There have been rumors regarding a possible easing of tensions between Qatar and its troubled GCC partners Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. After a decision by the Saudi, Emirati and Bahraini officials to send their teams to Qatar for the 24th Arabian Gulf Cup of 2019, certain positive interpretations followed in the international media. Along with this decision, high-level policymakers’ statements both in Saudi Arabia and Qatar have demonstrated their partial willingness for constructive dialogue to be established between the two parties. Many argued that this “football diplomacy” would help ease the tension between these three countries and Qatar. As the political and economic blockade imposed by Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Manama has been waning gradually, there was some hope that Gulf countries would recover the relationship. However, this is not as simple as many would like to think.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s lack of success on a number of regional issues, particularly the Qatar blockade, have led these countries to reconsider their foreign policies. The Saudi-Emirati axis was not able to force Qatar to bow down and meet with the initial demands. While Qatar, remaining defiant, has not made any change to its foreign policy, particularly with regards to 13 demands announced by the blockading countries. The Riyadh and Abu Dhabi administrations have come to the realization that the blockade of Qatar, which has been one of their main foreign policy miscalculations, can no longer continue. Despite realizing this there is still no genuine change to the hostile nature of these two countries’ attitude towards the Doha administration. While a majority of the issues that created division between Qatar and the Saudi-Emirati axis still exist, many initiatives of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are not and will not be supported by the Doha administration.

Therefore, it can be misleading to expect that the Qatari administration will take a positive attitude towards the rapprochement of these two countries. As a matter of fact, with the blockade in 2017, Qatar has reshaped its foreign policy and acted with the reflex of a country surrounded by hostile neighbors. As part of this strategy Qatar has developed strong alliances with regional and international actors, such as Turkey, Iran and the United States and diversified its political, diplomatic and economic alliances. 

Rather than being obliged to establish a means of dialogue with the Saudi-UAE axis, Qatar has done more to build consolidated international partnerships particularly with Turkey, the US and Iran. Bilateral relations, trade volume, military cooperation and socio-cultural harmony have seen a boost between Turkey and Qatar, with partners intending to reach record levels of bilateral trade and military cooperation particularly. With the US, Qatar has enjoyed the privilege of hosting the largest US airbase in the Middle East, and the US has also the made promises of enlarging it at despite Qatar’s regional entanglements. Qatar has also built a stronger relationship with Iran, one that was already in place even before the blockade was initiated.

Another reason as to why a genuine rapprochement between Qatar and its hostile neighbors will not occur is the way Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain treated the Doha administration. The attitude of Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Manama during the early stages of the blockade had a strongly negative effect on the both Qatari political and social actors. As the Qataris were being humiliated by its neighbors, their trust toward them was significantly damaged. Although there have been some constructive attempts by these countries to redress this more recently, the damage remains and is almost impossible to be recovered.

Finally, in the latest developments to ease tensions between the Saudi-UAE axis and Qatar, it doesn’t seem reasonable for Mohammed bin Salman and Mohammed bin Zayed to change course. Having spent a tremendous amount of effort, money and manpower to be the regional-agenda-setters, Mohammed bin Salman and Mohammed bin Zayed firstly intended to isolate Qatar to punish its allegedly disobedient foreign policy behavior. Being stalemated against Iran, being stuck in Yemen and having assumed an unassertive role in the global oil market, the Saudi-UAE axis aims to ease the existing tensions with Qatar, only to demonstrate their vulnerability and give countless regional concessions.

Despite suggestions that the recent football diplomacy may be a way out to the already deepened crisis in the Gulf region, it is hard to believe that there can be an easy solution to the existing problems between the parties. The idea of a rapprochement is wishful thinking at the simplest level of analysis, as the effects of the blockade continues and mistrust between the parties persists. The humiliation and insults toward Doha by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates is something fresh and unforgettable for both the political leadership and popular masses in Qatar. The Doha leadership was able to remain strong and solid during the hardest period of the crisis and it will simply not forget the mistreatment it was subjected by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.  

From Ankara’s perspective, the PKK (the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party) and its Syria-based offshoot pose the most serious threat to Turkey’s national security. In recent years, multiple states have provided support to the PKK-linked People’s Protection Units (YPG) to advance their own geo-strategic interests. Of all the Arabian Peninsula monarchies, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has received the most blame in Turkey for its backing of the YPG. Yet recently more Turks are paying closer attention to the deepening relationship between the Kurdish, Marxist group and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which must be understood within the framework of Riyadh aligning closely with Abu Dhabi’s increasingly anti-Turkish foreign policy agenda in the greater Arab/Islamic world.

The deepening of Saudi Arabia’s partnership with the YPG unfolds against the backdrop of scores of other issues that have severely tested Ankara-Riyadh relations in recent years from the Qatar crisis to the Jamal Khashoggi saga, and geopolitical competition in the Horn of Africa to the politics of post-2011 Egypt, as well as the failed coup plot against Turkey’s government in 2016.

Last year, the media in Turkey began paying closer attention to Riyadh’s links with the YPG. In November Yenisafak published an article about the Saudi and Emirati governments sending military forces to parts of northeastern Syria under the YPG’s control. Although Riyadh and Abu Dhabi deployed such forces to serve within the U.S.-led coalition fighting Daesh, a general perception across Turkey was that this move on the part of both Gulf states was meant to counter Turkish influence in Syria via the YPG.

The deepening of Saudi Arabia’s partnership with the YPG unfolds against the backdrop of scores of other issues that have severely tested Ankara-Riyadh relations in recent years.

The same newspaper put out a piece in 2017, only five days after the Saudi/UAE-led bloc began sieging Qatar, that featured a photo of the PKK terrorist organization’s founder, Abdullah Ocalan, with officials from Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Cairo. Shortly after that article’s publication, the Saudi Minister for Gulf Affairs paid a visit to YPG-controlled Raqqa and met with Brett McGurk, the then-U.S. special envoy to the coalition against ISIS, to discuss the reconstruction of that Syrian city, which ISIS had previously declared the capital of its so-called Caliphate. By August 2018, officials in the Kingdom had pledged USD 100 million to the reconstruction of areas in Syria that the YPG occupied, and two months later Saudi Arabia made that payment.

Saudi Arabia’s backing for the YPG is perhaps best understood within the context of the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ), who is the UAE’s de facto ruler, bringing Saudi Arabia into greater alignment with Abu Dhabi regional vision. Pushing back against Turkish influence in Syria, as well as throughout the greater Arab/Islamic world from Somalia to Iraq and Qatar to Libya, requires the unity of powerful Arab states, naturally making Saudi Arabia a key player in this regard from Abu Dhabi’s standpoint.

For the Emiratis, media has been an important pillar of their strategy for countering Ankara’s clout in northern Syria. During Operation Olive Branch’s launch, and in the following months of the YPG’s fall from Afrin, a host of UAE-based media outlets like Gulf News and The National published articles about Turkish military intervention in that Syrian Kurdish canton with titles such as the following: “Turkey-led forces pillage and loot in newly-captured Afrin”; “Turkey says it has besieged Syrian town of Afrin”; “Fear grips city seized by pro-Turkey rebels”; and “Fears for civilians in Afrin as Turkish forces close in”. Throughout Operation Olive Branch, Emirati media platforms labeled the YPG not as a terrorist organization, but instead as a “resistance movement”.

In March 2018, the month when Turkey’s military brought an end to the YPG’s control of Afrin, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) was meeting with Egypt’s leadership in Cairo, where he issued a statement claiming that Turkey, Iran, and other groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood made up a “triangle of evil” in the Middle East. The language was so similar to that of MbZ’s statements that the influence of the Abu Dhabian crown prince over his Saudi counterpart was crystal clear.

In March 2018, when Turkey’s military brought an end to the YPG’s control of Afrin, Saudi Crown Prince MbS said that Turkey, Iran, and other groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood made up a “triangle of evil” in the Middle East. 

By January 2019, high ranking diplomats from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, along with Bahrain, Egypt, and Jordan, met in the Hashemite Kingdom at the King Hussein Bin Talal Convention Center on the Dead Sea. They discussed several issues, but Syria was central to the talks which focused on devising strategies for pushing back against Iran and Turkey’s influence in the war-torn Arab country. That same month, the UAE’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Anwar Gargash voiced strong opposition to Ankara’s plan for establishing a buffer zone in northern Syria, stating that Turkey’s aims vis-à-vis the Syrian Kurds were a cause of concern for Abu Dhabi as well as Washington. Last month, Gargash stated  that international concerns about the YPG’s fate were “legitimate” given the armed group’s “pivotal role” in the defeat of ISIS in Syria.

Evidentially, Riyadh is joining Abu Dhabi in viewing strengthened relationships between the Arab states of the Gulf region and the YPG as a realistic and sound strategy for countering Ankara and Tehran in Syria. Unquestionably, Riyadh deepening ties with the YPG will continue to please the Emirati leadership in Abu Dhabi. Yet the question is how much risk will Saudi Arabia take in backing the PKK-linked group in terms of consequences vis-à-vis Turkey? It is legitimate to ask whether Saudi-YPG relations could lead to any direct clash between Ankara and Riyadh in Syria, or elsewhere in the region.

Media outlets in Turkey will likely continue covering Gulf states’ relations with the YPG, probably resulting in anti-Saudi sentiments increasing in Turkey roughly five months after Khashoggi’s killing in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. As officials in Ankara, along with human rights and civil society organizations worldwide, refuse to drop to Khashoggi file, Riyadh’s support for the YPG can trigger further escalations of tension in Turkish-Saudi relations at a dangerous time for the region, as well as for the bilateral relationship. With the Qatar crisis unlikely to resolve in the foreseeable future, combined with the possibility of another Turkish military operation against the YPG in Syria, there is much potential for friction between Ankara and Riyadh to reach new heights.

Turkey’s announcement that its military forces recently waged joint operations with Iran against the PKK against the backdrop of deepening of Saudi Arabia’s relationship with the YPG highlight how Ankara and Riyadh’s agendas in Syria are becoming increasingly incompatible with each other. Indeed, the Levant’s security architecture has changed drastically since the Syrian crisis erupted eight years ago. Although Turkey’s Syria agenda was quite aligned with Saudi Arabia’s regional foreign policy during the earlier parts of the Syrian crisis, underscored by Ankara, Riyadh, and Doha collectively supporting Jaish al-Fatah in an effort to oust the Ba’athist regime in Damascus, dynamics quickly shifted in a direction that pitted Turkey and Saudi Arabia increasingly against each other.

Turkey’s announcement that its military forces recently waged joint operations with Iran against the PKK against the backdrop of deepening of Saudi Arabia’s relationship with the YPG highlight how Ankara and Riyadh’s agendas in Syria are becoming increasingly incompatible with each other.

Following the intensification of Russia’s direct military intervention in Syria, it became clear that Bashar al-Assad’s government was no longer on the verge of potentially falling to Sunni Islamist rebels. At that point Ankara and Riyadh’s threat perceptions from the Syrian crisis became increasingly divergent with the Turkish leadership seeing the forces of Kurdish separatism (as opposed to the survival of Assad’s regime) as the gravest menace to Turkey, and Saudi Arabia viewing expanding and consolidating Iranian influence in Syria as the top threat to Riyadh’s interests in the country.

The odds are good that if the Saudi Kingdom continues sponsoring the YPG, Ankara-Riyadh relations will deteriorate further. It is also a safe bet than the Saudi-YPG partnership could prove far more injurious to Saudi-Turkish relations than any of these other matters that have further pitted these two Sunni Muslim powers against each other at a time in which they are competing for a leadership role in the Islamic world.

Pope Francis, the spiritual leader of the Catholic world, paid a historical visit to the United Arab Emirates. During the visit, the Pope led a sermon, which saw the participation of over 120 thousand Catholics living in the UAE. The Pope also met with the UAE leadership and representatives of other religions. One of the most symbolic pictures of this visit was the Pope’s close interaction with the Sheikh of Al Azhar, Ahmad Al-Tayyeb. This picture was meant to give the message of tolerance to the world, which the UAE claims to be the cradle of. In fact, the concept of tolerance was the main theme behind the visit. The UAE regime declared 2019 as the year of tolerance and the Ministry of Tolerance was established days before the Pope’s visit. UAE-based newspapers and agencies claimed that the Pope’s visit confirmed the UAE as the centre of tolerance.

However, experts and human rights advocates who follow the region closely have emphasized that the visit had different purposes than was claimed. The UAE administration, which has been responsible for human rights violations both inside and outside the country, has been allegedly in an effort to create a positive image of itself through different global PR activities. The Pope’s visit was just one of these. This was described in detail in a letter sent to the Pope on 3 February by Sarah Leah Whitson, director of the Middle East and North Africa division at Human Rights Watch.

The UAE administration, responsible for human rights violations both inside and outside the country, has been in an effort to create a positive image of itself through different global PR activities. The Pope’s visit was just one of these.

Whitson stressed that the UAE administration’s efforts to present itself as a tolerant regime is unacceptable as Abu Dhabi has increasingly become a regime that does not respect basic human rights. For instance, the UAE administration issued a new law in 2014 that made it possible to arrest opposition figures within the country. As a result of this, many human rights activists were unjustly arrested. A prominent academic and activist, Nassar bin Ghait, was arrested in 2015 and was given 10 years in prison. Another human rights activist, Ahmad Mansour, was recently sentenced to 10 years in prison after being detained in 2017.

Whitson also stated that the country must adopt new laws in order to democratize its stance on basic human rights, such as the freedom of expression and belief. It is argued that non-Muslims in the UAE have been experiencing difficulties in practicing their religious rituals. While positive steps have been taken in recent years, there are still legal obstacles that need to be tackled. Another human rights issue with regards to foreigners are the hard working conditions and discriminatory practices that workers have been experiencing.

In a letter to the Pope, Sarah Leah Whitson, director of the Middle East and North Africa division at Human Rights Watch, stressed that the UAE administration’s efforts to present itself as a tolerant regime is unacceptable. 

Another motivation for the UAE to host the Pope in the country can be described as winning the loyalty of millions of Catholics living and working in difficult conditions. It is no coincidence that the main theme of the Pope’s speech was how Christians could preserve their religion under pressure and in difficult times. Therefore, Pope Francis’ message was that it is a religious duty to both work under hard conditions and to preserve religious identity. Such a message would serve to cover the UAE’s responsibility for any wrongdoing against the Christian workers in the country. On the other hand, those Christians would remember the Pope’s visit as a symbol of Abu Dhabi’s respect for them as a religious minority and their rights.

The UAE has also been criticized for its aggressive foreign policy in the recent years. Critics such as the United Nations, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch, have particularly raised their voice against the UAE for its role in the humanitarian catastrophe in Yemen. It is argued that the UAE has been the main actor responsible for the deteriorating situation in Yemen. Human rights advocates called the UAE to stop its aggression in Yemen immediately.

The UAE also played a significant role in the military coup that occurred in Egypt on 3 July, 2013. Abu Dhabi supported General Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi to topple the democratically elected president of Egypt, Mohammad Morsi. This was a turning point in Egypt’s aspirations to become a democratic country, as the coup undeniably aimed to reverse this process. The UAE continued its support for the military regime in Egypt, which has become one of the most autocratic regimes in the world.

Another controversial initiative of the Pope’s visit was the Human Fraternity Document, which was signed by Pope Francis and Sheikh Ahmed al-Tayyeb. By including concepts such as tolerance, understanding and justice, the document called for religious leaders to work together in order to prevent violence and radicalism. It was argued that while remaining silent to human rights abuses and imprisonment of thousands of civilians in Egypt, Al-Tayyeb would not be in the position to sign such a document as the representative of Muslims across the world.

The United Arab Emirates wanted to use the Pope’s visit to improve its global image, which has recently been damaged due to many reasons. In order to contribute to its global image, UAE officials and media tools emphasized how tolerant the UAE is and how it works for peace and understanding among different beliefs. The Pope on the other hand, sought to emphasize the role of the Catholic Church in protecting the rights of Christians in the Middle East and the Arab world.

Yemen’s revolutionary uprisings in 2011 soon evolved into a complicated crisis that involved many regional and international actors. As in the case of Syria and Libya, the political uncertainty and instability in the country deepened as the intervention of external actors increased. The following process caused a spill-over in the conflict. Today, Yemen is witnessing a struggle between the Saudi-led coalition and the United Arab Emirates, and the Houthis supported by Iran.

The most damaging consequences of the political disagreement and power struggle in the country are on the civilians. The Saudi-led Operation Decisive Storm, which began in 2015, caused the death of a significant number of civilians. Despite the fact that Saudi Arabia had supposedly changed the nature of the operation into a political process by replacing Decisive Storm with Restoring Hope, Riyadh and its allies continued to use disproportionate attacks on civilians. According to international observes, the number of civilian casualties exceeded ten thousand, including children that constitute around 20% of these losses.

Although Saudi Arabia replaced the Operation Decisive Storm with the Operation Restoring Hope with an emphasis on the diplomatic process, Riyadh and its allies still attack on civilians disproportionally.

Increasing intensity of violence and the blockade that has been imposed on the Houthi-led areas in Yemen has created dire conditions for civilians. It has been reported that due to the blockade, at least 5 million people are in risk of losing their lives due to famine and shortage of medical support. This has been closely monitored by international organizations, as well as media channels that have shared heart-breaking images of children who are struggling to survive due to starvation. This has forced the international community to make calls for the termination of the humanitarian crisis in Yemen.

It can be argued that the global public opinion believes that Saudi Arabia and the UAE are the main actors responsible for the humanitarian catastrophe in Yemen. Although the Iran-backed Houthis also play a role in the deepening of the conflict, the use of disproportionate force by the Saudi-led coalition on civilians has caused humanitarian problems on the ground. Both regional and international actors have criticized the coalition due to its targeting of civilians and causing the death of thousands of Yemeni children and women.

A recent UN report states that the coalition forces led by Saudi Arabia bombed civilian settlements, market places, funeral ceremonies, weddings, fishing boats, and health clinics, all in the scope of war crimes.

In a report published by the United Nations in August, it was noted that the coalition forces led by Saudi Arabia undermined serious human rights violations in Yemen. The report also stated that coalition forces bombed civilian settlements, market places, funeral ceremonies, weddings, fishing boats, and health clinics, and that these situations could be evaluated within the scope of war crimes.

On the other hand, another significant development in this sense is the fact that some Western countries have decided to stop their arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE due to their human rights violations in Yemen. Most recently, German Chancellor Angela Merkel announced that Germany would no longer approve future arms deals to Saudi Arabia. A similar decision was taken by Spain and Norway. In addition, many influential groups in the U.S., U.K., and Canada have been putting serious pressure on their respective governments in order to cancel their arms deals with these two countries in the Gulf.

To end the suffering of the Yemeni people, the international community must put pressure on Saudi Arabia and Iran and their local proxies to come to the table.

It is therefore clear that the international community is uncomfortable with the war in Yemen. However, the humanitarian crisis in the country still does not play an important role in the agenda pursued by global actors in regards to the Middle East. Issues such as the Syrian Civil War, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Daesh, and the migration of Syrian refugees to Europe are considered to be more serious issues than the Yemen crisis. At this point, it is of great importance for countries like Turkey, who can play a game changer role in the Middle East, to act responsibly and put pressure on the warring parties in order to stop their activities.

The international community ought to take a stance and help to end the suffering of the Yemeni people. The international community must put pressure on particularly Saudi Arabia and Iran as well as their local proxies to come to the table in order to find a peaceful solution to the years-long crisis in Yemen. Otherwise, civilians will continue to pay the price of a regional power struggle between rival ideologies.

Following his election to the U.S. presidency in late 2016, Donald Trump produced two political strategies towards the Middle East. The first one is the plan dubbed as the “deal of the century,” which aims to solve the Palestine-Israel conflict. Although this has not been made public, Trump has slowly been trying to implement this plan. The second is the Middle East Strategic Alliance initiative that has recently dominated the U.S. agenda towards the region.

In this context, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo held a meeting on September 28, 2018, with the participation of six countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the foreign ministers of Egypt and Jordan. After the meeting, it was stated that the U.S. administration would provide full support to the establishment of a Middle East Strategic Alliance consisting of GCC +2 countries in order to combat armed organizations in the Middle East, to bring peace in Syria and Yemen, and to stop the harmful activities of Iran. In the following period, the U.S. media reported that Trump had planned to hold a Washington Summit with the leaders of the GCC +2 countries on 12-13 October. However, this never happened.

The Jamal Khashoggi incident, which took place on October 2, determined the agenda of Middle East politics. A Saudi citizen and a columnist for the Washington Post, Khashoggi disappeared after he entered the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. This incident created a global reaction against the Saudi regime, which is believed to be behind what happened to Jamal. More, a serious campaign against Saudi Arabia began from many spheres in the U.S. and the cooperation between the Trump administration and Riyadh has been heavily criticized. These developments made a negative impact on Trump’s Middle East Strategic Alliance initiative, which already suffers from different structural problems.

The first of these problems is the crisis between Qatar and other Gulf neighbors, namely, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain. In June 2017, these countries started a political and economic embargo against Qatar, which further deepened the crisis between countries in the region. The main reason for the rapid deterioration of the crisis is the harsh steps taken by Mohammad bin Salman, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia and Mohammad bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces. These policies increased the mistrust among the members of the GCC, and countries such as Oman and Kuwait have initially preferred to stay out of this anti-Qatar campaign. Both countries even criticized the Saudi and Emirati initiatives against Qatar. Therefore, it can be said that the unresolved Gulf crisis is the main obstacle for Washington’s Middle East Strategic Alliance initiative.

Another disagreement among the members of the GCC is the different attitudes taken in regards to Iran. While Saudi Arabia has been the champion of demonizing Iran, countries like Qatar and Oman have not pursued hostile policies. In fact, Oman has maintained good relations with Iran for many years and has signed numerous deals with the Tehran administration, especially in the field of energy. During the past few years, Oman has not criticized Iranian involvement in the civil war in Yemen and this attitude of Muscat has further angered the regime in Riyadh.

Another dispute among the Gulf Cooperation Council members has been taking place between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The disagreements between the two countries have increased in recent years. The first of these disputes is the status of the Khafji oil field, which the two countries jointly used for many years. However, due to the number of disagreements between the two, Saudi Arabia suspended its oil production, forcing Kuwait to do the same. Since then, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have failed to reach a consensus on the solution of this problem.

The second dispute surrounds the embargo on Qatar. Kuwait’s mediation efforts during the embargo on Doha were not accepted by Riyadh or Abu Dhabi. It is noted that Riyadh in particular failed to take a step for the solution of these problems. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s failure to address these issues, which were planned to be discussed during his visit on October 1, 2018, indicates that the Saudi administration has followed an uncertain policy in relations with Kuwait.

Another issue that hinders Trump’s Middle East Strategic Alliance initiative is Egypt’s reluctant attitude. Initial signs of Cairo’s reluctance in joining Saudi Arabia’s efforts to counter Iran was seen during Operation Decisive Storm in Yemen. The Egyptian army did not provide full-scale support to the operation, leading to a temporary crisis between Riyadh and Cairo. Egypt has also followed a different path from Saudi Arabia in Syria. The Sisi regime had multiple meetings with Bashar Assad and further engaged in military and intelligence cooperation with Damascus. Additionally, Sisi’s close relations with Russia is another sign of Egypt’s reluctance to join a U.S.-led campaign as Cairo aims to follow a balanced policy between Russia and the U.S.

One of the most important obstacles in establishing an Arab alliance against Iran is the possible discomfort of the Shiite population living in these states. The Shiites living in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait, would be alienated from such an alliance and from the U.S. policy to encourage a sectarian divide.

Future of the Middle East Strategic Alliance Project initiated by U.S. President Donald Trump is vague and doubtful. The future of the Trump administration in U.S. politics, the process of political transformation in the region and the deepening of the political divisions between the Gulf countries can be stated as the most important obstacles of this project.

Following the election of Donald Trump as President, the United States has adopted a new political strategy towards the Middle East. The most important component of this policy was the establishment of an Arab alliance, which would have two major aims: Following pro-U.S. policies in the region and fighting against threats that could harm Israel’s security. In order to establish such an alliance, the U.S. focused on three countries – namely, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. In this context, Trump made his first oversees visit to Saudi Arabia and then hosted Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi at the White House. Trump also met with the de facto leader of the UAE, Crown Prince Muhammad bin Zayed, at the White House on May 15, 2017.

This initiative became the main pillar of the U.S. administration’s new strategy for the region. Within this framework, the leaders of these countries have begun to act with the U.S. administration in all regional and global issues. Increasing pressure on the Muslim Brotherhood and policies towards Iran can be noted as examples of the issues that the Washington administration, Cairo, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi governments have co-opted.

The successful existence of this alliance is vital for Washington for several reasons. First, such an alliance is a crucial instrument in order to secure Israel from regional threats. The Trump-led U.S. administration’s approach to Israel is different from previous governments. Not only does Trump make his pro-Israel stance extremely visible, he also employs figures that are staunch supporters of Israel. In December 2017, Trump revealed his decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel – a decision that was always avoided by previous U.S. presidents.

Confronting Iran is also an important factor for establishing such an alliance. The U.S. aims to unify regional actors in their policies towards Iran. For this reason, Washington has been supporting Saudi Arabia’s and the United Arab Emirates’ fight in Yemen against Iranian-backed Houthis. A similar situation can also be observed in the case of Syria. The Trump administration’s hostile stance against Iran is no secret and this attitude was emphasized in Washington’s decision to impose new sanctions on Tehran.

A third reason why the U.S. administration wants to establish such a regional coalition is the issue of security and natural resources. As one of the leading countries in the world in terms of oil reserves, Saudi Arabia is also the main defence industry importer of the U.S. Riyadh is also one of the largest foreign investors, which has billions of investments in the U.S. Therefore, Washington indirectly benefits from the wealth of Saudi Arabia – which is generated from the country’s natural resources. Having a close relationship with countries that have large energy resources gives the U.S. an advantage in competition with global actors.

The creation of a pro-U.S. alliance in the Middle East is of great importance for Washington’s rivalry with global actors such as Russia and China. It can be argued that one of the main motivations behind the U.S. strategy in the Middle East is to prevent the rising influence of Moscow and Beijing in the region. Therefore, it is important for the U.S. to contain Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE in order to ensure they do not fall under the influence of other international actors.

The U.S. administration also aims to prevent a possible regional alliance between these countries and Turkey – one of the main challengers of Washington’s policies in the Middle East. The U.S. and Turkey have been increasingly distancing themselves from each other, and their regional strategies have been in strong competition. As a result, the policies of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have been in parallel with those of the U.S.

In order to impose its new strategy in the Middle East, the Trump administration wants to keep the most important countries in the region under its control. The recent political moves of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE reflect the fact that they are fully committed to a strong alliance with Washington. Most recently, while Muslim countries across the world condemned the decision, these countries showed minimal response to Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.

Although it may seem that Washington’s strategy of building a pro-U.S. regional coalition is at work, there are obstacles for its success. While social and political actors defy this initiative and continue to display their discomfort with U.S. influence in the region, there is rising popular dissatisfaction with authoritarian regimes such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Therefore, it is still unknown as to whether this U.S. strategy of forming an Arab alliance in the region will produce a functioning outcome.

Unlike many other Arab countries that experienced unsuccessful transition experiences in the post-2011 period, Tunisia has been considered a success story with its exceptional journey from an authoritarian regime to a functioning democracy. Thanks to the culture of reconciliation in the country’s politics Tunisia was able to overcome many political crises since 2011. The key factor for achieving political stability is the consensus that Islamist, secular and socialists groups have so far embraced. The Ennahda Movement, for instance, had even sacrificed the leadership position in 2013, in order to overcome a political crisis that the country experienced in the summer of that year. The group withdrew from the government and accepted to work with technocrats for the transition period. This was a key move that prevented the deepening of the crisis.

Thanks to the culture of reconciliation in the country’s politics theTunisia was able to overcome many political crises since 2011.

This withdrawal of Ennahda, however, had a negative effect on the perception of the party in the eyes of its voters. The party bore the consequences in the parliamentary elections in 2014, as they experienced significant losses in terms of votes. Nevertheless, the party continued to be an important actor in the political scene and played a serious role in the successful continuation of the post-revolutionary transition period in Tunisia.

Despite the relative stability, the country’s political life has also problems that have the potential to harm the transition period. Particularly, the developments that have been experienced during the last two months are increasingly jeopardizing political stability in Tunisia.

Prime Minister Youssef Chahed’s dismissal of Interior Minister Lotfi Brahem on June 6 has triggered a controversial period in the country’s politics. It is argued that the minister was sacked as a result of a boat accident, where up to 80 Tunisians migrants died in the Mediterranean. However, a number of international media outlets and observers suggest that there was another reason for that development.

It is argued that the Interior Minister Breham met with the head of the intelligence service of the United Arab Emirates in Djerba on May 29 and they discussed the possibility of a regime change in Tunisia, similar to the one that took place in July 2013. According to the plan put forward by the UAE official, the Prime Minister would be removed from office and replaced with Kamel Morjane, who was the former Defence Minister during the deposed President Zeinal Abidin Ben Ali.

It is claimed that the main purpose of this Emirati plot was to exclude the Ennahda movement from Tunisian politics.

It is claimed that the main purpose of this Emirati plot was to exclude the Ennahda movement from Tunisian politics. This is part of a much bigger strategy of the Emirati leadership that targeted the Islamic political actors in the Middle East. The first example of this was the Muslim Brotherhood leadership in Egypt. The UAE-backed local groups initiated a military coup that toppled Mohammed Morsi. The military regime in the country started a crackdown on the members of the Muslim Brotherhood.

A similar scenario would be thought for Tunisia, as the Ennahda movement has gradually increased its power in Tunisian politics. Despite its low profile during the past years, the movement won the local elections last April by receiving 5% more votes than its biggest rival Nidaa Tunis. The Ennahda movement has also continued its civil activities in the fields of economy, social solidarity, culture, religion, and youth.

The Ennahda movement has long been the target of a region-wide anti-Muslim Brotherhood alliance led by the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. This alliance aims to remove all Islamic political movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood and is making an intense effort in this context. These countries have also considered the Ennahda movement as a close associate of the Muslim Brotherhood. As a result, they have been involved in Tunisian politics since the revolution in 2011 and aim to exclude Ennahda from politics.

Despite such external interventions, the political groups in Tunisia, especially Ennahda, have been sensitive about continuing the stability by choosing the path of reconciliation. Following his meeting with President Beji Caid Essebsi, Ennahda leader Rachid al-Ghannouchi emphasized that the consensus must be achieved in order for the Tunisian revolution to remain a successful example.

It is of great importance that Ennahda and other Tunisian political groups show a unified front against foreign intervention in order to maintain political stability and become a strong democracy.

Eventually, these efforts have been successful and Prime Minister Youssef Chahed has appointed Hichem Fourati, who has been working in the Interior Ministry for many years, as minister. Following the vote of confidence in parliament, Hichem Fourati started his duty on July, 31, ending the two-month-long political crisis.

Foreign actors have not succeeded in their attempt to shape Tunisia’s politics according to their interests. However, it is expected that the governments of Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia are expected to maintain their campaign against the Ennahda movement in Tunisia. They will continue to work for preventing the possible success of Ennahda in the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections, which will take place in late 2019. Therefore, it is of great importance that Ennahda and other Tunisian political groups show a unified front against foreign intervention in order to maintain political stability and become a strong democracy.

The Gulf crisis, which began in June 2017, is likely to have much deeper consequences in Middle East politics than it has originally anticipated. This is understood from the way blockading countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt have been developing their policies against Qatar. It is obvious that these countries do not have any intention to step back from their policies. One of the recent developments in this context is the canal project that Saudi Arabia is continuing along its land border with Qatar. Currently, bidders are filing their applications to participate at the construction of the canal. So far five international companies have applied to the project that will cost 750 million U.S. dollars.

The main aim of the Salwa Canal is to turn Qatar into an island state. The canal is planned to be 60 kilometres long and 200 meters wide and it will host a recycling centre where nuclear waste will be stored. The other side of the canal will be a one kilometre deep area of a no mans land and will be announced a permanent military zone by Saudi Arabia. The project will last one year and finally, Qatar will literally be transformed into an island state.

The canal project is an expression of the hostility from Saudi Arabia against Qatar. This is also observed from the comments from the Saudi officials. Saud Al-Qahtani, an advisor of Saudi Crown Prince, Muhammad bin Salman, congratulated the Saudi people for the “canal project, which will turn the “terrorist Qatari state” into an island.” Similar statements by the officials of the United Arab Emirates and Egypt indicate that the crisis will last much longer than expected.

It should be reminded that the move to force Qatar further into political isolation is a historical mistake that would have serious repercussions. The Middle East has already been struggling to cope with religious and ethnic crisis, is now witnessing a much serious divide between neighbors that have similar cultural, economic and religious identities. Creating new spheres of crisis would lead to increase divisions that will further damage regional harmony.

Political differences should never require a government to take such a radical decision to literally change the map of a region. Creating an invisible wall between two countries that historically has few differences is a serious mistake for the governments that is responsible for it. Such decisions will not contribute to solving the crisis but rather deepen the divisions. This stance of Saudi Arabia and other hostile countries will further unite Qatari people under the leadership of Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani. Additionally, the crisis will have serious consequences in terms of regional politics.

One of the consequences of the Gulf crisis is the loss of confidence among the countries of the region, particularly those that involved directly. The deterioration of the unity between the Gulf States, which, despite all their differences, has the ability to act together for many years, will have a discouraging effect on possible regional alliance initiatives in the Middle East.

On the other hand, efforts to isolate Qatar from regional alliances will cause boycotting countries to lose their credibility in the eyes of governments and peoples of the region. Future policies of these countries will not find popular support and they will have difficulties in forming new regional alliances because of their untrustworthiness.

Another consequence of the Gulf crisis would lead some countries in the region to move further away from the axis of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Countries such as Oman, Kuwait and Jordan have been having second thoughts about their relationships with the Gulf neighbors as they eye to have better relations with other regional powers such as Turkey and Iran.

Finally, Qatar has so far showed a successful resistance during the Gulf crisis. Doha’s power came from its legitimate position. It’s known that boycotting countries attack Qatar with false information and use manipulation as a tool for reaching their political goals. Qatar, on the other hand, fights back with solid arguments that are correct and legitimate. This has given Qatar an upper hand and led the international community to embrace Doha’s position.

During an interview with the Saudi newspaper Asharq al-Awsat on October 28, 2017, Steve Bannon named Turkey as the biggest threat to the US. While this approach has many reasons, it is not independent from the influence of money from the Persian Gulf. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is said to have supported Steve Bannon financially and the UAE is considered to be Turkey’s biggest and yet mostly ignored political competitor in the Middle East.

While the international focus is more upon the rivalry between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, the rivalry between Turkey and the UAE is more decisive. Turkey as a non-Arab state with the cultural heritage of the former Ottoman Empire and the UAE as the bastion of authoritarianism and symbol for an extremely luxurious lifestyle, are two actors that combat each other on every political stage from Europe, Africa to the Middle East.

While Saudi Arabia and the UAE form the so called “axis of the status quo” promoting authoritarian regimes, Qatar and Turkey work together in the “revolutionary axis” supporting popular democracy movements in the Middle East.

Turkey and UAE relations before the 2011 Arab Uprisings

Turkey – UAE relations have not been so important in the past, and it is fair to state that both sides only met each other following the Arab uprisings in 2011. Turkey on its part mainly focused on the European Union and the United States before the AK Party came to power in 2001. As a NATO member, Turkey had played its important role in the alliance, mainly taking into account regional western interests. Political and economic relations with Middle Eastern countries were present, but Turkey’s main focus was on the west.

On the other hand, the UAE mainly focused on internal issues and had an international policy advocating diplomacy and diplomatic solutions – it still views foreign policy from the prism of domestic issues. Before the Arab uprisings in 2011, the UAE had invested in relations within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and even tried to solve its dispute with Iran over three islands with diplomacy in order to avoid a political crisis with Tehran. In 1980, the UAE mediated between Egypt and Libya on one side and Oman and South Yemen on the other. Until 2011, the UAE tried to stay neutral on the international stage while focusing on its own economy. One important exception was the oil-crisis in 1973 when the UAE sided with Saudi Arabia. Turkey and the UAE have both become more involved in regional affairs with their new economic stability. All in all, there was hardly any economic interweaving between the two countries.

One commonality of the UAE and Turkey is that they both have achieved an important economic growth, which has inevitably strengthened them. While Turkey expanded its economy from $151 billion in 1990 to $833 billion in 2011, by heavily investing in profits made from oil, the UAE expanded its economy from $51 billion in 1990 to $351 billion in 2011. While Turkey’s GDP slightly improved to $858 billion in 2016, GDP of the UAE slightly decreased to $349 billion in 2016. Nevertheless, both countries are trying to transform their economic prosperity into regional influence.

Rivalry after the Arab Uprisings

The rivalry between Turkey and the UAE has intensified since the Arab uprisings. While Turkey positioned itself as one of the most important supporters of popular conservative movements that favor democracy in the Middle East, the UAE has taken the side in support of established authoritarian regimes as part of counter measures. Turkey’s position also meant support for the Muslim Brotherhood, which also enjoys popular support throughout the Middle East. While Turkey had Qatar on its side, the UAE strengthened its position with the help of Riyadh. This rivalry is evident all over the Middle East.

What the UAE fears most is democracy, as this would question the authoritarian system of rule in the country. A survey conducted by the Washington Institute think tank at the end of 2014 illustrated that the Muslim Brotherhood is rated positively by around one-third of the population in Gulf countries.

Contrary to popular opinion, the Arab uprisings are not yet over. While one may argue that this battle between the two axes of Sunni Muslims in the Middle East may be unimportant now, it is simply the opposite.

The rivalry following the Arab uprisings has seen its pick in Egypt. The UAE rejected the Morsi government and supported the Abdelfattah Sisi military coup-government, while Turkey supported the democratically elected Morsi government (the first ever democratically elected government in the history of Egypt). The ambassador of the UAE in Ankara went back to the UAE for ‘holidays’ and didn‘t return to Turkey until 2016. The political conflict in Egypt is permanent and still ongoing, especially as Turkey still rejects political relations with the Sisi regime and the UAE continues to provide financial support.

Another important point was the coup attempt by Gulenist criminal cult members on July 15 last year, which was prevented due to massive opposition from the people and police in Turkey. The oil-rich sheikhs in the UAE allegedly funneled $3 billion to the Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETO) in order to encourage them to destabilize Turkey from within. Additionally, leaked e-mails from Yousef Al-Otaiba, UAE ambassador to the United States, revealed that the UAE could have been involved in the coup attempt of July 15. More, during the Qatar crisis, the UAE positioned itself as a pioneer of Qatar’s isolation, while Turkey expanded its military presence in Qatar and supported the government.

The conflict also spilled over to Libya, where a Muslim Brotherhood-led government was formed after the coup against Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. Turkey, which keeps good ties with the powerful leadership of Misrata, which mainly forms the military operations room “Bunyan al-Marsous” for the government in Tripolis, was dragged into a confrontation with General Khalifa Haftar. With the help of Egypt and the UAE, in 2014 Haftar established a rival administration in Tobruk, which challenges the internationally recognized “unity government.” While Turkey and Qatar never directly intervened in Libya, Egypt and the UAE did. Besides warplane raids in support of Haftar, the UAE and Egypt have and still continue to arm Haftar militias. In addition, with the cooperation of France, the UAE established a military base in Haftar-controlled territory.

Turkey has built a military camp in Somalia in order to train up to 10,000 Somalian army soldiers. Turkish aid organizations, a Turkish hospital in Mogadishu and educational opportunities for Somali civilians have given Turkey a prominent position in Mogadishu. The Turkish company Albayrak manages the Mogadishu seaport. Like Turkey, the UAE is also pursuing similar contacts in Somalia. More interestingly, the UAE is again undermining an internationally recognized government this time in Mogadishu. It supports the self-declared state of Somaliland that competes with Mogadishu for control over the strategic north of the country, which oversees the Gulf of Aden.

While the base is still being constructed in Berbera, located 100km north east of the capital, Hargeisa, UAE ships have already started docking at its deep-water port.

As both countries decided to separate business from geopolitics, despite political controversies, financial relations between Turkey and the UAE seem to be positive. Both countries are certainly increasing their exchange within the defense industries. The UAE has purchased many armament products produced in Turkey and the two have signed a contract to increase cooperation in defense industries. The UAE, alongside Saudi Arabia are the main clients of Turkish armament products.

During the International Defence Exhibition & Conference in Abu Dhabi at the end of February 2017, the Turkish company Otokar signed an agreement with the armed forces of the United Arab Emirates for the construction of an armored infantry vehicle of the Arma 8×8 type with a value of 661 million US dollars. One of the main reasons for the UAE to buy weapons from Turkey is the price-quality index. While Turkish armament products fulfil NATO-standards, they are much cheaper than products of other NATO members.

Relations between Turkey and the UAE are complicated. While both sides have relatively good relations with each other, the regional power struggle over influence in the Middle East will shape future relations. While Turkey can be described as a successful democratic project in the Middle East, which is questioning authoritarian regimes in the region, the UAE fears nothing more than democracy. The hidden competition between both sides is more decisive than the competition between Qatar and Saudi-Arabia. From Somalia, Libya, Europe to the Gulf, the UAE and Turkey have different agendas. Nevertheless, due to gains that can be made in defense industries, both sides try to maintain satisfactory bilateral relations.