From the beginning of the Syrian uprising, several Arab countries were almost unanimous in isolating the Syrian regime to punish it for its violations of Arab League resolutions and the rights of the Syrian people. This approach was translated by Qatar’s leadership in the Arab League and the important support of Saudi Arabia and post-revolutionary Tunisia and Egypt into a resolution that led to the suspension of the regime’s membership in the Arab League in November 2011.

In the following years, most Arab countries called on the regime to stop military operations against civilians, and some of them even played a greater role in actively seeking regime change in diplomatic manners and by supporting and financing the opposition. However, in the coming years, political changes occurred in some Arab countries such as in Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, causing a departure from regime change politics to the restoration of pre-Arab spring MENA security order, thus affecting the regional attitude towards the Syrian regime.

Egypt resumed consular relations in 2013, when most Arab countries took a stand against the Syrian regime, but has not fully normalized its relations with the regime to date. This shows that Egypt prioritizes the stability of the Syrian regime in its foreign policy, as Egypt distrusts the opposition and considers it a proxy for Turkey. Moreover, Egypt prefers to work with the army and considers it more reliable.

The UAE and Jordan, on the other hand, were on the opposite side and supported the Syrian opposition to varying degrees, but after the Russian intervention in 2015, the situation on the ground had changed, which, along with other factors such as the UAE’s attempt to counter Turkey and contain Iran with a different approach in Syria, led to a change in the countries’ priorities in their foreign policy toward Syria. In 2018, the UAE and Bahrain reopened their embassy in Damascus and resumed relations with the Syrian regime. The UAE wants to normalize its relations with the Syrian regime in order to have relations with all parties on the ground.

Similarly, when the Syrian opposition lost control of southern Syria in 2018 and signed reconciliation agreements, Jordan reopened its border with Syria with some restrictions, as it had done before 2015, Jordan has not completely severed relations with the Syrian regime, but it has downgraded its representation. It normalized its relations only in October 2021 after a telephone conversation between King Abdullah and Bashar al-Assad, which was expected after King Abdullah’s speech on CNN during his visit to Washington and after his meeting with President Biden.

Looking at the factors behind this action, the first one seems to be the economic factor, because the country is in a difficult economic situation, aiming at normalization and cross-border trade, as the Arab gas pipeline will help the Kingdom’s economy. In addition, the security factor is not as important as the economy, but it plays a role because the Kingdom is concerned about stability on its northern border and normalization will help in security coordination with the Syrian regime to prevent possible threats.

Although it has not severed its relations with the regime, Jordan has taken positions close to the Syrian opposition over the past decade, but has kept its border open with the Syrian regime for economic reasons. The Kingdom believes that normalizing its relations with the regime will help its economy recover and that it wants to play a role in resolving the conflict. Jordan has also sought to reactivate the bilateral agreement with Syria on various issues such as water. It also wanted to reactivate the Arab Gas Pipeline to reach Lebanon through Syria, which is part of the kingdom’s ambitions to become an energy hub in the region.

What sets Jordan apart, however, is that it is not only Jordan that wants to engage with the regime, but also brings along other countries that have the same idea of changing the regime’s behavior through concessions and vice versa. It is an approach that has met with the approval of the Biden administration. As part of its strategy to manage the Syria conflict by focusing on changing the regime’s behavior rather than regime change, this administration’s new approach to Syria is the opposite of the previous administration, which pursued a policy of maximum pressure.

In March 2022, another important UAE rapprochement with the Syrian regime took place, namely Bashar al-Assad’s visit to the country. This visit is considered very significant, mainly because it was al-Assad’s first visit to an Arab country since the beginning of the uprising. The visit can be analyzed from various points of view, such as future investments, the possibility of the regime’s return to the Arab League, and Iran’s influence.

The possibilities of reinstating the Syrian regime in the Arab League

In terms of support for the Syrian regime, not all of these countries are equally committed to Syria’s return to the Arab League in order to normalize the country’s relations with the world, but we can see some differences. In late January this year, Arab League Secretary General Ahmed Aboul Gheit said that Syria’s return to the Arab League was not discussed at the consultative meeting of Arab foreign ministers in Kuwait. He later added that Syria’s return to the Arab League depends on consensus among Arab countries. These are indications that a return is unlikely at the next summit.

The irony is that Egypt is playing a role in the Syrian regime’s return to the Arab League but has not yet fully normalized its relations with the Asaad regime, which could happen in the near future. As mentioned earlier, Egypt sided with the Syrian regime under President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, and the two countries have since restored consular relations.

The UAE changed its stance on Syria after 2015 until it normalized its relations with the regime. After that, they began to support the Assad regime and promote the normalization of their relations with other countries in the region. They went even further by calling for the lifting of sanctions imposed on Syria.

In Jordan, however, we see a different approach that accepts the current status quo in Syria as a reality. For example, Jordan does not fully side with the regime in the Syrian conflict, but rather seeks to benefit from the opening of its relations with the Syrian regime on an economic level and restore the situation to what was before the border between the two countries. In doing so, it advocates its approach to Syria “step by step” as a comprehensive plan for dealing with the regime.

Ultimately, these approaches are similar in some respects, but they are not identical. This means that not all of the approaches these countries are taking have the same goals. Moreover, not all countries approaching the Syrian regime can be considered allies of the regime; rather, it is about their needs.

Finally, these approaches are similar in some respects, but they are not identical. This raises the question of which of these approaches will be successful and how this will affect the situation on the ground. To what extent these approaches will be able to bring the Syrian regime back to the Arab League.

So far, these approaches have not been able to change the position of Riyadh and Doha in terms of normalizing relations with the Syrian regime, which may show how effective these processes have been so far. On another level, will the relations between the Syrian regime and the international community remain the same? Will we see some changes in the position of some countries like the U.S., or could other approaches be taken?

Syria is the only Arab state to support Russia’s recognition of Donetsk and Luhansk as “independent” republics and its invasion of Ukraine. Now pro-Assad Syrian forces will reportedly go to Ukraine to fight on Russia’s side in this war. All of this speaks volumes of Damascus’ indebtedness to Moscow.

Syria was one of only four countries worldwide to join Russia in recognizing Donetsk and Luhansk’s “independence”. The day the war began, President Bashar al-Assad told his Russian counterpart that “Western nations bear responsibility for the chaos and bloodshed.” Then, on 2 March, Syria joined only four other states in opposing a UN General Assembly resolution condemning the invasion.

With Russia facing high levels of international opposition to its invasion of Ukraine, this conflict gives Moscow’s closest allies opportunities to demonstrate loyalty to the Kremlin. “For Putin, the invasion of Ukraine is a clarifying moment of who is a friend, and who is an enemy,” explained Randa Slim, the director of conflict resolution at the Middle East Institute, in an interview with Politics Today.

Assad’s support for Russia in Ukraine has been necessary given Damascus’ dependency on Moscow. “Assad is forever indebted to Putin,” Mona Yacoubian, a senior adviser at the US Institute of Peace, told Politics Today. “Moreover, as a brutal dictator whose regime has been accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity, Assad has no compunction about supporting Russia in its brutal and illegal invasion of Ukraine.”

With Russia having done so much to help turn the tide in Syria beginning in 2015, saying that the Ba’athist regime’s survival is largely attributable to Moscow’s military intervention is no exaggeration.

“Syria owes almost everything to Russia (and Iran) in the last eleven years,” Marco Carnelos, a former Italian diplomat, told Politics Today. “Without Moscow’s military support it is quite uncertain that Bashar Al-Assad [would] have prevailed in the civil war that has so far ravaged country. On these political points, Syria had no other option than to recognize Donetsk and Luhansk Republic and support Russia’s position on the conflict in Ukraine.”

Carnelos told Politics Today that “maybe Russia needs soldiers better trained to the sort of guerrilla warfare that apparently is taking place in Ukraine, and that it is quite like what we have been watching in Syria all along these last years.”

According to Makki, the Syrian Arab Army has, at least for now, refrained from formally recruiting these pro-Assad fighters. He said there would have to be a presidential decree or something similar for any special dispensation. “It is most likely that the pool of recruits heading for Ukraine will be from the rougher auxiliary forces several of whom already have a past history in dealing with the Russians in Syria, such as National Defense Forces.”

Jomana Qaddour, a resident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs, where she leads the Syria project, said one should be cautious before reaching definitive pronouncements given how issues surrounding the recruitment question are evolving. “Most sources indicate that [the ex-National Defense Forces] are still only in a phase of registering volunteers, and not actually transporting them to Ukraine yet,” explained Qaddour.

Nonetheless, pro-Assad Syrian fighters entering the fray could prove problematic for Moscow. “Even if these fighters are transported to Ukraine, there are serious concerns about their lack of urban combat experience since in the Syria context many of them were tasked with intelligence work or manning of checkpoints after the Syrian government would capture land – and would task them, instead of official state forces – with carrying out war crimes against subdued populations,” according to Qaddour.

Cultural and linguistic barriers can’t be overlooked. These Syrian forces, who don’t speak Russian or Ukrainian, will be unfamiliar with local conditions. Also unclear is the Russian government’s ability to financially compensate these Syrian forces, particularly mindful of the economic problems that Russia must contend with as the world’s most sanctioned country. Qaddour told Politics Today that upon considering these factors, “it is likely cheaper and more practical for them to recruit pro-Russian fighters from neighboring countries.”

An important question is, how could the transfer of these Syrian forces to Ukraine weaken Damascus’ control of territory which it has spent years fighting to retake? Carnelos said that Damascus faces a “hard dilemma: honoring its debt towards Russia but doing so it risks losing ground somewhere in its endless civil war.”

As the war in Ukraine further internationalizes, anti-regime forces in Syria might seize opportunities to re-intensify their insurgency. “To have Russia bleeding more could be the moment to reignite the low intensity warfare that the Syrian battleground has been experiencing for a few years,” Carnelos told Politics Today. “Multiplying the fronts where Russia is engaged is the best way now to further complicate its Ukrainian adventure.”

As Slim put it, “The more difficulties Putin’s army experiences in Ukraine, the more his position will weaken in Syria mainly because of diversion of leadership, manpower and military resources to Ukraine away from other military theaters Russia is involved in including Syria.”

Yet under such circumstances the Syrian regime could count on support from its Lebanese ally. “Hezbollah can send enough fighters to make up for the shortfall in manpower should the Assad regime experience difficulties in holding on to territories it has retaken,” according to Slim.

Ultimately, it remains to be seen how Russia’s military campaign in Ukraine plays out on the ground in Syria. To be sure, the war in Ukraine has given Syria opportunities to prove to Moscow that Damascus is a reliable ally which is willing to help Russia amid its worst foreign policy crisis of the 21st century. With Syria continuing to depend on Russia, demonstrating such loyalty to Putin is a high priority for the regime in Damascus. But the price that Assad must pay for his country’s close alliance with Moscow is one that will be realized in coming weeks and months as the Russian-Ukrainian war rages on.

Arab tribes in Syria are a key element of the country’s social, cultural and historic identity. During the Ottoman Empire Arab tribes had strong relations with various sultans and were given weapons and money in order to secure their loyalty. Their cooperation with the Ottoman authorities was important for securing key trade routes to the east and to manage any threats from further east.

Eventually some tribes grew too strong and were co-opted by colonial powers to help topple the Ottoman Empire. Despite their services to the west, under the French mandate of Syria, Arab tribes were marginalized and their role in society, politics, and culture was heavily censored. The French were threatened by Arab nationalist sentiment and divided Syria along ethnic lines favoring minority groups including Christians, Druze and Alawites.

In 1946 this short sighted policy became the demise of the French as they left behind formerly unified territory divided along ethnic lines and the creation of two new states: Syria and Lebanon. Subsequent competition for power in Syria played out in the form of a series of coups and some short lived presidencies.

Hafez al Assad appointed himself President in 1970 when he ousted his Ba’ath Party comrades from power; the same people he helped bring into power during two previous coups in 1963 and 1966.

Under Hafez al Assad Arab tribes were viewed as a threat and managed by recruiting tribal members into the Ba’ath Party’s ranks. Tribal members were given positions in Syria’s notorious “mukhabarat”, intelligence agencies, and used to cull the tribal communities that were for the most part far living from governance centers.

In 2011 when the Syrian revolution began fissures emerged among tribal members. Syrians from the same tribe had different opinions about the Assad family and the revolution; and those divisions were easily identifiable among the ranks of fighters and activists on either side of the conflict. When Daesh emerged on the scene, Arab tribes were the first target for both the Assad regime and Daesh.

On the one hand Daesh insisted that the tribes should join the fight and revive the stolen glory of their ancestors while the Assad regime claimed the Arab tribes should cleanse their ranks of blasphemous Arabs that cooperate with Daesh and the opposition.

This tumultuous history of competition over the good graces of Arab tribes in Syria has resulted in a fractured social stalemate.

Even though they’re related they don’t agree on politics. The same can be said about many other tribes who were represented at the recent opposition sponsored tribal meeting. Nearly every one of the tribes has relatives which are operating in coordination with Russia, Iran, the Assad regime or the US backed YPG terrorists.

In Raqqa, another Arab tribe, Albuhamad, are also backed by Iran and are headed by Turki Albuhamad under the banner of the Tribal Fighting Force. They also coordinate closely with the YPG terror group’s so-called “Syrian Democratic Forces”. The participation of Arab tribes is an important ethnic card that the YPG and America both use to give credibility to their allegedly tolerant and multi ethnic autonomous governance project.

Iran and Russia are also competing to co-opt Arab tribal militia groups including the Al Maghaweer Militia which is made of members of the Tay Tribe. They are present in Hassaka province and operate under the auspices of the pro Assad Russian backed National Defense militia. But they also receive support from Iran.

The Iranian and Russian backed tribes operating in YPG controlled areas are the Assad regime’s proverbial hand in the pot and the reason why Iran and Assad continue to have a significant influence on local politics in America’s zone of influence in north east Syria.

The tensions between these pro Assad Arab tribes and the YPG boiled over recently and tribes demanded that a separate court system be set up to deal with issues related to the Arab tribes. They believe that the YPG’s form of justice is inadequate and unfair to the interests of the Arabs and their tribes.

Iran and Assad are not only working to improve their relations with the Arab tribes in YPG controlled areas but also in areas under the Assad regime’s control. Last December Iran hosted a meeting of Arab tribal leaders in Tehran that arrived from Damascus. The aim was to convince the Arab tribes to cooperate with Iran against the presence of American troops and the YPG terror group east of the Euphrates.

To some extent the Assad backed and Iranian funded efforts have resulted in significant developments east of the Euphrates. In early April, 400 Arab tribal fighters in Qamishli graduated from a training course of the pro Assad Russian backed National Defense militia. Russian and Syrian military personnel as well as Assad regime bureaucrats were present at the graduation ceremony in an area that’s dominated by US backed YPG terrorists.

Even though Russia and Iran are both working to court Arab tribal members around Syria their interests are at loggerheads. Russia aims to limit Iranian influence east of the Euphrates while Iran aims to increase its presence in close proximity to American troops.