the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP). So, the party marked a relative success for the first time after losing 8 elections in a row since Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu was elected as the party chairman in 2010. The CHP achieved this success with nationalist and former Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) member Mansur Yavaş in Ankara and with Ekrem İmamoğlu in Istanbul, whose profile is closer to the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) than the CHP. In Ankara, Yavaş and his friends celebrated their success by shouting Allah-u Akbar, whereas İmamoğlu performed a grace prayer in Eyüp Sultan Mosque.

Ekrem Imamoglu’s election in Istanbul affirms once again that a politician with a typical CHP, Kemalist, or secular identity cannot win an election in Turkey. 

So, it was once again affirmed that a politician with a typical CHP, Kemalist, or secular identity cannot win an election in Turkey’s sociology. The leading name aware of this fact within the CHP has been İmamoğlu. With the adoption of the new presidential system, alliances also competed for the local election. In the previous election, the AK Party’s vote share was 42 percent and the CHP’s was 26 percent. The CHP built its strategy on this sociological aspect and won the election only with a difference of 13 thousand votes against Binali Yıldırım, who marked significant achievements in Turkey’s transportation system, took office as prime minister and parliamentary spokesperson.

Istanbul before and after Erdogan 

Up until 1994, Istanbul was a city where garbage was hardly collected and piled up on streets, and in several instances the garbage piles exploded (in 1993, the garbage stored in Ümraniye exploded, leaving 37 people dead), tap water did not run most of the time and residents stored water in buckets. Also, public transportation means were very poor at the time. Only someone who owned a private car or could afford to pay for a taxi had the privilege of going to the other end of the city.

The Golden Horn was contaminated to such a degree that people could not breathe around it, whereas Topkapı, Suriçi and their neighborhoods almost turned into a dump. When Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was elected as Istanbul mayor 25 years ago, he took over from the CHP a city that was devastated in terms of urban development, which was a shame considering the glorious past of the city that once served as the capital of the East Roman Empire and Ottoman Empire.

Erdoğan’s team healed the city and marked a great period of recovery and progress in Istanbul for 25 years. They solved the water problem, restored historic buildings, afforested the city, and tulips eventually found their historic home again. The Golden Horn was cleaned and became home to 47 fish species and many parks, sports facilities and walking tracks were built around its surroundings. Istanbul has finally become a city with a giant underground web that makes reaching one end to the other end of the city very easy. The third transcontinental Bosphorus Bridge, namely Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge, was built, and the rail system and road transport were connected with a sub-sea tunnel. Plus, two new airports were introduced to the city.  

İmamoğlu endeavored to create an impression among the Kurdish and Muslim-conservative electorate that he is not a typical CHP politician.

Imamoglu’s discourse and election strategy 

Although it is hard to admit for Erdoğan dissidents, the municipal works in Istanbul that kicked off in 1994 and continued up until today have set a milestone for the city. With their service, the AK Party erased the bad memories of Istanbul under CHP’s rule, and İmamoğlu did his best throughout his campaign to avoid triggering this collective memory. Appearing as the joint candidate of the CHP, the Iyi Party and the HDP, İmamoğlu endeavored to create an impression among the Kurdish and Muslim-conservative electorate that he is not a typical CHP politician although the Kemalist mindset subjected these groups to oppression and suffering throughout the Republican history. As opposed to CHP Chairman Kılıçdaroğlu, who in regards to the New Zealand terrorist attack said, “terror coming from the Islam world caused different reactions across the world,” İmamoğlu recited Surah al-Yasin in Eyüp Mosque, which is located next to the Tomb of Eyüp Sultan, a companion of the Prophet Mohammad.

With their service in Istanbul, the AK Party erased the bad memories of Istanbul under CHP’s rule and Imamoglu did his best throughout his campaign to avoid triggering this memory. 

İmamoğlu, who evidently received education in Koran courses as a child – although the CHP is proud to have shut down these courses – appeared with his hijab-wearing mother in the first photo he presented to the public. While some groups from the CHP base wrote “the tyranny started in 1453” on walls in Istanbul during violent Gezi Park Protests, and Kılıçdaroğlu ignorantly said that “the Ottomans tortured and annihilated the Turks,” İmamoğlu started his election campaign by paying a visit to the Tomb of Fatih Sultan Mehmet.

While addressing the HDP base in Istanbul, who said “we feel like traitors for voting for the CHP, but we’ll still opt for CHP although it breaks our hearts,” he adopted a careful tone by saying: “Istanbul is the city that has the highest population of Kurdish citizens. We will not discriminate against anyone.” But this does not represent the whole situation. As I heard from a Kurdish businessman years ago: “We could not even enter some doors until the Welfare Party won Istanbul municipality in 1994. As from that time, we have joined and won many bids.”

Although the CHP displays a sharp antagonism against Erdoğan, the CHP leader does not even attend national holiday receptions hosted by Erdoğan and called him an “illegitimate President” despite the fact that Erdoğan was elected as President by 52.6 percent in the first round, İmamoğlu visited the President in the early periods of his campaign, and said the following about the visit: “It’s been a good meeting, in which we listened to some experiences and suggestions about Istanbul. He has relayed valuable anecdotes. I also asked for the President’s vote.” So, the new mayor of Istanbul was all along aware of the fact that Erdoğan has been a determining and transforming figure in Turkish politics for 25 years.

And maybe this is why he seems to be a figure who is under transformation to such an extent that he took an oath to “protect the spirit of Istanbul” in a letter he wrote in address to Kemal Atatürk in the Anıtkabir notebook. So, for the first time again, a CHP politician mentioned the spirit of Istanbul. Even more, while entering the municipality office on his first day as mayor, he said: “This city is a sacred city that has a peculiar spirituality, prayers and experiences. Embracing all these requires an extraordinary depth.”

Unless the Supreme Election Council (YSK) accepts the objections of the AK Party and the elections are renewed, İmamoğlu is likely to become a new high-profile politician in Turkish politics. It is not yet known whether he has the extraordinary depth to govern Istanbul that he himself referred to. Will he continue his political path as a Republican son embracing the Seljuk and Ottoman heritage as opposed to his party’s constant fight against the country’s values ongoing since the early Republican period, or will he keep this fight like his party by ignoring a thousand year old past as if addressing an amnesic society?

Will Imamoglu continue his political path as a Republican who fight against the country’s own values, or will he draw a new profile leaving the CHP’s classical stance aside?

Will it set an impediment to his career within the CHP if he follows the first path? Even though it seems quite early to speculate on that, the first signs of it have already surfaced. Although İmamoğlu performed a grace prayer in Eyüp Sultan Mosque after the election, it was represented by the CHP mouthpiece Halk TV and other Kemalist media outlets as “İmamoğlu said prayers of peace.” This is the formula they came up with to avoid saying “salaat!”

The possible source of inspiration for this tone is also curious. During the visit paid by the Catholic Church spiritual leader Pope Benedict XVI to Sultanahmet Mosque in Istanbul, Istanbul Mufti Prof. Mustafa Çağrıcı had invented a formula. The Pope’s visit to the mosque was referred as a “stance of peace” in media. But this expression caused a disturbance in the Catholic world and spurred a series of heated polemics. Evidently, the formula invented for the Pope entered the Kemalist media’s literature since they said “prayers of peace” instead of “performing salaat.” As they say, the devil is in the details.

Will İmamoğlu, a high-profile CHP politician now, perform Friday prayer with congregation on Fridays? If so, will Kemalist intellectuals and Kemalist media, who regard the statesmen’s performing Friday prayer beginning from the term of the late Turgut Özal as a “reactionary act,” be able to digest this? Coincidentally, it was reported while penning these words that President Erdoğan and Istanbul Mayor İmamoğlu met in the funeral of a businessman. After performing Friday prayer, the two names appeared on the same row for funeral prayers.

Plus, İmamoğlu tweeted “May your Lailet Al Berat be blessed,” and liked two tweets shared by the President Erdoğan, which are as follows: “A 4.5 year-long continuous period of action now lies ahead of our country. As the 82 million citizens, we should make the most of this period. We should leave behind election debates and focus on our true agenda, first and foremost the economy and security,” and “It is now time to once again cool the hot iron, shake hands, hug each other and reinforce our unity and solidarity. Our target in the upcoming 4.5-year period is to enhance our people’s prosperity as well as to achieve Turkey’s goals for 2023 by preserving the security-freedom balance and eliminating threats against our country.”

Turkey is still discussing the results of the March 31 local elections. As a result of the AK Party’s official application, the Supreme Election Council (YSK) has decided to re-count the invalid votes in 39 districts in Istanbul. The council took the same decision for 20 other provinces where other parties also made applications for the votes to be re-counted. For instance, while the AK Party applied for a re-count in Istanbul, Ankara, Adana, Antalya, and some other provinces, the CHP made an application for Bursa, Malatya, Giresun, Artvin and others.

Obviously, the re-count of votes in Istanbul has taken the center stage in the post-election period. Since the process itself is ambiguous and complex, it’s crucial to analyze different dimensions of mayoral elections in Istanbul. The first dimension of the Istanbul elections is its unique character compared to other previous elections. When the official results were announced by the head of the YSK soon after the elections, the difference between AK Party’s Binali Yildirim and the CHP’s candidate, Ekrem Imamoglu, was only 28,027. There has never been such a slight difference between votes of candidates in Istanbul before. Thus, the re-count of valid and invalid votes would have an enormous effect on the final results. As a result of the re-count of votes in Istanbul, the difference between Imamoglu and Yildirim, as I write this piece, has decreased to 13,000. This low margin between the two candidates has triggered discussions and objections in the post-election period.

The CHP itself applied to the YSK many times for a re-count of votes. CHP made an official application for the re-count of votes in Yalova in the 2014 local elections, and as a result, its candidate won the elections with a slight difference.

Another crucial dimension of the elections in Istanbul is the inconsistent approach of some political parties. As had occurred in the previous elections, political parties always make objections to the results, even if there was a huge margin between the candidates. In the case of Istanbul this time, the close results between Imamoglu and Yildirim has caused anger and frustration on the CHP side. Nevertheless, the CHP itself applied to the YSK many times for a re-count of votes. For instance, while the first official results were indicative of an AK Party victory in Yalova in the 2014 local elections, the CHP made an official application for the re-count of votes, and as a result, the CHP’s candidate won the elections with a slight difference.

Nonetheless, the CHP has strongly condemned the re-count of invalid votes in Istanbul even though the party has utilized this legal right on multiple occasions. This illustrates that political parties in Turkey still suffer from internalizing the fundamental values of democracy and the rule of law. The last dimension of the elections in Istanbul occurs at this point: Political parties want to adopt the rule of law according to changing conditions. In all previous local elections, there have been lots of delays in delivering the certificate of election – as is happening now due to the ongoing legal process. However, none of the previous examples raised tensions as much as the case of Istanbul, since political parties adopted the rule of law and accepted the YSK’s final decision.

President Erdogan has recently underlined that almost all the voting was marred by irregularities in Istanbul. It is obvious that the current discussions on the results in Istanbul will continue to remain high on the political agenda in the upcoming days. All parties will determine their strategies according to the YSK’s final decision, which may indicate the re-count of all votes, a repetition of the elections, or the victory of one of the candidates. We will wait and see.