U

.S. President Donald Trump announced that he will host Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan at the White House on Friday, August 8, 2025 for what he has called a “Historic Peace Summit.” The meeting is expected to culminate in the signing of a long-awaited peace agreement between the two South Caucasus nations, ending decades of hostility over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region.

Trump, speaking via his Truth Social platform on Thursday, framed the event as a personal diplomatic victory. “These two nations have been at war for many years, resulting in the deaths of thousands of people. Many leaders have tried to end the war, with no success — until now, thanks to ‘TRUMP,’” he wrote, using capital letters for emphasis.

The U.S. president revealed that the summit would include an official “Peace Signing Ceremony” and the signing of bilateral agreements between Washington and both Baku and Yerevan. According to Trump, these agreements will aim to expand economic cooperation, trade, and investment in the strategically important South Caucasus region, which lies at the crossroads of Europe and Asia and is rich in energy resources.

“I am very proud of these courageous leaders for doing the right thing for the great people of Armenia and Azerbaijan,” Trump stated. “It will be a historic day for Armenia, Azerbaijan, the United States, and the world.”

Decades-long conflict

Armenia and Azerbaijan, both former Soviet republics, have been locked in a bitter dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The predominantly ethnic Armenian enclave, internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan, declared independence in the early 1990s with Armenian military support. This sparked a full-scale war that killed tens of thousands and displaced more than a million people.

A fragile cease-fire brokered in 1994 failed to resolve the underlying dispute. Sporadic clashes continued over the years, culminating in the 44-day war in autumn 2020, when Azerbaijani forces recaptured large swathes of territory, including parts of Karabakh and the surrounding districts. That war ended with a Russian-brokered agreement, which also introduced Russian peacekeepers into the region.

In September 2023, Azerbaijan completed its military operations in Karabakh, restoring full sovereignty over the enclave after the surrender of the remaining separatist forces. The move marked a turning point, shifting the focus from military confrontation to political negotiations.

Road to peace

Efforts toward a comprehensive peace deal accelerated in early 2024, with multiple rounds of talks mediated by the European Union, Russia, and the United States. In March 2025, Baku and Yerevan announced that they had reached agreement on all 17 articles of a draft peace treaty, covering border demarcation, transport links, security guarantees, and the rights of ethnic minorities.

While details of the U.S.-brokered version of the peace agreement have not been released, analysts say it is likely to include American economic incentives and commitments to regional infrastructure projects, potentially tying the peace deal to broader U.S. strategic interests in the Caucasus.

The Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process has implications far beyond the South Caucasus. The region is a vital corridor for oil and gas pipelines connecting the Caspian Sea to European markets, bypassing Russia and Iran. Stability there would strengthen Europe’s energy security and create new opportunities for trade and transport across Eurasia.

Washington’s increased involvement also signals a shift in geopolitical influence. Russia, traditionally the main mediator in the conflict, has been distracted by its war in Ukraine and has seen its sway in the Caucasus diminish. The European Union has played a growing role, but the White House’s hosting of the signing ceremony is seen as a clear statement of U.S. diplomatic leadership.

Political Impact for Trump

For Trump, who is seeking to reinforce his image as a dealmaker on the global stage, the summit offers a high-profile foreign policy achievement. His administration has been working behind the scenes for months, according to U.S. officials, with special envoys shuttling between Baku and Yerevan to iron out differences.

The president has frequently criticized previous administrations for failing to resolve long-standing international disputes. By securing what could be a definitive peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Trump may claim a breakthrough comparable to historic agreements like the Camp David Accords.

The peace summit is scheduled for Friday afternoon in Washington, followed by a formal signing ceremony on the White House lawn. Both leaders are expected to deliver remarks alongside Trump, and the event will be attended by senior U.S. officials, foreign diplomats, and invited guests from the Armenian and Azerbaijani diasporas.

If successful, the agreement would formally end one of the most enduring and bloody post-Soviet conflicts, setting the stage for a new era of cooperation between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

A

zerbaijan achieved a historic victory in the Second Karabakh War. In fact, for the first time in modern times, it gained the opportunity to dominate completely the lands of Karabakh and the entirety of Azerbaijani lands. In order to understand Azerbaijan’s victory better, one can refer to Atatürk’s and his comrades’ victory in the War of Independence; in a way, Azerbaijan won its own War of Independence and secured its future.

To understand this process, a brief historical background and an introduction of certain concepts is necessary. The most decisive outcome of modernity for states was undoubtedly sovereignty, and nations have played the role of cement in the consolidation of sovereignty. In this sense, the end of the 18^th century and the whole 19^th century gave birth to a state model that appeared to make Machiavelli’s dreams come true.

However, modernity has not produced the same results for all nations. Although the right to self-determination, in a sense a universal achievement of modernity, is expressed as a right for every nation, the colonial peoples had to struggle in a different way. The Treaty of Turkmenchay (1828), signed as a result of the war between Iran and Tsarist Russia, not only divided Azerbaijan’s lands, but also initiated the colonial process that ended its sovereignty over its remaining lands (today’s Republic of Azerbaijan).

It is, thus, possible to look for the beginning of the historical root of the Karabakh problem in Turkmenchay, which went down in history as the first modern agreement that determined the modern order in the Caucasus. This agreement included the Azerbaijani Turks, the main power in the region, but not all the people of the region? Were the Azerbaijani Turks not part of the people of the region. In short, the liberation of the occupied part of Karabakh and the redefinition of the status of Karabakh in the name of the Azerbaijani nation became a matter of national sovereignty.

On the other hand, after the occupation of the Republic of Azerbaijan, which could not be transformed into a full-fledged state, by the Red Army forces, the Soviet Union established its dominance there and in the entire geography, and began to build its own order. Nagorno-Karabakh, the first modern status of Karabakh, was created in 1923, and was intended to serve the system built by the Soviets within the framework of Homo Sovieticus.

Therefore, the Soviets made the historical dominance of the Azerbaijani Turks over Karabakh problematic, and, in this way, the foundations were laid for the conflict that was to take place in the post-Soviet period. In order to make the Soviet system work in the South Caucasus, the Azerbaijani Turks, who have historically been the dominant and influential group in the region, had to be dealt with.

The bipolar system that emerged after World War II allowed Soviet policy to continue. However, the end of the Cold War, or the “end of history” as Francis Fukuyama claimed, began to bring about the end of the Soviet strategy. In short, as a result of the 44-day Second Karabakh War, it became clear that the consequences of the uprising of the late 1980s and the subsequent First Karabakh War were unsustainable.

Diplomacy and capacity utilization

All diplomatic negotiations following the ceasefire agreement that ended the First Karabakh War, signed on the initiative of Heydar Aliyev, ended in failure. From today’s perspective, it is understood that the Second Karabakh War was a necessity.

The war should be evaluated as the result of a multidimensional process and development. First, the Azerbaijani state had to acquire the knowledge of conducting and managing a war. The oil agreement, signed on the initiative of Aliyev immediately after the ceasefire agreement (1994), became the main factor of Azerbaijan’s economic development. Azerbaijan did not spend the years of occupation only in fruitless diplomatic negotiations: improving the capacity of the Azerbaijani state was one of the central government’s main goals.

On the other hand, Turkey, which has defined a new strategy for the 21^st century, began to carve out a place for itself as a new center in the regional geopolitical equation that is changing over time. The presence of a militarily, politically, and economically active Turkey in the region has also strengthened Azerbaijan’s power in the long run. Azerbaijan made better use of its capacity, won the Second Karabakh War, and saved its legitimate lands, recognized by international law, from occupation. This gave it the opportunity to become a fully fledged sovereign state on its legitimate territory. With the local anti-terrorist operation carried out in September 2023, the Azerbaijani state removed all occupying forces from the occupied territory and closed the sovereignty gap.

It should be remembered that the result of the First Karabakh War was an occupation contrary to international law. In the Second Karabakh War, the Azerbaijani state carried out its military operation in order to save its lands, which are recognized by the international law, from occupation. In other words, in spite of all the difficulties, adherence to international law brings justified success and victory in the long run.

After the Second Karabakh War, President Aliyev stated that the period of military conflict and war between Armenia and Azerbaijan has ended and the phase of diplomacy has begun. However, the modern order of Karabakh and even the region was built during the Tsarist and Soviet colonial periods, and therefore, despite the victory, it was impossible to sign an agreement immediately; in the modern process, the status of Karabakh was determined by the Soviets during the colonial process.

More important than an agreement, Azerbaijan and Turkey signed the Shusha Declaration, which was the first agreement signed between states in the region in the 21^st century. It was important to deepen Azerbaijani-Turkish relations, which had been tested during the war, especially in the military dimension. The changing economic and political uncertainties in Eurasia, necessitate that the military, technological, and economic dimensions be taken into account, and bring to the fore the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), which was proclaimed in Istanbul on the basis of the Nakhchivan Agreement of 2008.

The principles and institutions of the 20^th century, especially those built after World War II, are now being abandoned. In a sense, the 21^st century is giving birth to itself. In this sense, the effect of the OTS must be taken into account in the order that will emerge in the South Caucasus after the Second Karabakh War.

F

ollowing the blame for the loss in the Second Karabakh War being put on Nikol Pashinyan, Armenia was plunged into internal political turmoil and a process of self-examination. Although Pashinyan was re-elected after the Karabakh defeat, on June 20, 2021, the opposition and ultra-nationalist social groups could not handle the defeat in the war. Since then, Armenian politics have been divided and polarized between rapprochement with Western countries and reliance on Russia to resolve the Karabakh issue.

Having failed to implement the provisions of the Moscow armistice of November 9, 2020, which ended the Second Karabakh War, Armenians have been reluctant to open the Zangezur corridor. The failure in the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, which stipulated that the Zangezur and Lachin corridors would remain mutually open, put the Azerbaijani side on hold, but the hope of achieving a peace agreement through diplomacy was kept alive.

The Karabakh Armenians, who considered themselves a de facto state in Karabakh and were unable to reconcile with the results of the Second Karabakh War, escalated tensions with the Azerbaijani army in 2022 as if they were a separate state from Armenia and, encouraged by the presence of the Russian Peacekeeping Force in the region, were under the illusion that Azerbaijan could not intervene in Karabakh.

At the same time, the election of Samvel Shahramanyan as president by the representatives of Karabakh Armenians under the name of the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic undermined the spirit of the desired peace agreement.

Azerbaijan suspended aid through the Lachin corridor on the grounds that it was used to carry military equipment, while humanitarian aid through Aghdam would be permitted. In addition, Azerbaijan started to provide relief supplies to Karabakh Armenians, who threatened to burn the aid convoys.

As Karabakh Armenians armed themselves and increased their mine-laying activities, Azerbaijan launched an “anti-terrorist operation” on September 19, 2023. The identified targets were destroyed with precision ammunition. At the same time, Azerbaijan organized point operations in the direction of Karabakh with its law enforcement forces to “restore constitutional order.”

The Russian Peacekeeping Force stated that no civilians were harmed in the operations. After the internal security operation carried out by Azerbaijan, Armenia and Karabakh Armenians did not receive the support they expected from Moscow. They decided to lay down their arms and met with Azerbaijani officials in Khankendi under the supervision of the Russian Peacekeeping Force.

Although no clear decision was reached during the meeting, Karabakh Armenians accepted Azerbaijan’s demands in practice; some soldiers, however, opposed the surrender and retreated to forested areas. Many Karabakh Armenians sought to migrate to Armenia.

In Armenia, the Armenian opposition started demonstrations in Yerevan over allegations that Pashinyan did not provide enough support to Karabakh Armenians. Eight soldiers and former Yerevan mayor Albert Bazeyan were arrested following intelligence reports on a coup attempt by senior Armenian soldiers. Armenian politics was again thrown into turmoil, and the fragile nature of the balance in the Caucasus began to reappear as Armenians who were displaced to Karabakh after 1992 began to return to Armenia.

With the events in Armenia and the acceptance of Azerbaijan’s demands by the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, a new chapter has opened in the Caucasus. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia has now entered the final stretch, and the meeting between the leaders of the two countries in Spain, expected to take place on October 5, 2023, offers hope for a final peace agreement.

Do the Armenians have a strategy?

The Armenian strategy from 1992 to 2020 was to rely on the Collective Security Organization, i.e., Russian security guarantees, and to take advantage of the West’s silence in favor of the Armenians. However, Armenian politicians failed to interpret the changing global and regional balances. Putting aside the practice that a state can engage in an armed conflict on behalf of another state – only if its interests require it – Armenia assumed that the “forced” status in Karabakh was permanent.

With Armenian politics caught between Westernism and Russianism, the country has been unable to choose between the politics of threats and reconciliation. As a matter of fact, Pashinyan was able to say “Karabakh is Azerbaijan’s territory” while threatening Azerbaijan on social media. The reason for such ups and downs is Armenia’s economic, political, and military incapacity is the reason for such ups and downs.

Having no access to the sea and being landlocked between four neighboring countries, Armenia has transformed its economic vulnerability into military incapacity with political division. For this reason, the Yerevan administration has delegated the Karabakh strategy to other countries and has no long-term strategy or action plan.

Armenia’s strategic mistakes, especially regarding Russia’s attitude, is worth mentioning at this point. In this context, the military exercise with the United States determined Russia’s attitude towards the Pashinyan administration and pushed Moscow to be more neutral towards Karabakh.

Meanwhile, Armenia’s membership in the International Criminal Court made Moscow uneasy with the ICC being criticized by the Russians for the arrest warrant issued against Russian President Vladimir Putin. Pashinyan’s declaration that the Russian presence in the region has been weakened after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine and sending his wife, Anna Hakobyan, to Ukraine to provide humanitarian aid made Pashinyan’s Westernist and “unreliable” side explicit in Moscow’s eyes.

How should Azerbaijan’s current actions in Karabakh be interpreted?

Since 1992, Azerbaijan, with the motto “Karabakh is Azerbaijan!”, has been determined to connect Karabakh to its homeland, first through diplomacy and then through military means. In this respect, Azerbaijan has successfully implemented its diplomatic maneuvers and maximized its military readiness under the favorable conditions of political stability and the economic gains of the energy sector. Carrying out a long-term defense program, Azerbaijan did not delay its responses during periods of heightened tensions.

While Azerbaijan fulfilled the requirements of the document signed after the November 9 ceasefire, it expected the same from Armenia. In this framework, the mutual functionalization of the Lachin and Zangezur corridors was regarded as a clear parameter. On the other hand, no concessions were made towards Karabakh’s goal of becoming an independent state through political actions, and a policy was put forth towards the integration of Karabakh Armenians into Azerbaijan.

An active Azerbaijani strategy was put into practice in the face of the so-called Karabakh presidential election, which Karabakh Armenians wanted to dictate as a fait accompli. The main principle of the strategy is based on the concept of a “unitary Azerbaijan.” In this respect, the separatist actions of the Armenians were not tolerated.

Recent developments indicate that Azerbaijan is initiating a normalization process in Karabakh. Steps have also been taken to integrate Karabakh into Azerbaijan’s infrastructure and administrative system. In this context, electricity from Armenia was cut off and connection to the Azerbaijani grid was established.

Within the scope of normalization, Azerbaijan intends to ensure full control of Karabakh’s administrative, civil, and security organization in the coming days. However, the Baku administration’s ultimate goal in all these developments seems to be to sign a permanent peace agreement.

T

hree years and four days ago, the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War began with Azerbaijan’s counterattack in response to Armenian aggression. The war ended 44 days later, on November 9, with the Trilateral Declaration of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Russia. This agreement not only ended the war between the two countries, but Azerbaijan liberated 10,000 sq km of its occupied territory that covered an area of 13,000 sq km in total; it did not, however establish state authority in the remaining 3,000 sq km of Khankendi, Khojaly, Khojavend, and Agdere.

Azerbaijan seeks solution, Armenia stalls

In Karabakh, the so-called Artsakh Republic, a government created by Armenians in 1991 and not even recognized by Armenia itself, was established and a continuous link with Armenia was maintained through the occupied territories. According to Article 4 of the Trilateral Declaration, Armenia was to withdraw its armed forces from the region, while Russian peacekeepers were to be stationed there. In addition, according to Article 9 of the declaration, the so-called Zangezur corridor was to be established to ensure uninterrupted safe transport between the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic and Azerbaijani territories.

Although Armenia and Azerbaijan were negotiating a lasting peace, and Pashinyan occasionally reaffirmed his recognition of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, no peace treaty had been signed. In addition, Armenia had taken no steps regarding its military assistance and presence in the four regions or the Nagorno-Karabakh corridor.

During the second track diplomacy meetings with civil society organizations and third parties on both sides, utopian ideas such as “delaying the process as long as possible, reoccupying Karabakh when the conditions are ripe, and ensuring an uninterrupted territorial connection with Armenia” were sometimes expressed. At worst, Armenia sought a different status (autonomy or greater privileges under international supervision) for the Armenians living in Karabakh.

Process completed in Karabakh

Azerbaijan’s inability to establish its authority fully in Khankendi, Khojaly, Khojavend, and Agdere was not the only problem after the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. Attacks and sabotage by Armenia and Armenian-backed armed groups against Azerbaijani military posts and construction activities in the liberated areas posed a significant problem.

In fact, after the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, more than 300 Azerbaijani civilians and security personnel were killed by mines and sabotage. This situation posed significant risks not only for the reconstruction of the region, but also for the return of forcibly displaced Azerbaijanis. It, therefore, became untenable.

Finally, following recent attacks on civilians and police officers, Azerbaijan launched a counterterrorism operation on September 19. The operation was highly professional in its planning and execution. In less than 24 hours, the Armenian armed groups announced their surrender. As a result of the negotiations following the operation, the Armenian armed groups agreed to lay down their arms and to dissolve the so-called state. In this manner, it was confirmed once again that the status quo imposed on Karabakh for the last 30 years has come to an end and the curtain has closed.

Khankendi clan’s hand weakens

At this point, it would be an oversimplification to characterize the Armenian armed groups or the hardliners in Karabakh simply as separatist armed groups or terrorists. There are many reasons for this, but I will mention just three. First, these groups were very influential in Armenian politics and worked closely with the hardline diaspora, in a sense holding the fate of the Armenian people hostage.

Second, these groups, reportedly numbering between 10,000 and 12,000, had armored vehicles, tanks, and even air defense systems that almost no terrorist organization has in its inventory. In addition, combat-ready individuals were recruited and deployed from various countries, including the PKK/YPG and, most importantly, officers from the Armenian army.

Third, these groups received all kinds of military support from Armenia through the Lachin corridor. In fact, as part of Azerbaijan’s measures against mines and sabotage, mines produced after the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War have been detected in the region.

Therefore, with its recent anti-terrorist operation, Azerbaijan has not only consolidated state authority in these regions, but has also dealt a significant blow to the influence of the Khankendi clan, which is the “sword of Damocles” in Armenian politics and that had a significant influence over Armenia’s policies on Karabakh.

Opportunity to end the vendetta

Since the beginning of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, the Azerbaijani state has repeatedly declared that Karabakh Armenians are citizens of Azerbaijan and have the same rights and duties as other Azerbaijanis on the basis of citizenship. Nevertheless, after the surrender of the so-called administration in Karabakh following the military operation, tens of thousands of people of Armenian origin were seen leaving Karabakh for Armenia.

Utilizing the convoys formed by these civilians, the Armenian lobby, especially those living in the U.S., France, and Russia, as well as those who are categorically anti-Turkish and anti-Azerbaijani, (it would be more accurate to say Turkophobic), have launched a new campaign: they are lamenting and shouting slogans with tears in their eyes, and collecting signatures about a “genocide” that is being committed again, referring to 1915.

Those who are trying to manipulate this humanitarian tragedy did not see any evil when nearly one million Azerbaijani Turks were forcibly displaced in 1988-1994, nor when hundreds of people, including women, children, and elderly, were massacred in Khojaly in 1992. Nor did they raise a peep of protest when Armenia shelled Azerbaijani civilian settlements during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War.

S

ince 2020, following the liberation of Karabakh from nearly three decades of Armenian occupation, the region has yet to establish a stable governance structure. This issue is undoubtedly complex, involving a multitude of actors beyond the primary parties involved. In addition to the ongoing Baku-Yerevan crisis, tensions have arisen between Moscow and Yerevan, on the one hand, and Baku and Tehran, and Ankara and Tehran, on the other, contributing to regional instability.

In response to this intricate situation, Presidents Aliyev of Azerbaijan and Erdoğan of Turkey, towards the end of 2020, introduced a proposal for a platform that would bring together the key stakeholders in the region, with the aim of resolving the conflict and forging a lasting peace. This proposal, known as the “6-party platform,” did not receive a positive reception from Iran and Armenia. Meanwhile, despite various proposals, progress remained stagnant, with Iran basing its South Caucasus policy on preventing the geopolitical losses that could result from disrupting the 30-year status quo.

To this end, Iran tested the responsiveness of the Baku administration by taking provocative measures, such as conducting military exercises along the border and issuing provocative statements through official channels. Simultaneously, Iran continued to caution Azerbaijan and Turkey, asserting “red lines” and emphasizing its stance of not permitting any alterations to the existing borders.

Armenia’s foreign policy shift

When Armenia’s efforts to seek support for its foreign policy, aimed at maintaining the illegal occupation of Karabakh, failed to elicit a response, especially from Russia, it turned its attention to the United States. In this context, Armenia explored options such as withdrawing from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Simultaneously, U.S. and Armenian soldiers commenced a joint military exercise known as “Eagle Partner.”

Eagle Partner was deliberately timed to coincide with the so-called presidential elections conducted in a region controlled by Armenian forces within Karabakh, serving as a clear political message to Baku. These illegitimate elections, strongly condemned by Turkey and unrecognized by the U.S. and the EU, unquestionably undermine the prospects for establishing stability and peace in the region.

Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan noted during an interview with an Italian media outlet that “our dependence on Russia for security has been a strategic mistake,” as his wife, Anna Hakobyan, visited Kyiv to express support for Ukraine. These developments have undoubtedly irked Russia. While this diplomatic shift by the Pashinyan administration appears to be driven by Russia’s perceived vulnerabilities, stemming from events such as the Ukrainian conflict and the Prigozhin mutiny, it is unlikely to yield the desired outcomes for Armenia.

How realistic is the prospect of war?

Could this tension escalate into an outright war? Are we teetering on the brink of a major regional conflict, as some claim? I would emphatically say we are not. A meticulous examination of the parties’ responses to the unfolding events makes it abundantly clear that the prospect of armed conflict involving Iran and Turkey is exceedingly narrow.

Keeping Iran’s motivations for safeguarding its national interests in the South Caucasus in mind, a comprehensive analysis of Iran’s internal and external political equilibrium, along with its diplomatic acumen, leaves no room for the possibility of the outbreak of such a war. Notably, senior Iranian military officials have unequivocally refuted allegations of military buildup along the Turkey-Iran border. Furthermore, military authorities from both nations have solidified their commitment to enhancing Iran-Azerbaijan military collaboration through an official agreement.

Seyed Abbas Mousavi, the Iranian ambassador to Azerbaijan, has chosen to characterize these developments and discussions as akin to “a storm in a teacup.” In essence, he has interpreted them as a tempestuous but ultimately inconsequential commotion. Moreover, it has become evident that there is no verifiable statement attributed to Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan suggesting that Turkey would intervene if Azerbaijan were to come under attack.

Hence, the prospects of war are virtually non-existent, and diplomatic prudence prevails at the highest echelons of officialdom, guided by a keen sense of statecraft. However, this does not imply that tensions have completely dissipated. In simple terms, where there is smoke, there is fire. Several focal points continue to fuel this tension.

Social media accounts associated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) persist in issuing threats directed at Azerbaijan. In addition to that, Azerbaijan’s ambassador to Iran Ali Alizada, said via X, fomerly known as Twitter, that Armenian troops were engaging in military activities along the Nakhchivan border, characterizing it as a provocative move. These acts of provocation underscore Armenia and Iran’s reluctance to acknowledge the realities on the ground.

Iran’s efforts to stop the Zangezur Corridor or accept only similar plans tailored to their preferences are noteworthy. Nevertheless, given Iran’s inability to engage in a large-scale conflict, its primary recourse is to perpetuate instability in a bid to enhance its bargaining position. However, even if this tactic temporarily hinders progress, it remains dubious whether it can deter Azerbaijan from realizing its objectives in the medium and long terms.

T

he governments of Azerbaijan and Armenia have traded accusations of responsibility over border clashes that have claimed the lives of 71 Azerbaijani and 100 Armenian soldiers at the Karabakh border area since September 12, 2022.

The death toll is the highest since the two countries reached a truce in 2020 following the renewal of a 30-year-old conflict that ended in Baku recapturing much of the territory belonging to Azerbaijan that had been occupied by Armenia. Following Turkish diplomatic and military support, a truce brokered by Russia was reached.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) held a meeting on September 15, 2022, to discuss the situation on the ground in Karabakh, where a small Russian peace force is present.

Moscow calls for calmness

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation has called on all parties to the conflict to practice self-restraint. Both Azerbaijani and Russian presidents met at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit held in Uzbekistan on September 15-16.

The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a Russia-led military bloc, of which Armenia is part, along with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, said it will not send troops to support Armenia following a meeting held on September 13 at the request of Yerevan.

Nikol Pashinyan, the prime minister of Armenia, said in a speech before his country’s parliament that 105 Armenian soldiers were killed in the clashes, noting that he sought military assistance from the CSTO. Yerevan announced a unilateral ceasefire on September 14, and Baku in return offered to hand over the bodies of 100 Armenian soldiers killed at the border.

Yury Ushakov, Russian presidential aide, called on both parties to “observe the well-known trilateral statement of the leaders of Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia from November 2020, as well as January and November 2021.”

Turkey and the escalation

Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan reiterated Ankara’s support for Baku, noting that “the world should know that Türkiye stands by its Azerbaijani brothers and sisters,” during a speech he gave in Ankara on September 14.

“Türkiye hopes Armenia will step back from its current mistaken path to work for peace instead,” he said.

In the same context, Turkish Minister of Defense Hulusi Akar discussed the escalation in Karabakh in a phone call with his Azerbaijani counterpart Zakir Hasanov on September 14, stressing that Ankara stands by Baku and the people of Azerbaijan.

Concerns from Washington

Anthony Blinken, the U.S. secretary of the state, said in a statement that “the U.S. is deeply concerned about reports of attacks along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border, including reported strikes against settlements and civilian infrastructure inside Armenia. As we have long made clear, there can be no military solution to the conflict. We urge an end to any military hostilities immediately.”

State Department spokesperson Ned Price stated, “We have called on Russia, and we do call on Russia, to use that influence and to use that leverage in a way that helps to achieve a cessation of hostilities, and more broadly, a de-escalation of those tensions.”

Armenia and Azerbaijan fought a war in 2020 over the Karabakh region, which claimed the lives of 6,000 people and ended on November 9, 2020, following Russian mediation. Baku was able to recapture much of the territory of Karabakh, which was under Armenian occupation for 30 years.

Armenia today is going through the most difficult and bleak times in its history. Armenians have a poor and growingly poorer country, and a feudal-criminal-oligarchic political regime with collapsed science and education sectors. The country suffers from limited resources that are decreasing year by year and high emigration, above all of the intelligentsia, while the defeat in the Karabakh War in the fall of 2020 caused the loss of military equipment and military property worth $4 billion.

After running along international corridors with requests to influence Azerbaijan during the recent war, today, Armenia is suffering from a multibillion-dollar external debt with a $350 million state budget. This is the real legacy of the “Third Republic of Armenia”, with which today its citizens have to live. And there appears no exit in sight.

The principal reason for this state of affairs is that Armenia has not been able over the course of the 30 years of its existence to put into practice the ideology on which it was created and for which it has exited all this time. The meaning of the existence and all state activity of the “Third Republic of Armenia” was the implementation of the idea of Miatsum: the reunification of the Yerevan and Karabakh Armenians within the borders of a single state and the expansion of their “living space” through, first, the occupation and seizure of Azerbaijani lands, and, then, the territories of other neighbors such as the now Georgian region of Ninotsminda/Javakh with a predominantly Armenian population.

The “Third Republic of Armenia” was born thanks to the Miatsum movement, according to which it acquired its own state ideology, which very soon turned into a national idea and transformed the Armenian people in the diaspora into a modern political nation.

Over the last quarter of a century after the end of the First Karabakh War of 1988-1994, for the sake of the concept of Miatsum, “unification” in Armenian. Armenia has spent excessive funds on the maintenance of the occupation regime in Karabakh. Any true observer, however, could understand that it was not Armenia that occupied Azerbaijani Karabakh, but the separatist regime of Karabakh, which named itself Artsakh, occupied Do you mean occupied Karabakh, and took over all its human, material, and financial resources.

The total defeat of Armenia in the war with Azerbaijan in the fall of 2020 destroyed not only its army and half of its military infrastructure, but also inflicted a severe ideological defeat.

The total defeat of Armenia in the war with Azerbaijan in the fall of 2020 destroyed not only its army and half of its military infrastructure, but also inflicted a severe ideological defeat. It exposed the fact that the idea of Miatsum, which Armenia has lived with for the past thirty and more years, was, in fact, an absolutely unviable utopia. At least two generations of Armenians, who believed in it with reverence and suffered hardships for the sake of its realization, turned out to have been misled. The current internal political situation in Armenia perfectly proves this: the split in Armenian society took place precisely on the issue of each individual citizen’s subjective attitude on Miatsum.

Supporters of the current Armenian prime minister Nikol Pashinyan are ready to abandon Karabakh and the idea of Miatsum for the sake of a new future for their country, while supporters of his main opponent in the early parliamentary elections, former president Robert Kocharyan, count on the reincarnation of Miatsum ideology and believe in a victory in a new war with Azerbaijan, but now not only for Karabakh, but also for Nakhichevan. Miatsum is the cornerstone of the “Third Republic of Armenia”. In October-November of last year, the latter was split by the Azerbaijani army, after which Armenia plunged into internal political chaos, which we are all witnessing today.

Today, Armenia does not have a state ideology and its people have no national idea; therefore, the crisis is characterized by longevity, an uncompromising attitude, and fierceness.

After the collapse of the USSR, the idea of Miatsum became a kind of ticket for the post-Soviet Armenians into the Armenian diaspora. This gave it additional value and significance in the eyes of the Yerevan and Karabakh Armenians, in whose eyes Miatsum became a kind of “compensation” for the “genocide” – not for all Armenians, but only for post-Soviet Armenians, as a result of which the topic of “genocide” began to be perceived by them as optional in relation to the idea of Miatsum.

The Armenian diaspora, following the post-Soviet Armenians, was also forced to recognize the idea of Miatsum as a priority, so as not to shatter the sense of a national-religious Armenian unity from within. This ultimately led to the formulation of a new pan-Armenian ideology or the ideological triad “Armenia – Diaspora – Artsakh.” The defeat of Armenia in the recent war and the actual destruction of the occupation regime, which the Armenians themselves called “Artsakh,” put an end to this ideological structure despite what its supporters might claim.

Even Russia’s intervention in the war and the transition to temporary military control of a part of the Azerbaijani territory to Russia will not allow the Armenians in the medium term to hold out, at least in part, of Karabakh. The Kremlin is still able to slow down the complete return of all Azerbaijani territories under the official jurisdiction of Baku and the subsequent resettlement of Armenians from Karabakh, but it is no longer able to guarantee this in the future.

From day to day, Baku is multiplying its official claims against Moscow, which cannot adequately counter them or offer intelligible and comprehensive answers. As soon as the number of these claims reaches a critical mass, Azerbaijan will launch a diplomatic, political, and military offensive, which in the medium term will lead to the restoration of its control over its entire territory and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Karabakh. This will be the final blow to the currently moribund idea of Miatsum, which will automatically put an end to the history of the “Third Republic of Armenia”.

To maintain its presence in the South Caucasus region, today, Russia has to accept great losses of resources and prestige, and material sacrifices. All this for the sole purpose of preserving the current statehood of Armenia in order for it to recast its ideological basis – but always in line with Russian foreign policy. Otherwise, the Kremlin understands very clearly that Moscow will finally lose the South Caucasus region.

The agony of the “Third Republic of Armenia” with Russia’s resuscitation efforts will continue until either a new and acceptable Armenian state ideology is developed in the Kremlin or for the Kremlin, or until the Kremlin runs out of opportunities to maintain Armenia’s statehood. It is very likely that the patient will not be saved, since the spirit of Miatsum, which was the driving force behind the existence of the “Third Republic of Armenia”, is not immortal and will perish with the current generation of Armenian politicians.

The early parliamentary elections in Armenia on June 20 are unlikely to change this situation. Unless, of course, Nikol Pashinyan, who most probably will win the elections, himself declares Miatsum as dead and that Karabakh. Although in the upcoming elections there is also the option for the public to decide that Pashinyan is part of the past and that his predecessors belong in distant history.

The U.S. covert war against NATO ally Turkey gained a new dimension when U.S. President Joe Biden used the word “genocide” for the mass deportation of Ottoman Armenian subjects in 1915. Why did Biden add another thorny issue to the bilateral relations between Washington and Ankara, which are already at a low, at a time when he wants to contain Russia’s and China’s increasing influence? How will Washington’s unilateral actions against Turkey effect that policy? And, most importantly, should Turkey consider Biden’s statement as a serious affair?

The horrific events that took place in 1915, during the last years of the Ottoman Empire, and how to identify them has been a problem between the U.S. and Turkey for more than three decades. Each year, on April 24, all eyes turn to Washington to see if the U.S. administration will declare that a “genocide” was perpetrated against Ottoman Armenians in Eastern Anatolia.

Previous U.S. administrations have not used the term genocide in formal statements amid concerns over damaging relations with Turkey, a NATO ally. But this year, President Joe Biden became the first U.S. president to recognize the horrific events in 1915 officially as a “genocide,” risking another potential fracture with Turkey. In his statement, Biden said the intention was “not to cast blame but to ensure that what happened is never repeated.” He also referred to Istanbul as “Constantinople” which also drew criticism, since the latter is a word Greeks use for Turkey’s biggest city.

Reports in the U.S. media quoted diplomatic sources saying that Biden’s words “our aim is to not cast blame” can be understood to mean that he does not want to hold Turkey responsible.

But this is not the case…

The issue is highly sensitive. Turkey does not deny the suffering of Armenians in WWI. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan reiterated this in a letter to the Armenian Patriarch of Turkey and to Armenia, and called once again for the formation of a joint commission of historians and academics to analyze the national archives of Turkey, Armenia, and the related countries. Unfortunately, Turkey’s calls have not been accepted by Armenia as of today.

In 2016, Kamala Harris had reaffirmed her commitment to proper recognition and a resolution for the “Armenian genocide.”

There are many ways to explain why Biden used the word “genocide.” It is clear that Vice President Kamala Harris and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi were fully committed to the recognition of that so-called genocide. For the record, we should keep in mind that Kamala Harris met with members of the Armenian National Committee of America – Western Region (ANCA-WR) as attorney general of California when her campaign for U.S. Senate kicked into high gear in 2016, where she reaffirmed her commitment to proper recognition and a resolution for the “Armenian genocide.”

Given that an international judicial mechanism should decide what happened in 1915, documents, books, testimonies, and archives are the most reliable sources to base this decision on. Well-known historians like Bernard Lewis, Stanford Shaw, Heath Lowry, J.C. Hurewitz and Justin McCarthy openly stated that what happened in 1915 cannot be described as “genocide” once the archives and testimonies of the Armenians and the Ottoman Muslims are studied in detail without prejudice.

Documents and books like The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaktsutyun) has Nothing to Do Anymore written by Hovhannes Kajaznuni, the first prime minister of Armenia, are why Armenia does not want to open its archives for research and why the Armenian diaspora prefers lobbying and narratives over academic panels and historical documents.

As a co-founder of the Dashnaktsutyun Party, Kajaznuni presented his views about what really happened in 1915 and how they were deluded by the Russians and the British, during the party’s congress held in Bucharest in 1923 as a manifesto His statements shine a spotlight on the historical background behind the Ottomans’ decision to relocate Ottoman Armenian citizens. He said, “The dream of an Armenia that spans from sea to sea is the reason why we rebelled. We are the cause of the incidents. We were duped. The relocation implemented by the Turks was an appropriate measure. We should not look for a culprit, it is us. We lived together of centuries, now we can’t even look the Turks in the face.”

These confessions caused a great uproar among the members of the Dashnaktsutyun Party and almost all the copies of Kajaznuni’s book were collected from the libraries across Europe in the late 1920s. In 1955, in New York, the book was republished in English by the Armenian Information Service, this time excluding his original words.

There are many documents about the events of 1915 that should be brought to the attention of the public on both sides. The formation of a joint committee of historians is the only just, reliable, and humane way to define what really happened. Any evaluation without a legal landmark such as Biden’s unilateral decision, will only make things worse.

Iran plans to join the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Although EAEU officials claim they have never received any formal requests from Tehran, the Islamic Republic hopes to become the sixth member state of the alliance very soon.

For Iran, the best way to counter the U.S. sanctions is to strengthen economic ties with the Eurasian Union – a supranational entity that was created on the basis of the Customs Union of Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus in 2014. Armenia and Kyrgyzstan joined the EAEU in 2015, which was when the enlargement process stalled. However, in October 2018, the Eurasian Union signed a free trade agreement with Iran. The trade balance between the bloc and the Islamic Republic has been growing ever since.

Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, the total turnover between Iran and the EAEU increased by two percent in 2020 and exceeded $2 billion. Food products and raw agricultural materials accounted for about 80 percent, or $939 million, of the volume of supplies from EAEU countries to Iran, more than half of which – $609 million – fell on grain.

In turn, similar goods accounted for most of the supplies from Iran to the union – 68 percent or $575 million. Moreover, according to Iranian officials, Iran’s exports to Russia, the de facto leader of the EAEU, have increased by 40 percent, and a financial trading hub and a logistics center were planned to track customs and contracting issues.

Iran’s parliament speaker Mohammad Baqer Qaliba visited Moscow on February 10 and said that Iran would “permanently join the EAEU in two weeks.” Given that Qaliba is a potential candidate in the upcoming Iranian presidential elections scheduled for June 18, it is debatable whether his rhetoric should be taken as part of the election campaign or as a serious announcement of Tehran’s long-term geopolitical goals.

In any case, there is no doubt that Iran, faced with the U.S. sanctions, is keen to join the Eurasian Union as soon as possible. However, it remains highly uncertain if this organization is ready to let Tehran into the post-Soviet integration space. Mikhail Myasnikovich, the chairman of the board of the Eurasian Economic Commission, said that the Eurasian Union wants Iran to have “a special view on cooperation with Eurasia.”

No doubt, faced with the U.S. sanctions, Iran is keen to join the Eurasian Union as soon as possible.

That, however, does not necessarily mean that Iran will join the EAEU anytime soon. Also, according to Iya Malkina, aide to the chairman of the board of the Eurasian Economic Commission, “There have been no requests for Iran’s accession to the Eurasian Economic Union.” Such a statement could mean that the Islamic Republic will have to deal with bureaucratic procedures and may have to wait a while to become a full-fledged member.

Tehran’s potential membership in the EAEU would undoubtedly improve Iran’s economic and political position in the global arena. Such an action would likely allow the Islamic Republic to neutralize, at least partially, the cost of U.S. sanctions. It could also force the Joe Biden administration to be more flexible in the future negotiations on Tehran’s nuclear program. Also, given that the UN Security Council embargo on conventional arms shipments to Iran expired in October 2020, the Kremlin and the Islamic Republic could eventually strengthen their military ties.

It is no secret that the Islamic Republic is interested in purchasing the Russian S-400 anti-aircraft system and SU-30 fighter jets. It remains to be seen, however, if Russia will agree to such sales. In the past, Russia refused to sell sophisticated weapons to Iran, bending to pressure from the United States and Israel. Indeed, it is Israel that would not look favorably upon the Kremlin’s supply of arms to Tel Aviv’s major regional opponent.

It is a well-known fact that Moscow is actively making deals with the Jewish state. The two sides reportedly reached a deal on a prison swap to free a Jewish-Israeli woman held in Syria in exchange for the release of two Syrian prisoners by Israel. There are also speculations that Russia and Israel are negotiating on not only humanitarian issues, but also wider regional arrangements.

The Kremlin is trying to secure its own geopolitical interests in the region while balancing between Tehran and Tel Aviv.

Indeed, in early February, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spoke with Russian President Vladimir Putin about regional issues and the continued Russia-Israel coordination in light of security developments in the Middle East. Although Moscow has often been accused of acting as an ally of Israel, despite its formal alliance with Syria where Israeli forces regularly conduct airstrikes on Iranian targets, the Kremlin is trying to secure its own geopolitical interests in the region while balancing between Tehran and Tel Aviv.

There are indications that Moscow seeks to establish an alternative pathway to the markets of the Middle East. That could be one of the reasons why the Kremlin strongly supports the construction of the Nakhchivan corridor – a land route connecting not only Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave located between Turkey and Armenia, but also Russia and Iran. A future rail link between Russia and Iran, passing though Azerbaijan and Armenia, is expected to have a serious impact on economic relations between Moscow and the Islamic Republic.

Furthermore, a rail link could help Iran strengthen its ties with other Eurasian Union member states. For instance, Armenia is hoping to benefit from Iran’s accession to the Eurasian Union. A delegation of Iranian majlis is expected to visit Yerevan soon to take part in a meeting of the Armenian-Iranian parliamentary group of friendship. Also, Kazakhstan’s experts believe that, from an economic perspective, Iran’s potential membership in the EAEU will have a huge impact on the economy of the Central Asian nation.

For Russia, Iran’s trump card is probably its sea, namely the Indian Ocean. In order to get an access to sea trade routes, Russia has fought bloody wars for centuries. With Tehran joining the Moscow-dominated Eurasian Union, the alliance would go beyond the post-Soviet borders and the Russian Federation would likely increase its influence in the Middle East.

Everything that is happening in Yerevan nowadays has the signs of a military coup, but in fact it is not. Personally, I perceive the statement of Chief of the General Staff of the Armenian Armed Forces, Colonel General Onik Gasparyan, demanding that Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan resign as the military’s intervention in politics and a political démarche, but not as a military takeover or even the sign of a readiness to take full responsibility for the situation in the country.

If this general really wanted to remove Pashinyan from power, he would not have come out with incomprehensible statements, but rather would have gathered three or four dozen decisive officers around him, blocked the prime minister’s motorcade somewhere, disarmed or shot his guards, and took Pashinyan himself a hostage, forcing him to sign documents on the transfer of power, thereby giving such a step the legality of the transfer of power.

Currently, in Yerevan there are no signs of a military coup: the soldiers are in barracks, and the buildings of the parliament, the government, the national television, together with the state bank and other financial institutions of the country have not been taken under the control of the army. The Internet is not turned off nor are the airports closed.

The call of the Chief of the General Staff of Armenian Armed Forces for Pashinyan to resign only provoked a new round of confrontation between civilian supporters and opponents of the Armenian prime minister, while the army itself remained on the sidelines.

It became obvious that the Armenian military is not ready or is unable to end the chaos in the country, which they themselves have helped create in the first place. Perhaps for this reason, military commanders decided to play politics today so as not to lose their posts tomorrow.

Here it would be appropriate to recall the New Year’s address of Prime Minister Pashinyan to his compatriots, in which he stated that his main domestic political goal was to change the elites, while he did not specify which particular elites he was going to lustrate and ostracize. The high command of the armed forces of Armenia, with its extremely low level of professionalism, undoubtedly became one of the main reasons for the defeat in the war with Azerbaijan last autumn, after which all of the generals of the Armenian army should have been dismissed.

In recent months, Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan has been holding back from taking the decision to dismiss the defeated generals only due to the lack of worthy candidates to replace them. They, in turn, also perfectly understood that their time in high positions is rapidly coming to an end, and therefore decided to participate in the removal of the head of state from power – before he does so to them.

The generals of the Armenian army made their career during the rule of the so-called Karabakh clan in the country.

The generals of the Armenian army made their career during the rule of the so-called Karabakh clan in the country – a junta of field commanders of the illegal armed formations of the Armenian separatists of Nagorno-Karabakh during the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1990-1994 which includes former presidents of Armenia Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan. As we know, the “Karabakh clan” was expelled from power in Armenia as a result of the peaceful people’s revolution in the spring of 2018, after which the current head of Armenia, Nikol Pashiyan, came to power.

Since then, the confrontation between Pashiyan and his entourage, on the one side, and the representatives of the “Karabakh clan” of Kocharyan and Sargsyan, on the other, has not stopped. Many of the generals who demanded Pashinyan’s resignation were and continue to be closely associated with the “Karabakh clan.” Many of them have gone through all the stages of their military career in the occupation corps of the Armenian armed forces, known as the “Artsakh Defense Army,” in the previously occupied Azerbaijani lands. The Artsakh Defense Army was integrated into the structure of the Armenian army.

When on October 10, 2020, on the initiative and under the diplomatic pressure of Moscow, a humanitarian truce was declared to put an end to the catastrophic situation of the Armenian army at the frontline, Pashinyan broke the ceasefire by ordering the army to launch a missile strike on civilian targets in the Azerbaijani cities of Ganja and Barda. On October 14, 2020, the ex-Minister of Defense of Armenia David Tononyan also urged him to stop hostilities and start negotiations with Azerbaijan, but Pashinyan refused to take this step for another month, and only at the end of the first half of November, did he ask for peace on surrender terms.

But by this time, all the tactical formations of the occupation corps of the Armenian troops in Karabakh, or the “Artsakh Defense Army,” were physically destroyed or defeated at the battlefield – with the exception of one battalion in the Kelbajar region, which did not participate in battles. In other words, the “Karabakh clan” had lost its military and political support.

Pashinyan, by acting this way, clearly remembered that in the spring of 2018, when he came to power in Armenia, the then Head of State Sargsyan summoned army units from Karabakh to suppress popular protests and defend his regime, but what they did instead was to support the side of the protesters.

To avoid a repetition of such a scenario and deprive the “Karabakh clan” of their influence in the army, Pashinyan decided not to disband them, but to exterminate them in the war, thereby driving a wedge between Armenia and Karabakh to the extent of transferring the territory back to the jurisdiction of Azerbaijan. After all, it was not out of the blue that former Armenian President Robert Kocharyan said in his statement upon his return to politics that his return was not motivated by the “anti-Armenian” or “anti-national” sentiments of Pashinyan, but because of his “anti-Karabakh” actions.

The sequence and totality of these actions have their own logic, which should be understood and taken into account when predicting or forming scenarios for the course of events in the South Caucasus region, and especially in its neighboring countries – primarily Russia and Turkey- in the near and middle term.

First, Pashinyan provokes a war with Azerbaijan, surrenders Karabakh and all other previously occupied territories to it, then returns all Karabakh Armenians to Khankendi under the protection of Russian peacekeepers, thereby depriving the “Karabakh clan” of its material and social base. What will be his next step? It seems to me that after the reprisal (not physical, but metaphorical) of the opposition generals, the final outcome of which we will see within the next months, Pashinyan will begin to expropriate the assets of the leaders of the “Karabakh clan” and local oligarchs associated with them inside the country.

For the process of annihilation of the old army elites to take place as invisibly as possible in front of the international community and, most importantly, the Armenian diaspora, especially the Russian one, Pashinyan may completely abandon Karabakh and its population, leaving Russia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey on their own in Karabakh.

Perhaps such a prospect might seem to many as a fantasy or even a phantasmagoria, but one should be ready for all scenarios.

On September 27, 2020, responding to constant shelling of its villages and cities, the Republic of Azerbaijan began military operations in Karabakh. Within 44 days of the military campaign, the Azerbaijani army was able to inflict a heavy defeat on Armenia and Karabakh separatists, liberating several occupied territories. Based on the peace agreement signed by the Azerbaijani president, the Armenian prime minister, and the Russian president, hostilities ended on November 10, while Armenia withdrew its forces from three more occupied territories. During the conflict, there were many allegations of Armenia using mercenaries from various countries. Several reports and articles indicated that Yerevan relied on the help of various mercenary groups including the PKK terrorist organization. This opinion article will elaborate on these claims and shed light on the use of mercenaries in Karabakh.

The first report on Armenian use of mercenaries in Karabakh came from Russian journalist Ilya Azar in the newspaper Novaya Gazeta. He was the first to report on foreign mercenaries in Karabakh fighting for the Armenian side. In his article, he interviewed French citizen Artur Oganisyan, who came to Karabakh to fight on the Armenian side. After the interview, Azar was expelled from Karabakh. Reuters also interviewed Lebanese-Armenians fighting in the war and claimed that there are dozens of mercenaries coming from Beirut to fight in Karabakh against Azerbaijan.

The PKK in Karabakh

For a long time, experts in international relations have warned that non-recognized territories can become rogue states, and therefore sources of terrorism and criminal activities. These territories are de facto independent but not bound by any international treaties. They have their own armies, law enforcement, and political institutions, but lack financial viability which may force them to earn money through weapons sales, drug trafficking, and hosting insurgent training camps. Karabakh, for example, was one of the most militarized areas in the world. That safe haven attracted members of the PKK terrorist organization as well. Discussions of relocating some PKK groups to Karabakh started in the early 2000s. Karabakh separatists also began a process of settling Armenians, mostly from Syria and Lebanon, in Azerbaijani occupied territories.

The PKK’s decision to move some of its groups to Karabakh was a pragmatic choice for both sides. Karabakh is the only territory in the Middle East and the Caucasus where Turkey seemed less likely to engage in military action. Most of the countries in the region would hardly risk hosting PKK members for fear of Turkey’s military wrath. Even for Armenia, it would be suicidal to establish PKK camps on its territory. Yerevan would need to give explanations to the international community and could face sanctions for doing so. But Karabakh is a different story – the Turkish army was unlikely to chase PKK terrorists there. Any Turkish military activity in that area would involve the Armenian troops deployed in Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenian participation in a conflict would automatically bring Russia into it as the guarantor of the security of its southern ally. Thus, for many years, this territory was a safe haven for PKK groups.

Armenian soldier Albert Mikaelyan, captured by the Azerbaijani army during the recent military operations, stated during a press conference that while serving in an anti-tank unit, Mikaelyan noticed the presence of Kurdish-speaking mercenaries in the barracks, up to 1,500 of them. “They get paid $600. They are divided into teams of 10-15. They have been learning local conditions and preparing for deployment to the battlefield,” Mikaelyan added. Meanwhile, the Azerbaijani president’s aide, Hikmat Hajiyev, stated that Armenia is using the PKK terrorists on the front lines in Upper Karabakh. He expressed concerns about the use of the PKK in Karabakh and mentioned that there are terrorists in the ranks of the Armenian armed forces. Essentially, they were deployed on the front line of the Armenian armed forces. In a statement, Turkish President Recep Erdogan noted the presence of 2,000 PKK terrorists fighting alongside Armenia against Azerbaijan in Karabakh.

Armenian soldier Albert Mikaelyan noticed the presence of Kurdish-speaking mercenaries in the barracks, up to 1,500 of them.

Reportedly, Armenia transported most of these terrorists from Suleymaniyah, a stronghold of the PKK in Iraq. There were several flights from this Iraqi city to Yerevan before and during the recent military confrontations. Meanwhile, a separate group of YPG militants, regarded by many as the Syrian wing of the PKK, were sent to Nagorno-Karabakh from the Qamishli region on the Syrian-Iraqi borders. Azerbaijan, in turn, reported that dozens of PKK terrorists were killed in Karabakh during the military operations.

Despite the Armenian reliance on mercenaries, they were hardly able to change the course of the war. The Armenian side expected that the war would start and continue in a traditional way, using conventional weapons and tactics. Instead, Azerbaijan relied on technology, completely neutralizing the Armenian competitive advantage of using mercenaries. Thus, by the end of the military operation, Armenians suffered heavy casualties mostly caused by Azerbaijani armed drones and artillery attacks.