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yrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa announced on Sunday a comprehensive ceasefire and a far-reaching integration agreement between the Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), marking a major shift in the balance of power in the country’s northeast after years of fragmentation and conflict.

According to details published by the state-run Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), the agreement provides for an immediate and full ceasefire across all fronts and contact lines between Syrian government forces and the SDF. The deal is to take effect alongside the withdrawal of all SDF-affiliated military formations to areas east of the Euphrates River, a move described as a preparatory step for redeployment and reintegration.

Under the agreement, the provinces of Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa will be handed over fully and immediately to the Syrian government, both militarily and administratively. This includes the transfer of all civilian institutions, public facilities, and local administrative bodies to state control. Employees currently working in civil institutions in the two provinces will be retained within relevant Syrian state ministries, and the government pledged not to take punitive measures against SDF personnel or members of the existing civil administration.

The integration of all civilian institutions in Hasakah

The deal also stipulates the integration of all civilian institutions in Hasakah province into Syrian state administrative structures, further extending Damascus’ authority over territories that had remained outside direct government control for much of the past decade.

A key element of the agreement concerns strategic economic assets. The Syrian government will assume control of all border crossings as well as oil and gas fields in the northeast. According to SANA, Syrian forces will secure these sites to ensure that revenues are returned to the state, a development expected to have significant economic implications for a country struggling under years of war and sanctions.

Developments on the ground appeared to move in parallel with the political announcement. In eastern Deir ez-Zor, Syrian tribal forces took control of major oil and natural gas facilities previously held by the YPG/SDF, Anadolu Agency reported. Tribal groups operating east of the Euphrates, reinforced by fighters arriving from the western side of the river, seized the Al-Omar oil field and the Koniko natural gas field, two of Syria’s most important energy sites.

Withdrawal of U.S. forces

Local sources said the advances followed the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the area, which had previously used several of the oil and gas facilities as military bases. The U.S. pullout created a security vacuum that accelerated the collapse of SDF control in large parts of the region.

As tribal forces advanced, they also took control of several towns and villages east of the Euphrates, including Shehil, Al-Hawayij, Ziban, Tayyane, Abu Hamam, Hatla, Garanij, Baghouz, Susah and Shafeh. SANA broadcast images showing SDF withdrawals from key locations such as the Al-Halabiya Roundabout, described as a major transportation hub linking the eastern, western and northern countryside of Deir ez-Zor.

The Syrian army and internal security forces expanded their presence in other strategic areas. SANA reported that government forces took control of al-Tabqah Prison west of Raqqa province, while the army’s Operations Command announced full control of the al-Tabqah military airport. Internal security units were also deployed to villages in the western Deir ez-Zor countryside to consolidate control and restore order.

Regional reactions

Regional reactions to the developments were swift. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan held a phone call with President al-Sharaa on Sunday, stressing that the complete removal of terrorism from Syrian territory is vital for Syria and the wider region. According to a statement by Türkiye’s Communications Director Burhanettin Duran, Erdoğan reaffirmed that Türkiye’s support to Syria, particularly in counterterrorism efforts, would continue to increase.

During the call, the two leaders discussed bilateral relations and recent developments in Syria. Erdoğan emphasized that Türkiye attaches great importance to Syria’s territorial integrity, unity, stability and security—principles Ankara has repeatedly highlighted in its policy toward the Syrian conflict.

The agreement between Damascus and the SDF represents one of the most significant political and military shifts in northeastern Syria in recent years. The region, long shaped by U.S. military presence, SDF administration and complex tribal dynamics, is now witnessing a rapid reassertion of Syrian state authority.

While questions remain about the long-term implementation of the deal and the future role of former SDF militants within state structures, the combination of political agreements, tribal mobilization and regional backing signals a decisive moment in Syria’s protracted conflict, potentially closing one of its most enduring territorial and governance divides.

(Source: Anadolu News)

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or the first time in nearly 60 years, a Syrian president addressed the U.N. General Assembly on Wednesday, marking a dramatic turn in the country’s international standing after the collapse of the Assad family’s decades-long rule.

President Ahmad al-Sharaa told world leaders that “Syria is reclaiming its rightful place among the nations of the world,” as thousands of Syrians watched his speech on big screens in Damascus and other cities, waving national flags. His appearance was the first by a Syrian head of state at the U.N. since Noureddine Attasi spoke in 1967, months after Syria lost the Golan Heights to Israel during the Arab-Israeli war.

The speech comes just nine months after Bashar Assad’s sudden ouster in a lightning insurgent offensive that ended the Assad dynasty’s 54-year rule, a period marked by repression, mass killings and torture. Al-Sharaa, who rose to power after the fall of the Assad, framed his address as the beginning of a new chapter, promising accountability, reconciliation, and a break from Syria’s past.

Israel and regional tensions

Al-Sharaa used the U.N. platform to accuse Israel of continuing threats against Syria since Assad’s fall, warning that its policies “contradict with the international community’s support to Syria and its people” and risk destabilizing the region. Negotiations are underway over a potential security deal that could revive the 1974 disengagement agreement between the two countries, though Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has downplayed the prospects of a breakthrough.

Netanyahu’s office later confirmed that talks are in progress, stressing that Israel’s interests must be guaranteed, including demilitarization of southwestern Syria and security protections for the Druze minority.

Since coming to power, al-Sharaa has emphasized coexistence and pledged to protect Syria’s diverse communities. Al-Sharaa told the General Assembly that Damascus had formed fact-finding missions and granted U.N. investigators access to probe the killings. “I promise to bring anyone whose hands are tainted with the blood of Syrian people to justice,” he said.

Battling Syria’s drug trade

The president also touted his government’s campaign against the illicit Captagon trade, a multi-billion-dollar narcotics industry that flourished under Assad and helped finance his war effort amid Western sanctions. Authorities have closed dozens of production facilities in recent months, al-Sharaa said, while urging the international community to lift sanctions he argued now “shackle the Syrian people.”

U.S. President Donald Trump, who met al-Sharaa in May in Saudi Arabia, has already lifted or waived some sanctions. But the toughest measures, imposed by the U.S. Congress in 2019, remain in place and can only be removed through legislative approval.

Al-Sharaa’s speech was met with celebration in Damascus, where large crowds filled Umayyad Square to cheer his appearance. But in New York, members of the Syrian diaspora staged rival demonstrations outside the U.N.

Supporters waved Syria’s three-starred revolution flag, now recognized as the country’s official emblem, and praised al-Sharaa as the leader who ended decades of dictatorship.

Al-Sharaa’s international debut highlights Syria’s uncertain transition after decades of authoritarian rule and 14 years of devastating civil war that killed more than a million people and displaced millions more. His pledges of justice, coexistence, and economic revival face daunting obstacles: fragile security, lingering sectarian distrust, and the difficult task of rebuilding a shattered state.

“Syria does not wish the pain it passed through for anyone,” al-Sharaa said, closing his speech with an appeal for global solidarity and a statement of support for Palestinians amid the ongoing genocide in Gaza.

(Source: The Associated Press)

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yrian Information Minister Hamza Mustafa has accused Israel of working to divide Syria by backing local separatist actors in the southern governorate of Suwayda, particularly Druze leader Hikmet al-Hajri, in an effort to create autonomous canton-like regions and weaken the Syrian state.

“Israel does not want the existence of a united and stable Syria,” Mustafa told Anadolu in an exclusive interview. “It continues its policy of keeping the country fragmented and unstable. Unfortunately, some internal parties also serve Israeli policies with narrow political calculations.”

His comments come after weeks of rising tensions and intermittent clashes between Syrian security forces, tribal factions, and groups loyal to Hajri in Suwayda, a predominantly Druze province. According to Mustafa, a recent ceasefire agreement in the region was reached through U.S.-led mediation, supported by several other unnamed countries.

Ceasefire built on political dialogue

Minister Mustafa emphasized that Damascus had pursued dialogue—not war—over the past six months with political and armed factions in Suwayda, including Hajri’s group.

“The government had no intention of launching a military operation in Suwayda,” he said. “Our approach was political from the beginning. We offered local concessions, including allowing young people from the area to participate in maintaining order.”

Despite accusations from opposition figures that the government used force, Mustafa insisted that the military involvement was reactive, not pre-planned, and stemmed from rising tension between Druze groups and Bedouin tribes.

He described the ceasefire as a three-stage process: halting armed clashes and withdrawing security forces from the city center; expelling tribal groups from urban areas; and restoring services such as fuel, food, telecommunications, and internet access.

“Though Hajri-affiliated groups initially tried to violate the ceasefire, it stabilized within days,” he said.

Rejecting aid blockade allegations

Addressing allegations that the Syrian government was besieging Suwayda and restricting aid, Mustafa denied any such strategy, asserting that the state continues delivering humanitarian support without sectarian discrimination.

“Hajri and similar factions promote a false narrative about an aid blockade to gain political leverage,” he said. “They want to appear as the only protectors and providers for the region.”

According to Mustafa, Hajri’s faction has been monopolizing aid distribution, not the government, to “buy loyalty and punish opposition.” He said international aid organizations have been invited into the region to supervise distributions transparently.

“The so-called siege narrative is not only false but dangerous—it serves separatist goals and fragments Syrian society,” he warned.

Israel’s role and regional destabilization

Additionally, Minister Mustafa accused Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of exploiting Syria’s instability and fostering fragmentation in the name of domestic political survival.

“Netanyahu has relentlessly risked the entire region for his own future,” he said. “Israel’s handling of Gaza has already strained its Western alliances. It sees any attempt at a united, independent Syria as a threat.”

Mustafa added that while Israel claims to support Druze communities in occupied Palestine, it exerts pressure on them and uses their identity as a political tool.

“Israel is trying to export this model to Syria through groups like Hajri’s,” he said. “But the vast majority of Syrian Druze have historically sided with Damascus and continue to see Israel as an occupier.”

In a televised interview on the Iranian Al-Alam news channel on February 8, secretary general of the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, revealed that they wished the ex-Lebanese prime minister, Saad Hariri, reconsider his bombshell decision of “suspending” his political career, announced on January 24.

Nasrallah called the decision “unfortunate,” given that Hariri was their “candidate for the premiership,” highlighting that the political landscape remains extremely opaque in a post-Hariri era and that channels of cooperation and communication with the Future Movement, Hariri’s political party, shall remain open.

Ironically, Hezbollah never named Hariri for the premiership in the custom parliamentary consultations often held by the president of the republic before a PM is designated based on a majority of votes. However, Hezbollah’s position on Hariri’s departure says a lot about the role Hariri played to the militant group’s advantage especially since 2016, despite Hezbollah basking in unrivalled power during that period.

Hariri’s exit does not necessarily imply that observers, politicians, and researchers have written him off completely; however, his decision should not be taken lightly either, in terms of the seismic shift the country is undergoing by moving completely into the “Iranian influence archipelago.”

In late January, Saad Hariri arrived in Beirut following months of speculation in the wake of yet another solitary retreat – this time in the Emirati capital, Abu Dhabi – that came into effect mid-July last year. Hariri, a PM-designate at the time, stepped down after failing to form a government for over eight months. In Beirut, Hariri met with his aides, party members, MPs from his bloc, and other sectarian leaders or figures, and proceeded to announce the unthinkable: suspending his involvement in political activities and not running in the upcoming parliamentary elections.

In third-world countries (although I have reservations regarding the term), politicians and leaders do not simply step down: they either abdicate to their heirs or die while still in office. If they ever step down, it is often a form of a relegitimization process following serious blunders. Exhibit A is Egypt’s leader Gamal Abdel Nasser’s shenanigan in 1967 following his country’s catastrophic defeat by Israel in the Six-Day War of 1967.

Hariri is no Nasser

But Hariri is no Nasser and he might not even aspire to be one, and, Hariri was not met with waves of people flocking the streets asking him to rescind his decision as Nasser experienced back then. Hariri enjoyed a few flagship “selfies” with a handful of supporters near his Beiruti mansion and a couple of hours of chants in his name. The feeble reaction from Saad’s supporters, the ones he represents, is symptomatic of current times in Lebanon where sectarian leaders, previously holding gods-like statuses, are dealt major blows to their popularity, to a varying extent.

The Sunni community today stands at a three-way crossroad with different options to mitigate the current situation. As Saad fades into the horizon, until further notice, Sunnis can either succumb to further marginalization and disenfranchisement without devising a plan to attempt to fill Hariri’s shoes, or the main Sunni figures in the country can move towards creating a consortium that manages the transition into a post-Hariri era through cooperation, or lastly, compete amongst each other over the leadership of the sect causing further communal depression and the complete erosion of the sect’s leverage within the country’s power-sharing arrangement.

Unfortunately, Lebanon isn’t shifting into a secular state any time soon, nor will its sectarian system be altered at the moment, despite the hopeful dreams of the Lebanese youth that took to the streets during the October 2019 uprising.

It appears that the Lebanese Sunni leaders understand that now is not the time for petty politics amongst them, especially during an extremely sensitive phase where Iran sits and negotiates with the United States in Vienna not only regarding its nuclear program but also its influence in the region, and while the world is starting to show signs of reconsideration of policies towards the Syrian regime, despite its track record of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

As such, a common understanding seems to be brewing for the option of a concerted effort to rally the community and block the way in face of lackluster disbursement of Sunni votes. The cornerstone of such an effort will be the mufti who already adopted a proactive approach to the situation, in addition to the club of ex-prime ministers who, alongside Mikati, can throw their weight around.

However, this does not ensure that Hariri’s shoes will be filled. After all, and despite his blunders, he remains the Sunni community’s most popular leader and no other figure enjoys the potential Saad once represented – not even the sitting billionaire PM, Najib Mikati, who has yet to come out of his localized constituency in northern Lebanon towards the country as a whole.

With the Sunni community divided, Hezbollah can now rule much easier

The recent dynamics will pave the way towards a schism between the Sunni figures of the cities and those of the peripheries, who are not aligned in politics and allegiances. In fact, peripheral figures have a bigger chance for representation today, especially since they’ve maintained good relations with the Syrian regime in Damascus and with the tides shifting in their favor.

This schism will serve as a conduit for both Hezbollah and Bashar al-Assad to exercise influence over the Sunni role within the power-sharing arrangement, allowing them to break any form of unity sect leaders might work to establish. It’ll be easier for Hezbollah to rule in the wake of a divided Sunni community.

Hezbollah has lost an ally in Saad Hariri, a pro-Western PM with access to all capitals of the world who acted as a buffer between the international community and the Iran-aligned militant group and also as a whipping boy for most of the shortcomings under the pretext that “Hezbollah doesn’t rule.” Now, the group is gearing for a wider share of the pie in Lebanon as the reconfiguration of spheres of influence is underway in the region.

Hariri is obviously jumping ship, a sinking one with more holes than the current 6.5 million population can fill even if they all chipped in.

Hariri’s decision stacks up against a series of mistakes he has committed over a 17-year period, yet the decision might eventually pay off during these trying times – as in now. Saad is obviously jumping ship, a sinking one with more holes than the current 6.5 million population can fill even if they all chipped in. The economy is in shatters, the country’s relations with the outside world are collapsing, and the predominant Hezbollah-Free Patriotic Movement alliance has no competency or potential to lead the country out of the abyss.

More so, in order to secure a deal with the International Monetary Fund and other global donors, the time will come where even more difficult austerity measures will be required with harsh reforms that often come at a popularity expense. Hariri being out of the picture means he won’t be associated with those measures and will spare himself further decline in popularity.

Following the First Gulf War, the foreign ministers of Syria, Egypt, and the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), namely Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), met in Damascus and agreed on a new security cooperation initiative for the Gulf which came to be known as the “Damascus Declaration.” Although the GCC states later moved away from implementing the declaration, it contained an important aspect related to Turkey which is key to understanding the dynamics that shape the region today.

The thorny relations between Damascus and Ankara in the 1990s due to water and terrorism issues had adversely affected Turkey’s relations with the Arab countries, including those in the Gulf. The declaration, which aimed to pressure Ankara on the international platform, criticized Turkey’s plan to construct a new dam on the Turkish-Syrian border, called foreign contractors not to cooperate with Turkey, and warned Ankara over its actions. The importance of the Damascus Declaration was that, for the first time, the GCC countries expressed public and clear support for Syria in its dispute with Turkey.

However, since then balances have changed rapidly in international politics. When it comes to the Middle East, one of the world’s least peaceful regions, dynamics change even faster. Turkish-GCC relations within the context of the Syrian war is an interesting case to show the degree to which several factors shape the convergence and divergence in their relationship in Syria, which is known as the “heart” of the Arab world.

When protests erupted in 2011 in Syria, the GCC stood by the opposition that aimed to topple the Bashar al-Assad regime and recognized the opposition bloc as the “legitimate representative” of the Syrian people. The GCC states, which were motivated by several factors, most importantly political and sectarian ones, aimed to weaken Iran’s hand and bring Syria, a country predominantly Sunni but ruled by a Nusayri family, back into the Arab sphere of influence. Ankara also was among the most vocal critics of the regime and the staunchest supporter of the opposition when it failed to convince the regime to make reforms.

In Syria, Turkey and the GCC countries stood by the opposition, but supported different factions, as they harbored different visions for the post-Assad era.

In Syria, Turkey and the GCC countries stood by the opposition, but supported different factions, as they harbored different visions for the post-Assad era. Thus, the Syrian theater became the first backdrop of rivalry between Turkey and GCC states, namely Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, based on ideological differences.

In recent years, the power dynamics in the region have started to shift again as some Gulf countries, which cooperated with Turkey against the Syrian regime in the initial years of the crisis, seem to have put their differences aside and in varying degrees have approached Damascus, pitting Syria against Turkey as they did in the 1990s. Now their priority is their interests, both political and economic, rather than the fate of the regime as was the case a decade ago.

Normalization suit 

In December 2018, the UAE, which once supported the Syrian opposition forces alongside Saudi Arabia and Qatar, reopened its embassy in Syria. The UAE justified the move by declaring, “Given the regional expansionism of Iran and Turkey, there is an Arab role to play in Syria that has become even more necessary.” In March 2021, the UAE reiterated its position: “Syria’s return to the Arab fold is essential and has nothing to do with who wants or who does not want it. It is a matter of public interest and the interests of Syria and the region.”

A day after the UAE reopened its mission, Bahrain announced that its mission in Damascus continues its duty, underlining its keenness to maintain relations with what it referred to as a “brotherly” country. Manama, in particular, emphasized the significance of strengthening and activating the “Arab role” in preventing the dangers of regional interference in Syria’s internal affairs.

In October of last year, Oman sent an ambassador to Syria, becoming the first Gulf state to do so since they downgraded or shut missions in Damascus in 2012. Meanwhile Kuwait has said it would reopen its mission in Damascus if there was an agreement among the 22-member Arab League.

So far, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, two countries that firmly supported the opposition, have not taken any step forward. Traditionally, Riyadh pursues a “wait and see” policy and seeks gradual and slow partial normalization. Prospects for change in the Saudi position have increased particularly after the reports that Saudi intelligence chief Khalid al-Humaidan met with his Syrian counterpart in Damascus, the first meeting of its kind since the conflict broke out in Syria.

If there is a change of heart in Riyadh regarding the return of Syria to the Arab fold, Qatar – Turkey’s closest Gulf ally and a critical center for opposition meetings – will be the only Gulf country not involved in the normalization suit with Syria.

Factors driving normalization

The first factor of the Gulf rapprochement to Syria is Russia’s position. In 2015, when Russia, the regime’s staunchest ally, militarily intervened in the war, the balances on the ground rapidly changed. Russia’s interference became the game-changer that also altered the perception of the GCC towards the opposition and eliminated the idea of toppling Assad by force.

In this context, Moscow, which built a perception of Russia as a crucial geopolitical actor in the region, started to deepen its relationship with each GCC state, and engaged in dialogue over the Syria file. In recent years, there has been increasing support by the GCC states of Russia’s role in Syria, particularly at a time when the U.S. influence is fading away.

The second factor that drives the GCC rapprochement with Damascus is related to both the domestic and international context. The assertive members of the GCC, namely the UAE and Saudi Arabia, have started to move away from a foreign policy focusing on hard power (military tools), while prioritizing soft power (diplomacy).

The economy plays a central role in this diplomacy. Restoring relations with Damascus, not only politically, but economically, is significant and especially in terms of the reconstruction of Syria. On the international level, the election of U.S. President Joe Biden has significantly influenced the shift of the Gulf foreign policy from hard to soft power as the new administration, unlike its predecessor, pushes for de-escalation in the region.

The last factor is the antagonism of Turkey’s growing role in Syria. When Turkey conducted military operations in northern Syria (Operation Olive Branch, Operation Peace Spring, Spring Shield) to eliminate terrorist elements, Saudi Arabia, along with the UAE and Bahrain, opposed them on the grounds of “threatening Arab national security.”

Security experts admit that we are living in a new era of terrorism and that the terrorist organization Daesh (ISIS) is its most outstanding example. Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East organized a panel entitled “The Future of ISIS” to discuss Daesh’s legacy including its detainees and returnees, and strategies against a potential resurgence of the group in Iraq and Syria. The experts that participated in the panel discussed their views on the future of the terror group.

When Daesh jihadists declared the foundation of a so-called Islamic State in 2014, a battle between the Salafist-jihadi group and Al-Qaeda members broke out. According to Mohammed Abu Rumman, a Jordanian scholar and former Minister of Culture and Youth, the fight between the two extended all across the world, starting from Iraq and Syria and later crossing over to Yemen, Afghanistan, and North Africa. This included various Salafist jihadists some of whom affiliated themselves with Daesh while others felt closer to Al-Qaeda. According to Abu Rumman, even though both organizations have lost some of their influence, the fight and competition between them remains and is likely to continue in the future.

Daesh tried to build a strategy and ideology in Iraq, Syria, and other regions by branding itself a representative of Sunni communities. On the contrary, Al-Qaeda is more concerned with its struggle against globalization and its relationship with the United States, its “distant enemy.” According to Abu Rumman, the future of Daesh can’t be discussed without understanding the situations in Iraq, Syria, and Al-Qaeda together.

No Chance of an Insurgency in Iraq and Syria

According to Mara Revkin, a fellow at Georgetown Law’s Center on National Security and the Law, as a terrorist organization Daesh has few chances of staging a successful insurgency in Syria and Iraq. In order to survive, terrorist organizations must secure a political ground and economic resources for sustainable financing. Revkin explained that Daesh has neither political nor economic support.

The loss of its “caliphate” in Syria and Iraq was interpreted as a huge blow to the organization.

The loss of its “caliphate” in Syria and Iraq was interpreted as a huge blow to the organization. The group forfeited its technological bases and the territories it controlled, which were perceived as key areas for its continued presence. At the moment, this transnational terrorist group has been hindered from spreading violence and the changing dynamics have deprived the group of political and economic backing. Thus, the organization’s propaganda capacity has been doomed to fail.

Its limited activities, its internet and social media strategies, and losing its “caliphate,” turned the group into an underground organization and shifted its future plans. Abu Rumman noted that losses on the ground translate into a reduced presence on social media platforms, which are terrorist groups’ prime recruiting ground. A great contribution to this development was the declaration by the two social media giants, Twitter and Facebook, that they would not tolerate discourses encouraging violence on their platforms.

The Future of Daesh

The future of Daesh, in light of its ideology and presence in Syria and Iraq, is uncertain. Daesh lost all its strength including the local population’s support. Borzou Daragahi, a journalist and senior non-resident fellow at the Atlantic Council, argued during the seminar that their recruitment attempts constantly fail as the group has lost its legitimacy in the eyes of the local population, which stays away from the group.

In the future, it is less likely that Daesh will reorganize itself and establish strongholds in Syria and Iraq as it did in the past. The international community’s united fight against the terror group has effectively rendered a potential upsurge by Daesh impossible. This global effort is an exemplary case of  a global collaboration against a terrorist group.

Robert Ford, a former U.S. ambassador to Syria, said in a webinar that the United States under the Biden administration could deploy more troops to Eastern Syria, that withdrawal of troops is not subject to consideration, and that there will be a continued U.S. military presence in Syria. “There would be a continuation in discussing Syria, but a minor change can be witnessed by this new administration due to increased sanctions on Damascus.

The withdrawal of American troops can hurt the credibility of the U.S.,” he said. Ford went on to say that a slight change can also be seen regarding the refugee border policies as during Trump’s time in office not many refugees were accepted into the U.S., while Iraq and Syria will not be evaluated separately during the Biden presidency.

The webinar was hosted by SETA Washington D.C. on February 26, 2021 and examined the Biden administration’s possible policy towards Syria. Questions such as whether Biden would continue to interfere in Syria like his predecessors Trump and Obama or he would step back were among the topics of discussion.

The recent U.S. attack targeting pro-Iranian Shia militia in Syria was discussed by a number of experts, namely Robert Ford, a former U.S. ambassador to Syria; Dima Moussa, the vice-president of the Syrian National Coalition; and Wael Al-Zayat, the CEO of Emgage Foundation.

Dima Moussa asserted that uncertainty can be seen in Biden’s approach to the Syrian conflict as the Syrian issue is not present on the president’s priority list. She added that as far as the recent U.S. air strike against Syria is concerned, “an inheritance from Trump is seen for now.” She concluded, “We should wait a little bit more.”

Wael Al-Zayat started by noting that it is dangerous to make predictions pertaining to this issue which has been continuing for the last 10 years. “The U.S. again will spend a lot of time discussing the Syrian conflict under Biden’s administration. America’s connection with the SDF [Syrian Democratic Forces] will continue.

Robert Ford said that it would be better if Russia took control of the eastern part of Syria because Russia is closer to Damascus compared to Washington.

There might be a comprehensive talk between the U.S. and Assad’s regime. Dialogue between the U.S. and Turkey related to the Idlib issue would be puzzling. Bilateral dialogue between Turkey and the U.S. is inevitable for the sake of the Syrian victims because they consider both countries as their protectors.”

Robert Ford said that it would be better if Russia took control of the eastern part of Syria because Russia is closer to Damascus compared to Washington; that the KGB (the USSR’s Committee for State Security) and its successor, the Russian intelligence services, have been in close cooperation with Syria; and that the Iran-Syria relations have been closer than those of the U.S. and Syria. He added that that talks between Turkey and the U.S. are necessary.

She added that a solution is not possible by military means but only by political ones. Iran, the EU, and other regional actors should convince Assad to enter negotiations. According to Moussa, an international consensus needs to be reached, Russia needs to be a part of this coordinated effort, and a thorough policy plan should be introduced by Biden.

Al-Zayat clarified that a humanitarian approach should be the Biden administration’s top priority.

Al-Zayat clarified that a humanitarian approach should be the Biden administration’s top priority. The most important issue is how to define Syria’s national interests. Civilian protection is necessary in Syria, he noted, adding that the U.S. should not be spending its budget on Syria. The United States is already facing multiple problems like COVID-19, climate change, social justice, etc. “That’s why Biden should be focusing on eradicating other problems first, and then start thinking about the Syrian conflict,” he said.

Ford expressed his belief that the U.S. should not deploy troops to Syria without a clear-cut mission. He claimed that only Syrians can resolve the conflict because it started between their government and themselves. Ford clarified that he does not think that Turkey, Russia, or Iran can resolve this issue and neither can the U.S. An inclusive national plan by Syrians for Syrians is needed. He claimed that “Joe Biden has an incredible talent. He can manage situations very well, if he wishes…Biden will be deeply involved in the military confrontation in Syria.”

Al-Zayat concluded by going against Ford’s proposal, adding that A Syrian plan does not seem realistic because several sects are present there and they do not want to solve this conflict by themselves. There is no doubt that the conflict emerged between Syrians…; however, they are no longer its major component.

As Joe Biden has not been in power for long, it is difficult to say anything certain regarding his approach to the Syrian conflict. Predictions can be made but uncertainty is bound to remain. However, before taking any step for the resolution of the conflict, including imposing new sanctions or increasing the number of troops, the U.S. must take into account the current problems, the hopes, and the expectations of the Syrian people – both those living inside and outside of Syria.