Since the declaration of the ‘imminent’ military operation by President Erdogan in the east of the Euphrates and the U.S. decision to withdraw from Syria, many discussions have risen about the fate of the region. With Trump’s initiative, both sides are discussing the establishment of a 20-mile zone in northern Syria along the Turkish border. In order to protect its national security, Turkey is trying to eliminate the terrorist threat and trying to accelerate the return of refugees to safe zones. However, one important dynamic behind Turkey’s decisiveness to enter the east of the Euphrates is overlooked. Turkey’s local Syrian partners are pushing the government to conduct a military operation east of the Euphrates in order to expand their areal control and to return home.

Turkey’s partners want to increase their balance of power against the Assad regime and other actors involved in the crisis by increasing their areal control. The U.S. is not the only country that has to manage a relationship with local partners, as Turkey also fought together with different factions of the Free Syrian Army in two military operations against Daesh and the Marxist-Kurdish YPG. During a time in which the YPG controls vast territories, historical enmities, territorial disputes, ethnic and ideological tensions between Arabs and the Syrian Kurds are a driving motivation of local actors, such as tribes, to push Turkey into the east of the Euphrates.

High level meetings between U.S. and Turkish delegations have been continuing since the U.S. decision to leave Syria. While both sides are discussing the way to finalize the U.S. withdrawal and how to address Turkey’s national security concerns, the U.S. is seemingly in a search for a solution as to how they will protect the YPG. The U.S. attitude is not only underestimating the Turkish threat perception and the important issue of the return of Syrian refugees, but is also overlooking a facilitator factor that is pushing Turkey to go for Manbij and the east of the Euphrates.

If all legitimate Turkish concerns were to be addressed, but the interests of Turkey’s Syrian partners ignored, Turkey’s new power inside Syria will force Turkey to widen its sphere of influence. Many Syrian communities inside Turkey and in Syria have evolved a direct relation to Turkey, in which the country is seen as a leader. Many actors of the Syrian community want to bandwagon with Turkey in order to expand their own areas of control and therefore are pushing Ankara to open them the gate to Manbij and east of the Euphrates.

Turkey’s local Syrian partners are pushing the government to conduct a military operation east of the Euphrates in order to expand their areal control and to return home.

Why does Turkey have to care about the demands of its clients in Syria? Ankara has built a strong relationship with the Syrian community and military actors of the Syrian opposition. With the start of the Astana process and the Euphrates Shield Operation, Turkey’s role has increased a lot. Turkey’s institutions got in touch directly with the Syrian opposition society. From the Turkish Armed Forces to the Health Ministry, Turkey has become hugely embedded in Syria. However, the relationship between Turkey and the Syrian opposition is not one sided. Turkey has to care about the demands of its Syrian partners, as the entire Turkish Syrian policy is built upon cooperation with them.

Turkey’s leverage in Syria, its military operations and presence in Syria are based on Turkey’s Syrian partners. Ankara needs the Syrian opposition in order to be able to achieve its goals. More, the relation between Turkey and its Syrian partners are grounded in mutual interests in their animosity against the Assad regime, Daesh, and the YPG. While Turkey is a crucial supporter of the Syrian opposition, the Syrian opposition is likewise crucial for Turkey as an enabler in Syria.

During Operation Euphrates Shield, Turkey’s armed partners on the ground were visibly unprofessional, weak and unskilled, but the training provided by Turkish soldiers showed their results in Operation Olive Branch, in which the newly formed National Army displayed high capabilities. In contrast to the U.S. strategy, which trains, equips and lets the YPG fight on its behalf, Turkey trained, equipped and fought together with its local partners. The difference in this strategy can also be observed via the U.S. army losses and by the Turkish army in Syria. While the U.S. lost half a dozen soldiers, Turkey lost 71 soldiers in Operation Euphrates Shield and 41 soldiers in Operation Olive Branch. This difference is also a result of Turkey’s approach to the National Army, as Ankara does not view the National Army as a proxy but as a legitimate partner.

U.S. attitude does not only underestimate the Turkish threat perception and the return of Syrian refugees, but also overlooking a facilitator factor that is pushing Turkey to go for Manbij and the east of the Euphrates.

The National Army was formed by the Turkish-trained Free Syrian Army factions under the umbrella of the Syrian Interim Government. The gathering of the leaders of different Free Syrian Army factions elected the Chief of Staff to which 9 different offices including the Military Court, the Military Police and which the Finance Offices respond to. The Chief of Staff also controls three corps. Among the 29 Free Syrian Army factions, 13 were formerly supported by the U.S. – either by the CIA via MOM operation room or by the Pentagon. 10 factions were formed after the end of the direct U.S. support to the Free Syrian Army in northern Aleppo. The formation of the National Army is an important asset in Turkey’s Syrian policy, which also means more leverage for Turkey’s partner to push Turkey to increase its role in Syria, even if Turkey didn’t prefer to do so.

The National Army has become way oversized for the tiny area from Afrin to Jarabulus. The asymmetric situation between their controlled areas and their size and capabilities results in the need to expand. The National Army factions want to bandwagon with Turkey in order to increase their control and are pushing Ankara to green light a military operation to Manbij and east of the Euphrates. By gaining more territory, the armed Syrian opposition not only wants to increase its balance of power against the Assad regime, but also wants to return back to their hometowns. Thousands of fighters from the National Army originated from currently YPG-held areas. Factions like Jaysh al-Sharqiyyah, 20th Brigade, Ahrar al-Sharqiyyah, Thuwwar al-Jazira, Jaysh al-Ahfad and Hasakah Shield entirely originate from eastern Syria. The armed Syrian opposition is aware that it cannot launch an operation on its own, without the backing of Turkey, as Russia and the U.S. are still involved in the Syrian war. Therefore, the National Army is pushing its backer Turkey to take action.

Turkey might have its own agenda to fight the YPG, but Turkey’s Syrian partners and local actors see Turkey as a vehicle to achieve their own agenda and to liberate their hometowns.

Turkey might have its own agenda to fight the YPG, but Turkey’s Syrian partners and local actors in Syria see Turkey as a vehicle to achieve their own agenda and to liberate their hometowns. In order to bandwagon and gain from the Turkish government, these actors need Turkey to act. While many discuss how to address threats towards Turkey’s national security, the role of Turkey’s partners in Syria is overlooked. The Syrian opposition sees a new chance in the east of the Euphrates to push its own agenda and to boost its position.

The Syrian opposition is aware that they need more area control in Syria in order to have a stronger position against the Assad regime on the negotiation table. In order to re-gain a strong position like it did in 2013, the Syrian opposition will push Turkey into the east of the Euphrates with its entire means. A more comprehensive perspective in which the needs and demands of Turkey’s partners is needed in order to find a common ground for the period in Syria after the U.S. withdrawal. Otherwise, even if the U.S. might think that it has addressed Turkey’s national security needs, it might not convince Turkey as the needs of its partners in Syria were ignored.

As the latest statements and decisions made by the U.S., such as leaving 400 troops in Syria and planning to continue their support to the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces until 2020, with a $350 million indicates that the U.S. does not want to reach an agreement with Turkey. If the U.S. isn’t going to address Turkey’s security concerns and since Turkey is being pushed from inside by the Turkish people and the Syrian opposition to launch a military operation towards Manbij and the east of the Euphrates, the best for Turkey would be not to withstand this and push and conduct another military operation soon.

The U.S. withdrawal symbolizes a new phase for local and regional actors in Syria. Particularly for Ankara, the U.S.’ “slow and coordinated” pull out strategy, which involves 2,000 troops in North East Syria, is a game changer; it was an unexpected move that no one saw it coming two weeks ago in Ankara. However, President Erdogan had a very strong expectation that President Trump would take responsibility to reshape Turkish-American relations before it would be too late. He never gave up on maintaining his communication with President Trump.

The mobilization of Turkish troops and the declaration of high military readiness in the region following Erdogan’s Ankara speech was a direct message not for the YPG but for the U.S. government to change its policy towards the YPG. More importantly, Turkey’s unexpected yet comprehensive air strike against PKK positions in Northern Iraq was a strong sign that Turkey would extend same military campaigns against YPG positions in Syria. In this regard, it was the last chance for the Turkish-American relations to reevaluate the escalation on the YPG issue. Otherwise, Turkey would have been militarily involved in the North East Syria where the U.S. has been operating alongside YPG forces. During the phone call on December 14, as it is claimed, President Erdogan strongly stressed Turkey’s position on military action, and it was followed by Trump’s decision.

At this stage, the operational and strategic dynamics, as well as the new geopolitical calculations among the actors involved in the Syrian conflict should be reconsidered. The post-American Syria revealed the dynamics, especially for Turkey. Hence, President Erdogan should reevaluate his overall strategy on Syria. Turkey’s priority, as president Erdogan repeatedly expresses, is to eliminate the YPG threat for Turkey’s imminent national and regional security concerns.

The cooperation between the U.S. and the YPG, and the U.S. operational military presence in NE Syria were some of the important dynamics that restricted Turkey’s freedom of military action against the YPG. Trump’s withdrawal means that Turkey gained freedom of military action in eastern Syria, yet the development brings a challenging road-map for Turkey to achieve its strategic priorities. If Turkey delivers its priorities on the ground and redesigns the current balance of power, the Syrian conflict is likely to be reshaped soon.

Following the cleaning of the Manbij pocket from the YPG forces, Turkey will reach its initial goal to take full control alongside its border in the western part of the Euphrates River. This might bring Turkey freedom of military action not only to reshape the overall region including Idlib but also to accommodate refugees.

The challenges that Turkey has to reconsider are multidimensional. First and foremost, what type of military move, in an operational manner, that Turkey will adopt following the U.S. withdrawal is significant. It seems that Turkey’s first military mission is to establish a full-scale military control in the Manbij pocket where Turkey and the U.S. had already agreed, yet the YPG maintains its presence there. The intense military mobilization of Turkey and Turkey-trained National Army near the Turkish border and inside Jarablus demonstrate that Ankara will take military action in Manbij.

Even though the regime tends to mobilize its militias towards the Manbij pocket to retake the city from the YPG, Turkey certainly perceives Manbij as a military threshold to maintain its military deterrence. At this stage, deterrence for Turkey is the use of threats to dissuade the Syrian regime from initiating an undesirable act in the region. Following the cleaning of the Manbij pocket from the YPG forces, Turkey will reach its initial goal to take full control alongside its border in the western part of the Euphrates River. This might bring Turkey freedom of military action not only to reshape the overall region including Idlib but also to accommodate refugees. Up until now, 300,000 returned to their homes in the western part of the River.

Following the takeover of Manbij, Turkey’s second military move against the YPG is expected to be alongside the border. This military operation will have a different character as the YPG would probably want to defend Ayn Al Arab (also known as Kobane), Rasul Ayn, and Tel Abyad against Turkey’s military action. The YPG’s search for a new ally at this stage is one of the significant steps that can influence Turkey’s potential military action, yet it seems that no credible actor at this stage can prevent Ankara from taking military action in these regions.

The strategy that Turkey might adopt following the liberation of Manbij has two broad aims. While the first aim for Turkey is to disassemble the YPG’s territorial continuity alongside the Turkish-Syrian border, the second one is to provide a safe haven for the refugee community who were forcefully displaced by the YPG. If this will is the case, Turkey is set to accomplish its original aim to establish a secure zone alongside its Syrian border. This also means that fighting against Daesh is a secondary mission that should be carried out following the establishment of a safe zone for Turkey’s military presence.

Trump’s decision brought many opportunities to repair especially the U.S.’s wrong strategy of working with a terrorist organization to fight against another terrorist organization, but at the same time brought Syria into a new rivalry between the regional countries.

This probably brings the third dimension for Turkey’s post-American roadmap in Syria. Fighting against Daesh at this stage is a complicated issue from a military perspective in which Turkey has the capacity, yet the geographical distance where Daesh militants operate makes Turkey’s military engagement riskier. While Turkey was calculating a limited military operation against the YPG in its borderline, now Turkey has to reconsider its military strategy.

This requires a comprehensive counter-insurgency strategy for Turkey to clean the area from YPG and Daesh, hold the liberated territories to sustain military presence and finally to build the post-conflict places. More importantly, Turkey’s potential far-reaching military operation towards the southern flank of Syria might also bring the Syrian regime, Russia and Iran into the geopolitical rivalry in the region, which is a situation Turkey would not want to get into. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson said that “Syrian government should assume control of areas vacated by the U.S.” This means that Russia does not tend to accommodate with Turkey’s own roadmap for the post-American withdrawal. Therefore, cooperation with Russia and the U.S. is the most significant part of Turkey’s strategy in NE Syria.

The game changer development for Turkey would be a potential and quick dissolution of the Syrian Democratic Forces. If the non-YPG forces (mainly the Arab forces) inside the SDF decide to detach themselves from SDF, then Turkey’s strategy has to take the Syrian regime’s move towards the eastern part of the Euphrates into account

The game changer development for Turkey would be a potential and quick dissolution of the Syrian Democratic Forces. If the non-YPG forces (mainly the Arab forces) inside the SDF decide to detach themselves from SDF, then Turkey’s strategy has to take the Syrian regime’s move towards the eastern part of the Euphrates into account, which poses another trouble, not just for Turkey but also for the U.S.  

The Syrian crisis is fundamentally localizing geopolitics, in which each actor has strategically different priorities regarding every single terrorist formation in Syria. Trump’s decision brought many opportunities to repair especially the U.S.’s wrong strategy of working with a terrorist organization to fight against another terrorist organization, but at the same time brought Syria into a new rivalry between the regional countries. Undoubtedly, Turkey needs a comprehensive strategy for its Syrian road-map following the American withdrawal.

News agencies reported yesterday that the Syrian regime is dispatching forces and equipment to the village of Arimah, 25 km west of Manbij.

Reporting from the region, news agencies stated that 40 pickup trucks, 2 military tanks, several trucks with military equipment and military personnel together with armored vehicles have entered Armiyah, a village near Manbij.

Reuters claimed that the Syrian regime backed by Russian forces are in coordination with YPG leaders in the Manbij region and are working together in order to respond to the expected military assault by Turkey-backed Syrian rebels who are waiting for the ‘signal’ to come from the Turkish military. Yousef Hamoud – a spokesman for the National Army – the main rebel force in the region backed by Turkey – said “the battle will start soon.”

According to experts in Turkey, after the decision of Turkey to enter the east of Euphrates and the decision of the US administration to withdraw its troops from Syria, the recent move of Syrian regime will once again change the balances in the region. The move of Syrian regime is understood by some experts as the ‘move’ of Russia indicating that ‘Russia cannot be left aside’ after the withdrawal decision taken by Trump in consultation with Erdogan.

Speaking to the Turkish press yesterday, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu remarked that Turkey is determined for a military operation in the east of the Euphrates. He added that Turkey is pleased with the withdrawal decision of the U.S. administration and will continue its military and diplomatic conducts in the process of this withdrawal.

Cavusoglu also remarked that both the U.S. and Turkish governments agreed on the Manbij issue and informed reporters that both countries are working closely in order to complete the process. It is reported that Cavusoglu will visit Russia in the upcoming days in order to discuss the U.S. withdrawal process.

The Turkish Ministry of Defense also commented on the developments in Manbij by tweeting, “In accordance with the developments in Manbij, the activity in the Arimah area has been observed to belong to the Syrian regime, which has been in the mentioned area since 2017. The developments are being followed.”

Anadolu Agency reported that the military equipment and trucks of the Turkish army have reached Elbeyli, Kilis – less than 150km north of Manbij.

*Written by Selahattin Emre Celebi  

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared an expansion of Turkish military operations in Syria and pointed to the east of the Euphrates.

During his speech at the Turkish Defense Industry Summit yesterday, President Erdogan stated that a military operation will begin in the area controlled by the YPG in the west of the Euphrates River. Erdogan said: “While 80-85% of Manbij used to belong to the Arabs, at the moment there are terrorist groups there. In that case, we will take them out. It is our responsibility now.”

Further criticizing the U.S. administration, Erdogan stated, “We have not yet achieved any result in Manbij. Mr. President says that we will clear those (terrorist groups) in 30 days. We’ll see. We wish they would clear all the terrorists.”

“An undeniable diversion tactic has been carried out in Manbij. And at this moment it is still being carried out.”

Global media outlets have confirmed that the U.S. has taken a step to train 30,000 YPG terrorists in northern Syria. And President Erdogan asks the U.S. government “Is this true? Are you aware of what you are really doing?”

“The north of Syria is our south. They are trying to build a corridor there. We say ‘these are terrorists,’ but our strategic partners, especially the U.S., say that ‘they are not terrorists.’ These are (referring to the terrorist organizations) a branch of the PKK, and all the proof is exposed. Why don’t you act with us, but act with them?”

“While the Americans speak positively to our faces, they preferred to use elements of these terrorist groups on the ground. Recently, they have taken the step to train 30,000 terrorists in the area. They say ‘there is no such thing.’ However, the global media has confirmed this. They have this information. Is this true? Are you aware of what you are really doing?”

What will be the scope of Turkey’s operation to the east of the Euphrates?

According to Abdullah Agar, terror and security expert, the operation will involve an area of 20 thousand square kilometers and this time Sinjar – an area in the west of Iraq – will also be included.

Turkey’s new military operation to the east of the Euphrates will involve an area of 20 thousand square kilometers and this time Sinjar – an area in the west of Iraq – will also be included.

Regarding the possibility of Turkish and U.S. forces crossing each other, Agar highlighted the possibility of this risk but stated, “If the risk is big for Turkish soldiers, it is bigger for American soldiers. The U.S. has made a huge mistake by taking a path with terrorists.”

Confirming the importance of President Erdogan’s speech for reflecting the will of Turkey, Agar said, “An operation that will be executed in stages is ahead. We are talking about a process of 550 kilometers along the border and 40 kilometer square in depth. This means that the Turkish Armed Forces will conduct an operation in an area of 20 thousand kilometer square.”

The operation, announced yesterday by Erdogan could further damage the already tense relations between Turkey and the United States.

*Written by Selahattin Emre Celebi

Even though Turkey and Russia have different strategic priorities in the Syrian conflict, they have both turned into vital actors. The Istanbul Summit held between Turkey, Russia, France, and Germany, last month proves this point. The Istanbul Summit is much more critical in terms of exposing the vital position of these two actors in the Syrian crisis, rather than the summit outcome.

Even though the summit was initiated and organized by Turkey, we should reflect on how it was made possible. Although the analyses that came out in 2016 claimed that Turkey had lost its impact in the Syrian crisis, now it’s the opposite. The main reason for Turkey’s transformation into a key country can be explained through several factors. The most effective one among these being Turkey’s direct military involvement in the Syrian crisis.

Turkey made its first military move with the Euphrates Shield Operation. With this operation, Turkey not only eliminated the Daesh threat, but also prevented the PKK from consolidating more power in the region. Turkey also proved its capacity to take more military action in Syria, and enabled the military opposition to re-organize.

Turkey’s second major move was to continue supporting the opposition groups when they were extremely disorganized, lost power and space against the regime, and more importantly, when they were isolated on a regional scale. Through the success of the Euphrates Shield Operation and the agreement made with Russia, the actions taken against the PKK in Afrin have consolidated Turkey’s gains on a more strategic level.

The Afrin Operation yields two significant results: The first one was to reveal that the PKK’s presence in the western Euphrates was unsustainable and to organize the armed opposition under its control. The second was to develop a unique relationship model with Russia and the U.S. Turkey has transformed itself into a critical actor for Russia, while reinforcing its position in Syria through the Astana process.

On the other hand, Turkey kept military options on the table by following a strategy against the U.S.’s PKK stance. Hence, Turkey has become a critical actor for Russia in the context of the solution of the Syria crisis, and for the U.S. in the PKK case in the eastern Euphrates. This strategy has enabled Turkey to achieve gains in relations with these two actors. Turkey resolved the Idlib problem after the Sochi reconciliation with Russia and removed the PKK from Manbij, while persuading the U.S. to establish control over the region along with Turkey and local elements.

One of Turkey’s most critical moves was to take the military and political initiative to solve the Idlib problem. Thus, in Idlib Turkey prevented the regime from organizing a massive operation and the emergence of a new refugee crisis. This move positioned Turkey more prominently in the Syrian crisis and most importantly, has legitimized its position in the eyes of secondary actors such as France and Germany. Additionally, Turkey took a very difficult responsibility to eliminate radical groups in Idlib and reinforced its military position in the region.

The Istanbul Summit came to the fore as a concrete output of Turkey’s achievements thanks to its series of successful military operations in northern Syria and efficient diplomatic initiative in Idlib.

The Istanbul Summit came to the fore as a concrete output of these achievements. Through the inclusion of Germany and France to the summit, Turkey ensured both the re-consolidation of the de-confliction zone and the ceasefire in the context of the Astana talks and diplomatically positioned Berlin and Paris against Moscow. In this way, France and Germany, which benefited greatly from the Idlib agreement, reinforced their support for the agreement. Although Putin repeatedly said that the Idlib agreement is temporary, Turkey has internationalized the political consensus in Idlib as a model for the political settlement of the Syrian crisis.

Now Turkey is waiting for the U.S.’s PKK move. If the U.S. does not give up on its current strategy concerning the PKK/PYD, then a military engagement in the eastern Euphrates seems highly likely.

Immediately after the Istanbul Summit, we saw that the Manbij agreement was put into practice between the U.S. and Turkey as planned. At that point, Turkey made a military signal against the PKK in the eastern Euphrates. Now, however, Turkey will be waiting for the U.S.’s PKK move. If the U.S. does not give up on its current strategy against the PKK/PYD, then a military engagement will emerge as a great possibility in the eastern Euphrates.

The Istanbul summit may not have produced a result yet. However, how Turkey has arrived at this summit is more important than the results. It is likely that the military presence of Turkey in the field, its close relations with the opposition groups, the connection it has built between Russia, Europe, and the U.S. link and its ability to make use of these connections in the field makes Ankara one of the most important addresses in the political settlement of the Syrian crisis. As Turkey responds to the changing dynamics on the ground, it becomes a significant player of the geopolitical game in Syria. Following a balanced foreign policy will further reinforce Turkey’s achievements.

The most striking feature of the Brunson case is that the U.S. has resisted to understand Turkey’s new foreign policy, and this led to a crisis between the two countries. Just to remind the reader, American Pastor Andrew C. Brunson has been kept under arrest for almost two years with the accusation of aiding terrorist groups such as the PKK. He was put on trial, found guilty and was condemned to a three year plus imprisonment by the Turkish courts.

U.S. President Donald Trump and Vice President Mike Pence claimed earlier that he had been innocent and expressed that he had to be released immediately. The language adopted in those statements bore a degree of threat and was disrespectful to the Turkish judicial system. That’s why Turkish officials have criticized President Trump and Vice President Pence for not showing patience and being disrespectful to the judicial process after the release of the pastor. They underlined that Turkey is a country where the rule of law is shown due respect. In fact, the issue was more than being about the rule of law, it is more of respecting Turkey’s sovereignty and recognizing its new international status.

The Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi’s probable murder in the Saudi Arabia Consulate in Istanbul also points to the same problem. It is clear that the Saudi crown prince Mohammad Bin Salman ordered the killing of Mr. Khashoggi on account of his critical stance towards the Saudi regime. Regarding the very close and special relations between Prince Salman and President Trump’s son-in-law and senior envoy to the Middle East Jared Kushner, it is not hard to guess that the U.S. was closely following the issue and was informed that Mr. Khashoggi was ordered to be killed. Choosing Istanbul as the location for this outrageous act, which directly defies the norms of international politics, does not seem to be random. It has been rightly put forward by some analysts that the purpose of this unfortunate act of killing was not just to get rid of an opponent of the Saudi regime but to get Turkey involved into this unfortunate incident and to violate its sovereignty.

Combining these two recent incidents with the Trump administration’s supply of heavy weapons and diplomatic protection to the Syrian branch of PKK (YPG) and its unabashed and militant foreign policy towards Palestine and Jerusalem, one can conclude that the U.S. shows no respect to Turkey’s security concerns and sovereign rights. More to the point, the Trump administration fails to understand Turkey’s new foreign policy doctrine. Turkey has been following a revisionist foreign policy for a couple of years. It has been seeking adjustments in the existing distribution of power in its region and in the international system in general.

Turkey’s current Syrian policy and its call for reforming international institutions such as the UN Security Council on the basis of new international realities can be given as examples to this revisionist turn in Turkish foreign policy. Despite that these are defensive policies, since they were put into action after Turkey came under attack by terrorist groups and its long-term allies, they manifest the desire for change in international politics.

The U.S.’s uncompromising posture pushes Turkey towards more activism in its foreign policy. President Erdogan has just vowed to eliminate all the YPG militants in Manbij and cleanse off the region from the terrorist elements located in the east of the Euphrates river. This would be a punch in the face to the YPG (and also to the U.S.) who has already suffered a terrible loss in the Operation Oil Branch in Afrin. After that done Turkey would secure the control of all its southern border with Syria and become a more powerful actor in Syrian politics and in the region in general.

As long as the U.S. clings to its current policy of disrespecting Turkey’s sovereignty and supporting its enemies, this will get Turkey to feel more insecure and as a result it will accelerate its policy of defensive expansion in its vicinity. The Trump administration has to find a better policy to be able to contain Turkey. Supporting the YPG, giving unconditional support to Israel, disrespecting Turkey’s sovereignty and opening an economic war have so far backfired. Turkey has grown more powerful.

According to news reported from Anadolu Agency on Wednesday 10 October , U.S. forces in Syria’s Manbij have provided the PKK/YPG terror group with new construction equipment, allowing for terrorists to continue digging up trenches in the city center.

The U.S. support to the PKK/YPG in Syria has been a major point of difference between the policies of Washington and Ankara in Syria. While the U.S. believes that they can wipe out a terrorist organization by supporting another, Ankara has insisted that the U.S. regime ought to rule out support for any terrorist organization – regardless of their so-called ideological affiliation.

U.S. troops have continued to provide military and logistic transportation from northern Iraq to northwestern Syria, despite a deal between Ankara and Washington on the withdrawal of the terrorist organization from the city.

The Manbij deal that was reached in June this year was a reassurance to Ankara that the terrorist organization will withdraw from the city in order to stabilize the region.

According to the news produced by AA, local sources also told journalists that the U.S. also sends aid to the PKK/YPG in the region.

In the recent logistic support, trucks carrying four construction vehicles were transported to Manbij. U.S. soldiers escorted the transfer of these vehicles, which included 3 bulldozers and one excavator.

The PKK/YPG use this equipment in order to continue digging trenches and tunnels.

The disagreement over the control and status of the Syrian town of Manbij has been a symbol of the strategic differences between the U.S. and Turkey’s Syria policies for a while now. Turkey’s successful military operation in Afrin led to the announcement of a roadmap over Manbij, which relatively calmed down U.S.-Turkey tensions. However, the U.S. continued to support the PKK-affiliated YPG forces in a stated mission to deny a return to Daesh in northern Syria.

With Daesh no longer holding territory, this mission did not appear to provide convincing rationale for a prolonged American presence on the ground. More recently, the U.S. ended its ambiguity by announcing an open-ended presence in Syria declaring a mission to limit Iranian influence in Syria as part of a broader strategy to confront Iran in the region.

With this critical shift in strategy, the U.S. commitment to northern Syria seems to be set in motion for the long term. One of the first concrete outcomes of this change appears to be the administration’s stern warnings against a regime operation against Idlib, which would have caused yet another humanitarian catastrophe.

Turkey sent reinforcements to its observation posts in and around Idlib to prevent the regime from an easy takeover while lobbying Russia to prevent such an operation. The U.S. rhetoric against the looming operation may have helped Turkey’s case, convincing Russia to hold off at least for a period of time in return for the Turkish promise to push terror groups out of Idlib.

Another consequence of the U.S. policy change seems to be the announcement that the PYD would no longer negotiate with the Assad regime. This step seems to be aimed at softening the Turkish argument that the U.S. should not trust the PYD, which would work with the Assad regime, Iran or Russia depending on its needs. This argument still holds true despite the PYD’s obvious tactic to appease its American supporters, who are clearly concerned about the degree to which the regime is supported by Iranians.

The PYD has played a critical role in the PKK’s regional ambitions by opening the door for legitimacy in the international arena despite Turkey’s warnings. Turkey has been able to limit the PYD’s forays into the western side of the Euphrates but the area it continues to control remains a major concern for Turkey.

The U.S. policymakers in charge of the Syria policy would like to see Turkey enlisted on their side in their push back against Iran in the region and they must see an interest in alleviating at least some of the Turkish concerns. This kind of willingness to work with Turkey and the most recent announcement of joint Turkish-American patrols around Manbij can help rebuild confidence between the two NATO allies.

Nevertheless, we should be clear-eyed about the reality on the ground of the U.S. support for the PYD, which is considered by Turkey as a direct security threat. This will continue to be the Achilles’ heel in the U.S.-Turkey bilateral relationship. The PKK understands this and will seek to exploit it for its interests.

Turkey feels more confident after its Afrin operation, the Manbij agreement with the U.S., and the successful diplomatic effort to prevent the Assad regime from launching a major military assault against Idlib, supported at least rhetorically by Washington. These are strong signs for a renewed dynamic that takes into consideration Turkey’s interests and concerns. But once again, American support for the YPG continues to be the underlying fundamental strategic divergence between the two allies, with significant potential to undermine any positive momentum.

The U.S.-Turkey relationship has always been subject to ups and downs, including the Cold War years. This was one of the themes covered in a conference on the legacy of the July 15 coup attempt organized by SETA DC. The current state of U.S.-Turkey relations is certainly less than ideal, to say the least, but the good news is that both sides are talking to each other. The laundry list of disagreements includes their diverging views on the PYD and FETO, which continue to derail the relationship. After the U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal and the Trump administration’s decision to impose sanctions on Iran with a November deadline, we can now add Iran to the list.

On the upside, the most recent Manbij agreement could help bridge the gap between the two sides on the PYD issue. The news of investigations launched against FETO may calm, albeit to a limited extent, the Turkish concerns that Gulenists continue to operate freely in the U.S. against Turkey. On Iran, the most recent U.S. officials’ visit to Turkey might help avoid yet another confrontation between the U.S. and Turkey, similar to the one back in 2010 when Turkey voted against imposing sanctions on Iran as one of the non-permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. However, the most recent Congressional proposal that threatens Turkey’s access to some global financial institutions has put extra strains on the relationship.

In the above-mentioned conference, one overarching approach was that the U.S. and Turkey will be able to work through their disagreements as they have in the past. I subscribed to this idea as well but it does not mean that it will be easy. Turkey, as many other countries, has always found it easier to deal with the Executive branch rather than Congress since certain anti-Turkey lobbying groups have a strong influence on the Hill. The absence of a sufficiently large politically active pro-Turkey Turkish constituency in the U.S. has often been a disadvantage for Turkey’s views to be heard on the Hill. In the current situation, Congressional action driven particularly by the Brunson case is creating risks for the health of the ongoing U.S.-Turkey conversations over a variety of problem areas.

President Erdogan and President Trump seem to get along well and that could be a plus for the relationship. However, we cannot overlook the longstanding disputes coupled with a continuing strategic divergence over the PYD issue, which Turkey considers a national security threat. The Manbij agreement certainly helped to come to a common understanding on the northern Syrian city but it remains uncertain if it can be extended to the areas east of the Euphrates. Furthermore, it is a concern for Turkey that the PYD is seeking to cut a deal with the Assad regime to hedge its bets if the U.S. pulls out eventually. The U.S. has not articulated a clear policy on the PYD or about what it seeks to accomplish in northern Syria in the post-Daesh period.

The Trump administration continues to deal with domestic political problems ahead of the November elections. Much of the administration’s foreign policy approach has been about disruption and policy reversals rather than comprehensive strategies. The most consequential policy change for Turkey’s regional strategy might be the Trump administration’s policy reversal toward Iran, which is currently focused on imposing sanctions and isolating the country.

The U.S.’ relationship with Turkey continues to lack a solid policy framework although it benefits from established institutional ties and more robust engagement recently. The new Iran strategy may spell trouble for the relationship if the U.S. ignores Turkey’s concerns. In the absence of a broad framework for the bilateral relationship, we may end up experiencing a rehash of the 2010 disagreement over Iran, which may undermine limited progress in other areas.

The U.S. and Turkey can and most likely will work through specific policy issues but the current uncertainties can certainly destabilize the relationship once again. Both sides have a strong interest in avoiding such a scenario and deepening the strategic conversation will be ever more important to overcome potential spoilers.

Turkey’s counter-terrorism strategy has undergone a massive transformation, particularly in the fight against the PKK, while the extra-territorial military operations have expanded towards Syria and Iraq where the PKK has been consolidating its political and military influence since the dissolution of the Syrian and Iraqi sovereignties.

Turkey began to operationalize its new counter-terrorism strategy with Operation Euphrates Shield (2016) in Syria and carried out its military operation against the PKK in Afrin with Operation Olive Branch (2018). Even though, these two military operations have different geopolitical aspects and execution methodologies, both military operations had the same strategic objectives: to de-territorialize the PKK in Syria, to eliminate its military capacity including manpower, and to weaken its international cooperation especially with the countries that provide militarily and political support to the PKK since the rise of DAESH.

Turkish authorities believe that the reactionary struggle against the PKK is not the best strategy to degrade and defeat the PKK’s terrorist campaign against Turkey. The best approach, according to Turkish authorities, should be designed by considering three interrelated variables: political decisiveness, Turkey’s military advantages and sustainability of military operations not only within Turkey but also in extraterritorial spaces such as Syria and Iraq.

Political decisiveness became a central element of the new counter-terrorism strategy following the collapse of the peace process in 2015. Turkish security forces have been able to defeat the PKK’s violent activities through domestic counter-terrorism operations; even though the PKK aimed to establish “liberated zones” by implementing violent urban tactics to widen the conflict zones towards significant city centers in southern Turkey.

The central rationality behind the PKK’s strategic consideration was the Syrian Civil War, in which Turkey has had to deal with many security and political challenges. In such a conflictual environment, the PKK could enjoy its territorial expansion. However, Turkey’s early military reactions against the PKK in the city centers of southeastern Turkey during the urban conflict between 2015 and 2016 have made substantial progress, and the PKK lost its entire terrorist mobilization and public support across the region.

Following domestic-counter terrorism operations, Turkey started to expand its actions towards the PKK in Syria. During this period, Turkey’s priority was to roll back the PKK’s geopolitical expansion along Turkey’s Syria border. Afrin, in this context, was a strategic threshold for Turkey to see how Ankara would be able to maintain its political decisiveness under the regional security vacuum that was somehow antagonistic and the U.S.’s apparent strategy over the presence of the PKK in Syria in the fight against DAESH.

Turkey’s military advantages along with its increasing capacity in defense technologies became central to sustain its military operations and ultimately defeated the PKK in Afrin. Operation Olive Branch resulted in a military and political victory for Turkey. Following the 58 days of the clash, the PKK was defeated and had to leave from the city centers. Following the triumph of Afrin, the Manbij agreement with the U.S. over the issue of the PKK presence showed how Turkey used its political decisiveness and military capacity to change the facts on the ground. From a domestic counter-terrorism struggle to Afrin and Manbij, Turkey has also shown its willingness regarding the continuation of the military offensive against the PKK, even though the regional and international conjuncture is against this policy.

Now, Turkey aims to maintain its counter-terrorism strategy against the PKK in Qandil where the PKK has settled as a safe haven thanks to the lack of Iraq’s sovereignty, the geographical sophistication of the region and the military capacity that the PKK has been building for almost 40 years. At his stage, Turkey has similar strategic goals: securing its border security against terrorist infiltration, eliminating the PKK’s presence in northern Iraq by holding terrorist camps in the region to isolate the PKK from its stronghold in Qandil and preventing the logistical mobilization of the PKK.

Turkey’s military operation now targets the PKK’s two strategically important locations in the region: Khakurk and Qandil. Turkish forces have already secured almost 500 sq. km in Khakurk and opened a safe corridor that reaches the Qandil Mountain since the beginning of the operation in March 2018. This time, the military strategy is not only targeting to eliminate PKK terrorists but also aiming to clean and hold the territory where the PKK has any presence.

The execution of military tactics in operational level on the ground is different compared to the OOB and OES in Syria due to the topographical feature of the region. But, the political decisiveness, Turkey’s military advantages, notably its technological superiority over the PKK, and willingness to maintain military operations toward the center of the Qandil Mountains seem to change the nature of the conflict between Turkey and the PKK.

This will be the first comprehensive counter-terror operation against the PKK. The regional dynamics are also behind Turkey’s military offensive. If Turkey can manage the dynamics emanating from the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and the central Iraqi government in favor of its new strategy, the PKK cannot sustain its presence in the region. But this does not necessarily mean that the PKK threat for Turkey will disappear in the near future.

Source: Suriye Gündemi

At this stage, there are two critical strategic challenges for Turkey in its fight against the PKK. The first challenge is about the question of how the PKK will transform its overall strategy in Syria and Iraq after the fall of Qandil. More importantly, the real challenge for Turkey is whether the PKK can find another safe haven in Syria or Iraq. The second challenge for Turkey is about the question of how Turkish military can maintain its military presence in northern Iraq particularly in the Qandil area. The Defense Minister of Turkey announced that Turkey would not withdraw its military force until the PKK is ultimately defeated in Iraq.

Turkey now has 14 different military bases in northern Iraq. Compared to the previous military operations against the PKK in this region, the presence of Turkish military troops in different places provide more space to maneuver. However, the continuation of Turkey’s military presence might undermine the relations between Ankara and Baghdad. Therefore, the success of the new counter-terrorism strategy is also part of a regional agreement between Iraq, Turkey, and Iraq against the PKK. Iran is currently neutral toward Turkey’s ongoing operation. If Turkey’s military strategy can succeed in the short term to defeat the PKK in Iraq, then reaching a midterm consensus between Turkey, Iraq, and Iran will be easier.

Turkey is in the midst of a ground operation in Iraq. The operation aims to clear the entire area under PKK control in Iraq and remove the PKK headquarters from the Qandil region, which is about 100 km away from the Turkish border. There were already limited operations and ongoing air bombardments of the PKK targets taking place after the PKK ended the ceasefire in the summer of 2015. Nevertheless, according to local sources, the operations took a new phase on March 11th of this year.

Accordingly, Turkish forces landed on the top of the mountains (i.e., Şapan, Dilan, Kewet, Bene, Çiyasor, Alekan ve Çiyaneya) in Sidekan/Bradost in Soran district of North Erbil. Then, eleven military bases were installed in the area. Next, the installed bases were connected to each other with the clean & sweep operations of Turkish ground forces and newly built roads between the bases. We see a close synchronization of the Turkish air and ground forces in time, space and purpose for the clean & sweep operations.

As a result of this joint operation, 155 PKK members were neutralized in the region since March 11. The 23 km long border was cleaned of the PKK threat and a total 400 km square is cleaned of the PKK. As a result of this operation, Turkey formed two pockets of PKK-free areas in Iraq across its border, one across Çukurca in the west and one across Şemdinli in the east. The eastern pocked has become a corridor heading towards Qandil and is currently as close as 24 km to the PKK headquarters.

Since March of this year 155 PKK members were neutralized in the region. The 23 km long border was cleaned of the PKK threat and a total 400 km square is cleaned of the PKK.

Turkey seems to be committed to end PKK terrorism for once and for all. After the PKK ended the ceasefire by murdering four Turkish security personnel in three different occasions from July 20 to 23, 2015, Turkey started its counter-terrorism operations. In response, the PKK increased its terror attacks including suicide bombers in bus stops, stadiums, etc. and started its so-called “rural-based urban war” in 22 centers across six cities in southeastern Turkey.

Once Turkey cleaned these residential areas from the PKK, the country seems to be committed to end the PKK in its strongholds outside Turkey. The PKK has no safe havens in Turkey, not a single “liberated” village, but is freely recruiting, training, sheltering, and even ruling vast areas in Syria and Iraq. Afrin was the first place where the PKK/PYD was cleaned off, the PKK leader Ocalan’s posters were taken down from Afrin city, and school textbooks with references to Ocalan are no longer being taught to school kids in Afrin.

Given that Qandil is 100 km away from the Turkish border, it required diplomatic negotiations with the Iraqi central government.

Following Afrin, Turkey also pressured for Sinjar in Iraq and Manbij in Syria to be cleared of the PKK. Sinjar and Manbij are still matters of diplomatic encounters between Turkey, the U.S. and Iraq. Nevertheless, unlike Manbij in Syria, the PKK is not under the security umbrella of patron states in northeast Iraq. In fact, the organization does not even allow the Kurdistan Regional Government forces to the areas under its control. Yet, given that Qandil is 100 km away from the Turkish border, it required diplomatic negotiations with the Iraqi central government.

If Iraq will be cleared of the PKK altogether, it will have to receive the support of Iraq or even Iran, which otherwise might be a retreat or even a logistical support zone. Hence, Turkey’s offensive in Iraq will require its neighbors’ cooperation. And only after such a tripartite cooperation of Turkey, Iran, and Iraq, can the PKK finally be cleaned off from Qandil. As for defeating the PKK in Syria, Turkey will have to work with the U.S. and will have to find a way to persuade the U.S. to stop its support to the PKK’s consolidation in Syria.

The Syrian Civil War and its consequences have posed the most difficult strategic challenges to the U.S.-Turkey relationship in recent years. Issues such as the status of the Assad regime, the composition of the opposition, and the U.S. relationship with the YPG have strained bilateral relations. Most of the differences were manageable, as they had an indirect bearing on the security of the U.S. and Turkey. However, the YPG challenge has been of a different nature given that it is the PKK’s Syrian branch and the PKK continues to pose a threat to Turkey’s security.

Over the past couple of months, the two NATO allies finalized an agreement to take concrete steps toward addressing this challenge. While the “roadmap” agreement promises to deliver a serious reassurance to Turkey’s security requirements, its implementation will be key in determining whether it can succeed and lead to future cooperation. If successful, the plan could go a long way toward helping to rebuild the long-damaged mutual trust between the U.S. and Turkey.

The Manbij roadmap announced on Monday foresees the departure of the YPG forces from Manbij and the administering of the city by its local population over the next few months. The U.S. and Turkish security forces are supposed to cooperate on the ground to bring about a sustainable local governance model that is not dominated by the YPG. Both the Euphrates Shield and Afrin military operations have provided Turkey with a lot of experience in building functioning governance structures that are reflective of the ethnic realities of the various localities.

Turkey has long opposed what it calls “demographic engineering” and will continue to do so in the future. This will result in the governance of Manbij by local Arabs who were previously pushed out by the YPG. Once, and if, successful, Turkey will most likely push to implement this model east of the Euphrates as well, in order to reduce the dominance of PKK-aligned groups. This is critical not only for Turkey’s own security, but also for a durable and sustainable stabilization operation on the ground in Syria.     

If the best case scenario is realized as described above, Turkey’s immediate security concerns can be addressed and mutual trust can be rebuilt. It would certainly not solve all the challenges in the U.S.-Turkey relationship, but it would potentially remove one of the most pressing strategic disagreements between the two countries. However, U.S. support for the YPG would continue to be a sore point. U.S. officials and analysts underline the “limited” and “temporary” nature of this support, but for Turkey it certainly means much more. By partnering with the YPG on the ground, the U.S. lends credibility and legitimacy to YPG forces that goes beyond narrow assistance. It also empowers the YPG against other local groups, including those that are not aligned with the PKK. In the end, giving up armed struggle against Turkey becomes less attractive and unnecessary for the PKK and its allied groups.

This dynamic would continue to strain the bilateral relationship, although Turkey’s Afrin operation that put an end to the YPG march toward the Mediterranean and the prospect that the YPG may no longer be in Manbij will help address some of Turkey’s immediate security concerns. The current U.S. willingness to work with Turkey is a good sign. Nevertheless, it will need to be coupled with concrete action on the ground.

If Manbij can serve as an example of a successful stabilization effort and a sustainable and representative governance structure, the U.S.-Turkey strategic conversation would improve and could be broadened to include areas east of the Euphrates river. This kind of cooperation has been lacking between the two countries and is critically important if robust stability is to be achieved. The U.S. will need state allies like Turkey, especially if it intends to pull out of Syria, or at least further reduce its footprint. Investing in a sub-state actor will not help bring stability to northern Syria in the long run. In that sense, a successful implementation of the newly announced Manbij roadmap can help start a meaningful strategic dialogue between the two allies.

The roadmap on Syria’s Manbij is expected to be announced after a final negotiation between Turkey and the U.S., which will be handled between Mike Pompeo and Mevlut Cavusoglu on June 4 in Washington. According to Turkish sources, the two countries have agreed on a three-step principle roadmap. In the first step, the PKK affiliated YPG forces will withdraw from the Manbij pocket complying with the date that will be determined by the Washington meeting. The second step, according to the sources, will start 45 days after the meeting between Pompeo and Cavusoglu. During this phase, the U.S. and Turkish military and intelligence authorities will launch a joint inspection in Manbij regarding the deployment of the Turkish and Turkish-backed troops there. The third step, according to the agreement, will be taken by both sides to form a local administration in Manbij within 60 days after June 4. This is the most critical part of the agreement, as it will implement a commonly accepted model. According to Cavusoglu, it would also be applied to the rest of PKK/YPG held territory in Northern Syria.

There is two integral parts of the model: providing security and establishing local governance to be responsible for the municipal services that will be formed in line with the ethnic distribution of the population in consideration. Even though it was not mentioned in the agreement, Turkey highlighted the return of Syrians to their homes, which should be interpreted as a significant part of Turkey’s strategy in Syria that is likely to reduce Turkey’s refugee costs in the short term.

Even though it seems that the Manbij agreement can work on paper, realizing the agreement goals might be difficult. There are many ambiguities concerning the U.S.’s strategy over the PKK/YPG in the eastern part of the Euphrates River. The current disagreements over the issues of S-400 aerial missile defense systems and F-35 fighter jets expected to be delivered in 2019 complicates the agreement outcomes for both Ankara and Washington.

The U.S. also wants to overcome the Pastor Brunson issue while negotiating the Manbij model. More importantly, the possible reactions by certain American security establishments such as the Pentagon, particularly the CENTCOM, constitute the most crucial part in implementing the agreement on the ground. The Turkish side, in this regard, has many concerns regarding the U.S. administration’s approval of the agreement in Washington and its implementation by the CENTCOM towards the other specific regions under PKK/YPG control in northeastern Syria. However, Turkey sees the agreement as a starting point to de-escalate the political rift between the two countries.

Under these circumstances, one might wonder how the agreement will be accomplished. The first phase is relatively easy to implement the model. The PKK announced that its forces have already left Manbij. However, the PKK’s close ally and ideologically integral part in the region – the Arab forces – want to stay in Manbij to take responsibility in the process of forming local security and municipal services. Turkey will be opposing this option. For Turkey, this is another way to create a pro-PKK force without the PKK. If such a claim is realized, the U.S. can maintain its support to the YPG. The best deal for Turkey in this stage is to remove all PKK-affiliated persons or groups from Manbij and form local forces, which have no direct or indirect connection to the PKK.

The removal of all PKK-affiliated persons and groups is quite crucial to implement the second phase of the agreement. However, how the agreement will specifically take Turkey’s will into consideration is still an open question. For instance, whether the Burkan al-Furat (the Euphrates Volcano), consisting of Arab military fractions mostly, will leave Manbij or not is of crucial importance for Turkey. The PKK/YPG has been allied with the group, creating room for the Euphrates Volcano Operation when Kobane was attacked by Daesh in 2014. At this stage, American troops will continue to remain in Manbij while Turkey will be establishing observation stations along with the forces that will be mainly composed of anti-PKK/YPG Arabs. According to Turkish sources, there is also a possibility to establish a new observation point on the Turkish border along with a limited number of American soldiers to observe the agreement in Manbij and to facilitate the development of the model for other regions. It should not be expected for Manbij to undergo complete Turkish military control, as the Turkish military will be operating in other regions where the Operation Olive Branch and the Operation Euphrates Shield took place.

The implementation of the military aspect of the agreement brings the third phase into question, in which the U.S. and Turkey will establish a local governance model composed of local security forces and effectively local municipal services. Turkey has a valuable experience regarding the formation of an effective local governance model, including police forces and delivering basic services to local people. However, Manbij will be different, since the U.S., and perhaps France will be the partners in implementing the local governance model in Manbij.

The uniqueness of Turkey’s experience is emanating from its decision-making process without taking any third party’s interference into consideration. The local training forces in Turkey, delivering humanitarian aid to liberated regions in Syria and forming local governance processes are in full control of the Turkish authorities. However, the Manbij model will be implemented under the joint control and protection of the U.S. and Turkey after the withdrawal of YPG forces from the region within a specific period.

Turkey has many concerns regarding the formation of a security structure and local governance, in which any PKK-affiliated persons or groups might be part of the process. For instance, how the municipal structure will be determined by the ethnic distribution of the population since the PKK has changed the very nature of the demographic balance in Manbij is a vital issue. Therefore, implementing the third phase of the agreement will take time while both sides will be implementing the first two steps.

The most important aspect of the Manbij agreement depends on how the two countries will overcome disagreements between the two capitals. Both the U.S. and Turkey will not decide about the future of their relationship via the Manbij agreement. However, the agreement will open a new page for the future.

As we get closer to the June 24 Presidential elections, the topic of Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East fades away from daily politics in Turkey. However, a recent development, particularly the ongoing negotiations between Ankara and Washington, concerning the issue of Manbij, still remains pressing. Last week, Cavusoglu and the U.S. Secretary of State, Pompeo, held a bilateral meeting in Brussels to talk about current political rifts between Ankara and Washington, specifically to discuss how both sides can work towards overcoming the issue of PKK/YPG presence in Manbij. Undoubtedly, Manbij is not the only issue between Turkey and the U.S. Through this meeting, S-400s, Russia, and other regional topics were also put on the table.

When the negotiation between Ankara and Washington was taking place, French soldiers were photographed in Manbij while patrolling along with U.S. troops in military vehicles that carried French flags. France’s strategic rationality is understandable because of many reasons, and the increasing role of France in the region, especially in northern Syria, might pose new challenges for Ankara’s short-term strategic game plan. Therefore, Ankara is carefully following the developments in the region as the election atmosphere continues to spread across the country.

There are three components of the French approach towards northern Syria vis-à-vis the PYD-YPG presence. While the first one is to accomplish the fight against DAESH on the military front, the second one is to back local, political, and military forces (in this case, the SDF will probably be the main actor) to improve and consolidate local governance, including the security sectors. The last one will be part of the wider political transition period if international actors can reach a comprehensive peace plan for the future of Syria. It seems that France and the U.S. believe that the PYD, as the main component of the SDF structure, is vital in this transition process if they can console Turkey on the matter. However, the picture is completely different for Turkey.

Manbij is one of the critical issues that Turkey and the U.S. administrations have to overcome. France is trying to signal to Turkey that they are also a partner of the SDF-PYD in this region. Unfortunately, the latest conversation between Pompeo and Cavusoglu could not bring an end to the disagreement on the Manbij issue. The U.S. State Department released a statement after the meeting indicating that both sides are still testing each other about Manbij. While the U.S. reaffirmed their support for the established bilateral process to find a common way forward on Manbij, and underlined the U.S’s commitment to support Turkey’s national security concerns, Turkey recalled that the U.S. should take concentrate steps to end YPG presence in Manbij.

At this point, Turkey’s position is very clear. According to Ankara, Manbij city council should be run by groups in line with the past census results of the city, before the demographic change in the area imposed by the YPG and PKK took place. On the other hand, the U.S. initially wants to certain Turkey’s Afrin model whether the establishment of the city council properly works or not. However, Ankara does not seem to accept the U.S. proposal. According to the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cavusoglu, if the U.S. complies with the preliminary agreement on a roadmap, then the PKK will withdraw from Manbij while U.S. military presence will be maintained along with Turkish military presence. However, it is not expected that the Manbij conundrum will remain unsolved before the upcoming elections.

The U.S.’s game plan, especially after Pompeo’s appointment as the new secretary of state, is not about U.S. support to the PKK in northern Syria. There are two main strategies that Pompeo aims to achieve as the new secretary of state in charge. The first one is about Turkey-Russia relations particularly on the issue of the S-400 delay. Manbij is perceived by the U.S. as leverage to undermine the Turkish-Russian deal on the air defense missile system, which will be delivered to Turkey by the end of 2019. The second one is about anti-Iran rhetoric in the region, in which Turkey is seen as one of the important players in deterring Iranian influence. From Ankara’s point of view, the upcoming election will be a determinant factor. If President Erdogan maintains his power, then the Turkish position will not change. However, the problem between the two sides will continue.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan made a surprise visit to Turkey’s southern Hatay province last Thursday. As Operation Olive Branch continues to take ground, the visit was welcomed by a sizable audience, with the participation of some celebrities ranging from singers to national athletes.

Prior to the speech given in the late hours of the evening in the southern region of the Hatay Province, President Erdogan, accompanied by the Chief of General Staff Hulusi Akar, Deputy Prime Minister Bekir Bozdag, Defence Minister Nurettin Canikli and Land Forces Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces Gen. Yasar Guler, visited the Turkish military units to inspect the progress and congratulate the military men for their celebrated efforts.

The operation in Afrin, beginning in January of this year and ending last month, has been hailed by people in Turkey and those in the northwestern regions of Syria as not only a success against the PKK/PYD tyranny, but also on the fact that it has become one of the numbered peaceful places within the calamitous ongoing Syrian Civil War.

During his speech at the central police station, Erdogan adulated the wholeness of the people as being the foundation to protecting collective sovereignty, praised the solidarity of the public figures and celebrities for their presence, and thanked all the civilian care networks such as AFAD (The Disaster and Emergency Management, Republic of Turkey) to the Health Ministry for their support and determined efforts to help those in need. Lastly, while displaying his gratitude and respect towards the indispensable efforts of the Turkish Military, he quoted Gazi Mustafa Kemal in saying “There is no such thing as protecting the line, there is only protecting the ground, and a unified ground is what makes a nation.”

In recent years the YPG, the Syrian branch of the internationally recognized terror organization PKK, has increased its activity emanating from Syria since they took advantage of the Civil War and occupied the northern regions in 2012. The PKK/YPG has mostly focused on carrying out cross-border missile attacks on the Provinces of Hatay and Kilis, having fired more than 90 rockets in 2018 alone.

So far, two Syrian and three Turkish citizens have been killed, with over 100 casualties, of which numerous are still in critical condition. Together with human deaths, some of those who have survived are effected by a slow bombardment that their homes, vehicles and neighborhoods were destroyed.

With the Afrin operation coming to an end, direction has now turned to the Manbij. Separated by the Euphrates river from the rest of the YPG/PKK controlled areas of northern Syria, Manbij is another important territory in which Turkey seeks to relieve the areas inhabitants from unwanted occupation while protecting Turkish lands from further terrorist threats.

While recently there has been speculation of French intervention in the region as a mediator between Turkey and the YPG, Ibrahim Kalin, the spokesperson for the Turkish Presidency has firmly indicated that Turkey “rejects any efforts to promote ‘dialogue,’ ‘contact’ or ‘mediation’ between Turkey and terrorist organizations.”

When compared to Turkish endeavors, both Euphrates Shield and Operation Olive Branch have not only conformed with International Law, U.N. Security Council resolutions and her right to self-defense under the U.N Charter, but has been an effective and efficient method in maintaining the unity of Syria’s territorial integrity.

The successful completion of Afrin operation seems to have ruffled some international feathers however, bringing previously absent players into the spot light. Considering much of the brutality is over when compared to the bulk of the civil war, Macron’s attempt to enter Syria through the back door not only remind us of the ignominious policies during the French Mandate for Syria, but suggest he still has some road to travel before becoming a man in international politics.

On March 29, French President Emmanuel Macron met with leaders of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Élysée Palace. Following the meeting, Le Figaro first reported that France is sending troops to northern Syria, and then re-wrote the caption that France might send troops – referring to members of the SDF as source for the news. A day before this happened, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that U.S. troops will retreat from Syria. This was followed by a telephone conversion between Trump and his French counterpart, and increasing cooperation with Turkey. Combined with statements made by the YPG, recent developments have made it seem that France will take the place of the U.S. if the latter retreats from the region.

Élysée Palace refuted the claims with the statement that France will send reinforcement units to Manbij. However, the statement also touched upon the target of reaching “stability,” particularly in the secure zone located in northeastern Syria within the framework of an inclusive and balanced order. This might implicate France’s possibility of coming up with an administration model for the Syrian Kurds living in the region nearby the Syria-Turkey border in case Manbij is included in Turkey’s field of control. Élysée Palace also announced that they hope to see the establishment of dialogue between the SDF and Turkey with the support of the international community.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan reminded that his French counterpart remarked similar opinions during their one-on-one meeting and added: “We are deeply sorry about the latest statements coming from France, which we find wrong and hope to have stemmed from a misunderstanding. Those hosting the terror group members in a top-level office must know that this only means an antagonistic move against Turkey.”

The latest statements are far from being peculiar when considering the record of France in Syria, as the country has engaged in many atrocities in the Middle East. When France and the U.K. divided Arab territories into mandate governments according to the Sykes-Picot Agreement, France had Syria. Although the reports made after the Macron-SDF meeting were refuted, they still evoked memories of the French military’s invasion of Damascus 97 years ago. During France’s 20-year mandate government in Syria, the foundations of Syria’s future were laid. The mandate government divided the country into six regions and founded the “Special Forces of the Levant.” Comprising mostly of Nusayri and Druze soldiers, the Special Forces then formed the grounds of the Syrian Army. It is argued that the Nusayris gained dominance in the state despite being a minority group due to this ground laid by the French.

In 1970, Hafez al-Assad came to power by staging a military coup. In Syria, where more than 70 percent of the population is Sunni, the minority Nusayris ruled the country with the Baath regime, which is a peculiar combination of Arab nationalism and Soviet socialism. The French government and the Assad family always acted in favor of each other. Regardless of whoever came to power in France, this situation never changed. For instance, when Hafez committed the 1982 Hama massacre, socialist president François Mitterrand was serving his first term in Élysée, but he did not even issue a single condemnation to Assad. More, Hafez’s brother Rifaat al-Assad, the commanding officer allegedly responsible for the Hama massacre, moved to Paris after having tension with his older brother, and allegedly engaged in embezzlement and money laundering. He spent a serious amount on financing Channel Tunnel and received his residence permit thanks to that.

Republican President Jacques Chirac also displayed red-carpet treatment to Assad, who made his first visit abroad to Paris in 1998 after 30 years. In 1999, Chirac hosted Bashar al-Assad in Élysée before he had any official status. He was also the only western leader that attended the father Assad’s funeral one year later. Throughout all these decades, France has never shown any concern about the situation of Syrian Kurds, whom Assad deprived of citizenship. Plus, the country always supported Saddam Hussein, the perpetrator of the 1988 Halabja massacre. While Turkey opened its border gates after the Halabja massacre, France only accepted 500 Kurdish refugees. A French diplomat friend of mine was surprised at the fact that Turkey opened its borders without pursuing any form of screening. When I asked him how the French authorities selected people, he pointed to his teeth and said, “they look at their teeth.”

Although relations between Paris and Damascus hit a low after the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, who was Chirac’s close friend, Chirac’s successor Nicolas Sarkozy restored relations between the two countries. He hosted Bashar Assad three times while Assad paid return visits. However, the Arab Spring changed the course of events, as France could not foresee the phenomenon that started in Tunisia, where the Ben Ali dictatorship favored by France was overthrown. It can be contended that France showed such a hasty demeanor in Syria for this reason. The country favors dictatorial regimes, but as soon as their decline becomes obvious, it starts to criticize the same regimes. The statements issued by Élysée Palace regarding the Macron-SDF meeting stressed the male and female parity within the delegation. But they did not touch on the fact that many international NGOs issued various reports indicating that the YPG and PKK terror groups, which adopt an ideology with Stalinist and fascist elements, armed 10-year-old children and made 15-16 year-old children organize kamikaze attacks.

Middle Eastern politics is boiling once again. The rumor is that France will replace U.S. troops in Syria. While there are some signs of this, these are ambiguous at best. U.S. President Trump said in a speech in Ohio that the U.S. will be getting out of Syria “very soon.” On the other side of the Atlantic, French President Macron met with a delegation of the Syrian Democratic Forces (the late brand of the PYD) and declared his support for the organization. Pro-PKK sources even claimed that in the meeting Macron promised to send troops to prevent a further Turkish “aggression” against the SDF. Of course, many questions regarding this replacement scenario remain unanswered. Did Trump really mean what he said? Can he really pull troops out of Syria given CENTCOM’s years-long investment in the PYD/SDF? Can Macron really send troops to Syria? Even if he does, would they be just symbolic forces or can France really take the risk of a military encounter with other forces on the ground, particularly with Russia, given the recently heated relations between Russia and NATO? Hence, such a replacement in the near future is not probable, but possible. Anything is possible in the contingent world of politics anyway. Nevertheless, from Turkey’s point of view, such scenarios are worth attention but no more. Even if it happens, which is still not and may never be on the horizon, it is not a game changer for Turkey.

Regardless of which country arms and protects the PKK’s offshoot in Syria, Turkey seems to be decisive in its struggle to counter the PKK threat beyond its borders. Turkey’s Afrin offensive has resulted in the quick demise of the PKK’s Afrin project. Nevertheless, Afrin is just the first step of a more comprehensive offensive against the terrorist organization. For Turkey, the PKK has to be cleaned off from the areas it currently holds in Iraq and Syria. Turkey’s western allies might have difficulty to understand the country’s rationale, but to put it simply, Ankara does not want the PKK to send suicide bombers across the border from Iraq or Syria. The organization has cost thousands of lives in Turkey and it is time to terminate the group once and for all. If the PKK is terminated, that’s not going to happen in Turkey. The terrorist organization does not have any arms depots, school or training camps in Turkey. The PKK’s 40 year-long bloodshed did not suffice it to take a single village in Turkey. Conversely, the organization entirely resides on territories in Iraq and Syria.

The PKK’s headquarters, training camps and arms depots all are in Iraq and Syria. All the territories that the organization controls are beyond Turkish borders, whether it be Qandil, Sinjar, Manbij, or Haseke. The organization trains its recruits in camps in Iraq and Syria and sends them to Turkey through the territories that it controls. The PKK even runs schools in these places where it teaches children the “heroic” act of killing Turks. With the fall of Afrin, the organization will no longer be able to teach children in the city to be “heroes” by joining the PKK. Elementary schools in Afrin will no longer have the pictures of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan on its walls or in school textbooks. The city will no longer hold ceremonies for the PKK’s suicide bombers who both killed and died in Turkey. Afrin was just one of the PKK’s recruitment and training centers. Turkey is persistent to handling the rest of these arms depots, recruitment and training centers, and its entire organizational network and military capacity one way or another. Turkey is more dedicated than ever to counter the PKK wherever it seeks shelter, whatever name it makes up to call its offshoots, and whichever country it receives support from. The question is not whether it will, but when and where. Turkey’s “allies” that arm, train, and protect the PKK may keep the group safe in some zones for some time, but this was not enough to stop Turkey in Afrin and may not be enough in the next battleground.

The U.S. and Turkey have been pursuing conflicting strategies in northern Syria for a while now. Turkey adamantly pursued to end the U.S. support for the YPG while the Trump administration has seen the group as its “local partner” in the coalition’s anti-Daesh efforts. Turkey’s Operation Olive Branch has recently ended the YPG’s control over Afrin, a city in which the U.S. has declared no interest but expressed “concern” about the Turkish operation. While Turkey is focused on clearing its borders from the YPG and Daesh, the U.S. is insisting that Turkish military operations distract from the fight against Daesh.

The strategies of the two countries diverge from one another so much that they carry the potential to come head to head in Manbij. However, negotiations in bilateral strategy talks, a mechanism established following the former National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster and Secretary of State Tillerson’s visits to Turkey, could yield a cooperation deal in Manbij, which could potentially be broadened. In such an optimistic scenario, the anti-Daesh fight would actually be strengthened while Turkey’s security concerns vis-à-vis the YPG could be met. A deal that pushes the YPG back east across the Euphrates and establishes a U.S.-Turkey coordinated patrol of Manbij can be the basis of broadened cooperation in northern Syria.

Today, Turkey is pushing the U.S. to end the YPG control in Manbij, a promise made by Vice President Joe Biden under the Obama administration. The capture of the town was so alarming that Turkey launched Operation Euphrates Shield in August 2016, only a month after the failed coup attempt of July 2016, in order to prevent further spread of the YPG control in the area. For Turkey, the PKK was trying to accomplish what it could not inside Turkey by creating an autonomous zone in northern Syria through the YPG. By intervening for the first time militarily in Syria, Turkey took the matter into its own hands as multiple U.S. reassurances about the short-term and tactical nature of its support for the YPG did not materialize.

Turkey has been able to change the strategic environment on the ground through its military operations at the expense of both the YPG and Daesh. Clearing its border from both terrorist organizations seems to be its current strategy. The U.S. strategy only partially overlaps with the Turkish strategy but that could be considered as a glass half full. Through an arrangement as described above, diversification of the governing structure of Manbij more representative of the ethnic makeup of the area could be accomplished. U.S.-Turkey military cooperation in patrolling the city can be a trust building measure. Such success in Manbij would not erase the overall strategic differences between the two allies but it would pave way for a broader and meaningful strategic conversation.

The U.S.-Turkey strategic realignment will be very difficult to achieve as the U.S. keeps its exclusive focus on Daesh while ignoring Turkey’s legitimate security concerns regarding the YPG. However, if Manbij can serve as a success story of military and political cooperation on the ground, both Ankara and Washington can build upon it. Regular strategic conversations to coordinate policy are a must between the American and Turkish governments and it can start with Manbij. This is true not only for their Syria policies but other regional issues as well.

As the Trump administration is gearing up to pull the U.S. out of the Iran nuclear deal, a new era of uncertainty and tensions will likely emerge. President Trump has championed “America first,” a slogan that at times manifested itself as unilateralism in foreign policy. The recent addition of the Pompeo-Bolton duo to the administration promises more unilateralism than multilateralism. The administration will likely find an unwilling Europe to corner Iran, and Turkey is not likely to take a confrontational stand against Iran. Yet, if the U.S. and Turkey can work together in northern Syria, they could broaden their regional strategic conversation that might also include Iran in the near future. A cooperation in Syria between two NATO allies is not a wishful thinking; it is a matter of whether they will.

On the 58^th day of the military campaign Operation Olive Branch, Turkey declared its victory against the PKK/YPG in Afrin. Following the collapse of the PKK’s defense strategy and its unexpected isolation within the geopolitical struggle, the city is now under full control of the Turkish Armed Forces and the TAF-backed Free Syrian Army. One way or another, it is clear that this military-political victory of Turkey will provide more opportunities for strategic manoeuvres in Ankara’s next military move, particularly towards its ongoing military campaign against the PKK in northern Syria. Upon the liberation of Afrin city, with the surprisingly little resistance by the PKK, Turkey is now reconsidering its military and political options to minimize the PKK’s role in the midterm, and de-territorialize the PKK and YPG in Syria and Iraq.

Speaking in Ankara, a day after the TAF and Free Syrian Army cleared Afrin, President Erdogan vowed to further Turkey’s fight against terrorism beyond Afrin. In his speech, Erdogan said: “We have eliminated most of the terror corridors in the region,” and “we will continue this process until we entirely eliminate this corridor that includes Manbij, Qamisli, Ayn al Arab (also known as Kobani) and Rasuylayn.” President Erdogan also underlined that Turkey’s next military move will take place in Manbij – a region that is still under the control of the U.S.-backed PKK/YPG forces. Following the visit of former U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson to Turkey to negotiate about the PKK issue in Manbij, Turkey’s foreign minister Cavusoglu expressed that the YPG will hand over the governance of Manbij to the Turkey-led Free Syrian Army in the presence of the U.S. military units there. However, after Trump’s unexpected Pompeo move, as the new Secretary of State, Cavusoglu made a minor revision in his early announcement about the agreement with Tillerson over the issue of Manbij. Cavusoglu stated that Turkey and the U.S. have not reached an “agreement,” but a common “understanding” regarding the issue of the U.S.-PKK alliance in Syria. At this stage, there is still an ambiguity regarding the position of the new State Secretary in negotiations with Turkey.

While the U.S. administration’s stance towards Turkey remains unclear, President Erdogan said that Turkey would also continue its fight against the PKK in Sinjar, a region that has been controlled by the PKK since 2014. Now, the foreign and security policy circles in Ankara are speculating how Turkey will carry out its military campaign against the PKK in Iraq. Turkey sees Sinjar just as strategically important as Afrin and other PKK-controlled regions. The geographical proximity of Sinjar to Turkey, and the role of Sinjar as a hub between Qandil and northern Syria threatens Turkey’s national security, and provides the PKK with more space to freely mobilize its militants and military equipment. It is crucial to note that the PKK’s presence in Sinjar threatens Iraq’s territorial integrity as well as the political stability of northern Iraq.

The strategic rationality behind Turkey’s move against the PKK in Sinjar is very simple. Turkey believes that the PKK’s presence in Sinjar does not meet with the regional geopolitical expectations, similar to the PKK experience in Afrin. Turkey and Iraq recently reached a tacit agreement over the PKK issue in northern Iraq. Iran seems to share a similar perspective regarding the PKK presence in northern Syria and Iraq. The KRG’s independence referendum showed how an intra-regional competition turned into an ad hoc realistic alliance in the presence of a common threat. Therefore, it is possible to claim that the PKK lacks an intra-regional support in maintaining its political and military presence in Sinjar. More critically, the PKK does not benefit from the U.S. air protection in Sinjar. Thus, the security and foreign policy centers in Ankara believe that the PKK will be isolated if Turkey decides to intervene against the PKK in Sinjar.

However, this does not necessarily mean that Turkey will take unilateral action against the PKK in Iraq. There are three alternative scenarios that should be taken into consideration. First and foremost, Turkey will try to evacuate the PKK from Sinjar by encouraging the Iraqi central government to take military action. Secondly, Turkey and Iraq will take a joint military action against the PKK together, if the PKK does not peacefully hand over the city. The recent visit of Hulisi Akar, Turkish Chief of General Staff, was the first step in convincing Iraq to take military action against the PKK. After his visit, the two countries underlined the importance of commonality in the fight against terrorism. The third and yet undesired option is part of Turkey’s ongoing military activism in the region against the PKK. At domestic, regional and international levels, Turkey benefits from its trans-frontier military initiatives as the active use of military forces provide a strategic superiority for Turkey to contain security threats and strengthen its diplomatic relations. The launch of Operation Olive Branch is a good example in understanding how the use of power consolidates Turkey’s diplomatic efforts on regional and international scales.

Articulated as such, according to the third option, Turkey is likely to act unilaterally against the PKK in Sinjar. Many in the governmental circles believe that Turkey might also use its new proxy forces against the PKK in Iraq. It is fair to conclude that Turkey wants to secure its borders, and also its regional strategic priorities. The use of military power will be part of this strategy in the future until Syria and Iraq reach a level of sustainable stability and security. The regional dynamics, as well as the new trends in Turkish security and foreign policy, enables Turkey to carry out its military campaign beyond Afrin.

The recent decision by the Manbij Military Council to hand over territories in western Manbij to the Assad regime to prevent attacks from Turkish-backed Syrian rebel brigades will have its long-term effects on the YPG dominated Syrian Democratic Forces. In the eyes of Kurdish opposition groups, Syrian Arab allies of the YPG and the Arab population in Syria the credibility of the YPG dominated SDF will be questioned.

Syrian rebel forces captured the strategically important city of al-Bab from DAESH with the essential support of Turkish Armed Forces. After capturing the city, the regime and allied militias captured the town of Tadif and some other villages to the east. By doing so, the regime blocked further attacks by Syrian rebel forces against DAESH. After Turkey and Russia reached a ceasefire agreement between the Assad regime and the Syrian rebels, the focus of the Euphrates Shield Operation shifted towards the YPG controlled city of Manbij. Facing this threat, the YPG has taken huge steps to avoid any offensive towards Manbij.

Firstly the YPG tried to gain US-protection against any military attack on Manbij. They threatened that they would retreat from front lines in Raqqa against DAESH to defend Manbij against Euphrates Shield forces. Knowing the strategic importance of the city for the new US administration, they thought this would convince Washington to protect their presence in Manbij despite the US’s promise of a withdrawal of YPG forces from that city. These threats may have some effects on the US’s trust in the YPG, but their partnership stays strong.

For a long time it seems that the US would protect the YPG from any attacks by Euphrates Shield forces on Manbij. The US sent new batches of armored vehicles to the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces. It didn’t take long to see these new vehicles being used by YPG fighters. The military training of Manbij Military Council forces, which are also dominated by YPG fighters, also continued by the US. The CENTCOM Twitter account even cheered newly trained female fighters. YPG affiliated websites and sources started to publish visual confirmation of US troop’s presence in the area around Manbij. It seemed that the US would protect the YPG from any attack on Manbij despite its promise to Turkey, which designates the YPG as a terrorist organization because of its structural affinity with the internationally designated terrorist organization known as the PKK.

On 2 March 2017 the Military Council of Manbij published an official statement claiming they will hand areas west of Manbij over to the Assad regime and allied forces to prevent Turkish-backed rebel forces from taking the area, which means that the US’s ally on the ground is handing over territories to the Assad regime. This statement shows something important and will have many negative long-term effects for the YPG in Syria.

It firstly shows that the US didn’t agree to protect the YPG against Turkish-backed Syrian rebel forces. Despite a media campaign, which assumed US-protection for the YPG in Manbij, the Turkish and Syrian resolve to conquer Manbij prevented such protection for the YPG. US officials want to avoid an open escalation with its NATO ally, especially before the planned Raqqa operation. Therefore, the US will most likely pressure the YPG to withdraw and focus on Raqqa when the Manbij operation starts fully, to avoid a decrease in the fighting capability of the YPG and to secure the Raqqa operation.

The first soft attack of the Syrian rebels near Arima ended with the capture of three villages from the YPG. The videos of the battle clearly shows YPG fighters at the frontlines, showing that the area is dominated by the YPG as local sources claimed. The effectiveness of a possible Assad regime protection as border guards against Euphrates Shield forces is also very doubtful.

In addition, this might cause many problems for the YPG, and internal discussions are taking place over how they can hand over territories captured with the blood of their own fighters. The Kurdish National Council (ENKS) who are oppressed by the YPG started to question the goals of the YPG and how could they hand over areas to the Assad regime. The ENKS has traditionally strongly opposed the Assad regime, and they have good ties with mainstream Syrian rebels, the Turkish government and especially with the Barzani-government of the Kurdish autonomous region in northern Iraq.

In the same day of this statement, the Syrian Rojava Peshmarga that operates in Iraqi exile started an operation in the Sinjar Mountain to push the PKK and allied forces out of the area in cooperation with the Barzani-government and Turkey. The PKK refused to withdraw from the area. Supporters of the ENKS are questioning the reasons behind the YPG handover of territories to the Assad regime and not to the legitimate government of Kurdistan in Iraq. The YPG’s credibility among the Kurdish population will suffer with this agreement with the Assad regime. Tensions between the pro-Barzani and pro-PKK Kurds are rising. These tensions could also cross over to the Kurdish areas in Syria.

Hemin Hawrami , a senior adviser and assistant to President Barzani, and member of the KDP Leadership Council has officially asked the question of why the PKK handed over territories to the Assad regime, but not left Sinjar.

Another long-term effect for the YPG will be its relationship with Arab forces in the Syrian Democratic Forces who mainly oppose the Assad regime. The Arab allies of the YPG in the SDF will surely question the future of the organization and it will damage the credibility of the SDF. This action will be seen as proof of its collaborating with the regime.

The weakening of the alliance between the YPG and the Arab forces inside SDF could lead them to some kind of negotiations with Turkey and rebel forces who work with Turkey. Or at least, rebel forces who attack areas controlled by the SDF could argue that it would just be turned over to the regime later. Therefore, the SDF/YPG might have prevented an attack this time, but it has done more damage over the long run. The population in areas controlled by the YPG-dominated SDF could fear that their villages will be handed over to the regime in the future, so they could work with the Syrian rebels. In reality, this already happened in some areas which supposedly should be handed over to the Assad regime.

This latest action of the YPG dominated and controlled Manbij Military Council of the SDF will probably not prevent an attack on Manbij. Turkish authorities and Syrian rebels signaled that they will go for the city and it is not for sure if the Assad regime and Russia will risk an escalation with Turkey or if they would give up the YPG-control over Manbij like the US. But it is certain that the YPG lost credibility among the Kurdish population and its opponents in the ENKS. They have also lost credibility with their Arab allies in Syria.

Ahrar al-Sham’s presence and power in Northern Syria will be tested. The rivalry among high level Ahrar al-Sham commanders, between those who opposed a merger with Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (JFS) and those who are pro-merger, led to the announcement of a splinter group called Jaish al-Ahrar. If this process leads Ahrar al-Sham to further disintegration, JFS will be the winner of this split and probably become the strongest power in Idlib. A JFS dominated Idlib will be problematic for Turkey’s moderate Syrian opposition discourse and might weaken Turkey’s influence in Idlib and its surroundings. Ankara would prefer a well-supplied united Syrian armed opposition over today’s chaos. But if some merger will lead the Syrian opposition to a political position close to JFS, then Turkey will face a situation that could end with a loss of its influence on the main actor in Idlib.

A direct confrontation between the Turkish Army or Turkey’s Syrian allies with JFS should not be expected. Despite their extremist discourse and al-Qaeda-linked background, JFS enjoys support in the Syrian opposition and society because of their policies and their fight against Assad, DAESH and the YPG. Thus a fierce conflict between rebel factions won’t be tolerated nor find support among the Syrian pro-revolution public. But a fight against a common enemy would be a better cover for Turkey’s efforts among the Syrian opposition.There is reason to believe Turkey may get more directly involved in Idlib. Turkish President Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu have repeatedly stated that the target after al-Bab city will be Manbij, which is under YPG control. If the Euphrates Shield operation is extended not only to Manbij but also to Afrin, Turkey will prefer to surround the YPG from the south of Afrin too. In this case it would not be surprising if Euphrates Shield expands to include the Idlib northern countryside. This strategy may create the possibility of a direct Turkish confrontation with Assad and Russia, because a Turkish military presence in Idlib, on top of their presence in the Azaz-Jarablus-al-Bab corridor, may be a potential threat for Assad’s forces in Aleppo.But this strategy has the potential to increase Turkey’s influence over the Syrian opposition. Turkey has ties with mainstream opposition groups, in particular Ahrar al-Sham, Faylaq al-Sham, Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki and various FSA brigades. With the possible intervention of Turkey in Idlib, relations between Turkey and the mainstream opposition can move to a new phase with a high level of cooperation.

In brief, the civil war will not end in Syria after the fall of Aleppo, but the relationship between local actors (the Assad regime and the Syrian opposition) and external actors (backers of Assad and the Syrian opposition) will determine the fate of the war at least in North Western Syria. While the Syrian opposition lacks unity and a supply of heavy weapons, the Assad regime also lacks manpower to launch a successful offensive without effective support from its allies.

There are two questions that will apparently be decisive in the near future: how far will Russia continue to back the Assad regime, and when and where will Turkey further its intervention in Syria against the YPG?

Here, the questions are how much of this area is strategically important to Turkey and what the strategic success of the operation would be. There are three major factors with regard to these questions. 1) Daesh threat against Turkey. Daesh attacks along the Turkish border from northern Syria have recently intensified and these are directly related to the military developments in northern Syria. 2) PYD/PKK threat to Turkish national security. The PYD, the Syrian branch of PKK, has consolidated its power in northern Syria, which has encouraged PKK terrorists to geographically spread its violence over the Turkish territory. 3) The growing refugee problem in Turkey. The country continues to shoulder the heavy burden of 3 million Syrian refugees and the concomitant social and economic problems. In fact, Turkey had little choice but to liberate the area controlled by terrorists and move some of the refugees into their homeland in Syria. Therefore, the open-ended Operation Euphrates Shield rests on two military contexts: it is an offensive operation to liberate the projected targets from Daesh and PYD/PKK, and it is a stability operation to provide a secure zone for those who seek refuge.Now, it is better to focus on the current stage of the Euphrates Shield. So far, the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and Turkish forces have liberated a significant amount of territory and the offensive operation is expected to continue until the whole territory within the area of operation is completely liberated from Daesh and PYD/PKK terrorists. The primary target of the operation is undoubtedly Daesh, but once Daesh is defeated, the PYD/PKK will have the chance to rush into the liberated lands and to colonize them. The aggressive territorial expansion of the PYD/PKK makes the current operation more vital for Turkish security as much as for the local Arab and Turkmen populations.

Having secured the strip from Jarabulus in the north all the way to the Sajur River, 15 km to the north of Manbij, the FSA has now focused on Daesh-occupied territories in the west. This means that the march into Manbij has been currently postponed. The offensive operation against Daesh is anticipated to reach the line between al-Rai and al-Bab. The fiercest battle to be fought in this campaign against Daesh is expected to occur in the vicinity of the al-Bab district and its outskirts. As the westward move of the FSA continues, more Turkish tanks and mechanized battalions accompany them. This operation is also backed by the coalition air force during the march against Daesh positions.

Tactically, Turkish ground forces are formed in armored Battalion Task Forces (TF) as part of a brigade. Combat units consist of tanks, mechanized infantry, anti-tank, artillery, and air defense capabilities. Battalion TFs are the most important maneuver units for dominating ground battles by promptly responding to emerging threats and shaping the security environment. FSA soldiers are equipped with small arms and mounted on light sport utility vehicles to carry out the mission of seizing the intended targets.

Daesh and the PYD/PKK carried out numerous offensive activities against each other before the FSA and Turkish offensive operation began. Now they are both stable, and are digging in their positions to prepare a defensive stance. Al-Bab is fortified by Daesh and Manbij by PYD/PKK. The defensive actions of the terrorists being used in preparation to take advantage of the terrain in ground battles. The first element of exploiting the terrain is to secure the positions of fields of observation and fire. Both al-Bab and Manbij are covered by fixed weapon positions that have a range of 5,500 meters of direct fire. The direct fire weapons are the anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) of MILAN for the PYD/PKK and the 9M133 and 9K129 Kornet missiles for Daesh. So far, 5 Turkish tanks have been hit by these weapons, leaving 4 Turkish soldier dead and 10 others wounded. While the total number of ATGM that the PYD/PKK owns is estimated at 300, the number owned by Daesh is unknown. The mortar shells of both terror organizations could be effective against the FSA moving with light SUVs, but the positions of these weapons can be easily detected and engaged by Turkish or coalition air force elements, or the Turkish long-range Fırtına guns.

The second element of the defensive activities in al-Bab and Manbij is cover and concealment from FSA/Turkish observation and fire. Both terror organizations are expected to position themselves in urban areas inhibited by civilian populations. Al-Bab is populated by thousands of civilians and the population cover will presumably be the major factor of Daesh’s defense. On the other hand, the PYD/PKK has moved some civilians from the eastern bank of the Euphrates into Manbij to cause civilian casualties during an FSA/Turkish offensive. Moreover, some US Army Special Forces ODAs have also moved to Manbij to provide ally cover for the PYD/PKK, a human shield made up of US soldiers.

The third element is the obstacle to stop, canalize, or divert the FSA/Turkish offensive. Since the terrain around al-Bab and Manbij is bare, very few natural obstacles are set in the paths of FSA/Turkish advance. This means that both Daesh and the PYD/PKK have begun to set a series of mine fields. Since both terror organizations have very limited anti-tank landmines, they are expected to employ huge numbers of IEDs along most possible avenues of FSA advance. In fact, both terror organizations are highly experienced in using IEDs.

The fourth factor are the key terrains. Urban areas, roads, high ground, and bridges around al-Bab and Manbij are vitally important for both terrorist groups if they still intend to withhold the cities that the FSA/Turkish offensive aims to liberate. The road between al-Rai and al-Bab is of particular strategic importance for the FSA/Turkish advancement and provide supplies to the vicinity of al-Bab. The towns of Hazwan, Sozan, and Qabasin around al-Bab and the interconnecting roads are also critical for the FSA/Turkish offensive to break the resistance of Daesh. On the other hand, the roads between al-Bab and Manbij and the town of Arima are in key positions for the offensive in that they form the southern line of future stability operations.

The FSA/Turkish forces expect to seize Manbij in a peaceful way with the help of US-Turkish relations; however, a political and armed resistance is expected from the PYD/PKK, which also aims to jeopardize the strategic relations between Turkey and the US. Karakozak Bridge is the main supply connection between Manbij and the eastern bank of the Euphrates, and it is expected to be the number one key terrain to seize in the case of the PYD/PKK resistance to withdraw from Manbij.

As is understood from the elements of the terrain assessment, the first four elements will shape the FSA/Turkish advance into al-Bab and Manbij. The momentum of the Euphrates Shield is related to this. Other than Daesh and PYD/PKK direct actions against the FSA/Turkish advance, there are two possible threats: first, friendly fire casualties from the reluctant coalition air force; and second, the US Army Special Forces manipulations around Manbij.

Undoubtedly, the FSA/Turkish forces are capable of liberating the lands from the terrorist groups, if no international political strings are attached. However, the biggest challenge is endurance and, after the projected area is liberated from Daesh and the PYD/PKK, the presence of the FSA/Turkish forces for a period of time will be needed to guarantee stability. The success of the current offensive can be considered a threshold to the strategic success, but the real achievement will be the future of the stability operation that will shape the political environment as well as its capacity to respond to possible crises.