Recent disputes between the CHP and the Iyi Party have reached a deadlock. Last week, I mentioned that the different responses of these two parties towards recent incidents in Turkish politics may shift the composition of alliances in the long term. The recent announcement of the Iyi Party’s spokesperson shows that the Nation Alliance may be on the verge of shifting towards in another direction due to the changing environment in Turkish politics.

The Iyi Party’s Spokesperson Yavuz Agıralioglu announced that if the CHP keeps its relations with the HDP intact, the Iyi Party will no longer take part in the Nation Alliance. This statement shows that the ongoing disputes between two parties has deep-rooted causes. The Iyi Party had been complaining about the CHP’s cooperation with the HDP in the appointment of trustees in some municipalities, and the HDP’s active involvement with the Nation Alliance during the local elections. Thus, the latent crisis has come to the surface recently.

Nonetheless, it is impossible to say that the Nation Alliance will collapse due to the ongoing crisis. Understanding the rationale behind this issue requires examining the characteristics of pre-electoral alliances. In general, pre-electoral alliances are classified into two categories: active and passive alliances. In active alliances, the position of political parties in the alliance and their perception towards the issues at the agenda may change in time. When it comes to passive alliances, since political parties have a consensus on their positions rather than interests, the alliance is robust against challenging issues.

It is obvious that the Nation Alliance is indeed an active alliance compared to the People’s Alliance, which is clearly a passive one. Because of this issue, although the People’s Alliance can keep firmly grounded in the local and national values (yerlilik ve millilik) of Turkey, the change in the interests of one of the members of the Nation Alliance may create serious consequences for all members.

However, although the dispute between the CHP and the Iyi Party cannot be underestimated for the future of this alliance, it will not bring the collapse of the cooperation between the two parties. Since these parties’ interests are not adversarial yet, their cooperation to overthrow the AK Party government and President Erdoğan will seem to be maintained.

Nevertheless, it is also inescapable for these parties to keep their alliances without losing the support of their electorate. The Iyi Party may especially suffer from its cooperation with the CHP-HDP alliance if it becomes official. The Iyi Party’s nationalist supporters may withdraw their supports from the party due to the HDP’s increasing influence in the Nation Alliance block.

Moreover, since the parliamentary elections in Turkey require the building of formal alliances through declaring the reason of the alliance with a document, the Iyi Party cannot convince its electorate to have a formal alliance with the HDP. Because of this reason, as the latent figure of the opposition block, the HDP’s role is still ambiguous and stays under the surface.

Thus, it is too early to say that the Nation Alliance is collapsing due to the failure of cooperation and coordination mechanisms between the CHP and Iyi Party. Nevertheless, it seems that the Iyi Party should convince its supporters to have an alliance with the CHP which does not hide its close relations with the HDP anymore. Beyond all, as there are still four years until the elections, it is difficult for all political parties to keep their positions on currently shaky political ground.

Turkey is heading towards the final phase of its local elections, which will be held on 31 March. With no doubt, Turkey’s policymakers called for a new system of government due to various difficult experiences in the past, as building adequate and strong governments was not that easy. It was quite understandable that parties, which heavily criticized each other and even defamed one another, came together in order to find a common base for the country. As a consequence, citizens supporting each party casted doubt on the sincerity of politicians.

Nevertheless, the new presidential system entailed not a totally new, but a rather structural and stability oriented phenomenon, namely pre-election alliances. These alliances have been firm enough to be continued even in the local elections.

Turkish politics nowadays has established the roots of a two-block political landscape, although not both blocks have concrete political ambitions and systematic preferences. As is known, the “People’s Alliance,” consisting of the AK Party and MHP was established right before the 16 April, 2017, referendum and continued during the parliamentary and presidential elections last year. On the other hand, parties around the main opposition party, the Kemalist-secular CHP, made efforts to bring together entirely different, and indeed ideologically conflicting groups, such as the Kurdish-ethnic HDP, the conservative SP and the Turkish-nationalist-oriented Iyi Party.

The second bloc has less of a chance and more difficulty to persuade and broaden its electorate. This is due to their lack of a coherent election program and the lack of a shared future projection. While the People’s Alliance refers itself to a set of compatible ambitions and narratives, the Nation Alliance is based on incompatible narratives and only has one common objective – to get rid of President Erdogan.

Despite the actual alliance-seeking efforts by the CHP and other parties, they have oddly come to refuse the existence of such an alliance, even in provinces where it is obvious that the candidate is an umbrella one. If a CHP-led alliance does not have the courage to openly conduct a campaign, then political engineering will be an option, and this option will fail on election day. As a stark comparison to the Nation Alliance, President Erdogan and Devlet Bahceli have openly stressed the main framework of the People’s Alliance with regard to the local elections.

The People’s Alliance was established on the night of the July 15, 2016, coup attempt, when the AK Party and MHP leaders took a strong position against the Gulenist putschists. In addition to this, these two parties had previously come together to get work done in Turkish politics. For instance, the MHP did not boycott Abdullah Gul’s bid for presidency in the parliament in 2007 (despite strong opposition from both the pro-tutelage Kemalist officers within the CHP and the Turkish Armed Forces). More, in 2007, both parties came together to lift the headscarf ban, which resulted in a closure trial against the AK Party in 2008. Both party leaders also resisted the violent Gezi Protests in 2013.

Today, the People’s Alliance describes its main character as standing for the “people’s will,” with the only aim to “serve the nation.” However, the Nation Alliance does not seem to have any concrete political position or self-description. This ambivalence and blurriness leads to a lack of transparency. And because of this situation, the People’s Alliance has described the CHP-led alliance as the “product of secret bargaining and political engineering.”

Kemalist-secular authorities and traditional Kemalist voters are unsatisfied with a quasi-alliance between the CHP and HDP due to the fact that the latter is the political arm of the PKK terrorist organization. Senior CHP figures have announced their candidacy from the Democratic Left Party (DSP) as a protest against CHP’s alienation. This has therefore caused dispute between the CHP and DSP, and the CHP has accused the DSP for dividing votes. However, DSP Chairman Onder Aksakal has rejected such accusations and stressed that the CHP is the only actor responsible for the success of the AK Party. Aksakal also underlined the CHP’s previous efforts that failed and that were not compatible with its traditional values. These were, namely, nominating a non-CHP politician as CHP’s presidential candidate in 2014, supporting the ultra-nationalist Iyi Party with 15 CHP MPs in 2018, and of course, not accepting any electoral defeats since 2010 after Kilicdaroglu became chairman.

The 31 March local elections will most likely contribute to the transformation of Turkey’s political landscape. By this, it can be inferred that a two-bloc system will be entrenched in the future. The continuing efforts of the People’s Alliance are reinforcing this trend, while the CHP-led alliance lacks a sincere and concrete narrative. While it lacks a concrete narrative, this does not exclude the actual existence of the Nation Alliance. Time will show whether this alliance will transform in the long-run due to the political pressure felt from the electorate.

Turkey’s opposition parties including the CHP, the Iyi Party and the HDP have established a holy alliance to stop the ruling AK Party-MHP bloc. The political system, especially after the introduction of the presidential system in April 2017, has started to be structured by bipolarity. The underlying motive for both of the alliances is similar, the will to power. However, they are shaped by two different and rather opposing ideological frameworks based on their positions within the political system.

The opposition seeks to detach the AK Party-MHP bloc from power, and thus adopts a discourse of liberty. This discourse strives to convince the electorate that the ruling power is oppressive and excluding the majority of society. The ruling AK Party-MHP bloc, in contrast, puts forward a discourse of power in order to maintain and strengthen its grasp on power. This discourse seeks to persuade the electorate that its rule is inclusive and should continue to sustain the security and welfare of the country.

The CHP, Iyi Party, and HDP alliance, designed to topple the AK Party-MHP bloc, is shaped by two different and rather opposing ideological frameworks based on their positions within the political system. 

Therefore, the result of the power struggle, including the upcoming local elections on 31 March, between these two political blocs will be determined by a couple of factors. The first one is the persuasive power of each discourse or policy. For the ruling bloc, the electorate will look at whether its interests are tied to the continuation of the existing order. If the electorate feel that an election loss for the ruling bloc will destabilize the political system and lead to an insecure environment, both with respect to the economy and politico-military matters, they tend to vote for the ruling AK Party-MHP bloc. More specifically, if the AK Party-MHP ruling bloc convinces the electorate that it’s loss of power will impair the fight against terrorism (PKK, FETO and DAESH) and deteriorate the country’s economy, which had recently taken a downturn, it will guarantee the election victory.

Thus, the opposition should convince the electorate that a change in power or the replacement of the ruling bloc with the opposition will not harm the fight against terrorism and improve the country’s economy. The opposition should persuade the electorate that there is an alternative to the ruling power and that alternative is itself.

For the ruling bloc in Turkey, the electorate will look at whether its interests are tied to the continuation of the existing order. The opposition need to convince the electorate that a change in power will not harm Turkey’s fight against terrorism and will improve the country’s economy. 

This leads us to the second factor. The opposition should demonstrate that the alliance between the three political parties –here we can include the Islamist Felicity Party (SP)– form a strong and dependable force for ruling the country. The opposition alliance is formed by two secular-nationalist political parties –the CHP and the Iyi Party– and the Kurdish nationalist HDP. The integrity and coordination between the CHP and the Iyi Party is not a strong one since the CHP tilts towards the Left whereas the Iyi Party has right-wing tendencies. This creates a serious divergence of opinions over some critical issues. The relations between these two parties have already created serious ideological debates among their members and caused some party members to resign and shift sides.

The opposition is not offering a clear-cut economic program to fight with the existing economic problems such as rising inflation and unemployment rates as well as not providing a comprehensive program for urban planning

As we add the Kurdish nationalist HDP, which is the political representative of the PKK armed terrorist group, the internal contradictions of the opposition bloc intensively rises. Not only the right-wing Turkish nationalist Iyi Party members and its grassroots have reacted to this rapprochement with the HDP, but left-wing CHP members and its grassroots showed displeasure with the decision to ally with the HDP. The inclusion of the HDP into the alliance has decreased the chances for the opposition to be able to weaken the ruling bloc in the upcoming local elections. This will more likely be perceived by the electorate that the opposition bloc may endanger the fight against terrorism, especially Turkey’s struggle with the PKK’s Syrian branch, the YPG.

Moreover, the opposition is not offering a clear-cut economic program to fight with the existing economic problems such as rising inflation and unemployment rates. Not to mention that the opposition bloc has not provided a comprehensive program for urban planning and government in the run-up to the local elections. In sum, despite the rising public displeasure with the existing ruling power, the opposition seems to fail to offer itself as an alternative in the elections.     

There are three and a half months until the local elections in Turkey and each week as the political dynamics in the country are changing, names of the candidates, details of negotiations, and the nature of alliances are also changing.

The CHP and Iyi Party have agreed upon 21 cities – 11 has been taken by the CHP and the remaining 10 that the Iyi Party has a potential. There are rumors that the two parties will also come to an agreement on 19 other districts. However, details of these districts and the names to be put forward are expected to become clear next week.

After the party assembly meeting for determining candidates for local elections yesterday, Seyit Torun – deputy head of the CHP – made a press conference and announced 67 candidates of the CHP. Torun declared that CHP’s candidate for Ankara is Mansur Yavas, for Istanbul is Ekrem Imamoglu, Adana is Zeydan Karalar, and Antalya, Muhittin Bocek. In addition to these cities, Torun declared candidates for other cities including Ahmet Meric in Agri, Tanju Ozcan in Bolu, Rasim Yilmaz in Nigde, Ali Akyildiz in Sivas, and Fatma Kaplan Hurriyet in Kocaeli.

Within the framework of its alliance with the Iyi Party, CHP withdrew its candidate – Ahmet Akin – from Balikesir. Another controversial city during the alliance negotiations between the two parties was Adana. It was later decided that the Iyi Party will support CHP’s candidate and Zeydan Karalar was announced as the candidate for Adana yesterday. The Iyi Party will also support CHP’s Antalya candidate – Muhittin Bocek – who is currently the mayor of Konyaalti (a district of Antalya).

The most discussed candidate between the CHP and Iyi Party has been Mansur Yavas. He was finally announced as CHP’s candidate and according to the alliance between the two parties, the Iyi Party will support Mansur Yavas in Ankara.

In the local elections of 2014, Mansur Yavas was CHP’s candidate in Ankara, and he received 43.82% of the votes. AK Party’s Melih Gokcek won the elections in Ankara with 44.82% of the total votes.

There are discussions that CHP is currently having some problems in deciding about its candidate for Izmir, who will run against AK Party’s Nihat Zeybekci – ex-minister of economy. The current mayor of Izmir belongs to the CHP but is not running in the upcoming elections. There are rumors that Kemal Kilicdaroglu – head of the CHP – is planning to announce a “surprise” candidate.

On the other side of the equilibrium, the AK Party and MHP have decided to go through the cities that have already been announced. It is rumored that MHP has decided to withdraw its candidates in a couple of cities and is speculated that the AK Party will withdraw its candidates in Igdir and Kars, and support the MHP’s candidates. In the People’s Alliance so far, while the MHP has not nominated candidates in Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir, the AK Party has not nominated candidates in Igdir and Kars.

According to reports from HaberTurk, the AK Party will not nominate candidates in Adana, Manisa, Mersin, and Osmaniye, where the MHP currently controls the municipalities.

*Written by Selahattin Emre Celebi

Turkey’s local elections in 2009 will be the ‘first’ local elections in the new presidential system, both President Erdogan and his political competitors are going through a rigorous process making their final tunes in deciding the candidates of local administrators. It was recently announced by the party spokesperson that the candidates for about 40 municipalities have been decided and now waiting to be announced by the President Erdogan tomorrow.

President Erdogan and his party have still an advantage over their competitors since the last elections as the recent public opinion polls reflect. The AK Party attached importance to polls (temayül yoklaması) in deciding the candidates. In these polls two criteria are important: the first is how candidates perceive success and the second what would be the voting inclination of voters towards candidates.

Like all local elections in Turkish political history, three cities are the most important battle grounds in the competition: İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir. Experts argue that the results in these major cities will have an important impact on the next presidential elections

Change is expected in the AK Party candidate profiles that more than half the candidates will probably be new names. For Istanbul, the candidate of AK Party is finalized: Binali Yildirim – the former and last Prime Minister of the parliamentary system who has gained esteem through his former administrative responsibilities. In Ankara, polls show that Mehmet Ozhaseki – previous Minister of Environment and Urban Planning – who has a considerable experience in local administrations (as major of Kayseri between 1998-2015)- will be the final candidate. For Izmir the mentioned name was Mahmut Ozgener – 38th President of Turkish Football Association – who was an important political figure in İzmir, but sources close to the party tell that the AK Party’s candidate for İzmir will be Nihat Zeybekci, former minister of economy.

President Erdogan’s main competitor, Kemal Kilicdaroglu – head of CHP (Republican People’s Party) – has long been flirting with Meral Aksener’s Iyi Party to come up with a common candidate in major three major cities Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir in order to consolidate opposition votes against the AK Party candidate as they are aware that one victory in Ankara or Istanbul against AK Party will have a psychological effect.

On the other hand, People’s Alliance shows glimpses of survival even though both leaders, Erdogan and Bahceli, publicly announced before that there would be no alliance in the local elections. However, both leader got together in the presidential palace recently and some say that they reached to an understanding for a partial agreement on some cities. President Erdogan wants the support of MHP in Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir in return for supporting MHP’s candidates in three other cities. HDP (Peoples’ Democratic Party) which has been losing public support over the past five years, will apparently support CHP’s candidates in the western cities but it will depend on the candidate’s profile. CHP will be facing a grave dilemma of with whom to form an alliance: Turkish nationalist Iyi Party or Kurdish nationalist HDP?

*Written by Selahattin Emre Celebi. 

On Sunday 22 April, Turkey’s main opposition party CHP announced that 15 MPs had resigned and joined the Iyi Party. This action was taken under the conditions when it was not yet clear whether the Iyi Party could take part in the June 24 early elections. After this move by the CHP, it was announced that the Iyi Party could take part in the elections. This incident created a rapprochement between the two parties and turned into an official alliance in time. Nowadays, Turkey has been witnessing another rapprochement between the CHP and the Iyi Party and wonders whether it will turn into another pre-electoral alliance again.

Indeed, there have been some rumors of unofficial meetings taking place between the party officials for some weeks now. Some of these meetings have been verified by party officials, but it was emphasized that the agenda of those meetings were not related to local elections and possible alliances. Nevertheless, the leaders of the CHP and the Iyi Party had their first official meeting last week.

The CHP and the Iyi Party are trying to find a way to make not a broad but a limited cooperation and are seeking to find a proper and well-designed method to provide it.

The agenda of this meeting, of course, was the upcoming local elections and the possible advantages and limitations of forming an alliance. As reflected in the press, the parties are negotiating on several scenarios in order to form an alliance in 9 provinces. In other words, the CHP and the Iyi Party this time are trying to find a way to make not a broad but a limited cooperation and are seeking to find a proper and well-designed method to provide it.

Nonetheless, the picture is not yet clear even though the sides are asserting the opposite. For instance, Istanbul, Ankara, Antalya, Mersin, and Adana, are expected to be an issue of negotiation between the two parties. However, previous election results reflect the fact that these parties fail to win the elections by forming an alliance, even if ceteris paribus. Additionally, surveys conducted to see possible outcomes of the alliance prove the probability its limited success.

Under current conditions, the CHP forming an alliance with HDP in Istanbul and Iyi Party in Ankara seems to be more reasonable. However, when taking into consideration previous election results, even this will not bring about the intended outcome.

Of course, both the CHP and Iyi Party are aware of this fact as they conduct surveys and prepare simulations. Due to this reason, the CHP has been trying to broaden the boundaries of a possible alliance by involving the HDP. Kilicdaroglu had a meeting with a former HDP MP, Ahmet Turk, last week solely for this purpose. The Iyi Party on the other hand, has announced that they will not accept any scenarios that suggest bringing the Iyi Party and HDP together. This means that the CHP will have to make a choice between these two parties by calculating the gains and losses of the two options.

Under current conditions, forming an alliance with the HDP in Istanbul and with the Iyi Party in Ankara seems to be more reasonable. However, when taking into consideration previous election results, even this will not bring about the intended outcome. More, it is not an easy job to find candidates running for election under any possible alliance. For instance, Mansur Yavas, one of the possible joint candidates for Ankara, underlined that he would not run under a party and demanded a broad consensus on his name. Finding a proper way and good candidates for alliances is a complex issue.

The lack of trust between the CHP and the Iyi Party might be the biggest deficiency for a possible alliance.

Last but not least, the lack of trust between the CHP and the Iyi Party might be the biggest deficiency for a possible alliance. The sharp break of the Nation Alliance after the June 24 elections caused mutual accusations and severe criticisms between the two parties. None of the parties took the responsibility of the failure of alliance and blamed each other instead. Since only 5 months has passed since this process, both parties will primarily have to pay attention to building trust between themselves.

Less than five months are left to the local elections in Turkey. Political parties have already started the process of selecting their candidates. Even though it is not yet officially confirmed, Iyi Party is going to nominate Ümit Özdağ for İstanbul, Şengül Hablemitoğlu for İzmir, and İsmail Koncuk for Adana according to party sources. Before selecting the right candidate, all political parties are setting a roadmap to follow in the upcoming elections. Analyzing these roadmaps is crucial to understand main dynamics of the upcoming process.

As the governing party, the AK Party has begun to make some preparations for possible candidates. The party will organize a meeting for the party delegates in the following days in order to settle the criteria for candidate selection. Even though this criteria has not yet been clarified, President Erdogan underlined that the party would determine candidates with the participation of all party branches. Furthermore, the AK Party is focusing on choosing candidates who have a good reputation in their electoral districts. In accordance with this aim, party officials are paying close attention to the results of surveys conducted in various electoral districts to see the reflections of possible candidates.

While there have been some names debated in the press as possible candidates, the head of the local administration branch of the party announced that the process would be finalized at the end of the month. According to official statements coming from other party sources, some provincial and district heads will resign in order to run for the position of mayor.

AK Party officials are paying close attention to the results of surveys conducted in various electoral districts in order to assess the reflections of possible candidates.

When it comes to the main opposition party, the CHP is still facing serious issues, which is preventing the party from focusing on local elections. While on the one hand Muharrem Ince’s role within the party is still being questioned, the latest controversial speech of CHP deputy Ozturk Yilmaz on the Adhan (Islamic call to prayer) raised tensions within the party again. Because of this reason, the CHP spokesman warned all party officials to obey the rules of the party and to stay away from provocative speeches.

Despite these issues, the party is still discussing the possibilities and limitations of forming an alliance with other opposition parties. The CHP had a meeting with representatives from the Iyi Party and the HDP in previous weeks. Nevertheless, it is still a question as to whether the party will form an alliance or not, and how opposition parties will approach the idea of forming an alliance in the local elections. Thus, it seems that these parties will wait until last minute to announce whether they will be forming an alliance or not.

The HDP, on the contrary, is openly seeking to form an alliance, especially with the CHP. The party officials frequently call for uniting against the AK Party to gain more municipalities and weaken the party on a local level. Although the HDP officials see the formation of the “democracy block” as an obligation, the other parties have not yet replied to this call yet. Some CHP officials have welcomed this idea and are trying to convince party leadership to respond positively.

The main opposition party, the CHP, has not been able to focus on local elections due to the party being pre-occupied with the unclear role of Muharrem Ince within the party and the recent controversy regarding the Adhan.

Consequently, while parties have accelerated their preparations for the upcoming local elections, their candidates and strategies are still unclear. After the candidates are announced, all parties will start their local election campaigns on local and national levels.

Nowadays, Turkey’s political agenda is full with international issues. The new term in Turkey-U.S. relations after the release of Pastor Brunson has become a matter of curiosity in the last couple of days. Moreover, the missing Saudi journalist, Jamal Khashoggi, seems to have shifted the U.S. approach against Saudi Arabia and thus will affect the current dynamics in the Middle East.

Under this ambiguous environment, Turkey’s domestic agenda and the upcoming local elections have become of secondary importance for the public. Nonetheless, political parties have already began to concentrate on their possible strategies in the local elections.

As part of their preparations for local elections, Turkey’s political parties held consultation and evaluation meetings in order to draw a road map. All parties had an idea on the possibilities and limitations in choosing the right candidate. The governing AK Party, for instance, underlined that the upcoming elections would be a turning point for Turkey’s future and it was an obligation to increase both the vote rate and the number of mayors in order to successfully implement the new presidential system. Party officials and members contributed to the ongoing discussions on possible electoral strategies in accordance with this purpose.

One of the major issues that will determine electoral strategy is whether the AK Party and the MHP will form an alliance in order to maximize their benefits. Since the unofficial meetings between the two parties have just started, it is still not possible to clarify this issue. Nevertheless, it should be underlined that both parties pay a significant attention to forming an alliance and are trying to form a consensus on possible ways of achieving this. It seems that the further details of this issue will surface in the following days.

On the other hand, preparation meetings held by the MHP and the Iyi Party revealed the increasing tension between these two parties. Even though both parties have had hot discussions since the June 24 elections, the degree of discussions altered in the last days. The Iyi Party blamed the MHP for betraying nationalist ideals by forming an alliance with the AK Party.

Since the Iyi Party faced serious existential crises after the June 24 elections and was about to collapse, it is now trying to find a new identity and purpose for existence. In accordance with this aim, the party is working to develop a nationalistic stance instead of its catch-all approach, which failed in the previous elections.

The main opposition party, the CHP, has also been discussing possible election strategies. During the meetings held, party officials criticized the party’s current discourse on being so elitist and left-wing oriented. The solution proposed for this problem was to adopt rightist and populist discourse in the upcoming local elections in order to change the image of the party.

At this point, the CHP faces a serious dilemma in deciding whether or not to form an alliance with the Iyi Party and the HDP. Due to the fact that the Nation Alliance failed in the last elections, the party is hesitant to cooperate with these parties. While an intra-party group is working hard to convince the sides to form an alliance with the HDP, some party officials are wary of this and are aware of the risks.

However, the supporting group sees this as the only way of achieving success in the local elections. The more nationalist wing of the party wants to form an alliance with the Iyi Party, especially in Ankara and some provinces in the Mediterranean and Aegean.

Even if consultation and evaluation meetings were a stage for drawing a road map for the local elections, political parties still need more time to finalize their strategies. Due to this, parties are expected to focus more on domestic policy in the upcoming days.

With the rise of discussions around local elections, the electoral strategy of opposition parties in Turkey have come to the forefront again. Especially the main opposition party, the CHP, became the focus of these discussions last week. The party’s possible strategy was not only an issue of concern among other parties; it was also a puzzle for intra-party circles. Even though the CHP’s strategy in local elections is not clear yet, taking into consideration discussions made, it is possible to see a latent alliance among the CHP and other opposition parties.

As occurred just before the June 24 elections, the party once again conducted a research on possible outcomes of forming alliances in local elections. Even if the results of this research were not shared with the public, it becomes an obligation for the party to keep its current position in the local administration as reflected on the press. Due to this reason, there are several scenarios on the table for the CHP’s local election strategy.

Nowadays, the main scenario focuses on the outcomes of a possible alliance between the CHP and the HDP during local elections. A similar scenario was also present during the June 24 election period. Due to the fact that the CHP found this alliance ineffective in comparison to the alliance with the Iyi Party (IP) and the Saadet Party (SP), party circles convinced the leaders to choose the second option. Although there was not an official alliance between the CHP and HDP during the June 24 elections, the CHP maintained its latent support for the HDP’s electoral campaign. This was to such an extent that some CHP circles voted for the HDP in the parliamentary elections. Post-election surveys indicate that the HDP passed the threshold with the votes it obtained from CHP supporters.

Due to these reasons, another latent alliance between the CHP and HDP is the most powerful scenario on the agenda. As reflected in the media, the party sees this alliance as beneficial – especially in metropolitan cities. Istanbul, of course, becomes the main target of the CHP in local elections and the party designs its electoral campaign by focusing on this city. The results of the 2014 local elections reflect the fact that it is not possible for the CHP to “win” Istanbul by only forming an alliance with the HDP. Thus, the party is trying to broaden the boundaries of this alliance by involving other parties and political circles.

At this point, the possibility of forming an alliance with IP (Iyi Party) is also on the agenda. However, because the official alliance between the CHP and IP was broken soon after the June 24 elections, it is difficult for these two parties to re-form an alliance. More, rising nationalistic tendencies within the IP makes it impossible for the party to get together with the HDP. Finally, IP officials blamed the CHP for failure in the parliamentary elections, and therefore, it will not be easy to convince these individuals to forming another alliance with the HDP.

Even though the official alliance between CHP and IP was broken soon after the elections, the close relation between CHP and HDP continues. The similarity in discourse among these two parties increases the possibility of an alliance to occur during local elections. It is almost certain to see a latent alliance in Istanbul and Ankara, and it will not be a surprise to see an alliance in other electoral districts. However, seeing as the votes of this alliance will not be enough for the CHP to gain Istanbul, the party will try to find a new way to convince Meral Aksener’s IP.

An analysis on Turkish elections was published in Foreign Policy, entitled “Turkey’s Opposition Lost to Erdogan, Then It Lost Its Mind.” The article reads: “Since June 24, when Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan celebrated his thirteenth consecutive electoral victory, his opponents have been in a headfirst free fall. Their sad state captures the fundamental problem of Turkish politics: The opposition is out of ideas and lacking in inspiration and its leaders care more about keeping their seats than keeping their country afloat.”

It is an entirely different discussion as to whether the opposition had a mind to lose, but it is obvious that their current situation is saddening. Ever since Kemal Kilicdaroglu became the chairman of the main opposition, Republican People’s Party (CHP), on May 23, 2010, he changed the Central Executive Board of the party nine times, organized five conventions, renewed the party assembly numerous times, and assigned a total of 300 new names throughout this period. But all these changes did not save Kilicdaroglu from facing nine election defeats within eight years. And this time, the party did not only lose the election but also took a heavy blow despite the CHP’s presidential candidate Muharrem Ince earning eight points higher than the vote share of his party in the presidential elections.

I assume that they are referring to these factors when they say that the opposition is out of its mind. On the night of the elections, the party’s deputy chairmen argued on televised programs that the presidential election would definitely make it to the second round according to the results they obtained. When Ince could not be reached for a long period after the results were announced, it was claimed that Ince was abducted by Erdogan, and most of the electorate believed this absurd claim. Ince said: “I was not abducted. Those claiming or believing such a thing must be schizophrenic.” A week later, the deputy chairmen of the party had to admit that they lied during the election night and were in fact already informed about the results after some party members exposed what happened that night.

However, it is true that Ince’s vote share in the presidential election was eight points higher than the CHP’s vote share in the parliamentary election, which naturally led Ince proponents to demand a change in the leadership and call for an extraordinary convention in the party. Kilicdaroglu blamed Ince by arguing that the latter only cares about his seat, to which Ince responded: “I do not care about my seat, but organizing a convention is essential.” Upon that, the party’s head office suggested holding the convention if 615 signatures could be gathered amongst the delegates. For a couple of weeks, several deputy chairmen of the CHP and Ince quarreled through Twitter. Kilicdaroglu proponents blamed Ince for being “rude and shallow” and being a “denigrator,” to which Ince responded: “If I am to get elected, I will be your chairman, too. I understand that you are under pressure.”

Two weeks later, Ince proponents announced that they gathered the required number of signatures to organize the convention. However, the head office stated that “Out of 618 signatures, four are duplicated, five do not belong to a delegate, 31 are revoked, 4 are forged, and 5 are not signed in the relevant date. Consequently, the sufficient number of signatures could not be collected and thus the convention will not be organized.” When the revoked signatures triggered speculations that Kilicdaroglu exercised pressure on the delegates, the head office said: “They revoked their signatures just as they signed, which is very natural.” After this statement, eight Ince proponents went on a hunger strike. They waited with placards reading “I love living and keeping everything alive. But I am hopeless. Either I die, or I will see the convention. The choice is yours.” But they ended the strike when the head office did not give any response.

Sad, isn’t it? The CHP and its leader Kilicdaroglu, who faced nine election defeats, did everything to hinder Ince’s competing in the convention although they had presented Ince as the presidential candidate only two months ago. Amid all the debates, Kilicdaroglu contented himself with changing the Central Executive Board for the tenth time.

Meanwhile, the oppositional Good Party (Iyi Party) Chairwoman Meral Aksener left the first party meeting after receiving a 7.29 percent vote share despite all the hype revolving around her in both the national and international media. On the next day, she announced that she had left her seat and would not become a candidate in the party convention. But she returned only a week later. The party members did not know that Aksener would leave, and they did not know whether she would run for chairperson when she returned, and now they are not sure if she will stay even if she becomes the chairwoman. According to rumors, Koray Aydin, one of the leading figures of the Iyi Party, will join the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) while several other members are said to join the CHP or the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party). According to another rumor, Aydin will not join the MHP but become the chairman of the Iyi Party while the other party members will either remain independent or join other parties.

This is the current state of the parties and their leaders who vowed to make a change and govern Turkey only two months ago.

After weeks of intensive campaigning and eager anticipation, Turkey successfully accomplished yet another test of democratic maturity by holding the combined general and presidential elections last Sunday. The fact that these elections constituted a milestone for the paradigmatic transition towards the presidential government system ensured that they were fiercely fought by both the government and the opposition parties with the notable addition of public relation initiatives by the presidential candidates. These were the first general elections that were held in the aftermath of the failed military coup attempt on July 15, 2016, and as such they represented the dawn of democratic normalization and a potential end to the state of emergency that was declared after the coup.

Despite all the hype and misinformation in mainstream international media accusing President Erdogan of authoritarianism and the government for suppressing the political opposition, pretty much all the stakeholders agreed that the elections were held in an open, free and fair environment. The campaign trail was peaceful and turned the whole country into a festival zone via vibrant promotion endeavors by the parties and candidates.

On election day, voter turnout was around 87 per cent which represented one of the highest participation rates in Turkey’s democratic history, comfortably surpassing most of the established democratic polities in the world. Electoral alliances ensured that the ten per cent threshold for entry to the parliament was not applied and almost 99 per cent of the votes cast for political parties were reflected as parliamentary representation.

The incumbent Justice and Development Party (AK Party), the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), the Republican People’s Party (CHP), the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), the Iyi Party, the Democrat Party (DP), the Felicity Party (SP) and the Great Union Party (BBP) will be represented in the forthcoming parliament. The parliament will be one of the most representative and inclusive parliaments in Turkey’s political history. So there is no discussion concerning the procedural validity or democratic legitimacy of the election results.

When it comes to gauging the winners and losers of the elections, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan emerged undoubtedly as the biggest winner with yet another crystal clear victory over his political opponents. He received over 52 per cent of the total votes and was successfully elected in the first round as the first president of Turkey under the new presidential government system. Being the dominant political actor who placed his mark on Turkey’s political, economic and social transformation over the course of the 2000s, Erdogan managed an effective campaign and confirmed once again that he retains the confidence of the Turkish electorate going forward as the most credible leader.

Erdogan has been in power as Prime Minister and President for the last sixteen years without interruption and managed to record thirteen election victories. Despite risks of democratic fatigue and popular reaction to some of the government actions by certain social groups, the personal political popularity and societal approval of Erdogan seems to withstand the toughest tests of time. While clinching his latest landslide victory in the presidential elections, he managed to receive nearly eleven million votes more than his closest rival Muharrem İnce. It is really very difficult to cite another political leader in the modern democratic world with such strong and consistent democratic credentials.

The reluctance of Western media to understand and analyze the uniqueness of the deep bond between Erdogan and the Turkish society lets them to confuse unrivaled democratic legitimacy with authoritarianism. The Turkish President displays exceptional capacity to create a popular blend of socio-economic stability, structural transformation, improved public services, increased living standards and identity politics which is translated into sustained electoral success.

But it was also interesting to note that for the first time in these elections there was a ten per cent gap between Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (52 to 42 per cent) which indicated a performance divergence. Although the People’s Alliance, comprising the AK Party (295 MPs), MHP (49 MPs) and BBP (1 MP), which was born out of the popular resistance to the July 15 coup attempt clinched a clear parliamentary majority, Erdogan in his traditional balcony speech on election night frankly expressed that he received the ‘message of the electorate’ and will oversee a thorough post-election analysis.

So far, taking electoral demands, reactions, or signals swiftly into account through rational and well-researched analyses has been one of the greatest strengths of Erdogan. Therefore, it is pretty likely that he will gather detailed reports concerning the dynamics that affected AK Party votes in certain cities as a result of candidate selections for the parliament, performance of local administrations, or certain economic policies. Therefore, the post June 24 process will witness Erdogan’s multifaceted attempts to oversee a great transformation in the institutional structures of the Turkish state, while keeping the electoral strength of his AK Party in check going forward to the municipal elections next March.

Sunday’s elections also opened a new chapter in Turkish politics as the new electoral regulations allowed alliances between different political parties, thereby making the ten per cent national threshold obsolete. As voters made it absolutely clear that local representation is important to them, legal reforms could be made to lower the national threshold or create some form of single-member district system in the near future. Incidentally, strategic voting which implied certain shifts among allied political parties was one of the most important factors leading to surprising results in view of preceding public opinion polls. As the presidential government system becomes more institutionalized, it is highly likely that strategic voting and issue-based alliances among different political groups will become more pronounced. Therefore, leading political parties and their leaders will have to adopt their ways in line with the emerging patterns of pragmatic voting behavior.

The Nationalist Action Party (MHP) clearly gained from its alliance with the AK Party and the rising national sentiments in the wake of military operations in northern Syria, gathering critical parliamentary representation with 49 MPs. The leader of the MHP, Devlet Bahceli, was among the winners of the electoral process by managing to keep his party above the eleven per cent mark and maintaining his strategic alliance with Erdogan despite the recent internal division within his party which gave birth to the Iyi Party. In the context of the strong executive that will be formed with the presidential system, MHP has great potential of acquiring a degree of political effectiveness that goes much above its numerical presence.

Another winner who came stronger from the campaign trail and election experience was Muharrem Ince who ran as the presidential candidate of the CHP. Ince, a long-time domestic opponent of CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu, was nominated as the presidential candidate in an almost futile race against the towering figure of President Erdogan probably in an attempt to undermine his future party leadership aspirations. Yet Ince as a pragmatic figure who could address the radical secular groups that characterize the backbone of the CHP as well as relatively conservative voters in central Anatolia displayed a surprising performance and personally received eight points higher than his party.

Differing from Kilicdaroglu in his more mature reactions, Ince congratulated Erdogan’s election victory and declared that he will continue his public meetings after the elections, signalling a leadership clash within the CHP. Both CHP and Kilicdaroglu were among the main losers as the party vote stood around a disappointing twenty two percent, while their strategic moves aimed at keeping the Iyi Party and the PKK-affiliated HDP above the ten per cent threshold caused numerous criticisms from within the party organization.

Meral Aksener, the leader of the newly established Iyi Party was another loser as she received unlimited public support from international media during the campign as the chief candidate that could undermine Erdogan’s authority. But despite all the media hype, Aksener’s personal electoral support did not even reach to the ten percent mark and her fragile party might well disintegrate in the parliament. Finally, HDP was another loser as the support for its leader Selahattin Demirtas fell three points to seven per cent, while party votes reached eleven per cent with the controversial tactical support of CHP supporters which was later criticized for legitimizing a terror-affiliated group.

As soon as election results were declared President Erdogan adopted a reconciliatory tone and expressed that the institutionalization of the presidential system will proceed through an inclusive process with the contributions of different social sectors, business actors and NGOs. He is keen to embark on a democratic normalization and development endeavor through which the state of emergency will be gradually lifted, structural reforms in the economy will be swiftly implemented and new productive synergies will be created to galvanize Turkey’s position as an emerging power in the global system. If the Western world decides to support this endeavor by accepting respectable and equitable forms of interaction with Turkey rather than portraying Erdogan as an ‘old-school third world dictator’ and blackmailing him through political or financial means, a positive environment of win-win situations could emerge sooner rather than later.

In two weeks, Turkish people will go to the polls to elect the members of their Parliament and President. In this process, political parties are still running their campaigns in order to increase their votes. The running AK Party is designing its campaign on the basis of the progress made by Turkey under the AK Party governments. Furthermore, the party also proposes new projects to accelerate this progress in the new era, which is called “the rise.” Nonetheless, some opposition parties cannot keep away from falling into the trap of populism and use populist discourse in accordance with their strategic needs. Because of this reason, it is important to examine prominent dimensions of election strategies of political parties.

Because the AK Party had already initiated its campaign towards the next elections and conducted meetings throughout the country before the announcement of snap elections, it is the most prepared party compared to others. After the snap election decisions, the party accelerated and broadened the scope of the campaign.

Indeed, the party’s electoral strategy has depended on a two-dimensional political space. In the first space, the party prefers traditional methods based on direct contact with masses and visiting people’s houses. It is well known that President Erdogan cares about this method very much and urges party branches to listen to the demands of people face to face. Additionally, the party also organizes mass meetings in each province of the country in order to reach to people as part of this method in the field.

On the other side, the party also prefers to use innovative methods via internet and social networks. All party representatives use social media channels actively especially to widen their voter base. The details of the AK Party’s election strategy are shared day by day on the party’s official website and social media channels. The combination of these two dimensions turns the party’s campaign into a more dynamic and active process. This is one of the reasons that makes the party’s campaign more successful compared to the strategies of other parties.

The main opposition party CHP also uses two-dimensional methods in its campaign strategy. Nonetheless, the gap between the presidential election campaign and parliamentary campaign causes some crisis within the party structure. Because Kilicdaroglu and Ince are conducting their election campaigns separately, they have a contradictory discourse. For instance, they have different opinions about each other’s success and possible vote rate in the elections.

Even if Kilicdaroglu eliminated the intra-party opposition movement cadres, most of who are close to Muharrem Ince rather than himself, the possible scenarios after the elections indicate that there can be another escalation in the intra-party opposition movement to change Kilicdaroglu’s leadership. As a result of this dispute, the party supporters do not want Kilicdaroglu to get ahead of Ince during the election campaign. For this reason, Kilicdaroglu had to cancel the joint meetings he planned to have with Ince. Additionally, Ince’s use of populist discourse in the campaign causes Kilicdaroglu to remain in the background. Thus, it is possible to say that this duality in party politics may bring another escalation in intra-party opposition after the elections.

Other political parties also use diversified political campaigns. The MHP pays attention to direct contact with people rather than organizing large-scale meetings. The Iyi Party, on the other side, tries to introduce itself to the masses and designs its campaign on this basement. All parties will maintain their campaigns until the elections. However, according to YSK rules, pre-election restrictions will be implemented by June 14 and parties will have to re-organize their campaign strategies according to these restrictions.

In two weeks time Turkey will hold one of its historical elections. They are historical because they are the first elections after the Turkish constituent decided to switch to a presidential system in April 2017. The AK Party-MHP alliance’s victory will consolidate a presidential system whereas the CHP-Iyi Party-SP alliance’s election success will put it under question and make way to switch back to the old parliamentary regime. Thus, the June 24 elections are more about structural matters that design the rules of the game for political actors rather than a competition between political parties over good governance.

The AK Party-MHP alliance campaigns to uplift the country with a presidential system to an upper league in international politics where only democratic and powerful countries reside. The CHP-Iyi Party-SP alliance, in contrast, criticizes Turkey’s presidential system of being one-man rule and promises to restore the old parliamentary system. The AK Party-MHP alliance’s presidential candidate Recep Tayyip Erdogan, during his public meetings insists that other candidates, especially CHP’s candidate Muharrem Ince, are not competent for the post. Erdogan deliberately targets Ince and strikes him of not even having been elected to the post of CHP’s general secretary. His incompetency, for Erdogan, stems from his lack of experience in governing the state and unbridgeable gap with the public due to Kemalist CHP’s authoritarian and elitist past.

In response to Erdogan’s verbal charges, other candidates especially CHP’s Ince, who seems to outshine the other candidates in the opposition camp with Erdogan’s help, takes pains to show he is as competent as Erdogan and has a strong touch with the people. He does not hesitate to deride Erdogan and target pro-Erdogan media to show that he is strong. He also puts a showcase image that he’s a man of the people by riding a bike before the crowd in his public meetings and distributes photos in which he drives a tractor or praying in a mosque with the villagers.

Alongside his populistic gestures, Muharrem Ince often seems to forget his party’s basic campaign message, which is restoring the old parliamentary system. He seems to embrace the presidential system.

Alongside these rather populistic gestures, Ince often seems to forget his party’s basic campaign message, which is restoring the old parliamentary system. He seems to embrace the presidential system and poses himself as the most important rival of Erdogan for the presidential post. Yet Ince’s unamenable attitudes have seemed to cause a serious discomfort for the other candidates in the opposition bloc. Last week, Iyi Party’s leader Meral Aksener called the leaders of her alliance partners to an urgent meeting to discuss the preparation of a road-map that responds to the question of how to restore the old parliamentary system in the aftermath of the elections. After the meeting, CHP’s leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu and Iyi Party leader Meral Aksener gave a joint press conference where they declared that both leaders were in agreement and committed to the plan of switching back to the parliamentary system.

It is obvious that Ince’s move to the front and to be the primary rival of Erdogan has worried Aksener. If Aksener does not show a considerable success in the elections, her leadership within her newly founded party will be questioned. There are some figures, such as Umit Ozdag, in the party waiting for the right moment to take over the party leadership.

If Aksener does not show a considerable success in the elections, her leadership will be questioned. There are figures, such as Umit Ozdag, waiting for the right moment to take over the party leadership.

Not to mention Kilicdaroglu’s fear of losing his seat as the CHP’s leader in the event of Ince’s confrontation with Erdogan ends up with the CHP’s increase of its votes. This may trigger a process of soul searching within the party and cause a leadership change. That’s why Kilicdaroglu discharged many of Ince’s men from the party in the run-up to the preparation of the party’s list of parliamentary candidates. Kilicdaroglu undercut the support for Ince within the party cadres.

All in all, a roust may hit the opposition parties, especially after the elections. The main reason for this will be the lack of a comprehensive and well-defined political project shared by all opposition parties, which can produce a united front. The absence of such a political project not only makes the division within and the parties visible but also curtails its chance of winning the elections.

Last week, the German Minister of State for Europe, Michael Roth, visited Turkey and met with members of the Turkish government, such as his counterpart Minister Omer Celik. Roth, who is a member of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), also paid a visit to Turkey’s main opposition party, the left-nationalist CHP, where he described Turkish democracy as “facing danger,” and subsequently, to the newly established Turkish nationalist party, the Iyi Party. Actually, it’s not very clear as to why a German minister considered a dissident and split party of the MHP, the Iyi Party, worthy to visit. The minister’s statements regarding the Iyi Party were also very strange and exaggerated, which made clear that he –and generally German foreign politicians focusing on Turkey– need some new advisors regarding Turkish politics and the country’s dynamics.

While Roth stressed the importance of Turkish-German relations, he also said that they foresee/predict that “Kurdish voters in the Southeast part of Turkey, who are in between the AK Party and HDP” will support the Iyi Party chairman, Mrs. Aksener. It’s not clear whom Roth means with “they foresee/predict…” The Social Democrats, his ministry or even the ruling coalition government of Germany? Independent from this prediction, it’s not quite understandable how a social democrat minister can supportively predict a nationalist and MHP-split new Turkish party’s alleged success in parts of Turkey, where, according to surveys, on the one hand, conservative voters generally prefer the AK Party, and on the other hand, Kurdish nationalist voters prefer secondly the separatist-Kurdish nationalist HDP. Consequently, the question arises by whom and with what kind of ambitions the minister is advised? In addition to this absurd situation, the ministers’ words exhibit clearly that there is no actual idea about Turkish voters’ dynamics and preferences. It’s already known that these days the German foreign office is lacking personnel. However, the fact that there is a similar expertise problem is also striking.

Besides that, it’s not a secret that German social democrats are very skeptical with regard to those MHP close ideas in general, although, most of the accusations are based on known prejudices. Even ironically, the ministers’ statement, which he tweeted subsequent to the tweet concerning the meeting with Mrs. Aksener, concerned a condemning message about “nationalism” in general. Independent from the point whether Roth has any concrete knowledge about nationalist approaches in Turkey or global nationalist ideas except the extreme problematic ethnic motivated German case, it’s a very weird situation that he declares his support for a newly established Turkish nationalist party while subsequently condemning nationalism as a general phenomenon. In addition, German media outlets and political circles address the new “People’s Alliance” (Cumhur İttifakı) –consisting of the AK Party and MHP– while stressing its “nationalist” component with a negative tone. But on the other hand, there is a supportive discourse on behalf of the newly established nationalist opposition party, Iyi Party.

The current picture becomes more bizarre if one remembers the recent elections in Germany on September 24, 2017. Prior to that date, Turkish President Erdogan had asked Turks living in Germany, possessing German citizenship, to vote against some major German political parties. Following these statements, the German public and politicians harshly criticized the President and accused him of interfering in domestic affairs. In addition, the federal government recently set another ban against the election campaigns Turkish politicians intended to run in Germany with regard to the June 24 elections. By this, it should be clear that the main ambition is to prevent AK Party politicians’ meetings in Germany. Thus, it’s difficult to understand why a German minister does not see any problem in promoting a certain Turkish political party, while his government builds absurd barriers against certain Turkish politicians in Germany.

Of course, the German Minister of State, Roth, has the right to be interested in Turkish domestic politics, and of course, he can sympathise with a certain Turkish political party – even as a social democrat he may support a newly established Turkish nationalist party. Furthermore, he has the right of not having any idea about the dynamics of Turkish voters – in particular regarding the southeast region. But one should keep in mind that amid the election campaigns in Turkey, a German minister’s statements and active standpoints, which favor a certain political party, are definitely not in compliance with the Germans’ own alleged standpoints. That is to say, for instance, not to interfere in domestic affairs. These kind of –and generally unfairly addressed– issues are unfortunately on the table with respect to the Turkish government; even if the Turkish government just addresses certain issues concerning Turkish citizens living in Germany. Thus, the federal government has to be sincere and diminish its obvious and continuous double standards. If a country permanently tries to prevent certain Turkish politicians’ meetings in Germany by complaining about false aspects, then, one expects that the federal German government stops interfering in other’s domestic affairs, too. But before that, in order to expect better bilateral relations, one has to learn Turkey’s realities without illogical wishful thinking.

As Turkey moves towards its first presidential election, which will be held on 24 June, the political parties including the secularist People’s Republican Party (CHP), the nationalist Good Party (Iyi Party), the Islamist Felicity Party (SP), and the Kurdish nationalist Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) have struggled to team up against the alliance between the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). Every alliance needs an ideological basis and the alliance among the opposition parties in Turkey is not an exception. However, the existing ideological distance between the parties poses a serious obstacle for them to form a working alliance.

This lack of shared ideological basis is sought to be evaded by resorting to negative politics, which is shaped around the principles such as democracy. And democracy is defined by a strategic goal with reference to opposing one-man rule, more particularly, Turkey’s shift to a presidential system and its main actor President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. This equivalence between democracy and anti-Erdoganism might mobilize some sections of society, especially the loyal supporters of these parties. However, it falls short of persuading the majority of non-partisan, MHP constituents and the AK Party supporters. Not to mention the expected loss of votes owing to ideological contradictions among themselves.

Hence, the combined electoral support given to the alliance does not reach fifty percent of votes. This means that anti-Erdoganism is not enough to get the opposition to win the elections. There are two main reasons for why anti-Erdoganism is not sufficient for the opposition to get what they want. First of all, anti-Erdoganism is to be equivalent to democracy and Erdogan’s leadership in Turkey and the presidential system he backs are supposed to violate the fundamental principle of democracy, which is keeping the place of power empty. The AK Party rule for 15-plus years has complied with this principle of democracy. AK Party’s political life has been shaped around consolidating democracy by rolling back the military tutelage and extending the sphere of politics. And this politics of democratization has consistently attracted an ardent support from Turkish society.

Besides, the presidential system in Turkey allows for the presence of the opposition, agrees to share power and transfer it through free and fair elections, and abides by the democratic norms of separation of powers and the rule of law. The acquisition of one-man rule, therefore, does not live up to the requirements of a genuine one-man rule. Indeed, a system might be considered a man-rule, first of all, if it does not allow for a multi-party system and free elections. It needs to reject sharing power and transferring it. Secondly, a system can be described as one-man rule if it rejects checks and balances and the rule of law. That is, the rule must be arbitrary. The strong execution does not necessarily mean a one-man rule. This is what the opposition fails to grasp and tends to confuse about the presidential system in Turkey. The transition to this system received popular support and approval in the referendum on 16 April, 2017.

The second reason why anti-Erdoganism serves poorly for the opposition stems from the fact that democratic politics requires the creation of new societal demands or bringing the majority of existing societal demands together in a single political project. One can admit that despite its limited scope, the anti-Erdogan alliance brings some societal demands together. If anti-Erdoganism succeeds, the CHP believes that the “old Turkey,” which was shaped around the military tutelage, could be reinstituted and that the CHP would easily hold on to power. The HDP, too, thinks that the return of the old Turkey would create a political situation where the alienation of Kurds from the Turkish state and creation of an independent “Kurdistan” under the control of the PKK could be more likely. In the same vein, the Iyi Party feels very nostalgic about the old Turkey where the bureaucracy used to call the shots whereas the SP believes the return of the old Turkey would make it once again the main opposition party.

Sadly, the support for the old Turkey in Turkish society is not that large. Turkish society demands the further consolidation of democracy in national politics, justice in redistribution of wealth, development in the economic sphere and a powerful and autonomous Turkish state in regional and international politics. Anti-Erdoganism is far from responding to these societal demands and this makes it a poor idea in creating the largest and most inclusive power bloc in Turkish politics. If the opposition does not give up its polarization politics, it will most likely meet a decisive defeat in the upcoming election.

An unexpected call from the MHP Chairman Devlet Bahceli for snap elections made a swift change in Turkey’s political agenda. The call from Bahceli was positively welcomed by President Erdogan and the AK Party circles due to the urgent need to implement presidential system, which was approved on April 16, 2017. President Erdogan emphasized that Turkey needs to hold snap elections in order to overcome uncertainties arising from the cross-border counter-terror operations in Iraq and Syria and the crisis in neighboring countries. After the parliament approved a bill on holding early elections last Friday, the date of snap elections – June 24 – was approved.

The AK Party and MHP decided to form an alliance for the next general election a couple of months ago. Thus, these parties already established their election strategies on national unity and stressed that their alliance -the People’s Alliance – would be open to each party respectful of the country’s national values, unity and solidarity. Nonetheless, the opposition parties failed to form an alliance even when they negotiated regularly with each other to reach a consensus on the issue. Although concrete steps were taken for various alliance formulas such as CHP-HDP-Iyi Party, CHP-HDP/CHP-Iyi Party, the parties could not reach an agreement. However, after the announcement of the snap elections, it became necessary for these parties to take an immediate decision on whether to join the elections either as part of an alliance or on their own.

In this context, the CHP became the most controversial party. The party has intensely been criticized for not developing an election strategy yet. Due to it being uncertain as to whether the party will form an alliance or not, the party circles started to force the Party Council to make an urgent decision towards the snap elections. As seen in the discussions, the first scenario on the CHP’s election strategy is based on the formation of an electoral alliance with the HDP. The rapprochement between these parties in the last two years strengthens this possibility. Nonetheless, there is a concern that an electoral alliance between these parties may provoke a reaction among voters of these parties, especially among the CHP’s Kemalist and nationalist voters.

However, CHP’s recent step reflected the inconsistency and ambiguity in the party’s election strategy. On April 22, the CHP allowed 15 of its MPs to join the Iyi Party. This strategy is defended with the argument of supporting the Iyi Party’s attempt to join the parliamentary elections, which would be decided after the examination of the High Election Board (YSK). This strategy was harshly criticized even by some prominent names in the CHP because of manipulating elections. Even if the Iyi Party has never joined an election before, it will get a treasury grant and form a parliamentary group in the Assembly. This strategy, which is legal but unethical, shows the possibility of upcoming next steps through the elections. Thus, it should be said that there is not going to be issues or principles in the formation of alliances among opposition parties. The only motivation behind these kinds of inconsistent steps is the anti-Erdogan agenda of these parties.

When it comes to the Iyi Party, the party seems to have two different road maps. On the one side, the party tries to broaden the limits of its alliance with the Felicity Party. It was announced that the Felicity Party would support Meral Aksener if the presidential elections proceed to the second round. It remains unclear whether this alliance would be valid in the first round of elections. On the other hand, the leading names of the party continue to negotiate with the CHP in order to form an alliance in both presidential and parliamentary elections. It is generally believed that their strategy will be revealed until the end of this week.

The initial outcomes of the ongoing negotiations on pre-electoral alliance between the Felicity Party and the Iyi Party was revealed last weak. The vice chairman of the Iyi Party announced that both parties had agreed on forming an alliance on principal and that the Democrat Party will also join this alliance. As stated in the declaration coming from the Iyi Party, the content and method of this alliance is not clearly defined yet. Nonetheless, it is certain that these parties are going to form an alliance in the second run of the presidential elections if no candidate wins a simple majority (50%+1 vote) in the first round. The vice chairman of the Iyi Party rationalized this strategy by giving the example of Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu who was nominated as the candidate for presidency by the CHP and MHP alliance in the 2014 presidential elections. The failure of Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu in that election was taken as a reference point by the Felicity Party and Iyi Party to failure of pre-electoral alliance in the first round. Thus, the first significant strategy for these parties in forming an alliance appeared as the second run-based formulation.

Issues, principles or ideology?

Another striking point of this unripe alliance is the emphasis on ambiguous principals which are not publicly declared. Both parties explained that this alliance is going to be established on principals that both parties agreed on. Nevertheless, the extent and limitations of these principles were not defined. Whether the core of these principles are going to be a set of values or an ideology was not expressed by the parties. On the contrary, the AK Party-MHP alliance introduced the core of their alliance as the value of national unity, which would be open to each party respectful of the country’s national values, unity and solidarity. The AK Party and MHP also emphasized that parties willing to join this alliance had to respect these values. When it comes to the Iyi Party-Felicity Party-Democrat Party alliance, there is still no issue, principle, or value on surface in terms of forming the alliance. Because of this reason, the alliance has been criticized by some circles as being so latent.

In this point, another striking question comes to the forefront: why have these parties accelerated their efforts to form an alliance even when they are not ready yet? Actually, it is obvious that the clear-cut formulation of the AK Party-MHP alliance forced other parties in the system to take their positions about forming an alliance. Even if these parties are not ready to form an alliance in related to the ambiguity of their interests, they took measures to not drop out of the race towards the 2019 elections.

Indeed, it is possible to have a discussion on the issue of ideological proximity between these parties in the following days. It is related to the fact that the ideological proximity between the parties to form an alliance will be effective in determining the components of the alliance and its success or failure. Since there is a mismatch between the ideologies of the Iyi Party-Felicity Party-Democrat Party triumvirate, it will be difficult especially in parliamentary elections for these parties to form alliances and hold their voters. Additionally, the CHP is expected to continue its search for alliance until the elections, which will also determine the boundaries of the Iyi Party-Felicity Party-Democrat Party alliance.

It is obvious that the opposition parties still lack in a consensus on pre-electoral alliances. The problems are mostly related to the problem of ideological distance between aforementioned parties and the fuzziness of their interests in joining an alliance.

Following the power struggle within the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), the Iyi Party was established on October 25, 2017, almost five months ago. During the establishment process of the party, it was stated that the party would bring a new understanding to Turkish political life instead of being a continuation of the MHP. The leading figures in the party, who also define themselves as nationalists, stated that the party would embrace people coming from various circles and not only nationalists, in accordance with its catch-all party characteristic.

According to Meral Aksener, the leader of the party, besides the former MHP members, the right-wing voters and moderate leftists alienated by existing party politics would gather under the roof of Iyi Party. However, the last five months have illustrated that the party is far away from its target point and suffers from an identity crisis, which was rooted in the establishment process of the party and its aftermath.

First signs of the identity crisis were seen when the name of the party, the program, and the legislation were announced. Even if the party claimed to become Turkey’s largest catch-all party, it was seen from the names on the Founders Committee that most of the founding members had been involved in political affairs on the nationalist and centre-right lines in the past. Thus, one of the first criticisms was that the new founded political party was dominated by symbols of nationalist thought, from the names in the Founders Committee to the leadership cadre and the party program, despite its claim to be a catch-all party.

The nationalist discourse in the party’s program also strengthened these criticisms that the program states that “politics will be created over values and nationalism will be moved to cultural and economic areas.” Similarly, the whole program was dominated by nationalist discourse and far away from bringing connecting issues in society into the forefront more than dividing ones to get support from various circles.

Another striking issue related to the identity crisis was the dominance of populism and pragmatism in the party discourse without having a flexible ideological stance. The party program included objectives such as entering into the top 10 economies of the world and increasing national income, making a democratic political party law, being among the first twenty countries in the PISA order, reducing the unemployment rate below 7% at the end of five year and realizing industry 4.0 revolution in technology. The most striking among these goals was the promise of returning to the parliamentary system with a constitutional amendment within a year. All of these promises show the populist side of the party, which, indeed, contradicts the nationalistic discourse.

Even if the party’s leader and cadres still insist that the party does not define itself on nationalism, the contradiction of values and acts caused intra-party conflicts which resulted in the resignation of some prominent founding members – the last one of whom was the vice chairman of the party. While other parties in the system were blamed for not representing the general will, the biggest failure of the Iyi Party has been so far to define itself with the old terminology of party politics. The problematic nationalist-populist discourse utilized without a clear-cut definition brought the party to a deadlock. Reducing the party’s ideological baggage to such an extent that can lead to the creation of further conflict zones could result to a “split within a split” during the 2019 elections.

Contrary to the conviction of some European journalists, Meral Aksener is nothing like Marine Le Pen. Nor is she anything like the politically ambiguous Macron who ascended to the Elyseé, crushing the French political left and right. First of all, Aksener isn’t a new face – she’s a 61-year-old politician who has been in politics for 23 years. While she was a nationalist, a follower of the Grey Wolves movement in Turkey during her student years, she has been involved with almost all right-wing political parties in Turkey.

Meral Aksener first entered politics in 1994 together with Turkey’s first female Prime Minister, Tansu Ciller. Aksener ran in the mayoral elections in Kocaeli, but lost. On the road to parliamentary elections in 1995, the coalitions formed with the leftist Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP) during the prime ministries of both Suleyman Demirel and Tansu Ciller had left Turkey in ruins. Consecutive unidentified murders were committed, the Turkish Lira lost 168 percent of its value and interest rates skyrocketed to 7000 percent.

As one of the closest aides to Ciller, in 1995 Aksener became a parliamentary candidate for the True Path Party (DYP). Necmettin Erbakan’s Welfare Party (RP) was the victor of the election, while Ciller’s DYP came third. Aksener became the Minister of the Interior during the RP-DYP coalition, which was eventually deposed by the military that was defined as a “post-modern coup” by its perpetrators. Both Aksener and her leader Ciller were targeted by Turkey’s most influential media group, Dogan Media Group. While having previously supported Ciller, Dogan Group began to target her after she formed a coalition with Erbakan. Attempting to protect Ciller in her capacity as Minister of the Interior, Aksener threatened the aforementioned media group: “We’ll find it difficult to hold back the youth fanatical of Ciller. This is my last warning. We will not be held responsible for what may happen.” While there were attempts to revoke Aksener’s parliamentarian immunity after this statement, the coalition government was deposed by the military, which left everything in shambles.

Although the 1997 “post-modern” military coup erased Ciller from Turkish politics, Aksener attained a long-lasting prestige in the field. While the military were briefing academics, high judges and journalists about the government, Aksener, as the Minister of the Interior, had emphasized that she would dismiss any governor who attends those briefings. This stance she took against the military increased the sympathy for Aksener by Turkey’s political right. Following, Aksener joined the reformers (later known as the Justice and Development Party, or AK Party), who departed from Erbakan in July 2001. A couple months later Aksener joined the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and became a special advisor to the party’s leader, Devlet Bahceli. Aksener was MHP’s candidate for Istanbul during the mayoral elections in 2004, which she lost. While she was elected as a Member of Parliament in 2007 and in 2011, she was not listed as a candidate by Bahceli in November 2015. Aksener was an ambitious politician, and furious by the acts of Bahceli, she convened to MHP’s extraordinary congress in an attempt to become chairperson of the party. Adding this attempt to her list of losses, she eventually formed her own political party.

Once sympathized by the right-wing for her unyielding stance against the military, Aksener entered a new era accused of being affiliated to the Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETO). While it was acknowledged as a congregation, FETO was known for being sympathetic towards Aksener. Moreover, it is no secret that FETO encouraged Aksener to become a presidential candidate since 2012. In spite of this, there isn’t any strong evidence about Aksener forming an organic relationship with FETO – the clandestine organization that infiltrated the state offices step-by-step in 40 years and eventually orchestrated the July 15 coup attempt in 2016. Although she had not stated it outright, sources close to her claimed that Aksener told her close friends in the meantime that the December 17-25, 2013, “judicial coup” attempt in Turkey not only shuddered herself but also the whole Parliament. However, strangely thereafter, Aksener took a position that enabled her to be blamed of being a FETO sympathizer, probably due to her political ambitions and calculations for the future. While FETO members were being cleansed from public institutions, Aksener did not only fail to criticize the criminal cult leader Fetullah Gulen, but also rejected the “Hashashin” statements made against him and his followers. Aksener criticized every operation the government conducted against FETO, seizing their assets such as private preparatory schools, banks, media outlets and associations, which funded the terrorist organization with the pretense of humanitarian aid.

Whether willingly or unwillingly, Aksener stood silent for months after FETO’s murderous July 15 coup attempt. It became impossible for her or any other political actor to maintain their positions prior to the coup with respect to FETO. So, Aksener began her statements by saying: “I believe President Erdogan is sincere in his fight [against FETO].” In addition, departing from her previous stance, she included policies about fighting FETO in her party program. Other manifesto promises include ensuring Turkey becomes one of the top ten economies in the world, increasing national income, entering the top 20 countries in PISA listings, decreasing unemployment to under 7 percent within 5 years and realizing a 4.0 revolution in technology industry.

Aksener wants to become president in order to realize the above-mentioned goals. Considering the political landscape of Turkey however, her manifesto promises are highly ambitious – in Turkey today the AK Party retain around half the electoral vote, while the other half is shared between the Republican People’s Party (CHP), MHP and the Democratic People’s Party (HDP).

Hoping to receive support from the Kurdish population in Turkey, Aksener launched her party campaign by visiting Bitlis and Mus – cities in East Anatolia where the AK Party and HDP are the prominent competitors in the region. She rented a house in Bitlis for 650 Turkish Liras and made her first speech: “We will adopt the discourse of love and goodness. I will create projects by listening to you. If I break my promise, you can come and stone my house in Ahlat (a district in Bitlis).” Not giving any credit to rhetoric, Kurdish voters will treat Aksener as their neighbor, but they will not vote for her. Indeed, no one reacted to her statement – not even to the “stoning” part, with strong local motives. In addition to the Kurds, Aksener is also after the Alevi vote. However, their vote is shared between CHP and HDP.

In order to appeal to all political factions, Aksener has gathered various figures, who are mostly irrelevant and incompatible to each other. The commonality between these individuals is that while they have been active in politics for many years, they have been unsuccessful and, thus, forgotten by the public. Although there are a number of new faces, this doesn’t really change anything for the party.

For instance, Ruhat Mengi, a fervent advocate of animal rights, yet lacking the same commitment to human rights, has voiced the Kemalist laicist rhetoric of the 1930s throughout her carrier as a journalist. Mukadder Besegmez, from a completely opposite background, is a traditionalist who comes from Erbakan’s “National Outlook Movement.” Another example is Deputy Chairperson Koray Aydin, who is an idealist that previously blamed Aksener of being a FETO member. Aydin also ran for the chair of MHP twice, and failed.

Individuals that have failed to obtain the leadership of MHP seem to have merged into Iyi Party, as Umit Ozdag, another individual who was unsuccessful in his bid, is now the Deputy Chairperson of the Iyi Party, responsible for media and propaganda. Ozdag’s father was one of the military officers who orchestrated the May 27, 1960 coup, which resulted in the execution of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and 3 ministers. Ozdag’s father later became a prominent member of the National Unity Committee that administered the country after the coup. Of course, while Ozdag cannot be held responsible for his father’s political past, when asked about this history he replied: “My father was an exemplary Turkish military officer. He was involved in the coup because he believed it to be true.” This is not the only time Ozdag made reckless statements. Only recently he claimed that over 1 million Turks live below the starvation line and that 32.6 percent of Syrian refugees in Turkey are overweight, while 27.7 percent of them are obese. While this statement lacks any logical assessment, according to Ozdag, Syrians are feasting, while a part of Turkey is starving.

While Mengi, Besegmez, Aydin and Ozdag are only a few examples, which illustrate the lack of consistency in the party, there are other individuals in the Iyi Party who served as former ministers of the DYP, Democratic Left Party (DSP) and Motherland Party (ANAP) – all of these parties faded away in the 2002 elections.

Will Meral Aksener be able to ascend to the presidency with this team? This seems impossible. So, will she be able to surpass the electoral threshold? It’s too early to answer this question. In illustration of the inconsistency and ideological emptiness of the Iyi Party, MHP Secretary General Ismet Buyukataman stated: “Aksener reminds me of the character Maho in the 1980s hit film ‘Banker Bilo.’ Maho promised his fellow villagers to take them to Germany and loaded them into the dumper of a truck, touring the whole country for days. When the villagers were unloaded from the truck, they found themselves not in Germany, but on the mountainsides near Istanbul.”