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here come times throughout history where military innovations or shifts in the character of warfare take great revolutionary leaps, allowing those able to reap their benefits first to position themselves at a substantive competitive advantage. Militaries that identify and exploit these periods of disruptive changes make major shifts in the balance of power, security, and prosperity for their nations. Those who fail to do so, or fail to adapt to change, risk exposing their country to danger. What will the next big thing in warfare be? And how can militaries successfully adapt to meet the challenge? The Origins of Victory: How Disruptive Military Innovation Determines the Fates of Great Powers provides an authoritative take and the necessary foundation for healthy speculation.

Military strategist Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr. discusses military revolutions—or shifts in the character of warfare—and specifically the most recent precision warfare revolution which is currently reaching its maturity.

According to Krepinevich, an even newer revolution is emerging. This is fueled by the advances of commercial and military-driven technology, such as AI 3D manufacturing, synthetic biology and quantum computing, and directed energy and hypersonic weapons, and is accelerated by the competition between the U.S., Russia, and China.

The precision warfare revolution was introduced by the U.S. military in the First Gulf War. It gave the U.S. a monopoly over this form of warfare for several decades, but now other powers such as China have these capabilities.

In this era of increased competition amongst great powers, The Origins of Victory, first gives a preliminary assessment of the disruptive changes occurring in general war to identify the existing characteristics of the precision warfare regime, and goes on to offer speculation of the overlapping successor revolution.

Second, The Origins of Victory examines the crucial factor of how military organizations have successfully anticipated and exploited disruptive changes in warfare faster than their rivals.

The book consists of two parts. In Part I, Krepinevich considers the characteristics of the emerging competitive environment through trends over the years and identifies the ones that may show yield in the future. He discusses the maturing precision warfare and the overlapping new revolution, as well as their implication for deterrence.

The world is in an era of permanent low-level conflict. Traditional conflict has largely left its place to grey-zone warfare and hybrid war. States have always used unconventional and non-military ways to acquire leverage or attain victory; however, the increasingly complex and interconnected current nature of the world has made interdependence the battleground.

From sanctions to competing for and buying influence abroad, warfare has taken a more subtle, sly, undeclared, unending, and, most importantly, unrestricted, form. Nowadays, this has blurred the line between war and peace.

While traditional war is very expensive, unpopular, and often too difficult to manage, this new way of war is groundbreaking and does not shy away from any tool available. War is all around us, in everyday life, culture, economics, law, and information. Even something as innocuous as cute cat pictures online can become a ploy.

Mark Galeotti takes us through the weaponization of everything, from disinformation, cyberattacks, and espionage to subversion and crime, in order to understand the changing landscape of war and what it might bring.

Gone are the days of “stable” warfare! The subtle components of martial and everyday civilian life are blending, leading to instability within countries and a legitimacy crisis across the globe. However, this development does not need to be a solely negative one. As Galeotti points out, conflict is democratized, meaning the people are not just bystanders and can take positive action to avoid zero-sum situations. The Weaponisation of Everything: A Field Guide to the New Way of War equips the reader with ways of surviving, adapting, and taking advantage of the opportunities presented by this new reality.

When everything is weaponizable, why would the distinction hold any meaning? Where do we begin to look? How can civilians be mindful of this development? Many of the weapons used are often abstract but their effects are very much tangible and jolting. As it turns out, some things are more weaponizable than others.

Luckily, The Weaponisation of Everything lays bare how this warfare takes form all around the world with examples and a future trajectory. While this form of conflict may be vague and confusing, Galeotti makes the topic apprehensible for all readers.

Even though technology advances in leaps and problems seem to be constantly evolving, Galeotti’s approach invites the reader not only to face the emerging reality, but also to learn to adapt to the new permanent, bloodless war. The Weaponisation of Everything, first released in February 15, 2022, is now available in paperback as of February 14, 2023.

Mark Galeotti, The Weaponisation of Everything: A Field Guide to the New Way of War (Yale University Press, 2022) ISBN 9780300253443, 256 Pages

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lassical realism has been a long-standing theory in explaining international relations, and Jonathan Kirschner reminds us why. Although it has been overshadowed by newer schools of thought such as structuralism, classical realism offers great insight into contemporary issues in the international politics arena.

Have contemporary realists lost their way? With renewed emphasis on the crucial roles played by uncertainty, contingency, and contestation, An Unwritten Future: Realism and Uncertainty in World Politics shows how classical realism better explains the formative events of the past and vital issues of today while assessing the fundamental flaws of classical realism’s would-be successors, namely structural realism and hyper-rationalism. It seeks to reclaim classical realism and deem it, once again, a worthwhile theory. The book, however, does not engage in paradigm wars and does not stray away from the realist tradition.

An Unwritten Future lays out realism’s core principles and discusses the contributions of the perspective’s key thinkers, including Thucydides, Hans Morgenthau, and Raymond Aron, among others. On brand with classical realism where “doubt is not an afterthought,” Kirschner also addresses realism’s limits and shortcomings.

In turn, Kirschner explores contemporary issues, including the ascent of great power challengers, the political implications of globalization, and the diffusion of power in modern world politics—such as the implications of China’s rise, future global order, and the shifts of balance of power and nature of conflict. He also does not neglect to provide a guide to a classical realist political economy highlighting the overlooked but impactful factor of social economy.

Kirshner debunks the notion that classical realism is unscientific and supports the idea that it is better to be vaguely right than exactly wrong. He highlights classical realism’s emphasis on attending to both power and purpose where history, uncertainty, and contingency play a large role. Classical realism, therefore, offers practical utility in an increasingly unpredictable world. Kirshner applies classical realism to the case of the British appeasement of the Nazis and the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War to demonstrate theory in practice. The book also contains a discussion dedicated to explaining the inner workings of classical realism for its persistent skeptics.

Providing a refreshing reminder of the richness of classical realism, this reexamination of the realist tradition is a must-read for students, analysts, and academics interested in international relations theory. Furthermore, An Unwritten Future is rich within its scope, delving into theory, economy, history, and contemporary topics, and provides a little something for everybody.

Jonathan Kirschner, An Unwritten Future: Realism and Uncertainty in World Politics (Princeton University Press, 2022) ISBN: 9780691166773, 336 pages

The hegemonic interpretation of the Cold War has been a struggle between a capitalist and liberal democratic Western bloc led by the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on the one hand, and a communist Eastern bloc led by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact on the other. It is certainly true that this depiction covers the two most significant alliances of the Cold War in terms of their military and economic capabilities.

However, this interpretation writes off a third category of countries, which constituted a much larger group than either the Western or the communist bloc in terms of their population: the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Inspired by the Bandung Conference in Indonesia in 1955, and formally established in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in 1961, it was initially spearheaded by a number of Third World leaders including Nasser, Nkrumah, Nehru, Sukarno, and Tito, the leaders of Egypt, Ghana, India, Indonesia, and Yugoslavia, respectively.

Only three years later, led by the NAM, the “Group of 77” (G77) was established on June 15, 1964 by 77 developing countries signatories of the “Joint Declaration of the Seventy-Seven Developing Countries” issued at the end of the first session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Geneva. These countries already then represented, and even more so represent today, a very sizeable percentage of the world’s population. They included dozens of recently decolonized African and Asian countries as well as a few Latin American countries, but almost no European ones with the notable exception of Yugoslavia.

The NAM was not at all a one-off attempt by a group of developing, and mostly postcolonial, African and Asian countries trying to justify their refusal to ally with the Soviet Union or the United States. Rather, it was a notable step in a series of systematic and recurrent attempts and designs to chart a “third way” for what came to be known as the Global South.

These efforts continued with a call for economic justice and the need for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), culminating in the United Nations General Assembly’s (UNGA) “Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Order” on May 1, 1974.

The NAM, G77, and NIEO stoked the idealism of those who aspired to a world government.

The NAM, G77, and NIEO, launched by the same group of countries, represented the “third way” during the Cold War, and claimed the mantle of an activist kind of “neutrality.” Their activism brought energy and symbolic relevance to the UNGA in particular, with a flurry of UNGA resolutions condemning various gross violations of human rights. The NAM, G77, and NIEO also stoked the idealism of those who aspired to a world government based on the United Nations (UN), while also motivating spirited calls for a reform of the UN.

This was a sign of how seriously the UN was taken by some political and social actors at the time, especially in the Global South. These efforts contrast with the widespread cynicism vis-à-vis intergovernmental organizations, and especially the UN, at present.

In a special issue of Perceptions, the academic periodical of Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs that debated Turkey’s grand strategy, which I edited, I suggested that Turkey’s role should be that of a “third power,” supporting the independence and territorial integrity of its neighbors that have been occupied by the two rival global and regional alliances spearheaded by the United States and Russia.

The United Arab Emirates and Iran are the countries spearheading the regional operations of these U.S.-led and Russia-led global alliances, respectively, and the disastrous consequences of their interventions are observable most clearly in Syria and Yemen.

Middle powers and some former great powers are looking for a third way since the end of the US-led liberal international order and unipolarity.

Many other middle powers and even some former great powers are looking for a “third way” at present, especially since the end of the U.S.-led liberal international order and unipolarity, for which 2016 is often considered as the turning point with Brexit and Donald Trump’s election in the United States. Brazil under Lula da Silva could be considered another such example of a rising regional power that sought a third way in the emerging multipolar world order.

The efforts of Muslim countries to get together to defend their common interests and to stop genocidal massacres or the mass internment of Muslim minorities from Bosnia to Myanmar, and Kashmir to Xinjiang are yet another such example.

Having moved from a world order of liberal-socialist bipolarity (1945-1991) to one of a liberal unipolarity for about a quarter century (1991-2016), we arguably inhabit a post-socialist, post-liberal, and multipolar world order today. This is an environment, both geopolitically and ideologically, which is very propitious for the flourishing of a “third way” thinking, not (only) of the Tony Blair-Anthony Giddens variety, but along the lines of South-to-South cooperation as previously observed.

The experience of the NAM, however, also provides cautionary tales about the hijacking of such attempts at international solidarity by one or the other of the two great power alliances (such as the Soviet bloc) as well as benefiting autocratic regimes that deny the basic right to vote and competitive elections to their own citizens at home in the name of progressivism.

China’s investments in Balkan countries that are not members of the European Union keep growing. The region remains stuck in the EU’s waiting room, as well as in the Euro-Atlantic sphere of influence, but is using every opportunity to deepen its economic, political, and, to a certain extent, cultural ties with Beijing.

The so-called Western Balkan states – all of them located in the central and southern parts of the Balkan Peninsula, not in the West – have always attracted the interest of the regional actors, Russia, Turkey, and the European Union. The United States, as the major global power, traditionally has the last say in the coal-rich region. Not so long ago, China, through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has expended its partnership with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia.

The BRI, launched in 2013 by President Xi Jinping in Kazakhstan, aims to connect Asia with Europe and Africa through major infrastructure projects, trade facilitation, financial integration, and cooperation in other areas. In the Balkans, Beijing is mostly interested in infrastructure and energy.

According to the American Enterprise Institute, China’s investments and contracts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia amounted to $14.6 billion from 2005 to 2019. The amount is relatively low, given the fact that the European Union still accounts for more than 70% of the overall direct investment in the region. On the other hand, China’s share in the Balkan countries accounts for only 5.7% of the overall trade in the region.

There are, however, fears that the EU could eventually lose its influence in the region. North Macedonia’s president Stevo Pendarovski has recently emphasized that if the EU appears disengaged in the Balkans, other countries would step in. “When you are absent, then the strategic void will be filled by somebody else. Everybody knows whom we are speaking about,” he said.

Back in 2017, Federica Mogherini, an Italian politician who served as High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, warned that the Balkans can “easily become one of the chessboards where the big power game can be played.”

The game apparently already started, although at this point the West does not force the Balkan countries to pick a side. Indeed, Washington and Brussels have mechanisms to reduce the Chinese influence in the region that is heavily dependent on the European Union. One call from the White House could easily expand the American de facto control over the Balkans, and reduce the Chinese economic presence.

The Washington Agreement, signed by Prime Minister of Kosovo Avdullah Hoti and the President of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić on September 4, 2020 at the White House, clearly demonstrates who the “real boss” is in the Balkans. The agreement committed Belgrade and Pristina not to use equipment supplied by “untrusted vendors” in their telecommunications networks.

It remains to be seen if Serbia will have to eliminate China’s tech giant Huawei completely – with whom Belgrade signed a strategic agreement in 2017 – from the ongoing installation of fixed broadband infrastructure, including the 5G network. For now, the country manages to relatively successfully balance between the West and China.

Serbia, the region’s largest economy that accounts for 44% of regional GDP, already hosts several large Chinese equity investments, most notably the Chinese Hesteel Group’s 2016 purchase of the Smederevo steel mill that was previously owned by the American company U.S. Steel. In addition, China is also involved in some huge infrastructure projects in Serbia, namely the construction of Corridor X, railway and highway sections, Corridor XI highway, as well as Kostolac thermal power plant.

The very fact that the U.S. companies operating in Serbia sold their assets to China is a clear indication that Beijing’s business in the country has Washington’s tacit support, at the very least.

Beijing also owns copper-gold assets in the Serbian town of Bor, which the Chinese Zijin Mining company purchased from the American Freeport-McMoRan Inc. in 2019. The very fact that the U.S. companies operating in Serbia sold their assets to China is a clear indication that Beijing’s business in the country has Washington’s tacit support, at the very least.

It is also worth noting that in June 2020 Serbia has publicly displayed six new military drones purchased from China. Such an action, however, did not seem to worry the United States, given that the Serbian Army has close ties with the Ohio National Guard. In addition, in 2019, Serbia, whose parliament declared armed neutrality in 2007, conducted 13 military exercises with NATO members. One of them, Montenegro, has also developed strong ties with China.

In 2014, the smallest nation in the Balkans took out a loan of nearly $1 billion from the Export-Import Bank of China for the construction of the Bar-Boljare highway that will link the Adriatic Sea and the country’s border with Serbia. The highway, which is located at one of the most challenging landscapes for building in the whole of Europe, will connect Bar, the largest coastal town and harbor in Montenegro, with the Serbian capital Belgrade.

The deal that Podgorica and Beijing signed provides a 20-year repayment period and a six-year grace period, while the first annual repayment of $67.5 million falls in July. So far, Montenegro has paid only 2% of the interest, but the country is already facing a debt crisis. Even though the Balkan state targets 2025 to be ready for E.U. accession, the bloc will not be paying the Chinese loan.

“Through its banks, China has provided the most favorable and competent loans, has offered reputable infrastructure contractors, and has given the possibility for domestic contractors as partners in these projects, allowing local enterprises to be involved,” wrote the former Montenegrin president Filip Vujanović for the Chinese Global Times.

Still, according to EU figures, Montenegro’s national debt could soar from 65% to around 80% of GDP once its loan from China is fully repaid.

North Macedonia is another Balkan state that relies on Chinese loans. Skopje has reportedly received both Chinese state bank loans and development cooperation funds. It was the first country of the “17+1” cooperation platform, formed between China and Central and Eastern European nations, to make use of the $10 billion credit line made available by China for infrastructure projects.

The U.S. has now chosen its new president: Joe Biden. But despite a united front against Donald Trump, Democrat’s victory was on a razor’s edge. In the U.S., many pessimists claim that Donald Trump lost but Trumpism reigns regardless of the election outcome. Nihan Duran interviewed Human Rights Advocate and the former Vice President of World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP) Poka Laenui (Hayden F. Burgess) on the future of the U.S. democracy after the Trump administration, rights of the indigenous people, and finally the root causes of Trumpism as another form of populism in the Western world.

When we compare the 2020 U.S. election with the one in 2016 when Donald Trump was running against Hillary Clinton, back then, people were associating Trump’s victory with a reaction to something called “the establishment.” Yet this issue was never raised during the current election. Why do you think it is so?

It is so because, after four years in the White House, Trump’s finger-pointing at the “Establishment” would be a self-critique. Biden did not make an issue about the “Establishment” because he had much bigger fish to fry, Trump’s absolute failure in the Corona Virus war!

Was the debate on “the establishment” baseless?

Yes, as promoted by Trump. His “draining the swamp” of those establishment crooks during Trump’s administration showed that he brought in the dredges into his administration, directly counteracting his accusations against “the establishment.”

So, what did happen to “the establishment”? Simply evaporated?

It is a matter of whose establishment we are trying to address. Trump’s new Republican establishment will evaporate. The Democratic establishment will assert itself, especially in areas where the Republicans will have abandoned as a result of the loss of the White House, the loss of the House of Representatives in 2018, and the loss of its strength in the Senate, still undetermined the extent of their Senate loss.

There have been efforts to recognize the rights of indigenous people both locally and internationally. This paved the way for what you refer to as decolonization. What makes “Trumpism” so peculiar and worrisome for the future of the U.S. democracy and the rights of indigenous people?

I see Trumpism over the last four years as an aberrational swing of the political pendulum to the extreme right, almost to the extent of the early days of Adolph Hitler, who is also elected to lead his country. In the case of the U.S., the election process was able to hold strong and finally oust Trump. But the swing to the Right has left its mark. The pendulum will now swing to the Left.

How extreme will that swing go is questionable, but the center of that question is the character of Joe Biden and the administration he puts together, as well as the team of Pelosi Schumer, as well as the influence of Kamala Harris.

If you ask whether there will be a greater movement to the decolonization of Hawaii to the extent of Independence, I will say, not immediately. But under the Democratic administrations, there has been a loosening up of the present colonization. In 1979, the formation of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs in Hawaii, in 1993 the public confession in the form of the U.S. Apology Resolution, and in 2016, the adoption of Federal Rules for the recognition of a Native Hawaiian nation. All of this falls short of the call for decolonization, but it shows that under Democratic control, this progress has occurred.

Under Trumpism and his “America First” mantra, the rights of indigenous peoples throughout the world and within the current borders of the United States had no room in the Trumpist master plan.

What were the root causes of Trumpism to reign over the last years?

Power! The office of the Presidency, but a fluke of U.S. structure which allows the “electoral college” to select not the most popular but one who managed to collect a majority of the college. Once Trump possessed this power of office, he was able to threaten the weak-kneed Republicans to go along and violate long-established norms in American political life. Those Republicans did so and continued to do so as long as Trump held the power.

How do you connect Trumpism with the overall rise of populism in the Western world?

It is part of the pendulum swing from the threat of non-Western populations and countries. It is a fear of the rise of China especially, as well as Vietnam, India, and North Korea in the East. As Europe looks to the Middle East, they see those countries and peoples whom Europe had reigned over, now bursting forth and not willing to kowtow to European/American influence.

While these events are occurring, the Western world is seeing the decline of their economy, culture, and unity. Trump’s call for “America First” has many pessimists claim sound to the United Kingdom, as well as many other European countries.

Instead of embracing the changing face of the world, the European/American approach is to “circle the wagons” and take a defensive posture against the “barbarians”. They turn to build walls to keep them out, such as Trump’s wall along the U.S. Southern border which never materialized, or his immigration policies which will soon be reversed. European countries have also followed the same approach.

What would embracing the changing world mean? It could mean shared prosperity for all, through the enrichment of peoples’ cultures, religions, economy, and humanity. It could mean denuclearization among a more trusting community of nations, of decolonization allowing all peoples to guide their own futures which would allow for wiser governance and use of resources, and a wider and deeper appreciation of the peoples of the world and all of the treasures they can offer the world.