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n Eurowhiteness, Hans Kundnani, Associate Fellow in the Europe Programme at Chatham House, challenges a sanitized and linear history of the EU, prompting the reader to rethink Europe’s peaceful image against its imperial past. He goes on to tackle myopic assumptions about the European project throughout the book.

Kundnani argues that pro-Europeans, who cradled cosmopolitanism and renounced nationalism, have failed to perceive the reality of European regionalism. This provocative critique dissects both the civic and ethnic elements that shape European identity by highlighting Europe’s interaction with the “Other” and linking “Europeanness” and “whiteness.” 

Eurowhiteness may come off as unpalatable to many pro-Europeans, but it raises valuable questions against a backdrop of a rising far-right in Europe. Especially in the wake of the 2015 refugee crisis, the complex relationship between European identity and race demands urgent reflection.

Q. What are some of the myths that cause blind spots in understanding the European identity?

I would mention two in particular. The first is the idea that the EU is a cosmopolitan project. Cosmopolitanism usually has something to do with the whole world, and Europe is not the whole world. There’s a tendency by pro-Europeans and the EU to mistake Europe for the world. For example, when they talk about European integration, they sometimes seem to think that they’re talking about global integration, but they’re not.

Similarly, when they say “I’m a European or I’m a European citizen,” they seem to think they’re saying I’m a citizen of the world, but they’re not; They’re saying I’m a citizen of this particular region that has a very particular history and relationship with the rest of the world.

This is what I call in Eurowhiteness “the of myth of cosmopolitanism in Europe”, and related to that is the idea to think European integration is good for the whole of the world, but that may not necessarily be the case; It may be good for Europeans or may not be good for Europeans, arguably. But even if it is good for Europeans, it’s not clear if it’s good for the whole world.

The second myth would be that the EU is a peace project, and that is not entirely wrong. However, the way that pro-Europeans talk about it is sometimes simplistic; that after 1945 Europeans rejected war, and since then Europeans stand for peace. In reality, Europeans did not reject war in general in 1945. They only rejected war with each other.

In 1950 as the Schuman Declaration, which can be seen as the beginning of the idea of the EU as a peace project, is made by France’s then-foreign minister Robert Schumann, France is simultaneously fighting a brutal colonial war in Indochina.

Similarly, seven years later, when the Treaty of Rome is signed, France fought a brutal colonial war in Algeria. This demonstrates that Europeans are continuing to fight colonial wars until they’re defeated or exhausted.

Europeans like to think of themselves as being uniquely peaceful. The real story is more complicated, and in particular, as I say, to the extent that Europeans have rejected military force, it is military force within what has become the European Union, not even within Europe at large, that is being rejected.

Q. Has the EU’s focus shifted from peace to power?

I wouldn’t say it has shifted from being about peace to being about power. I think it was always about power as well as peace. In particular, it gets to what I was just saying about the idea of the EU as a peace project.

If you go back to the interwar period pan-European movement, which is the inspiration for the post-War European integration project, it is very clear that at that time already that the European integration project is about power and the perception of European decline accelerated by fighting one other.

The idea is: If we want to maintain our position in the world – and at that time this is a position of colonial domination- we have to stop fighting with each other. Not so that we can end European colonialism, but so that we can continue it. So in other words, European integration would take the competitive element out of European colonialism, allowing its practice collectively.

Part of the point of European integration in 1950s was for France and Belgium to consolidate their colonies in Central and West Africa at a time when they were no longer able to on their own. In particular, they needed an injection of West German capital.

The idea of geopolitical Europe goes back to the 1920s. It only seems new because pro-Europeans like to tell a story of Europe through the aforementioned myths. It only seems like a shift because we’ve forgotten the real history of how European integration began.

Q. Does the EU still export the European social model and the general welfare state?

Social market economy and the welfare state are no longer what the EU can to claim export anymore. It may have done once, but even in Central and Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War we observe that this is not the case. In fact, the former communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe had much more generous welfare states when they were communist countries.

What happened as they joined the EU during the enlargement process is that those welfare states were dismantled as part of their transition to democracy. There are obviously lots of things that you can criticize about the communist systems in those countries, such as the lack of political freedom and so on, but they did have welfare states.

What has happened now is a further stage in which the EU is putting pressure on member states to dismantle the welfare state. For example, during the euro crisis, the austerity Germany imposed on Greece dismantled what was left of the Greek welfare state.

Q. Your book suggests that civic ideas of Europe are being replaced by ethnic-cultural ones. What is the connection of the neoliberalization of Europe to identity politics?

What I try to show in the book is that there have always been both of the elements of civic and ethnic-cultural idea in the history of what I call European regionalism- which is similar to nationalism on a larger continental scale. I’m suggesting that we can think of the history of ideas of Europe in the way we think about the history of nations. Therefore, regionalism is like nationalism.

The earliest ideas of Europe are predominantly ethnic-cultural. For example, in the medieval period, Europeanness is synonymous with Christianity. From the modern period onwards, you begin to get civic ideas of Europe. Then, in the post war period is when the EU came closest to evolving into a purely civic regionalism. Particularly, in the period from the 60s to the 90s-2000s, there was an idea of Europe centered on the social market economy, the welfare state and depoliticized mode of governance which European integration had produced.

I think what’s happened is that the social market economy and the welfare state have been hollowed out by neoliberalism in the EU. Meanwhile, there has been a backlash against the depoliticised mode of governance where the older civic idea of Europe is no longer persuasive in the same way it was before.

The way I understand neoliberalism is not just financialization, but it’s also the depoliticization of economic policy. In other words, it’s taking economic policy out of the space of democratic contestation. Although, to some extent, this has happened in the whole world in the last 30-40 years through things like the World Trade Organisation rules, the EU has taken it further through the creation of the single market, and also the Eurozone and the fiscal rules. Therefore, it’s very difficult now to pursue a left wing economic policy in the Eurozone because the fiscal rules don’t allow you to do it.

My argument is basically that when you take economic policy out of the space of democratic contestation and no longer have big fights between left and right about economic policy, your democratic politics shifts to cultural questions.

The point of democratic politics is to reconcile different interests and to have fights about questions where people in your society have different ideas or different interests. I think a healthy democratic politics is one where you do that about economic issues because there are real differences between the interests and different ideas as well.

What has happened now is that the center left parties and the center right parties converged in the center around neoliberal economic policy, which the EU has constitutionalized. Therefore, the way parties can differentiate themselves from each other now is around cultural questions.

In terms of what Europe says to the rest of the world, there was a time it would say it stood for the social market economy and the welfare state and now it says it stands for European civilisation.

A good example of this is the phrase “the European way of life,” which used to be used by French socialists, specifically, to refer to the social market economy and the welfare state and the idea of solidarity that it was meant to embody, saying “that’s what we in Europe stand for as opposed to the United States.”

Now when you look at the way that the phrase is used, it is in more civilizational terms. In the current European Commission, the Commission of Ursula Von Der Leyen since 2019, a European Commissioner for promoting the European way of life and his job is to keep migrants out, which makes it very explicit that migrants- only migrants from the South, not migrants from the east- are a threat to the European way of life. That is a very explicit expression of civilizationalism where the European way of life is defined in terms of culture and civilisation, not in terms of the social market economy and the welfare state.

Q. In your book you imply that the center right is increasingly mimicking the far right. Is there a pro-European version of the great replacement theory, if so, what is it?

There is an idea that the EU represents a European civilisation which is being increasingly threatened. This is basically a far right idea that has now been taken on by the center right in Europe.

For example, a couple of weeks ago, Eric Zemmour was doing a rally in the South of France with the young far right leader Marion Maréchal, and the slogan on the lectern at which he was speaking was ‘Defend our civilization.’  The way the far right is thinking about Europe is there’s a European civilisation that is threatened right now. The far right tends to talk about this in the context of migration. That is, it’s the migration of non-white and non-Christian people that is threatening European civilisation.

For example, Valérie Pécresse, the Republican candidate in the French Presidential election in 2022, was talking about white replacement theory or alluding to it in terms of migration. However, in addition, what the centre right tends to do is not talk so much about migration as a racial threat, but more in foreign policy terms as a threat to European civilisation. Macron has given speeches where he’s quite explicit about this.

In other words, international politics is a clash of civilizations, like how Samuel Huntington argues, and Europe is a distinct civilization. Moreover, for someone like Macron, the West is not one civilization, which is what Huntington thought but that Europe is a distinct civilisation, separate from the United States as well.

Where I see a connection with great replacement theory is that this is almost the international political equivalent of the great replacement theory. It’s not about migration but it’s that if Europe does not unite and defend itself, it will be also replaced by other civilizations. Macron has basically said that.

Q. What are some key takeaways from history regarding Europe’s interaction with those who it sees as the “Other”?

I try to show in Eurowhiteness that there’s a long history of defining Europe against various different “Others” at various different times and it’s constantly shifting. But roughly, I would say, in the medieval period when Europe is pretty much synonymous with Christianity, Jews are defined as the primary internal other and Muslims as the primary external other, excluding the divide between Western Christendom and Eastern Christendom.

Then, in the modern period, I try to show how there is a new complex modern idea of Europe, which is partly to do with the European enlightenment and the scientific revolution. It is a rationalist, secular idea of Europe rather than a religious one. At the same time, the idea of Europe also emerges in the context of the encounter of Europeans with the populations of Africa and Asia, and especially the Americas, and that’s the context in which the idea of whiteness emerges.

So, the modern idea of Europe is not just a rationalist one as opposed to a religious one, it’s also a more racialized idea of Europe that is closely connected to the idea of whiteness. What I think happens in that context is that non-white people around the world are the “Others” against which Europeans define themselves.

In the 20th century and particularly after World War I, you have the new idea of Europe as a geopolitical bloc, which I mentioned earlier. European civilisation or the European spirit, as they talked about it at that time, is being threatened by the United States on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other hand. In that context, Russia and also the United States are respectively an “Other.” What I think we’re seeing today is a mixture of all of those “Others.”

Rather than a “New Cold War,” we are now witnessing the culmination of an economic war with Russia, where the financial, energy, and capital markets are the battlegrounds. In his timely book, Economic War: Ukraine and the Global Conflict between Russia and the West, political risk analyst and consultant Maximilian Hess takes the reader through the period in which the seeds of economic warfare are sprouting into full bloom: from the initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014 to Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022 and beyond.  

The book skillfully delves into various economic fronts around the world, demonstrating the weaponization of economic tools such as pipelines, mining, credit, and cryptocurrencies. Each chapter unfolds like a chess game between Russia and the West, allowing the reader to map the moves of the contestants both chronologically and regionally, including Russia’s response to Western sanctions and what is at stake for each party.

There were a number of disputes in the early and mid-2000s between Russia and Ukraine over gas supplies and the terms thereof that led Russia to cut off deliveries and precipitated gas supply crunches in the wider European market. What I think people forget is that Nordstream 2 and Nordstream 1 were never intended to increase the total amount of Russian gas that could be pumped to Central Europe.

Instead, they were designed to ensure that Russia didn’t have to do it through Eastern Europe, in particular through Ukraine, so that Russia could then increase the leverage of its gas policy over Ukraine. We should have understood this risk at the time of Nordstream 2, because it was essentially designed to give Russia the same kind of leverage over other Eastern European states that it had gained over Ukraine.

Q. Why do you think Putin choose to invade Ukraine specifically in February 2022?

I think he thought it was an important time economically, when the West was weak and divided. He hoped that the sanctions response and the economic response would be less intense than it might have been at another time. Thinking in terms of change in 2020 and 2021, the end of the Trump administration and then the Biden administration that follows made it clear that there would be a concerted sanctions strategy.

He hoped that European unity would be weak and insufficient to resist him. Inflationary pressures from COVID-19 had already increased, and Russia had already begun to cut off its gas supplies to Europe. At the same time, he was preparing his troops to invade Ukraine and saw it as a moment when the West would be relatively weak economically and relatively vulnerable. Therefore, less likely to act against him and less likely to act in support of Ukraine. Which, of course, turned out to be a very big strategic miscalculation on his part.

Q. Has Russia’s strategy of crippling Europe with gas cuts failed?

Largely, I think it has failed. Not because of any failure within the strategy itself but because of collaborative actions on the part of the West. Intelligence was shared by the United States, by officials who had spoken on the record and had reached the assessment that there was a small chance that Russia wouldn’t invade Ukraine in October 2021, simply the brutal nature of Russia’s onslaught in February, and the fact that the Europeans saw an army of the largest form that had taken this action in Europe since World War II, made it clear to many European leaders that they had no other choice.

Putin was preparing, and did prepare, for a scenario in which Europe was fully on board with the sanctions regime through Russia’s fortress balance sheet strategy, the Kremlin’s process of building up large reserves of ‘hard currencies’ and gold. But now that the initial pain of that gas strategy is being felt, and inflation has been at such high levels for a year and a half. There are obviously still many politicians, particularly in Europe, such as former French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who are calling for a softer approach to Russia on these issues. That’s why Putin’s strategy is not one that is over; by threatening more economic pain, he can also undermine support for Ukraine in the long term. Global gas markets are much more fragile, and we could still see a new spike in gas prices this winter as a result of the Kremlin’s actions.

Q. Did Putin pull out of the Black Sea grain deal in an attempt to revive the inflation weapon?

I believe very strongly that this is what he is trying to do. It also gives him the tool of offering grain to African countries to gain more support there. I think we should be prepared for more actions by the Kremlin to deliberately try to stir up inflationary pressures, possibly trying to find a way to drive up prices, as well. The Kremlin really has only one major option, which is to threaten an export embargo and actually take action to make it look credible. That option is difficult because Russia’s budget is now so skewed toward the military.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine marked a pivotal moment in international relations, sparking outrage and condemnation from the global community while igniting deep-rooted tensions that had been simmering for decades. The invasion, which began in the early days of 2022, cast a dark shadow over the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity. As Russian forces advanced, cities and towns across Ukraine were transformed into battlefields, with civilians caught in the crossfire and their lives altered by the devastating consequences of war.

In 77 Days of February, a group of distinguished writers from Reporters Magazine, the only Ukrainian publication dedicated to long-form literary journalism, present a remarkably powerful collection of 24 personal narratives. The anthology aims to give readers unprecedented access to first-hand accounts of the atrocities suffered during the early days of the invasion.

It also serves as a tribute to the indomitable spirit and fortitude of the Ukrainian people, who continue to demonstrate unwavering strength and pride in the face of adversity. Marichka Paplauskaite, editor-in-chief of Reporters Magazine, joins us for an interview about 77 Days of February and her accounts of enduring the war as a Ukrainian journalist.

Q. At the beginning of the book there is an emphasis on why it is important to talk about the war in Ukraine from the beginning, with a reference to memory being unreliable. Would you like to share that with our readers?

The initial months of the war presented a profoundly challenging period for us. My colleagues and I felt an overwhelming urge to contribute to the cause of our country, and given our writing skills, we set out to create narratives. The primary goal of our magazine, Reporters, was to tell the story of Ukraine through the lens of personal stories, moving away from traditional hard news and focusing on the encounters, sentiments and emotions of individuals. So when the war broke out, our choice was clear: to share these stories first with fellow Ukrainians and then with a global audience.

This book carries an intense emotional weight, because it was simply not possible to discuss this subject without emotion. It encompasses our homeland and our own firsthand encounters. At first, we wondered if it was premature to delve into such intimate experiences. However, as the war continues and the timing of victory is uncertain, we decided to tackle the subject now, while the wounds are still raw.

Human memory is indeed very fragile, especially when it comes to traumatic events. The mind tries to forget events that have caused suffering. That’s why what we have managed to capture in texts about the events and memories of the first months of the war seems very important to me.

Q. What has changed between the beginning of the war and now?

We have been living under the conditions of a full-scale war for a year and a half now. It’s unfortunate to admit it, but we have managed to get accustomed to the war. In our cities, we still hear the air raid siren every day, which always means that Russian missiles or Iranian drones used by Russia are heading towards our territory to commit new acts of violence against innocent people. Nevertheless, under these circumstances we continue our work and try to live, adapting to the conditions of war.

Q. As a journalist, you’ve had the opportunity to interact with various individuals impacted by the war, is there a story that was particularly inspiring to you?

It’s hard for me to say which story impressed me the most. Because all the stories in the book are incredibly personal. There is one change that happened to us journalists at the beginning of the war: we became the heroes of our own texts. For instance, there are two stories about Chernihiv by our author Vira Kuriko. Her husband went off to fight, and she returned twice to the city surrounded by Russians, describing the life of people under siege.

Another story is “Pasha and the Old Man” by Olga Omelyanchuk. Her acquaintance overheard a phone conversation in a basement. Someone was talking about a paralyzed old man whose relatives had left him in a flat in Irpin. At the time, fierce street battles were raging in the town. Olga found soldiers who agreed to find the old man and evacuate him. It was a risky operation. But the soldiers managed to navigate the streets where gunfire echoed and rescue the man. I am struck by the humanity of this story. It shows an example of how one can remain human even in times of war.

Another story I would like to mention is titled “The Sea”. It tells the story of fishermen from the Kiev Sea – a vast reservoir. Villages on one bank were occupied by Russians in the early days, while on the other bank there was a fishing base. In times of peace these men would have been considered poachers, but in times of war they became heroes. They would cross the sea in their boats and rescue people from the occupation. This was dangerous because the sea was still covered with ice and the Russians were shelling the boats. Nevertheless, these fishermen risked their lives to save others.

As you can see, these stories depict not only the horrors of war, but also courage, compassion, desperation, and light.

Q. How has covering these stories affected you? Have you had the space to reflect on your own grief?

When we were working on these stories, we had to prepare everything so quickly that we had no time to think. But afterwards I had some time to think and I realized that it’s not about the stories, it’s about the lessons I learned during the war and during my work as a journalist and editor living in Ukraine.

We feel that we must live now; if you want to do something, do it today. If you want to tell someone you love them, tell them today. It’s not only because of the conditions of our personal lives during the war in general, but also because there are many stories, for example about nameless graves, that remind us to appreciate what we have.

Q. What struggles do you face bringing these stories to a global audience?

It was so important for us to share our work with readers abroad because we are afraid that the war will be normalized, as I mentioned before. We still need support, and I absolutely understand that people abroad can lose interest in the war in Ukraine and think, “Well, it’s news from Ukraine again. But for us, it’s a real and ongoing tragedy, all the time, in every town.

We want people to not just read the stories, but to empathize and think about how they would feel and act in that situation. And I hope that through these stories our readers can form an emotional connection with Ukraine. I think the biggest challenge is that it’s incredibly difficult to comprehend the experience of war unless you’ve been through it. I’ve read numerous books about different conflicts around the world. But when it came to war in my own country, I wasn’t prepared.

War is the worst experience one can have. Our subconscious can block the desire to understand this experience because it’s too painful. That’s why I hope that the stories in the book, which are very emotional and personal, will give foreign readers a chance to somewhat grasp our reality.

Q. Could you tell us about networks of collaborations amongst journalists at this time?

Our team isn’t large; besides editors, we only have two full-time correspondents. However, we have a large pool of freelance authors across the country. When the war started, they all reported to me about the stories they were witnessing and wanted to describe. It was a unique time of unity for all citizens, and journalists were no exception. We worked as a single team, driven by the importance of documenting events of historic magnitude, recording the crimes of the Russians, and capturing new pages in Ukrainian history. It was a time of solidarity and professional unity within the journalistic community.

Q. How has misinformation made life more difficult for the Ukrainian people during the war?

Personally, I haven’t found this to be a problematic issue because we don’t watch or rely on Russian propaganda TV channels or anything of that sort. If we come across something that raises suspicion or doubt, we check it out. Sometimes, when we come across something dubious, we instinctively recognize its lack of credibility. We make sure to verify and re-verify; after all, we have colleagues in all regions of Ukraine.

For instance, when a Russian propaganda channel tried to dismiss the atrocities in Bucha as a hoax and labeled the alleged victims as actors, my colleagues and friends were in Bucha. They witnessed the bodies on the streets, took videos and photographs that unequivocally confirmed the reality of the situation. Russian propaganda doesn’t shake us because we are here, on the ground, witnessing everything first hand.

Q. What important remarks would you like to share with our readers?

The main message I want to convey is that the war is an ongoing reality and our struggle persists. Readers may peruse the accounts documented within the 77 Days of February and recognize the tragedies and turmoil depicted, but they have the privilege of closing the book and returning to their daily lives. The reality we face, however, remains unchanged, with analogous stories unfolding every day across Ukraine. Our need for support continues.

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n Original Sin: Power, Technology and War in Outer Space, Dr. Bleddyn E. Bowen presents the sobering reality of space technology; its development to enhance the killing power of the state.

Bowen discusses the political, strategic, and social causes and consequences of the Global Space Age and sees it as an outgrowth of the international system actors within it. The book provides a global view of international politics of space and its increasingly multipolar environment, and masterfully links technopolitics to power politics.

Q. What is the original sin? How did nations first decide to pursue space power?

It’s tied up in the Thermonuclear Revolution, through the pursuit of military power. If it wasn’t for the perceived military benefits of being able to launch nuclear weapons, you would not have had the very large sums of money poured into these very temperamental, exotic new technologies in the 1940s and ’50s. The scenario would be similar for satellite technologies; they were very temperamental and unknown. The potential benefits were so huge that both superpowers’ military industrial complexes in the early Cold War put resources into it, and got the things working that then opened up access to space for all sorts of other applications as well.

The original sin refers to the military interest in developing those very first technologies that opened up the entire space. It started with the Sputnik shock. The launch of Sputnik in 1957 was the product of the Soviet missile arms and nuclear project. It wasn’t just to have a demonstration; Khrushchev did not plan that. It was very much Sergei Korolev saying, “Well, we might as well put a demonstration satellite up there.”

They were building those rockets to launch nuclear weapons. Korolev was told he could only work on the satellite in his spare time, so that the work did not interfere with developing them as missiles with nuclear weapons. So, Korolev and his teams worked on Sputnik in their own time, not on the main line of work. Even the very first satellite launch was just the tip of the iceberg of what was a massive military nuclear buildup.

Q. How has the use of space technology evolved from back then?

What we have today are just mature and advanced versions of the same basic technological system. They are often decades old. GPS is 50 years old. We just have a very advanced version of it today compared to 50 years ago. So, it’s about the spread and the increased availability of the services rather than a change in the technology as such.

It didn’t happen overnight, but by the 1990s most of the kinds of satellite service types that we use today had been developed in their earliest generations, or sometimes even the second or third generations.

Satellite TV, for example, came out of military command and control systems. The Tokyo Olympics were broadcast by satellite in 1964; it was the first major sports event to be broadcast by satellite. That’s an example where the actual service and technology have been there for a long time, but it’s far more ubiquitous now.

Satellite navigation is another one. Various parts of the military and civilian economy in the United States were already using the very first services of GPS in the late 1980s. Today, those services are just far more accessible to everyone rather than just specialized organizations.

Similarly, with satellite imagery; one of the applications was in 1960 when the first Corona spy satellite images came back. Those things have been around for a very, very long time; now, you have a lot more commercial companies doing that, which means the private sector, and even individuals who have the money can purchase those kinds of images now, and get them much more quickly as well.

However, I’m not optimistic about that future, because if anything of value is found that is economically feasible to develop or exploit, then selfish interests will probably prevail because the precedent is already there in Earth orbit. If you want to look at the actual competition for resources in space, it’s been happening for decades already in the geostationary satellite belt.

At geostationary orbit, 36,000 kilometers above the equator, there’s a finite space and finite radio frequency spectrum to use, and different countries have to file at the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) to get the right to use the particular radio communication frequency and the location to put their satellite. They are given a time limit to get their satellites up there and to start using it. Then, they must continuously use it and have a satellite there, or they lose the right to that slot and somebody else can bid for it. It’s pretty much on a first-come-first-serve basis.

The geostationary belt and Earth orbit are so valuable for military and economic purposes that there is no truly equitable method of governance there. It may occur in the future; politics is about possibilities. However, that’s the precedence we’ve set over the last 70 years, and it’s not encouraging. I don’t think we’re going to have profitable moon mining anytime soon. I think that might take another 100 years or more. But if the moon becomes economically very valuable, there aren’t many positive precedents to use sadly.

Q. Do actors hog up these strategic locations? Is there any regulation that prevents such an act?

In terms of geostationary satellite slots and frequency use, it is first come, first served, and if you don’t use it, you lose it. The filings on the ITU are constantly watched because if countries or companies file for a certain frequency, and if it was approved, they own that frequency. Some countries like to file for very large satellite constellations and people evaluate this as an attempt to hog the spectrum or a location.

It’s up to the countries within the ITU to resolve those disputes before final decisions are made. If the ITU fails to make enough decisions that people think are fair, then the organization itself risks becoming desolate. There has to be some level of coordination to avoid jammed and incompatible satellite usage. So, you could end up with a situation where nobody can use satellites in a certain area, because too many people are trying to use it at the same time.

Q. How does more countries or actors stepping into the space arena translate to international relations?

That is a difficult question. I won’t have a clear answer for you, because I’m observing it just like everyone else. The phrase the “democratization of space” is being thrown around a lot. I don’t like that phrase because I don’t think that having more countries doing things in space is necessarily democratic.

Space governance is usually more a reflection of power politics rather than any democratic process, and a lot of countries that are doing more things in space are not democratic countries themselves, and even within democratic countries there are questions over how involved the wider electorates are in space policy, or whether they are actually interested or informed about their countries’ space policies and activities. There’s a representation and engagement question there that we would ascribe to any system we would call democratic.

So, whilst there’s more population in space now, perhaps in terms of the number of different countries, and also large private companies doing things in space, I wouldn’t call it democratic. We don’t have a truly democratic governance structure for outer space. There are votes of the UN General Assembly, but it’s not really the same as the domestic democratic system.

On one hand, more countries are paying more attention to space now, because it affects everyone, so more engagement and more awareness is a good thing. On the other hand, it means that the ways that a lot of countries have been using the United Nations to try to govern space activities needs to be revisited in a way that recognizes that dozens more countries now have a stake in it. It’s not necessarily the West versus the rest, and it requires a shift in mentality for many of the older traditional space powers, including China, Japan, and India, just like Western Europe, the United States, and Russia.

The older, bigger traditional space powers are used to being able to do what they want to, without having to consider the rest of the world too much—that is less and less the case now. If they can’t change the ways they behave, or try to get agreements or consensus built in various forums, that may be an issue. Space is becoming more like governing the seas now, with a lot of smaller states much more involved and influential in any sort of UN-level agreement.

Q. Do different countries take similar or different paths in developing and utilizing space technology?

There are variations, especially in the way countries might want to present themselves. Yet, they share a lot of the same technological hurdles because it’s the same base technologies that you need to use. As I do in Original Sin, you can look at six or seven significant space powers and they all must get over the same technological hurdles to have their own access to space, their own launch vehicles, their own satellite industries, their own educated and trained workforce in space technology and sciences, etc.

Especially early on, when space knowledge and technology were not as widespread, there were many common challenges that had to be faced. But then, within that broad similarity, in terms of the technological challenges, you have the variations in the way certain countries go about doing things.

Japan, for example, didn’t really have that much of an explicit military connection to its satellite and launch vehicle deployment. The logic of autonomy and avoiding complete dependence on the United States was supported by the Japanese government, just in case Japan might need to develop its own nuclear weapons program in the upcoming years. Having a nuclear energy industry and a rocket launch industry, you got the fundamental infrastructure there to develop nuclear bombs and missiles, if you need to down the line. India’s major space efforts were presented in terms of social and economic development, much more so than the Soviet Union, China, and the United States.

Today, there are even more variations because there are already six established space powers: the United States, Europe, Russia, China, India, and Japan. Other countries can now cooperate or purchase services and pick and choose which aspect of space industries they want to develop or take part in. Take Nigeria, for example. It has dropped its old ambitions of having its own launch vehicle, its own rockets, and its own astronaut in space, and focused on satellites and using satellite data. That means, Nigeria has really important stakes in what goes on in space, but it can’t launch its own satellites and it still buys satellites. It still hasn’t gotten a full satellite manufacturing capability yet, but it operates and uses its own satellites.

Brazil has major Earth observation satellites in a joint program with China. It tried to have a launch program which failed, and they eventually gave up on it because it was just too expensive. Other countries, for a fee, would launch their satellites for them. Britain, for example, doesn’t have its own launch capability, but it does a lot in space science, engineering and research, integrated with the European Space Agency. It relies on the United States for security and intelligence applications in space and services, and is a world leader in small satellites manufacturing. It’s not comprehensive, but it’s got very targeted, niche strengths.

Finland has a commercial radar imagery satellite company, and is a big player in terms of the space economy and technology development in the particular area, but it doesn’t have its own rockets.

Just like any other aspect of military, technological, economic, or diplomatic power, space power has so many different applications. What matters is what kind of space technologies and industries each country actually needs because they will be different for each case.

Different countries today can tailor their space strategies and policies according to their economic and security needs, etc. The United Arab Emirates is particularly interesting. They are throwing money at space in lots of different areas; they are investing in defense security, economic infrastructure, and space exploration. They have sent a satellite to Mars and wanted to send a payload to the moon, but they still don’t want to build their own rockets.

Space is still so expensive and you need a lot of trained people and highly specialized skills. You need to have loads of people go into rocket science, which would take them out of other sectors of high-technology skills and training that they could otherwise be deployed at. Therefore, space power must be targeted in countries that are new to space or smaller countries.

Q. The Outer Space Treaty bans the placement of nuclear weapons in space but that’s not the case with conventional weapons. What measures can actors take to protect themselves?

This has been the case since 1967 based on Article 4 of the Outer Space Treaty. There’s not a lot you can do in terms of governance, because there’s no appetite for any more restrictions on other kinds of weapon bans in space. The Russians and the Chinese have tried to push a treaty on it, but it has not gotten anywhere. It is seen by many as a bad faith diplomatic exercise; it is not something that’s done with genuine intent to try to make space warfare less likely to happen.

There’s not a lot you can do other than to build more satellites, so that if something happens to one, there are more ready to take over, or to build terrestrial alternatives or backups. If the satellites go dark, there’s not a lot you can do because if a determined enemy wants to shoot down your satellite and they have technology capabilities, direct defense of satellites is very difficult.

Against electronic warfare or cyber warfare, there are more options for defense. However, it’s difficult for us on the outside to observe it. The forensics of that become very difficult. It’s hard to tell when something is a deliberate attack or just accidental.

They are highly proliferated and the cost to entry is lower, so smaller powers can do cyber operations. It’s difficult to stop a missile from blowing up your satellite but you have more options to respond to enemy jamming or a cyber attack, the effects of those can be reversed. So, in terms of governance, there’s not a lot you can do. On the other hand, militarily depending on the kind of attack, there are some things you can do in some areas.

A

t a time when norms are increasingly pushed aside in the international arena, one great quagmire stands to impact us all: climate change. Humanity seems to be gambling its present and future, while corporations aim to delay transition for profits. It is not just an issue that effects those of us alive today, but also the distant strangers of the next generation.

Who bears the responsibility? How can we deal with climate change fairly? Should one resent the “burden” or embrace the “challenge”?  In The Pivotal Generation: Why We Have a Moral Responsibility to Slow Climate Change Right Now, political philosopher Prof. Henry Shue helps the reader dissolve the separateness between the past, present, and future, and oversee their responsibility towards climate change. Shue encourages the reader to face the historic challenge of our generation, like past generations have with the complex challenges they faced.

Q. Why are we “the pivotal generation”? Why is it a privilege to be us?

We’re the pivotal generation because we just happen to live at the time when either we do enough to prevent climate change from getting out of hand or we don’t – and this is going to be decided in the next 10 or 20 years.

We know from the science that greenhouse gas emissions, especially carbon dioxide emissions, have to reach net zero by 2050 if climate change is not to be even more severe than it’s already going to be.

It’s just common sense that if we have to go all that way by 2050, then we need to get halfway by about 2030 since reducing emissions by the second half is going to be much harder than the first half.

We have a chance to make an enormous difference and really deeply influence the course of human history. That’s the privilege – and almost an honor: to be an absolutely crucial generation. In some ways, those of us alive now are the most important people in human history, because we’re going to determine whether climate change stays relatively moderate or it becomes even more severe.

One can also think of this as a burden as we have to carry on a lot of tasks. But I find it sort of exhilarating to think that we’re in the position to accomplish as much as we can accomplish, if we get serious about the problem of climate change.

We have a chance to make an enormous difference and really deeply influence the course of human history. That’s the privilege – and almost an honor: to be an absolutely crucial generation.

Q. What makes climate change stand out as the main challenge of our generation?

It’s because so much of a difference will be made in the short time. It’s not that there are no other very important problems, we need to prevent nuclear war, xenophobia etc. But as far as we know, we don’t have to deal with those problems in the next 10 or 20 years, but in the case of climate we really do have to bring about a revolution in our energy system in the next 10 or 20 years.

Since World War II, there has never been a year when carbon dioxide emissions weren’t more than they were in the previous year, except for the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Every year, except for 2020, emissions are going up. That’s a deep, built-in trend, and it has to be reversed very quickly. We need to turn things around, use much less fossil fuel, and do it right away.

There are other problems that are also very important, though dealing with climate change will help with a number of other problems. For example, it will help with health. A lot of people have lung and heart disease because of the particulate matter that burning coal puts into the air.

If we burn less fossil fuel, we won’t only deal with the climate; we will greatly improve health and also save a lot of money. One of the really hopeful things already is that it’s cheaper to build a new solar energy farm and then use it than it is to keep using a coal-burning plant that’s already there. The prices of some alternatives, particularly solar, have already gone below the price of fossil fuels.

Q. Nowadays, with limited time and energy, we are made aware of an incomprehensible number of topics and are often left feeling overwhelmed. Your book highlights responsibility. How can we take responsibility for climate change in our lives?

I do, as you say, talk about responsibility. That’s partly because this is what I work on as a political philosopher, but it’s also very much in our interest to deal with climate change.

However, the thing I wanted to emphasize especially is our responsibility toward future generations. I think we picture future generations as strangers, people who we’ve never met or who we don’t know and don’t have anything much to do with us in our daily life.

In fact, in our daily life, we are shaping the world that future generations are going to live in, and so they’re not distant at all. We are shaping their world, and we have a very tight, intimate connection with them. And so, I think we do have responsibility for the problems that we leave them with. They may be able to solve some of the problems, but we’ll see to it that they have less of them.

For example, there’s going to be sea level rise, and this is going to cause problems for coastal cities. They can move or try to build sea walls or all sorts of things, so they won’t be entirely helpless, but it is true that they will inherit problems like sea level rise from us. The less we do about climate change, the more problems that they are going to inherit.

Q. What are the developed nations’ historical responsibilities?

They’re huge. It’s countries like the one I was born in, the United States, and the one I live in, the United Kingdom, which are mainly responsible. I believe the way to think about responsibility is to look at total cumulative emissions over history and the country with the greatest total cumulative emissions is the United States.

China currently has the most emissions per year, but their cumulative emissions are still quite a bit less than the U.S. I think a reasonable way to look at this is to the extent that you’ve emitted the gases that cause climate change, you are to that extent responsible for the problem. Therefore, this means most of the responsibility goes to the most industrialized countries.

There are complications to this. Saudi Arabia, for example, sells enormous amounts of fossil fuel, and they haven’t generated a lot of greenhouse gas emissions because they’re not a heavily industrialized country. But for the most part it’s the industrialized countries in North America and Western Europe, and Japan which have done the most to cause the problem. I think, the common sense principle is, if you’ve made the mess, then you should clean it up.

And one thing this means is that to get to zero emissions all countries have to stop using fossil fuel, but poorer countries can’t just find a lot of money all of a sudden, and install renewable energy everywhere. However, it’ll be bad for the climate if they follow the same route to development that countries like mine did. So, one of the ways in which a country like the U.S. or the UK can exercise its responsibility is to finance, to some extent, and, at least, invest in sustainable development in poorer countries. In this case, this means leapfrogging over the fossil fuel and going straight to non-fossil fuels like solar, wind, even nuclear. There are problems about nuclear, as everybody knows, but it doesn’t generate greenhouse gas.

Q. In your book, you talk about the fossil fuel interest having entrenched allies within the U.S. government and banking sector. Can we break up that cycle?

We’ll see. That’s the crucial battle, because even the richest countries which talked the most about doing something about climate change are all still subsidizing fossil fuels. In the U.S., there is accelerated depreciation for companies that drill new oil wells. That’s absolutely absurd! We don’t need new oil wells, and we certainly don’t need to give tax breaks to companies that drill new oil wells. This shows that a big section of our politicians is basically captured by fossil fuel interests.

I think the only hope is essentially democracy and social change brought about by people. Many fossil fuel companies say they are committed to the Paris Agreement and to net zero by 2050, but they are not doing anything to get there.

If they wanted to, they could develop plans that would change them from being oil companies to being energy companies, which is what they say they’re doing but it’s not what they’re actually doing. Since they’re not voluntarily making the transition, the only way to get them to do it is to have a political action.

There are a lot of different possible kinds of political action, like carbon taxes or border taxes. There are also many complicated questions about what exactly to do. I think we need our governments to take forceful actions that will require the transition away from fossil fuel, and that will, for a start, put a stop to additional extraction.

New oil wells are drilled using loans from the major banks, and, once again, the worst banks in the world are all American: JP Morgan Chase, Wells Fargo, Citibank, Bank of America. It’s hard to put pressure on banks, but we can try, and you can.

This spring, for example, there’s going to be a day when people cut up their credit cards if they have a credit card from these banks. By the way, there’s a report that anybody can access on the web called “Banking on climate chaos.” It’s revised every year, and it shows exactly which banks are making how many loans for the extraction of fossil fuel. And so, you can find out who the main offenders are and not give them your business.

Q. How can activists and decision-makers approach the sociopolitical implications of climate change, such as climate refugees who are projected to reach one billion by 2050?

The best thing to do is to prevent flows getting worse than they are. As I mentioned before, this means enabling countries which have a lot of poverty and quite rightly want to eradicate the poverty to do it by a path that doesn’t mean more use of fossil fuel, and, therefore, more emissions.

The countries that are wealthier should invest and assist with this. For example, India has a huge amount of coal, and it happens to be particularly dirty coal. We really need India not to burn that coal. The way to do it is to invest in their solar power. The more quickly we can bring down the amount of fossil fuel that’s burned and the amount of emissions that are released, the less the sea level will rise, and for example, the fewer people will have to flee from coastal cities.

The important thing to do is try to take actions that prevent people having to flee. People don’t want to leave their own country. It’s not only in the interest of the potential receiving countries, but if we don’t act fast, movements of refugees are going to be really very serious.

Q. In the broader global context, we see an era of international relations drifting away from norms. However, actors cooperate in certain areas while having relatively hostile relations. As far as interests are involved, it’s a kind of double standard. Should we expect states to act morally?

States do tend to pursue their own national interest, but one thing about climate change is that it is in everyone’s interest to deal with it. I think the best that any given nation can do is to carry out its own responsibilities and hope that others will respond.

Now, for exactly the reasons you gave, people worry that others will be so-called free riders. The U.S., in particular, has worried endlessly about whether if it spends a lot of money on climate change, it’ll end up having to carry the burden for everybody. If everyone holds back waiting for other people to do things, nothing will happen, and that’s where we are right now.

People have been holding back and worrying about whether they’re going to get stuck with the bill. I think the only hope is to stop worrying about whether other people are going to take advantage of you and start showing some leadership to what needs to be done and hope that others will respond by doing something similar.

They may not, and if they don’t, then one can take tougher action. For example, the EU now is going to introduce border tariffs on products that are made in ways that generate more emissions than the products would have generated if they had been made inside the EU. This is a way of putting pressure on other countries to reduce their emissions.

The hope is that rather than paying the border taxes, other countries will crack down on their own emissions. That’s a way of pressuring others: it’s not violent, but it’s pressure, and it’s not just waiting for other people to do the right thing. It is, however, tricky. We don’t want to start wars, and even trade wars if we can help it. At the same time, this is very important and we need to take measures that will be effective. Actually, the EU has been showing some leadership, and, on the whole, has been the most effective set of countries on climate change. So, there are some countries trying to do the right thing.

Q. Do you think that climate technology investments could be used as a foreign policy tool in global competition. Are we seeing such developments?

I think the best thing any country can do for its own national interest is to be leading the world in non-fossil fuel technology. A country like the U.S. or countries in the EU need to develop alternative technology in order to deal with climate change since these are going to be the technologies that the world is going to be using for the next century, or many centuries. It is also in their interest to be the ones who develop it.

If other nations are smart, they’ll be developing the technology too. The last thing you want to do is end up being a country that’s still burning coal and oil when everybody else has the alternatives. This is actually a very clear case where doing the right thing is also very much in your long-term self-interest, and can enhance your competitive position economically.

I think the best thing any country can do for its own national interest is to be leading the world in non-fossil fuel technology.

We are on the brink of irreversibility in some cases when it comes to climate change, which can squelch all hope. Do you have any optimistic concluding words for our readers?

The truth is, we’re in a real battle. We could win or we could lose, but there are some good things happening. The youth movement, the Greta Thunbergs of the world, is the most hopeful thing. Just in the last few years, young people across the world have gotten really angry at the old goats like me, who’ve been here for decades and have not dealt with the problem. And they’re getting really fired up – that’s good!

Another very good thing that I mentioned already is that the prices of alternative energy are way down, and so it’s much cheaper to install and use solar than it is to just keep using coal, for example. But as you mentioned, we know that there are so-called tipping points, cases where something in the climate passes a point of no return, and you can’t go back.

Particularly with ice sheets, which means with sea level rise, it is possible that we’ve passed at least one tipping point for West Antarctica, and we know that Greenland and East Antarctica are not too far away, especially Greenland.

This is another reason why the next decade or so is really crucial. We’ve got to turn around the emissions and the speed of the rise before we pass any more tipping points. But people are finally getting fired up and so I have some hope. We’re not doomed – there are things we can do and things we’re beginning to do. We have to keep doing them and do more of them.

I

n his book Growth for Good: Reshaping Capitalism to Save Humanity from Climate Catastrophe, Alessio Terzi, an economist at the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs and lecturer at Sciences Po, examines the concerns of the degrowth movement which challenges one of the most fundamental components of a capitalist economy: economic growth. He takes the ideas that are rather idealistic and injects them with a dose of pragmatism to explain how growth once more can be a force for good.

Terzi initially strikes a balance between opposing views. He acknowledges the value of the degrowth movement’s arguments, addresses the parts in which they fall short, and lays out the tools that are effective. Growth for Good emphasizes innovation and how capitalism allows it to thrive; however, it also underlines the parts of a capitalist economy that need adjustment in order to take action to combat climate change now.

What is remarkable about the book is its refreshing approach that encourages the reader to keep an open mind. It offers more than an argumentative and sterilized defense of a point of view: it is a genuine yet refined thought process leading into Terzi’s blueprint for an executable agenda allowing the reader to easily follow and absorb the concepts that he highlights in the book. Growth for Good does not only preach about innovation, it embodies innovation in the way it communicates.

In Growth for Good innovation is the key to solving the climate crisis. How does innovation come into play when addressing the concerns of environmental activists?

In the chapter I have on innovation itself and how innovation comes about, I explain that innovation responds to what is perceived as a need. So, the very definition of innovation itself, how it manifests, why certain innovations develop at certain points in time, and whether they are developed and utilized depends on need.

The invisible hand is an important concept in economics for responding to needs, but we can’t seem to get that response when it comes to the environment. Why is that?

The invisible hand in a capitalist system is the price mechanism. The price mechanism doesn’t work because for a very long time we’ve treated the environment as an endless bucket where we could shove our trash. Therefore, there was no pricing for any of these things, and the invisible hand doesn’t do its job at all.

Why would change happen now?

Why this process of transformation will happen is that luckily, we see growing concern about climate change and environmental awareness in people, which wasn’t the case for a very long time. I think that that is the first step which triggers a domino effect throughout society.

Whereas it’s very important to have pioneers who are environmentally aware at an earlier stage, I’m not waiting for a moment in which the whole of society becomes environmentally driven and thinks that one must prioritize the planet over personal needs. Rather, I am waiting for the moment where the cheap option and the green option coincide, and I think that we’re starting to see this increasingly.

For example, when people and governments are willing to invest in greener modes of transport such as electric cars, companies see opportunities for profits. They respond to the opportunity and scale up their production and the costs for these technologies fall. Then, these technologies can spread across society, including people with fewer financial means.

If we want to look for a spark of optimism, these green technologies will not spread linearly but exponentially. Once we reach tipping points, they will spread very fast. We are seeing these developments with renewable energy sources and with a variety of new technologies which are going to be crucial in a green economy.

In your book you warn of a rebound effect for developing countries. Do you think there is enough time to prevent a tip over that would cause us to lose the climate race?

The climate is changing fast, and we are potentially experiencing the tipping points that you are hinting at from a climate, environmental perspective. We have technology and innovation on the other side of the race, which again will experience positive tipping points in terms of acceleration of deployment – that is the component that we’re trying to define.

I am often asked, “Are we going to win against climate change?” It is a bit of an odd question to me, because the climate is already changing. So, to some extent we will experience some of these changes, such as extreme weather events. Their frequency will increase. That’s a fact because they are already baked into the atmosphere. What we will do is try to use innovation to contrast these effects.

I am often framed as an optimist in the fact that I believe that the innovation push can happen, and it can happen fast, but I don’t want to overplay my optimism in the sense that all our problems will magically be solved equally and everywhere. I think that the decades ahead will be a rough period of transition and adjustment.

What is the blueprint that Growth for Good offers?

Economic growth as it is right now leads to CO2 emissions, a linear way of consumption, and therefore pollution of various sorts, but this doesn’t have to be the case. Economic growth can once again be a force for good – that’s where the blueprint comes into play. It requires action from a variety of actors in society.

There is a lot that governments can do in terms of regulation such as taxing carbon, carbon pricing, and penalizing certain behaviors like bans on single-use plastic. Furthermore, governments should put together big plans and invest in infrastructure for a green economy. With respect to industrial policy, governments should invest in research and development for new ways to decarbonize industry. Meanwhile, there is also a lot businesses and consumers can and should do. The blueprint comes together only if all these actors act at the same time, and no single one can work it out on its own.

What would be the most defining factor for saving humanity from a climate catastrophe?

My view rests on the idea that green technologies can be made cheaper. It is not a potential abstract concept, but something that you can see and measure. The degree and speed in which this happens is going to be the most crucial factor. So, observing how fast these technologies develop and cost curves go down will be defining whether we end up on the winning or the losing side of the race with climate change.

Eighteen years after the fall of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Iraqi Shiites are divided on the relationship between political power, ethnicity, and religious legitimation. However, one thing that is clear is that the greater majority of high-ranking Shiite religious scholars in Iraq support democracy. Peyman Eshaghi of Politics Today interviewed Dr. Ali Taher Elmemmud, associate professor of sociology at the University of Baghdad, on his book titled The Embers of Governance: Iraqi Shiites and Nation-State Building Challenges in the Post-2003 Era, Beirut, Darelrafidayn, 2017 [in Arabic].

Q. What is the inspiration and motivation behind this book? What is the inspiration and motivation behind this book?

This book was my doctoral dissertation. It took two years to write, and a passionate defense that lasted six and a half hours was held for it. This was because it was the only dissertation defended in the Faculty of Humanities and the Department of Sociology of Baghdad University on Shiism and state-building in Iraq. After that, of course, it took a year to turn the dissertation into a book.

Of course, I removed some theoretical aspects from the book, and it became more suitable for non-academic readers and researchers. To write the dissertation, I conducted field research for more than a year. I succeeded in conducting interviews with twenty notable personalities. It was very challenging to meet Iraqi high-ranking Shiite clerics, known as “Sources of Emulation,” and top political figures due to Iraq’s situation and the sensitivities surrounding the issue. Among them are Al-Sayyid Ali Al-Sistani, Sayyid Muhammad Saeed Al-Hakim, Muhammad Is’haq al-Fayadh, and Bashir Al-Najafi.

Talking to intellectuals was much easier, but as I said, interviewing leading religious figures in Iraq was more difficult. For example, I spent six months trying to interview a Shiite high-ranking religious scholar known as “Marja” (literally Source of Emulation) in Najaf.

Q. How did you conduct research for this book?

While examining the state-building by Shiites in Iraq after 2003, I tried to study the fundamental theories of state-nation building. But I soon realized that many of the approaches cited about Iraq do not reflect the realities of the country. Perhaps this is because most of the researchers who have worked in this field have been non-Iraqis or have not done fieldwork. It must be borne in mind that Iraq is a country with an ancient history and deep-rooted culture. Therefore, it is challenging to bring together all the affairs of Iraq and understand the country in terms of the relationship that the government has had with its people.

For example, Francis Fukuyama has written about state-building in Iraq, and British author Liora Lukitz has written another book on state-building in Iraq. In this book, Lukitz applies Anthony Smith’s theory of national identity to the case of Iraq. However, when we scrutinize the issue, we find that neither of the two writers has been able to consider and understand Iraq’s realities. These two “Western ways” of thinking could not comprehend the local complexities.

Since 2003, Iraqi Shiite Islamists have ruled with the same secular tools and way of thinking. Thus, it must be said that this is a new phenomenon in the course of Shiite political thought. In practice, no Shiite Islamist has tried to pass Islamic law in parliament since 2003. Personal status laws were never transformed into the “Islamic” ones. The budget law, one of the clauses of which imposes a tax on alcoholic beverages, which practically guarantees their free sale in Iraq, has never been criticized by a parliament whose majority is Shiite Islamists. They never tried to establish an Islamic institution called the government. Such things show that their Islamism enjoys a civil approach.

Although this approach is not Islamist in the conventional sense, it is not necessarily secular in the anti-religious sense. Instead, it respects religion without allowing religion to rule directly. Iraqi Shiite Islamists are in favor of a civil society, and Islamism for these Islamists is a belief in Islam and a personal commitment to it. In other words, Islamism is defined by performing a series of private acts of worship, observing sincerity and trustworthiness, and the like. Islamists have no purpose other than themselves and individual issues, and do not intend to lead society towards Islam.

Most of the Iraqi Shiites are following Ayatollah Sistani. However, they are not the only ones. Some Shiites are also openly secular in three types: first, liberal seculars represented by people like Ahmad Chalabi, who passed away a few years ago. Second, the national seculars who are represented in the political arena by politicians such as Ayad Allawi. The third group is the Communist seculars, represented by the Iraqi Communist Party.

Islamist Shiites are also made up of several groups. Most of them follow Ayatollah Sistani. The second group, which is smaller than the first group, is Muqtada al-Sadr. Religiously, they were following Sayyid Muhammad-Sadiq al-Sadr, Muqtada al-Sadr’s father, who was assassinated by state forces in 1999, and now they follow Muqtada al-Sadr. Muqtada is a nationalist figure who has never called for the formation of an Islamic-Shiite state since 2003. He has promoted religious, denominational, and cultural pluralism in Iraq, especially in recent years.

The third group of Shiite Islamists is loyal to the theory of velayat-e faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist). They follow Ayatollah Khamenei, the supreme leader of Iran, who resides outside Iraq in the Iranian capital of Tehran. These people are mainly affiliated with Iraqi militia groups. They have never dared to say that they want an Islamic or Shiite state since the fall of Saddam, but their approach is vividly focused on the Shiite identity and creating a Shiite ummah. In their view, the Shiite ummah ranges from the Hazaras of Afghanistan to Hezbollah in Lebanon. According to them, the leadership of this Shiite nation will be in Tehran.

The last group of Iraqi Shiites is supporters of Ayatollah Sayyid Sadiq al-Shirazi. They are much fewer in number than others. They are more focused on ritual issues, and they do not have a specific political program.