We have been living in a unipolar world since the end of the Cold War. The U.S. has been the sole major power. However, the structure of the international system has been evolving away from unipolarity due to the disproportional growth rates among states. Accordingly, there are states that speedily head to gain the status of major power. China in particular has increased its military and economic capacity in a short span of time, which is expected to reach the level of development that facilitates it to challenge the primacy of the U.S. So, a bipolar world is rising.

Besides, recently, new regional powers have emerged. Brazil, South Africa, and Turkey, are among those powers. The rise of regional powers, though it does not complicate things much at the global level, puts pressure on the U.S., which, as the only major power, engages in the politics of regions such as the Middle East as an off-shore balancer. Losing the control of a region may undoubtedly have political repercussions on the international level. That may give way to penetration of another extra-regional power or worse lead to the emergence of a regional hegemon, which may happen to rise as a global power in the long run.

Russia’s enhancement of its influence and Turkey’s tendency to act autonomously in the Middle East can be cited in this context. The relative decline of U.S. power in the Middle East has prompted Russia to fill the power vacuum and has urged Turkey to start the process of uplifting its status from a balancer to a hegemon in the region.

Current U.S. foreign policy faces the problem of accommodating China and regional powers like Turkey. So far under the Trump presidency, the U.S. has countered this problem by developing a unilateralist and isolationist foreign policy. This foreign policy basically seeks to contain and overturn the power shift that is now taking place. The Trump administration has taken policies that range from trade war to military tour de force for that purpose. This has been accompanied by the securitization of China and regional power like Turkey in the media.

Nevertheless, especially owing to the domestic political necessities like the upcoming elections for the Senate, the Trump administration has started to take contrary decisions towards these countries. The release of Pastor Andrew Brunson last week, who had been in prison for about two years in Turkey on accusations of aiding the PKK, was reciprocated by signaling to lift some of the economic sanctions that had been imposed on Turkey earlier this year.

Here we should note that Trump seems to plan to use the release of Brunson in his election campaign in order to mobilize the Evangelical and conservative voters to go to the polls and vote for the Republicans for the Senate. Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, has recently expressed that some sanctions could be lifted. This marks that the period of tension, which was grown by mutual retaliatory political moves, seems to enter into a period of relative normalcy.

However, this should not increase the hopes for bilateral relations. As noted above, relations between Turkey and the U.S. will not be normalized unless the U.S. agrees to accommodate Turkey by admitting its new international status, which is an autonomous regional power. Indeed, in the past, relations between the two countries have witnessed several low points, including the Cyprus crisis in the 1970s. Yet, the reason behind these kinds of tensions was not structural. Turkey was merely expecting for its sovereign rights to be expected. It did not seek to change its status and position in international politics.

Today, Turkey seeks to adjust the international order according to recent changes in its domestic politics and the distribution of power in the region. Turkey does not want to keep playing its traditional role of the “outsider” balancer in its vicinity by following the U.S. leadership and national interests. Instead, it desires to establish itself as an autonomous powerhouse in the region. The U.S. has so far responded to Turkey’s new foreign policy attitude by supporting the terrorist organizations such as the PKK and FETO (led by U.S.-based criminal cult leader Fetullah Gulen), which strives to curb the country’s potentials and capabilities.

In response to this attitude, Turkey has continuously given the message that it will not take a step back. For instance, last week President Erdogan signaled a new wave of military operations in the south of the country and stated that Turkey was adamant to cleanse the east of the Euphrates River from all terrorist (PKK) elements. This, no doubt, will be a new test on how “healthy” the relations between Turkey and the U.S. are.

Aiming to eliminate terrorist elements of PKK/YPG, The Operation Olive Branch (OOB) launched by Turkey on January 20 revealed how local, regional and international actors in the Syrian crisis are intertwined. Both Syrian “revisionist actors” and regional actors, trying to maintain or maximize their gains along with minimizing damage, openly voiced their discomfort regarding Turkey’s novel “boots on the ground” strategy, which priorities Turkey’s military power as a foreign policy tool. More than just voicing, they have also taken certain steps seeking to obstruct Turkey’s military depth in Afrin. Iranian-led Shiite militia in support of Assad moving to Afrin to fight against Turkey, together with PKK/YPG last month, was one of the most significant indicators of the aforementioned situation. Meanwhile, despite having different motives, we have seen both Russia and the U.S. become agitated because of the Afrin operation.

Even though it is wary about Turkey’s “boots on the ground” strategy, Moscow calculates that this strategy will escalate the tensions between Ankara and Washington and force Turkey to become closer with Russia; therefore, their approach towards Turkey remains the same. Meanwhile, Washington doesn’t want to strengthen Russia’s hand and is aware that disregarding threats to Ankara’s very existence may deteriorate Turkish-American relations further, evolving into something more than a conjunctural crisis. In this respect, the recent diplomatic traffic between Turkey and the U.S. indicates that the U.S. policymakers have become “more concerned” about Turkey’s assertiveness in Syria and that the U.S. desires to reconcile with Turkey rather than exacerbate the schism between the two NATO partners.

The “boots on the ground” strategy which could be defined as eliminating threats before they reach the country’s borders is clearly yielding positive results for Turkey’s national security. The picture is actually clear; taking the Operation Euphrates Shield and outposts being established in Idlib into consideration, Ankara will achieve a military and political depth in Syria that includes territories northwest of the Euphrates with OOB; a depth that Turkey won’t relinquish in the near future. With the possible addition of Manbij to the aforementioned territories as a result of negotiations with the U.S., Turkey might secure targets in its “game plan” more easily in the short-term.

Turkey’s Game Plan in Afrin

Turkey’s Afrin operation is the continuation of the new national security strategy that was shaped more clearly after the July 15 coup attempt. According to this strategy, Turkey could only contain threats emerging in Syria and Iraq, as a result of the power vacuum, with efficient deployment of military assets. In this respect, the strategy foresees the utilization of military power in the field and in cross-border operations instead of reserving it.

Considering the larger region which includes Syria and Iraq along with protruding military power and the said region’s political and geopolitical realities, the following are Ankara’s aims for the future:

• Minimizing the PKK existence on both Syrian and Iraqi borders
• Consolidating diplomacy in order to assure Syria’s territorial integrity
• Consolidating diplomatic compromise with Russia and Iran achieved in Astana and Sochi
• Weakening the U.S.’ political and military ties with PKK/YPG

In order to simultaneously achieve the aforementioned targets, Turkey has to overcome certain trials. Ankara’s security strategy mostly focuses on the minimization of the PKK threat. However, the efficient deployment of military power won’t suffice on its own; the complex network of regional and international relations has to be managed simultaneously.

First of all, eliminating the cross-border threat of the PKK with military force requires a meticulous balance between the seemingly conflicting interests of Russia and the U.S. Every improvement in Turkish-Russian relations in regards to PKK/YPG and Syria has an impact on Turkish-American relations; therefore, the relations between Turkey and Russia is at the center of it all. On the other hand, consolidation of diplomacy and the maintenance of the reconciliation between Turkey, Russia and Iran are necessity for preserving Syria’s territorial integrity. Inclusion of Washington to this process might bring balance between Moscow-Regime-Tehran, consolidate the diplomatic initiative and work in favor of Turkey. It shouldn’t be forgotten that certain regional actors like Israel and Iran might attempt to undermine this diplomatic process. Tehran’s approach to Turkey could be clearly understood from Iran’s deployment of militia and armed forces of the Syrian regime which forced Russia to become the intermediary between PKK/YPG and the Syrian regime in Afrin. Iran could be asserted as the leading “most unreliable” actor that could prevent Turkey from achieving its aforementioned goals.

Syria’s territorial integrity isn’t all about the dynamics between Turkey and PKK/YPG. In other words, Turkey may have thwarted PKK/YPG from controlling a united swath of land with Operation Euphrates Shield and OOB; however, it isn’t possible to foresee how the diplomatic process along with the preparation of a new constitution will shape Syria, especially east of the Euphrates. This is important as it is a reminder that the Syrian conflict isn’t only about the power struggle between the regime and the opposition.

A part of Turkey’s game plan, consolidation of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Ankara is relatively easy. Russia desires the schism between Turkey and the U.S. to widen and deepen. Meanwhile, we know that Russia needs Turkey in resolving the Syrian crisis and this is the main reason for Russia giving the green light to Turkey’s Afrin operation. Moscow knows that Turkey’s presence on the field tests the relations between the U.S. and PKK/YPG, forcing the U.S. to act more carefully. On the other hand, Moscow also believes that counterbalancing Iran’s field advantage and prominent influence over the regime with Turkey is useful. Besides the Syrian crisis the tensions between Turkey and NATO, along with the EU, makes Russia’s investment in Turkey even more worthwhile. Therefore, the consolidation of relations between Ankara and Moscow has become one of the pillars of security policies. Yet, symmetricity of this consolidation is crucial.

Turkey-U.S. Relations

The aim to weaken the U.S.’ relations with PKK/YPG and reinforcing cooperation rather than conflicts have become a crystallized subject in terms of the ever-complicating network of regional and international relations. In order to dismiss the PKK as an issue between Turkey and the U.S., territories under the control of the terrorist organization on both banks of Euphrates has to diminish, its armed capacity has to be minimized and its partnership with the U.S. should end. Even though the PKK won’t be able to hold on to the west side of the Euphrates because of OOB, Iran’s and the Syrian regime’s certain initiatives on the field might make it harder for Turkey to completely control Afrin.

Yet, Turkey needs to “reconcile” and “find a midway” with the U.S. to realize the remaining two aims. Minimizing PKK/YPG activities to the east of the Euphrates through military intervention is among the options. However, realization of this intervention without any kind of reconciliation with the U.S. might escalate the crisis in Turkish-American relations. There is hope for a settlement between Turkey and the U.S. after the former U.S. Secretary of State Tillerson’s visit to Ankara. If the U.S. leaves Manbij to the Turkey-backed Free Syrian Army, Ankara might revise the options regarding the east of the Euphrates. This obviously doesn’t mean Turkey will consent to the PKK existence in the said region.

The other options include reinforcing the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which consists mostly of PKK/YPG militants with Arabs and Kurds that aren’t affiliated with the terrorist organization, thus diluting the existence of terrorist elements, and recalling all the heavy weaponry provided to the YPG after the military phase against Daesh is over. A concrete step has to be yet taken to realize these options. Meanwhile, if Washington seeks a “local power” to limit Iranian influence over Syria in a post-Daesh setting, it has to be aware of the issues that might emerge as a result of building this strategy on the YPG. Therefore, Turkey is still one of the leading actors that could prevent revitalization of Daesh and aide the dismantling of Iran’s influence in Syria.

It’s definite that Turkey won’t back down and will force the U.S. to sever its ties with PKK/YPG. At this point, Turkey has to be militarily active on the field; Turkey’s military activities might persuade the U.S. to agree with Turkey’s demands.

Secondly, the necessity to implement a strategy that would thwart both Russia and Iran’s attempts to undermine Turkey’s fight against PKK in Syria. Iran is the most “anti-Turkey” country involved in the Syrian crisis. While Moscow handles issues in a more pragmatic way, Tehran always sees events through an ideological lens; the Shiite militia’s latest performance in Afrin proves this. It should be remembered that “military activism” and deterrence will be key in counterbalancing Iran.

Since Turkey implemented “boots on the ground” strategy in northern Syria, the Syrian crisis has become more complicated. Only those who are determined will land on both feet at the end of this crisis.

Israel has become increasingly mentioned in matters regarding the conflict in Syria, but this was not the case during the past seven years. Over the course of the conflict, Israel closely followed the developments in Syria, did not hesitate to interfere when it saw it as necessary, and tried to shape the Syria-Israel border according to its own priorities.

Israel has had two main priorities in Syria since March 2011. The first has been preventing Hezbollah from acquiring any weapons from Iran that could be considered “game changers.” With this purpose, several locations in Syria, including the capital Damascus, were targeted by Israeli airstrikes. Existing deployments were also targeted to prevent the military capacity of militia groups acting under the guidance of Hezbollah and Iran from advancing in terms of the threat they posed on Israel. For until 2011, the Iranian threat on Israel was perceived as coming from the Israel-Lebanon border and the limited military capacity of Hezbollah. Israel paid the price of Iran’s technology transfer to Hezbollah in the 2006 Lebanon War, during which the number of military vehicles lost was enough to change the course of the conflict. Due to this reason, preventing a similar situation from occurring again has been one of Israel’s top priorities in Syria.

The second priority of Israel in Syria has been preventing any groups acting under the guidance of Iran from acquiring territory along its border with Syria. The Israeli-Syrian border had been the most secure border of Israel since the 1980s. Even though the war between the two countries was ongoing on paper and Israel was occupying Syrian land (the Golan Heights), the Assad regime never sought an aggressive policy towards Israel. Attempts at infiltration and harassment over the border were thwarted by troops under the direct command of Maher Assad. On the other hand, Israel achieved critical strategic dominance by building observation and radar systems on Mount Hermon that enabled to observe the military activities in Damascus in real time. But after March 2011, the calculations of Israel had to be changed due to the Syrian regime’s loss of control over the lands along the border, the pouring of many pro-Iranian militia members into Syria and the control of the border passing to rebel groups. Israel, which had previously preferred the Assad regime as a “familiar enemy” over the unfamiliar rebel groups, prioritized the establishment of a de facto buffer zone along the Israeli-Syrian border after the regime lost control of the region.

Limited Intervention in Syria

Despite the military actions taken by Israel to implement the priorities discussed above, the Assad regime continuously avoided reacting in a manner that would completely oppose Israel. Despite Israeli airstrikes that did not only target Hezbollah and Iran but also the regime, Syria chose to remain silent. More precisely, the discursive responses never turned into military actions. This had two main reasons. One was that the Syrian regime did not want to oppose a strong actor like Israel when it was already dealing with rebels and facing an erosion of its power and influence to such a great extent that it warranted an intervention by Russia. Any damage to the regime’s air force capabilities would compound the threat posed against it by the rebels. The second was that Russia, which evolved from a trusted ally to the regime’s main reason for survival during the conflict, did not allow any attacks against Israel. Ultimately, the control of air defense equipment that would deter or defend against Israeli airstrikes was in the hands of the Russians. For these reasons, Israeli airstrikes were not reciprocated by military action.

But the tension between Israel and Iran was one of the conflicts put on hold in Syria. As Iran gained ground in Syria, Israel, still perceiving Iran as an existential threat, sought to build global and regional alliances in response.  Previously, Israel had only “bordered” Iran through Hezbollah, now it also had to face a powerful Iranian presence on the ground in neighboring Syria. The most critical development at this point was the election of Donald Trump as the president of the U.S. and the subsequent start of a new and special period in U.S.-Israel relations. Both nations decided that limiting Iranian influence in the region was a priority for themselves, even though they are yet to develop a concrete strategy on the issue. An attempt to reach a regional understanding against Iran was made with the active participation of the U.S., Gulf countries, led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), chose to become a part of this understanding.

However, it is difficult to argue that this understanding has caused any real change in the situation in Syria. Differences in national priorities, the lack of a concrete strategy and ideological narrow-mindedness have brought a new dimension and form in the aim of limiting Iranian influence. While the U.S. sought to limit Iranian influence in Syria through cooperating with the PKK, this strategy became even more meaningless with the start of the Operation Olive Branch. Gulf countries completely lost their focus on Syria. With the failure to turn this understanding into a concrete will, Israel began to work on achieving its above mentioned priorities within its own capacity.

The Red Line is the Israeli-Syrian Border

Israel did not change its low-profile yet active course on Syria even after the downing of an Israeli F-16 by the Syrian regime, which was an exceptional case in the history of the conflict. In other words, even though an escalation of tensions between Israel and Iran was expected following the downing of the F-16, both Israel and Iran (along with the Assad regime) prevented such an escalation from occurring. Israel prefers to continue its approach of limiting the military capacity of Hezbollah and keeping pro-Iran groups distant from its border via airstrikes over an escalation of tensions. At this moment it assumes that the Assad regime will continue to not respond seriously to Israeli airstrikes. With these considerations it reserves its right of intervention.

At the same time, Israel is preparing in the background to consolidate its de facto buffer zone if needed. It is known that Tel Aviv, considering the presence of the regime and Iranian-backed militia along its border a red line, is now in an effort to deepen its relations with some rebel groups. It should also be noted that this red line is also being respected by both the regime and Iran. The protection and fortification of a de facto buffer zone similar to the one built by Jordan in Daraa will continue to be one of Israel’s strategic priorities in Syria.

In the future, we will see Israel continue its precision airstrikes in Syria and increase its focus on the Israel-Syria border and the border crossings between Syria and Lebanon. Israel will continue its attempts to limit the Iranian presence in Syria within its own capacity and keep waiting for the U.S. to implement a more extensive strategy to fight Iranian influence, since the limited interventions of Israel in Syria will not be enough to effectively limit the rising Iranian influence.

Earlier last week the government had announced that they have completed all necessary and requested documents for the extradition of the criminal cult leader Fetullah Gulen from the U.S.

On Friday Justice Minister Abdulhamit Gul stated that there “is no obstacle left formally for his [Gulen’s] extradition.”

While Turkey’s fight against FETO, a terrorist organization which orchestrated the failed coup attempt last year, continues, an employee of the U.S. Embassy in Turkey had also been charged with espionage and seeking to overthrow the Turkish government.

While not mentioning any of the above developments in its statement, the U.S. Embassy in Ankara announced that it has suspended processing non-immigrant visa applications.

A statement issued by the Embassy claimed that recent events have forced the U.S. government to reassess the commitment of the Turkish government to the security of U.S. facilities and personnel.

The statement read: “In order to minimize the number of visitors to our Embassy and Consulates while this assessment proceeds, effective immediately we have suspended all non-immigrant visa services at all U.S. diplomatic facilities in Turkey.”

Non-immigrant visas are issued to those travelling to the U.S. for tourism, medical treatment, business, temporary work or study.

Turkish Embassy in U.S. retaliates

Following the announcement of the U.S. Embassy in Ankara, the Turkish Embassy in the U.S. announced yesterday that processing non-immigrant visa applications have been suspended.

The statement released by the Mission read: “Recent events have forced the Turkish Government to reassess the commitment of the Government of the United States to the security of Turkish Mission facilities and personnel.”

“In order to minimize the number of visitors to our Embassy and Consulates while this assessment proceeds, effective immediately we have suspended all non-immigrant visa service at all Turkish diplomatic facilities in the U.S.”

“This measure will apply to visas and passports as well as e-Visas acquired at the border,” the statement read.

According to official data released on Thursday, Turkey’s monthly consumer confidence index was lower in September in comparison to previous months.

A report published by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat) illustrated that the index decreased from 71.1 percent in August to 68.7 in September – a total decrease of 3.4 percent.

The confidence index is perceived as a vital gauge of the overall health of the economy, indicating the public’s sentiment about sending money, which in turn gives clues about economic vitality.

All sub-indices of the main index were also lower in September. The probability of saving index, which indicates the expectation of earning enough money to save, showed the sharpest decline as it decreased from 22.4 percent in August to 20.2 in September – down by 10 percent.

The number of people unemployed expectation index, a reflection of sentiment about the health of the labor market, was down by 2.7 percent and stood at 70.5 in the previous month.

Turkey’s financial situation expectation of household index was the least-hit figure in September, decreasing 2.5 percent to reach 89.6 percent.

TurkStat also reported that Turkey’s consumer confidence index started 2017 at 66.9 percent in January and hit its highest level with 72.8 in May.

Amid the confidence index, Economic Minister Nihat Zeybekci emphasized that Turkey is expected to end 2017 in the top three world economies.

After expanding by 3.2 percent in 2016, the Turkish economy posted a 5.2 and 5.1 percent growth in the first and second quarters of 2017 according to TurkStat.

Praising this progress, at the World Business Summit in New York, which was organized by MUSIAD USA, Zeybekci stated that “despite the coup attempt last year, the ring of fire in Syria and Iraq, and economic difficulties with Russia, we had an economy that expanded by 3.2 percent in 2016.”

“Our growth rate in the third quarter can put us at number 1 in the world. We can come in second place in the world for the fourth growth quarter. Even third place is not a bad performance for us,” the Economic Minister added.

Zeybekci further added that “almost half of Turkey’s growth in the second quarter was a result of exports and production. This is the growth style that we want to see, and we want to ensure its sustainability for 2018, 2019 and 2020.”

Turkey’s growth rate surpassed perennial heavyweights including the US, UK and Germany in the second quarter, which posted 2.2 percent, 1.7 percent and 2.1 percent year-over-year growth rates respectively according to data obtained from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

The US economy after FOMC decision

As the year comes to an end, the US Central Bank has decided to hold interest rates steady the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) announced on Wednesday.

After the conclusion of its two-day meeting, the FOMC voted unanimously to maintain its interest rates at 1.00-1.25 percent.

A statement by the FOMC stated that “job gains have remained solid in recent months, and the unemployment rate has stayed low.”

The unemployment rate fell to 4.3 percent in July, its lowest level in 16 years. However, inflation remains below the Federal Reserve’s target of 2 percent.

According to the Labor Department, the Consumer Price Index – a major measure of consumer inflation in the US economy – rose 0.4 percent in August, or 1.9 percent year-on-year.

The FOMC added that it expects inflation to reach 2 percent in the medium term.

In spite of the recent hurricanes Harvey and Irma, which has caused a deep social and financial burden on the state, the FOMC stated that “storm-related disruptions and rebuilding will affect economic activity in the near term, but past experience suggests that the storms are unlikely to materially alter the course of the national economy over the medium term.”

The FOMC has two meetings left this year. While analysts do not expect a rate hike in November, they believe the Fed may increase rates the following month.

The downfall of relations between Turkey and the U.S. along with certain European countries in the last few years have weakened the country’s ties with the Western alliance. Considering that this alliance was established with NATO during the Cold War and based itself on security cooperation, the negative approach adopted by Western states towards Turkey’s security has deteriorated these relations. There are two issues that are distracting and inexplicable in terms of the solidarity expected from the NATO alliance. The first is, despite listing the PKK as a terrorist organization, Western states are allowing affiliates of this terrorist group to act freely in Europe. Second is the un-hidden military and financial support for the PYD, which is another arm of the PKK. The policies of Turkey’s Western “allies” during the July 15 coup attempt, which were perceived as a tacit support for the coup, further deteriorated relations. Similarly, countries like the U.S. and Germany opening their doors and offering protection to FETO members, who are being prosecuted as perpetrators of the coup attempt, is disconcerting Turkey.

Moreover, the insistence of these countries, in utilizing organizations like PKK/PYD and FETO as a means to “re-calibrate” Turkey’s “shifted axis” continues to obstruct healthy relations between Ankara and Western capitals. It should be highlighted that these listed terrorist organizations are not the only methods Western countries adopt in their so-called process to “re-orbit” Turkey. Attempts to press Turkey on Iraq, Syria and Qatar fronts, and enabling mechanisms of economic disruption like Germany did, and ventures aiming to spread distrust through adjudications like the US did can be considered as said tools.

Ankara not backing down from its independentist foreign policy means the continuation of the Western attacks.

In this case, what should Turkey’s foreign policy look like?

Firstly, as the country has limited economic and military capacity in comparison to global powers, Turkey will inevitably seek a balance that will relieve the pressure from Western countries and allow it a wider room for maneuver. In this respect, Turkey should improve relations with global powers like Russia and China, while emphasizing cooperation and tensions with regional powers like Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Considering the fact that the listed global powers have certain hegemonic aspirations just like the U.S. and other Western countries, it is definite that achieving a balance will be challenging. However, it should be acknowledged that Turkey is not the only country facing this challenge. Germany, for instance, is also struggling to achieve a balance between its relations with the U.S. and Russia. This nature of international relations therefore forces a sovereign state to pursue foreign policy in a rational manner, ensuring the consideration of all challenges that can potentially be faced.

Today, the most prominent threats to Turkey’s security emerges from the current policies of the U.S. and German governments. So therefore, improving relations with Russia, China and other Middle Eastern countries may allow Turkey to counterbalance its Western partners. A second suggestion for a strong and capable foreign policy is that, despite the recent developments, threats and negative press that it is receiving, Turkey should refrain from disassociating herself from the West. As the bilateral relations between Turkey and Germany have come to the forefront, and while German politicians have tried threatening Turkey with suspending EU accession negotiations, the reactions they have received from member states such as Britain and Greece illustrate the fact that Western states are not in unison in terms of their approach towards Turkey. It is for this reason that Ankara must continue to seek positive dialogue with rational actors in the West. By doing so, Ankara will have the opportunity to underline the hostility of certain Western states, implying the fact that the West could completely lose Turkey if this attitude does not change. This is necessary for both pushing the policies of western states against Turkey into a more tolerable direction and preventing Russia and China from dominating Turkish foreign policy.

While Turkey’s reliance on the West in the face of threats from Soviet Russia during the Cold War era had been destructive, today, over-reliance on Russia or China in the face of threats from the western world carry equal potential harm.

With all factors listed, its geographical location and strategic importance makes Turkey an important actor in global politics, which is why carrying friendly relations with both the East and West will be beneficial for all parties. In order to ensure that Turkey does not repeat the mistakes of the past or fall into isolation, despite the difficulties that the government is facing, maintaining a balanced foreign policy is what Ankara is trying to achieve.

The Turkish government had commenced to negotiate with the PKK in order to resolve the most prominent issue that it inherited since the very first years of the Republic: the “Kurdish issue”. As a result of Erdoğan’s initiative in 2009, negotiations between the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) and the PKK started. After a while, transcripts of proceedings between MIT and the PKK in Oslo were published in a daily. At the time, nobody knew that these were leaked by FETO, which had infiltrated the state and established a parallel structure over 40 years. Only two things were known about this organization then: firstly, it was a religious congregation with a significant financial power that opened schools all around the world and possessed multiple media outlets and business associations. Secondly, they had racist tendencies towards Kurds that were made apparent by their media outlets and speeches by Fetullah Gülen.

Known for being comparatively more sensitive towards Islam than western parts of Turkey, not many in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions really liked Gülen’s congregation due to their racist tendencies. Moreover, the majority of Kurds who still preserved the medrese and dergah traditions (traditional educational and religious institutions) inherited from the Ottomans didn’t perceive the said congregation as “religious” and didn’t find its leader’s residence in the US ordinary. Even though FETO infiltrated the bureaucracy, military and universities in the region, they were only able to gain a few followers among the people.

On February 7, 2012, during the early hours of the day, a news flash: Istanbul’s Specially Authorized Prosecutor Sadrettin Sarıkaya who was conducting an investigation into the PKK-linked KCK organization, requested MIT Undersecretary Hakan Fidan to come to the courthouse on Thursday. I have to repeat this as it isn’t a situation that could be comprehended at the first. Try to think of this event occurring in the UK. The then Prime Minister Erdoğan and his government initiates a reconciliation and peace process and a prosecutor in Istanbul calls the head of MIT to the courthouse as a suspect!

http://thenewturkey.org/fetos-civil-administrators-and-their-trips-abroad-before-the-coup-attempt/

Istanbul’s Specially Authorized Prosecutor Sadrettin Sarıkaya personally called MIT Undersecretary Hakan Fidan, former Undersecretary Emre Taner, former Deputy Undersecretary Afet Güneş and two other former MIT employees and demanded they give statements as a part of the KCK investigations. The prosecutor was accusing Fidan and his colleagues of having committed a crime for being part of the negotiations with the PKK in Oslo. There was another interesting situation. On the same day, the Prime Minister was in Istanbul to undergo a medical operation, which the public did not know about. However, due to security concerns, the time of the operation was changed. For this reason, when Hakan Fidan called the Prime Minister he was able to talk with him. Erdoğan sensed something foul about the situation and told Fidan not to go to the courthouse and give a statement. Even though Erdoğan said on TV after the incident, “They would first arrest the head of MIT and then me. I had authorized the head of MIT. So, they should personally call me to the courthouse”, nobody – with the exception of those who were interested in the Kurdish issue – cared much about this statement. It was widely known that the prosecutor was close to FETO. However, the incident was perceived by many as the group’s exaggerated sensitivity towards the Kurdish issue rather than a Gülenist attack on Erdoğan and the state.

The Gezi Park incidents in June 2013 followed this event. The protests were initially started by people whose concerns were environmental and who objected to a construction project that was to take place in a park in Taksim. Yet, it didn’t stay as a protest by environmentalists. After a little while Kemalists, later joined by the Alevis, joined the protests alleging that “their lifestyle was under threat.” It became apparent that FETO had a finger in this incident. Gülen and his organization tried to provoke the protesters with their associates within the police force through the use of violence. Zekeriya Öz, a fugitive Gülenist and a former prosecutor, tweeted the following on this subject: “If the PKK had participated in the Gezi Park protests, those who are governing now wouldn’t be in their seats. I don’t know who ordered them, but the PKK didn’t join.”

There were other prominent Gülenists that were trying to spark new conflicts by provoking the protesters that were completely organized over social media. For instance, a renowned Gülenist fugitive Emre Uslu, who now lives in the US, tweeted that PKK militants turned a car over which had female passengers with headscarves in Maltepe, Istanbul (however, such an event didn’t transpire). Efforts to evolve street protests into a civil war through constant provocations were apparent. While Gülen’s media outlets openly supported the Gezi Park protests, the Gülenists changed their tune towards the end when a group in İzmir vandalized their school. Participating in the Gezi Park protests with various reasons and motives, the majority of the youth seemed unaware of this effort to exploit the situation.

We started to hear that a new wave of street protests similar to the Gezi Park protests were to take place in November. These could’ve been just a rumor, of course. Still, I had heard this from an academic who lived in the US and from a journalist that had ties with FETO. The Gülenist journalist had said “I don’t know if 10 or 15 soldiers will be killed, but something will happen and Erdoğan will go.”

6 months after the Gezi Park protests, on January 9, 2013, three women including Sakine Cansız, who was one of the founders of the PKK and who supported the peace process, were killed at the Kurdish Information Bureau in Paris. These killings took place right after the government announced that they were negotiating with Abdullah Öcalan for the resolution of the Kurdish issue. This incident pitted the two sides against each other. It was a sensitive and fragile issue as after all there were negotiations with a terrorist organization and the Turkish public’s top enemy Abdullah Öcalan. The person who was caught by French security forces had a trace of gunpowder on his coat. His name was announced as Ömer Güney. According to the information gathered from the French security forces, Güney was close with the terrorist organization to an extent that he could be deemed a PKK sympathizer. This information consolidated the theories that it was an intra-organizational execution. There was great outrage and this outrage poured onto the street. The funeral of Cansiz in Diyarbakır was attended by tens of thousands of people.

Eleven months after the murder, the December 17-25 operation that was conducted by the Gülenists within the judiciary, security forces and media aiming to depose the government with the accusation that it was corrupt took place. For the first time, regardless of their political views, all witnessed and became aware of the intimidating operational capacity of FETO. During those days, Gülenist media outlets started to spread disinformation that MIT was responsible for the murder in Paris. Moreover, they alleged that Ömer Güney was actually a member of MIT. Yet, almost nobody cared about this subject as there were more pressing issues present.

In January 2014, PKK-affiliate KCK stated that the murder of the three women was carried out by FETO’s members within the state and that Ömer Güney was actively engaged with Gülenists. Ömer Güney, who was to be tried after a two-year long investigation by the Paris Prosecutor’s Office, was taken to a hospital for an ailment in his brain. In January, just one month before his trial, he died. It was later discovered that Ömer Güney was visited by three individuals from Turkey and that those individuals were FETO members.

Then, the terrible event known as the Kobane incident took place. Using Daesh’s attack on Kobane and the alleged inaction by Turkey as excuses, the leader of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) Selahattin Demirtaş and his colleagues called for countrywide streets protests on October 7. I said to myself “this must be the second Gezi Park protest that was being discussed.” Protesters built barricades and engaged with the security forces. 50 died and 682, 139 of them police officers, were wounded. 1,113 buildings, including 25 district governor offices, 67 police headquarters and 29 political party offices, were damaged.

One of FETO’s media outlets, Zaman Daily’s Editor-in-Chief Ekrem Dumanlı visiting Diyarbakır’s Mayor Gülten Kışanak and their open support for HDP while the aforementioned events were taking place were intriguing. When news of the visits by HDP deputy Ahmet Türk and former HDP deputy Nazmi Gür’s paid to Fetullah Gülen in 2014 in Pennsylvania was heard, it astonished many. There were many news pieces on FETO providing intelligence to the PKK and deciphering the code names of state operatives within the PKK. How the PKK dug trenches in many cities, especially in Diyarbakır, in order to start a war despite the people’s objections was made clear after the July 15 coup attempt. The FETO-member military officers and pilots bombed the Parliament with F-16s that flew from Diyarbakır. FETO militants did whatever they could to both provoke the public and enable the PKK.

Two years after these events two HDP deputies, one of them in prison, made two statements. These two statements are unprecedented, considering HDP’s disposition in the last two years. In his interview with journalist Ruşen Çakır, HDP deputy Sırrı Süreyya Önder said the following: “October 6-8 Kobane events might have never taken place, because the ‘prevalent state perspective’ [AK Party] was foreseeing solidarity with Kobane. I will be extremely clear about this; the said solidarity was obstructed by FETO-affiliated generals whose roles in the July 15 coup attempt is apparent. They put an extreme pressure on Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. Now, generals who commanded the units in Sur, Nusaybin and Cizre are being tried as the perpetrators of the coup attempt. I have seen how these generals obstructed the solidarity between Turkey and Kobane-Rojava.”

Accused of “being a member of a terrorist organization,” “inciting to commit crime” and “inciting the public to unlawful meeting and demonstration,” HDP deputy Ayhan Bilgen made a similar statement very recently during the session of his trial at Diyarbakır 5^th Heavy Penal Court:

“October 6-8 was a demonstration of a civil war in this country. Who incited these conflicts must be investigated thoroughly. It should be investigated whether these were the same people who wanted to depose the elected government on July 15.”

The fog of war is slowly fading, yet unfortunately it isn’t possible to talk about a social base that would support the reiteration of a peace process, not in the short-term. FETO is an important component of this issue and so is the PKK. How these two terrorist organizations came together after years and their role in all that transpired must also be taken into account.

May 2017 has been a historic month for Turkish diplomacy. President Erdoğan had one-on-one meetings with leaders of prominent countries including the US, Russia, China and India. The importance of the month for Turkish foreign policy is due to the number, diversity and timing of meetings, rather than their content. These meetings may have the potential to shape the future of Turkish foreign policy, which has been stuck in a defensive mode since 2014 due to the Syrian Civil War and domestic political issues, and now is expected to take a new direction. Turkey’s active involvement in the Qatar crisis is also an important sign of returning to pro-active diplomacy and mediation efforts.

These proactive steps taken to shape Turkey’s foreign policy vision and its framework were not indicative of a clear strategic disposition, but were tactical attempts to widen Turkey’s shrinking economic and strategic field. For these steps to acquire a strategic quality, Turkey has to make an agreement with at least Russia, the US or the EU, which Turkey has fluctuating relations with.

Turkey’s relations with the US are expected to stay fragile due to Washington’s insistence on supporting the PKK in Syria. With the EU, Germany will be the determining factor but stagnant relations seem likely to continue until Germany’s federal parliamentary elections. Among these three actors, Russia seems to be the most viable option for a positive structural change in the short run.

Whether to cooperate with Russia in strategic terms is a vital question for Turkey. This cooperation has the potential to directly affect Turkey’s relations with the EU and the US. However, contrary to economic relations, Russia seems to be refraining from negotiations with Turkey at an equal level, along with binding diplomatic actions. Ankara’s negotiation with Moscow to buy the S-400 air missile defense system is an important move that has strategic value, but any strategic effort with Russia has the potential to be overshadowed by friction between the two countries when it comes to Syria.

Limitations of Strategic Cooperation

The most prominent diplomatic meetings in May were the ones with the leaders of the US and Russia. The main focus of both the meetings was to manage the effects of the Syrian Civil War on Turkey and limit the support being given to the PYD/YPG. The crisis which emerged with the downing of the Russian SU-24 aircraft by the Turkish Armed Forces in November 2015 ended with Erdoğan and Putin’s meeting in Sochi in May 2016. While the normalization process between the two countries is often described as being complete, there are still disparities in bilateral relations.

Due to their diverging positions with the US and EU, Turkey was forced to take the path of least resistance during this process. Even though Turkey tried to use the relations with Russia as a counterbalance for the strained relations with the West, it could be said that it was not a complete success. Despite the warm messages from the Moscow, Russia has utilized Turkey’s isolation from the West for its own interests.

http://thenewturkey.org/rebalancing-turkey%E2%80%99s-foreign-policy/

Breaking away from this strategic congestion difficult because without a significant detachment from the West, Turkey has little chance to develop a strategic relation with Russia. This kind of disengagement would leave Turkey more vulnerable and in a disadvantaged position as Turkey and Russia’s strategic vision on the Middle East, the Balkans and the Black Sea are mostly contradictory.

Russia would see Turkey’s disconnection from the West as a sign of weakness and a chance to impose its own will. It is also possible for Turkey to have worse tension with Russia than it does today with the EU and the US. Turkey seemingly will have a hard time in overcoming this paradox in the short term. Conducting meticulous diplomacy that does not antagonize any of these actors should be Turkey’s priority.

Despite the disparities on Syria’s future, Turkey and Russia establishing a joint political platform during the Astana Summit is a positive development. Even though Russia takes Turkey’s concerns about the PYD into consideration, it has also kept the possibility for cooperation with the Syrian Kurds on the table. Russia is simultaneously attempting to keep relations with Turkey at a certain level and not letting the US have all the influence over the PYD. For Russia, a partial agreement with Turkey on Syria means counterbalancing Iran’s influence in Syria. Restraining Iran would also prove useful for the regime.

Meanwhile, Turkey having various operations in Syria, such as the Operation Euphrates Shield, which aimed to establish a presence on the field, serves as a potential risk to the relations with Russia. A closer look at this complex web of relations reveals that all actors are trying to counterbalance each other, especially in the context of Syria. Turkey, due to its strained relations with the US and EU, is at a disadvantaged in this game.

Search for Balance in Trade

In terms of trade, limitations on Turkish agricultural exports to Russia were largely removed and a partial agreement reached between Turkey and Russia. Meanwhile, Russia continues to enforce limitations on tomatoes, which are an important agricultural export item for Turkey. After the meeting between the Turkish and Russian leaders, Turkish tourism business leaders were relieved and entered the new tourism season with more hope. The issues in fields where mutual interest is at hand were resolved quickly and the two sides cooperate in many cases; however, it is not possible to talk about similar progress or agreement in strategic issues.

The most important field of cooperation between Turkey and Russia that has a strategic aspect is energy. While multinational platforms like the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization diversify Turkey’s economic and diplomatic relations in terms of both quantity and quality, these platforms offer little strategic value for Turkey. None of Turkey’s strategic priorities can be addressed with a deeper level of cooperation with these organizations.

Turkey’s economy is dependent on the EU, whose member countries account for Turkey’s largest foreign trade volume. While Indian, Chinese and especially the Gulf markets have gained prominence for Turkey, the volume of Turkey’s exports to these countries is still below a level that could compete with trade with the EU. Chinese and Indian markets do not offer a rich potential that could lead to the creation of substantial employment in Turkey in the short and midterm. In terms of exports, Turkey has yet to find alternative markets that can compensate if there are any hiccups with the EU market. Turkey’s fragility in its European relations lies in trade, rather than security and diplomacy. Turkey’s alternatives to the European markets are much more limited than Europe’s. Creating market options besides the European one has become a strategic aspect for Turkey.

A game-changing strategic agreement in terms of economy, security and foreign policy seems impossible for Turkey in the short term. Turkey and Russia’s joint initiative on the de-confliction zones in Syria is an important venue for strategic cooperation. Most pressing issue for the Kremlin is, however, the choice between tactical ally in Syria, the PYD, and a possible strategic partnership with Turkey. Turkey’s most essential dilemma, on the other hand, is to try to achieve a strategic alliance either with the US or with Russia, while keeping which one would be the right choice in mind, to overcome the impasse in foreign policy and security aspects that were caused by the Syrian Civil War. The disagreement of the said two powers causes the elongation of the Syrian war. On the other hand, an agreement between them could leave Turkey out of the loop.

As the center of gravity of the global political economy is rapidly shifting from the Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific region, the relative importance and influence of the rising powers in the multipolar global system continue to increase. In this context, the attention in public opinion focusing on Turkey-China relations is quite natural given that China is the world’s leading rising power that gradually erodes Western institutional, economic and technological hegemony; while Turkey is the leading rising power in the Middle East, Balkans and Caucasus axis.

As far as Turkey’s foreign policy options are concerned; it is obvious that the country’s approaches and policy choices especially with regards to regional geopolitical developments have radically diverted from the stances of the US and the EU since the reversal of the Arab Spring via authoritarian coups, foreign interventions and civil wars.

Since many global powers are endeavoring to strike a balance in Syria, reminiscent of the power balances in the 19th century, and the Western allies are overtly attempting to undermine the national security of Turkey in the region; Turkey is spurred to seek new formulas that would balance its conventional Western engagement occasionally with Russia or other emerging powers. For instance, as  Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan clearly expressed during his recent meeting with the US President Donald Trump, Turkey vigorously condemns the NATO allies’ equipping the People’s Protection Units (YPG) with heavy weaponry under the pretext of an anti-Daesh fight, as Turkey recognizes the YPG as a terrorist group.

The concerns on this matter have so far been expressed in a calm and patient demeanor to avert risking NATO’s security umbrella and shouldering the heavy costs of a possible tension with the US. Meanwhile, it is evident that the diplomatic unrest with the EU has also continued in parallel with the rise in far-right movements in mainland Europe. The insincerity displayed by the EU on the refugee issue tarnished mutual trust and the crisis eventually reached a point of suspending Turkey’s EU membership negotiations due to soaring arrogance of European leaders during Turkey’s state of emergency and the constitutional referendum process.

Boosting ties with the Eastern World will balance out Western Influence 

Consequently, it would be utterly reductionist to interpret President Erdoğan’s remarks about joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and leaning towards boosting relations with the rising powers of the East as a yearning for a permanent detachment from the Western allies. In contrast, Erdoğan’s subsequent visits to the rising Eastern powers such as India and China ahead of his critical meeting with President Trump contained considerable symbolic messages in terms of strategic balancing of ties with Western allies.

http://thenewturkey.org/turkey-in-the-eastern-mediterranean-energy-equation/

Right before his first face-to-face meeting with President Trump, President Erdoğan attended the “Belt and Road Summit” in Beijing on May 14 and 15, in which he met around 30 world leaders. In the group photo from the Summit, the hosting leader Xi Jinping symbolically posed between Erdoğan and Russian President Vladimir Putin. As the leader of a key NATO member, Erdoğan’s participation in such an important meeting in which a new globalization vision has been introduced by China, serves as significant strategic leverage that could ease the diplomatic unrest between Turkey and the West. This is particularly true when it is considered that Erdoğan enjoyed great interest and respect from both the Russian and Chinese leaders.

Turkey’s Position in China’s Global Initiative

The “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) project is of critical importance since it demonstrates that China has entered a new phase in its controlled integration process to the global system. The project embodies China’s willingness to start a bold initiative by forming networks of finance, trade, logistics, communications, infrastructure and culture from the Eurasia axis. In this context, it was illuminating to see that the final declaration of the Summit stressed “an open global economy” and “participatory and free trade” while articulating the need to object to all kinds of protectionism.

Neo-protectionist tendencies are climbing in all developed economies and particularly in the US as a measure against shrinking global demand and economic stagnation. And it is no secret that President Trump overtly targets rising economies like Mexico and China with these measures. Therefore, China’s insistence on global integration by means of free trade reveals the country’s self-confidence in international economic and technological competition.

As a matter of fact, China is known to have advanced in a stable manner on the axis of foreign policy and economic strategy while taking systematic steps towards expanding its possible spheres of influence in the world system since 1980s, when Deng Xiaoping’s opening policies were started. In this context, the OBOR project reflects the vision of establishing an expansive economic and political sphere of influence by financing the infrastructure and development investments of developing countries in a line extending from Central Asia to Africa and Latin America.

The project also sets out an aspiration to completely resolve the domestic infrastructure and accessibility problems of China, which galvanized its role as the world’s manufacturing production base. The project grants access to all Western countries including the United Kingdom and growing economies like Turkey, which denotes different partnerships and multilateral win-win cooperation links as part of hundreds of projects planned to be implemented under this initiative. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Silk Road Fund (SRF), which are China-led multilateral initiatives, create significant public finance sources for the investments that are to be made as part of the project.

China’s ability to establish balanced relations with Western agents in political and strategic terms by making room for itself in the global system through economic integration, trade and technological competitiveness sets a feasible model for Turkey in certain terms. Of course, the two countries are not comparable in geographic size, population, economic and technological experience, military alliance structures and historical developments. However, both countries share a willingness to improve their positions in the global system by pursuing “developmental” policies. Consequently, it is not a surprise that the presence of Turkish contracting companies in the world market comes in second position after that of China while the two countries increasingly came across in economic diplomacy initiatives in Africa and Latin America.

The OBOR mega project is of vital importance for Turkey as well as China since Turkey was a natural component of the ancient Silk Road and the Central Asian Republics through which the project goes have strong linkages with Turkey. The project will definitely create many opportunities for Turkey to boost its economic dynamism and diplomatic influence via networks of infrastructure, transportation, communications, trade and finance in an area extending from East Asia to Europe and Africa. Ankara is perfectly aware of the fact that the economic and geo-strategic center of the global system is rapidly shifting towards the Asia-Pacific axis. In this framework, Turkey attaches great importance to its bilateral and multilateral relations with China.

There is a great potential in Turkish-Chinese trade relations through increasing investments by Turkey-based firms in the growing Chinese market and improving economic ties with China, which is Turkey’s second largest trading partner after Germany with a $20 billion trade volume. The leading fields with growth potential include large-scale projects such as nuclear energy and high-speed rail lines, science-technology, finance, currency exchange transaction to support national currencies in trade, and co-investments in third countries.

Turkey and China share similar perspectives on various global governance issues including reforming the global governance system, economic diplomacy and advocating a more participatory order. As diplomatic relations between the two countries develop, economic relations and strategic partnerships will undoubtedly gain momentum. These developments will not unsettle Turkey’s existing alliance with the West; but rather contribute to the formation of relations on a more equitable footing.

President Erdoğan’s meeting with US President Trump was overshadowed by the Pentagon’s decision to provide heavy weaponry to the YPG. Meanwhile, Trump’s mind was preoccupied with rumors of impeachment over allegations his administration shared state secrets with Russian officials. Some circles in Washington, on the other hand, tried to prevent the one-on-one meeting of Erdoğan and Trump.

The Pentagon’s hasty decision to equip the PKK/PYD with heavy weaponry was due to a possible revision in the planning of the Raqqa offensive after the two leaders’ meeting. There were no substantial changes in the planned Raqqa offensive, which is being coordinated by the Pentagon, but Turkey was able to relay its concerns about the PYD/YPG and the demographic engineering in the region at the highest official level. Turkey was also able to secure certain guarantees about the fight against the PKK, and made clear the fact it would actively continue its fight against the terrorist organization. Moreover, Turkey emphasized that it wouldn’t stand idle as the PKK/PYD, Daesh, and Iran-backed Shiite militias carried out ethnic and sectarian cleansing in the region.

Trump’s statement underscoring the strategic and military partnership between Turkey and the US was crucial. Even though the Turkish delegation returned to the country with a cautious optimism, this statement was perceived as the herald of a new era in Turkey-US relations, which had been on the decline since May, 2013. No one was expecting all the issues between the two countries to be resolved in an instant, but the image of the two leaders standing side by side was interpreted as the beginning of a more promising period for bilateral relations.

This was not the only indication that the level of understanding and cooperation between the US and Turkey could be on the mend.

Factors prompting the normalization of Turkey-US relations

The normalization in relations between Turkey and Israel, which had been in a crisis since the Mavi Marmara incident, will cause a gradual change in how Turkey is perceived both by the Trump administration, which has been especially sensitive on the issue, and circles that are associated with the Israeli lobby in Washington, which have advocated anti-Turkey sentiments for some time now. While Turkey will continue to advocate for the basic rights of the people of Jerusalem and Palestine, it will be more careful to avoid tensions with Israel. There are concrete efforts to increase the common interests of the two countries, especially in energy, tourism and trade.

Another issue that both Turkey and the US converge on in this new era is Iran’s expansionist policies in the Middle East. In particular, Iran-backed militia forces which are trying to gain ground using a sectarian discourse and ideology are posing a threat to the interests of many countries and local elements in the region. Checking these militias, whose presence is rationalized as a necessary counter to Daesh, brings Turkey, the US and many other countries in the region on common ground.

http://thenewturkey.org/will-the-trump-administration%E2%80%99s-syria-policy-change-after-the-chemical-attack/

Enclosing Sunni countries with a “Shiite crescent” – a policy that was covertly endorsed by the Obama administration to limit the Sunni governments in the region much to the chagrin of traditional allies like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf countries and Israel – is no longer sustainable. The Trump administration, which is yet to take over the control of security and foreign policy from the Obama administration’s military and civil bureaucrats, will realize that cooperation with Turkey could yield more effective results than surrounding the country with terrorist organizations like the PKK/PYD and Shiite militia forces.

Turkey’s success in Operation Euphrates Shield already debunked the myth that the PKK/PYD is the most effective force in the fight against Daesh. If Brett McGurk, the US envoy to the coalition against Daesh, and an Obama administration appointee who has built his own career on the an alliance with the PKK/PYD, and certain CENTCOM officials take a step back, the permanent and constructive possibilities of coordination with Turkey will become more apparent.  Turkey can provide a solution that is sustainable given the region’s sectarian and ethnic patterns, unlike the PKK/PYD, which has only sought to exploit these dangerous fault-lines.

The US’s persistent support to the PKK/PYD is antagonizing moderate Syrian Kurds who are being dominated by the terrorist organization, along with Arabs in Northern Syria who have been forced from their own lands, not to mention Washington’s own ally, Turkey. If the Trump administration is to adopt a controlled chaos strategy in the Middle East, just like the Obama administration, instead of an orderly one, they can continue their alliance with PKK/PYD; however, if the US wants to stabilize the region and win over the allies it has offended, they have to widen their narrow perspective. In this respect, Erdoğan and his team went to Washington with a comprehensive plan.

Another development which may cause the Trump administration to revise its relations with Turkey is the level of popular support President Erdoğan has demonstrated through the constitutional amendment referendum. Certain circles in Washington have been trying to prove that Erdoğan has little support and will not remain in office long, a campaign that began with the Gezi Park Protests in May, 2013. Having emerged with the clear support of the people both in the July 15 coup attempt and the April 16 constitutional referendum, Erdoğan has shown that he is has the backing of Turkey, and he is not going anywhere. Decision makers in Washington, along with leaders of other countries will have to acknowledge this sooner or later.

Erdoğan, at his meeting with Trump, expressed a sincere hope for more cooperation between the two countries, while also highlighting Turkey’s concerns on the road to normalization. Ankara is eagerly waiting to see how Trump will respond to its call. It is still not clear whether the relationship between the two countries is to become strategic in terms of regional politics. Another question that the whole world anxiously awaits the answer to is whether Trump will be left standing after his ongoing power struggle with the Washington establishment.

The Syrian crisis is in its fifth year and there is still no workable solution in sight. On the contrary the recent developments especially the Russian military involvement in support of the Assad regime will only escalate the gravity of the situation.

From the outset, Russia, along with China and Iran, sided with the Assad regime. Yet, the alliance has a relatively long history. It dates back to the beginning of the 1960s when the socialist secular Ba’ath party took over power in Syria (1963). Russians opened a military base in Tartus, on the coast of the Mediterranean Sea. This collaboration hit its peak after the death of Jamal Abdel Nasser, with his successors leaping into the arms of the USA. In the 1970s, Hafez Assad as a “secular Baathist,” after taking power in Syria, searched for a cover for his sectarian rule and legitimized it by lending his support to the Palestinian cause. Hafez Assad started to fight against the USA, Israel’s main sponsor, and thus befriended Russia, the enemy of imperialism and supporter of the “struggle of people.” Russians continued to support Hafez for years in various fields: military, economic – the Euphrates dam project for instance – and in many scientific missions. Syrian political propaganda about steadfastness and confrontation always included the readiness of Moscow to build an air defence bridge in case of a war with Israel.

Relations started to weaken in 1986, during the Perestroïka years, when the issue of the Syrian debt to Moscow (13.4 billion USD) was highlighted. Having problems with Russians, Hafez Assad turned to the USA and adopted a more friendly approach towards it. Assad’s troops participated to the international coalition led by the United States during the Second Gulf War against his old enemy, the Baathist Saddam Hussein. In time, relations between Russia and Syria strengthened again starting in 2001 when Russia wrote off the parts of the Syrian debt and lowered it to 3.6 billion USD; the pace of rapprochement and cooperation has been increasing since.

In the last five years Russia has been a keen supporter of Bashar Assad and eventually, decided to intervene militarily in Syria and as it claimed to fight terrorism and takfirist groups. But why did the Kremlin actually intervene? What is the truth about its intentions? And most importantly, how should we read this intervention?

http://thenewturkey.org/rebalancing-turkey%E2%80%99s-foreign-policy/

It is clear that the USA’s role as sole superpower after the collapse of the Soviet Union has been seriously challenged with Putin’s coming to power. It is also clear that Putin, with his upbringing and military intelligence mentality, wants to restore Russia’s old glory and perhaps even fulfill the country’s most important strategic dream of gaining a foothold in the Mediterranean Sea.

Such an ecclesiastic welcoming by the Russian Orthodox Church will fuel religious sentiments and can create an explosive ground reaction  and resistance in Muslim streets. Confirming this understanding, the first heralds of what will follow came in the Islamic fatwas released by Saudi Arabian religious authorities to fight Russians in Syria

First, there is no doubt that the Russian intervention in Syria is a wrong decision. Putin was and is still supporting Assad, in his war against his own people. Yet the error does not lie in this only – at the end of the day nobody cares about civilians. The error is that Russia will probably sink in the Syrian quagmire just as the United States sank in Iraq, and the elimination of “extremist takfiris groups” will take a very long time. Russia doesn’t seem disturbed by this factor, as it announced lately the expansion of its military base in Latakia to accommodate 200 additional aircrafts, as well as the expansion of the port of Latakiato, a harbor which can host an aircraft carrier and more than 12 battleships. It thus becomes clear that the Russians have come to stay and that they have tied up their survival in the region with Assad’s survival.

It wouldn’t be irrelevant to say that Russian intervention will turn the war more destructive, more destabilizing and more catastrophic for everybody with higher levels of damage and losses. Due to the Russian viewpoint on military action and its definition of success for military campaigns – Russian intervention in Chechnya is the best example- this intervention will force more Syrians to flee from conflict areas, meaning more refugees knocking on Europe’s doors. Furthermore, it gives Assad more power and strength to continue his political actions and course.

One of the most prominent manifestations of destabilizing the relative stability of the region was Turkey’s harsh response to the Russian aircraft violation of its airspace. It is known that the United States and Russia have reached a memorandum of understanding regarding flying over Syrian skies and that Israelis guaranteed the safety of their skies during Netanyahu’s visit to Moscow only a day after the Russians declared their intentions to conduct air strikes in Syria. Yet due to the fact that NATO has long borders with Syria and with the “Islamic State” (via Turkey) the possibility of an accident between the two powers remains as a threat to global security for the indefinite future.

On the other hand, Russian intervention will increase the indignation among Arab countries, particularly the ones who were and still are continuing to support the revolution of Syrian people against Assad and insist on his departure as a precondition for negotiations to build the Syria of tomorrow. It is possible that Saudi Arabia may become keener to supply Syrian opposition with more money and weapons to reinforce its statute and strengthen its position vis-à-vis the Russian-Iranian Shiite alliance with which Saudi Arabia is in open war on the Yemen front.

Moreover, to Muslim discontent Russia is no longer a communist atheist state, but a growing Christian power. Communist Russia was never really welcomed in the Muslim world and will not be welcomed now as it debuts its military intervention in an Arab Muslim country from a religious standpoint. The Russian Orthodox Church has blessed the military intervention, calling it a “holy war.” Such an ecclesiastic welcoming by the Russian Orthodox Church will fuel religious sentiments and can create an explosive ground reaction  and resistance in Muslim streets. Confirming this understanding, the first heralds of what will follow came in the Islamic fatwas released by Saudi Arabian religious authorities to fight Russians in Syria. Sunni Islamic extremism will inevitably be pushed further, an extremism that has become the focus of the Russian Christian-Iranian Shiite-Assad axis. Again, this will not result in anything but more extremism and more bloodshed.

The sad reality is that the Russian mistakes of today are only paid for by unarmed Syrian civilians who have seen their country torn to pieces by war for the last five years.

By intervening in Syria Russia has stopped any incentive for dialogue between parties. The rebels have declared their rejection of the United Nations’ mediation which they had previously accepted. The Assad regime, on the other hand, never displayed any real intentions to partake in dialogue and does not seem to hesitate in escalating the destruction of the country in order to keep its position.

It is evident that after the launching of bombings on the “terrorists,” Russia seems to desire to deprive the West of any partnership in a future political solution, by targeting not only ISIS troops, but also striking the moderate factions close to Washington, and all the forces opposed to the Assad regime. Russian aircrafts are reportedly avoiding bombing ISIS sites in addition to the fact that ISIS and Russians are concurrently trying to destroy Syrian opposition, in accordance with their own ambitions: Russians for the reasons mentioned above and ISIS in order to establish itself as the sole Sunni power keeping back the Shiite tide.

Most probably even if Russia has enjoyed some success in the first phase of its plan, the next stage will not be an easy one. The Russian military air force and artillery are empowering the Syrian regime where it already has a formidable superiority over the insurgents, namely firepower, yet leaving Assad’s key problem, manpower, unaddressed. It should be noted that many local sources confirm that defections from the Syrian army are still continuing to this moment.

More Islamic extremism won’t please the West, will bring more conflicts in Syria, and reshuffle the cards. The United States and Europe will not be in favor of standing idly in front of a new escalation of extremist forces – the world has not yet finished with the monstrosity called ISIS. United States jets have already bombed a mortar factory belonging to the non-jihadi Jaysh al-Sunna rebels, who were preparing to hit the Alawite Mountains.

In the end, we must not forget the fundamental fact that Bashar Assad did not earn his presidency by elections, as his father, and his regime is accepted as a repressive and dictatorial regime. Putin is also far from being perceived as a democratic leader; he is pretending to seek a “political solution” that comes on the back of soldiers, aircrafts and advanced missiles in Syria. Napoleon once said “Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake.” The sad reality is that the Russian mistakes of today are only paid for by unarmed Syrian civilians who have seen their country torn to pieces by war for the last five years.

On June 29, 2014, an armed group declared that they had established the Islamic State and that they were to restore the caliphate. Subsequently, the group changed its name to the Islamic State of Iraq and to Levant/Syria-ISIL/ISIS.  In a short span of time, the group has taken hold of a number of cities, ammunition stores and has established substantial financial resources.

ISIL is a modern phenomenon and it is in many ways not different from fascism or communism which for a great part defined the bloody history of the twentieth century. For ISIL, the caliphate is a mere declaration of intention – it has never offered any theological explanation of it. Its leadership’s main group of advisors is composed of the remainders of Saddam’s army, especially the Republican Guards; in this manner ISIL features in the dictatorship of the Saddam era. ISIL is a reflection of the situation created by the United States and, later, by Iran in the region. Currently, Western countries are targeting ISIL, which in return, puts up strong resistance and has gained new sites in Iraq and Syria. At this stage, ISIL has gained the sympathy and support of radical organizations such as Al Nusra and the Islamic Front. ISIL’s power is, in a sense, a result of the lure of power. It must be born in mind, however, that neither other jihadi movements –including many warring factions under the banner of ISIL- nor major denominations –including Salafis- have accepted ISIL’s call for the establishment of the caliphate.

ISIL’s ontological base is a reaction against the regional policies of Western countries and Israel alongside the failure of the state institutions in Iraq and Syria. The emergence of fascist organizations everywhere in the world in such overwhelming and long-term instability is frequently encountered. ISIL is an outcome of the latter and to present it as one of the main reasons of the state of affairs in the Middle East is complete demagoguery.

Salafi movements can be seen as products of the reaction against the globalization of modernity in an effort to influence the Islamic world. However, ISIL represents a more radical break than Salafi movements; it is impossible to consider ISIL as part of heretical Islam. It is true that ISIL has derived its human resources from “Muslim” societies but its mode of appearance, ignorance, hastiness and greenness has reduced it to a tool for preparing the ground for regional operations of various outsiders and to legitimize and facilitate their operations.

ISIL is a modern phenomenon and it is in many ways not different from fascism or communism which for a great part defined the bloody history of the twentieth century.

ISIL suggests that all areas of life –and politics, of course- must be carried out as they were in the initial stages of Islam. That stage, at least as far as ISIL defines it, is almost an imagined one. As to the call for the caliphate of Al Baghdadi, certain questions must be answered from the outset: Is the caliphate an issue that can be owned by a group formed in a few years and trying to make a name by terror activities? Can we explain the situation while ignoring its historical-sociological background? As is known, the caliphate has a connotation of higher authority inviting all Muslims to obey. Today, the nation-state, which is formed on the concept of “absolute” positive and negative sovereignty, is the norm in global politics. It will not recognize any higher authority including the caliphate in the traditional meaning of the term. Therefore, a call for the caliphate is nothing but an instrument to carry out immediate objectives.

http://thenewturkey.org/why-daesh-is-so-pleasant-to-israel/

Radical groups or ideologies can be seen in every society and in all periods. What is important is how these groups or ideologies get hold of the community or the international system. At this point, we should ask: would we still be referring to the so-called Al-Qaida organization, had there never occurred a power struggle between the USSR and the U.S. in Afghanistan? Can we understand the emergence of ISIL without Al-Qaida and the U.S. occupation of Iraq? Going back further, without the postcolonial practices of Western countries in the Middle East – i.e. the extraordinary political capacity of the U.S. to remain on friendly terms with Saudi Arabia so as to hold sway over oil flux – would Salafi/Wahhabi ideologies terrorize marginal groups in the Islamic world?

What about the concept of jihad and mujahidin? Were not the mujahidin the “good guys” for the U.S. before 1989? What was the content of the concept prior to the mujahidin of Afghanistan? What about democracy? Do Western countries want to see real democracies in the Islamic world? What is the nature of the rage of the Muslims living in Western countries? Is it only because they are Muslims or because of the frustration caused by racist and exclusionary circumstances in the West? What is the target of this rage? Why do they kill Muslims in Syria and Iraq?

With these questions, we do not want to empty the historical content of the concept of jihad and to suggest that the concept is wholly produced by Orientalist approaches. On the contrary, the term jihad occupies an exceptional place in Islamic history. It has been a main motivation behind the social, economic and political power of Muslim states. From this perspective, we need to ask again: Can people who use the “jihad” rhetoric offer a clear definition of the concept, which is acceptable to everyone, especially to Muslims? Do the “jihadists” emulate historical Muslim figures or modern warriors like Hitler and Saddam Hussein? Current representation of the concept empties its historical content and makes it unattractive in the eyes of the whole world, including Muslims. This sort of empty concept eliminates one of the vital ontological roots of the Islamic world and exterminates its most important vantage point against the West.

It does not seem realistic to say that ISIL will soon be wiped out of the Middle Eastern scene in an environment where state institutions are paralyzed, the state image has collapsed, and political commitments are defined along sectarian lines.

At this point, it is of little significance to detect the presence of Western actors or intelligence agencies in the emergence of ISIL. What is significant is how ISIL is utilized by global actors for the sake of their pragmatic purposes. In order to understand this, we should look at the kinds of results brought about by policies designed and implemented through ISIL. To give a few examples:

• The intervention of countries such as the U.S., the U.K., Russia and Iran in Iraq and Syria is legitimized in the eyes of both their public and the global community.
• These countries have exported radicals from their homelands and in this manner postponed upcoming internal problems, thanks to the ground offered through ISIL.
• The concept of Muslim-Western tension proposed in the “Clash of Civilizations” thesis has been reinforced through ISIL.
• The center-periphery relations between the West and Middle Eastern countries have been reinforced with no visible anticipation of change in the near future.
• This environment has increased the importance of Israel as the sole representative of the West in the region and any possibility of objection to Israeli policies by the international community has been seriously impaired.
• Although Syrian opposition was and still is the most important group struggling against ISIL, its legitimacy has severely been eroded; the Assad regime has been legitimized and its life has been prolonged through ISIL.
• Iran has stiffened its hegemony in Iraq and increased its presence in Syria under the pretext of combating ISIL.
• Kurdish nationalism, PKK and its affiliates in Syria and Iraq have grown stronger.

It does not seem realistic to say that ISIL will soon be wiped out of the Middle Eastern scene in an environment where state institutions are paralyzed, the state image has collapsed, and political commitments are defined along sectarian lines. Unless power-sharing struggles between global and regional actors cease, to build successful states in Iraq and Syria will never be possible. The most aggrieved parties from this situation have been the Syrian and Iraqi peoples, of course. Regional countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran, and Turkey have been hit the hardest both in their domestic and foreign policies. It cannot be said that Western countries and Russia have clearly benefited from the turmoil in the region. The country that has benefitted the most, however, is Israel, which is now the most relaxed it has ever been in its history as the highest threats to its existence, namely Syria, Iraq and Egypt, have been paralyzed.

Following the coordinated terrorist attacks in which 130 people were killed in Paris on November 13^th, many observers (including politicians) declared that France was going through its own “9/11”.  At first glance, there are indeed many striking similarities between the two terrorist attacks and the way they both traumatized the United States of America in 2001 and France in 2015.  Far more than localized attacks that could be socially and / or geopolitically explained, these tragedies has been unanimously described as a global “act of terror” against either “the American Way of Life” or the “French lifestyle”. In both cases, these “barbaric” and “foreign” attacks targeted peaceful civilians and the only possible response would be the declaration of a “global war on Terror” (Georges Bush) or a “merciless war” against the Islamic State (François Hollande).

As a direct consequence of these terrorist attacks on domestic soil, both George W. Bush and François Hollande benefited from the “rally-round-the-flag effect”: they openly became “War Presidents” and intensified their military intervention in the Middle East while reducing civil liberties at home.

On the international front, The United States of America heavily bombed Afghanistan that was harboring Al-Qaeda and invaded Irak in 2003 (without the authorization of the United Nations) whereas France immediately intensified its bombing of the so-called and self-proclaimed “Islamic State” (I.S.) in Syria. One should not forget that the ensuing chaos in Irak led to the creation of I.S…

On the domestic front, the U.S. government drafted the “Patriot Act”, which drastically limited American civil liberties and opened the door to the infamous Guantanamo prison. With the same parliamentary support, the French Government declared a new “state of Emergency” by extending a law created in 1955 during the bloody postcolonial war of independence in French Algeria.  It also proposed to write the State of Emergency into the French constitution.

However, beyond these apparent similarities between the American and the French immediate reactions to these international acts of terror (intensified military intervention in the Middle East and strict restriction of civil liberties), it is possible to highlight a few factors proving that history will not repeat itself and that “November 13^th” can not become a French version of “9/11”.

http://thenewturkey.org/ex-soviet-state-fighters-in-daesh/

On the international front, it is obvious that France, a newly (re)integrated NATO member, does not have the United States of America’s diplomatic and military capabilities.  As a truly Hobbesian State, America had the military power to invade Irak on its own even if they tried, mostly for diplomatic reasons, to build the largest “coalition of the willing”: At the end, out of the 48 Nations officially supporting the Bush administration in its “war against terror”, only three nations (The United Kingdom, Australia and Poland) offered limited military support on the Iraqi front. It is true that France is still one of the five permanent members of the United Nation Security Council and remains the largest army in continental Europe with a nuclear arsenal.  But as a more Kantian European State focused on peace building since the end of the Cold War, France has neither the diplomatic power nor the military might to follow the United States’ steps in the Middle East. As confirmed by President Hollande’s mixed results in his attempt to build a larger coalition with the support of key regional players such as the United States, Russia or even its closest European ally Germany, it is clear that France will not be able to unilaterally wage the “merciless war” against ISIS on Syrian soil as President Hollande and Prime Minister Valls promised to French citizens.  In addition, the current humanitarian tragedy in Syria where millions of civilians are brutally killed and forced into exile by both ISIS and the terror producing/exporting Assad Regime will force the French government to follow a more diplomatic path. The recent diplomatic agreement reached between the European Union and the Turkish government on the Syrian refugee crisis is a promising step in this more peaceful direction.

The future of civil peace and collective harmony in France depends on it.

If there is no doubt that “November 13^th” cannot have on the international scene the same impact as “9/11”, there are serious reasons to worry about the consequences that a radicalized war against ISIS terror could have on the French domestic front.  Situated thousands miles away from the Middle East with a very small Muslim community, the United States of America can still afford to dangerously instrumentalize Islam(ism) for political gain without having to greatly suffer on the domestic front from such an anti-Muslim rhetoric. Donald Trump’s recent call to block all Muslim Foreigners from entering the United States is a disturbing sign that Islamophobia remains an effective tool to gain support during an election campaign.

However, the situation of France, the country hosting the largest Muslim community in Europe, is radically different. As opposed to what happened in 2001, the French situation is a lot more complex since – despite apparent links to Syria – it was clearly a matter of homegrown terrorism with European connections. Moreover, as proven by the 2005 suburban youth riots and by the 2015 attacks against the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo and the kosher hypermarket, France is still struggling to harmoniously balance its multicultural and pluri-confessional identity inherited from its troubled colonial past with its deeply rooted Republican principals inscribed in the first two articles of the Constitution: “liberty”, “equality”, “fraternity” and “secularity” (“Laïcité”).  In a country where Marine Le Pen’s anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim National Front is becoming the main party shaping the whole political landscape, it is urgent that the French Republic rightfully preserves its integrity without however abandoning its core democratic values. It is also important that, in the name of national unity, France protects its Muslim community, which unanimously condemned the barbaric killings on November 13^th. But there are reasons to worry:  In the wake of the Paris attacks, islamophobic hate crimes have skyrocketed not just in France but in the whole Western world.  In recent days, many French associations and non-governmental organizations have denounced the drastic reduction of civil liberties made possible by the new State of Emergency. For example, many climate activists have been abusively placed under house arrest during the COP 21 conference in Paris even if they did not represent a terrorist threat. Many search warrants and house arrests have also targeted innocent Muslim French citizens who, thankfully, have been finally released. There are thus serious reasons to fear that the security measures taken by the French government could put at risk the civil Rights at the heart of French society and more particularly the freedom of its Muslim community. As clearly summarized by former conservative Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin (who gained international fame by opposing the U.S. invasion of Iraq in his 2003 UN speech), it is the moral and political duty of France to resist “the temptation to slide towards authoritarianism”.

The Paris attacks will certainly go down as one of the most tragic and infamous day in recent French History.  The difficulty to develop a more (self)critical and complex understanding of  “November 13^th” is a normal reaction that can be partially explained by the profoundly traumatic nature of these killings.  And yes, this is still the time to mourn and salute the memories of these 130 innocent victims. But if we want to make sure that History does not repeat itself and that “November 13^th” does not have the same tragic consequences for world peace than “September 11^th” and if France does not want to fall into the “civil war trap” designed by the so-called “Islamic State”, the time will come soon to move beyond grief in order to truly understand the complex social, cultural and (geo)political roots of what happened on November 13^th.  The future of civil peace and collective harmony in France depends on it.