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hailand carried out airstrikes against Cambodian military positions on Monday after heavy fighting erupted along contested sections of their 817-kilometer border, shattering a ceasefire agreement brokered earlier this year by U.S. President Donald Trump and Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim.

The Thai military said the renewed clashes began around 5 a.m. local time (2200 GMT) when Cambodian forces allegedly opened fire on Thai troops, killing one soldier and wounding eight. Thai Air Force officials said air support was then deployed to “deter and reduce Cambodia’s military capabilities” after Phnom Penh allegedly mobilized heavy weaponry and repositioned combat units near frontline areas.

Cambodia rejected the accusation, saying its forces had come under unprovoked attack at two locations. Its Defense Ministry insisted Cambodian troops had not retaliated and accused Bangkok of “dangerous provocations” undermining the October ceasefire agreement.

The escalation marks the most serious confrontation between the two Southeast Asian neighbors since intense five-day clashes in July left at least 48 people dead—mostly civilians—and forced an estimated 300,000 residents to flee their homes

385,000 evacuated as fighting spreads

Thai authorities said more than 385,000 civilians in four border districts were being moved to safety, with over 35,000 already sheltering in temporary facilities set up across Buriram and Surin provinces. Residents described sustained gunfire and explosions.

“It startled me. The explosions were very clear. Boom boom!” said Phichet Pholkoet, a resident of Ban Kruat district. “I could hear both heavy artillery and small arms.”

Across the border in Cambodia’s Oddar Meanchey province, local officials said more than 1,100 families had been evacuated as artillery fire echoed across multiple areas. Opposition politician Meach Sovannara told Reuters from Samroang town that he heard continuous shelling as residents fled deeper inland.

A senior Cambodian provincial official said three civilians were seriously wounded in the latest clashes.

From May skirmish to full-scale crisis

Tensions between the two nations began rising in May, when a Cambodian soldier was killed during a brief exchange of gunfire, the first fatal incident since 2011. The row escalated sharply in July after a landmine blast injured a Thai soldier, prompting Bangkok to recall its ambassador and announce Cambodia’s ambassador would be expelled.

A day later, armed clashes erupted across multiple points along the disputed frontier. Thailand deployed F-16 jets, one of which bombed a Cambodian position. Heavy artillery fire and rocket attacks soon spread, marking the worst fighting in more than a decade.

International mediation intensified. On July 26, U.S. President Trump phoned the leaders of both countries and pushed for a ceasefire, linking progress in border talks to the resumption of separate bilateral negotiations on U.S. trade tariffs. Malaysia, the United States, and China also urged restraint.

On July 28, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet and Thai leaders signed a ceasefire in Putrajaya, Malaysia. A more comprehensive agreement followed on Oct. 26 in Kuala Lumpur, witnessed by Trump, whose involvement drew a Nobel Peace Prize nomination from Cambodia.

By early November, both sides began withdrawing heavy weaponry and conducting de-mining operations. Cambodia said it expected full withdrawal by the end of the year.

Ceasefire unravels amid landmine incidents

But the truce began to fray within days. On Nov. 11, Thailand announced it was halting implementation after a landmine blast severely injured a Thai soldier. Bangkok accused Cambodia of laying new mines—charges Phnom Penh has repeatedly denied.

Reuters reported in October that expert analysis indicated at least some mines recovered along the frontier appeared recently laid.

On Nov. 12, just one day after the Thai move, a Cambodian civilian was killed as both sides again accused each other of opening fire.

The fragile peace broke down completely on Dec. 8, with Thai airstrikes marking the first cross-border aerial operations between two ASEAN member states in years.

Cambodia’s influential former premier Hun Sen—father of current Prime Minister Hun Manet—warned that Thai forces were acting as “aggressors” and trying to “provoke a retaliatory response.” In a Facebook post, he urged commanders “at all levels” to exercise restraint, saying the “red line” for a response had already been set but did not elaborate.

Cambodia’s Defense Ministry said Thai forces launched dawn attacks after “days of provocative actions” but emphasized that Cambodian units had not fired back.

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hina and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) signed an expanded free trade agreement Tuesday, with Chinese Premier Li Qiang urging closer economic cooperation as he positioned Beijing’s economic model as an alternative to what he called rising protectionism from the United States under President Donald Trump.

The upgraded deal — known as the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area 3.0 — was signed on the final day of the ASEAN summit and witnessed by Li and Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, this year’s ASEAN chair. The revision broadens the existing pact to cover digital trade, sustainability, the green economy and support for small and medium-sized enterprises.

Li said deeper integration would help the region withstand global economic headwinds and warned against “confrontation” and “bullying,” in a swipe at U.S. tariff policies. “Unity is strength,” he said, stressing what he described as “mutual reliance” between China and its Southeast Asian neighbors.

But his remarks drew a measured response from Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., who welcomed the economic benefits of the upgraded pact but insisted that cooperation “cannot exist alongside coercion,” a reference to repeated maritime confrontations between Manila and Beijing in the South China Sea.

Trade surging despite geopolitical rivalry

The original ASEAN-China free trade pact came into force in 2010 and has helped propel two-way trade from $235.5 billion that year to nearly $1 trillion in 2023. China and ASEAN are now each other’s largest trading partners, and officials hope the expanded deal will help streamline market access and reduce non-tariff barriers.

Analysts say the upgrade reflects a wider trend of non-U.S. economies deepening cross-regional ties amid Washington’s tariff escalation and supply chain restructuring.

“Non-U.S. countries are coming together to strengthen trade relationships for their prosperity even as a recoupling with the U.S. is ongoing,” said Southeast Asia expert Bridget Welsh.

The trade signing came as ASEAN leaders continue to navigate strategic competition between Beijing and Washington. Trump used part of his visit to the summit to announce new economic initiatives with Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam, even while maintaining his latest round of tariffs.

Anwar said the bloc’s engagement with both powers underscored its desire to avoid forced alignment. “The day before we were with President Donald Trump … and today we are back with China. That reflects ASEAN centrality,” he said.

Tensions between Washington and Beijing appeared to ease slightly ahead of a planned meeting between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in South Korea later this week, which negotiators hope could yield a compromise on trade disputes.

Maritime tensions not going away

Despite the economic diplomacy, territorial flashpoints continue to shadow relations. Marcos accused China of “dangerous actions and harassment” toward Philippine vessels and aircraft, and denounced Beijing’s plan to designate a disputed shoal as a “nature reserve,” calling it a pretext for asserting sovereignty.

Other ASEAN members — including Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei — also have overlapping claims with Beijing in the South China Sea. China claims almost the entire waterway, one of the world’s most important maritime trade routes.

Marcos reiterated his push to fast-track a Code of Conduct on the South China Sea when the Philippines takes over the ASEAN chairmanship next year.

Chinese foreign ministry officials, meanwhile, accused the Philippines of “deliberate provocations” and said Manila is responsible for recent flare-ups.

(Source: The Associated Press)

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ndonesia, under its ASEAN Chairmanship in 2023, has spearheaded a crucial initiative to accelerate the negotiations for a Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea, gaining unanimous agreement from all ASEAN member countries and China. The groundbreaking move was announced by Rolliansyah Soemirat, the Director for ASEAN Political and Security Cooperation, during a press conference in Jakarta on January 9, 2024.

In a bid to expedite the COC negotiations, Indonesia’s initiative introduces a set of comprehensive guidelines, marking a historic moment as the first-ever practical guidelines for the COC. These guidelines aim not only to hasten the negotiation process but also to provide substantive material ensuring the effectiveness and practicality of the COC.

Addressing the complexity of the COC elements, Rolliansyah emphasized the need for a breakthrough to expedite the negotiations successfully. The guidelines put forth by Indonesia encapsulate the aspirations of ASEAN and China to conclude the COC within three years, fostering an environment of intensive discussions on pending issues and proposing working methods to streamline the negotiation process.

A code of conduct reflecting international norms

“The COC is anticipated to be a code of conduct reflecting international norms, principles, and rules aligned with international law, particularly UNCLOS. The ultimate goal is to establish a stable, safe, and peaceful South China Sea,” stated Rolliansyah.

During its ASEAN Chairmanship, Indonesia has achieved significant progress in the COC negotiations, reaching the second reading or discussions on the second round. This positive development is considered a crucial momentum towards the accelerated agreement on the code of ethics.

Indonesia previously hosted COC negotiations between ASEAN and China in March, setting the stage for ongoing discussions. As part of its commitment to the COC process, Indonesia plans to host the next round of negotiations at the end of 2024, contributing further to the acceleration of this significant diplomatic effort.

Promoting practical maritime cooperation

In addition to the COC negotiations, Indonesia affirms its commitment to promoting practical maritime cooperation between ASEAN and China in the South China Sea. The objective is to enhance mutual trust, thereby supporting and preserving peace, security, and stability in the region.

The international community has welcomed Indonesia’s proactive stance on expediting the South China Sea COC negotiations. The successful agreement on guidelines reflects the collaborative efforts of ASEAN member states and China, emphasizing the importance of regional cooperation in addressing complex geopolitical challenges.

As Indonesia takes the lead in fostering dialogue and cooperation, the eyes of the international community remain on the South China Sea, where overlapping territorial claims have long been a source of tension. Indonesia’s role as a mediator and facilitator in the COC negotiations underscores its commitment to regional stability and adherence to international norms.

Sources: The Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Reuters

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n a recent forum held in Hawaii, Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. brought to light the escalating conflict in Myanmar, marking it as a significant and complex challenge for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The situation in Myanmar has seen over a million people displaced, following the military coup in 2021, which overturned years of tentative democratic progress and led to both internal conflict and economic downturn.

President Marcos highlighted the commitment of ASEAN to address the crisis, despite the intricacies involved, including the substantial humanitarian impact.

The United Nations reports that the displacement numbers have been rising since the coup, as the military faces resistance from an alliance of ethnic-minority groups and pro-democracy fighters.

ASEAN response

ASEAN, in response to the junta’s actions post-coup, has excluded the top generals from its meetings, demanding adherence to a peace roadmap established two years ago. This move signifies ASEAN’s ongoing efforts to promote peace and stability in the region.

The Philippines is set to chair ASEAN in 2026, taking over from Myanmar as host, and President Marcos’ statements come at a critical juncture. He acknowledged the loss of support for the military junta from within its own ranks, according to recent analyses.

Furthermore, Marcos pointed out the ‘exponential’ growth of the humanitarian cost of the conflict over recent years, which has also affected the Philippines, with reports of Filipino citizens being among the victims of human trafficking linked to the turmoil in Myanmar.

The turmoil in Myanmar

The ASEAN bloc has been facing increased pressure to mediate and provide solutions to the Myanmar crisis, as the military-led offensive continues to displace thousands more.

President Marcos’ call to action underscores the need for ASEAN to navigate this difficult issue effectively, taking into consideration the broad humanitarian and political implications.

As the situation develops, ASEAN’s role in shaping the outcome of the Myanmar crisis remains pivotal, with the world watching closely how the bloc will manage one of the most pressing regional conflicts in Southeast Asia.

In the past two decades, Russia has become the largest supplier of weapons to Southeast Asia in an attempt to balance China with Russian arms exports to Southeast Asia totaling more than $10.8 billion. What makes Russia a suitable supplier of arms to certain Southeast Asian countries is that it offers cheaper equipment, barter as a payment alternative, and does not consider human rights records unlike Europe and the United States. Nevertheless, there is a decline in the region’s arms imports from Russia, mainly due to the drop of imports by Vietnam, but also a regionwide decrease of arms imports overall.

Although applied selectively, a factor that caused the recent decline of the regional arms trade with Russia is the wariness of sanctions associated with the U.S. Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). However, for countries such as Myanmar which are already criticized by the U.S., or for countries with long-lasting historical ties to Russia, the benefits outweigh the costs.

Myanmar

Myanmar has long been riddled by conflict between armed militias and repressive regimes. The country underwent regime change in February 2021 with a military coup. Russia has since shown support to the junta regime as seen in the participation of Russian officials in the 2021 military ceremony for the Armed Forces Day on March 27; the supply of arms to the junta; and the June 2021 visit of Min Aung Hlaing, the junta leader who is now the prime minister of Myanmar, to Moscow, at the invitation of the Kremlin.

China is Myanmar’s top arms supplier, but it also provides support to armed militia groups along its border, and therefore Russia allows the Myanmar military to balance its reliance on China. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), over the past 20 years, Myanmar purchased $1.686 billion worth of arms. The arm purchases in the last decade include R-73 air-to-air missiles, BRDM-2 armored vehicles, Yak-130 and Su-30MK aircraft, 57E6 surface-to-air missiles, 96K9 Pantsir-S1 missile systems, and Orlan-10E drones.

Vietnam

Although Vietnam’s arms imports from Russia are on the decline, it still mainly relies on Russia, accounting for around 85% of its total arms imports. In the past 20 years, Russia has sold $6.542 billion worth of weapons to the Southeast Asian country. Apart from a tightening military budget causing the decline, past procurement issues caused by sanctions towards Russia during the annexation of Crimea have pushed Hanoi to attempt to diversify its suppliers.

Vietnam’s ongoing dispute with China on the South China Sea impacts its arm purchases. Since China is superior in military power, Vietnam mainly opts for an anti-access/area denial strategy that aims to block its adversary’s entry or movement. Its purchases from Russia have included Gepard-3 frigates, various anti-ship missiles, Project-636E Kilo-class submarines, the K-300P Bastion-P coastal defense system and coastal defense artillery, Su-30MK2 aircraft, T-90S/SK tanks, and Yak-130 aircraft.

Malaysia

Russian arms imports made up 33% of Malaysia’s total arms imports in the past two decades. However, recently, the country does not seem to be interested in buying arms from Russia. Between 2007 and 2013, Russia exported approximately $1.2 billion worth of arms to Malaysia. However, after 2013, there is no reported purchase of Russian arms by Malaysia; the country has been looking to reduce its reliance on Russian arms and seems to be moving further away from Russia even with existing contracts.

Malaysia has a contract with Russia for the supply of spare parts for its 18 Sukhoi Su-30MKM aircraft purchased in 2003, but is considering procurement of spare parts from other countries such as India. Its contract for the supply of Metis-M anti-tank missiles still appears to be intact.

The newcomers and infrequent buyers

Cambodia and the Philippines are newcomers to the Russian arms market. Cambodia only recently, in 2021, bought two secondhand Mi-8MT/Mi-17 transport helicopters. The Philippines has sought to modernize its military throughout the years, but has struggled with financial strains. The Philippines is traditionally a U.S. ally and did not buy major weapons from Russia until 2021, despite the fluctuating relations with the U.S. over human rights concerns during President Rodrigo Duterte’s war on drugs. However, it turned to Russia in an effort to diversify its market.

In 2016. the U.S. Senate blocked a sale of 20,000 assault rifles to the Philippines. Russia later donated 5,000 Kalashnikov rifles, 5,000 steel helmets, about a million rounds of rifle ammunition, and 20 army trucks to the country. Russia even offered a “no political condition” weapon production deal in 2019 and started negotiations for selling helicopters and submarines.

The Philippines signed a $249 million contract in November 2021 with Russia to buy 17 Mi-17 transport helicopters projected to be delivered in a little over two years. As for the submarines, the countries have yet to make a decision.

Another potential market for Russia to increase its arms supplies is Thailand. The Royal Thai Armed Forces acquired 10 Mi-8MT/Mi-17 transport helicopters intermittently over the years 2008, 2015, 2018, and 2021. In 2008, they also bought 36 Igla-S portable surface-to-air missiles. Since 2017, Thailand and Russia have seen an increased cooperation with the military-technology collaboration agreement that has been reached between the two countries.

Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam remain Russia’s most outstanding arms customers in Southeast Asia. Regarding Laos and Myanmar, Russian verbal support of their authoritarian regimes is also observable. While markets such as Indonesia, Cambodia, and the Philippines may pose potential opportunities, the Russian invasion of Ukraine could have detrimental implications on these openings considering the possibility of international backlash on the aforementioned countries.

A virtual summit for democracy was held on December 9-10, 2021, upon the invitation of the United States. At the summit, Joe Biden renewed his call for democracy and the fight against authoritarianism and corruption. Amongst more than 110 invited countries, 89 showed up. The question now is why the Biden administration initiated the Summit for Democracy. Let me address some important issues and their consequences in what follows.

The general assertion is that the summit was initiated in order to respond to the rhetoric that American democracy is in decay and crisis – a debate which has gone global. One of the key denominators of the democracy crisis in the U.S. has been the horrific attack on Capitol Hill on January 6, 2021 following the results of the U.S. presidential elections.

On August 30, 2021, this was followed by the withdrawal of the U.S.-led NATO forces from Afghanistan, another evident U.S. failure. These and similar events brought the image of U.S. democracy into question before a global public. In this context, the Summit for Democracy was designed to rectify the image of the U.S. both domestically and globally.

The exclusion of major U.S. partners

China and Russia were not invited to the Summit for Democracy as they are regarded as the ideological rivals of democratically ruled countries. There were also countries from the Asia-Pacific and Africa that were not on the invitation list: Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, which are considered de facto allies of the United States, were among the ASEAN members not invited.

China and Russia were not invited to the Summit for Democracy for they are regarded as the ideological rivals of democratically ruled countries.

Although Singapore and Thailand might not be fully democratic, and Vietnam has a single-party rule, they uphold – to a certain degree – democratic practices such as civil society organizations and a rule-based administration. They also have closer ties with the U.S. in fields including not only economy but also culture, academia, and the defence sector. Not only this, but they have been approached by the U.S. to adopt policies against China. Indeed, this is closely related to the well-established Asian pivot policy by former U.S. president Barack Obama.

The invitation of only Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines from the ASEAN region to the Summit for Democracy has led to speculations. Is there a rift between the rest of the member countries of ASEAN and the United States due to a widening ideological gap between democracies and non-democracies? Or is it because of these countries’ sociopolitical or socioeconomic alliances with U.S. rivals? If the former turns out to be true, there is definitely a certain degree of miscalculation by the Biden administration.

There is no doubt that the U.S. is losing credit as the leader of global democracy along with its capacity to defend democratic principles and values. Political elites in ASEAN member states, which rely on Western democracy as an ideal, can no longer satisfy or silence emergent anti-Western sentiments as now critical voices even within the ruling circles in Europe increasingly emerge and question the credibility of the U.S. “democratic” engagements abroad.

Concern over the Lack of Engagement

Japan is a highly acclaimed U.S. ally in the Asia-Pacific region and approached the U.S. decision not to invite certain ASEAN countries to the summit critically.

No doubt that the U.S. is losing credit as the leader of global democracy.

Japanese political commentators were in favor of inviting all ASEAN members, not only some, to the summit. According to them, direct U.S. engagement with ASEAN is essential to sustaining the security in the Asia-Pacific against China. The Japanese commentators seem right to criticize the imposition of a definition of democracy technically contrived by the U.S. alone.

On the subject of the exclusion of Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, Japan has implicitly reacted by expressing its concern about how to improve democratic rules in ASEAN without the U.S. facilitation and engagement through political, economic, and cultural mechanisms.

To highlight additional concerns, it should be emphasized that Singapore, a U.S. ally, and Vietnam, a potential partner of the United States, were not invited to the summit. Taking into consideration that Barack Obama was the first U.S. president to visit Hanoi after the Vietnam War, the exclusion of Vietnam from the summit is not an encouraging move for enhancing the partnership between the two capitals.

Categorizing certain Asia-Pacific countries as “non-democratic” may be true in principle. Nevertheless, the imposition of a Western-based democracy model may not be acceptable by a number of regional countries.

This miscalculated approach by the U.S. administration can potentially trigger more controversy among non-democracies in the Asia-Pacific, and may result either in an attempt to copy the model of the U.S. democracy, which could potentially end up in failure, or push them further towards strengthening their ties with China, the world’s second superpower.

Step Forward

The question remains whether the composition of the countries invited to the Summit for Democracy consisted of a wider alliance or the U.S. was simply playing the leadership role by marking its influence on democratically ruled countries. Then, the subsequent question is whether the U.S. administration intends to divide the world into democratic and undemocratic rules. If the latter is true, it is not difficult to guess the existence of a larger division and separation of countries by the United States as democratic and non-democratic ones.

The lack of U.S. engagement with Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, as member states of ASEAN, can deter the democratization processes further if the United States’ formal involvement remains ineffective. The influence of democratic principles has decreased significantly around the globe in the last decades. This includes Western countries, where democracy was born, as has become evident in the treatment of people of color and migrants.

The task of major democratic countries such as the U.S. is not to judge other democracies apathetically, but rather to galvanize democratic engagements with countries that are undergoing democratic challenges by paying a degree of respect to their existing democratic institutions.

Whilst modern-day official diplomatic relations between Malaysia and Turkey were established in 1964, the ties between the two countries predate the modern era. Early relations can be traced back to the early sixteenth century when the Malay Sultanate of Malacca received the Ottoman help to fend off an attack by the Portuguese.

In the nineteenth century, a number of Malay states had close relations with the Ottoman Empire and notable amongst these was the personal ties between Sultan Abu Bakar of Johor and the Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamid II.

High-level visits between Malaysia and Turkey started in 1974 and since 2000 there has been undoubtedly greater interaction between the two states. Both countries are active members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation. In 2014, relations between the two countries received yet another impetus when they were elevated to a strategic partnership.

Trade and investment between Turkey and Malaysia have been growing significantly especially since August 2015 when a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the states entered into force. For Turkey, the FTA with Malaysia was its first with a member state of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its second in the Asia-Pacific region.

There is also the Turkey-Malaysia Business Council, which was created in 1995 to facilitate trade. In 2019 alone, total trade between Malaysia and Turkey was valued at US$2.2 billion, with the balance of trade in favor of the former.

In the same vein, while Malaysia is Turkey’s largest trading partner in Southeast Asia, for Malaysia, Turkey is its third most important trading partner in West Asia. A number of Turkish companies also operate in Malaysia and these include FNSS A.S., Evyap, Haus, Yonca-Onuk, Prota Asia, Novaplast, Dorce, Tepe Kimya, Polin Waterparkbuilds, Arcelik-Beko, Dalin, LC Waikiki, Aselsan, and De Facto – to name a few.

Similarly, a few Malaysian companies too have invested in Turkey, notable amongst which is the Malaysian Airports Holding Berhad (MAHB) that not only operates but is, in fact, the largest shareholder in Istanbul’s Sabiha Gökçen International Airport, Turkey’s second busiest airport.

In terms of trade and investment, Turkey views Malaysia as its gateway to Southeast and East Asia, and likewise Malaysia sees Turkey as its doorway into the West Asian and European regions.

In the defense sector, Turkey is one of Malaysia’s main source of defense procurement, namely armored vehicles and military communications. During the visit by President Erdoğan to Malaysia in December 2019, a number of agreements between firms in the defense sector were signed.

At the global level, both Malaysia and Turkey have been described as emerging middle powers often playing a pro-active role in international affairs, and especially on issues concerning the Islamic world.

A recent example of this role was when Malaysia convened the Kuala Lumpur Summit (KL Summit or Perdana Dialogue) with the theme “The Role of Development in Achieving National Security” in December 2019. The summit was attended by 450 delegates from 56 countries.

Notable among the attendees were Turkish President Erdogan, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, and Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, the Emir of Qatar. The summit’s main agenda was to discuss problems besetting Muslim nations and undertake efforts to enhance unity in the Islamic world.

Notwithstanding the above, there were those who viewed the KL Summit as an attempt by Malaysia (and perhaps even Turkey) to create a new bloc in the Islamic world and provide an alternative to the Saudi-led OIC. The non-attendance of Saudi Arabia and even Pakistan (apparently at the insistence of the former) gave further credence to such views.

Compounded with the KL Summit were attempts by the Mahathir government to distance itself from Saudi Arabia, witnessed especially its decision to shut down the King Salman Center for International Peace (KSCIP) in Putrajaya in August 2018.

That said, the KL Summit was also very much in line with Malaysia’s new Foreign Policy Framework (FPF), launched in September 2019, which amongst others envisions a greater role for the country vis-à-vis the Islamic world.

However, barely three months after the summit, in late February 2020, the Mahathir government fell and since then little has been heard of the whole scheme. With Mahathir, the driving force behind the summit, out of power, it appears that the whole initiative to provide leadership and some form of direction in the Islamic world may have passed into oblivion.

The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is the fruit of competitive international trade affairs in the Asia-Pacific that has been dominating world trade and investment environments in the past few decades. The treaty authorizes the member countries’ rational choice to stand between protectionism and free trade.

A treaty pact was signed on November 15, 2020 with virtual participation of the leaders of 15 member countries who represent almost 2.2 billion people and 30% of the world’s GDP. The anticipated greater plan and its practical gain will pump $200 billion into the global economy.

With the RCEP representing a bit less than one-third of the global economic output, this agreement is expected to have a great impact on the global economy. As observed in the last four years, more than half of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China have constantly shown annual growth of more than 6-7%.

In recent years, the ASEAN countries have not only displayed a galvanizing productivity in logistics supplies and international trade, but have also gradually improved and showed an engagement with the dominant capitalist economic principals in the form of freer commercial activities.

This development, triggered by determinant geo-political narratives in the Asia-Pacific region, effectuates creation of certain trust among members of nations and the global investors.

The spirit of the ASEAN

The terms of the agreement provide a functional vehicle to eliminate the internal differences of member countries so as to reinvigorate production and trade affairs, while obtaining gains from this regional development.

There are three major aspects which can be considered as crucial developments. The first is the ASEAN-centered expansion of trade and investment activities.

The second is related to the East Asian nations, such as China, Japan, and South Korea, that have agreed, for the first time, to comply with mutual trade rules. Without a doubt, this will have a greater influence on the region’s peace and stability. In particular, the East and South China Seas will reclaim the status of mutual waterways for all the nations adjacent to them.

The US: Inside or outside the game?

The RCEP resonates with signs of effort toward the gradual reconstruction of economic growth in the Asia-Pacific. It poses novel problems for the new U.S. administration that add to the distress of a presumed isolation. Thus, U.S. President-elect Biden may desperately search for alternatives for repositioning his country on the global stage, and, in particular, in the Asia-Pacific.

However, the grave challenge the Biden administration will face is how to convince the U.S. Senate to rebound the country’s leadership in the Asia-Pacific region. Rather, the U.S. may opt to revive the relationship with regional powers and the ASEAN.

Biden will have no other choice but to reinitiate the active presence of the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific since the U.S. is already in a declining standing on the eco-political scene.

Since the United States lost an opportunity by rejecting the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) four years ago, the new administration will potentially be excluded from the RCEP, and President-elect Biden will experience a great dilemma.

When one closely revisits the first term of the Obama administration, it becomes apparent that the Eastern and Southeastern Asian countries, which serve as major drivers of global growth, intended to restructure regional trade affairs.

Liberalization is currently being experienced by the emerging regional powers. A larger regional trade agreement such as the TPPA or, as clearly proven today, the RCEP was expected since the beginning of this century, because of the changing nature of global business and trade.

When soft enforcement was used by certain regional powers such as Japan and Singapore to convince the Obama administration to sign the TPPA, it took half a decade to reach a consensus, which finally arrived in 2015. Therefore, it is not astonishing that an almost similar process began in 2012 for the regional countries in the Asia-Pacific to reach a similar pact.

Biden will have no other choice but to reinitiate the active presence of the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific since the U.S. is already in a declining standing on the eco-political scene.

Thus, the new U.S. administration is likely to take a step to create a peaceful environment on the global stage in order to gain the support of its allies, some of whom feel abandoned and others politically distanced. A better-case scenario would see the U.S. invest creatively in soft power rather than refocus on the competition with China as it has done in the previous years.

India’s Lack of Self-Reliance

India preferred not to sign the RCEP in order to protect its domestic market from the “invasion” of Chinese goods.

Although growth figures show that the country has progressed in the last half decade, the Narendra Modi government preferred to lean on restricted trade borders. But the major argument is that India is yet to conceive its regional power role.

Since U.S. President-elect Joe Biden and the Indian government dubbed the RCEP a new emerging power, there is an alternative for a new geopolitical structure in the Indo-Pacific.

Biden and Vice-President-elect Kamala Harris have professed a desire to engage with India. There are strong signs that Harris has been perceived positively by Indians. Harris’s ancestral link may be instrumentalized for the U.S. in the use of soft power towards India in order to help the country regain its lost presence in the Asia Pacific region.

The RCEP is the end product of the long negotiation processes among the member countries that have dominated global trade and economic activities in recent decades. If this treaty is successfully applied, there is little doubt that it will mold trade affairs on a global scale.