The advance of the U.S. supported YPG-led SDF forces seems to have slowed down although President Trump had announced that it was a matter of a week before the last patch of territory in Daesh hands could be retrieved. It is no secret that SDF is against the U.S. departure from the region and it has slowed down operations in the past, such as during the Raqqa operation. In their calculation, the longer the operations against Daesh take, the more likely that the U.S. would prolong its presence on the ground. In the meantime, the administration has been persuaded to leave a residual U.S. force (400 soldiers), which would certainly make SDF happier than a sudden and full U.S. withdrawal. This is where the Turkish public opinion will be uneasy once again about the U.S. strategy. Leaving a residual force can easily look like the U.S. is more preoccupied with protecting the SDF forces rather than with precluding the return of Daesh.

Leaving a residual force of 400 soldiers can easily look like the U.S. is more preoccupied with protecting the SDF forces rather than with precluding the return of Daesh. This is where the Turkish public opinion will be uneasy once again about the U.S. strategy.

The partial reversal of the withdrawal decision by leaving roughly 400 U.S. soldiers in Syria will not surprise Turkey. There has been much debate on the advisability of a complete withdrawal and the argument that the U.S. would be “abandoning Kurds” to their fate seems to have been effective. Turkey has strongly opposed the idea that it was waiting for the U.S. to attack and “slaughter” Kurds as was argued in the Western media. It has been strongly lobbying the U.S. for a policy that would satisfy Turkish national security concerns in the form of creating a safe zone in northern Syria. Turkey also argued that the Manbij agreement could be a model to work with the U.S. but limited, if at all, progress has been achieved there. In the current situation, a U.S. residual force in the region may not necessarily be a problem if it is done in coordination with Turkey. In other words, for the sake of a healthy Turkish-American relationship going forward, the U.S. presence in the region can no longer appear as providing American protection for the YPG.

President Trump’s willingness to take Turkish concerns seriously is a plus but devil is in the details.

President Trump’s willingness to take Turkish concerns seriously is a plus but devil is in the details especially in the Syrian scene. It has been a major disadvantage for the U.S.-Turkey relations to have the divergence on Syria strategy dominate the conversation for several years now. There are signs of a broader conversation developing including bilateral as well as the regional issues. However, the U.S. support for the YPG will continue to be a factor consuming every other potential positive development. In the Turkish public opinion, the U.S. pullout decision was closely associated with the end of such support. It was clear the military leaders saw the decision as a hasty one and the public relations campaign to “protect the Kurds” was closely associated with that view. Now that the administration has agreed to leave a residual force to relieve the political pressure from Congress, the mission will have to be defined clearly and carefully. “Peacekeeping” will likely be an unconvincing one, especially if a clear strategy to work with Turkey on the ground is not crafted.

The importance of the U.S. working with Turkey on Syria should not be underestimated. It would be a clear commitment to Turkish security and reduce bilateral tensions, in the meantime, strengthening the NATO alliance. Perhaps even more importantly, it would serve as an anchor in preventing further instability in Syria, enabling the eventual political resolution of the civil war. This kind of coordination and cooperation between the two allies would not be solely in the interest of Turkish national security but for the sake of regional stability. This may sound like wishful thinking in an environment where virtually every actor seems to work at cross purposes. Nevertheless, it is arguably the only way for true stability and peace.

The U.S. withdrawal symbolizes a new phase for local and regional actors in Syria. Particularly for Ankara, the U.S.’ “slow and coordinated” pull out strategy, which involves 2,000 troops in North East Syria, is a game changer; it was an unexpected move that no one saw it coming two weeks ago in Ankara. However, President Erdogan had a very strong expectation that President Trump would take responsibility to reshape Turkish-American relations before it would be too late. He never gave up on maintaining his communication with President Trump.

The mobilization of Turkish troops and the declaration of high military readiness in the region following Erdogan’s Ankara speech was a direct message not for the YPG but for the U.S. government to change its policy towards the YPG. More importantly, Turkey’s unexpected yet comprehensive air strike against PKK positions in Northern Iraq was a strong sign that Turkey would extend same military campaigns against YPG positions in Syria. In this regard, it was the last chance for the Turkish-American relations to reevaluate the escalation on the YPG issue. Otherwise, Turkey would have been militarily involved in the North East Syria where the U.S. has been operating alongside YPG forces. During the phone call on December 14, as it is claimed, President Erdogan strongly stressed Turkey’s position on military action, and it was followed by Trump’s decision.

At this stage, the operational and strategic dynamics, as well as the new geopolitical calculations among the actors involved in the Syrian conflict should be reconsidered. The post-American Syria revealed the dynamics, especially for Turkey. Hence, President Erdogan should reevaluate his overall strategy on Syria. Turkey’s priority, as president Erdogan repeatedly expresses, is to eliminate the YPG threat for Turkey’s imminent national and regional security concerns.

The cooperation between the U.S. and the YPG, and the U.S. operational military presence in NE Syria were some of the important dynamics that restricted Turkey’s freedom of military action against the YPG. Trump’s withdrawal means that Turkey gained freedom of military action in eastern Syria, yet the development brings a challenging road-map for Turkey to achieve its strategic priorities. If Turkey delivers its priorities on the ground and redesigns the current balance of power, the Syrian conflict is likely to be reshaped soon.

Following the cleaning of the Manbij pocket from the YPG forces, Turkey will reach its initial goal to take full control alongside its border in the western part of the Euphrates River. This might bring Turkey freedom of military action not only to reshape the overall region including Idlib but also to accommodate refugees.

The challenges that Turkey has to reconsider are multidimensional. First and foremost, what type of military move, in an operational manner, that Turkey will adopt following the U.S. withdrawal is significant. It seems that Turkey’s first military mission is to establish a full-scale military control in the Manbij pocket where Turkey and the U.S. had already agreed, yet the YPG maintains its presence there. The intense military mobilization of Turkey and Turkey-trained National Army near the Turkish border and inside Jarablus demonstrate that Ankara will take military action in Manbij.

Even though the regime tends to mobilize its militias towards the Manbij pocket to retake the city from the YPG, Turkey certainly perceives Manbij as a military threshold to maintain its military deterrence. At this stage, deterrence for Turkey is the use of threats to dissuade the Syrian regime from initiating an undesirable act in the region. Following the cleaning of the Manbij pocket from the YPG forces, Turkey will reach its initial goal to take full control alongside its border in the western part of the Euphrates River. This might bring Turkey freedom of military action not only to reshape the overall region including Idlib but also to accommodate refugees. Up until now, 300,000 returned to their homes in the western part of the River.

Following the takeover of Manbij, Turkey’s second military move against the YPG is expected to be alongside the border. This military operation will have a different character as the YPG would probably want to defend Ayn Al Arab (also known as Kobane), Rasul Ayn, and Tel Abyad against Turkey’s military action. The YPG’s search for a new ally at this stage is one of the significant steps that can influence Turkey’s potential military action, yet it seems that no credible actor at this stage can prevent Ankara from taking military action in these regions.

The strategy that Turkey might adopt following the liberation of Manbij has two broad aims. While the first aim for Turkey is to disassemble the YPG’s territorial continuity alongside the Turkish-Syrian border, the second one is to provide a safe haven for the refugee community who were forcefully displaced by the YPG. If this will is the case, Turkey is set to accomplish its original aim to establish a secure zone alongside its Syrian border. This also means that fighting against Daesh is a secondary mission that should be carried out following the establishment of a safe zone for Turkey’s military presence.

Trump’s decision brought many opportunities to repair especially the U.S.’s wrong strategy of working with a terrorist organization to fight against another terrorist organization, but at the same time brought Syria into a new rivalry between the regional countries.

This probably brings the third dimension for Turkey’s post-American roadmap in Syria. Fighting against Daesh at this stage is a complicated issue from a military perspective in which Turkey has the capacity, yet the geographical distance where Daesh militants operate makes Turkey’s military engagement riskier. While Turkey was calculating a limited military operation against the YPG in its borderline, now Turkey has to reconsider its military strategy.

This requires a comprehensive counter-insurgency strategy for Turkey to clean the area from YPG and Daesh, hold the liberated territories to sustain military presence and finally to build the post-conflict places. More importantly, Turkey’s potential far-reaching military operation towards the southern flank of Syria might also bring the Syrian regime, Russia and Iran into the geopolitical rivalry in the region, which is a situation Turkey would not want to get into. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson said that “Syrian government should assume control of areas vacated by the U.S.” This means that Russia does not tend to accommodate with Turkey’s own roadmap for the post-American withdrawal. Therefore, cooperation with Russia and the U.S. is the most significant part of Turkey’s strategy in NE Syria.

The game changer development for Turkey would be a potential and quick dissolution of the Syrian Democratic Forces. If the non-YPG forces (mainly the Arab forces) inside the SDF decide to detach themselves from SDF, then Turkey’s strategy has to take the Syrian regime’s move towards the eastern part of the Euphrates into account

The game changer development for Turkey would be a potential and quick dissolution of the Syrian Democratic Forces. If the non-YPG forces (mainly the Arab forces) inside the SDF decide to detach themselves from SDF, then Turkey’s strategy has to take the Syrian regime’s move towards the eastern part of the Euphrates into account, which poses another trouble, not just for Turkey but also for the U.S.  

The Syrian crisis is fundamentally localizing geopolitics, in which each actor has strategically different priorities regarding every single terrorist formation in Syria. Trump’s decision brought many opportunities to repair especially the U.S.’s wrong strategy of working with a terrorist organization to fight against another terrorist organization, but at the same time brought Syria into a new rivalry between the regional countries. Undoubtedly, Turkey needs a comprehensive strategy for its Syrian road-map following the American withdrawal.

Mid-June this year the Assad regime began an extensive operation in southwest Syria aiming to get control of the last rebel stronghold region. The assault led to the displacement of 320,000 civilians and the regime made considerable territorial progress. However, the current situation in Syria’s southwest also questions the reliability of Russia and the U.S. as both states were guarantors for the de-escalation zone in Deraa.

Following large scale attacks from regime-allied militias and the Russian air force, Syrian rebels first lost ground at the Lajat valley. With time, and with the mediation of Russia, some rebel leaders negotiated a reconciliation agreement with the Assad regime. Even though Russia was (and still is) an active part of the ongoing military assault, it succeeded to position itself as a mediator between the rebels and the regime. To the cost of the Assad regime gaining control over the strategic Nassib border crossing to Jordan, thousands of displaced Syrians began heading home after the rebels and the regime reached a deal in southwest Syria.

While over the years the U.S. convinced Syrian rebels in Deraa to stop their military activities against the Assad regime in exchange for guarantees, the Russians promised to hold back the regime from attacking Deraa. Nevertheless, before the imminent start of the operation in southwest Syria, the U.S. informed the military opposition that they should not expect U.S.-support and political protection against the regime assault. On the other hand, Russia declared the end of the de-escalation zone in southwest Syria.

With the start of the assault in southwest Syria, Russia and the Assad regime gave the Syrian opposition two options: Reconcile with the regime or resist at the cost of a humanitarian crisis through heavy aerial bombardment. Rebels who were in a patron-client relation with the U.S. found themselves abandoned in front of a military superior Russian fire power.

Russia and the U.S. broke their deals with Israel and Jordan

Russia and the U.S. not only abandoned the armed Syrian opposition. Both states had initially made important promises to Jordan and Israel, which they failed to keep. While Jordan feared a new refugee wave, the Israeli government rejected the possibility of Iran-backed militias at the northern edge of the Golan Highs, which is occupied by Israel. Against all agreements between Jordan, the U.S. and Russia on one side, and Israel, the U.S. and Russia on the other, 60 thousands refugees are at the Jordan border and Iran-backed militias are part of the ongoing campaign in Deraa approaching the Israeli border, day-by-day.

For Israel the Russian intervention in Syria came at the cost of a growing Iran-backed militia and Hezbollah presence in Syria with better equipment and supplies. Therefore, the Israeli administration tried to find a solution with Russia and requested U.S. help against any Iranian aggression. Israel did not only limit itself to this, but also took action by itself by bombarding strategic Iranian positions with Syria. Geographically, Syrian rebels in southwest Syria were also a de-facto buffer between Israel and Hezbollah and other Iran-backed militias. With the current developments, Israel faces a bigger threat from Iran and its proxies to its northern border.

Possible impacts of the broken deals in southwest Syria for northern Syria

In southwest Syria it was the U.S. who abandoned Syrian rebels and opened the way for a Russia-backed regime assault. One may argue that the U.S. lacked any military presence in Deraa in order to stop the Russian assault. However, seven years of war in Syria has showed that the cost of such an assault could become exorbitant if the U.S. decided to supply Syrian rebels with weapons and ammunition. Rising costs of a military operation is a strong argument for Russians to keep their promises. Thus, if the U.S. administration wanted to protect Syrian rebels, it would have done so.

The situation in southwest Syria also draws to the question as to whether the U.S. will abandon its partner forces in northeast Syria – the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – in the face of a possible Russian assault. It’s known that the Assad regime want to re-gain the control of all of Syria. Until today, the U.S. has protected their partner force from various regime operations in Tabqah and DeirEzzor by using air force, but this may change in the future despite the Pentagon’s plans to expand their investment into their partner forces.

The YPG-dominated SDF may become frightened of how reliable their patron really is. It can be stated that the fear of the U.S. abandoning the YPG-dominated SDF is growing within the ranks of the partners of the U.S. In addition to the developments in southwest Syria, the Manbij roadmap between Turkey and the U.S. led to frustration within the SDF. Especially as the war against Daesh is coming to a near end, the YPG’s trust in the U.S. administration is declining.

One may argue that the nature of cooperation between the U.S. and SDF is quite different from the nature of the U.S. backing the southern front. While the rebels in southwest Syria were part of a “Train & Equip” program of the MOC operation room connected to the CIA, the “Train & Equip” program for the SDF is approved by the U.S. Congress as part of Pentagon’s efforts to eliminate Daesh.

In addition to these developments, the U.S. is only watching while Iran and Iran-backed militias are heading towards Israel despite Israel’s security concerns. If the U.S. isn’t willing or is not able to ease Israel’s security concerns by taking action due to Russian superiority in Syria, what guarantees that the U.S. will secure its partner forces from a decisive Russian position? On the other side, one can also argue that the patron-client relation between the U.S. and SDF is different to that with Syrian rebels in the southeast, as the U.S. installed several military bases in northeast Syria and invested a lot in its client.

However, with the above argument in mind, U.S.-backed forces have already began negotiating the handover of Raqqa to the Assad regime, and reports suggest that a delegation of the regime visited the city, which was captured from Daesh after 1784 airstrikes of the international coalition. According to reports, the negotiations included the arrest of members of an Arab brigade within the SDF – the Raqqa Revolutionaries Brigade. The YPG-dominated SDF and the Assad regime have reportedly agreed for the SDF to hand over the control of the Tishreen and Tabqa dams on the Euphrates River in northern Syria to the regime. Part of the negotiations between the SDF and the regime was also a full handover of Manbij, but both sides couldn’t agree on the role of the U.S. in this case.

Prior to the Trump-Putin summit in Helsinki on July 16, reports emerged suggested a possible deal between the two sides in regards to Syria, which includes Russian and the Assad regime’s expansion of outreach to northeast Syria. According to the Washing Post, this was proposed by McGurk. However, during the press conference given by the two leaders, Syria was only mentioned regarding Israel’s security concerns and the future re-constriction efforts in Syria.

The U.S. decision to abandon rebels in southern Syria facing Russian pressure also meant abandoning Israel and Jordan in many ways. This development may also affect the U.S. position in northern Syria. U.S. partner forces and the SDF have a different patron-client relationship with the U.S. in comparison to southern rebels. The U.S. invested a lot, proved to be ready to protect its client against the regime and officially plans to further invest in its client. Nevertheless, the U.S. retraction in southwest Syria led the SDF to question how reliable the U.S. administration would be in front of real Russia pressure. In this regard, the SDF had negotiations on its own with the regime and agreed to hand over two strategic dams to Assad, trying to ease its dependence from its patron and trying to prevent the regime from risking a confrontation by opening the way for negotiations and deals.

On March 29, French President Emmanuel Macron met with leaders of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Élysée Palace. Following the meeting, Le Figaro first reported that France is sending troops to northern Syria, and then re-wrote the caption that France might send troops – referring to members of the SDF as source for the news. A day before this happened, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that U.S. troops will retreat from Syria. This was followed by a telephone conversion between Trump and his French counterpart, and increasing cooperation with Turkey. Combined with statements made by the YPG, recent developments have made it seem that France will take the place of the U.S. if the latter retreats from the region.

Élysée Palace refuted the claims with the statement that France will send reinforcement units to Manbij. However, the statement also touched upon the target of reaching “stability,” particularly in the secure zone located in northeastern Syria within the framework of an inclusive and balanced order. This might implicate France’s possibility of coming up with an administration model for the Syrian Kurds living in the region nearby the Syria-Turkey border in case Manbij is included in Turkey’s field of control. Élysée Palace also announced that they hope to see the establishment of dialogue between the SDF and Turkey with the support of the international community.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan reminded that his French counterpart remarked similar opinions during their one-on-one meeting and added: “We are deeply sorry about the latest statements coming from France, which we find wrong and hope to have stemmed from a misunderstanding. Those hosting the terror group members in a top-level office must know that this only means an antagonistic move against Turkey.”

The latest statements are far from being peculiar when considering the record of France in Syria, as the country has engaged in many atrocities in the Middle East. When France and the U.K. divided Arab territories into mandate governments according to the Sykes-Picot Agreement, France had Syria. Although the reports made after the Macron-SDF meeting were refuted, they still evoked memories of the French military’s invasion of Damascus 97 years ago. During France’s 20-year mandate government in Syria, the foundations of Syria’s future were laid. The mandate government divided the country into six regions and founded the “Special Forces of the Levant.” Comprising mostly of Nusayri and Druze soldiers, the Special Forces then formed the grounds of the Syrian Army. It is argued that the Nusayris gained dominance in the state despite being a minority group due to this ground laid by the French.

In 1970, Hafez al-Assad came to power by staging a military coup. In Syria, where more than 70 percent of the population is Sunni, the minority Nusayris ruled the country with the Baath regime, which is a peculiar combination of Arab nationalism and Soviet socialism. The French government and the Assad family always acted in favor of each other. Regardless of whoever came to power in France, this situation never changed. For instance, when Hafez committed the 1982 Hama massacre, socialist president François Mitterrand was serving his first term in Élysée, but he did not even issue a single condemnation to Assad. More, Hafez’s brother Rifaat al-Assad, the commanding officer allegedly responsible for the Hama massacre, moved to Paris after having tension with his older brother, and allegedly engaged in embezzlement and money laundering. He spent a serious amount on financing Channel Tunnel and received his residence permit thanks to that.

Republican President Jacques Chirac also displayed red-carpet treatment to Assad, who made his first visit abroad to Paris in 1998 after 30 years. In 1999, Chirac hosted Bashar al-Assad in Élysée before he had any official status. He was also the only western leader that attended the father Assad’s funeral one year later. Throughout all these decades, France has never shown any concern about the situation of Syrian Kurds, whom Assad deprived of citizenship. Plus, the country always supported Saddam Hussein, the perpetrator of the 1988 Halabja massacre. While Turkey opened its border gates after the Halabja massacre, France only accepted 500 Kurdish refugees. A French diplomat friend of mine was surprised at the fact that Turkey opened its borders without pursuing any form of screening. When I asked him how the French authorities selected people, he pointed to his teeth and said, “they look at their teeth.”

Although relations between Paris and Damascus hit a low after the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, who was Chirac’s close friend, Chirac’s successor Nicolas Sarkozy restored relations between the two countries. He hosted Bashar Assad three times while Assad paid return visits. However, the Arab Spring changed the course of events, as France could not foresee the phenomenon that started in Tunisia, where the Ben Ali dictatorship favored by France was overthrown. It can be contended that France showed such a hasty demeanor in Syria for this reason. The country favors dictatorial regimes, but as soon as their decline becomes obvious, it starts to criticize the same regimes. The statements issued by Élysée Palace regarding the Macron-SDF meeting stressed the male and female parity within the delegation. But they did not touch on the fact that many international NGOs issued various reports indicating that the YPG and PKK terror groups, which adopt an ideology with Stalinist and fascist elements, armed 10-year-old children and made 15-16 year-old children organize kamikaze attacks.

Recently this week spokesman for the Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) Col. Ryan Dillon announced that the U.S.-led coalition was creating a 30,000-strong “Border Security Force” in northern Syria.

It was announced that the majority of these 30,000 fighters would be SDF veterans – otherwise known as YPG militants.

In stark comparison, on Thursday 18th January, the Pentagon dismissed the recently announced “Border Security Force” and announced that the U.S.-led coalition is training the PKK/PYD-led SDF as a “stabilization” and “hold force.”

Pentagon spokesman Eric Pahon stated: “There was a mis-characterization of the training that we are providing to local security forces in Syria.”

“What we are doing is designed to enable our partner forces to maintain local security, as our statement said, for people who are returning to their homes.”

Pahon claimed that the training is “aimed also at preventing an outflow of fleeing Daesh terrorists as their presence comes to an end and they start trying to scatter.”

Asked whether this new force would be a policing force, Pahon said he would not describe it in that way, but rather call it a “kind of security or stabilization force,” or some sort of “hold force.”

Describing what a “hold force” meant, Pahon stated that it is designed to secure small areas where Daesh has been removed and to prevent the terror group’s resurgence.

Following the statements made earlier this week by Ryan Dillon, Turkey had criticized this decision on all fronts.

In regards to Turkey’s sensitivity over the issue, Pahon said: “We are aware of the security concerns that our NATO ally Turkey has presented. We have been in regular discussions with Turkey particularly since this issue cropped up. Our senior leaders have been talking. I am not going to get into the content of those discussions. Turkey is also a valuable member of the coalition.”

On Sunday 14 January, Ryan Dillon, spokesman for the U.S.-led coalition, officially known as the Combined Joint Task Force –Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), announced that the coalition will establish a new 30,000 strong border security force with the SDF.

The SDF is a U.S.-backed group that is largely controlled and funded by the PKK/PYD terrorist organization in Syria.

In a written statement, Dillon stated that “The coalition is working jointly with the SDF to establish and train the new Syrian Border Security Force (BSF).”

He added that “Currently, there are approximately 230 individuals training in the BSF’s inaugural class, with the goal of a final force size of approximately 30,000.”

Earlier this week it was revealed that the PKK/PYD was forming a so-called army with U.S. support.

Some 400 “border guards” trained by the U.S. through the Pentagon and the CIA formed “The North Army.”

These trained terrorists were also provided with both theoretical, technical and military training and assistance and high-technology equipment.

Attempting to justify the situation, Dilal stated that efforts were taken in order to ensure that individuals served in areas close to their homes. “Therefore, the ethnic composition of the force will be relative to the areas in which they serve.”

“More Kurds will serve in the areas in northern Syria. More Arabs will serve in the areas along the Euphrates River Valley and along the border with Iraq to the South.”

Informing that the recruitment process had begun, Dilon also highlighted that half of the recruits of the new force will be SDF veterans.

Turkish response

The SDF – a group pioneered by the PKK/PYD – is inevitably one of the biggest national security threats to Turkey.

Regardless of the fact that the U.S. recognizes the PKK as a terrorist organization, and amid the attacks that the group has conducted in Turkey, the Trump administration continues to support the Syrian offshoot of the group, the PYD and the SDF.

Thus, following Dillon’s statement, Turkey’s presidential spokesman Ibrahim Kalin emphasized that the U.S. is taking “worrisome steps towards legitimizing the PKK terrorist group’s Syrian offshoot, PYD-YPG under the pretense of the ‘fight against Daesh.’”

In a written statement, Kalin also added that the steps taken by the U.S. aimed to provide a permanent place for the terrorist group in the region.

Highlighting that the situation is “totally unacceptable,” Kalin re-iterated the fact that Turkey has the right to fight all terror groups in any manner, time and place it deemed fit, and would continue to take necessary measures to ensure its security in line with national interests.

Following the first response from Kalin, the Foreign Ministry also issued a statement reminding that Turkey had re-iterated on numerous occasions that it was “wrong and objectionable” to operate with the PKK/PYD terrorist organization on the ground in Syria in order to fight against Daesh.

The statement also added that the establishment of the so-called Syria Border Protection Force was not consulted with Turkey – which is also a member of the coalition.

Highlighting the mystery behind the decision, as it is unknown which coalition members approved the decision, the Foreign Ministry also stated that “To attribute such a unilateral step to the whole coalition is an extremely wrong move that could harm the fight against Daesh.”

“Such initiatives, through cooperation with the PYD/YPG in contradiction with the U.S. commitments and statements, endanger Turkey’s national security and the territorial integrity of Syria, and are totally unacceptable.”

In addition, Deputy Prime Minister Bekir Bozdag tweeted: “Letting the PYD/YPG – PKK’s branch in Syria – by the U.S. to establish a so-called terror army for creating a terror corridor in the region on the pretext of combating Daesh, is not a fight against Daesh and terrorist organizations, but rather a support to terrorism and terrorist organizations.”

Ankara has on numerous occasions reminded the U.S. administration that they cannot win the battle against terrorism by condemning one form and supporting the other. However, despite these efforts, the U.S. administration is continuing to make drastic mistakes in the Middle East.

Russia warns

Turkey is not the only country to have condemned and spoken out against the decision of the U.S. Party to the Astana talks, the Russian administration also slammed the U.S. plan to form an army led by the PKK/PKK, warning that it could jeopardize Syria’s territorial integrity.

Speaking at his annual news conference in Moscow, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov pointed to the possible problems that could occur between Turkey and the Kurdish population as a result of the U.S. plan.

“The U.S.’ unilateral, ultimatum-like project, aimed at establishing an army in Syria, may create problems in relations between Turkey and the Kurds.”

Lavrov also stated that this move by the U.S. would lead to the formation of a large isolated area on Syria’s border with Turkey and Iraq.

“This serious issue is leading to worrisome results regarding the steps to be taken for these areas in Syria.”

Similar to Turkey, Russia’s Foreign Minister underlined that Moscow expects an explanation from the U.S. administration as this move will not “serve to calm the situation” in Syria’s Afrin district, which borders Turkey.

“Like our Turkish and Iranian colleagues, we also expect an explanation from the U.S. on this issue. We think this decision will jeopardize Syria’s territorial integrity.”

Following the independence referendum proposed by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq on September 25, 2017, the governments of Turkey, Iran and Iraq have come closer to an unprecedented degree. This analysis will shed light on the post-referendum (and the post-Daesh) developments regarding Turkey’s hunt for the PKK, a terrorist organization that has been targeting Turkish security personnel and civilians for about four decades.

Following the referendum in September 2017, despite its close relations with the KRG, Ankara managed to build a trilateral bloc including Turkey, Iran and Iraq, while also leaving an open door for the less-hawkish and more realistic KRG politicians, such as the regional Prime Minister, Nechirvan Barzani. Turkey’s reaction to the referendum was not only based on the KRG’s unilateral decision, which Turkey saw, at best, as a sign of irresponsible partnership. Rather, Turkey’s primary concern in Iraq is the future of the PKK, which is already deeply rooted in the country, and which is seeking to increase its sphere of control. Hence, Turkey utilized the referendum crisis as an opportunity for a more effective alliance against the PKK, which is flourishing with the backing of prominent international sponsors in the context of the Syrian Civil War. For Turkey, this new alliance is more promising than what the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) could have ever provided in terms of a final defeat of the PKK.

For Turkey, the new alliance with Iraq and Iran is more promising than what the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) could have ever provided in terms of a final defeat of the PKK.

For a long time, the PKK was perceived as the winner of the turmoil in the Middle East. Following the Gulf Wars and the regime change that followed in Iraq, the terrorist organization secured itself safe havens in Northern Iraq amidst the power vacuums and buffer zones between the central and regional governments and neighboring countries. The civil war in Syria has also worked to this end for the PKK. The terrorist organization created some nicknames, or umbrella groups (Syrian Democratic Forces being the latest one) in order to carry out its operations and partner with the United States in Syria. Hence, the PKK expanded the territories it captured and began to consolidate its territorial control. As a reaction to this ever-growing threat over the past few years, Turkey shifted its policy goals in Syria to preventing the PKK corridor along its border. While Turkey carried out the Euphrates Shield and Idlib operations primarily for this reason, the main goal was to hit the PKK in its headquarters in Qandil, Iraq.

Nevertheless, Ankara faced a significant problem: Given the concerns shared by the central government and by Iran and the complex web of partnerships between the local and international actors in the region, Turkey’s close relations with the KRG did not permit Turkey limitless freedom for its operations in Iraq. In addition to a military alliance, Turkey has long developed a mutually beneficial relationship with the KRG based on economic cooperation over oil and construction businesses. In this complex web, the Turkish-KRG alliance (particularly with the ruling party, the KDP), was mostly limited to the provision of ground intelligence by the KDP in regards to the PKK and information regarding the organization’s bases in Turkey. In return, the KDP could rely on Turkish support against the PKK or even against a possible Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) aggression. While this relationship seemed to be a win-win situation for both Turkey and the KDP, the PKK’s growing influence in Syria required a more comprehensive reaction from the Turkish administration, which needed more than what the KRG was able to provide.

The PKK’s growing influence in Syria required a more comprehensive reaction from the Turkish administration, which needed more than what the KRG was able to provide.

As a country that witnessed the gains obtained by the PKK in each revisionist step in Iraq and Syria, Turkey backed the status quo in Iraq during the referendum process. Yet the problem was that each revisionist move in the past helped the PKK increase its influence by ensuring that it became part of the new status quo. The PKK not only found safe havens in its camps across the Turkish border, but also begun to rule areas via conscripting the locals to its own ranks by collecting tax and running schools and other public services from what it calls the “Medya Defense Zones” across the Turkish border down to the mountains across the Iranian border as well as a number of refugee camps, Mahkmur being the most famous one. Hence, the only revisionism that Turkey can tolerate in Iraq is one that will target the PKK’s presence in the country. While Turkey’s existing relations with the KRG provided some assistance to its target of the “Medya Defense Zones,” this move was far from wounding the PKK in a degree to question its chance of survival. The PKK’s ability to stretch its goals and motives to the Sinjar Mountains has made Turkey question the limits of its alliance with the KRG.

Given the American support for the PKK in Syria, and the organization’s attempts to control Sinjar in Iraq, Turkey felt the need to find a more effective alliance against the terrorist organization. While the referendum in September was the last thing Ankara could tolerate, it gave the governments of Turkey, Iran and Iraq a chance to work together. Based on this recent agreement with Iraq and Iran, Turkish military incursions against the PKK can take place in areas that Turkey could not previously operate in. Two examples that reflect this are the recent attacks on the PKK positions in Asos and Mahkmur – both areas are deep inside Iraq, sharing no proximity with the Turkish border.

The Asos area near the town of Mawat of Sulaymaniyah province is a continuation of the Qandil Mountains and cuts across the Iranian border. Turkey’s troubled relations with Iran and Iraq prevented it from carrying out operations in this area, which is 175 kilometers away from the Turkish border – enough for the PKK to comfort itself against Turkish security forces. Hence, the Asos area was a pretty safe-zone for the PKK at times when the organization was not in a hot conflict with Iran, particularly since the 2011 truce. However, the PKK’s comfort in this area has finally been driven to an end as Turkey began to target Asos in repeated bombardments throughout November. During air strikes, Turkish authorities claimed to have killed over 65 PKK terrorists along with destroying their arm depos. The PKK’s main media outlet Firat News also confirmed the attack and claimed that the specific coordinates of the bases were given to Turkey by Iran.

The recent Asos and Mahkmur attacks illustrate that Turkey is forming an effective anti-PKK alliance with the Iranian and Iraqi governments.

Local news outlets stated that Turkey hit the Asos region twice on November 4 and 12 together with many other PKK bases in Qandil, Sinath-Haftanin, Gara, Metina, Avasin-Basyan, Zap and Khakurk. The Asos area was targeted once again in late November, and according to PKK sources, “Iranian scout planes were flying over the area shortly before the bombing of the Turkish jets.” Such news on Iranian scout planes, Iranian artillery shelling and Turkish airstrikes continued in early December, which reflects the fact that Turkey and Iran are committed to root out the PKK from its safe havens comprising the areas from Qandil to Asos. While the shock of the Asos bombardment was still fresh, another wave of airstrikes targeted the Mahkmur area. While the refugee camp in Mahkmur was supposedly a UN-supervised camp, it is currently being ruled by the PKK under the banner “Martyr Rustem Refugee Camp.” While the PKK initially portrayed the attack as if the Turkish state was targeting civilians in the refugee camp, the terrorist organization later announced the names of five PKK members (under the banner of Mahkmur Self-Defense Forces) who died in the strike.

The recent Asos and Mahkmur attacks illustrate that Turkey is forming an anti-PKK alliance with the Iranian and Iraqi governments, while its long lasting western allies are turning their backs to Turkey’s fight against the terrorist organization. Thanks to this new formation, Turkey is now able to target the PKK in areas that provided a safe-zone for the terrorist group. As Turkey is waiting for the right time to face the PKK in Syria (and will probably wait until it finalizes a deal with Russia on Afrin, and until the US retracts support from the group in the east of the Euphrates River), Ankara is determined that now is the best time for such an encounter in Iraq.

A simplistic view of the Syria war from distance would explain that the war is all about overthrowing the evil called Daesh from the worn torn country. Every contending power – the US, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Iran – including their regional allies have the same claim. But under the barrage of daily media reports, which advance the same view as that of the contending powers, the inside story is ever more intricate to an extent incomprehensible to the distant gaze.

The most remarkable has been the role of the US in the war. The US particularly ventured into the war to eliminate the terrorist organization Daesh, and seldom did it acknowledge that its objectives were determined by the presence of its global rival, Russia, and the regional felon, Iran.

Recent revelations by the former spokesperson of Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Talal Silo, who last month defected from the amalgam, will have consequences beyond Syria and most importantly Turkey. In an exclusive interview with the Anadolu Agency on Friday, the former high-ranking commander of SDF, Silo gives a detailed account of the Syrian war that helps us to see what is happening behind the scene.

Someone trying to draw the mental picture of the Syrian war must, first of all, dismiss Daesh as a mere media object that covers up the superpower proxy. That is to say, one must directly and simply focus on role the US is playing in the war to counter its rival’s increasing regional influence.

The real motive behind the US intervention in Syria never was to fight Daesh. Rather the US intends to secure its interests, that too by aligning with the SDF, much against the wishes and security of the regional ally, Turkey.

SDF is an amalgam of different ethnic and religious groups but dominated by PKK supporters. The armed group receives its weaponry, vehicles and military support from the US to apparently fight Daesh in different regions of Syria – most recent Raqqa and oil-rich Deir Al-Zor provinces – where the US wants to be ahead of Russian backed groups.

According to Silo’s revelations, the US along under the name of its allies SDF and YPG targeted to reach Bukamal and Mayadin districts before the rapidly advancing Syrian regime forces.

More interesting part of the war is the oil trade by the PKK which it sold over Daesh areas and also to the regime through an officer of the regime, al-Katirji, who is the general responsible for taking oil from the PKK. Moreover, the money transactions in oil trade was carried out through banks from Lebanon and Europe through accounts belonging to PKK members.

He even revealed that an American intelligence officer wanted them to advance towards Deir Al-Zor and that the US will give the “necessary support to provide a post towards the sea to the SDF and the Syrian Democratic Parliament.” The logic the intelligence officer gave that SDF and PKK wing YPG can only maintain a viable structure only if they have an “access to the sea” – (called Mediterranean corridor).

By giving an example of Kurdistan and Erbil, which do not have any access point to the sea, hence always needs to convince the other parties to export oil, the US promised the “Mediterranean corridor” but failure in the Deir Al-Zor operation dashed the hopes.

On the question of the US protecting weapon depositories for the YPG, Talal Silo’s revelations go in line with Turkish claims. It was Americans not only providing weapons to YPG but also protecting them by keeping them in their own bases which Turkey could not target.

If it were the US supporting the SDF and YPG in Deir Al-Zor, in Afrin the story was different. When the US denied to support them in Afrin they approached the Syrian regime through Assad’s cousin, Hussein Assad.

“He told me to establish a line between the SDF and the Russians positioned at Khmeimim base,” said Talal Silo.

More than the outcome of these proxy dealings among Americans, Russians, the Syrian regime and Iran, the mere act of these dealings is significant. They tell multiple stories: that the world powers only act for their own interests – to distribute the ruins of Syrian war at the cost of Syrian peoples’ lives. Second, by collaborating with the SDF and YPG, Turkish security concerns were thrown into disguise. Despite the long insistence of Turkey that the armed groups are closely allied to the PKK terrorist organization, which is involved in a decades-long war against Turkish state, all the sides involved in the Syrian war have been providing support to these groups to exploit them for their own interests.

*Written by Waseem Ahad. 

Despite huge American support, PKK-affiliated YPG forces are trying hard to take Raqqa from DAESH. After the quick withdrawal of DAESH from the Raqqa countryside, their resistance against the US-backed YPG is strong. It seems like the YPG is scrambling to take over the city unlike the Manbij experience. Therefore, the US-led international coalition is massively bombing the city, but DAESH has heavily fortified itself inside.

Ineffectiveness of the YPG in Raqqa and DAESH Resistance

On June 6, the YPG-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) announced the start of the Raqqa operation. Even if the list of participants was long, the main force in the operation are the PKK-affiliated YPG. Thuwwar al-Raqqa, which is the only brigade in the region which once governed Raqqa city and fought at Ayn al-Arab (Kobane) alongside the YPG against DAESH, has been excluded from the Raqqa operation, which has resulted in a lack of local support for the operation. Also, the Arab Quwwat al-Nukhba brigade (The Elite Forces) of Jarba was forced out of the Raqqa operation. Both brigades were forced out for the same reason: they weren’t obeying YPG orders. The number of Arabs within the YPG-led Syrian Democratic Forces was already low and with the exclusion of these two bigger brigades, it became even less than it was before.

The low number of Arabs in the ranks of the SDF and the exclusion of the only brigade in the region with governing-experience in Raqqa led to a lack of local support for the Raqqa campaign. Due to a lack of local support, it was certain that the operation will lack intelligence and insightful information which is important in urban fighting. Nevertheless, the huge US-support for the operation in terms of weapon supplies, military training, supervision and air support in the face of current DAESH-weakness led to estimates that DAESH will soon collapse in Raqqa. But it has been otherwise.

The YPG forces are apparently inefficient and have low fighting moral and discipline. DAESH on the other hand is still using their Suicide Vehicle Borne IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices) and other forms of suicide attacks which is completely inhumane, but it shows their fighting moral. In addition to suicide attacks, DAESH is heavily reliant on snipers. In DAESH propaganda videos, they show how their snipers kill YPG forces, smoking cigarettes on terraces. Despite long and systematic US-training for the YPG-led SDF, the fighters are lacking basic knowledge in urban warfare.

Airstrikes by the International Coalition in Raqqa to compensate for YPG ineffectiveness

Facing the ineffectiveness of the YPG, the US-led International Coalition is massively bombarding Raqqa. The bombardment is so intense that geolocation with DAESH propaganda videos became impossible. Not only DAESH propaganda videos, but also CENTCOM press releases show the huge destruction of Raqqa. Since the start of the operation, the US-led International Coalition has struck Raqqa 1,606 times in 68 days. That’s an average of 24 strikes per day. Compared to 5 strikes per day in Mosul in May 2017, the airstrikes are incredibly frequent. If one also compares the scales of Mosul and Raqqa, the intensity of airstrikes will become more visible. Or one can also compare the number of airstrikes to the number of Turkish airstrikes at the beginning of the Euphrates Shield Operation which was 211 in 66 days, or 3 strikes per day.

One point which shows the ineffectiveness of the YPG forces in Raqqa is the rising number of airstrikes conducted by the US-led International Coalition over time. While the International Coalition bombed Raqqa 21 times per day in June, it increased to 23 times per day in July and to 30 per day in the first 12 days of August.

The Future of Raqqa after the defeat of DAESH

The decision by the US-administration to start the Raqqa operation with the PKK-affiliated YPG-forces instead of the Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army seems to be a huge mistake, which will be clearer after the defeat of DAESH. This choice also increases the costs of the operation enormously, and makes it harder for President Trump to explain the undertaking to the U.S. public.

Compared to the operation to take Al-Bab, which was captured by Turkish-backed FSA forces and only partially destroyed in some western neighborhoods, Raqqa is being completely wiped out by airstrikes. Due to the lack of local support, which would be available if the Raqqa operation was conducted by the Syrian Arab rebels, and the ineffectiveness of the YPG in fighting in Arab areas, the US-led International Coalition is forced to wipe out Raqqa with airstrikes. Now, the rebuilding of Raqqa without the support of Turkey, which shares a long border with Raqqa province, will become very difficult.

Furthermore, the extremist-leftist ideology of the YPG and their ethnic Kurdish-identity are two main reasons why the Raqqa population sees them as a ‘foreign power’ which will occupy the city much like DAESH did for years. The YPG experience against factions like Thuwwar al-Raqqa which did not obey YPG orders is known. The leader of the brigade who fought in Ayn al-Arab (Kobane) is now under house-arrest by the YPG. In addition, Kurdish opposition parties like ENKS were systematically suppressed by the YPG. Therefore, the question of how Raqqa will be governed and rebuilt after it is destroyed remains unanswered. Claims of a US-Russian agreement of handing over the city to the Assad regime after the defeat of DAESH, seem for the time being unlikely, but not impossible either. If this happens, it will be the result of the unwise decision made by the US in Raqqa, when it preferred to work with the PKK-affiliated YPG forces instead of their NATO ally Turkey and the Free Syrian Army.

When the Syrian civil war erupted, no one could easily predict the battlefield would evolve to a multi-dimensional and multi-territorial conflict where thousands of foreign proxies and fighters from different countries have been dragged into expeditiously. Based on the fact that the general overview of the battlefield has expanded and even most ominously crossed the borders of Syria and spilled over Iraq, it is unrealistic to talk about presence of just one battlefield but there are numerous battlefields where proxies have buckled down to debilitating each other.

DAESH is causing a radical sociological transformation in the region

Even though there are various actors actively playing on the ground, DAESH and its earlier incarnations are the main precipitating factors welcoming a radical sociological transformation in the region. DAESH has a bid of “becoming a state” leaning on a rather apocalyptic vision with a rhetoric of self-proclaimed caliphate. This rhetoric rips up the main notion of the Westphalian state system called ‘soil integration’ and destabilizes traditional state envisagement. When DAESH hit the road to implement a deconstruction model in the region, its golden shot was the seizure of Mosul in June 2014 which symbolized the tearing up of the Sykes-Picot Border of 1916, which demarcates Iraq from Syria. Only then did it grab the attention of international community and especially that of the US.

DAESH is slaughtering tens of thousands of people ferociously under its rule with a desire to expunge each force on its way, which puts in danger its autocratic rule. From the very beginning of the war; the reason of Russia and the US’s entry into the war respectively is primarily about saving Assad and destabilizing the region in the favor of PYD, Syrian branch of the PKK, where they are dominating a vast majority of Syria’s northern border; currently advancing towards Deir-Ez Zor Euphrates Axis and pushing towards DAESH de facto capital Raqqa with the full support of the US-led coalition.

Fighting against the threat posed by DAESH is one of Assad’s rationalization for staying in power and to be protected by Russia; however; it is crystal clear that neither Assad with a constant military, diplomatic and financial support from Russia and Iran nor the US is fighting DAESH to root out its cruel militias from the Middle East. One incident which is worth remembering: Syrian troops were driven out of Palmyra in December, 2016 following leaving of Russian soldiers and abandoning the historical city to fate of guardianship of the Syrian army in April. Syrian troops retook Palmyra from DAESH for the second time in March, 2017; nevertheless; it is blatant that there is a sham fight among Syrian troops and DAESH militants to leave and recapture the strategic territories in the Syrian civil war.

A success story in the Syria battlefield: Operation Euphrates Shield

Owing largely to the quest for a new pro-active foreign policy direction; Turkey launched Operation Euphrates Shield on August 24 to purge the region from terrorist groups such as the PYD, YPG and DEASH along with the Turkey-backed Free Syrian Army force and Turkish officials confirmed that the 2,200-square-kilometer area has been completely cleared of the DAESH militants. While the operation has turned out an unequivocal success; a number of foreign policy commentators both in the national and international level are running a campaign to discredit significant gains by Turkey in the Al-Bab operation after the US deploys heavily armed marines to Syria to launch the Raqqa offensive with the YPG dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) amid Turkey’s objections to the US authorities.

However, as Turkey Presidential Spokesperson İbrahim Kalın stated yesterday; it is not yet certain which groups and policies will shape the future of Raqqa. Taking into consideration the above-mentioned facts; the speculation of Al-Bab operation is rather baseless; where Turkey’s gains on the ground are so obvious. In addition, one thing should be emphasized that Turkey is the only country in the world coordinating its fight against the PKK, its affiliate in Syria the PYD, and DEASH at the same time.

Manbij Operation: Outcome of military success in Al-Bab

Relying on its recent military success in Al-Bab, Turkey has launched an operation of encircling of the Western Manbij even though Russian General Staff declared that an agreement was reached between the Assad regime and the YPG for the peaceful transfer of Manbij’s control to Assad regime forces. Free Syrian Army continues its operations against Syrian Democratic Forces despite arrival of government fighters due to the fact that Manbij Military Council which is under the domination of the US allied Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) denied handing over areas to the Assad regime in a menacing manner.

In addition, as the US state department explained earlier this week; the US is insistent on not seeing the YPG as a terrorist group despite raising Turkish concerns which is a clear sign of the US authorities would carry on protecting YPG forces at all costs.  It seems that the US is going ahead with several measures with an intention to refute Turkey’s leading argument on the Syrian battleground, especially following Turkey’s announcement in the previous week that should the YPG forces does not withdraw from Manbij which was promised several times by the US authorities over the past few months, Turkey will storm the YPG forces.

The US recent moves are leveraging the crisis in the region

Apparently, the US’s recent moves are clear indicators of its willingness to escalate the crisis with Turkey. After Trump took office on January 20, 2017; it is still unclear what kind of a US is Turkey going to ally with? The latest moves of the US invite Turkey to reshape the basic parameters of Ankara’s relation with the US. Despite the fact that Turkey has been successful in blending its wider objectives with a clear intention to fight DAESH and YPG, the ambiguity that the US breeds in Syria is still eliciting many risks that Turkey should withstand. Based on a precarious sort of balance prevalent in the region, the final move of the US might be interpreted as way of blunting Turkey’s recent gains throughout the Al-Bab Operation.

Recent military maneuver of the US might raise up tensions between various actors in the battlefield

The US’s recent policy has produced a direct confrontation with Turkey such as once was experienced heavily with Russia. This would be the biggest foreign policy test for Ankara, on how much is it able to adjust to its new pro-active foreign policy instruments to the new phase of the US foreign policy. It seems that the US foreign policy priorities happen to line up with PYD which causes ramping up of divergence between the US and Turkey in terms of Syria policy and the Middle East as a whole. Nonetheless, recent military and political maneuvers of the US might lead to inter group and intra group struggles in the region taking into consideration sectarian and demographic vulnerabilities embedded in the region, especially while it is obvious that all the actors and borders have intertwined each other like never before. Having been confronted with multidimensional threats, Turkey appears determined not to leave off its advantageous position in Syria across swathes of strategic attacks coming from both national and international level.

The recent decision by the Manbij Military Council to hand over territories in western Manbij to the Assad regime to prevent attacks from Turkish-backed Syrian rebel brigades will have its long-term effects on the YPG dominated Syrian Democratic Forces. In the eyes of Kurdish opposition groups, Syrian Arab allies of the YPG and the Arab population in Syria the credibility of the YPG dominated SDF will be questioned.

Syrian rebel forces captured the strategically important city of al-Bab from DAESH with the essential support of Turkish Armed Forces. After capturing the city, the regime and allied militias captured the town of Tadif and some other villages to the east. By doing so, the regime blocked further attacks by Syrian rebel forces against DAESH. After Turkey and Russia reached a ceasefire agreement between the Assad regime and the Syrian rebels, the focus of the Euphrates Shield Operation shifted towards the YPG controlled city of Manbij. Facing this threat, the YPG has taken huge steps to avoid any offensive towards Manbij.

Firstly the YPG tried to gain US-protection against any military attack on Manbij. They threatened that they would retreat from front lines in Raqqa against DAESH to defend Manbij against Euphrates Shield forces. Knowing the strategic importance of the city for the new US administration, they thought this would convince Washington to protect their presence in Manbij despite the US’s promise of a withdrawal of YPG forces from that city. These threats may have some effects on the US’s trust in the YPG, but their partnership stays strong.

For a long time it seems that the US would protect the YPG from any attacks by Euphrates Shield forces on Manbij. The US sent new batches of armored vehicles to the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces. It didn’t take long to see these new vehicles being used by YPG fighters. The military training of Manbij Military Council forces, which are also dominated by YPG fighters, also continued by the US. The CENTCOM Twitter account even cheered newly trained female fighters. YPG affiliated websites and sources started to publish visual confirmation of US troop’s presence in the area around Manbij. It seemed that the US would protect the YPG from any attack on Manbij despite its promise to Turkey, which designates the YPG as a terrorist organization because of its structural affinity with the internationally designated terrorist organization known as the PKK.

On 2 March 2017 the Military Council of Manbij published an official statement claiming they will hand areas west of Manbij over to the Assad regime and allied forces to prevent Turkish-backed rebel forces from taking the area, which means that the US’s ally on the ground is handing over territories to the Assad regime. This statement shows something important and will have many negative long-term effects for the YPG in Syria.

It firstly shows that the US didn’t agree to protect the YPG against Turkish-backed Syrian rebel forces. Despite a media campaign, which assumed US-protection for the YPG in Manbij, the Turkish and Syrian resolve to conquer Manbij prevented such protection for the YPG. US officials want to avoid an open escalation with its NATO ally, especially before the planned Raqqa operation. Therefore, the US will most likely pressure the YPG to withdraw and focus on Raqqa when the Manbij operation starts fully, to avoid a decrease in the fighting capability of the YPG and to secure the Raqqa operation.

The first soft attack of the Syrian rebels near Arima ended with the capture of three villages from the YPG. The videos of the battle clearly shows YPG fighters at the frontlines, showing that the area is dominated by the YPG as local sources claimed. The effectiveness of a possible Assad regime protection as border guards against Euphrates Shield forces is also very doubtful.

In addition, this might cause many problems for the YPG, and internal discussions are taking place over how they can hand over territories captured with the blood of their own fighters. The Kurdish National Council (ENKS) who are oppressed by the YPG started to question the goals of the YPG and how could they hand over areas to the Assad regime. The ENKS has traditionally strongly opposed the Assad regime, and they have good ties with mainstream Syrian rebels, the Turkish government and especially with the Barzani-government of the Kurdish autonomous region in northern Iraq.

In the same day of this statement, the Syrian Rojava Peshmarga that operates in Iraqi exile started an operation in the Sinjar Mountain to push the PKK and allied forces out of the area in cooperation with the Barzani-government and Turkey. The PKK refused to withdraw from the area. Supporters of the ENKS are questioning the reasons behind the YPG handover of territories to the Assad regime and not to the legitimate government of Kurdistan in Iraq. The YPG’s credibility among the Kurdish population will suffer with this agreement with the Assad regime. Tensions between the pro-Barzani and pro-PKK Kurds are rising. These tensions could also cross over to the Kurdish areas in Syria.

Hemin Hawrami , a senior adviser and assistant to President Barzani, and member of the KDP Leadership Council has officially asked the question of why the PKK handed over territories to the Assad regime, but not left Sinjar.

Another long-term effect for the YPG will be its relationship with Arab forces in the Syrian Democratic Forces who mainly oppose the Assad regime. The Arab allies of the YPG in the SDF will surely question the future of the organization and it will damage the credibility of the SDF. This action will be seen as proof of its collaborating with the regime.

The weakening of the alliance between the YPG and the Arab forces inside SDF could lead them to some kind of negotiations with Turkey and rebel forces who work with Turkey. Or at least, rebel forces who attack areas controlled by the SDF could argue that it would just be turned over to the regime later. Therefore, the SDF/YPG might have prevented an attack this time, but it has done more damage over the long run. The population in areas controlled by the YPG-dominated SDF could fear that their villages will be handed over to the regime in the future, so they could work with the Syrian rebels. In reality, this already happened in some areas which supposedly should be handed over to the Assad regime.

This latest action of the YPG dominated and controlled Manbij Military Council of the SDF will probably not prevent an attack on Manbij. Turkish authorities and Syrian rebels signaled that they will go for the city and it is not for sure if the Assad regime and Russia will risk an escalation with Turkey or if they would give up the YPG-control over Manbij like the US. But it is certain that the YPG lost credibility among the Kurdish population and its opponents in the ENKS. They have also lost credibility with their Arab allies in Syria.