D

ay by day, international interest in the Turkic republics and Central Asia, in general, is growing. It seems that global interest in the region has increased, especially after the decisions taken by the Organization of Turkic States at its 9th Summit in Samarkand on November 11, 2022. One of the main reasons for this interest is undoubtedly the weakening of Russia’s influence in the region due to the war in Ukraine. Since the beginning of 2023, China, the European Union, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Germany, the United States, and the United Kingdom have held important summits and bilateral meetings with the aim of developing solid cooperation with the Central Asian states in the future.

The population of the five Central Asian countries, namely Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, is around 80 million. Their geographical area covers more than four million square kilometers and the sum of their cultivated land exceeds 28.5 million hectares. These countries are very rich in natural resources such as oil, gas, gold, and uranium, and investment rates in the landlocked Central Asian region are increasing every year. In 2022, Kazakhstan attracted the most foreign direct investment in Central Asia with $6.1 billion.

While Uzbekistan followed Kazakhstan with $2.53 billion, Turkmenistan attracted almost $1 billion, Kyrgyzstan almost $300 million, and Tajikistan around $170 million. As these are the official figures, the actual figures are much higher. According to data from Uzbekistan, after the reforms that began in 2017, foreign investment in the country has increased tenfold in the last six years. In January 2024, during his visit to China, the president of Tajikistan signed a $400 million investment agreement with the country. In addition, the volume of e-commerce in Central Asia, which is developing rapidly, is expected to exceed $66 billion by 2028.

In 2022, Turkey’s exports to Central Asian countries grew by around 30%, reaching approximately $12 billion. Turkey’s trade volume with Turkmenistan is increasing every year, with $4.7 billion exported to Kazakhstan, $3.3 billion to Uzbekistan, and $1.9 billion to Turkmenistan. In a few years, Turkey’s trade volume with Turkmenistan, which has reached $2.5 billion in 2023, is expected to exceed $5 billion, while in 2023, Turkey’s share of the construction sector in Turkmenistan will be $3.2 billion.

European organizations are planning to invest €1.5 billion in the region to develop the Trans-Caspian transport route (Central Corridor) to transport Kazakh oil to the West. The main purpose of this corridor is to reduce dependence on transit routes through Russia.

The Turkic republics are located at the center of the East-West trade routes, along the transit route, and the importance of this corridor is increasing every year. Factors contributing to this importance include international imports, the development of exports, the desire to reach markets in the region, the aim to transfer energy resources and precious metals safely and at low cost, the need to establish logistics bases for long-distance transfers, and the need to create alternative lines and routes in order to increase predictability. In this context, alternative railways and roads are constantly being built in the Central Asian region and work continues on the establishment of major logistics bases.

A new diplomatic format: “C5+”

On May 18-19, 2023, a summit of heads of state was held, known as the “C+C5” (China + Central Asia 5). At the invitation of Xi Jinping, the summit brought together Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, the president of Kazakhstan; Sadyr Zhaparov, the president of Kyrgyzstan; Shavkat Mirziyoyev, the president of Uzbekistan; Emomali Rahmon, the president of Tajikistan; and Serdar Berdimuhammedov, the president of Turkmenistan. This summit had a new format as it was the first China-Central Asia leaders’ summit to be held at the point where the Silk Road began after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was commented that China wanted to take advantage of the historical conjuncture  as the summit was held at a time when Russia’s relations with Central Asia had stagnated due to the Russia-Ukraine war.

The programs and cooperation agreements signed at the summit drew attention to China’s determination  to develop more solid and predictable relations with Central Asia in the future. China’s exports to the Central Asian region will amount to $62.3 billion by 2023—overall, it should be noted, not a very large figure for the Chinese economy. Moreover, the Central Asian countries are of geostrategic importance to China, particularly in terms of trade routes from the region to the West, while China’s efforts to develop alternative routes for Central Asia continue. Uzbekistan received a $398.8 million loan from China in 2023. Most of these loans will be used for energy, transport, agriculture, and water management. China, in fact, is the main source of financing for Kazakhstan and other countries in the region.

European Union-Central Asian Heads of State Summit (EU+CA)

After China’s C+C5 format, meetings and visits have shown that there is great interest in the Central Asian countries. The President of the European Council Charles Michel visited Kyrgyzstan to host the 2^nd Summit of Central Asian Heads of State on June 2-3, 2023. The summit, which took place in the Kyrgyz city of Cholpon-Ata, was attended by President Sadyr Zhaparov of Kyrgyzstan, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev of Kazakhstan, President Emomali Rahmon of Tajikistan, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan, Deputy Chairman of the Turkmenistan Council of Ministers Nurmuhammet Amannepesov, representing President Serdar Berdimuhamedov of Turkmenistan, and President of the European Council Charles Michel. Multilateral and mutually beneficial cooperation and the future of relations between the European Union and Central Asia were discussed in the context of international relations.

The summit also reaffirmed the determination to continue the high-level dialogue between Central Asia and the EU, and to develop the EU-Central and Eastern Asia (CEA) (EU+CA) partnership in accordance with the priority areas identified by the parties, with the aim of achieving common prosperity and security in Central Asia. The participants expressed their intention to adopt the EU-CA Cooperation Roadmap at the next ministerial meeting and underlined their commitment to making Afghanistan a secure, peaceful, stable, and prosperous country. The heads of state and government also instructed the foreign ministers and the EU High Representative Josep Borrell to formalize and advance the implementation of the joint roadmap to deepen relations between the European Union and Central Asia.

Intense interest in Central Asia has led Germany to pursue a more active policy in the region. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz invited the Central Asian leaders to his country and hosted a major summit on September 29, 2023. The visit was the first time the leaders of these five countries visited a European Union country together. Following the start of the Russia-Ukraine war, when oil supplies from Russia were cut off, Kazakhstan began supplying oil to the Schwedt refinery in Germany. At this point, Germany sees Kazakhstan as an alternative in energy supply and as a geography where investments can be made in the production of green hydrogen energy.

At the summit, Germany declared it would establish a Strategic Regional Partnership with the C5 countries in the fields of economy, energy, natural resources, climate, environment, and regional cooperation. In the short term, it is understood that Germany attaches great importance to strengthening energy security and creating alternative energy supply routes, especially with Kazakhstan, in order to prevent a possible energy crisis in the country. The statement made at the summit on continuing efforts to develop the EU “Global Gateway” project as an alternative to the “Belt and Road Initiative” also attracted attention.

Growing Arab interest in Central Asia (GCC+C5)

While countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Lebanon have recently opened embassies and consulates in Central Asian countries, they have also begun to establish important trade links and invest in projects in the region.

Following the European Union-Central Asian Heads of State Summit, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, president of Qatar, one of the most important states in the Arab world, made an important official visit to Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan on June 5-9, 2023. During these visits, agreements were signed between Qatar and the regional countries in the fields of energy, tourism, and education. Qatar’s intention to invest in the region’s subsurface and surface resources, as well as the common goals of exploiting the region’s resources by supporting key projects in the region, were clear from the meetings held during the visits.

The Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Gulf States and the Cooperation Council for Central Asia (GCC+C5), also under the leadership of Saudi Arabia, was held in Jeddah on July 18-19. This summit is seen as the beginning of a new phase of joint cooperation mechanisms between Central Asian and Gulf countries. The latter independently maintain trade relations with the former; the Gulf countries have serious mutual project-based trade relations with the region, especially Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The summit set the goal of creating a way and an opportunity for the countries of the region to mutually improve their cooperation in the economic and cultural fields.

The Haydar Aliyev Centre for Eurasian Studies at Ibn Haldun University in Turkey held a webinar on the impact of the war in Ukraine on Central Asia on March 30, 2022. The webinar included Prof. Luca Anceschi, an expert on Eurasian studies who teaches at the University of Glasgow, UK; Akbota Zholdasbekova, an associate professor at L.N Gumilyov Eurasian National University, Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan; Emil Dzhuraev, co-founder and fellow at Crossroads-Central Asia, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan; and Prof. Yaşar Sarı from Ibn Haldun University, Istanbul, Turkey.

Response from state and civil society in Central Asia

Speaking of Turkmenistan’s official position, which is unclear at present on the Russia-Ukraine war, Luca Anceschi noted that Turkmenistan “is a country where war is not debated in the public press. Whatever the news makes internationally, doesn’t make it in Turkmenistan because the government decides what goes and what doesn’t go into the news. The country has been engaged very publicly in the presidential transition as well.”

He added, “This is a very inwards-looking country; it’s a country that only cares about themselves, not because the people are like that but because the regime forced them to do so.”

Emil Dzhuraev elaborated on the issue of the official position of Central Asian countries on the Russia-Ukraine war. According to Dzhuraev, “All Central Asian countries, in one way or another, expressed a position of neutrality.” Countries are using the cover of official state neutrality in order to escape the ire of parties involved in the ongoing war.

One can also see the evolution in these neutral positions when countries like Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have showcased their greater sympathy towards Ukraine. “However, that doesn’t mean an open condemnation of the aggressive actions by Russia,” said Dzhuraev.

While addressing the response of civil society in Kyrgyzstan, Dzhuraev said, “There have been public protests and demonstrations in support of both countries [Russia and Ukraine],” but “there is a lack of information, if not ignorance about what the matter really is” among the people. Because of the strong presence of Russian state-controlled media from which a large part of Kyrgyz population gets their daily news, “there is an urgent need for countries [Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan] to consider their information security question.”

Dzhuraev argued there is a prevailing division of allegiance between young and older Kyrgyz. According to Dzhuraev, old generation Kyrgyz are pro-Russian due to the “imprint of many years in close affinity with Russia under the Soviet Union.” He also noted the role of Russia’s “propaganda campaign that has been working successfully with Putin in the center in Kyrgyzstan.”

In this regard, Dzhuraev stated that the “lump-sum value of remittances has come down during the COVID19 restrictions to 20%, which is less than normal.” He added that during the Russia-Ukraine crisis, “one could expect even a sharper decline in remittances.” He further stressed the debates which are emerging in Kazakhstan around Kyrgyz migrants in Russia and the fear of their possible recruitment in the war against Ukraine.

A large number of goods that Kyrgyzstan receives from EU markets and other countries apparently come through Russia. Dzhuraev put emphasis on revisiting the “question of whether Kyrgyzstan can refigure its supply routes for imports of essential goods such as medicine, food items, technology, etc.”

Central Asian countries “treading a fine line”?

Countries in Central Asia are maintaining the position of neutrality. An Uzbek Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson clarified that Uzbekistan maintained neutrality regarding the war in Ukraine. Uzbekistan hasn’t recognized the pro-Russian separatist-controlled districts in Ukraine’s Donbas, known as the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. The same is the case with Turkmenistan, which maintains a position it calls “positive neutrality.”

Turkmenistan seems to uphold its long-standing principle of “permanent neutrality” by avoiding all public comments on the Russia-Ukraine war. Kyrgyzstan’s foreign minister reiterated the country’s commitment to the principle of territorial integrity.

Dzhuraev concluded that “the Central Asian positions of neutrality should be read actually as covers for stances against the war. Central Asian countries have appealed to resolve the crisis on the basis of international law, and there is no doubt that international law would certainly be on the side of Ukraine and condemning Russia.”

According to Dzhuraev, “Neutrality should be read as the timid signs of siding with Ukraine as far as these countries can afford.”

While speaking on the relations of Kazakhstan with Russia and Ukraine, Zholdasbekova maintained that they “will be coming to more neutrality.” She further stated that “we believe in a bright future, and we believe that our great principle of multivectorism will still serve us after Russia’s aggression.”

Press freedom in Central Asia

Dzhuraev pointed out Russia’s tendency to “write Kyrgyzstan into a position of support of Russian actions by Russian sources.” It happened when Kyrgyzstani president Sadyr Japarov talked with Russian president Putin over the phone. After the call, Russia’s media agency reported that the Kyrgyz president supports Russia’s actions in Ukraine. However, as Dzhuraev said, “From Kyrgyzstan, there was no such word, not even close to that.”

Many cases are also coming to the surface regarding the declining press freedom in the Central Asian countries, particularly Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Recently, Kyrgyzstan authorities raided the broadcaster Next TV and detained its director over their published posts covering claims by a former head of Kazakhstan’s intelligence agency that Kyrgyzstan has secretly agreed to provide military support to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

“These kinds of troubling signs are there in Kyrgyzstan, but the press and civil society are fighting for their freedom and rights every day while dealing with numerous trials/changes against them,” said Dzhuraev.

Speaking of the existence of free press in Kyrgyzstan, Zholdasbekova gave the examples of a few instances where news channels were banned because of content. According to Zholdasbekova, “There is no limitation to what you are watching, but sometimes when channels become too aggressive, they somehow might be closed without any explanation.”

On February 24, in the morning, following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s public address to the nation, Russia launched its so-called special military operation, which has proven to be a full-scale invasion and war, never officially declared as such by Moscow.

On a declarative level, the “special military operation” had three main goals. First, the protection of the self-proclaimed People’s Republics of Luhansk and Donetsk, which were formally recognized by Russia on February 21, as the two manufactured breakaway entities that formally asked Moscow for military assistance.

Second, the de-militarization of Ukraine, which, de-facto meant erasing Ukraine’s military potential which has grown after 2014. Third, the so-called de-Nazification of the country, not clearly explained in Russian sources, which arguably means “cleansing” the country of allegedly anti-Russian political and intellectual forces.

In reality, however, in launching its military offensive against Ukraine, Russia’s strategic goal should be viewed as follows: further dismemberment of the country—ideally breaking it up into two separate and, perhaps, loosely connected entities based on geographic and ethnic-linguistic principles—and the restoration of a pro-Russian puppet government, potentially led by Ukraine’s former president Viktor Yanukovych who fled to Russia in 2014, which will be completely subordinate to the Kremlin’s will. If Russian goals and objectives with regards to Ukraine are to be accomplished, the country is likely to cease to exist.

While Russian armed forces are muddling through Ukraine’s outskirts reportedly suffering unprecedentedly high military losses in Russia’s post-1991 history and the Russian economy is nearing the brink of collapse as a result of heavy economic sanctions imposed by the U.S., the EU, their allies, and regional partners, many large brands (more than 150) have walked out of the Russian market. Now, Russian political leadership is reportedly seeking ways to garner international support to legitimize its actions in Ukraine.

Aside from Belarus, which has found itself in a complete dependency on Russia both economically and politically, Russia’s seemingly best bet in terms of drumming international support could come from other members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and members of the Central Asia macro-region.

However, Tokayev adamantly refused to send Kazakhstani troops to Ukraine. Moreover, he blamed the “refusal to follow the Minsk Agreements”—without actually pointing to the culprit—as the main source of the “developments in Ukraine.”

Apparently, Tokayev’s position was a negative surprise for Putin, who counted on a much more cooperative attitude given Russia’s role in dealing with public protests earlier this year. Thus, it is highly likely that Kazakhstan, which has been able to preserve strategic distance from all regional/global centers of power, will not become embroiled in the Russia-spurned war against Ukraine.

Moreover, Russia’s growing international isolation, which is turning the country into an international pariah and a “toxic” partner, will make the Kazakh leadership act even more cautiously, potentially, articulating its leaning toward other actors, such as China and Turkey, even stronger.

Added to this, an armed conflict against a neighboring state (Ukraine) under the guise of “protecting the Russian-speaking population,” which greatly disturbed Kazakhstani authorities back in 2014, especially in light of Russia’s rhetoric, should be a great source of uneasiness for Kazakhstan —even though this may not be publicly declared.

Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are other Central Asia actors on whose support Russia could theoretically count on. However, things are all but simple with these two states as well.

Tajikistan, which is also a member of the CSTO and a country dependent on Russia economically and for security, was approached by Russia shortly after the outbreak of the war. On February 27, during her visit to Dushanbe, Valentina Matviyenko, chairwoman of the Federation Council of Russia’s Federal Assembly, stated that relations between the two countries “have stepped to a new level of strategic partnership.”

Yet, following this meeting, Tajikistan cancelled all flights to a number of Russian cities, at the same time refraining from giving any further comments on Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

Another member of the CSTO, Kyrgyzstan, which is also a member of the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union, took an extremely reserved stance as well, distancing itself from the conflict. In regard to these two states and their reaction to the Russo-Ukrainian war, it makes sense to underscore two aspects.

First, a recent border clash in April 2021 between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan that resulted in dozens of casualties demonstrated both the weakness of the CSTO and the evasiveness of Russia’s position—a reality that was hailed neither by Tajikistan nor Kyrgyzstan.

Thus, most likely, the reserved reaction by both countries now might, at least in part, be owing to that. Second, the abovementioned border crisis identified yet another trend that is likely to grow:  the increasing influence of Turkey in Central Asia, especially in light of Russia’s reckless behavior in the post-Soviet space and Ankara`s extremely well-calculated and balanced approach.

Finally, analyzing the impact of the Russian aggression against Ukraine and its impact on Central Asia from a more macroregional/global prospective it makes sense to highlight yet another aspect. Russia’s embroilment in Ukraine, its political and economic isolation, and the decreasing presence of the U.S. in the region (particularly visible after its withdrawal from Afghanistan), make China the likeliest winner of this whole situation.

In addition to remaining Russia’s only strong economic partner—incidentally, Beijing is also not breaking ties with Kyiv and/or Western powers—China is the likeliest beneficiary of Russia’s isolation. For Central Asia, this also means that Beijing’s regional presence, already strong, will increase even further.

China is setting up for a return as a superpower under Xi Jinping. By all definitions, Beijing cleverly demonstrates greater economic and political power in Asia to establish itself as a great global actor. The Chinese road to global supremacy runs through ambitious but articulate strategies like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It is worth noting here that China has successfully triumphed over colonial exploitation moving from a Soviet-style Communist state to an independent socialist regime with a mixed economic system.

The mammoth economic growth over the last 70 years has allowed China to achieve great economic and political success both at home and abroad; however, this hasn’t been sufficient to ensure China a place of global leadership. Today, China is truly a global player: it is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC); a factory of world products; a center of the world supply chain; and a major part of the global political economy. Yet, China is not a comprehensive power of the U.S. or the Soviet style.

Although Beijing has achieved colossal economic weight to pursue its interests abroad, it seeks more than economic power and desires to restore its lost glories known as “Chinese Dreams” and to become a superpower. Beijing’s SCO and BRI framework should be studied within this perspective to understand its grand strategy in Central Asia, an important zone of world geopolitics.

How China uses the SCO

Let’s discuss the SCO framework first. For China, the SCO has been conceptually used both as an institution and a region. Initiated as “Shanghai Five,” the necessity of the SCO became quite apparent for China by the end of the 20th century. China initiated the foundation of the first multilateral organization named the “Shanghai Cooperation Organization” in 2001.

The collapse of the Soviet Union, the emergence of newly independent states with porous borders of around 3,000 kilometers had largely worried China, which had virtually no connections with the region until 1992. This organization at times was defined by external observers such as Matthew Brummer and Richard Weitz as “the world’s least-known and least analyzed multilateral group, an OPEC [Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries] with [nuclear] bombs and a prospective anti-American Asian NATO.”

Shanghai Cooperation Organization was created to cater to Chinese needs for creating “New Regionalism.”

Others like Stephen Blank and Simon Tisdall have dubbed the organization as “either an ineffectual and shallow regional talk-fest or a transparent cloak for the maintenance and expansion of malignant Russian and Chinese influence in Central Asia.”

However, those who understand its significance and the process of its evolution trace its roots to Chinese initiatives taken in the 1990s. The advocators of this perception, such as Chung-Chian Teng and Niklas Swanstrom, were quick to unravel the Chinese design behind the SCO’s foundation. For them, China is the principal driver of the SCO, and the organization was created to cater to Chinese needs for creating “New Regionalism, establishing vassal relations between China and Central Asia or as geopolitical maneuverings.”

Scholars like Shirley Z. Yu have put forth the notion that the world would witness a paradigm shift in three decades and have attributed this to the successful operation of the BRI. In 2018, Yu wrote that the “BRI will serve as the transitory grand strategy between 2013 and around 2050 when China reaches its modernity according to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s ‘Two Centenaries Plans’, China would govern the world with its version of world order and will establish a Sino-centric world i.e., Pax Sinica.”

China needs to develop strong regional leadership with the help of its political relations with Central Asian states.

For that, China needs to develop strong regional leadership with the help of its political relations with Central Asian states and the economic infrastructure Belt and Road Initiative as a mechanism to assert its position abroad and influence on a global scale.

Therefore, it is obvious that the Chinese observers are busy providing a very rosy picture of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative as announced by Xi Jinping at Nazarbayev University in Kazakhstan in 2013 depicting the “Belt” as the land trade route connecting China with Central Asia, Russia, and Europe, and the “Road” as the maritime route via the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific.

To be precise, unrest in China’s western province Xinjiang and its bordering with the Islamic republics of Central Asia, which are rich in oil and gas; the vacuum created in the region with the retreat of Moscow; and the military withdrawal of Washington from Afghanistan prompted the Chinese to come up with a developmental strategy through which they can address the country’s core concerns of threat of terrorism, instability in the wider region, and effective exploitation of the regional hydrocarbon resources.

In a nutshell, the BRI can be viewed as China’s geopolitical power play under President Xi rather than an economic and infrastructural development project. By pumping massive money to attain geopolitical advantages for Beijing, this initiative is intended to influence the emerging world market, to secure energy resources, to promote the Chinese currency, to create a Sino-centric Asian order, to counter other great powers’ influence, and to strengthen ties with neighboring countries.

As far as Sino-Russian cooperation in Central Asia is concerned, it is merely symbolic and largely U.S.-centric. The cooperation is, in fact, governed by the spirit of “the rival of my rival is my partner.” Although Sino-Russian collaboration through two non-western cooperative initiatives like the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the BRI have overshadowed the American influence in the region, the unprecedented rise of China in the region has certainly unsettled Moscow in its hinterland. Central Asia was the backyard of Russia until the arrival of China, and Moscow enjoyed enormous strategic advantages from this arrangement.

The Sino-Russian cooperation in Central Asia is merely symbolic and largely U.S.-centric and is governed by the spirit of “the rival of my rival is my partner.”

But with massive Chinese economic investments and integrative infrastructure projects making inroads into Central Asian countries, Moscow slowly but steadily has started losing ground in its so-called near abroad. In fact, China’s Belt and Road Initiative has strengthened Beijing’s position in Central Asia and unprecedentedly improved its rule-making ability in the region.

China is moving forward under the leadership of Xi Jinping with the “Chinese Dream” as its thrust to establish an ever-stronger Chinese nation characterized by wealth and power in military terms. The Chinese agenda of a Sino-centric Asian order on the premise of “Two Fronts and One Circle” will definitely irk Russia if not now very soon.

Kazakhstan experienced unprecedented developments in January 2022. Economy-driven protests, triggered by the rise of liquefied natural gas prices, turned into violent demonstrations in a very short time. In some regions, particularly in Almaty, the former capital and economic center, protestors looted private properties, government buildings were torched, the international airport was seized, and the state authority almost disappeared.

Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, president of Kazakhstan, reacted promptly and dismissed the government, declared a curfew and a state of emergency immediately thereafter, and invited the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) troops to the country. When the protests subsided in a short time, the state of emergency ended and a schedule for the withdrawal of troops was declared.

The events in Kazakhstan were considered by some as a “surprise,” while others viewed them as “expected.” A fair and balanced interpretation of the events shows that there were tensions due to socio-economic factors and that the protests should have come as no surprise. Despite this, no one expected the demonstrations to turn into organized violence in such a short period of time.

In any case, events in Kazakhstan seem to have calmed down for now and stability has been restored. However, it is clear that these events will have local and regional implications, some of which are closely related to Turkey.

Factors affecting Turkey’s approach to the events in Kazakhstan

The events in Kazakhstan occurred in a limited time particularly as Kazakhstan is one of the country’s main partners in foreign policy and plays an important role in the Turkic world and Central Asia. This made it inevitable that Turkey be prompt but sensitive in its reaction towards the developments.

Three interrelated factors shaped Turkey’s reaction: the normative dimension, the bilateral relations dimension, and the regional context including the Turkic world and the Organization of Turkic States (OTS).

As for the normative dimension, Turkey has faced and overcome several anti-democratic challenges and interventions that threatened its political system, democracy, and stability. Only in the last decade, the Justice and Development Party governments faced the violent Gezi Park protests in 2013, the December 17-25, 2013 judicial coup attempt, and the July15, 2016 foiled coup attempt.

Turkey’s reaction to the protests in Kazakhstan

The developments in Kazakhstan and the possibility of increasing instability put the bilateral relations of Ankara and Nur-Sultan at risk as the developments had the potential to cause negative consequences in the Turkic world and particularly for the OTS (Organization of Turkic States). Just two months earlier, on November 12, 2021, Turkey hosted the Eighth Summit of the Organization of Turkic States (Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States) in Istanbul and the organization changed its name to “Organization of Turkic States” with Turkey becoming the chair. At the same summit, member states approved the “Turkic World Vision 2040” that draws a roadmap for the next two decades. Kazakhstan was among the influential actors behind this name change and vision.

Once the protests turned violent and riots became commonplace in Kazakhstan, Turkey initially tried to analyze the situation, and with the responsibility of the OTS chair, acted as both a friend and partner.

On the fourth day of the protests, January 6, 2022, President Erdoğan initiated telephone diplomacy and spoke with Tokayev and other heads of OTS states. In his call with Tokayev, Erdoğan stated that Turkey is closely following the developments and reiterated Turkey’s solidarity with Kazakhstan. In his other phone calls, too, the president expressed the importance of Kazakhstan’s stability.

On the same day, the OTS issued a statement on the events taking place in Kazakhstan. The statement did not make any distinction between the Kazakh people and government, and expressed OTS’s readiness to support the people and government of Kazakhstan if needed. Meanwhile, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu had a phone call with his Kazakh counterpart Mukhtar Tileuberdi on January 7, and organized an Extraordinary Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of Turkic States on January 11 that reiterated the organization’s support for Kazakhstan.

Briefly, Turkey’s approach in the first three days of the protests was to evaluate the situation and possible future scenarios, and prepare for its response. Due to the sensitivity of events, Turkey didn’t make a distinction between the people (or protestors) and the government. Instead, Ankara preferred to embrace both the Kazakh people and the government, and expressed its strong support for the country’s stability. This stance was observed in the subsequent statements of both Turkey and the OTS.

Risks and opportunities in the new era 

The developments in Kazakhstan show how protests can turn into organized violence, becoming a major challenge even in a relatively stable country like Kazakhstan. Therefore, it’s inevitable that Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states will derive lessons from this turn of events.

The new era in Kazakhstan and Central Asia contains risks as well as opportunities for Turkey. The opportunities derive from the domestic politics of the Central Asian states and regional geopolitics. For instance, recent events in Kazakhstan revealed how fragile states are when the political processes and stability are not supported by economic and welfare policies. Likewise, the events reveal how the power struggle among the political elites or within the bureaucracy, particularly within the security sector, can be a major threat for the stability of the state.

There are also regional repercussions of these events. Russia has showed it is an effective and “preferred” actor in the region whether through the CSTO or its bilateral engagements. Without a doubt, the increase of Russian influence in Central Asia will have consequences on Turkey’s bilateral relations with regional actors and cooperation in the OTS.

The new era in Kazakhstan and Central Asia contains risks as well as opportunities for Turkey.

On the other hand, Turkey has the opportunity to develop a new approach in Central Asia through bilateral relations with the Turkic states, especially Kazakhstan, and the OTS. For instance, Turkey is in the position to offer more cooperation for training or restructuring internal security organizations as well as increasing intelligence and military cooperation. Since Turkey has experienced serious challenges before, the country can share its experiences with other Turkic states.

From the OTS perspective, member states should learn a lesson from the immediate call and response of the Russian-led CSTO. As a medium-term goal, therefore, the OTS can form an initiative to develop military cooperation among its member states that can be used as a peacekeeping force or an observation mission in the future. Such an attempt would be the basis for a possible collective military cooperation that could be functional during regional crises or in UN-led non-combat missions.

On January 15, 2022, military personnel deployed by the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) – a Russia-dominated international security organization that in addition to Russia itself includes Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan – started to leave Kazakhstan. This operation, officially dubbed a “peacekeeping mission,” involved the deployment of 2,500 paratroopers on the territory of Kazakhstan and became the first event of this type carried out by the CSTO since its creation in 1992.

The operation was launched after Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev forwarded his official request to members of the CSTO for assistance to deal with massive public protests that ultimately resulted in widespread violence and instability causing massive (in)direct economic losses and dozens of victims and that broke out in Kazakhstan in early January. Mass protests in Kazakhstan, Central Asia’s most stable country economically, started over the government’s unpopular decision to double gas prices, which affected the most vulnerable layers of the Kazakhstani society.

Having started in Zhanaozen (Mangystau Region) on January 2 – a region that has experienced public protests before – under mainly economic slogans, the protests soon spread to all major cities, despite the fact that Tokayev dismissed the government and ordered that gas prices return to their previous level. The protests reached their culmination in Almaty, where events took a particularly dramatic turn.

In his official statement, Tokayev called protesters “bandits and terrorists,” stating that “foreign states” had masterminded the protests and were organizing a de facto foreign invasion of the country. Tokayev’s opinion was immediately shared by leaders of both Belarus and Russia, where President Vladimir Putin classified events in Kazakhstan as “aggression of international terrorism.”

After several days of instability that witnessed, among others, multiple instances of vandalism, despicable violence, and full-fledged street fighting between the protestors and the Kazakh security forces, Tokayev managed to take control of the situation in all major cities and Kazakhstan started to return back to normal life gradually. While neither the circumstances of the tragic events have been fully revealed nor is it completely apparent how the Kazakhstani domestic milieu and foreign policy will evolve, three macro aspects should be highlighted.

First, the completion of the (para)military mission in Kazakhstan by the Russian-led CSTO is a vocal claim that this organization – unlike the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) or similar projects – is a living entity whose operational scope and ambitions are likely to expand. It is also quite clear that when attempting to increase its influence in Central Asia, Russia, in light of the absence of other trump cards, is likely to rely increasingly on its so-called security export mechanism, i.e., Russia’s use of (para)military help and assistance to other countries facing security threats and challenges.

Third, the current mission of the CSTO in Kazakhstan might not become the last instance when the organization`s resources are used in Central Asia. It is highly likely that with Russia`s growing interest and involvement therein, the macro-region, which is rife with ethnic-religious conflicts and permeated with disagreements that have recently (once again) resulted in a (para)military conflict on the Tajik-Kyrgyz border leading to multiple casualties, might soon become a battleground between powerful players once again.

Indeed, Central Asia is a resource-endowed and strategic geographic location which is indispensable for establishing steady logistical ties between the East and West, and that once again has turned into an intersection of the strategic interests of such powerful players as Russia, China, Turkey, Iran, India, Pakistan, and the United States as well as a space for the emerging risks and uncertainties posed by the Taliban rise to power in Afghanistan.

Central Asia is a resource-endowed and strategic geographic location which is indispensable for establishing steady logistical ties between the East and West.

In light of all the above, another important aspect needs to be underscored: on January 10, 2022, Alexander Lukashenko unequivocally, and somewhat unexpectedly, warned the Uzbek authorities that they have to consider seriously the prospect of a repetition of events similar to Kazakhstan’s on their territory. Apparently, this statement, which was firmly rebutted by the Uzbek political leadership that stated that the country has enough resources to deal with a similar crisis was meant to convey the idea (arguably, circulated from Moscow) that Uzbekistan should consider (re)joining the CSTO – Uzbekistan was once a member of the CSTO but left the organization on two occasions, in 2006 and 2012.

Interestingly enough, when following events in Kazakhstan, part of Uzbek intellectual circles and the policymaking community while generally supporting Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s confidence in Uzbekistan’s ability to solve problems independently still argued that in case the challenge would exceed these capabilities “Uzbekistan might ask the Russian Federation, as its ally, for help and assistance.”

Finally, it is quite curious to note that only several months ago Russia, whose economic potential and “soft power” in Central Asia are considerably lagging behind actors such as China that exerts influence via the Belt and Road economic mega project and Turkey whose influence is premised on ethnic-cultural and religious pivots, seemed to have very few competitive advantages in the macro-region. Today, the situation appears to be getting more complex and challenging.

The fact that the Kazakhstani president requested assistance from the CSTO – aka Russia – and not any other international organization, including, for instance, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),  is very telling. In the case other countries encounter similar problems, Kazakhstan might have cast a long shadow in the greater region.

“Attention, this is Moscow speaking!” A Soviet citizen knew that something important would follow this famous radio announcement’s opening sentence. From the shores of the Arctic, the city of Vladivostok, and in the great steppes of Central Asia, this ominous imperative reminded the people under which nation’s guidance they are living.

Even though the ‘national anthem’ of the Soviet Union started with the words “Unbreakable Union of freeborn Republics”, it continued as “Great Russia has welded forever to stand”. Thus, it was clear who was the master and who was the serf in the ‘voluntary’ union. Despite the myths about the creation of the new Soviet man, a trial to create a single Soviet nation from a blend of diverse ethnicities, ‘nationalities question’ followed the Soviet Union until its demise. The quest to form Russian-free national identities in the post-Soviet area is still one of the priorities of the former communist states.

Central Asia, with its geostrategic importance and pathway of the historic Silk Road, hosts significant human potential along with its economic leap in the last two decades. Almost 30 years after the dissolution of the Union, Russia no longer holds the monopoly of cultural hegemony in the region. Russian language is in decline and favored mostly by the older generations. The indigenous cultures and other foreign languages are gaining popularity among the new generation. Furthermore, Russian culture is also challenged by the official changes in legislation.

However, considering economic and historic ties, Moscow is still the most dominant state over Central Asia and is trying to use its soft power as much as possible to protect its economic, political, and military interests.

Russian Language

In 1938, the Russian language became mandatory at all schools in the Soviet Union, which increased the popularity of the language among the newly literate population. 1989 Soviet demographic census showed that 80 percent of the Soviet Union spoke Russian, and most of them were non-Russians inhabitants. The dominance of the Russian language covered all aspects of daily life and business, from media to army to literature. Russian also became a lingua franca among the elites and artists of the Soviet Union from various ethnic backgrounds, and even created a fictive class difference depending on the level to which the language had been mastered.

Nowadays, the number of Russian speakers is decreasing in Central Asia, where the language is losing its former strength and importance. Apart from Kazakhstan, Russian speakers do not exceed 50 percent of the total population in each Central Asian state, now briefly analyzed in turn.

One of the major problems by the end of the dissolution of the Soviet Union was a demographic problem in Kazakhstan. The northern part of the country was mostly inhabited by the ethnic Russians and despite the mass exodus with the dissolution, they still constitute 21 percent of the total population. The question of loyalty of the Russian population in Kazakhstan was a barrier for  Kazakh nation-building and the sovereign unity of the country after independence. The concerns of separatism even forced the government to move the capital from the southern city of Almaty to Astana (Nursultan).

In the 1990s, 25 to 40 percent of Kazakhs could speak very little or almost no mother tongue, and 65 percent of Kazakhs expressed their Russian knowledge in the level of native or very fluent in a 1989 census. Currently, both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are leading on the number of Russian speakers and their constitutions give official status to the Russian language.

On the other hand, Kyrgyzstan is still under the significant cultural dominance of its northern neighbor. In contrast to all other Central Asian countries, Russian schools are increasing in Kyrgyzstan and most of the higher education is offered in Russian as well. Despite the need to take a language test in Kyrgyz for civil service, most of the daily business is still conducted in Russian. Printed outlets and TV shows in Russian continue to be preferred over Kyrgyz media. The country’s economic reliability on Russia prevents Bishkek applying strict measures as Kazakhstan. However better Russian knowledge of Kyrgyz migrant workers in Russia makes them advantageous compared to others in the market.

In contrast to Kyrgyzstan, Uzbeks are trying to eradicate all remnants of Russian in the government business. Today, the country is preparing a law to penalize government officials for their usage of Russian in official business. Uzbekistan continually reforms the legislation to promote Uzbek and its Latin alphabet as well. However, a wide range of Uzbek language users still write in the Cyrillic alphabet. Despite the decrease in studying Russian, the language still holds significance because of the high numbers of Uzbek migrants, which was over two million who went to Russia in 2018 alone.

Turkmenistan also takes extreme measures against the Russian language since the country distanced itself against everything Russian. Besides strong enforcement of the Latin alphabet, the speakers of Russian are only 18 percent of the country according to a 2013 study. This generation mostly consists of elders who studied in the Soviet Union and still live a hybrid lifestyle, a mix between Russian and Turkmen cultures. There is only one Russian school in Turkmenistan, which is named after famous Russian poet Alexander Pushkin, and the printed and visual media in Russian is almost non-existent in the country.

Alternative Paths

Besides the non-arguable decline of the Russian language, certain sectors cannot be imagined without Russian cultural influence. Firstly, traditional cultural institutions such as theatre, culture shows, museums, and libraries are mostly under the supervision of the state in Central Asia. These state institutions are still controlled by nomenklatura who were educated in the communist regime and missing their lifestyle and fame in the U.S.S.R. They are mostly the older generations, some of them having ethnic Russian background, however, the rest were brainwashed and assimilated during the Soviet reign. They continuously try to use their influence over the people to create a pro-Russian agenda.

Secondly, the economies of the Central Asian countries are still tied to Russia to a certain degree. Memberships of Russian lead organizations are popular among the regional countries, despite the diminishing political power of Kremlin. Furthermore, the dependency on remittances of Central Asian migrants working in Russia makes it easier for Russia to infiltrate domestic affairs of countries and demand certain rights for the Russian language and culture.

Back in the Soviet days, Russian was almost the only option for Central Asia to have access to global developments. Currently, thousands of students from the region are learning alternative languages and studying abroad. The increasing influence of English, Turkish and Chinese languages shows that the current popularity of the Russian entertainment sector is also under threat of competition. Especially the youth are more aware of global trends and their command on alternative foreign languages allows them to bypass Russian. On the other hand, the nation-building process in the region continues where governments promote local languages and try to make them popular along with English instead of Russian.

Despite centuries-long colonialization, assimilation, imperialism, and demographic manipulations, Turkic nations are still the majority of the population in the Central Asian Turkic republics. To promote their common cultural identity, the International Organization of Turkic Culture (TURKSOY) was founded in 1993 and organizes common theatre, music, art, and literature projects. Moreover, the Turkic Council along with the Turkic Academy created common history and geography textbooks for schools in the member countries. The project tries to avoid a conception of history of the Turkic World that was created by Russian assimilative policies. This is a historic opportunity to finally develop an alternative route to Russian cultural dominance over Central Asia and bring the Turkic World together in a peaceful way.

It is not easy to erase everything related to Russia in 30 years of independence. The ideal of Gaspirali Ismail Bey, “Unity in language, thought and action” is still not achieved but is progressing slowly. Central Asia is located in a challenging geography where both China and Russia are trying to exert their influence and play the new Great Game. Therefore, Central Asian countries need to progress their nation-building as quickly as possible and create national unity that can stand against foreign cultural interference. The future seems promising. New generations are integrating into the developed world, states are trying to protect local culture, and most importantly, Russia is far from being an attractive alternative.