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alaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s recent comments on Taiwan have intensified scrutiny over whether the Southeast Asian nation is drifting from its long-held policy of non-alignment and tilting toward Beijing amid intensifying US-China rivalry.

In an interview with Al Jazeera aired earlier this month, Anwar stated unequivocally that he viewed Taiwan “as part of China, period,” adding that this position was “accepted by all.” The remarks drew immediate praise from Beijing and sharp condemnation from Taipei, while reigniting debate among analysts and diplomats about Malaysia’s strategic orientation.

When pressed on whether he would condemn China if it resorted to military force should peaceful reunification fail, Anwar drew a controversial parallel to his own country’s territorial integrity. If a Malaysian state attempted to secede, he said, he would use force to “protect the sanctity and unity of” Malaysia.

China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs welcomed the comments, with a spokesman reiterating that Taiwan is “an inalienable part of China’s territory” and that “China must and will be reunited.”

Taiwan’s government, however, warned that Anwar’s “one-sided support for China could negatively impact Taiwanese businesses’ confidence in investing in Malaysia.” The self-governing island, the world’s leading semiconductor producer, remains a major investor in Malaysia’s critical chip manufacturing sector.

Walking back or doubling down?

Facing questions from local media in the days following the interview, Anwar appeared to soften his stance, emphasizing that Malaysia respected China’s position but favored a peaceful resolution to tensions across the Taiwan Strait.

The apparent recalibration did little to quell speculation about Malaysia’s geopolitical leanings, particularly after Anwar courted further headlines by calling for strengthened defenses in the Bornean state of Sabah. He cited the development of US-backed military facilities in neighboring Philippines as partial justification for increased defense spending.

The Philippine government is upgrading military installations on the island of Balabac, located just 50 kilometers from the Malaysian islands of Banggi and Balambangan. Balabac was recently added to the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement between Washington and Manila, granting US forces access to designated locations across the Philippines.

Anwar’s remarks have reinforced longstanding suspicions among Western observers that Malaysia is breaking from its traditional non-aligned posture and aligning more closely with China. The country has become one of the most enthusiastic recipients of Chinese investment under Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative, and China now represents Malaysia’s largest trading partner.

Malaysia has also diverged sharply from Western positions on other geopolitical issues, most notably the ongoing conflict in the Middle East. Long a vocal critic of Israel, Malaysia under Anwar has been especially outspoken in its opposition to Israel’s war on Gaza.

The Sabah dimension

Some analysts, however, caution against reading Anwar’s comments as evidence of a strategic realignment.

Chee Meng Tan, an assistant professor of business economics at the University of Nottingham Malaysia, noted that Malaysia’s recognition of Taiwan as part of China dates back to the 1974 communiqué signed by then-Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries.

“What was new was Anwar’s statement on the potential use of force, which the One China policy does not explicitly require,” Tan said, suggesting the remarks should be viewed in the context of Anwar’s scheduled visit to China in September.

Anwar’s comments on the US-backed base in Balabac are also connected to Malaysia’s long-running territorial dispute with the Philippines over Sabah. Manila has claimed the territory since it joined Malaysia in 1963, a claim Kuala Lumpur has consistently rejected.

The Philippines reaffirmed its claim to Sabah in February, maintaining that its Maritime Zones Act 2024 preserved “existing and valid claims” over part of the state. In July, Malaysia lodged a formal protest with the United Nations over the Philippines’ claim to an extended continental shelf that Malaysia argued encroached on Sabahan waters.

Tan suggested that Anwar’s comments on the Balabac military buildup may represent “a ‘protect-my-border’ reflex rather than a pro-China gesture.”

Balancing act continues

Anwar’s call to bolster Sabah’s defenses also comes as Malaysia seeks to strengthen its military posture in Borneo, partly to reinforce its claims in the disputed South China Sea, where Malaysia is a claimant state alongside China, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Brunei.

While Malaysia has adopted a less confrontational stance on the South China Sea dispute than the Philippines, it has maintained robust defense ties with Western powers as a quiet counterweight to China’s military buildup in the contested waters.

This is exemplified by Malaysia’s continued commitment to the Five Powers Defence Arrangements, a multilateral security framework that also includes Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. While not a binding defense treaty, the arrangement commits members to consult in the event of an armed attack on Malaysia or Singapore.

Under the framework, annual military exercises involving personnel and assets from member countries are conducted. The arrangement maintains an air defense operations headquarters at a Malaysian Air Force base in Butterworth, Penang, headed by a senior Australian Air Force officer. Australia also maintains a rifle company in Butterworth and regular maritime patrol aircraft deployments to Malaysia.

As a central pillar of the arrangement, Malaysia facilitates a Western military presence in the region that analysts say provides a quiet deterrent against potential aggressors.

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aiwan’s military conducted a large-scale coastal defense exercise on Tuesday, simulating the destruction of an invading Chinese force in what officials described as a more realistic combat scenario designed to strengthen the island’s readiness against a potential amphibious assault.

The drill, held along Taiwan’s western coastline facing mainland China, involved the coordinated use of rockets, artillery, mortars, anti-tank missiles, and mobile weapons systems to create a defensive “kill zone” aimed at stopping enemy forces before they could establish a beachhead.

The exercise comes amid growing military pressure from China, which claims Taiwan as its territory and has not ruled out the use of force to bring the self-governed island under Beijing’s control. Chinese military aircraft and naval vessels regularly operate around Taiwan, while Beijing has intensified military activities in the Taiwan Strait in recent years.

The drills were conducted simultaneously from eight locations across a 20-kilometer stretch of coastline near the central city of Taichung, an area considered one of the most likely landing points for a potential Chinese invasion.

Military officials said the exercise reflected a broader effort to make Taiwan’s armed forces more agile and prepared for actual battlefield conditions.

“What is different about this training compared with the past is that we are no longer conducting heavy artillery firing in a fixed, routine formation,” artillery commander Ong Yih-ming told reporters during the exercise.

“The timing for entering positions this time was based on realistic combat conditions. Therefore, the level of difficulty for our troops was considerably higher,” he said.

Overhauling military doctrine

Taiwan has been overhauling its military doctrine in recent years, shifting away from traditional large-scale formations toward a more flexible defense strategy focused on mobility, survivability, and rapid response.

The latest exercise showcased several key weapons systems, including the domestically produced Thunderbolt-2000 multiple launch rocket system, a truck-mounted platform designed to deliver concentrated firepower while maintaining high mobility.

Military officials said Tuesday marked the first time in seven years that the Thunderbolt-2000 had conducted live-fire operations in an active deployment area.

Rocket commander Liao Neng-cheng said the exercise significantly reduced preparation times to better mirror wartime conditions.

“In previous years, units would often arrive at firing positions a week in advance and spend several days preparing,” he said.

“This time, we arrived only one day before the exercise and completed all preparations within a much shorter timeframe.”

Improving military’s ability

The changes are intended to improve the military’s ability to survive and operate under conditions where enemy surveillance, missile attacks, and electronic warfare could limit opportunities for lengthy preparations.

Alongside the Thunderbolt-2000 systems, troops deployed U.S.-made Paladin self-propelled howitzers, anti-tank missiles, conventional artillery pieces, and mortar units. The weapons were used in a simulated operation designed to halt an amphibious landing force approaching Taiwan’s shores.

Military planners have long regarded Taiwan’s western coast as one of the most vulnerable areas in any future conflict. The region’s beaches and mudflats provide some of the few locations suitable for large-scale amphibious landings by the Chinese military.

The exercise took place as tensions between Taipei and Beijing remain elevated.

Taiwan’s government rejects China’s sovereignty claims, insisting that only the island’s 23 million people have the right to determine their future. Beijing, however, considers Taiwan a breakaway province and has repeatedly stated that reunification is inevitable.

Chinese officials have increased military and political pressure on Taiwan since the election of Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te, whom Beijing has labeled a separatist.

China’s growing intolerance of Taipei

China has also suspended formal communications with Taipei and stepped up military patrols near the island. Taiwanese authorities have reported an increase in Chinese coast guard activities around Taiwan’s waters, including near the Taiwan-controlled Pratas Islands in the northern South China Sea.

Speaking to local media on Tuesday, Chiu Chui-cheng, head of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, accused Beijing of attempting to alter the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.

“The one trying to change the status quo is the Chinese Communist Party,” Chiu said.

“We will use strength and sufficient deterrent capability to prevent the Chinese communists from changing the status quo by force.”

The Chinese government’s Taiwan Affairs Office did not immediately comment on the exercise.

Security analysts say Taiwan’s military modernization efforts reflect growing concerns over China’s expanding military capabilities and increasingly frequent operations near the island. While many experts believe an invasion would remain an extraordinarily complex undertaking, Taiwan continues to strengthen its defenses and improve readiness for a range of possible conflict scenarios.

Tuesday’s exercise highlighted Taipei’s determination to demonstrate its ability to defend the island’s coastline and respond quickly to potential threats, even as cross-strait relations remain among the most sensitive flashpoints in the Asia-Pacific region.

The drill also underscored Taiwan’s ongoing efforts to adapt its military strategy to an evolving security environment, one increasingly shaped by China’s military rise and the growing strategic competition between Beijing and the United States.

(Source: Reuters)

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hina has deployed large numbers of obsolete fighter jets converted into attack drones at air bases near the Taiwan Strait, according to a new report that highlights Beijing’s evolving military strategy toward Taiwan. The study, published by the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, draws on satellite imagery and open-source intelligence to show rows of modified J-6 aircraft positioned at six bases across Fujian and Guangdong provinces, both located close to the strategically sensitive waterway separating mainland China from Taiwan.

The J-6, a Chinese-built version of a 1950s Soviet fighter, was once a core part of China’s air force but has long since been retired from frontline service. Analysts now say that hundreds of these aging jets have been repurposed into unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), designated as J-6W drones. By removing onboard weapon systems and installing automated flight controls and navigation technology, the Chinese military has transformed these legacy aircraft into expendable strike platforms capable of carrying out high-risk missions without endangering pilots.

According to the report’s author, former U.S. naval intelligence officer J. Michael Dahm, China may have converted more than 500 of these aircraft into drones, with at least 200 already deployed near the Taiwan Strait. He told Reuters that these drones are likely to play a key role in the opening phase of any potential military operation against Taiwan. Rather than functioning like conventional remotely piloted drones, they are expected to operate more like cruise missiles—launched in large waves toward predetermined targets.

Overwhelming Taiwan’s air defense systems

Military experts believe the primary purpose of these converted drones would be to overwhelm Taiwan’s air defense systems through sheer volume. By sending large numbers of relatively inexpensive drones toward high-value targets, China could force Taiwan and its allies to expend costly interceptor missiles. This tactic, often described as a form of asymmetric warfare, seeks to exploit the imbalance between the low cost of offensive systems and the high cost of defensive countermeasures.

A senior Taiwanese security official, speaking to Reuters, said the threat posed by these drones is significant precisely because of this cost imbalance. “To prevent strikes on critical infrastructure, we will inevitably face the challenge of using expensive missiles to intercept them,” the official said. In response, Taiwan is accelerating plans to acquire new counter-drone technologies designed to neutralize such threats more efficiently.

The development comes amid rising tensions between China and Taiwan, which Beijing considers part of its territory despite strong opposition from the island’s government. China has not ruled out the use of force to achieve reunification, while Taiwan maintains that its future should be decided solely by its people. Although recent assessments by the U.S. intelligence community suggest that China is not currently planning an invasion by 2027, other defense analyses indicate that Beijing is rapidly building the capabilities needed to carry out such an operation if it chooses to do so.

A diverse mix of airpower

Experts say the deployment of J-6 drones is only one component of a broader Chinese military strategy that emphasizes a diverse mix of airpower. In a potential conflict scenario, waves of drones could be launched alongside ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, advanced fighter jets, and long-range bombers, all arriving at different speeds and altitudes. This multi-layered assault would complicate defensive efforts and create what one analyst described as an “air defense nightmare.”

Peter Layton, a former Australian air force officer and visiting fellow at Griffith University, said such an approach would aim to saturate defenses and create confusion. “There would be a lot of diverse threats all coming at once,” he said. “The goal is to overwhelm the system so that some weapons inevitably get through.” He added that the J-6 drones, despite being based on outdated technology, would still require advanced and expensive missile systems to intercept due to their speed and size.

The increasing reliance on drones reflects broader changes in modern warfare, where unmanned systems have become central to military operations. Conflicts such as the Russia-Ukraine War have demonstrated the effectiveness of deploying drones in large numbers for reconnaissance, targeting, and direct attacks. These systems can often be produced quickly and at relatively low cost, making them well-suited for sustained, high-intensity conflicts.

Stealth UAVs and carrier-based unmanned systems

China has also been investing heavily in more advanced drone technologies, including stealth UAVs and carrier-based unmanned systems. Analysts believe these newer platforms could be used in conjunction with converted legacy aircraft like the J-6, creating a layered drone force capable of both high-end precision strikes and mass saturation attacks. In addition, there are indications that China is experimenting with using drones in deception operations, potentially to confuse adversaries and test defensive responses.

Despite their potential effectiveness, the deployment of J-6 drones is not without risks. The air bases where they are stationed are located relatively close to Taiwan and could be vulnerable to preemptive strikes in the event of a conflict. Nevertheless, analysts suggest that their role as expendable assets means they would likely be launched early in any military campaign, reducing their exposure to counterattacks on the ground.

The report underscores the growing complexity of the military balance in the Taiwan Strait and the increasing importance of drone warfare in shaping future conflicts. As both China and Taiwan continue to adapt to these evolving threats, the risk of miscalculation remains a concern for regional stability. For now, the presence of these converted drones serves as a stark reminder of how even outdated technology can be repurposed into a significant strategic tool in modern warfare.

(Source: Reuters)

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aiwan’s President Lai Ching-te announced on Thursday that the island is fast-tracking development of a new “T-dome” missile defense network, a system designed to intercept high-altitude threats amid escalating military pressure from China.

Delivering his National Day address in Taipei, Lai described the project as a “multi-layered safety net” capable of detecting and neutralizing incoming missiles. He said the initiative was central to his government’s broader effort to boost defense spending and strengthen Taiwan’s domestic defense industry.

“Increasing defense investment is both a clear necessity to counter enemy threats and a driving force for developing our own defense industries,” Lai said, pledging to raise military expenditure to 5 percent of GDP by 2030.

The “T-dome” concept — widely viewed as a nod to Israel’s Iron Dome — is expected to integrate a range of missile systems and radar technologies capable of intercepting targets at multiple altitudes.

While Lai offered few technical details, Taiwan’s defense ministry last month unveiled a new indigenous air defense missile designed to hit medium-range ballistic targets and reach higher altitudes than the U.S.-made Patriot batteries currently in service.

Responding to a rising threat

The acceleration of the missile shield comes as U.S. and regional defense experts warn that Beijing is preparing to achieve full military capability to attack or blockade Taiwan by 2027, following orders reportedly issued by President Xi Jinping.

China, which claims Taiwan as part of its territory, has repeatedly vowed to take the island by force if Taipei indefinitely resists unification. Lai reiterated in his speech that China must act as a “responsible great power” and “renounce the threat of force to change the status quo.”

Referencing the lessons of the Second World War, Lai said the world must ensure that such suffering is never repeated, while affirming Taiwan’s resolve to “preserve peace through strength.”

Beijing’s reaction and regional context

In previous years, similar remarks by Lai have provoked military responses from Beijing. After he described China as a “foreign hostile force” in March, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) launched extensive drills encircling Taiwan, involving live-fire exercises and naval patrols around the island.

A Taiwan defense ministry report published Thursday detailed Beijing’s expanding use of cyberattacks, cognitive warfare, and joint combat readiness patrols, describing them as part of a “comprehensive threat” campaign against the island.

The report also warned of China’s increasing ability to conduct targeted strikes designed to pressure Taiwan into political concessions without triggering a full U.S. military response.

U.S. and diplomatic reactions

A foreign diplomat in Taipei told reporters that Lai’s speech appeared aimed in part at reassuring the Trump administration, which has pressed U.S. allies and partners in Asia to take greater responsibility for their own defense.

“Lai’s message sends a clear signal to Washington that Taiwan is investing heavily in deterrence,” the diplomat said, adding that the president had “avoided inflammatory rhetoric” — a likely relief to both Washington and Beijing ahead of a possible Xi-Trump meeting later this month.

Taiwan’s 2026 defense budget, presented in August, allocates 3.3 percent of GDP to military spending — a record figure that includes major investments in missile production, radar systems, and cybersecurity.

Lai said these efforts are part of a long-term vision to make Taiwan more self-reliant in defense technology. “The future of our security lies in our own hands,” he told the crowd gathered outside the Presidential Office in Taipei.

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he Taiwan Strait has emerged as a geopolitical hotspot, garnering significant attention due to the escalating tensions between the United States and China. This narrow body of water, separating the island of Taiwan from mainland China, has become a focal point of power struggles and competing interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

China’s rise as a global power, both economically and militarily, has fueled concerns over its pursuit of reunification with Taiwan, which currently enjoys de facto independence from China. President Xi Jinping has made reunification a cornerstone of his administration, employing a combination of diplomatic pressure, military posturing, and economic incentives to isolate Taiwan diplomatically and erode its international standing. China’s military modernization, including the development of advanced weaponry and naval capabilities, has increased its capacity to forcefully assert its territorial claims. Meanwhile, the U.S. engages with Taiwan in a way China views as provocative. Should we be concerned?

In War and Peace in the Taiwan Strait, Scott L. Kastner delves into the increasingly tense relationship between China and Taiwan. As fears of a potential military conflict loom large, Kastner offers readers a comprehensive and nuanced analysis of the factors that could lead to hostilities while emphasizing that the situation should not be exaggerated. This book not only sheds new light on the prospects for cross-strait military conflict but also explores the pathways that could either lead to or help prevent such a crisis.

Kastner begins by examining the complex implications of deepening economic integration between China and Taiwan. While economic ties have historically been seen as a stabilizing force, the author delves into the potential risks that arise as a result of this interdependence. He further explores the shifting balance of military power in the region, considering the implications of China’s military modernization efforts and the potential impact on Taiwan’s defense capabilities. These dynamics, coupled with uncertainty surrounding the future of U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s security, contribute to the complex landscape of the Taiwan Strait. A crucial question Kastner considers in his book is whether the United States would come to Taiwan’s defense.

The author also highlights the significance of domestic political changes in both China and Taiwan. By analyzing the internal dynamics within these two entities, Kastner provides readers with a deeper understanding of how domestic factors can shape cross-strait relations and potentially impact the likelihood of military conflict. Kastner delves into an in-depth examination of the intricately intertwined economies of Taiwan and China, as well as their historical background and the significance of freedom in the Taiwanese context.

While the risks of conflict are indeed real, Kastner’s analysis offers a more tempered perspective, emphasizing that war in the Taiwan Strait is far from inevitable. He argues that there are multiple distinct pathways that could lead to hostilities, and the mechanisms that may mitigate one type of conflict might not necessarily be applicable to others. However, the book underlines the presence of powerful mitigating factors, combined with plausible steps to reduce the likelihood of military conflict, providing a glimmer of hope for avoiding a catastrophic outcome.

Combining international relations theory with meticulous empirical analysis of regional trends, Kastner presents readers with valuable insights into the potential occurrence of war in the Taiwan Strait and, more importantly, how such a conflict can be averted. The book equips policymakers, scholars, and interested readers with the knowledge necessary to navigate this complex geopolitical landscape.

War and Peace in the Taiwan Strait is a timely work that provides a comprehensive examination of the risks and possibilities surrounding military conflict in the region. Kastner’s expertise and meticulous research contribute to a vital perspective that not only deepens our understanding of the Taiwan Strait issue but also provides valuable insights into maintaining peace and stability in the region.

Scott L. Kastner, War and Peace in the Taiwan Strait (Columbia University Press, 2022) ISBN: 9780231198653, 272 pages

Written by Dilara Özer

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he United States’ intense engagement in Taiwan in order to curb China, with which it competes not to lose its global leadership, encircling the latter in the Indo-Pacific, attracts the close attention of the entire world. The escalation of the crisis and the direct attempts of the parties to the dispute to engage in war resemble a disaster scenario for the whole world.

At this point, putting aside the possibility of a direct war between the U.S. and China over Taiwan, with the two great powers having nuclear weapons, it is likely that the U.S. will respond to a possible Chinese operation against Taiwan by increasing its support for Taipei, thus wearing China out. What attitude will European countries have in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan?

Considering the UK’s long-standing special relationship with the U.S., London’s policy towards Taiwan is more important than other European countries. In this context, when we look at the current UK policy towards Taiwan, London does not recognize it as an independent state in accordance with the One-China policy and considers it a part of mainland China. At the same time, the UK maintains its informal relations with Taiwan through its trade and culture office in Taipei, the island’s de facto capital.

Less tensions in the Taiwan Strait

The UK is dissatisfied with the heating tensions in the Taiwan Strait as more than 300 British companies are present on the island and more than 180 Taiwanese companies are present in the UK with investments in various sectors. In this respect, the possibility that these investments will suffer if the tension on the U.S.-Taiwan-China front turns into a war disturbs London. For this reason, adopting a rational approach, the UK is in favor of solving the Taiwan issue through dialogue.

London intends to continue its established policy on the issue, as clearly expressed in a report published by the House of Commons in February of last year. Yet, according to the same report, the UK also supports Taiwan’s participation in international organizations as an observer member. Thus, for the time being, the UK complies with China’s red line regarding Taiwan and is far from adopting an approach that could provoke Beijing; however, its support for Taiwan’s membership in international organizations causes unease in China.

On the other hand, there is a strong expectation that if China launches a military operation against Taiwan, the U.S. will support Taiwan, and the UK will follow in the United States’ footsteps. This expectation must be viewed in light of the special relationship between London and Washington. First, the social, cultural, political, and economic seeds of today’s America were planted by the UK. For this reason, the political relations between the two countries have been shaped based on mutual trust and common interests. As a result, Europeanists, who favor a self-sufficient Europe that is independent from the U.S., perceive the UK as the United States’ European arm. In this spirit, France, the pioneer of this European camp, prevented the UK’s membership in the European Union until 1973.

The UK as a functional actor between Taiwan and China

In addition, the UK transferred its role as a dominant actor in global politics to the U.S. after World War II. Since then, the UK has equated the power of its successor, the United States, with its own and has taken the side of the U.S. in almost every issue that has occupied the agenda of global politics. So much so that the UK has provided the U.S. with the greatest support both in theory and practice in Afghanistan and Iraq, which has had tremendous impacts on regional and global politics for years, and has acted together with the U.S. in the Syrian and Libyan crises. The U.S. included the UK, its most reliable European partner, in the AUKUS military alliance, which it formed with Australia two years ago in order to counterbalance China in the Indo-Pacific. This development seriously damaged the U.S. and UK’s common relations with France and made China very uncomfortable.

In other words, the UK will act as a functional actor contributing to the securitization process of the Taiwan issue by siding with the U.S. In this respect, London will probably send financial and military aid to Taiwan, similar to the support it provided to Ukraine following the Russian invasion. In the same context, UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak noted at the G-20 summit held in November last year that “China poses a systemic challenge to UK values and represents the biggest state-based threat to our economic security. We will consider sending arms to help Taiwan to defend itself in the event of an attack from Beijing.”

In conclusion, on the one hand, the UK does not follow a policy that will directly confront Beijing on the Taiwan issue and does not want the tension in the region to grow further, taking into account the mutual investments in Taiwan and Britain. At the same time, the UK does not hesitate to signal that if China attempts a military intervention against Taiwan, it will follow the U.S. and support Taiwan in accordance with its traditional Atlanticist foreign policy.

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he Pacific is heating up. The rise of China rocks the balance of power making room for an emerging new order. In this month’s book bundle, we present eight books about the hottest topic of international affairs: the U.S.-China rivalry. What awaits the world as tensions rise? This selection approaches the topic from comprehensive and diverse angles ranging from international relations theory assumptions to the most outstanding topics of the U.S.-China rivalry such as economic leadership and information war.

The competition between the two great powers has overtaken the world agenda and is shaping foreign policy decisions globally. Therefore, this book bundle was compiled with special attention to the reactions of middle and smaller powers in the face of this competition, aiming to give the reader a broader perspective to interpret what awaits the world more holistically.

Will the shift in the balance of power between the U.S. and China lead to a war? International relations theory predicts that shifts between a hegemon and a rising power may trigger actions with such consequences. Steve Chan examines how many of these theories hold true in the case of U.S.-China relations with Taiwan remaining a flash point for a possible Sino-American conflict.

Rumbles of Thunder: Power Shifts and the Danger of Sino-American War further explores the risk-oriented popular narratives on the topic with sound and well-grounded judgement, considering whether several factors that can raise or lower international tension apply to the current situation. Chan criticizes overly mechanistic frameworks and shows that power shifts do not predetermine violent outcomes—and neither does their absence ensure peace. In fact, many factors like domestic politics, international political economy, and the choices of individual leaders come into play.

Rumbles of Thunder demonstrates that claims of a “rising China” catching up and overtaking the United States are alarmist, and Chan predicts that American structural advantages will endure for some time to come. Contrary to popular belief, Chan does not maintain that China acts like a revisionist power seeking to overturn the system or that the U.S. is defending the international order. Rumbles of Thunder brings a fresh analytical outlook to the table and challenges conventional wisdom on the likelihood of war between the United States and China.

Steve Chan, Rumbles of Thunder: Power Shifts and the Danger of Sino-American War (Columbia University Press, 2022) ISBN: 9780231208451, 336 pages

In Accidental Conflict: America, China, and the Clash of False Narratives, Stephan Roach argues that the conflict between the U.S. and China wouldn’t have emerged were it not for a needless clash of false narratives, and that much of the rhetoric on both sides is dangerously misguided, amplified by information distortion, and should be seen more like a reflection of each nation’s fears and vulnerabilities than a credible assessment of the risks they face. The U.S. blames its trade and technology threats on China yet overlooks its shaky saving foundation. Meanwhile, China blames its growth challenges on the alleged U.S. containment of market-based socialism, ignoring its failed economic rebalancing.

Accidental Conflict: America, China, and the Clash of False Narratives provides an analysis of both nations’ economies, politics, and policies, and offers a new road map for restoring a mutually advantageous relationship. The book will be available in paperback on June 6, 2023.

Stephan Roach, Accidental Conflict: America, China, and the Clash of False Narratives (Yale University Press, 2022) ISBN: 9780300259643, 448 pages

Kevin Rudd, a former Australian prime minister who spent more than forty years in China, puts the turbulent relationship between the U.S. and China under the spotlight with insightful analyses based on his firsthand understanding of the mindsets of the leadership whose judgment will determine whether the future course of events will escalate to a war.

Rudd provides context as to why the U.S.-China relationship rests on a seismic fault: cultural misunderstanding, historical grievance, and ideological incompatibility are all pivotal antecedents. The antagonism between the two superpowers is starkly visible, among others, in the field of military, intelligence, technology, and trade, while either country’s capacity to draw the last straw grows daily.

Against this gloomy backdrop, Rudd constructively argues that the relationship is not doomed to escalating tension and war. If both sides can sustain a “managed strategic competition” by coexisting without betraying their core interests, conflict could be avoided. However, the opposite could be catastrophic. The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict between the US and Xi Jinping’s China demystifies the actions of both sides, explaining and translating them for the benefit of the other.

Kevin Rudd, The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict between the US and Xi Jinping’s China (PublicAffairs, 2022) ISBN-13 9781541701304, 432 pages

As the U.S. faces the first real challenge to its economic hegemony with the rise of China, The United States vs. China: The Quest for Global Economic Leadership sees experienced policymaker, economist, and scholar C. Fred Bergsten analyze the two great powers’ competition from the scope of global economic leadership. Is economic conflict beyond the existing trade war inevitable between China and the U.S.? Will their clash produce a new economic leadership vacuum? What can the consequences of a world economy adopting Chinese characteristics be?

According to Bergsten a confrontation between the two would be calamitous. He further argues that it would be self-defeating for the U.S. to attempt to “decouple” from its rival. Bergsten advices the U.S. to pursue “conditional competitive cooperation” to lead, rather than destroy, the world economy instead of a policy of containment. As for China, he recommends exercising constructive global leadership.

Fred Bergsten, The United States vs. China: The Quest for Global Economic Leadership (Polity Press, 2022) ISBN-13 978-1509547357, 384 pages

Is China really a threat to the U.S. or just a threat to its unilateral superpower status? According to Paolo Urio, the U.S. has historically disguised the true nature of its relations with the nations that have stood in the way of its ambitions, often projecting fear of harm from other nations even as it was expanding its dominion over them. America and the China Threat: From the End of History to the End of Empire revisits and debunks the idea of the universality of U.S. values, and the perception of the imperial, dictatorial, and state capitalist character of today’s China. It provides a historical analysis of the divergent ideologies of the U.S. and China, and reveals the source of strain the U.S. faces in adapting to the changes occurring in the international system that has moved beyond its exceptionalism and uncontested leadership, now challenged by China.

Urio challenges the U.S. proclamation that it alone can assure stability and prosperity in the international system, while demonstrating that Chinese ideology has achieved greater flexibility by integrating values imported from the West and several Confucian values. Urio argues that China is better able to adapt its public policies to changes in the national and international environments. America and the China Threat: From the End of History to the End of Empire further addresses China’s significant military and economic advances and its new investments.

Paolo Urio, America and the China Threat: From the End of History to the End of Empire (Clarity Press, 2022) ISBN-10 1949762505, 476 pages

Information War: How Artificial Intelligence Is Driving U.S.-China Military Competition addresses a crucial variable shaping the intensifying confrontation between the U.S. and China: the struggle to control information. How will modern technology be wielded in a rising conflict between the two superpowers?

Technology and national security expert Tom Stefanick argues that the two contemporary superpowers will base their security competition primarily on the fight to dominate information and perception. How will the adversaries attack the other’s information architecture while protecting their own? Stefanick highlights that the way each country chooses to employ information countermeasures will determine the amount of friction and uncertainty in the conflict.

Stefanick draws attention to artificial intelligence, which will play an important role. Information War: How Artificial Intelligence Is Driving U.S.-China Military Competition reviews the recent Chinese research and trends in AI to determine how it will approach the conflict, and provides a sober view of how artificial intelligence will be weaponized in the new information war.

Tom Stefanick, Information War: How Artificial Intelligence Is Driving U.S.-China Military Competition (Brookings Institution Press, 2022) ISBN-13: 9780815738824, 280 pages

China expert Andrew Small offers an eclectic view of a rivalry ranging far beyond “great power” politics. He provides the inside story of a revolution in the China policy of countries from around the world. The Rupture: China and the Global Race for the Future explains a diverse range of topics such as how many of the Western politicians and business leaders closest to Beijing have now become its sharpest opponents, how the COVID-19 pandemic dramatically accelerated this trend, and why 5G represents the first test case as to whether China can win the race for the future.

As competition grows between systems, the Western model itself is transforming given that China’s rise changes both the balance of ideas and the balance of power. Small traces U.S. efforts to recast relations with old allies, examining Europe’s growing role in the technological and economic contest, and Beijing’s attempts to build a coalition of its own.

Andrew Small, The Rupture: China and the Global Race for the Future (Hurst Publishers, 2022) ISBN 9781787387782, 304 pages

What path does a middle power take when engrossed in the competition between great powers? Do they get caught up between the two or forge a path of their own? In the heating U.S.-China rivalry, what are the strategic responses of middle powers in the Asia-Pacific? The Strategic Options of Middle Powers in the Asia-Pacific examines these questions through the specific case studies of South Korea, Australia, Japan, India, Taiwan, and Vietnam from their local perspectives.

With each chapter, written by experts, the book provides comprehensive studies of the regional powers in the Asia-Pacific with an in-depth examination of the contemporary geopolitics of the region, including the impact of both the Trump and Biden administrations, Beijing’s “wolf warrior” diplomacy, cross-strait relations with Taiwan, and the influences of Japan, Vietnam, Australia, and South Korea. The Strategic Options of Middle Powers in the Asia-Pacific reveals that regional middle powers actually exert influence on the direction of regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, and develops theories of foreign policy analyses, forming a systematic framework through initiating crucial concepts, including reluctant hedging, economic statecraft, and strategic position-taking.

Chien-Wen Kou, Chiung-Chiu Huang, Brian Job, The Strategic Options of Middle Powers in the Asia-Pacific (Routledge, 2022) ISBN 9781003156314, 278 pages

To liberate Asia Pacific from Japanese Imperialist Forces during the Second World War, the United States devised an “island hopping” strategy meant to secure as many islands as possible, with the aim of forcing the enemy back to its home soil.

Two battles were crucial to the Allies’ success: the Battle of Midway in 1942, where the U.S. Navy inflicted mortal wounds on its Japanese counterpart, and the Battle of Guadalcanal spanning 1942 to 1943, where the U.S. Army and Marines defeated Japanese land forces in the Solomon Islands.

A full 80 years later, the Solomon Islands has suddenly become the centre of superpower confrontation once again, but this time between the United States and an ever-increasingly militaristic and imperialistic China.

Unlike, Japan, however, China has effectively seized the South Pacific country, comprising six major islands and hundreds of smaller islands, without firing a shot. This Chinese move has left the U.S. and Australia, along with their regional allies, in a state of frenzy rage because the islands, particularly Guadalcanal, are a choke point connecting the U.S. to Australia and New Zealand, which is why Japan wanted the islands eight decades ago, and why China wants them today.

If the U.S. is cut off from Australia and New Zealand, then it is essentially cut off from the South Pacific, giving China a huge leg up in its ambition to dislodge the U.S. from the entire Western Pacific and Asia. Suddenly, the memory of Japanese submarines torpedoing Australian vessels in Sydney Harbor, and Japanese warplanes bombing the Australian city of Darwin in 1942 has invoked a security crisis in Canberra and Washington DC.

Australian Strategic Policy Institute executive director Peter Jennings predicts Chinese warships and warplanes could arrive in the Solomons within weeks, saying, “Their model is what they’ve done in the South China Sea, which is to move quickly and decisively before people are able to gather their thoughts and resist,” adding he expects Beijing to move while Australian policy elites are distracted with the national election, scheduled for May 21.

Solomon Island’s Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare has given verbal assurances he will not allow China to construct a military base on its soil, but nobody in Canberra or Washington DC is buying it, given the deal was revealed only after details of it were leaked; revelations Sogavare has allowed Beijing to secretly bring dozens of weapons into Honiara; and because Beijing has essentially bought the Solomon’s parliament by paying $40,000 to parliamentarians who voted for Sogarvare.

On Friday, a U.S. delegation by Indo-Pacific envoy Kurt Campbell arrived in the Solomon Islands to discuss concerns the U.S. and its allies have over the security pact with China, which they fear will extend China’s military presence in the region, igniting a new regional arms race. Australia has also shuttled diplomats to Honiara, with Japan announcing it will do likewise later this month, and New Zealand and Tonga saying they will raise their concerns at the forthcoming Pacific Islands Forum.

Chinese state media has slammed opposition to Beijing’s security pact with Honiara, even accusing Australia of having a “colonialist mentality,” while Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Zhao Kijian said Australia and US should “respect the sovereign and independent choices made by China and the Solomons and not instigate confrontation.”

But these claims and statements are patently absurd, given the Australian government, unlike its Chinese counterpart, has not sought to bolster its relationship with the Pacific Island country by bribing and extorting its political class.

Moreover, Australia’s Pacific “Step Up,” which has allocated $2 billion to building infrastructure in the region, does not saddle countries with unrepayable debt, unlike China’s debt trap diplomacy, or what is known as its One Belt Initiative.

“In Mr. Sogavare, the Chinese government has found a willing partner. And his commitment to such a secretive deal has shown how a single politician cosying up to Beijing in a small country can create geopolitical risks worldwide,” observes the New York Times.

Most significantly, Solomon Islanders view the move as anti-democratic, with recent polls showing 90 percent of the country wanting closer ties to the U.S. and Australia over China, and 79 percent opposing financial aid from Beijing. They also remember that the country was rocked by anti-Chinese violence in November of last year, after it was revealed Sogavare used Chinese government money to sway votes in the parliament.

The country’s opposition leader, Hon. Mathew Wale, slammed the China deal, calling it does not represent the interests of Solomon Islanders, but “for the personal and self-interests of the Prime Minister.”

“His election campaign was said to be funded by PRC state-owned companies. The payment of members for his political survival in November was also bought with PRC money. This personal secret military deal with the PRC is no different. This deal is not for the military protection of Solomon Islands. There are no external threats to Solomon Islands. The deal is to maintain Sogavare’s hold on power and to undermine the democratic freedoms available to Solomon islanders,” he said.

The opposition leader also called out the Prime Minister over promises closer ties to China would herald a flood of Chinexe investment, which, until now, have not materialized.

While most analysts believe the Solomon Islands can be persuaded to walk back the China deal, Jennings says it will take a “focused effort” on Australia’s part and “more money than we would like to spend,” but it’s a price Canberra and its regional allies must be prepared to pay if they do not wish a repeat of the same threat they endured from an expansionist Japan eighty years ago.

An article by Gideon Rachman in the Financial Times last July is a prime example of western intelligentsia’s limited understanding of China’s unhindered rise as a superpower. “Becoming a superpower is a complicated business. It poses a series of connected questions about capabilities, intentions and will,” Rachman wrote.

To help us understand what this claim precisely means, the FT writer uses an analogy. “To use a sporting analogy, you can be an extremely gifted tennis player and genuinely want to be world champion, but still be unwilling to make the sacrifices to turn the dream into reality.”

At least, in Rachman’s thinking, China is capable of being a political actor, though it remains incapable of vying for the superpower status, as it supposedly lacks ‘the will’ to make the required ‘sacrifices’.

Although I visited Beijing only once, a few years ago, I, or even any casual visitor to the Chinese capital, could attest to the powerful collective economic engine that fuels not only China but much of the world economy. While Chinese officials do not outright profess that their ultimate aim is to make their country a superpower – for, frankly, rarely are superpowers aware of the mechanisms that lead to such status – the Chinese leadership fully fathoms the nature of the challenge at hand.

Take Chinese President Xi Jinping’s speech in October 2019, on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the founding of the Republic of China. “Over the past 70 years, under the strong leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC), the Chinese people, with great courage and relentless exploration, have successfully opened the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics.

Along this path, we have ushered in a new era,” he said. Note Xi’s constant references to ideology, nationalism, forward-thinking and insistence on China’s central position in this ‘new era’. Xi was elevated to the status of Mao Zedong – as a ‘core leader’ in 2019 and ‘helmsman’ in 2021 – precisely due to his role in transitioning China in terms of power, politics and global prestige.

The sooner we acknowledge that China is an influential political entity that operates according to a clear and decisive political strategy, the more meaningful our understanding of the geopolitical transformation in Asia, and the rest of the world, will be.

Indeed, the sooner we acknowledge that China is an influential political entity that operates according to a clear and decisive political strategy, the more meaningful our understanding of the geopolitical transformation in Asia, and the rest of the world, will be.

Since the rise of Britain as a colonial power, thus the advent of a new world order, determined almost exclusively by western powers, the global center of power, starting in the 18th century, had shifted away from Asia and the Middle East.

Later on, starting in the mid-twentieth century, the main competition that colonial western powers had been forced to contend with came from the Soviet Union, its Warsaw Pact, and their international allies, mainly Europe’s former colonies in the Southern hemisphere.

The U.S. involvement in long wars with undefined objectives opened up unprecedented geopolitical spaces that Washington and its western allies have dominated over the course of decades. For example, the U.S. had near-total geopolitical control over much of South America starting with the introduction of the Monroe Doctrine, in 1823. The same assertion can be made about Africa which, despite the formal end of colonialism in the long-exploited continent, continued to revolve around the same western colonial powers of yesteryears. However, a noticeable shift in the West’s geostrategic influence in these regions began taking place in the last three decades.

Russia has speedily offered itself as a military and strategic ally and alternative to the U.S. in parts of the Middle East, Africa, and South America.

While the West was fighting essentially futile wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as part of the intentionally ill-defined ‘war on terror’, regional and international political actors moved in to fill the gaps created by American and western absence from their various regions of influence. Russia has speedily offered itself as a military and strategic ally and alternative to the U.S. in parts of the Middle East, Africa, and South America – in Syria, Libya and Venezuela respectively – as China moved in to fulfill a much larger economic role, branding itself as a fair partner, especially if compared to western powers.

It was not until the gradual U.S. retreat from Iraq in 2011 that Washington announced its ‘Pivot to Asia’, a new military and political stratagem aimed at offsetting the Chinese influence in the Asian Pacific region. Much of former U.S. President Barack Obama’s first term in office was dedicated to America’s political strategic realignments in the Asia Pacific.

“The United States is a Pacific power, and we are here to stay,” Obama declared in a speech to the Australian parliament in November 2011. “As we end today’s wars, I have directed my national security team to make our presence and missions in the Asia-Pacific a top priority.”

However, the American geopolitical shift may have arrived belatedly. For one, the repercussions of America’s military undertakings in Central Asia and the Middle East – as time has clearly demonstrated – were far too severe and costly to be simply canceled out by a declaration of a new strategy. Two, China had, by then, built a complex network of alliances in Asia and around the world, allowing it to cement real bonds with many nations, especially those concerned or fed up with the West’s obsession with military superiority and interventions.

According to a report published in October by the International Institute for Sustainable Development, over the last twelve years, China has been Africa’s largest trading partner. “China has created 25 economic and trade cooperation zones in 16 African countries,” the report reads, “and has continued to invest heavily across the continent throughout the COVID19 pandemic,” according to a government report about Chinese–African economic and trade ties.

In contrast, according to data published by Statista Research Department in August 2021, “after a peak in 2014, foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa from the United States dropped to 47.5 billion U.S. dollars (from 69.03) in 2020.”

Here is precisely where many analysts go wrong, arguing, as Rachman did, that “China’s economic weight, as the world’s largest trading power and manufacturer, gives it significant political leverage internationally. […] But Beijing’s economic power is not always politically decisive”.

This limited thinking is based on the assumption that, to be ‘political’ is to follow the same blueprint used by the U.S. and its western partners in their approach to foreign policy, diplomacy and occasional wars. China’s take on politics, however, has always been quite different. According to Beijing’s thinking, China does not need to invade countries to earn the designation of a political actor.

Instead, China is simply tapping into its own historical trajectory of utilizing economic influence in its quest for greatness, and arguably, empire. The fact that the Road and Belt Initiative – a long-term strategy aimed at connecting Asia with Africa and Europe via land and maritime networks – is a modern interpretation of the Silk Road, which was a network of ancient trade routes which linked China to the Mediterranean region, is enough to tell us about the nature of the Chinese model.

Recent months have seen the People’s Republic of China (PRC) adopting an increasingly belligerent posture towards Taiwan, as evident in undertaking aerial incursions into the latter’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in unprecedented numbers and repeated statements denouncing any move by the island toward seeking formal independence.

Concurrent to this, the U.S. has taken an increasingly assertive posture against the PRC. The preceding Trump Administration saw a unprecedented surge in U.S. warships undertaking Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) through the Taiwan Strait; a more recent leak by the Taiwanese authorities has revealed that the Trump Administration authorized the deployment of a training detachment of US troops to Taiwan.

More recently, President Joe Biden affirmed the U.S. commitment to defend the island. In offering a less-than-veiled indication of the likelihood of a U.S. military intervention, Biden’s statement has aroused debate over whether his Administration is abandoning the U.S. policy of ‘Strategic Ambiguity’ toward Taiwan.

‘Strategic Ambiguity’, adopted following Washington’s establishment of diplomatic ties with Beijing in 1979, was drafted with a twofold aim in mind. First, it enabled Washington to hint at Beijing the possibility of U.S. military intervention, if the mainland were to attempt an unprovoked invasion.

Second, strategic ambiguity enabled the U.S. to simultaneously hint to the Taiwanese authorities that unnecessarily provoking the mainland would void the contingent scenario of U.S. military intervention. Such a proviso thus sought to induce caution in Taipei.

We should not be too surprised about Biden’s assertiveness over Taiwan.

Whilst the Chinese Communist Party has reason to be furious over Biden’s statement, we should not be too surprised about Biden’s assertiveness over Taiwan. The ambiguity underpinning the possibility of U.S. intervention to support Taiwan is conditioned on the nature of mainland behavior; in light of the escalatory moves that Beijing has adopted towards Taiwan in recent months, a statement highlighting the Biden Administration’s willingness to defend Taiwan is consistent within the bounds of the policy of Strategic Ambiguity, and a necessary one at that, given the need to warn China against further escalation.

Second, recent developments in Taiwan have elevated the island’s status as a poke in the eye of the CCP’s ego. Whilst the PRC floundered in responding to the spread of COVID19 and was only able to bring the virus under control due to harsh lockdown measures and manipulation of its domestic media, Taiwan was able to suppress the virus through its ‘whole-of-society’ response that underscored the efficiency of the island’s model of governance.

In so providing a high-profile instance of good governance in a democratically-elected polity, Taiwan has earned widespread international praise; combined with the mainland’s repeated attempts to sideline and bully Taiwan over the last several years, the result has been a growing sense of international solidarity with the island, with a growing number of EU delegations to Taiwan.

This was exemplified in September 2020, when President of the Czech Senate Miloš Vystrčil visited Taiwan and, on the floor of the Legislative Yuan, declared in Mandarin Chinese that ‘I am a Taiwanese’, alluding to John F. Kennedy’s ‘Ich Bin Ein Berliner’ speech in 1963.

The combined effects of these developments has been to arouse CCP fears of an increase in pro-independence sentiment in the island that has already been increasing in recent years due to a younger Taiwanese demographic that has little emotional connection to the mainland, as well as growing international scrutiny of the mainland’s human rights abuses, and Beijing’s reneging on its promises to respect Hong Kong’s autonomy as part of the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ model.

The convergent impact of these developments has been to arouse the CCP’s fear that the Taiwanese populace may become further emboldened into seeking formal independence for the island, under which circumstance the CCP’s failure to bring about unification with the mainland would stand as a high-profile policy failure that will undermine the CCP’s domestic credibility.

The CCP’s current sabre-rattling is thus likely intended to coerce the Taiwanese populace against any further actions that would otherwise force CCP’s hand to avoid a domestic crisis of legitimacy.

With no end in sight to the mainland’s pattern of provocations against Taiwan and the Biden Administration affirming the U.S. commitment to Taiwan, the next question concerns the possibility of a Sino-U.S. clash over Taiwan. I do not see such a scenario occurring in the immediate future. As noted above, China is attempting to rely on threats of force to dissuade the Taiwanese populace from seeking formal independence.

The CCP is aware that a clash of arms with the U.S., at a time of clear U.S. military superiority over the PRC, is the kind of gamble that would likely lead to a Chinese defeat, the kind of high-profile failure that the CCP cannot deflect domestic public opinion from.

The next question is about a possible Sino-American clash over Taiwan.

Over the medium-to-long term, however, the picture is less clear, for two convergent reasons. The first concerns the rapid pace of modernization in the PRC’s air and naval power capabilities. In conjunction with Beijing’s investment in cyber-warfare, cruise missile and space warfare technology, U.S. policymakers have expressed increasing concerns that the PRC may close the military gap sufficiently, to the extent that the CCP believes that it might emerge triumphant from a short, armed takeover of Taiwan that would enable Beijing to present Washington with the fait accompli of Chinese control.