Rising tensions between Iran and Israel, culminating in retaliatory warfare since the 7th of October, have plunged Saudi Arabia into a state of uncertainty. Despite Riyadh’s long-standing rivalry with Tehran, the recent truce with Iran, escalating regional tensions and Saudi Arabia’s own domestic interests have led its leaders to adopt a more cautious and pacifist tone.

This time, Saudi Arabia has framed its response to Israel’s actions against Iran in legal rather than political terms. Riyadh condemned the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran as a “blatant violation” of Iran’s sovereignty. Earlier, Israel’s attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus on 1 April, followed by Iran’s retaliatory missile and drone barrage two weeks later, prompted Saudi Arabia, along with other Gulf states, to swiftly condemn the Israeli attack and warn of “the dangers of war and its dire consequences”.

Despite historic tensions with Iran, Saudi Arabia has been actively involved in diplomatic efforts to prevent a catastrophic escalation. Prince Faisal bin Farhan, the Saudi foreign minister, has been at the forefront of communication with all parties involved, advocating “double restraint” and stressing that “we do not need more conflict in our region”.

For the Saudis, a war with Iran – whether started by Israel or anyone else – is a no-win scenario. It will be fought in their backyard and the Arabs will bear the brunt of the devastation. Arab soil will be the battleground because Israel and Iran have no common borders. Such a war would shatter Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s (MbS) vision of a prosperous and unified Middle East, a dream he once likened to a ‘new Europe’. Instead, the region could tragically morph into a post-World War II Europe, divided and set back for decades.

As a key player in the global oil market, Saudi Arabia is acutely aware of the economic consequences of any disruption to oil supplies in the event of a regional war. The recent example of the Houthis, a relatively small group, posing a critical threat to international shipping routes in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden during the Gaza conflict, albeit with subtle efforts at prevention by the ad hoc US-UK-led naval coalition. In addition, the kingdom’s proximity to conflict zones and the presence of Iranian-backed militias in neighboring Iraq and Yemen on Iran’s axis of resistance pose significant security threats.

Before even considering such a fight, the Saudis need ironclad security guarantees from their Western allies, the same kind that Israel enjoys to ensure deterrence. Frankly, that’s a tall order, at least for now. While their offensive capabilities exceed those of Iran, the Saudis recognize the need for robust air defences to counter Iran’s extensive arsenal of missiles and drones. This concern underscores the importance of President Donald Trump’s 2020 proposal for a Middle East NATO against Iran, particularly one that unites Saudi Arabia, Israel and other Arab states.

Building on the momentum of the Abraham Accords, which normalized relations between Israel and several Arab states, the US envisioned a regional defence cooperation framework. This included transferring Israel’s operational area of responsibility from the US European Command (EUCOM) to the US Central Command (CENTCOM) and proposing integrated air and missile defence (IAMD). This vision seems to be bearing fruit, albeit in a fragile and secretive way.

Although acknowledged by Israel and denied by Arab governments, including Riyadh, reports from outlets such as the Wall Street Journal suggest that Saudi Arabia has played a role in intercepting Iranian missiles and drones. Of course, this was a sign of cooperation, not an intention to engage in a full-scale war between the two. Unlike Arab officials, Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant openly saw it as “an opportunity to build a strategic alliance against this serious threat from Iran, which threatens to put nuclear explosives on the heads of these missiles”.

Iran’s attack on Israel served two purposes. First, it exposed Israel’s formidable air defenses and unwavering Western support, which boasts an impressive, reported 99% intercepting success rate. Second, this narrative would undoubtedly spark a parallel drive for advanced defence capabilities in Saudi Arabia, while raising concerns about unequal treatment of allies in the face of the Iranian threat. It reminds us of how the Saudis have endured a serious threat from Iranian-backed Houthi rebels since 2015 (over 430 ballistic missiles and 851 armed drones).

President Biden’s complex relationship with Saudi Arabia’s MbS has further complicated the situation, shaking security assurances. Attacks by Iranian-supplied Houthi missiles and drones on key Saudi energy facilities in 2019 and 2021 marked a turning point. The subsequent US withdrawal of Patriot missile batteries in 2021 exacerbated feelings of abandonment and a lack of US commitment, as expressed by Prince Turki Al-Faisal to CNBC, ‘not indicative of America’s stated intention to help Saudi Arabia defend itself against external enemies’.

Recently, Saudi Arabia took a step back from discord with Iran, a step towards normalization with Israel, and another towards a security pact with the US before the presidential elections in November. But the outbreak of the Hamas-Israel war has halted progress on these fronts. One reason is Saudi Arabia’s balancing of moral imperatives with strategic considerations.

Traditionally a champion of the Palestinian cause, Saudi Arabia finds it morally and popularly unacceptable to ally itself with the Jewish state (Israel) occupying Palestinian territory and recently killing 33,000 in Gaza against the Shiite Muslim state (Iran), especially at a time of war. But despite discreet cooperation with Israel, Saudi Arabia is officially stuck in a ‘chicken or the egg’ conundrum. Should a solution to the Palestinian problem come before normalizing relations with Israel, or vice versa?

Precarious neutrality reigns

In a multipolar regional landscape where Iran and Israel, both adversaries of the Arabs, are engaged in a protracted conflict, Saudi Arabia will arguably gain a strategic advantage in the regional balance of power. It is worth noting that the Arab Israeli enmity predates that of Iran and has been unresolved since 1948.

The Saudis may consider themselves fortunate to have cautiously forged a truce with Iran and avoided formal normalization with Israel, which would provide a strategic buffer in the event of war. This stance may allow them to maintain neutrality, be ready to mediate, or at least send an appeasing message to Iran if necessary.

In Saudi Arabia’s quest for foreign policy autonomy, neutrality has become one of its strategic tools. It allows Riyadh to avoid entanglement in US rivalries, as seen in conflicts such as the Russian-Ukrainian war and the brewing Israeli Iranian escalation. Such detachment is in line with Saudi political and economic interests.

Indeed, any attempt by Saudi Arabia to remain neutral in a looming war between Israel and Iran is a precarious balancing act. The kingdom hosts some American business and defence assets on its soil, including Patriot batteries, which necessitates routine cooperation with the US, especially in contingencies such as an Israeli Iranian war.

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rab Gulf countries implement strict drug-control legislation, enforcing it through judicial proceedings and border checks. They cooperate with international organizations and neighboring nations to boost intelligence exchange and prevention operations; however, these efforts require further improvement.

Academic studies show that drug abuse and addiction have become a significant issue in the Gulf region. Increased drug use, including hashish, amphetamines, and prescription drugs, creates significant challenges for society, public health, and safety. The GCC enables regional cooperation against drug trafficking through information sharing, synchronized operations, and training programs among member governments.

The strong cultural and religious traditions of Saudi Arabia discourage drug abuse. The Saudi government prioritizes counternarcotics and trafficking operations. The Saudi government has applied imprisonment, fines, and the death sentence for drug smuggling since 1988.

In March 2023, the General Directorate of Narcotics Control (GDNC) in Saudi Arabia announced the arrest of numerous individuals who were caught promoting and selling narcotics across cities in the Kingdom. Attempts to transport 483.3 kg of hashish and 35 tons and 176 kg of the narcotic plant khat were stopped. Twelve million illegal amphetamine tablets were discovered in a shipment of pomegranates, demonstrating a dedication to stopping drug trafficking and safeguarding the public. The Anti-Narcotic Agency also launched a “report them” campaign for drug users and distributors in the Kingdom.

On the other hand, the World Bank announced that Saudi Arabia’s drug campaign had cost the nation an estimated $10 billion annually. This covers the price of security, law enforcement, and medical treatment. Riyadh has been devoting more economic resources to the fight against drug trafficking.

Why do smugglers target Saudi Arabia?

Drug trafficking in the GCC is facilitated by several factors. Tribal and ethnic ties across borders assist traffickers in establishing channels of distribution in the region. The Gulf region’s closeness to countries that produce illicit drugs, such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, and Lebanon, as well as expatriates engaged in criminal activity, have also contributed to increased drug smuggling in the Kingdom. At the same time, Gulf citizens associated with organizations classified as terrorist by important state actors such as Hezbollah, DAESH, and Al-Qaeda play an active role in these networks.

Saudi Arabia is a target for drug traffickers for various reasons, including high societal demand, a wealthy market for producers, the country’s geographical location, restricted domestic production, black market demand, and the regional instability of its south and north borders. On the other hand, its regional rivals may be using drug smugglers and distributors as a weapon to destabilize the Kingdom.

Omar Munassar, a Middle East expert, told Politics Today, “The drug cartels’ focus on Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations can be explained by two primary factors. Firstly, there is a significant economic motive due to the region’s wealth and the high demand for drugs among the youth population. Secondly, certain political groups, such as Hezbollah, which have conflicts with Riyadh and the broader region, exploit drug trafficking as a means to wage a cultural war while receiving financial support to strengthen their own economies.”

The UAE as a transit point in the Gulf

Due to its well-developed welfare and infrastructure, international maritime connections, financial center status, and transshipment visitors, the UAE is an important drug transit destination. Abdul Jaleel Mahdi, director of the Dubai Police’s anti-narcotics branch, said, “We are a transit country. Our surroundings, airport, port amenities, and proximity to manufacturing and transiting countries all have an impact.” However, the government is aggressively striving to prevent drug trafficking with harsh measures.

Ali Bakir, who teaches at Qatar University, told Politics Today that “the fact that it [UAE] is at the center of the regional trade through neighboring UAE ports means that the country is accessible from sea, land, and air.” “The authorities there have been gearing up to counter drug smuggling for years. Yet, it is always cheaper for the drug dealers to fight this war as long as some of their production reaches its destination,” he added.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE have geographic proximity, tribal ties, and well-designed transportation channels which provide advantages for drug smugglers. According to the Saudi government, 83.2 kg of cocaine were confiscated from a car at the Saudi Arabia-UAE land border crossing at Al-Batha in May 2023. To combat the UAE serving as a hub for drug trafficking, Saudi Arabia has improved surveillance and boosted border security, and is working with its neighbors to snare drug shipments and take down smuggling networks.

Weaponizing drugs

The Assad regime in Syria and Iran’s proxy Hezbollah have been responsible for sending illicit drugs, especially Captagon, to Saudi Arabia. Captagon tablets are simple to manufacture, widely accessible, and inexpensive to purchase. The smuggling of Captagon, mostly produced in Syria, has exploded in the last decade. This addictive drug has invaded the Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia.

Habib al-Badawi, a professor at the Lebanese University, told Politics Today: “Geographical location near the Levant and Sarawat Mountains plays a vital role, as Saudi Arabia shares borders with other countries known for drug production or trafficking, such as Yemen and Iraq, while drug farms and factories are in a safe haven on the Lebanon-Syria borders.”

After finding more than five million Captagon tablets hidden in a cargo of pomegranates destined for Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom halted the importation of fruit and vegetables from Lebanon on April 25, 2021. According to Karam Shaar’s a political economist and non-resident senior fellow at Newlines Institute, report on Captagon, 370 million pills were intercepted in 2022 in Saudi Arabia. He stated, “The Assad regime realized that this is something they can weaponize for political gain … and that’s when production started being on a large scale.” Captagon has had a devastating impact on many Saudi citizens and expats, especially on youths, while Syrian politicians and Hezbollah authorities deny the accusations.

Arab News has disclosed interviews and investigations suggesting that “facing global sanctions that have left it desperate for revenue, the Syrian regime has gone into the drug-manufacturing business, working with Iranian-backed militias in Syria and Lebanon to smuggle industrial quantities of Captagon into Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states, by land, sea, and air.”

Reuters has claimed that Saudi Arabia has compensated the Syrian regime with $4 billion to stop Damascus from smuggling drugs into the Gulf. This claim has been related to Syria resuming membership to the Arab League in May 2023. The readmittance was on the condition that Syria stops narcotics from being smuggled across its borders and allows Syrian refugees to return.

Drug smuggling in Saudi Arabia is influenced by various factors like high demand, geographic location, proximity to producers, regional instabilities, and the involvement of entities like Syria and Hezbollah in narcotics exports. The Kingdom seems to be determined to combat drugs, as security forces have been engaging in counter-campgins to capture drug dealers in recent months.

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ine Arab countries have entered the club of the top 40 weapons-buying countries in the world, according to a recent report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). At the same time, between 2018 and 2022, arms imports by European countries increased by 47% compared to 2013-17 while imported arms decreased by 40% in Africa, 21% in the Americas, 7.5% in Asia and Oceania, and 8.8% in the Middle East.

Meanwhile, the global powers’ share in arms exports has varied, with the U.S. share increasing from 33% between 2013-2017 to 40% from 2018-2022, while Russia’s share fell from 22% to 16% in the same years. China’s share of global arms exports amounted to 5.2%, Germany’s share stands at 4.2%,  Italy’s at 3.8%, and Israel’s at 2.3% between 2018-2022.

For the first time, two Arab countries, namely Jordan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), have joined the list of top 25 arms exporters globally.

Algeria’s global share of arms imports has declined from 4.1% in 2013-2017 to 1.8% in 2018-2022, moving the country from 12^th position to 18^th in arms-importing countries globally. Algeria remains the top country in Africa importing arms.

Morocco’s arms sales have declined from 1.1% in 2013-2017 to 0.8% in 2018-2022 globally. Morocco currently ranks 29^th among arms-exporting countries—a decline from the 21^st position it held.

The GCC takes the lead

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) occupied the first ranking in arms imports, with 180 war jets ordered by the Gulf monarchies out of 260 exported to the Middle East. Notably, arms exports to the Arab Maghreb have declined while exports to Egypt, which has 4.2% of the global share of arms imports, remained the same.

In 2018-2022, Saudi Arabia came after India in global arms imports, with a total percentage of 9.6% following India’s 11%.

Saudi Arabia’s arms imports declined slightly from 10% of global arms purchases in 2013 to of 8.7% in 2017.

Qatar moved from the position of the world’s 17^th arms importer in 2013-2017, to third in the world in 2018-2022, with an increase of 311%.

The United States was the main contributor to exporting arms to Qatar with 42%, followed by France with 29%, and Italy with 14%.

Egypt and the UAE

The economic crisis in Egypt did not affect the share of its arms imports. Although Egypt receives approximately $1.3 billion annually in U.S. military aid, the United States is not among the top three arms suppliers to Cairo.

Instead, Russia topped this list with circa 34%, followed by Italy and France with 19% each.

On the other hand, the UAE arms imports have declined moving the country from fifth place in the world (2013-2017) to 11^th (2018-2022).

It is likely that the decline in the country’s arms imports is related to the country’s shift towards manufacturing its own weapons, and even exporting them, thus joining the club of top 25 arms exporters.

The UAE ranked 18th in the world in arms exports, accounting for 0.4% of the world’s total arms exports.

Between 2018 and 2022, the UAE exported 28% of Egypt’s arms imports, 27% of Jordan’s, and 15% of Algeria’s.

The United States was the main supplier of arms to the UAE, with about 66%, followed by Turkey (7.4%).

Russia ranked third with 5.4%, although the UAE army is known for its reliance on Western weapons.

The war in Ukraine and East Asian arms exports

Ukraine has become the third-largest recipient of global arms in 2022, accounting for 2% of global arms purchases between 2018 and 2022.

Between the years 2013 and 2017 and the years 2018 and 2022, arms imports by East Asian states increased by 21%. The SIPRI report concluded that “[a]rms imports by China rose by 4.1 per cent, with most coming from Russia. However, the biggest increases in East Asia were by U.S. allies South Korea (+61%) and Japan (+171%).” The report went on to state, “Australia, the largest arms importer in Oceania, increased its imports by 23 per cent.”

The list of major arms importers did not include Arab countries such as Oman, Sudan, Libya, Iraq, Tunisia, Syria, Mauritania, and Lebanon.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan told a businessperson whose business had been affected by the informal Saudi boycott of Turkish products, “They expect me in February. They made a promise and I will pay a visit to Saudi Arabia in February.” This visit to Saudi Arabia marks the first one in seven years – the last being in 2015.

Thanks to the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) Al Ula agreement in January 2021, there is now room for optimism manifested in the constructive moves by both Turkish and Arab leaders toward a broader normalization process. On many occasions and during Abu Dhabi’s Crown Prince Mohamed bin Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan’s visit to Turkey last month, President Erdoğan has indicated Turkey’s willingness to repair ties with Egypt and the Gulf states.

President Erdogan told journalists upon his return flight from Abu Dhabi, “We are continuing our positive dialogue with Saudi Arabia. We want to continue by taking concrete steps in the coming period. We want to develop the process in a positive direction.” It is expected that it might take a few weeks to one or two months to address topics that have not been revealed.

Despite the fact that expectations are more important than timing, it may be vital to create an appropriate foundation and take actual steps prior to the visit. Perhaps Saudi Arabia has more reservations and conditions than the UAE, or it is behaving in accordance with its foreign policy approach, “Better to delay than rush,” to assess the ramifications of what its pint-size GCC neighbors are doing.

Now or later, Turkey and Saudi Arabia’s resuming realist and pragmatic politics could bring about broader regional implications. Primarily, thawing the icy relations between the two regional giants would rectify the intra-GCC and intra-Sunni bloc divisions that Iran has exploited to flex its muscles in the region.

What does Turkey expect?

After a decade of shaky relations between Turkey and Saudi Arabia, experts suggest that broken political, economic, and security ties should be rebuilt. Betül Doğan Akkaş, a Gulf expert, thinks that “two reasons make Erdoğan’s planned trip to Saudi Arabia critically important to the reconciliation process. The first is, as expected, an economic angle [and the second,] defense alliances.” Meanwhile, addressing political issues of normalization in a broader context could be possible unless Ankara would be exposed to unfavorable conditions.

Politically, normalizing ties with Saudi Arabia may enhance Turkey’s political capacity that experienced a decline in the Middle East since the Arab revolutions. A Saudi-Turkish political alignment has a potential to give Ankara considerable regional weight in settling three hotspot files: Syria, the Eastern Mediterranean, and Egypt.

A Saudi-Turkish political alignment has a potential to give Ankara considerable regional weight in settling three hotspot files: Syria, the Eastern Mediterranean, and Egypt.

Setting a common political vision for Syria is a real option on the table especially after Riyadh indicated its unwillingness to reset ties with the Assad regime. As for the Eastern Mediterranean, Ankara believes that resetting relations with Riyadh would deflect Saudi Arabia and its fellows’ pro-Greece position, which has become more visible since the onset of their diplomatic spat. At least, owing to the complexity of the Egyptian-Turkish dispute, President Erdoğan’s visit to Riyadh is intended to pave the way for Cairo and push Saudi leadership to facilitate this challenging mission too.

What does Saudi Arabia expect?

In general, better Arab-Turkish relations could stimulate the development of a regional stabilization plan for dealing with the crises in Yemen, Libya, and Syria; create measures to deter Iran’s influence; and converge stances for reacting to the changing world order given the rise of China.

Aside from Saudi Arabia’s intent to throw a veil over the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, which bitterly strained bilateral ties, the wide range of Saudi expectations from President Erdoğan’s visit include political and security collaboration.

The Saudis and Emiratis believe that boosting relations with Turkey may partly lure the latter away from its unique ties with Qatar.

Both Turkey and Saudi Arabia, politically speaking, seek to mobilize regional states to their regional causes. Regardless of their regional leadership contest, Turkey would lend weight, albeit symbolically, to Saudi Arabia in its never-ending battle with Iran. For Saudi Arabia, the timing of normalization with Turkey is ideal for forming a regional bloc to exercise a certain influence over the ongoing nuclear talks with Iran in Vienna. And against the backdrop of the GCC crisis, it seems that the Saudis and Emiratis believe that boosting relations with Turkey may partly lure the latter away from its unique ties with Qatar.

Regarding security expectations, Saudi Arabia believes it can re-establish Turkey’s backing for its military campaign in Yemen in light of the latest Houthi escalation which involved hitting Abu Dhabi with missiles and drones. There are two potential forms of Turkish support: military equipment, including drones, which according to Akkaş, will be “a type of cooperation but problematic in relation to Turkey’s international profile”; and rallying Turkey around the Saudi-Emirati campaign on designating the Houthis as a terrorist group.

In the long run, collaboration in the defense industry is in both parties’ best interests. On March 16, 2021, Saudi eyes on Turkish drone technology spurred President Erdoğan to state that “there was Saudi demand for Turkish armed drones.” Turkey joined in the Saudi Armed Forces Exhibition (AFED) in 2018 as an early hint of this. In 2017, Riyadh signed a deal with Turkey’s private company Vestel, which licenses Saudi Arabia to co-produce Karayel-SU drones. Allegedly, these multi-mission drones have been deployed in Yemen, where the Houthis claimed to have shot down one in the Yemeni province of al-Jawf in 2021.

Recently, it has been proposed that arms ties may help ease political disputes between Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Turkey’s success as a rising independent defense model may encourage Saudi Arabia to do the same, either by cooperating or following Turkey’s footsteps. For both, the issue is to find alternative destinations for arms exports and imports. Saudi Arabia may look to Turkey not only for drones but also for “missile and radar technologies, electronic warfare, and air defense systems,” argues Furkan Halit Yolcu in an article published in Politics Today.

Also, Egyptians expect to join the Turk-Arab normalization train soon. However, they are mindful that healing strained relations with Turkey will take time and effort. Normalization can take the form of bridging the differences between the two countries’ leaders, but there is more to it than that.

Ideologically, the military coup led by Abdel Fattah al-Sisi against the Muslim Brotherhood government in 2013 caused a long political showdown between Turkey and Egypt. As a result, Turkey continued to denounce the Sisi rule, host Muslim Brotherhood officials and political refugees on Turkish soil, and refuse to extradite Muslim Brotherhood-wanted officials to Egypt.

Politically, Egypt and Turkey have played power games in their respective zones of influence. President al-Sisi designed the Egypt-led East Mediterranean Gas Forum, which comprises six regional members but has excluded Turkey. Another example is the tripartite gas pipeline deal between Egypt and Turkey’s rivals Greece and the Republic of Southern Cyprus to transport Eastern Mediterranean natural gas to Europe via Southern Cyprus, which Turkey saw as a political project. On the African front, in addition to Turkey’s posture in Libya, Turkey’s cordial relations with Egypt’s rival Ethiopia have irritated Cairo.

Since the last months of 2021, the UAE’s diplomatic moves in foreign policy have been attracting the attention of Gulf scholars and observers. In an interview, Dr. Sultan Ahmed Al Jaber, the UAE’s minister of industry and advanced technology, noted that the recent diplomatic moves by the UAE are critical to the country’s new foreign policy. “The art of partnership is part of our DNA, and it has been key to our success over the years,” said Al Jaber. Signals of change and using diplomacy instead of military power from Hormuz to the Suez constitute a sharp rupture for UAE foreign policy.

Following the withdrawal of its military presence from Yemen in mid-2019, the UAE regional security policy entered a de-escalation mode. Political conflicts with neighbors started being replaced with an economic interests-driven foreign policy. The Gulf states’ regional loneliness, partly due to the Biden administration’s hesitancy to take an active role in regional affairs, forced the UAE and other GCC states to fend for themselves within the shifting regional security dynamics and alliances.

While the Al-Ula reconciliation ended the groupings of the GCC states, the post-reconciliation process sparked a diplomacy rivalry among the GCC actors which strived to present themselves as the region’s important stabilizers and peacemakers.

The rhetorical shift in UAE foreign policy can be best understood by looking into the “10 Principles” announced in the “Projects of the 50” campaign in 2021. The projects publicized the strategic roadmap planning for the UAE’s economic, political, and social development. Among the “10 Principles,” “good neighborliness” stands as one of the UAE’s essential principles for stable political, economic, and social relations with its neighbors.

While openness, tolerance, and peace were mentioned as the state’s core values, the UAE calls for peace, harmony, negotiation, and dialogue to resolve all conflicts by envisioning bilateral relations based on a non-security or non-military perspective. This new narrative will help the Emirates to overcome its thorny relations with Turkey.

The Saudi-Emirati tension

Following the UAE’s military withdrawal from Yemen, the UAE-Saudi relations entered a period of standoff where distrust rose. After the 2017 Qatar diplomatic crisis, the UAE had adopted a common security understanding with Saudi Arabia that endured until the withdrawal of the Emirates from Yemen in mid-2019. Although the UAE was also militarily disengaged from several bases like Eritrea or Somaliland, its departure from Yemen made Saudi Arabia the foremost responsible for Yemen’s humanitarian crisis internationally.

The new pragmatism of the UAE foreign policy resulted from the Emirati decision-makers’ abandonment of a proactive foreign policy and military interventions in Syria, Yemen, and Libya. Although the UAE did not experience demonstrations such as those in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, the potential for the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, through the Al-Islah movement that was founded in 1974, was perceived as a threat to the existing state structure and the royal families of the seven emirates of the UAE. This fear caused the demonization and the labeling of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist group working against the stability of the Gulf monarchies.

The close rhetoric between Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood for almost ten years, pushed Emirati decision-makers to adopt adverse policies towards Turkey in various regional crises.

The close rhetoric between Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood for almost ten years, pushed Emirati decision-makers to adopt adverse policies towards Turkey in various regional crises like the Syrian Civil War and the Eastern Mediterranean until the visit of Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan (MBZ), the crown prince of Abu Dhabi and de facto ruler of the Emirates, to Turkey in November 2021.

Before visiting Turkey, Sheikh Mohammed and other UAE decision-makers made diplomatic visits to Jordan, Egypt, and Syria as part of the claimed Emirati diplomatic activism in the region. However, the visit to Turkey attracted more regional and international attention due to the lousy record of bilateral relations since 2011 and accusations over the UAE’s financial support to the foiled coup d’état attempt in Turkey in 2016.

Despite tense political relations, Turkey’s trade ties with the UAE have continued to improve, and UAE exports to Turkey rose to 110 percent while total trade increased by 21 percent from 2019 to 2020. The satisfaction on both sides following the Erdoğan-MBZ meeting and the agreements focusing on the strategic investments to generate steady and safe revenues in the long term, including the logistics, health, and energy sectors, demonstrated both states’ preference to overlook their political divergences for the sake of economic advantages.

As a result, regional cooperation, dialogue, and negotiation themes initiated new diplomacy rhetoric between Turkey and the UAE. Similarly, one might emphasize the change of Turkish foreign policy rhetoric towards the Gulf, such as referring to the six Gulf states as Turkey’s friends – not only “brotherly Qatar” anymore.

UAE exports to Turkey rose to 110 percent while total trade increased by 21 percent from 2019 to 2020.

Throughout the 2017 Qatar crisis, Turkey adopted a security-oriented approach and claimed to provide a security umbrella to the whole Gulf. Turkey adopted this controversial rhetoric to calm the anxieties of Saudi Arabia and the UAE after establishing a Turkish military base in Qatar. Still, it made Turkey’s relations with the prementioned Gulf states even tenser. Now, one can observe a change in the rhetoric of almost every Gulf state towards establishing non-military bilateral ties. This does not harm Turkey’s relations with Qatar, but allows Turkey to include itself in the Gulf regional security architecture through cooperation, trade, and peaceful means.

In contrast to Saudi Arabia, the UAE has been more willing to establish relations regional actors like Iran or Israel. The UAE’s maneuver capacity can be related to the abandonment of religious themes in its foreign policy rhetoric. At the same time, Saudi Arabia has historically adopted a “distinctive” status for itself in the Arab world.

While Oman, Kuwait, and Qatar have always cultivated significant relations with Iran, Saudi and Emirati decision-makers have viewed Iranian regional activities and proxy wars as working against the domestic security of regional states such as Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, or Iraq. Interestingly, Iran’s imports from the UAE reached $5.39 billion in the period of March-August 2021, illustrating the high volume of trade relations between the two even in times of crisis.

However, since April 2021, behind-the-scenes meetings between Iranian and Saudi officials were revealed, which jump-started efforts to normalize  diplomatic ties with Iran. The endeavors of the Gulf states came in the form of re-establishing diplomatic relations with Iran without waiting for the Biden administration’s steps to renew the 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal, which would bring Iran a vainglorious opponent to the diplomacy table.

Similar to the Saudi side, at the Baghdad Summit held in August 2021, the UAE’s Vice President and Ruler of Dubai Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum met Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian to discuss the possibilities of a “neighborhood policy and diplomacy.”

Lebanon’s agony was compounded over the past few weeks as a result of statements made by the country’s newly appointed minister of information, George Cordahi, in a prerecorded online media interview that saw the light on September 10, 2021, but which was filmed in August 2021 and released after Cordahi was appointed in Najib Mikati’s government on September 10.

In the interview, Cordahi committed a series of blunders which highlight his very basic understanding of regional politics (or even politics, in general) and his skewed moral compass regarding what constitutes an admirable leader in his opinion (i.e., Bashar Assad and Vladimir Putin). However, all of that didn’t matter and quickly became a sideshow against the backdrop of the measures that were immediately enacted by the Saudi government following the airing of the episode by the online platform of Qatari state-owned Al Jazeera.

Riyadh seemed to have taken offense in Cordahi’s statements on Yemen, where he said that the Iran-aligned Houthi group was “defending itself … against an external aggression,” adding that “homes, villages, funerals and weddings were being bombed” by the Saudi-led coalition. He also called the 7-year war in Yemen “futile” and said it was “time for it to end.”

A diplomatic crisis spiraled out of control, with Riyadh fully halting Lebanese imports and ordering the “recall of the ambassador in Lebanon for consultations, and the departure of Lebanon’s ambassador to the kingdom within 48 hours.” Other countries within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) followed suit or took other measures, but the GCC appeared united in its stance against Lebanon – the Gulf’s unity on such a negative position towards Lebanon constitutes a precedent, with Oman and Qatar taking less escalatory measures than their counterparts.

The crisis goes well beyond Cordahi’s words regarding the war in Yemen.

Yet, while the blame for what transpired is being directed towards Cordahi, with several Lebanese politicians or sectarian leaders denouncing his statements and asking him to resign – including, in an indirect way, the incumbent prime minister – the crisis goes well beyond Cordahi’s words regarding the war in Yemen.

In fact, from an observer’s point of view, the current diplomatic crisis has been a long time coming with the perfect storm brewing over the years, especially since back in 2016 the so-called presidential deal was struck between Saad Hariri, Michel Aoun (and his U.S.-sanctioned son-in-law Gebran Bassil), and Hezbollah.

The deal birthed what was dubbed a neo-troika, which represents a power-sharing arrangement reminiscent of the one that existed during the Syrian regime’s occupation of Lebanon. However, this time, the main antagonists were the top leaders of the three main sects in Lebanon: the Maronites, the Shi`a, and the Sunnis. Yet, the neo-troika does not place all three parties on an equal footing within Lebanon’s power-sharing arrangement.

The ultimate weakening of Hariri and the disintegration of the political camp that was previously perceived to balance Hezbollah’s growing power, catapulted the Iran-funded and armed group into new echelons of influence in Lebanon. May 2018 resembled the final nail in the coffin, with Hezbollah and its allies winning a majority in the parliamentary elections allowing it to exercise control over the legislative, the executive, and the presidency. This inherently meant fully controlling the country’s foreign policy too.

Two major incidents exemplified Riyadh’s waning influence and Lebanon’s break from its traditional foreign policy positioning.

Two major incidents exemplified Riyadh’s waning influence and Lebanon’s break from its traditional foreign policy positioning. Both incidents were championed by none other than Gebran Bassil, Hezbollah’s main Christian ally in Lebanon. In February 2016, U.S.-sanctioned Gebran Bassil refused to condemn attacks on the Saudi embassy in Tehran and its consulate in Meshhad. Bassil, at the time, was a foreign minister and his decision broke with Arab unanimity within the Arab League.

Even Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, at the time, denounced the attacks, and said that his government had opened an investigation to punish the perpetrators. Moreover, Bassil refused to condemn drone attacks that targeted two major Saudi Aramco oil installations in September 2019. Bassil justified his stance by equating the Houthi attack on Riyadh to the Saudi-led Arab coalition on Sanaa while alluding to the policy of “dissociation” to avoid taking a stance. That did not bode well with Riyadh, given the gravity of the attack which obviously crossed all the red lines between Riyadh and Tehran.

Riyadh effectively realized – the hard way – that it went from hero to zero in Beirut in a span of only 15 years. This can be viewed as a record time for a country’s shift in allegiance given the size of investments Riyadh once held in Beirut, and especially since it engineered the end of the civil war in 1990 and funded Lebanon’s postwar reconstruction drive.

While Lebanon was previously seen as a satellite state were Riyadh and Damascus shared influence, the country today rotates in the Iranian orbit despite Riyadh and other powers, like the United States, retaining considerable influence there.

In today’s regional geopolitical setup, Lebanon falls within the “Iranian influence archipelago,” a reality supported by statements made by senior Iranian officials, the current Lebanese political state of affairs, and the fact that the international community includes the Lebanese dossier whenever it intends to negotiate with Tehran. After all, Najib Mikati’s government did not see the light despite the immense effort and pressure France’s Elysée exerted over 13 months up until French President Emmanuel Macron received a nod from the Iranians following the installment of their new hardline administration in Tehran.

Nevertheless, the recent Saudi escalation towards Lebanon appears to be a last hurrah despite the Saudis framing it as them cutting their losses in Lebanon and leaving. The developments in Iraq and Lebanon over the past two years – since the uprisings of October 2019 broke out in both countries – and the growing anti-Iranian sentiments in both countries, reinvigorated the Saudi drive to try and instrumentalize the new dynamics in order to attempt to roll back Iranian influence in the region.

The results of the Iraqi parliamentary elections that were held last month and the huge blow that the Iran-aligned militias were dealt, cemented the Saudi conviction, especially as Riyadh maintains good relations with the caretaker Iraqi PM – who until now remains the most favorable candidate to be reappointed to the position– and the winner of the parliamentary elections, Muqtada al-Sadr. Iraq’s influential Shi`ite cleric, al-Sadr, made a rare visit to Saudi Arabia in July 2017 and met with Mohammed bin Salman.

With today’s intertwinement of dossiers in the region, especially due to Iran’s bloated influence in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen, the Saudis as much as the Iranians, view the regional chessboard as one unit where they can put pressure on each other in different places to gain concessions. Meanwhile, both had a major interest in engaging in an Iranian-Saudi dialogue that is taking place in Baghdad, an attempt to appease the administration of President Joe Biden. From one side, the Saudis want to appear like they’re breaking away from the zero-sum approach they pursued towards Iran during the days of Donald Trump’s administration, while the Iranians benefit from a semblance of regional diplomacy to try and keep “regional matters” away from the negotiation table in Vienna.

“Stop what you’re doing and read this. This leak is going to be the story of the year,” wrote the eminent NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden last month as Amnesty International and Forbidden Stories obtained a leaked list of 50,000 phone numbers of potential targets of the Israeli spyware company, NSO Group.

NSO’s main service is Pegasus, a malware that infects iPhones and Android devices to enable the tool’s operators to extract messages, photos, and emails; record calls; and secretly activate microphones. The geographical scope of both NSO clients and victims seems limitless – from the Middle East to Europe, the U.S., Africa, East Asia, and Latin America. Traces of the Pegasus malware were most recently discovered on phones in the United Kingdom and France, amongst 45 other countries where the virus was found.

The company’s usual targets, which were revealed over the last few years, were mostly journalists, activists, and dissidents – some of whom ended up being tortured, arrested, killed, or forcibly disappeared as a consequence. However, the formidable, leaked list included some targets with unbelievable portfolios; NSO has moved from spying on journalists to spying on presidents, prime ministers, royalty, CEOs, and public figures. One of the most prominent highlights in the leaked list was France’s president Emmanuel Macron and Morocco’s king Mohammed VI.

This prompted the French government to demand an explanation from the Israeli government, which then hurried to send its defense minister to Paris for a few hours to assure France that Israel will take this issue seriously. The French National Agency for the Security of Information Systems has confirmed finding traces of Pegasus malware on the phone of a senior journalist in its state-owned international news network France24.

This latest revelation underlines one crucial conclusion: NSO is out of control. Its malicious hacking services, which are virtually unconstrained, have become a major security threat in cyberspace, and it has the full backing of an Israeli government willing to turn a blind eye to the company’s activities in order to bolster its regional and international relations.

Israel is an international hub for spyware companies whose main personnel almost always comes from the Israeli military.

Indeed, NSO is just the tip of the iceberg. Israel is an international hub for spyware companies whose main personnel almost always comes from the Israeli military, especially the Israeli Military Intelligence Unit 8200. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have perfected a multitude of surveillance strategies as a result of their decades-long abuse of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories in flagrant violation of their right to privacy.

The Israeli government under Benjamin Netanyahu was even NSO’s patron, whereby it promoted and pushed its spyware sales across the world. Wherever Netanyahu traveled on official visits, deals between the visited country’s government and NSO followed – from Hungary to Mexico, India, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and others.

This positions Israel as a force for regional and international destabilization where state-sanctioned – and state-sponsored – private spyware firms like NSO have been the informal arm of the Israeli government that are employed “off the record” to do the dirtiest work, such as espionage and interference in foreign countries.

This can also be seen in the activities of another Israeli cybersecurity firm, Psy-Group, which ran a $2 million voter suppression operation in support of Donald Trump’s 2016 campaign, according to the 2020 report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. The operation was paid by George Nader, an advisor to de facto  UAE ruler Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ).

The Israeli government’s complicity with NSO’s cyberweapons should raise more than eyebrows. Accountability is paramount. The very least Israel’s government should do is to immediately revoke NSO’s export license and ban spyware trade.

NSO does not only offer security, it also provides infectious viruses. It does not aim to make the world safer – with its Pegasus cyberattack tool, it aims to make it more vulnerable, more at risk, and more afraid. If NSO can hack into the phones of statesmen, parliamentarians, and CEOs, no phone is safe from its malware until action is taken.