The United States’ withdrawal from Afghanistan marks a pivotal moment in modern history, with far-reaching implications for both regional dynamics and global security. After nearly two decades of military involvement, the decision to withdraw American troops from Afghanistan raised critical questions about the future of the country, the stability of the region, and the legacy of American intervention.

The withdrawal process, which began in earnest in May 2021 and culminated in the complete evacuation of U.S. forces by August of the same year, unfolded against a backdrop of political, security, and humanitarian challenges. The decision to end America’s longest war was driven by a range of factors, including shifting domestic priorities, war fatigue among the American public, and a reevaluation of strategic objectives in an evolving geopolitical landscape.

The consequences of this withdrawal, however, extend far beyond the withdrawal itself. As the Taliban rapidly regained control of large swaths of territory, including the capital city of Kabul, the chaotic scenes of desperate Afghans seeking to flee and the subsequent collapse of the Afghan government reverberated across the globe. The vacuum left in the wake of the withdrawal has raised concerns about the potential for a resurgence of terrorism, the erosion of hard-fought gains in human rights and women’s rights, and the regional power dynamics as neighboring countries seek to assert influence in the aftermath of the U.S. departure.

In August in Kabul, Andrew Quilty, a Walkley award-winning journalist, presents a gripping account of the historic fall of Kabul. Through the eyes of witnesses on the ground, Quilty unveils the dramatic events that unfolded as the Taliban seized control of the Afghan capital, marking the abrupt and humiliating end of America’s longest mission.

Quilty’s narrative is powerful and illuminating, weaving together the personal stories of resilience, fear, and hope that unfolded amidst the chaos. He skillfully highlights the complexities of the situation, providing readers with a nuanced understanding of the larger geopolitical forces at play and the far-reaching consequences of foreign intervention in Afghanistan in chronological order.

August in Kabul captures the resilience and spirit of the Afghan people, who have endured decades of conflict and upheaval. It also serves as a stark reminder of the limitations and failures of foreign intervention. It is a vital contribution to the historical record, offering readers a remarkable and deeply human perspective on a pivotal moment in recent history. With meticulous research, powerful storytelling, Quilty crafts a narrative that will leave a lasting impact on readers, urging them to reflect on the complexities of war, its aftermath. August in Kabul is a must-read for anyone seeking to understand the complexities of the Afghan conflict and the profound impact it has had on individuals and nations alike.

Andrew Quilty, August in Kabul: America’s Last Days in Afghanistan (Bloomsbury Academic, 2023) ISBN: 9781350370319, 272 pages

Written by Dilara Özer

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he Taliban unveiled their plan to build hundreds of religious schools across the country which would result in the raising of the third and fourth generations of radicals. Additionally, the group is turning educational institutions into religious schools and curricula into a fastidious form of religion. Strategically, this would help them fortify the bases of their regime. On the other hand, Afghans are fed up with the strict rules the Taliban impose on people without providing any services to the public. The sudden flip from freedom to a restricted life under the Taliban is worrisome for Afghans.

The group banned education and work for women, and millions of Afghans have either fled or strive to flee the country with some joining resistance forces against the group. Additionally, unemployment and poverty are at their peak. No single country has recognized the group. Reportedly, unknown aircraft circle above the Taliban daily and target Al Qaida and Daesh fighters. Will the Taliban survive? How long will their regime last?

The Taliban government could last more than five years

The Taliban’s harsh regime makes people obedient. When anyone protests them, they quickly disappear. Additionally, the Taliban systematically work to produce version three and four of the Taliban by building hundreds of religious schools across the country to expand the number of their fighters in the long run. The first religious school was founded by the Taliban’s interior minister, Sirajuddin Haqqani, in Khost Province exactly where American Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl was released in 2014 in a prisoner swap for five prominent Taliban prisoners from Guantánamo Bay.

The Taliban Ministry of Education announced that there are around 6,000 religious schools in the country, and added that the group plans to build 34 large religious schools in each of the provinces to serve up to 34,000 students at a time. Such systematic production of the next Taliban generation would contribute to the length of their regime, which would continue for more than five years, at the least.

Importantly, there isn’t any strong domestic anti-Taliban armed force to match the Taliban in either quantity or quality. Ahmad Massoud, the leader of the National Resistance Front (NRF), recently said that he has up to 4,000 fighters which is 4% of the Taliban’s force. This number is not enough to overthrow the Taliban regime in the next few years. At the same time, while the Taliban enjoy Pakistan’s support, no country so far has shown support for the NRF.

The Taliban, in fact, are similar to Iran’s religious regime, and despite the world being against the Islamic Republic of Iran, with heavy sanctions on it, the religious regime in Tehran continues to govern for 43 years. The Western world frequently meets the Taliban leaders in Afghanistan and abroad, and since the Taliban took power, the U.S. alone has provided over $1.1 billion in humanitarian aid to Afghanistan which ends up going to the Taliban.

Importantly, the Western world has other priorities which distract it from the Taliban such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which might be a protracted conflict, the U.S.-China trade war, the post COVID-19 disorder, and climate change, which causes severe food and resource crises and the spread of diseases. These global challenges would divert Afghanistan from the world’s eyes and leave the country to the hands of the Taliban.

The Taliban government would face drastic security challenges

Taliban fighters are not the only security threat to the country. Among others, Daesh’s fighters have conducted numerous attacks and have had several hard fights with the Taliban. It is estimated that Daesh has 4,000 to 5,000 fighters in Afghanistan. After the fall of Kabul, the so-called Islamic State published a commentary where the group accused the Taliban of betraying Jihadists by the peace agreement with the U.S., and vowed to continue fighting them.

Since the Taliban took over the capital, Daesh has carried out deadly attacks. Last week, Daesh claimed responsibility for a bombing that killed five and wounded forty near the Taliban’s Foreign Ministry. In another incident this month, Daesh attacked the Taliban’s military airport in Kabul, killing 20 and wounding 30. Last month, Daesh also attacked a hotel in Kabul leaving behind 21 casualties.

In an interview with CNN, Abdul Munir, a Daesh commander, stated that he leads 600 fighters, including Indians, Pakistanis, and Central Asians. He added, “When the foreigners and the people of the world leave Afghanistan, we can resume our operations.” Apart from Daesh, the NRF is another challenge for the Taliban. Even though the Taliban fighters have seized the center of Panjshir, the NRF fights from the mountains of Panjshir.

Last week, Amrullah Saleh, former vice president and one of the leaders of the NRF, announced that their fighters arrested 300 Taliban in the eastern province of Nuristan. There are also other newly formed resistance groups including the Freedom Front of Afghanistan which consists of former military officers led by General Yasin Zia, the former military chief of staff, and the Islamic National Movement for Afghanistan’s Freedom led by General Abdul Matin Sulimankhil. These guerrilla groups might not topple the Taliban regime in the short run, but they could put the Taliban government in hardship.

Possible scenario for overturning the Taliban government  

Another incident like 9/11 in any one of the NATO member states would challenge the Taliban’s regime. This time NATO forces would intervene in Afghanistan in a different format than in 2001. NATO forces might use their over-the-horizon policy to topple the Taliban’s regime. Since the Taliban took over power, several jihadist organizations have returned to Afghanistan. These groups have fought the U.S. forces alongside the Taliban for the past twenty years. After the U.S. withdrawal, Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri returned to Kabul and was killed by a U.S. drone.

There is a risk that such groups would be after revenge for the death or imprisonment of their fellow jihadists during the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, including Osama bin Laden who was killed in Islamabad, Pakistan and al-Zawahiri who was in Kabul. Since 9/11, the U.S. has detained roughly 780 Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters in Guantánamo Bay.

The return of these jihadist groups to Afghanistan could threaten the U.S. and its allies in the region and the world. During the Taliban’s previous tenure in the 1990s, Al Qaeda in one day carried out two attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing more than 200 and wounding over 4,500 people. Should these groups carry out similar attacks to 9/11 in any of the NATO member states, the Taliban regime would abruptly come to an end.

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fghanistan was the hub of opium poppy cultivation in the 1990s. The Afghan government sought to meet the supply gap; however, the government’s inadequacy and the lack of law enforcement brought about the loss of control over the countryside.

The cultivation in the countryside reached its prime when its control by the state was lost. According to the World Bank’s 2004 Social Development Paper, this was an effect of the decline in “credible law enforcements hindering the growth of the opium economy.” The situation resembles the present-day Afghanistan under Taliban rule.

Since the Taliban’s recent takeover, “the group has been trying to amend its image in the hope of earning international recognition and the easing of sanctions” reported Dilara Ozer for Politics Today. She added, “Deputy Prime Minister Abdul Salam Hanafi asked international donors for cooperation to help find alternative businesses for farmers and treat drug addicts.”

Given the poor economic circumstances, parents have resorted to sedating their hungry children by giving them medication, a report claims. Poverty reaching a record high with parents selling their daughters and organs for money. Drug consumption has become a preferred coping mechanism in the country, which cultivates 80 percent of the world’s opium.

The lack of social and public services meant that old buildings like the U.S military camps were being transformed into rehabilitation centers. In a recent documentary, Arte.tv reported the terrible conditions there as the centers lack any medical aid and safety.

The conditions reflect an inhumane treatment of patients and the poor social and economic structure of the country. Some patients are unable to leave the treatment centers, having no contact with their families, while others are unable to survive drug withdrawals due to lack of medicine and medical assistance. There are reports of infested blankets and lack of food.

Echoing the opium bans in 2000 and 2001, the Taliban’s ban, announced in 2022, aimed to earn international recognition. There were already sanctions and lack of humanitarian aid. The effect of the opium ban caused opium sales to triple from $425 million in 2021 to $1.4 billion in 2022.

There is a 32 percent increase in opium cultivation for 2022, and what these figures will look like for the 2023 report will be a deciding factor for the reliability of the recent ban and Taliban’s efforts in administration

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) questioned whether the ban will be enforced by the Taliban as the cultivation season has approached, while other sources have cited that farmers have already began cultivation – but the Taliban turn a blind eye.

The Failure of the War on Terrorism as a War on Drugs

The opium economy because of opium’s addictive nature and demand is a booming endeavor that has been used to fund warlordism, state power, and narcoterrorism. The lack of law enforcement, and the limited economic stability and support of societal development have the potential to create further issues for the crackdown on opium trafficking, cultivation, and consumption. John F. Sopko wrote that the “eradication efforts had no lasting impact on opium poppy problem” while alternative cultivation programs that did not incorporate larger security and developmental strategies ultimately become short-lived for counternarcotic goals.

Between 2000 and 2020, the UK has provided £3.5 billion to Afghanistan as “humanitarian aid”; however, it was reported in the recent Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) that most of these funds had been used towards security agencies, such as the police.

Since the primary task of the police was not civilian policing but counterinsurgency operations, the appropriation of the UK aid funds was “unwilling to challenge the U.S. approach.” Furthermore, financial flows have been reported to serve a geostrategic and military agenda in the aftermath of the NATO-led occupation. According to Jean Shaoul, institutions like the World Bank, the United Nations, and various NGOs “mobilized in this endeavor” rather than providing humanitarian aid and relief.

Narcoterrorism

A distinction between criminal activity and terrorism is important. As Emma Bjornehed, senior lecturer at Swedish Defense University writes by referencing to the work of UNCRI member Tamara Makarenko stating that, “The most common criminal activity that terrorist organizations are involved in is the international drug trade, thus although organized crime may involve different criminal activity such as arms trade, human trafficking, racketeering, by viewing the crime aspect of the continuum as solely narcotics trade, the continuum can be used as a tool to view the concept of narcoterrorism.”

Afghanistan now faces with instabilities and increasing poverty due to insufficient control of the opium trade and other challenges. Alongside drug trafficking, the routes are also used for other illicit criminal activities. Given that the routes have been identified, Co-Chair of the Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals Csaba Kőrösi further mentions that the “threat from drug trafficking is linked with the threat of terrorism, regional and global security.”

The opium economy produces shocking effects on the states that oppose it. The opium economy has allowed Afghanistan to maintain its state power and the Taliban to remain warlords, but the strength of the opium economy has dismantled the state’s morality while it has remained a huge source of financial gain.

Prices have loomed and farmers are more prone to remain in the cultivation given its profit. Given this situation and the fact that the other means of production suggested for farmers have not shown to be successful under the assistance of other nations and organizations, the threat of narcoterrorism persists.

Pressure remains for counter efforts to manage the opium trade routes which vary from land, sea, and air. Given the recently announced ban and the poor law enforcement, opium prices have spiked and the Balkan Route is likely to be under more stress.

As the end of August marks a year since the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Taliban remain unrecognized and desperately craving legitimacy.

Ever since the Taliban seized Afghanistan in August 2021, there was much speculation on the consequences of their recognition by regional powers. Countries like Russia, China, Iran, and Pakistan were considered the main beneficiaries of the U.S. withdrawal as they are more capable of filling the power vacuum.

But despite the hype, no country recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan.

“We call upon regional and other countries, the United Nations, international organizations, and especially Islamic countries and organizations to recognize the Islamic emirate as a legitimate government, to have a positive collaboration with it, and remove all the imposed sanctions,” Mujib-ul Rahman Ansari, an Afghan cleric said during a three-day gathering of Afghan leaders on July 2, 2022.

Afghanistan is currently facing one of the worst humanitarian crises in its history. As poverty and economic crisis sweep through Kabul, lack of recognition makes it harder for Afghan people to survive.

Who has recognized the Taliban?

As recognition of the Taliban would improve trade relationships and enhance security cooperations, Afghanistan’s neighbors and regional players have demonstrated more interest in engaging with the group. However, many of the regional players have abstained from recognition and instead focused more on diplomatic talks. Countries like Pakistan, Russia, Turkmenistan, China, and Iran have quietly approved Taliban-appointed diplomats.

Being one of the first actors to take action, China expects the group to protect its interest in neighboring countries. It is also concerned about the Belt and Road Initiative which runs through Afghan territory. For other countries like Pakistan and Iran, security and commerce are the top priorities.

Who opposed the recognition?

The UAE along with Saudi Arabia were among the first to recognize the Taliban when they came to power in 1996. However, in 2021, these countries refrained from doing the same. Similarly, countries like the United States have been reluctant to recognize the Taliban and froze their assets, making things difficult for the Afghan economy.

In this context, Russia and China have accused the U.S. and its allies for the economic crisis in the country. Both have also demanded the release of frozen funds and the provision of assistance to the Afghans.

Better behavior matters

The Taliban are still on the terror list of many countries. Most countries abstain from recognizing them as they want the group to be more responsible and promote inclusivity. The international community urged the Taliban to provide more freedom for women and provide universal access to education.

A recent report by the UN Assistant Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) has also highlighted the extra judicial killings, torture, arbitrary arrests and detentions, and violations of fundamental freedoms by the Taliban regime.

Last August, Mujahid told reporters, “There will be no prejudice against women.” However, most girls in Afghanistan have not been allowed to go to school after August 2021. In December 2021, the Taliban banned women from traveling alone unless they have a male companion, and all women have been ordered to cover their faces in public.

Almost a year after the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, many governments still tie their recognition of the Taliban to its actions on the ground, including the way the group view and treat women.

On Saturday, April 2, Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid announced a ban on opium cultivation, opium use, and trade, and warned that crops would be destroyed, and perpetrators would be punished according to Sharia law. The new ban also covers illicit drugs and alcohol.

Afghanistan is the world’s largest opium poppy cultivator, and a significant portion of its GDP relies on the crop. Throughout the years of instability and war in the country, the numbers of opium poppy farmers reached millions.

The ban, taking place amidst the free fall of Afghanistan’s economy and cash shortage, sparks fears of livelihood and food insecurity. At the same time, the decision was met with praise from the international community which demanded drug control from the Taliban. Since their takeover, the group had been trying to amend its image in the hope of earning international recognition and the easing of sanctions.

Afghanistan’s rocky road with opium

Since the 1990s, Afghanistan became the world’s largest producer of opium. The trend started in the 1980s due to political, geo-strategic, and economic factors—mainly the lack of effective governance, and deterioration of the economic and agricultural infrastructure due to the civil war. Thus, the rural farming of opium poppies became a viable livelihood option.

Prior to the civil war that started in 1979, the Afghani government had already been struggling with the enforcement of opium production bans due to an unavailability of resources. Like other conflicts, illicit drug production and trade became a lucrative option for the fighting groups to fund arms when the war started.

After the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan in the 1990s, the Taliban took control of most parts of the country. Most of the patronage of the fighting factions’ financial resources dried up leading them to turn to opium cultivation. There were insufficient resources for agricultural products like wheat accompanied by lack of coordination for existing resources.

Moreover, agricultural taxes including income from opium poppies were collected by mullahs and local authorities throughout the fighting period before the Taliban took control, which signaled a greenl ight for cultivation. When the Taliban took control, they banned the drug trade in 1994. The group made an attempt to end poppy cultivation by imposing restrictions rather than a full ban; however, in 1996, taxes similar to the ones formerly paid to mullahs where imposed on farmers and traffickers of opium. The production and consumption of opiate drugs were banned, but trade and heroin labs still remained.

What is more, the Taliban ascent to power caused the civil servants and skilled professionals to flee the country while economic collapse starved those who remain. Salaries are no longer paid as cash shortages prevail and finding employment is increasingly difficult. Meanwhile, food prices have skyrocketed, and Afghanistan endured one of its worst droughts in 2021.

Food insecurity in rural areas is aggravated and similar settings are increasingly visible in urban areas where the middle class resides, many resorting to selling their belongings to buy food. According to the UN, around 23 million people acutely struggle with food shortages in Afghanistan.

In December 2021, Filippo Grandi, the UN high commissioner for refugees, alerted of the risk of increased migration and called for economic aid. Later that month, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution to make an exception on UN sanctions on humanitarian grounds if provided directly, bypassing the Taliban. The Taliban government has mainly been compliant, allowing the direct provision of aid.

Opium ban comes during harvest season, alternative plan yet to be made

Recently, opium cultivation in Afghanistan saw a surge with farmers seeking alleviation from the country’s dire economic situation. Opium products generate at least $1.8 billion in Afghanistan annually. The Taliban’s strategy regarding income alternatives to the lucrative crop is still uncertain. TOLO news, a local Afghani news outlet, reported that Deputy Prime Minister Abdul Salam Hanafi asked international donors for cooperation to help find alternative businesses for farmers and treat drug addicts.

Ian McCary, the chief of mission for U.S. Embassy Kabul (currently based on Doha), praised the move in a tweet and pointed out that enforcement would be key for the positive outcome of a thriving licit agricultural sector. It is yet to be seen if drug control and an attempt at building a more temperate image will ease international sanctions for the Taliban or even contribute towards an official recognition by the international community.

March has proved to be a busy month for the Taliban as they crackdown on basic freedoms and announce dramatic changes for the Afghan people, particularly the women.

First, the Taliban banned education for girls beyond 6th grade, making a sudden U-turn decision that ignited concern and raised many questions around the world. Second, women can no longer travel without a male chaperone, whether it be by car or plane. Third, recreational parks have become segregated by gender allowing men to visit on four days and women on the other three days. Finally, international media outlets like the BBC and Voice of America have been banned, taking their news bulletins off the air.

These hasty decisions have made experts, officials, and those familiar with the group concerned about what it could mean for the future direction of the country, and rightfully so. But besides the obvious concerns, the Taliban’s crackdown on basic freedoms is a sign of their weakness and inability to address the myriad of problems Afghanistan faces. Simply put, the Taliban are shooting themselves in the foot, showing their severe short-sightedness and major handicaps.

The Taliban are pushing to return to the past

Months before the talk of the Taliban joining some sort of power-sharing deal in Kabul, many in Washington were suggesting that the Taliban have softened their extremist religious interpretations and brutal use of force.

The narrative of a Taliban 2.0. dominated western circles, officials and leaders expressed hope in the group’s change of course this time around. But for most Afghans, skepticism was always there. How can a group that has countlessly violated human rights ever be trusted again?

During its first stint in power in the 1990s, the Taliban deprived all girls and women of education, keeping them in the dark. Similarly, media and freedom of expression took a strong detour as journalists could not report the realities happening on the ground. Other tactics like moral policing, interrogations, and reprisals against government workers, activists, and important figures were a common part of life under Taliban rule.

The Taliban are inconsistent

Amid the onslaught of their recapture, experts were mostly unsure what the Taliban had in mind.

In an interview with BBC, Saad Mohseni, head of Tolo News, Afghanistan’s leading TV news channel asked the question that was on everyone’s minds, “will the real Taliban please stand up?”

He added, “we are getting different opinions and views from different quarters. Now is the time to make it clear to them [the Taliban] that if you go back to the mid 1990s, it’s not going to be acceptable to the world at large.”

It’s true. Since their takeover, the Taliban’s messaging has been inconsistent with ambiguous responses to the pressing concerns of education, media, and women’s rights. It is no wonder why the international community is walking on eggshells, still very reluctant to officially recognize a group that has little cohesion and a bad reputation on top of that.

Many experts believe that these inconsistencies reflect the deep friction between the Taliban’s political leaders and their hardline commanders and foot soldiers, whereas the abrupt backtrack on girls going to school acts as the biggest indicator of this.

It’s important to note that the Taliban are not a homogenous unit. Their political wing and military wing differ in terms of their degree in religious conviction. The problem with this is that neither wing can survive without the other, and for top tier Taliban heads like Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada, they cannot afford to lose the loyalty of their foot soldiers who are holding everything down for them and therefore must appease them to prevent any further PR damage.

The Taliban cannot address the elephant in the room

Perhaps, the biggest handicap the Taliban faces is their inability to address the elephant in the room: the economic and humanitarian catastrophe unfolding in Afghanistan.

In fact, many Taliban members have desperately called upon former Afghan government officials and other actors to return and assist them with technical expertise because they fail to have any skills themselves.

As the group focuses on the lengths of men’s beards, the dress code of women, and how to hoist their flag atop the hills of Kabul, meanwhile, Afghans are starving.

A UNDP study conducted in September stated that 97 percent of Afghans could plunge into poverty by mid 2022.

Afghanistan is facing the collapse of essential services as food aid runs out, according to U.N. agencies, who released a rapid appeal for more than $600 million on October 5, 2021 to sustain approximately 11 million people across the crisis-plagued country until the end of the year.

Due to security concerns, staff evacuations, closures, and legal difficulties, most of the former Afghan government is no longer operating due to the recent Taliban takeover. Humanitarian relief and other assistance given by the U.N. agencies and civilian groups as a result have been severely restricted. U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres said on August 31, 2021 that “a humanitarian catastrophe looms” in Afghanistan and asked donor countries to “dig deep” to support an emergency flash appeal. The United States and the European Union have declared that humanitarian help will continue to be provided to Afghanistan.

Following the Taliban’s takeover, the U.S. froze $7 billion in Afghan reserves, while the International Monetary Fund (IMF) froze  funding to the country, including hundreds of millions of dollars in Special Drawing Rights, which may be turned into currency during times of crisis, according to the IOM. The Central Bank of Afghanistan can only get a fraction of the money it needs. As a result, Afghan banks’ coffers are unable to be easily replenished, resulting in ATMs running out of cash and the imposition of withdrawal limitations.

The developing situation has created a significant disturbance and threatens Afghanistan’s critical winter wheat season, which is about to start.

An IMF spokesperson stated, “As is always the case, the IMF is guided by the views of the international community. There is currently a lack of clarity within the international community regarding recognition of a government in Afghanistan, as a consequence of which the country cannot access SDRs [special drawing rights] or other IMF resources.”

The developing situation has created a significant disturbance and threatens Afghanistan’s critical winter wheat season, which is about to start, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) warned of a major fundraising conference.

The complex set of sanctions imposed on the Taliban by the United Nations Security Council, as well as sanctions imposed by the United States, the European Union, and many other governments, should be reviewed to ensure that they do not obstruct the delivery of humanitarian aid by nongovernmental organizations.

Uncertainty looms about the type of administration the Taliban will form; it’s a crucial concern for both international actors holding Afghanistan’s reserves and humanitarian organizations halting programs and financing. However, at what cost will withholding the Taliban monetary assets negatively impact Afghan food scarcity and a growing humanitarian crisis?

As Afghanistan enters a new era with the Taliban’s takeover in August 2021, its potential political preferences in internal and international affairs have raised concerns. The Taliban’s rule strengthens Saudi Arabia’s position over Afghanistan. However, Iran is also trying to prevent the formation of a regime that doesn’t serve its interests in the future. The two states have always tried to establish a foothold on each other’s borders. Saudi Arabia attaches great importance to Afghanistan as it encouraged jihad in the 1980s and supported the Taliban in the 1990s. Likewise, Yemen is important to Iran, which has been supporting the Houthis in the last decades.

When the Taliban took control of Afghanistan in the 1990s, some were fearing that Saudi Arabia would spread its religious model not only in Afghanistan but also in newly independent Central Asian countries. The danger increased when the Taliban killed Iranian diplomats in 1998. In response, Iran deployed its forces on the eastern borders and conducted military drills.

Iran, which had just come out of a devastating Saudi-backed war with Iraq, called the killing of its diplomats a Saudi plot to plunge Iran into another war. Iran, therefore, didn’t want to fall into the trap that Saudi Arabia and others had planned for it. Instead of a direct military intervention in Afghanistan, Iran decided to deal with the Taliban threat by supporting the Northern Alliance. This policy continued until 2001 and with the 9/11 terror attacks and the United States’ invasion of Afghanistan, the Taliban threat for Iran was eliminated, and Iran’s allies gained political power in post-Taliban Afghanistan.

However, the Taliban was replaced by American forces, which posed another, perhaps bigger, threat to Iran. Thereafter, Iran’s strategy was to expel the United States from its eastern borders, namely Afghanistan, and from its western borders, namely Iraq. Both objectives also intersected with those of the Taliban.

Iran and Saudi Arabia came into conflict in the post-Taliban Afghanistan. Initially, Iran supported the Afghan central government and Saudi Arabia in retaliation supported the Taliban in order to attack and weaken the Afghan central government, which then had close ties with Iran. However, due to the increasing threat from the United States, Iran abandoned its ideological differences and approached the Taliban to push away the U.S. forces. This was a challenging move by Iran and Saudi Arabia constantly tried to push the Taliban away from Iran’s influence.

The rise of ISIS-K pushed Iran more towards the Taliban. Iran’s purpose was to use the Taliban to suppress ISIS-K on its eastern borders.

The rise of ISIS-K pushed Iran more towards the Taliban. Iran’s purpose was to use the Taliban to suppress ISIS-K on its eastern borders. The Taliban is regarded by Iran as a local force that could manage insecurity in Afghanistan with the least consequences for Iran. In addition, Iranian officials may have thought that this rapprochement with the Taliban could balance Saudi Arabia’s influence in Afghanistan as Saudi Arabia and the Taliban share common interests.

The Taliban’s recent takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021 is different than in 1996. Some argue that Saudi Arabia will dominate Afghan domestic and foreign policy soon; however, a look at the past ten years and the recent events after the Taliban’s victory, show that Iran and the Taliban will not be on bad terms and the Taliban leaders seem to take Iran’s expectations into consideration as well.

Iran’s support for the Taliban is no secret. More interestingly, both Iran and Saudi Arabia support the new Afghan government, and expect the Taliban to establish stability following 40 years of devastating conflicts and war. Despite the Taliban’s takeover providing an opportunity for cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the rivalry between the two depends on their ideological rivalry in the region, which seems to have softened recently but which will continue nonetheless in the short term? Competition between the two in Afghanistan may continue in social, cultural, and economic fields. Afghanistan is closely linked to Iran in all three respects, while Saudi Arabia is mostly investing in the establishment or funding of religious schools.

Given the dire financial need of the Taliban, Saudi Arabia may use financial resources to exercise a certain influence over the group. In contrast, some claim that Iran could be a source of inspiration for the Taliban and the mutual enmity towards the U.S. could be a basis for a rapprochement between the two.

Controlling the influx of Afghan migrants to Iran, establishing political stability, continuing trade with Iran, and suppressing terrorist groups such as ISIS-K are the most important expectations that Iran has from the Taliban. For Saudi Arabia, however, having a regime in Afghanistan that could isolate Iran is a strategic goal, which seems difficult given the new geopolitical realities in the region and Afghanistan.

The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and its reluctant policy to support or launch a new war in the region, and especially the Iran-Taliban close relations make it hard for Saudi Arabia to achieve its goal. The Taliban need to be internationally recognized which highlights Iran’s role.

Today, despite the two countries’ deep distrust of each other, Tehran and Riyadh have common interests in establishing peace in the region and especially in Afghanistan. The U.S. withdrawal is the starting point for both countries, as there was no strong supporter of Saudi Arabia than the U.S. in Afghanistan. At the same time, there is currently no U.S. threat against Tehran in Afghanistan.

Establishing relative stability in Afghanistan during the Taliban era is Tehran’s favourite option. The Taliban need Iran’s and Saudi Arabia’s recognition and their assistance in reconstructing Afghanistan’s devastated infrastructure. Ultimately, it seems that the Taliban will benefit from the Saudi-Iranian rivalry in their country.

In the midst of the sudden political changes in Afghanistan, the disastrous withdrawal of the U.S. forces, the rapid Taliban takeover, and the narrow escape of the American-installed Afghan government, Pakistan sees itself once again trying to carefully handle the mess left by the Americans on its western border. International pressure is mounting, time is short, the internal situation of Afghanistan is fragile, and Pakistan is once again at crossroads to tackle the American leftovers.

“So, we then left Pakistan. We said okay, fine, you deal with the Stingers that we left all over your country. You deal with the mines that are along the border. And, by the way, we don’t want to have anything to do with you, in fact we’re sanctioning you. So, we stopped dealing with the Pakistani military and with ISI and we now are making up for a lot of lost time.”

These were the words uttered by then U.S. secretary of state Hillary Clinton, in the congressional hearings of April 2009, on the Obama administration’s foreign policy. She categorically highlighted that the U.S. had a share in plaguing Pakistan. She criticized the role of the U.S. in the post-Soviet scenario for leaving Afghanistan prematurely and never looking back. Importantly, the U.S. not only left the mess in Afghanistan for Pakistan, but to add salt to injury, Pakistan was sanctioned by the United States.

Today’s Pakistan once again is being blamed by the U.S. for American failures in the region. The Pakistani military and intelligence are being targeted by the West. The U.S., as always, is trying to look for a scapegoat in Pakistan. The Biden administration is not only criticizing Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan but U.S. senators have introduced a bill seeking to probe its alleged role in the Taliban’s takeover in Afghanistan.

Today’s Pakistan once again is being blamed by the U.S. for American failures in the region.

One wonders if the U.S. will ever learn from its past mistakes. Will it ever put a full stop to its hegemonic stance towards the countries that do not accept its influence while designing their foreign policy?

It’s time for the U.S. to realize that scapegoating and pressurizing Pakistan will not work at all in its favor. It will neither help Pakistan nor will it bring any good to the people of Afghanistan. It is not the time for diplomatic confrontation.  Rather, it’s time for seeking long-lasting resolutions by extending a helping hand to the ultimate shareholders of Afghanistan, the Taliban. As highlighted by Pakistani Premier Imran Khan in his recent address to the United Nations General Assembly, the world must come forward to help Afghanistan before it turns into a humanitarian crisis.

If the U.S. is genuinely concerned about the well-being of the people of Afghanistan, then it must shun the idea of enjoying unipolar superpower stature in the world. The U.S. needs to turn itself into a cooperative state that believes in mutual benefits based on bilateral relations, rather than acting as an agitating and aggressive state towards other nations.

Sadly, the Americans did not pay any heed to Pakistan’s concerns and Pakistan had to fight against terrorism on its own. Pakistan paid an enormous cost in a war on terror that initially had nothing to do with Pakistan. Nearly 80,000 people lost their lives, with almost the same number losing limbs, and more than $200 billion was lost owing to the fragility of the western front.

One might question how is India to be blamed for terrorism in Pakistan for the last 18 years? Well, interestingly enough, the current national security advisor to the Indian premier, Ajit Doval, while delivering a lecture at SASTRA University in 2014, highlighted the “defensive offense” doctrine that India followed to engage with Pakistan. The doctrine revolves around Indian tactics to engage with Pakistan on two fronts. Doval boasted about how India exploited Pakistan’s fault lines to invest in proxies against Pakistan from its western front.

Pakistan continued showing its concerns related to India about issues such as India financing and facilitating terrorism in the country through supporting the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA). Pakistan captured an in-service commander of the Indian Navy, Kulbhushan Jhadev, from Balochistan. Hindu by faith, commander Jhadev held a passport with the Muslim name “Hussein Mubarak Patel” and clandestinely entered Pakistan via the Pakistani-Iranian border. The case is still sub judice in the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

India believes that Pakistan’s military has always focused on its eastern front with India. To engage Pakistan through an Afghanistan ruled by an anti-Pakistan regime was the most suitable solution for India as it would force Pakistan to split its military’s strategic focus. As a nation, Pakistan fought valiantly and tirelessly against the Indian “defensive offense.”

Currently, Pakistan’s supreme focus is on the sustainability of the Taliban setup in Kabul knowing that the Taliban, time and again, have stated that they will never allow their land to be used against any of their immediate neighbors. Pakistan not only wants sustainable peace in Afghanistan, but to ensure that Afghanistan gains momentum economically. It is an uncontested fact that Afghanistan will be self-reliant in securing itself under the rule of the Taliban, but whether they can ensure the country’s economic security is debatable.

Linking the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to Afghanistan and eventually to the Central Asian Republics (CARs) from Pakistan is the only viable solution to the clouds hanging over economic security in Afghanistan. Only an economically active and self-reliant Afghanistan under the Taliban can ensure regional peace.

Any political change in Afghanistan can trigger broader geopolitical transformations in south Central and West Asia. Thus, the Taliban’s return in Afghanistan has disturbed many geopolitical calculations. Iran had played a vital role in overthrowing the Taliban in 2001 by sharing key intelligence input with the United States and showing its full support for the Northern Alliance, the main group opposing the Taliban. However, Iran is now facing a serious dilemma.

In the past, Iran competed with Pakistan by providing support to the Taliban’s opponents in Afghanistan during the 1990s. In particular, the Iranian regime supported the Shia Muslim minority’s participation of the larger anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. Iranian assistance was the bedrock of the Northern Alliance’s resistance to the Taliban. Other nations like Russia, India, and Turkey also joined Iran in backing the alliance.

The visit of Faiz Hameed, the chief of Pakistan’s ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence), to Kabul to help finalize the composition of the interim government setup under the Taliban was not taken lightly by Iran. Iran’s foreign ministry statement criticizing Pakistan and the anti-Pakistan protests that followed in Tehran indicate that the nascent Taliban-Iran bonhomie, which was generated after Tehran recently participated in some conciliatory negotiations with the Taliban, is not going to last long.

Iran’s Discomfiture with Pakistan 

When the Taliban were busy taking control of the last Northern Alliance stronghold, the Panjshir Valley, the Iranian regime’s mouthpiece Tehran Times cited a United States Central Command (CENTCOM) source, which told FOX news that the Pakistan military was assisting the Taliban offensive in Panjshir. The report said that Pakistani assistance included 27 choppers loaded with Pakistani Special Forces, and that they were backed by Pakistani drones. Interestingly, in 2019, the Iranian Parliament had voted to put CENTCOM on its list of terrorist groups.

Iran’s former conservative president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, in an interview on August 3, 2021 with WION, an Indian news channel, heavily criticized Pakistan. He alleged, “Pakistani officers directly got involved in the war for Panjshir. I have a piece of advice for Pakistan. What happened in Afghanistan will soon expand and engulf Pakistan too. The countries which supported and designed this plot will face the consequences.”

Ahmadinejad called the Taliban’s rise to power in Afghanistan an international anti-human “satanic plot” by a few world powers – referring to the U.S. and the West in general. He further stated that the entire Taliban project is a violation of international law. According to him, the U.S., Russia, China, and Pakistan helped the Taliban. Ahmadinejad’s choice of an Indian media outlet to speak against Pakistan demonstrates Iran’s frustration about not getting a share in post-NATO Afghanistan as it had hoped.

Following this, Turkish, Azerbaijani, and Pakistani militaries launched their first-ever joint exercises in Baku on September 12, 2021. The drills were named “Three Brothers – 2021.” The joint exercises emphasized Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan’s roles in building peace, stability, and development in the Caspian Sea region.

Iran reacted with a sharp criticism and claimed that this would pose a danger to regional stability. In response, Iran held its own military drill on the Azerbaijan border on September 28. Now, Iran has worries that Afghanistan might join the “Three Brothers” in the future.

In fact, most of Iran’s harsh criticism in recent weeks has been directed at Pakistan and not against the Taliban. The selective attacks on Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan signify Iran’s displeasure with Pakistan’s growing profile both in geopolitics and diplomacy resulting from the Taliban takeover in Kabul.

Potential Troubles for Iran

Iran’s support of the overthrowing of the Taliban in Kabul in 2001 was due to its ideological rivalry with the then Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Iran also wanted to ensure that U.S. forces could not operate against it from Afghan soil. Tehran tried its best to help establish a friendly government in Afghanistan and avoided any semblance of a coalition with other regional actors, especially Pakistan and its arch-rival Saudi Arabia.

From 2017 onwards, Iran diverged from its initial anti-Taliban policy and started developing cordial ties with them in order to maintain pressure on the U.S. military forces on Iran’s borders, and to gain leverage against the U.S. forces and deter their efforts to intimidate their country.

It is true that the Taliban seem to have evolved from their first stint in power and their relations with Iran have improved markedly. Iran’s embassy remained functional after the Taliban takeover of Kabul on August 15. Iran is now among the few countries that the Taliban invited to their government inauguration ceremony.

Unlike Iran, the Taliban in Afghanistan have directly defeated the U.S. in an open battle and emerged victorious. Iran’s anti-American rhetoric perhaps lost some of its competitive sheen in the Muslim world. Above all, the gravest challenge to Islamist Iran will be Islamist Afghanistan. A Sunni emirate under the Taliban will posit itself as an ideological rival to the Shia imamate in Iran.

Iran fears that the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan after the stabilization phase will pose a challenge to the politics of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the region. Unlike the previous Kabul regime, the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate will not hesitate to criticize Iran’s regional policies.

The Chabahar Port in Iran, in which India had made considerable investments, will no longer be an alternative seaport to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port, built and controlled by the Chinese, as it was anticipated by Iranians some years ago. It was supposed to provide passage to Afghanistan by bypassing Pakistan. However, the current situation in Afghanistan has changed the game. The Taliban leadership seems more interested in utilizing the infrastructure built under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) projects in western Pakistan to link up the Afghan infrastructure network with the CPEC. This decision will definitely not sit well with the Iranians.

The Taliban have openly announced their preference for the CPEC extension to Afghanistan, which is both economically and logistically better from Afghanistan’s point of view. Kabul is very close to Peshawar, Kandahar is very close to Quetta. Herat remains the only major Afghan city close to Iran.

Iran’s endorsement of the Taliban, which started with the 2015 visit of a Taliban delegation, actually emanated from Tehran’s political compulsion as none of Afghanistan’s neighbors was willing to antagonize the Taliban by supporting the militias of the erstwhile Northern Alliance. Iran’s outcry started only after the fall of the Panjshir Valley.

The Taliban will make sure that powerful warlords will have no political future in Afghanistan. With this, Iran will lose its proxies on the ground, especially the Shia Hazara militia in Afghanistan. Unlike the period of the previous Kabul regime, when patrons of Afghan warlords enjoyed a huge sway in the government, the Taliban will not allow warlordism and will most certainly disarm all the militias. There is also the question of the existence of the Iranian-backed Fatemiyoun Brigade before the Tehran rulers. The Fatemiyoun Brigade mainly comprises the Hazara Shia minority of Afghanistan. Hazaras currently make up around 10% of Afghanistan’s total population of 38 million. It is highly possible that the Taliban will not tolerate the recruitment of their Hazara population for Iran’s proxy wars.

Although there is no immediate and direct threat to Iran from the Taliban rule in Afghanistan, the Taliban takeover of Kabul has in fact strengthened Pakistan’s geopolitical ascendance, which in turn will pose a direct challenge to Iran’s influence in many adjoining regions. New Afghanistan will tilt the balance of power in Pakistan’s favor and it will deepen Iran’s already tumultuous relations with Pakistan.

Sources reported that Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar was badly wounded in gunfire in Kabul over a disagreement among the Taliban leaders on how to resolve the Panjshir situation and government structure. The Taliban later denied that Baradar was wounded. Nevertheless, a source asserted that the Deputy Afghan PM Mullah Baradar is upset with the current face of the Taliban government.

The Taliban formed the government and appointed ministers after 20 years of fighting the U.S. and the Afghan government. Last month, the Taliban swiftly reached the capital and took over 33 of the 34 provinces in the country without major impediment. However, despite a massive aerial and ground encroachment on Panjshir, the resistance against the Taliban is still alive.

The Taliban are going through a transition from guerilla fighting to governance, bringing order to a multiethnic nation, and adjusting within the contemporary world. War and governance are two distinct issues. Now that the Taliban must govern, they face numerous challenges.

Governance: No single institution is functional

The Taliban had vowed that the group would form an inclusive government where all political parties, ethnicities, and classes see themselves in the government. Nevertheless, last week, they announced their first cabinet where only their leaders and commanders are appointed. The announcement faced massive criticism since it did not include a single woman or any Hazara ethnics, whereas Afghanistan is home to millions of Hazaras.

The appointed ministers lack governmental experience, and no minister has a PhD, master’s, or undergraduate degree, while all the cabinet members, including its chief minister, are religious scholars. In addition, many of the skillful, well-educated, and experienced Afghans have already left Afghanistan and those who remain are striving to get out.

Human rights and the Taliban

The Taliban’s fastidious form of Islam has been met with deep concerns by human rights organizations and movements across the globe. In a democratic and liberal society, the Taliban apply an interpretation of Sharia law where music is banned, and women’s rights to education and work are limited or completely halted. This decision has brought the group face-to-face with criticism by the international community.

For the past 20 years, women enjoyed access to education and work – rights that they are now denied to them by the Taliban. Concurrently, Afghans have been posting on social media videos of Taliban flogging women on the streets and searching houses for affiliates of the previous government.

Such actions have led to women’s demonstrations in Kabul and a massive protest in Kandahar against the Taliban. The social media campaigns and attacks on them have discomforted the Taliban to the extent that the group couldn’t fully comprehend and mark its victory. Afghans and their sympathizers across the globe have been actively engaged in publicizing the Taliban’s actions. Relying on social media, the global media formulate news and update policy-makers across the world about the Taliban. The Taliban are monitored by ordinary Afghans’ cell phones, who record their moves and in one click inform the entire world.

The Taliban and the economy

The United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres warned that Afghanistan faces a dramatic humanitarian crisis. The warning comes after international aid to Afghanistan has dried up, businesses are closed, investments have fled, unemployment has reached an all-time high, and poverty is rife. The protracted conflict and drought have exacerbated the humanitarian catastrophe. The UN reports that in 2021 alone, over half a million people have been internally displaced in Afghanistan.

The Taliban now manage revenue sources such as customs; however, in the absence of trades, investments, and businesses, the customs do not generate enough revenue. In fact, they do not even cover the daily expenses of the Taliban’s sustenance and fuel expenses. The Taliban also do not have access to the $9.5 billion in assets belonging to Afghanistan’s central bank, which have been frozen by the United States. The country’s economic situation and the humanitarian catastrophe are causing genuine hardship to the Taliban.

Security challenges: National Resistance Front and ISIS-K  

In Afghanistan, Taliban fighters were not the only security threat to the country. Among others, the fighters of the Islamic State in Khorasan (ISIS-K) have conducted numerous attacks and have fought hard against the Taliban. After the fall of Kabul, ISIS-K published a commentary where the group accused the Taliban of betraying Jihadists with the peace agreement with the U.S., and the group vowed to continue fighting the Taliban. Since the Taliban took over the capital, ISIS-K has carried out deadly attacks.

Among others, the fighters of the Islamic State in Khorasan (ISIS-K) have conducted numerous attacks and have fought hard against the Taliban.

Last month, ISIS-K fired rockets in Kabul followed by a statement which read, “By the grace of God Almighty, the soldiers of the Caliphate targeted Kabul International Airport with six Katyusha rockets.” In another incident, the group carried out twin suicide attacks against a crowd outside of the Kabul airport killing 85 people, including 13 Americans. It is estimated that the group has 4,000 to 5,000 fighters in Afghanistan. In an interview with CNN, Abdul Munir, a commander of the so-called Islamic State stated that he leads 600 fighters, including Indians, Pakistanis, and Central Asians. He added, “When the foreigners and the people of the world leave Afghanistan, we can resume our operations.”

Apart from the so-called Islamic State, the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan (NRF) is another headache for the Taliban. Even though the Taliban fighters have seized the center of Panjshir, the NRF fights from the mountains of Panjshir. The majority of the commanders of the Northern Alliance (officially the United Islamic National Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan), including Marshal Abdul Rashid Dostum, Atta Mohammad Noor, and Hazara leaders have fought heavily against the Taliban.

Ismail Khan, another prominent commander in the  Panjshir resistance, asserted that the Taliban’s rule will not last and that Panjshir resistance is expanding. These commanders have opposed the Taliban in Afghanistan. Should they begin a resistance, they would put the Taliban’s government in hardship.

International isolation and the Taliban

The previous Afghan government was recognized worldwide; however, despite the Taliban having appointed their cabinet and chief minister, no country is amenable to recognizing their government – even the countries that have supported them in fighting the U.S. Despite Pakistan’s support for the Taliban, the country has not recognized their government. Iran and Russia, once amicable to the Taliban, now move in a different direction. Tehran slammed attacks on Panjshir Valley and urged the Taliban to honor commitments. It also slammed Pakistan’s aerial attacks on Panjshir and said it will probe into the attacks.

On the other side, Moscow has sent its military to Tajikistan to block potential threats from Afghanistan. The Taliban also face international isolation. The European Union had already threatened the Taliban with isolation if they seize power. In addition, Germany’s foreign minister stated, “A transitional government that does not include other groups is not the signal for more international cooperation and stability in the country.”

The E.U.’s top diplomat, Josep Borrell, said in a statement that the Taliban would face international isolation. NATO, the UN, and Britain warned that the Taliban will be isolated should they continue to take power by force, and that the international community will not recognize the group. Importantly, the president of the United Nations Security Council for September warned that the Taliban must sever ties with all international terrorist organizations or continue to face sanctions and isolation.

Should the Taliban not dramatically change their ideas and actions, the group might face extinction as it cannot govern a complicated country in a complicated region. To govern, the Taliban need legitimacy from the people, international recognition, and monetary resources. Meanwhile, they halted political dialogue and encroached on the National Resistance Front in Panjshir. Yet, a good lesson to be learned in Afghanistan today is that when the Taliban were toppled in 2001, they soon resurfaced in Bahramcha in the Helmand Province.

Should the Taliban not genuinely engage with the world and Afghan parties on the issues of concern, there are risks of facing international sanctions and of the emergence of national confrontations.

Despite being a fundamentalist Shia Islamist power, some may have been surprised to see Iran hosting the Sunni Islamist Taliban in Tehran and congratulating them over their victory in their 20-year war against the United States that finally saw Kabul back in the hands of the insurgents and the Joe Biden administration withdrawing all forces not long after. But it is precisely the Taliban’s military successes and their ability to inflict humiliating defeats against the U.S. that has Iran so overjoyed, rather than any particular affinity for the Taliban themselves.

Iran played a role in the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan

It is easy to forget considering Iran’s incessant rhetoric on being the spearhead of the so-called “Axis of Resistance”, but Tehran played a significant role in facilitating the invasions of both Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003.

Far from being warm friends, Iran once considered going to war against Afghanistan in 1998 after the Taliban massacred not only hundreds of Hazara Shia but also managed to kill eight Iranian diplomats and a journalist at Tehran’s consulate in Mazar-i Sharif. Seeing an opportunity to avenge themselves against the Taliban, the Iranian regime provided military and intelligence support to the George W. Bush administration, helped the United States to topple the Taliban and force them out of power.

The Iranian regime then spent the better part of the first decade of the War on Terror agitating against drawing any distinction between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, insisting that the two ought to be considered inseparable from one another and deserving of the same powerful military response from Western powers.

However, once Tehran’s ambitions for nuclear weapons came under the spotlight and international pressure began to mount against them led by Washington, they suddenly changed their tune. Iran began to host Taliban fighters and commanders in Iran, extended some weapons and other supplies to the militants, and even tried to insert themselves into the Afghan peace process brokered by the Donald Trump administration in 2019.

It suddenly became in Iran’s interests to support the Taliban if only to ensure that the Afghan group could inflict continued losses against the United States and to apply pressure against Washington in the nuclear talks that were first started by Barack Obama, abandoned by Trump, and now being courted once again by Obama’s protégé and ideological successor Joe Biden. By supporting the Taliban’s military activities and providing shelter to its leadership and commanders, Iran was using the group to humiliate the Americans in Afghanistan and weaken their resolve against Tehran.

Up until that point in time, however, it is clear that Iran has never harbored any real love for the Taliban and has in fact fought them and opposed them since the 1990s.

The Iran-Taliban honeymoon didn’t last

It is perhaps unsurprising that a fundamentalist Shia regime would view the existence of a fundamentalist Sunni regime right across its border as being anathema to its national security interests. After all, and until very recently where they showed some softening, the Taliban have shown a very low tolerance to Shia minorities in Afghanistan and have perpetrated massacres against them.

Additionally, there is an ethnic element to Persian Iran’s dislike of the Taliban. While they do recruit from across the ethnic divide, the Taliban are predominantly Pashtuns and they have disputes with Persian-speaking nationalist groups, particularly the Tajiks of the Panjshir valley and surrounding areas. Only recently, Ahmad Massoud, the son of famed Soviet-era Afghan militia commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, launched a rebellion against Taliban rule with the assistance and urging of the Tajik former Vice President Amrullah Saleh.

That rebellion was swiftly crushed after offers by the Taliban to power share were rebuffed by Massoud and Saleh, but while the operation was still underway, Iran repeatedly made announcements that the Taliban’s campaign breached international law (without explaining how) and that the Taliban conquest of Panjshir was to be “condemned in the strongest terms”. Former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad went so far as to implicate Pakistan in the Panjshir campaign and accused the U.S. of concocting a “Satanic plot” by surrendering power to the Taliban.

While it is still too early to get a precise read on what Iran intends for the Taliban, it knows that the new Afghan government is in dire need of international aid and recognition and so it may try to leverage this weakness against them. However, Iran’s allies in Panjshir have been all but wiped out, and its Shia Hazara militia proxies in the Fatemiyoun Brigades who served with such bloody distinction in killing Syrian civilians are also in no position to fight Afghanistan’s new rulers – at least not yet.

Tehran will therefore likely try to patiently wait for an opportunity to undermine the Taliban again, precisely as they did when they facilitated the U.S. invasion in 2001. They will agitate against them diplomatically by encouraging other states not to engage with them, and will attempt to foment domestic discord by pushing Afghanistan’s Shia minority to rebel while simultaneously offer political and military support to Persian-speaking ethnic minorities.

Obviously, the Taliban are not going to forget who the Iranians fundamentally are and their approach toward them since 1996. The marriage of convenience in order to eliminate the U.S.-led Western presence in Afghanistan is now at its end, and the honeymoon period did not last long at all. The Taliban will now be wary of Iranian subterfuge and will crackdown vigorously against any plot against them, perhaps forming a flashpoint for future conflict between the neighbouring countries.

Prior to the terror attacks outside Kabul Airport that took the lives of 170 people and at least 200 wounded which included Afghan civilians and American military personnel. Western countries were warned of an impending strike. The attack on August 26, 2021, did not surprise the Pentagon, and neither did their perpetrators. The Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) was ready to inflict devastation by taking advantage of the chaos at Kabul Airport.

The U.K, New Zealand and the U.S. were warned; as stated by a senior U.K. defense official James Heappey, who told the media prior to the bombing of an ‘imminent, lethal attack’. The U.S. embassy in Kabul sent a warning on August 28th warning US citizens in Afghanistan at many airport gates to “leave immediately” due to security risks. President Joe Biden has highlighted the possibility of an assault many times during the last week, using it as justification for not delaying the August 31 deadline for military withdrawals.

In response, President Joe Biden vowed to track down the perpetrators and instructed his military chiefs to devise counter-plans against the terror group and later on stated “And to ISIS-K: We are not done with you yet”.

ISIS-K and their objectives

The Islamic State Khorasan Province, also known as Daesh Khorasan, ISIS-K, ISKP, is an official affiliate of the so-called Islamic State in Afghanistan, as acknowledged by its central leadership in Iraq and Syria. ISIS-K was established in January of 2015. It was able to establish territorial authority in numerous rural areas in north and northeast Afghanistan in a short period of time, and it started a deadly campaign across Afghanistan and Pakistan.

ISIS-K perpetrated assaults against minority groups, public spaces and institutions, and government offices in major cities in Afghanistan and Pakistan in its first three years. Emboldened by America’s withdrawal, ISIS-K initially appeared in 2015, a year after ISIS — originally a branch of Al-Qaeda that developed into a competitor — captured tracts of territory across Iraq and Syria and declared a caliphate.

Both ISIS-K and the Taliban are religious fundamentalist groups who aim to govern via an authoritarian system based on their radical interpretation of the Sharia law.

Both ISIS-K and the Taliban are religious fundamentalist groups who aim to govern via an authoritarian system based on their radical interpretation of the Sharia law. Though both employ violence to maintain their regimes, the distinctions between the extreme organizations – as well as others like Al-Qaeda – basically boil down to significant strategic disparities, ISIS-K’s goal is to establish a caliphate in Central and South Asia; outside the borders of Afghanistan whereas the Taliban’s focus is establishing an Islamic governing state within Afghanistan.

The ideological interpretation and enforcement of the Sharia law is one of the vital differences between the most important Daesh and the Taliban. One element is how women are treated in their interpretation of Islamic law. Reuters Institute of Journalism published a lengthy paper on this topic stating that “ISIS heavily sexualizes females as an object… whereas Taliban portray women in one consistent role.”

What happens next?

International experts are afraid that the humanitarian situation will worsen in the coming weeks and months, despite the fact that comprehensive evaluations will take time and require much enhanced humanitarian access. In the first half of 2021, civilian deaths and injuries in Afghanistan hit new highs, with a particularly significant spike in killings and injuries since May 2021, when international military forces began to depart, and combat increased following the Taliban onslaught.

On July 26th, UNAMA (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan), released a new study, in which it predicts that unless violence is significantly reduced, Afghanistan will see the greatest number of documented civilian fatalities in a single year since UNAMA records began in 2021.

The research warns that if the rising violence is not stopped, an unprecedented number of Afghan civilians will die or be wounded this year. According to the head of UNAMA, Deborah Lyons, “The data shows a very disturbing trend, particularly since early May, of ever-increasing numbers of Afghan civilians being killed and injured due to the expanding conflict”.

This will most certainly continue to spread terror and confusion, delay the withdrawal process, and demonstrate that the Taliban are unable to provide security to the populace in the short term. If the organization can reestablish some kind of territorial control in the long run and recruit additional fighters, it is likely to make a resurgence and represent a danger on a national, regional, and worldwide scale and the attack on Kabul Airport would be small in comparison to what they’re capable of doing, and will further exacerbate a Central Asian refugee crisis.

If the sum of New Delhi’s fears is a Taliban take-over of Afghan government in Kabul, then those anxieties received a further jolt on 26 July when Pakistan reopened a major southwestern border crossing that is currently under Taliban control on the Afghan side.

Islamabad has said the border crossing will be used only for the transportation of food and other goods, the Afghan government has accused Pakistan of backing the Taliban, an accusation that invites the Indian government to imagine future teams of violent jihadists flowing across Pakistan into India and Kashmir.

New Delhi is also acutely aware that a destabilized Afghanistan, or one controlled by the Taliban is totally fine with Islamabad, particularly because friendly relations between the Indian government and Kabul is the sum of Islamabad’s fears. What Pakistan fears most is being wedged between two hostile states – India on its eastern border and an Indian friendly Kabul on its western frontier.

It’s for these reasons, Pakistan has a close or cordial relationship with the Taliban, and India with the Afghan government, thus posing a strategic problem for New Delhi as the militants make their seemingly unstoppable march towards the Afghan capital.

New Delhi is now planning for the inevitable by reaching out to the Taliban, an effort made complicated by the military support it has long provided the Afghan government in its war against the militants. India has already invested $3 billion in aid and reconstruction activities in the country, including providing Kabul with combat helicopters, artillery platforms, small arms, surveillance and targeting technologies and ammunition.

Kabul has been pleading with New Delhi for more military assistance and sent Afghan Army chief Wali Mohammad Ahmadzai to India on 27 July for a 3-day series of meetings with his Indian military counterparts, but requests for more weapons and Indian soldiers have fallen largely upon deaf ears because the Taliban appear set for total victory.

India’s former ambassador to the United Nations, Syed Akbaruddin, said in a recent interview that there’s no chance of India sending troops to Afghanistan, saying, “We have challenges on our own frontiers too. In the current situation I don’t think there is any political or public acceptance for it.”

Instead, New Delhi is “scrambling” to open diplomatic channels with the Taliban, with India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar signalling his country’s interest in engaging with the Taliban during a video conference held in September of last year.

But to date, this effort has also fallen upon deaf ears because of India’s hitherto military partnership with the Afghan government.

Suhail Shaheen, a spokesperson for the Taliban, accused India of “siding with the government installed by foreigners” during a recent interview with Foreign Policy.

“They are not with us. If they stick to their policy of supporting a government imposed on Afghans, then maybe they should be worried. That is a wrong policy which will not serve them,” he said, before adding, “We have reports from our commanders that India is providing weapons to the other side.”

“How is it possible that they want to talk to the Taliban but practically they are providing weapons, drones, everything to Kabul? This is contradictory.”

This – a starkly contrasting tone to the one struck five years ago, when a former Taliban spokesperson said the group had “no problem with Hindustan…In fact, we want to send them a message of peace and friendship.”

But now that the Taliban anticipates victory, it sees little or no advantage in forging close diplomatic ties with New Delhi, especially given neighboring Pakistan, China and Iran, along with Russia have each expressed a willingness to accept and normalize a future Taliban controlled Afghan government.

From the Taliban’s perspective, it’s fledgling relationship with China offers the most upside, given the Asian country’s status as a regional and global superpower, and its desire to include Afghanistan as part of its Belt and Road Initiative, having expressed interest to construct a motorway connecting Kabul to Peshawar, Pakistan, as reported by the Daily Beast.

That said, any future relationship China, Pakistan, Russia, and Iran strikes with the Taliban will not come without unwanted complications and blowback, a reality that gives India room to pause and breathe, particularly because each of these countries has ongoing security issues with what they deem to be Islamic extremists and separatists within their own borders.

“This explains why not only India but several Asian countries consider the return of Taliban as a security headache despite Pakistan and China reportedly looking for an advantageous role in Afghanistan, the strategic heart of Asia,” observes India Today columnist Prabhash K. Dutta.

India will take heart from the fact that the Taliban is likely to incite fear and a sense of insecurity among non-Pashtun ethnic communities along the Afghan-Pak border, which might spark conflict within Pakistan’s borders.

India will also see value in persisting with backchannel diplomacy with the Taliban, knowing the militant group will need significant outside help to reconstruct the country in a post-civil war environment. The Taliban will also see upside in establishing a security guarantee with India to allow it space to focus almost exclusively on domestic concerns.

But for now, New Delhi is adopting a multilateral approach to unfolding events in Afghanistan by calling for peaceful reconciliation between the Afghan government and the Taliban, while at the same time urging its geopolitical allies, including the United States, to avoid presuming the insurgent group has secured victory, and to not rush into “normalizing” a Taliban takeover of the country.

Q. In your book, Reconciliation and Social Healing in Afghanistan (2017), you shed light on the different attempts of peace-building in Afghanistan, particularly during the 1980s and the 1990s. What was different back then and why does it matter today?

The National Reconciliation Policy (NRP) was adopted in 1986 under the leadership of my father, Najibullah, and his government. At the international level, as the Cold War reached its peak, the NRP started gaining momentum in light of Perestroika. The new leadership in the Soviet Union was keen to end their “bleeding wound,” which is how they referred to their war in Afghanistan. The Soviet leadership under Mikhail Gorbachev was determined to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan and found a natural ally in the cadres of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), who supported the idea of an independent, free, neutral, and sovereign Afghanistan.

Hence, the NRP as an evolving process was composed of international instruments such as the Geneva Accords in 1988 and the UN Five-Point Peace Plan in 1991. Recognizing the role of Pakistan in backing the Mujahideen groups, the Geneva Accords ensured an agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and Pakistan with the Soviet Union and the United States as guarantors, which is still binding.

Q. Regarding past and present approaches to peace in Afghanistan, are there any major challenges that have persisted to this day?

The conflict in Afghanistan has been ongoing for more than 40 years. The division lines are no longer only ideological like they were during the Cold War, they are also ethnic and religious. The illegal trade of arms, drugs, and precious stones has also created strong and deep-rooted networks of criminals that also feed the conflict.

While the Geneva Accords guaranteed the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, they failed to achieve their main purpose of non-intervention and non-interference between two neighbors. Additionally, the agreement could not prevent the continuation of arms supplies from regional countries such as Saudi Arabia to the Mujahideen despite the two superpowers agreeing not to supply arms to their benefactors.

Q. What were the major loopholes in previous approaches to peace in Afghanistan in terms of their design and implementation?

The main loopholes of the peace process of the 1980s-1990s include: the lack of consensus amongst regional countries and the main conflict stakeholders in Afghanistan, the continued supply of arms to different parties in the absence of an international legal mechanism to oversee disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and the end of the war despite the government’s call and eagerness for such a mechanism to be established, the lack of accountable mechanisms on the part of the guarantors, the lack of independent, neutral monitoring mechanisms overseeing and documenting the developments and implementation of the accords/peace process, the refusal of the Security Council upon the request of the Afghan government to provide peacekeeping troops for the duration of the interim government until the elections took place and the continuing double games by the Afghan conflict stakeholders vis-à-vis their geopolitical interests.

Q. In this respect, how do you evaluate the continuing peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban in Qatar, Russia, and later in Turkey?

The current peace talks started with a lot of optimism in 2017; however, the process proved to have shortcomings in terms of following through. For example, the two-year process leading to the Doha Agreement excluded the Afghan government from negotiations and reduced its position to a passive observer while legitimizing the Taliban as a political group. The process was not transparent – neither the Afghan government nor the Afghan people know the so-called secret annexes of the Doha Agreement.

The mediator in negotiating peace, i.e., the United States, remains as one of the main conflict stakeholders in Afghanistan. The meeting in Moscow confirmed the fact that the participating countries and the stakeholders from outside and inside Afghanistan did not want the re-establishment of the Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan.

Q. How do you think the perspectives of the Taliban and the Afghan government can be reconciled so as to bring peace to Afghanistan?

The parties need to see the commonalities in their positions and desires for a shared future in their country. Currently, positions of power dominate the discussions and the focus is on who will be the winners or the losers. It is a tit-for-tat moment in which the Taliban want to assert themselves as the winners of the war against the U.S. and the Afghan government.

What is common between the Taliban and the Afghan government is their desire for power; however, it must be explored if their wishes for a ceasefire, disarmament, integration of their forces into the Afghan security forces, truth commission, and other forms of transitional justice can be shared. Unless the two sides show flexibilities in moving away from their explicit and implicit “red-lines”, meaningful engagement ending in a peace agreement will not materialize.

I believe that the U.S. asked Turkey to host the conference not only because Turkey is a NATO member, but also because of its unique position as an Islamic country in the region and its historical friendship with Afghanistan.

In addition, reconciliation between the two sides will not be possible unless the Taliban get out of the influence of Pakistani security establishment. This can only be possible when the fuel for fighting is extinguished by the regional and the global powers providing guarantees for a ceasefire, peacekeeping forces, and no-interference and non-intervention on the part of the regional stakeholders.

Q. How should the international community approach the peace resolutions in Afghanistan?

The way the international community can approach the peace process is to stand by the Afghan democratic institutions and design a multilayered mechanism whereby guarantees must be made including peacekeeping forces for the upcoming years, which will allow the Afghan government to build consensus through democratic means, develop its economy, and give voice to the marginalized.

Islam was, is, and will remain the main religion of Afghanistan, the way Islam is the main religion in Turkey, but Muslim countries can also adopt progressive, democratic visions for their citizens instead of promoting religious extremism or handing power to such extremist religious groups. Afghanistan can find this balance if its current institutions are safeguarded, and international guarantees end the proxy wars.

So far, every conference about the future of Afghanistan that has been held since Bonn 2001 has brought together elites that have negotiated their way to power instead of bringing people-centered issues to the agenda such as transitional justice, a truth commission, the demands of the victims of the war, DDR, the rights of women, and, above all, the sovereignty and unity of Afghanistan as a nation.

Q. You have just highlighted the importance of the efforts to bring a people-centered vision into the existing approaches to peace in Afghanistan. Could you elaborate on this?

In my book, Reconciliation and Social Healing in Afghanistan: A Transrational and Elicitive Analysis towards Transformation, I have analyzed at length how countries that have embarked on a peace process have established countrywide mechanisms to engage with non-governmental organizations, civil society, and people impacted by war at the social, economic, and political levels.

Najibullah’s government had established a successful mechanism called the “National Reconciliation Commission” that was present with offices and staff at the district level. However, they did not have time on their side and were in a constant state of emergency. Today, Afghanistan is in a worse situation because it lacks a nationwide peace structure, mechanism, and narrative. The government’s efforts in this process are neither people-centric, strategic, or inclusive.

Q. What role do you think civil society and women can play in the peace process?

The role women groups and civil society have in Afghanistan is key in bringing sustainable reconciliation because women have been the survivors of the 40 years of Afghan conflict. They often bring issues to the table that are related to their survival and the future of their children, i.e., the future generations of Afghanistan. Therefore, their inclusion on the negotiation table is a necessity for peace.

Since the start of the intra-Afghan negotiations on September 12, 2020, there is a genuine excitement among ordinary Afghans regarding peace talks and a possible reconciliation with the Taliban. The high level of optimism is partly driven by the fact that the U.S. and the international community are supporting the peace negotiations. On matters that allow it, the international community, led by the U.S., has been persuading both sides to offer a compromise to speed up the reconciliation process and end the tragic war in Afghanistan.

It is important to note that the United States’ role as a global power has been crucial in the intra-Afghan negotiations. Previously, the U.S. had no intention to engage directly with the Taliban and similarly the Taliban refused to negotiate with the Kabul government, considering it a puppet regime. The result has been a deadly stalemate and prolongation of a senseless war.

However, all sides of the conflict in Afghanistan are talking now, which is a very encouraging sign for peace and reconciliation in the war-ravaged country. One clear issue is that the Afghan conflict has no military solution. Fortunately, the U.S. has realized this vital fact. Most American generals, politicians, and military analysts agree that the Afghan conflict is in a stalemate with no military solution in sight.

Most American military leaders like retired U.S. Army Brigadier General Don Bolduc agree that it would be hard for the Kabul government to survive in the case of a U.S. pullout. Another positive development is that the Biden administration appears to be eager to find a political solution to the Afghan conflict.

On the other hand, to convince Biden to withdraw U.S. forces fully from Afghanistan and to honor the U.S.-Taliban Doha Agreement, the Taliban’s leadership on February 16, 2021 issued an open letter addressed to the American people. In this letter, the Taliban called on Washington to remain fully committed to the agreement that was reached in Qatar a year ago and paved the way for ongoing intra-Afghan peace talks.

In fact, the intra-Afghan negotiation which started on September 12, 2020 in Doha, Qatar seemed a failed attempt to find an agreed solution to the current Afghan war. In five months of consecutive talks, the Taliban and the Afghan government were not able to move forward with solving the current dilemma of Afghanistan. Here is why.

The intra-Afghan negotiations in Doha were not instigated according to the expected schedule, but even with their late commencement, so far, the Taliban and the Afghan government have only been able to work on the agenda of the dialogue. In addition, the talks were later affected by the results of U.S. elections which were won by the Democrats and which saw Joe Biden elected as the president of the United States.

In fact, both the Afghan government and the Taliban used delaying tactics to wait for the new U.S. foreign policy regarding the Afghan peace process. The United States’ new government announced that the Doha Agreement will be reviewed and reevaluated.

This announcement apparently indicated that the agreement may face challenges. As a result, the Taliban retreated from the talks and visited countries like Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, Pakistan, and even Russia while the delegation of the Afghan government was still in Qatar.

Recently, the Taliban political representatives in Doha have admitted that the monopoly of power is not a solution to the current stalemate. They have been willing to share power with other political groups inside Afghanistan. The Taliban have been in contact with various political groups in Afghanistan to work together on a post-peace plan for Afghanistan.

On March 18, the delegates of Afghan political groups including the Afghan government and the Taliban attended the “Troika” conference in Moscow. The one-day conference was part of larger efforts by regional powers to reach peace between Afghan political groups, the government, and the Taliban.

The conference aimed to attract regional support for the Afghan peace process and make Afghans discuss the current political and military stalemate.

The Taliban once more emphasized that the U.S. should honor the Doha Agreement and withdraw by May 1, 2021; they claimed that if Afghans sit around a table, they can easily find a solution to the current crisis in their country.

On the other hand, in March 2021, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken sent a letter to Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah who leads the High Council for National Reconciliation (HCNR) in which he signaled displeasure at the slow pace of peace negotiations.

Colm Quinn, a foreign policy journalist, rightly reports that the letter indicates three ways for future endeavors to bring peace to Afghanistan: to “move matters more fundamentally and quickly” towards peace, holding ministerial-level talks between representatives from Russia, China, Pakistan, Iran, and India together with the United States to discuss a “unified approach”; a senior-level meeting between the Taliban and the Afghan government hosted by Turkey to take place “in the coming weeks”; and a proposal to implement a 90-day reduction in violence intended to prevent a spring offensive by the Taliban.

A peaceful outcome for Afghanistan can only be reached with a deal between the Taliban and the remaining Afghan political parties including the Afghan government. The upcoming conference in Turkey plays an important role in putting an end to the conflict in Afghanistan and the United States.

Under U.S. President Biden, the Americans will support diplomacy, even if the ultimate goal of the U.S. national security strategy is to ensure that Afghanistan never becomes a safe haven for terrorists to attack the United States. In addition to the aforementioned conditions in Blinken’s leaked letter to Ghani and Abdullah, the Taliban is asking the U.S. to release their remaining prisoners, estimated at 7,000, and remove them off its blacklist.

Similarly, the American public is sick and tired of the Afghan war. Recent public surveys show that most Americans want U.S. forces out of Afghanistan. Among the American veterans, almost 70% favor the U.S. forces withdrawing from Afghanistan.

On the Afghan side, the desire for peace is obvious. Afghans have suffered enormously during the past 20 years of conflict. Almost, all Afghans across the country support peace negotiations with the Taliban.

Fortunately, there is growing regional support for a negotiated settlement. U.S. special envoy to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad’s trip to Pakistan, Russia demonstrated that Pakistan and Moscow and other regional countries will cooperate with the U.S. and Afghans regarding the intra-Afghan peace talks with the Taliban in Turkey. This is a sign of the region’s commitment to assist all Afghan parties to end the senseless war.

More than 60% of Afghanistan’s population is below the age of 30 as per the report by the International Organization for Migration. Thus, the role and responsibility of the Afghan youth within the context of the peace process cannot be ignored. The Afghan youth must be part of the process and must be consulted.

Finally, Afghans have a historical perspective. In their recent history of winning a war and losing peace, they have experienced both the Geneva Accords in 1988 and the Bonn Conference in 2001. Afghans and their representatives in Kabul know that if they don’t participate in the conference on Afghanistan in Turkey, foreign powers will chart their destiny. They know that if they don’t take charge of events, foreign powers (international and regional) will form a government which will not be in their best interests. Together, let’s make 2021 the year of peace for Afghans and Afghanistan.

Mullah Fazal, a leader of the Taliban, and Abdul Rashid Dostum confronted a verbal clash when Mullah Fazal called Dostum a “traitor” and “killer” during the Moscow conference on Afghanistan last week. Russia hosted a two-day summit on Afghan peace with the participation of Afghanistan (Taliban and the government), China, Pakistan, and the United States. Another higher-level international conference is set to occur in Ankara next month to quest a political solution to the Afghan conflict.

Amid these peace talks, Afghans are worried about the future of Afghanistan and their destiny whether the Taliban and the Afghan government peace negotiations would prevail. The concerns also include the retaliations between influential Afghans and former commanders who had fought each other for several years; if they would reconcile or the country would descend to another civil war.

Here are the three scenarios:

Scenario 1: Peace negotiations produce a flawed compromise.

The Taliban’s vowed Islamic system is entrenched as a so-called inclusive government where the Taliban would have more power. The Taliban would filter politicians and some government officials before merging them into an inclusive government. As a result, U.S. troops will withdraw from Afghanistan. Later, the Taliban would rectify the Afghanistan constitution and will bring dramatic amendments to it, which might not be acceptable to some of the castes and political parties. The revision will include adding and exercising fastidious Islamic law placing restrictions on women’s liberty, free media, public speech, and music which is already prohibited under the territory of the Taliban control.

This might create social and political disorder, and in the absence of strong security forces, the country will lead to vast insurrections. Since the Taliban have already vowed they would restore Islamic rule, it would raise the concerns and voices of the national and international human rights organizations over the rights of women and freedom of speech. The international community’s assistance is mostly contingent on human rights.

Thus, the international aid to Afghanistan would dry, and the Taliban (future government of Afghanistan) will not be able to carry the high costs of its military, which is currently $3.75 billion annually, to fight any future resistances against their administration. In addition, the Taliban would not recognize new titles given to their former foes with whom they have fought for several years. This includes deceased commander Ahmad Shah Masoud as the national hero of Afghanistan and Abdul Rashid Dostum as Marshal, who is also the leader of the Uzbeks in Afghanistan. This would create fractions, and resistances would emerge in different corners of Afghanistan.

Scenario 2: Peace talks fail

The peace talks would break when the parties stand on their ego, increase violence in order to gain more on the negotiation table, or run the talks based on pure sharia law. The Taliban will try to take power by force and will engage in a heavy fight with the national security forces across the country. A senior Taliban official told CBC News the Taliban’s options in Afghanistan. He stated, “at the moment the U.S. and Afghan governments have no plan B, only the Taliban have a plan A and B. Our plan A is a peaceful political solution, and Plan B, definitely a military takeover.”

Scenario 3: Peace negotiations prevail.

Taliban and the Afghan government produce satisfactory outcomes of the talks and agree upon forming a government acceptable to all parties. Both parties show flexibility and give sacrifices. For instance, the Taliban agree to equal power-sharing rather than surpassing. In addition, they abstain from implementing Sharia law; however, both sides’ demands are met to a possible extent which would lead to a win-win situation. The deal will also include a perpetual ceasefire that the Afghans yearn for for several years and would move toward strengthening the security forces and building a strong state.

In this scenario, the prospective government would decide about its relationship with the international community and the support of the US and NATO to the future government of Afghanistan. In this scenario, the Taliban and Afghan government deal would not bring nationwide peace. The low-in-rank commanders and militants would not accept the deal unless the Taliban are fully in power and the Sharia law is exercised in Afghanistan. Therefore, these militants would remerge under a different flag and brand with the patrons of some neighbor intelligence.

Last week, in an interview with Vice News, a Taliban commander in Afghanistan warns the US new administration. He asserts “we are totally ready to fight. We do not get tired of Jihad. Injuries do not sadden us. Martyrdom does not pain our hearts. We win if we get martyred. If we are tired, that is a success. We succeed by just being at war. We will enter Kabul in victory. This is our way.” On the other hand, ISIS will remain, and some of the lingering insurgents might join them. It is also possible that some new insurgent groups would form.

The third scenario is obviously ideal since the violence will drastically reduce. Neither the ISIS nor the newly formed insurgents would be strong enough to challenge the new government formed by the Taliban and the current government. Under this scenario, the international community would continue supporting Afghanistan. The new government will further strengthen the security apparatus and would gradually turn the country economically and security-wise stable, self-reliant, and ultimately at a permanent peace.