Rising tensions between Iran and Israel, culminating in retaliatory warfare since the 7th of October, have plunged Saudi Arabia into a state of uncertainty. Despite Riyadh’s long-standing rivalry with Tehran, the recent truce with Iran, escalating regional tensions and Saudi Arabia’s own domestic interests have led its leaders to adopt a more cautious and pacifist tone.

This time, Saudi Arabia has framed its response to Israel’s actions against Iran in legal rather than political terms. Riyadh condemned the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran as a “blatant violation” of Iran’s sovereignty. Earlier, Israel’s attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus on 1 April, followed by Iran’s retaliatory missile and drone barrage two weeks later, prompted Saudi Arabia, along with other Gulf states, to swiftly condemn the Israeli attack and warn of “the dangers of war and its dire consequences”.

Despite historic tensions with Iran, Saudi Arabia has been actively involved in diplomatic efforts to prevent a catastrophic escalation. Prince Faisal bin Farhan, the Saudi foreign minister, has been at the forefront of communication with all parties involved, advocating “double restraint” and stressing that “we do not need more conflict in our region”.

For the Saudis, a war with Iran – whether started by Israel or anyone else – is a no-win scenario. It will be fought in their backyard and the Arabs will bear the brunt of the devastation. Arab soil will be the battleground because Israel and Iran have no common borders. Such a war would shatter Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s (MbS) vision of a prosperous and unified Middle East, a dream he once likened to a ‘new Europe’. Instead, the region could tragically morph into a post-World War II Europe, divided and set back for decades.

As a key player in the global oil market, Saudi Arabia is acutely aware of the economic consequences of any disruption to oil supplies in the event of a regional war. The recent example of the Houthis, a relatively small group, posing a critical threat to international shipping routes in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden during the Gaza conflict, albeit with subtle efforts at prevention by the ad hoc US-UK-led naval coalition. In addition, the kingdom’s proximity to conflict zones and the presence of Iranian-backed militias in neighboring Iraq and Yemen on Iran’s axis of resistance pose significant security threats.

Before even considering such a fight, the Saudis need ironclad security guarantees from their Western allies, the same kind that Israel enjoys to ensure deterrence. Frankly, that’s a tall order, at least for now. While their offensive capabilities exceed those of Iran, the Saudis recognize the need for robust air defences to counter Iran’s extensive arsenal of missiles and drones. This concern underscores the importance of President Donald Trump’s 2020 proposal for a Middle East NATO against Iran, particularly one that unites Saudi Arabia, Israel and other Arab states.

Building on the momentum of the Abraham Accords, which normalized relations between Israel and several Arab states, the US envisioned a regional defence cooperation framework. This included transferring Israel’s operational area of responsibility from the US European Command (EUCOM) to the US Central Command (CENTCOM) and proposing integrated air and missile defence (IAMD). This vision seems to be bearing fruit, albeit in a fragile and secretive way.

Although acknowledged by Israel and denied by Arab governments, including Riyadh, reports from outlets such as the Wall Street Journal suggest that Saudi Arabia has played a role in intercepting Iranian missiles and drones. Of course, this was a sign of cooperation, not an intention to engage in a full-scale war between the two. Unlike Arab officials, Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant openly saw it as “an opportunity to build a strategic alliance against this serious threat from Iran, which threatens to put nuclear explosives on the heads of these missiles”.

Iran’s attack on Israel served two purposes. First, it exposed Israel’s formidable air defenses and unwavering Western support, which boasts an impressive, reported 99% intercepting success rate. Second, this narrative would undoubtedly spark a parallel drive for advanced defence capabilities in Saudi Arabia, while raising concerns about unequal treatment of allies in the face of the Iranian threat. It reminds us of how the Saudis have endured a serious threat from Iranian-backed Houthi rebels since 2015 (over 430 ballistic missiles and 851 armed drones).

President Biden’s complex relationship with Saudi Arabia’s MbS has further complicated the situation, shaking security assurances. Attacks by Iranian-supplied Houthi missiles and drones on key Saudi energy facilities in 2019 and 2021 marked a turning point. The subsequent US withdrawal of Patriot missile batteries in 2021 exacerbated feelings of abandonment and a lack of US commitment, as expressed by Prince Turki Al-Faisal to CNBC, ‘not indicative of America’s stated intention to help Saudi Arabia defend itself against external enemies’.

Recently, Saudi Arabia took a step back from discord with Iran, a step towards normalization with Israel, and another towards a security pact with the US before the presidential elections in November. But the outbreak of the Hamas-Israel war has halted progress on these fronts. One reason is Saudi Arabia’s balancing of moral imperatives with strategic considerations.

Traditionally a champion of the Palestinian cause, Saudi Arabia finds it morally and popularly unacceptable to ally itself with the Jewish state (Israel) occupying Palestinian territory and recently killing 33,000 in Gaza against the Shiite Muslim state (Iran), especially at a time of war. But despite discreet cooperation with Israel, Saudi Arabia is officially stuck in a ‘chicken or the egg’ conundrum. Should a solution to the Palestinian problem come before normalizing relations with Israel, or vice versa?

Precarious neutrality reigns

In a multipolar regional landscape where Iran and Israel, both adversaries of the Arabs, are engaged in a protracted conflict, Saudi Arabia will arguably gain a strategic advantage in the regional balance of power. It is worth noting that the Arab Israeli enmity predates that of Iran and has been unresolved since 1948.

The Saudis may consider themselves fortunate to have cautiously forged a truce with Iran and avoided formal normalization with Israel, which would provide a strategic buffer in the event of war. This stance may allow them to maintain neutrality, be ready to mediate, or at least send an appeasing message to Iran if necessary.

In Saudi Arabia’s quest for foreign policy autonomy, neutrality has become one of its strategic tools. It allows Riyadh to avoid entanglement in US rivalries, as seen in conflicts such as the Russian-Ukrainian war and the brewing Israeli Iranian escalation. Such detachment is in line with Saudi political and economic interests.

Indeed, any attempt by Saudi Arabia to remain neutral in a looming war between Israel and Iran is a precarious balancing act. The kingdom hosts some American business and defence assets on its soil, including Patriot batteries, which necessitates routine cooperation with the US, especially in contingencies such as an Israeli Iranian war.

Lebanon’s agony was compounded over the past few weeks as a result of statements made by the country’s newly appointed minister of information, George Cordahi, in a prerecorded online media interview that saw the light on September 10, 2021, but which was filmed in August 2021 and released after Cordahi was appointed in Najib Mikati’s government on September 10.

In the interview, Cordahi committed a series of blunders which highlight his very basic understanding of regional politics (or even politics, in general) and his skewed moral compass regarding what constitutes an admirable leader in his opinion (i.e., Bashar Assad and Vladimir Putin). However, all of that didn’t matter and quickly became a sideshow against the backdrop of the measures that were immediately enacted by the Saudi government following the airing of the episode by the online platform of Qatari state-owned Al Jazeera.

Riyadh seemed to have taken offense in Cordahi’s statements on Yemen, where he said that the Iran-aligned Houthi group was “defending itself … against an external aggression,” adding that “homes, villages, funerals and weddings were being bombed” by the Saudi-led coalition. He also called the 7-year war in Yemen “futile” and said it was “time for it to end.”

A diplomatic crisis spiraled out of control, with Riyadh fully halting Lebanese imports and ordering the “recall of the ambassador in Lebanon for consultations, and the departure of Lebanon’s ambassador to the kingdom within 48 hours.” Other countries within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) followed suit or took other measures, but the GCC appeared united in its stance against Lebanon – the Gulf’s unity on such a negative position towards Lebanon constitutes a precedent, with Oman and Qatar taking less escalatory measures than their counterparts.

The crisis goes well beyond Cordahi’s words regarding the war in Yemen.

Yet, while the blame for what transpired is being directed towards Cordahi, with several Lebanese politicians or sectarian leaders denouncing his statements and asking him to resign – including, in an indirect way, the incumbent prime minister – the crisis goes well beyond Cordahi’s words regarding the war in Yemen.

In fact, from an observer’s point of view, the current diplomatic crisis has been a long time coming with the perfect storm brewing over the years, especially since back in 2016 the so-called presidential deal was struck between Saad Hariri, Michel Aoun (and his U.S.-sanctioned son-in-law Gebran Bassil), and Hezbollah.

The deal birthed what was dubbed a neo-troika, which represents a power-sharing arrangement reminiscent of the one that existed during the Syrian regime’s occupation of Lebanon. However, this time, the main antagonists were the top leaders of the three main sects in Lebanon: the Maronites, the Shi`a, and the Sunnis. Yet, the neo-troika does not place all three parties on an equal footing within Lebanon’s power-sharing arrangement.

The ultimate weakening of Hariri and the disintegration of the political camp that was previously perceived to balance Hezbollah’s growing power, catapulted the Iran-funded and armed group into new echelons of influence in Lebanon. May 2018 resembled the final nail in the coffin, with Hezbollah and its allies winning a majority in the parliamentary elections allowing it to exercise control over the legislative, the executive, and the presidency. This inherently meant fully controlling the country’s foreign policy too.

Two major incidents exemplified Riyadh’s waning influence and Lebanon’s break from its traditional foreign policy positioning.

Two major incidents exemplified Riyadh’s waning influence and Lebanon’s break from its traditional foreign policy positioning. Both incidents were championed by none other than Gebran Bassil, Hezbollah’s main Christian ally in Lebanon. In February 2016, U.S.-sanctioned Gebran Bassil refused to condemn attacks on the Saudi embassy in Tehran and its consulate in Meshhad. Bassil, at the time, was a foreign minister and his decision broke with Arab unanimity within the Arab League.

Even Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, at the time, denounced the attacks, and said that his government had opened an investigation to punish the perpetrators. Moreover, Bassil refused to condemn drone attacks that targeted two major Saudi Aramco oil installations in September 2019. Bassil justified his stance by equating the Houthi attack on Riyadh to the Saudi-led Arab coalition on Sanaa while alluding to the policy of “dissociation” to avoid taking a stance. That did not bode well with Riyadh, given the gravity of the attack which obviously crossed all the red lines between Riyadh and Tehran.

Riyadh effectively realized – the hard way – that it went from hero to zero in Beirut in a span of only 15 years. This can be viewed as a record time for a country’s shift in allegiance given the size of investments Riyadh once held in Beirut, and especially since it engineered the end of the civil war in 1990 and funded Lebanon’s postwar reconstruction drive.

While Lebanon was previously seen as a satellite state were Riyadh and Damascus shared influence, the country today rotates in the Iranian orbit despite Riyadh and other powers, like the United States, retaining considerable influence there.

In today’s regional geopolitical setup, Lebanon falls within the “Iranian influence archipelago,” a reality supported by statements made by senior Iranian officials, the current Lebanese political state of affairs, and the fact that the international community includes the Lebanese dossier whenever it intends to negotiate with Tehran. After all, Najib Mikati’s government did not see the light despite the immense effort and pressure France’s Elysée exerted over 13 months up until French President Emmanuel Macron received a nod from the Iranians following the installment of their new hardline administration in Tehran.

Nevertheless, the recent Saudi escalation towards Lebanon appears to be a last hurrah despite the Saudis framing it as them cutting their losses in Lebanon and leaving. The developments in Iraq and Lebanon over the past two years – since the uprisings of October 2019 broke out in both countries – and the growing anti-Iranian sentiments in both countries, reinvigorated the Saudi drive to try and instrumentalize the new dynamics in order to attempt to roll back Iranian influence in the region.

The results of the Iraqi parliamentary elections that were held last month and the huge blow that the Iran-aligned militias were dealt, cemented the Saudi conviction, especially as Riyadh maintains good relations with the caretaker Iraqi PM – who until now remains the most favorable candidate to be reappointed to the position– and the winner of the parliamentary elections, Muqtada al-Sadr. Iraq’s influential Shi`ite cleric, al-Sadr, made a rare visit to Saudi Arabia in July 2017 and met with Mohammed bin Salman.

With today’s intertwinement of dossiers in the region, especially due to Iran’s bloated influence in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen, the Saudis as much as the Iranians, view the regional chessboard as one unit where they can put pressure on each other in different places to gain concessions. Meanwhile, both had a major interest in engaging in an Iranian-Saudi dialogue that is taking place in Baghdad, an attempt to appease the administration of President Joe Biden. From one side, the Saudis want to appear like they’re breaking away from the zero-sum approach they pursued towards Iran during the days of Donald Trump’s administration, while the Iranians benefit from a semblance of regional diplomacy to try and keep “regional matters” away from the negotiation table in Vienna.

As Afghanistan enters a new era with the Taliban’s takeover in August 2021, its potential political preferences in internal and international affairs have raised concerns. The Taliban’s rule strengthens Saudi Arabia’s position over Afghanistan. However, Iran is also trying to prevent the formation of a regime that doesn’t serve its interests in the future. The two states have always tried to establish a foothold on each other’s borders. Saudi Arabia attaches great importance to Afghanistan as it encouraged jihad in the 1980s and supported the Taliban in the 1990s. Likewise, Yemen is important to Iran, which has been supporting the Houthis in the last decades.

When the Taliban took control of Afghanistan in the 1990s, some were fearing that Saudi Arabia would spread its religious model not only in Afghanistan but also in newly independent Central Asian countries. The danger increased when the Taliban killed Iranian diplomats in 1998. In response, Iran deployed its forces on the eastern borders and conducted military drills.

Iran, which had just come out of a devastating Saudi-backed war with Iraq, called the killing of its diplomats a Saudi plot to plunge Iran into another war. Iran, therefore, didn’t want to fall into the trap that Saudi Arabia and others had planned for it. Instead of a direct military intervention in Afghanistan, Iran decided to deal with the Taliban threat by supporting the Northern Alliance. This policy continued until 2001 and with the 9/11 terror attacks and the United States’ invasion of Afghanistan, the Taliban threat for Iran was eliminated, and Iran’s allies gained political power in post-Taliban Afghanistan.

However, the Taliban was replaced by American forces, which posed another, perhaps bigger, threat to Iran. Thereafter, Iran’s strategy was to expel the United States from its eastern borders, namely Afghanistan, and from its western borders, namely Iraq. Both objectives also intersected with those of the Taliban.

Iran and Saudi Arabia came into conflict in the post-Taliban Afghanistan. Initially, Iran supported the Afghan central government and Saudi Arabia in retaliation supported the Taliban in order to attack and weaken the Afghan central government, which then had close ties with Iran. However, due to the increasing threat from the United States, Iran abandoned its ideological differences and approached the Taliban to push away the U.S. forces. This was a challenging move by Iran and Saudi Arabia constantly tried to push the Taliban away from Iran’s influence.

The rise of ISIS-K pushed Iran more towards the Taliban. Iran’s purpose was to use the Taliban to suppress ISIS-K on its eastern borders.

The rise of ISIS-K pushed Iran more towards the Taliban. Iran’s purpose was to use the Taliban to suppress ISIS-K on its eastern borders. The Taliban is regarded by Iran as a local force that could manage insecurity in Afghanistan with the least consequences for Iran. In addition, Iranian officials may have thought that this rapprochement with the Taliban could balance Saudi Arabia’s influence in Afghanistan as Saudi Arabia and the Taliban share common interests.

The Taliban’s recent takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021 is different than in 1996. Some argue that Saudi Arabia will dominate Afghan domestic and foreign policy soon; however, a look at the past ten years and the recent events after the Taliban’s victory, show that Iran and the Taliban will not be on bad terms and the Taliban leaders seem to take Iran’s expectations into consideration as well.

Iran’s support for the Taliban is no secret. More interestingly, both Iran and Saudi Arabia support the new Afghan government, and expect the Taliban to establish stability following 40 years of devastating conflicts and war. Despite the Taliban’s takeover providing an opportunity for cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the rivalry between the two depends on their ideological rivalry in the region, which seems to have softened recently but which will continue nonetheless in the short term? Competition between the two in Afghanistan may continue in social, cultural, and economic fields. Afghanistan is closely linked to Iran in all three respects, while Saudi Arabia is mostly investing in the establishment or funding of religious schools.

Given the dire financial need of the Taliban, Saudi Arabia may use financial resources to exercise a certain influence over the group. In contrast, some claim that Iran could be a source of inspiration for the Taliban and the mutual enmity towards the U.S. could be a basis for a rapprochement between the two.

Controlling the influx of Afghan migrants to Iran, establishing political stability, continuing trade with Iran, and suppressing terrorist groups such as ISIS-K are the most important expectations that Iran has from the Taliban. For Saudi Arabia, however, having a regime in Afghanistan that could isolate Iran is a strategic goal, which seems difficult given the new geopolitical realities in the region and Afghanistan.

The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and its reluctant policy to support or launch a new war in the region, and especially the Iran-Taliban close relations make it hard for Saudi Arabia to achieve its goal. The Taliban need to be internationally recognized which highlights Iran’s role.

Today, despite the two countries’ deep distrust of each other, Tehran and Riyadh have common interests in establishing peace in the region and especially in Afghanistan. The U.S. withdrawal is the starting point for both countries, as there was no strong supporter of Saudi Arabia than the U.S. in Afghanistan. At the same time, there is currently no U.S. threat against Tehran in Afghanistan.

Establishing relative stability in Afghanistan during the Taliban era is Tehran’s favourite option. The Taliban need Iran’s and Saudi Arabia’s recognition and their assistance in reconstructing Afghanistan’s devastated infrastructure. Ultimately, it seems that the Taliban will benefit from the Saudi-Iranian rivalry in their country.

Ebrahim Raisi, ex-judiciary chief of Iran, has been elected as the new president in Iran’s June 2021 presidential elections. The 2021 elections were low key; economic hardship and fading public trust in government alienated people from the ballot boxes. Iran’s election turnout was the lowest since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Many experts interpreted the low turnout as a sign of a legitimacy crisis for the Iranian regime.

With Raisi’s victory, reformists and moderates were wiped off the political scene. Conservatives have complete control over the legislative, executive, and judicial bodies. Hence, the Iranian political scene will be dominated by conservative elements for at least four years. In domestic politics, strict media control (especially on social media), limited political freedoms, and a colorless political life can be expected. In foreign policy, Iran will have breaks and continuities because of regional and global developments, and Raisi’s political orientation.

Raisi’s Presidency and Foreign Policy-Making in Iran

Based on the constitution of Iran, the president must consult on foreign policy issues with other institutions, assemblies, and senior officials. The parliament has a say on every domestic and foreign political matter. Specifically, the Iranian parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee is very active in foreign policy discussions. Furthermore, the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) is one of the highest authorities that decides on Iran’s foreign policy. The Iranian president is the council’s natural chairman, and the council’s secretary is appointed by the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei.

Members of the SNSC are comprised of heads of the three branches of the government; the interior, foreign, and intelligence ministers; the chief of staff for the Armed Forces; the heads of the Army and the Revolutionary Guards Corps; relevant ministers; and other members appointed by the supreme leader. Iran’s strong political and economic institutions called “bonyadha” (foundations) also have an impact on foreign policy decision-making. Consequently, the Iranian president has limited power in determining Iran’s foreign policy.

The new president of Iran, Raisi, is unlikely to display strong political leadership in his first years in power. Beside institutional and legal restraints, there will be two determinants contributing to Raisi’s limited political power: First, Raisi has spent most of his career in the judiciary, thus, lacks political and administrative experience apart from being the head of the famous religious charity organization Bonyad-e Astan Quds Razavi (Astan Quds Razavi Foundation) between 2016 and 2019.

Bonyads are highly powerful institutions in Iran and are constitutionally exempt from parliamentary or governmental examination – they are only accountable to the supreme leader. Second, Raisi owes almost all his career to Supreme Leader of Iran Ali Khamenei. This means, he cannot breach the line drawn by Khamenei.

An interesting point about the new Iranian cabinet is that it contains some figures, who worked under Ahmadinejad’s presidency. Interior Minister Ahmed Vahidi served as defense minister under Ahmadinejad; Javad Owji, who has been nominated as the new minister of oil, was Ahmedinejad’s oil minister; and Rostam Ghasemi, who was also Ahmadinejad’s oil minister, has been appointed as the roads and transportation minister. Considering the tension between Ahmadinejad and Khamenei, Raisi’s ministerial choices show that the above names are pursuing their agenda rather than participating in Ahmadinejad’s current political stream.

Many of the names Raisi appointed and he himself are on the U.S. or EU sanctions list. This situation severely limits the diplomatic capacity of the new Iranian government. Some are curious as to how Western countries will contact and negotiate with the Iranian president and his ministers given that some of them are on their sanctions lists.

Iran’s Current Foreign Policy

Both during the election campaign and after his election, President Raisi declared that he is not against nuclear negotiations. However, he also said that negotiations carried out in the previous period did not serve the interests of the Iranian people. For this reason, one can say that although the Iranian president is not against nuclear negotiations in theory, in practice, he will approach the issue in a tone and style that the P5+1 countries do not desire.

Both during the election campaign and after his election, President Raisi declared that he is not against nuclear negotiations.

Therefore, nuclear deal negotiations are likely to come to a deadlock. The latest round of negotiations were held two weeks before the Iranian presidential election. It was necessary to clarify how the newly elected president and his team would approach the issue of nuclear negotiations. However, although Raisi has been elected to office, the negotiations have not started yet. Hardline MP Mojtaba Zonnour said that Iran would not continue negotiations because the “Vienna format is a worse repetition of the JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action] and is jumping out of the frying pan into the fire.” Even though Raisi’s new cabinet and foreign policy team started their work, the future of the nuclear deal is not clear yet.

Raisi repeatedly emphasized prioritizing friendly relations with Iran’s neighbors in his foreign policy agenda. After his election, he clearly stated that Iran wants to normalize its relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. During Trump’s presidency, Tehran’s relations with these two countries deteriorated. With Biden coming to power, Gulf leaders calculated that they would not enjoy U.S. support against Iran as they did before.

The change in the U.S. administration is the main reason behind the two Arab Gulf states’ recent positive attitudes towards Iran. The main objectives on the Iranian side are maintaining the Gulf’s security and preventing conflicts with Gulf countries. Considering Iran has suffered from the U.S. sanctions seriously for almost ten years, avoiding costly conflicts with regional powers will benefit it.

Following his inauguration as Iran’s new president, Raisi has faced serious challenges from Afghanistan. As many experts and officers indicated, after the U.S. withdrawal from the war-torn country, the Taliban took over government. Land warfare expert at the International Institute for Strategic Studies Ben Barry claimed, “If the U.S. ceases to use its airpower to directly support Afghan forces, the Taliban will gain a considerable military advantage.” Sadanand Dhume from the American Enterprise Institute, said, “The Taliban don’t care about human rights any more than they did in 2001 and likely will take power.”

With the Taliban takeover, regional balances have drastically changed. To orient itself with newly emerging dynamics in Afghanistan, Iran changed its rhetoric and attitudes towards the Taliban. The situation in Afghanistan poses many challenges to the Tehran administration. For this reason, Iran has been negotiating with the Taliban for the past two years. First, to maintain border security, Iran took preventative measures and increased its military presence at the border and closed some border gates with Afghanistan.

Thanks to the agreements between Iran and the Taliban, this time, the notorious military group did not systematically persecute the Shiite minority.

What is more, the Taliban are famous for atrocities against Shiites in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, thanks to the agreements between Iran and the Taliban, this time, the notorious military group did not systematically persecute the Shiite minority. Although there are reports about Taliban attacks towards Hazara Shiites, there is no credible evidence that shows it is an official Taliban anti-Shia policy.

On the contrary, according to some media outlets, Taliban members joined the Ashura ceremonies and gave assurances that the Shia minority will be protected. Furthermore, in terms of trade and preventing drug and human trafficking, Iran needs to negotiate with the Taliban.

The Raisi era began in Iran with a vibrant foreign policy agenda. The stalemate in nuclear talks, normalization of ties with the Gulf states, and the Afghanistan crisis will take over most of Raisi’s foreign policy agenda. However, there may be unexpected turns or advancements in the coming days. Raisi’s response to these developments will be shaped by the dynamics stated above.

Forty-two years have passed since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran by a referendum landslide held on March 30 and 31, 1979, when 98.2% of the country’s eligible citizens approved the new regime. A series of dramatic developments which unfolded during the last years of the Pahlavi regime ultimately brought its downfall ushering the revolutionary triumph of Ayatollah Khomeini, whose arrival back to Iran on February 1, 1979 after fourteen years of exile marked the movement’s zenith.

Immediately after his return, he made a historic speech at Behesht-e Zahra, Tehran’s famous cemetery, where he said, “I will appoint the government! I will slap the present government on the mouth! With the support of the people, I will appoint the government!” Indeed, he “slapped” the shah’s last government and held the country’s reins in a matter of days, with Prime Minister Shapour Bakhtiar resigning from his post to flee Iran shortly afterwards. Nevertheless, the long-standing chaos was far from over.

Post-revolutionary Iran

Iran is, more often than not, a puzzling case especially when it comes to its recent past. The referendum was approved by an overwhelming majority, but it did not take long for the unrestrained revolutionary enthusiasm to start to fade and an increasing number of Iranians to experience a sense of anxiety and fear which had a lot to do with the chaos that erupted after the revolution.

The situation further deteriorated by the assassinations of senior revolutionary figures, including some high-ranking ayatollahs and politicians; the trials and executions of several figures who served under the deposed shah; and the bloody struggles between the erstwhile allies of the revolutionary movements who turned into its staunch enemies after its victory. But none of these could match the horrors of the Iran-Iraq War, which lasted eight years, and brought devastating humanitarian and economic costs to both sides.

In the early 1980s, during the heat of the revolutionary turmoil, many people, including politicians, ordinary citizens, and observers at home and abroad alike, wondered if this “unlikely” revolution was “inevitable” or whether things could have followed a different path had the shah and his regime behaved more consciously. Now, more than four decades later, the more valid question is whether the Iranian revolution fulfilled its promises or not.

Retrospectively speaking, in a country where the population more than doubled from approximately 39 million in 1979 to some 83 million currently, the economic and infrastructural records of the Islamic Republic cannot be said to be worse than the Pahlavis. The same holds true for its educational and health policies. Yet, the pressures on freedoms never stopped and in time, the “revolutionary ideals” turned into viable tools for subjugating not only “the traitors” (khain) or “the enemy” (doşmen) but also ordinary Iranians including some of those who originally supported the revolution.

This never-ending revolutionary discourse hinders Iran’s normalization. During the last decades, significant progress has been made in this regard but it has fallen far behind popular expectations, especially those of Iran’s younger generations. This is the most pressing domestic challenge awaiting Iranian political elites, both from the conservative and the reformist camps. As for the outside, there are other challenges.

Iran in the Middle East

Obviously, the attitudes of the new regime changed Iran’s position within the international community at large – and not necessarily for the worse in all cases. As a matter of fact, had the Hostage Crisis of November 1979 not occurred between Iran and the U.S., the Islamic Republic could have been more warmly welcomed by the Western world as the shah’s image as a reasonable leader was, at least to the end of his reign, badly hurt.

Islamic Republic’s Middle East policy was not a radical shift from the previous era, at least in terms of its objectives.

But even so, Iran’s capacity as a principal oil exporter, its geostrategic location, and the economic interests of many European states in the country, gave it enough room for maneuver in international politics. To this, Iran’s major role in Middle Eastern politics should also be added.

From a broader historical perspective, the Islamic Republic’s Middle East policy was not, from the beginning, a radical shift from the previous era, at least in terms of its objectives. Yet, the means and the discourse used for this policy were revolutionary. In the thick of the war against Iraq, Ayatollah Khomeini said that they were not after conquering the world and that they wanted to share pains with Muslims. “We do not want to go anywhere to capture it… We are defending Islam… Saddam is oppressing his own people. We are not attacking; at this we are in a defensive position.”

Evidently, although the war was originally started by Saddam Hussein, it could have stopped much earlier and at lower costs for both sides had Iran not shifted from a defensive position to an offensive one at some stage of the war. Equally significant was the lesson Iran’s leaders learnt from the war which, they thought, was “imposed” on them.

During the war, Iranian leaders felt that they were left to their fate by most of the Arab regimes which, they thought, strove for the Islamic Republic’s downfall with the notable exception of Hafez al-Assad’s Syria. He had his reasons to hate Saddam more than the Islamic Republic that was eager to align with him. Khomeini died in 1989, about a year after the war was over, and was replaced by President Ali Khamenei as Iran’s new supreme leader. Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a relatively moderate figure, emerged victorious in the 1989 presidential elections to be Iran’s fourth president.

Now Iran seemed to follow a different path in its regional policies. Nonetheless, the growing presence of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in the region, the emergence of Lebanese Hezbollah in the early 1980s with Iran’s full backing, and the unwillingness of some Arab regimes including, but not limited to, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, for a rapprochement with a “revolution-exporting Iran” undermined the prospects for normalization throughout the 1990s.

Moreover, faced by the threats posed by the U.S. and Israel, Iran adopted an extensive armament policy to the further concern of its neighbors. The 21st century opened an entirely different page for Iran’s presence in the Middle East.

The turn of the century unfolded two rather paradoxical developments. On the one hand, Iran’s nuclear program came to the attention of the U.S. and the rest of the international community at a time when Saddam was soon to be blamed for having weapons of mass destruction. On the other, the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) after 9/11, eliminated two of Iran’s archenemies: the Taliban and Saddam respectively.