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hen Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan says he does not want to see “a new conflict in the Horn of Africa,” he is not making a throwaway remark about a distant region. He is speaking after high-level talks in Addis Ababa and phone calls that range from Abu Dhabi to Mogadishu, at a moment when Red Sea tensions, Ethiopia’s search for sea access and Somalia’s first offshore drilling project are all converging. I don’t read this as a routine diplomatic line. To me, it is a sign that, for Ankara, stability from Ethiopia to Somalia has become a strategic test of its broader foreign policy narrative.

Over the last few years, Türkiye has steadily expanded its footprint along the Red Sea–Gulf of Aden corridor. Somalia hosts Turkish trainers, engineers and aid workers. Ethiopia has become one of Ankara’s largest investment destinations on the continent. Sudan, Djibouti and even Eritrea now enter Turkish debates about sea lanes, energy routes and security risks. Erdoğan’s latest message simply makes explicit what policy choices have already been saying quietly: the Horn of Africa is no longer a side file.

That matters because the region sits at the intersection of several fires at once. Civil war in Sudan, unresolved tensions inside Ethiopia, maritime insecurity in the Red Sea and the persistent threat of al-Shabaab in Somalia all blur into one another. For a country that sees itself as both a regional stabilizer and a rising middle power, ignoring this arc of instability is not really an option.

From a “Somalia file” to a regional vision

Türkiye’s entry point into the Horn of Africa was Somalia. What began as humanitarian aid during the 2011 famine turned into a long-term relationship that combines military training, infrastructure projects, and political support. Ankara built roads, hospitals and schools in Mogadishu, opened an embassy when many others stayed away and later established a major military training base to support Somali forces fighting al-Shabaab.

Over time, this “Somalia file” stopped being just about one fragile state. Turkish diplomats and security officials increasingly framed it as part of a wider picture that stretches from the Suez Canal to the Indian Ocean. Turkish Airlines routes, port projects and naval deployments all reflect the same logic: what happens around the Bab el-Mandeb strait and the Gulf of Aden directly affect Türkiye’s trade, energy security and diaspora connections.

As Ethiopia’s leadership began to talk more openly about its need for sea access, and as Sudan’s war threatened to fragment another coastal state, Ankara’s calculus shifted again. It was no longer enough to work only with Mogadishu. Relations with Addis Ababa deepened around investment, defense cooperation and discussions on how Ethiopia could secure access to ports without triggering a wider conflict. The message coming out of Erdoğan’s meetings has been consistent: any solution on sea access should be based on regional consensus, not unilateral moves that risk pulling everyone into a crisis.

This is happening in a crowded field. The United States, Gulf countries, Egypt, the European Union and China all have their own military bases, port concessions and political projects in and around the Horn. Türkiye is not the biggest player in terms of money or firepower. Its difference lies in what it is not: it has no colonial history in the region; it presents itself as a partner from the Global South and it speaks the language of both security and development at the same time.

Security that tries to reduce, not export, risk

Erdoğan’s Horn of Africa message is rooted in very concrete security concerns. Ethiopia is still managing the aftershocks of internal conflicts. Sudan’s civil war threatens to spill over into Chad, South Sudan, and the Red Sea. Eritrea remains a closed but influential actor. In Somalia, al-Shabaab has not disappeared, even as security forces have made gains. Across the water, Yemen’s conflict and Houthi attacks on shipping lanes have turned the Red Sea into a zone of permanent alert.

In such an environment, escalation rarely stays local. A border clash between Ethiopia and a coastal neighbor, a miscalculation in Sudan or a major attack on shipping could quickly draw in Gulf states, Western navies and regional rivals. Trade routes, energy flows and migration patterns would all feel the shock.

Türkiye’s answer has been to invest in local capacity rather than posture as a front-line power. In Somalia, Turkish officers train army and police units, while naval forces contribute to anti-piracy and maritime security missions. The aim is to help local institutions stand on their feet, not to replace them. The same logic applies to Ethiopia and Sudan, where Ankara stresses respect for territorial integrity and advocates political dialogue even as it supplies equipment and technical support.

From Ankara’s perspective, stability in the Horn is tied directly to its own security. New refugee flows, disrupted shipping in the Red Sea, or the spread of extremist networks would quickly reach the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond. At the same time, a more stable Horn offers opportunities: safer trade corridors, energy cooperation with Somalia, and a friendlier environment for Turkish investment in Ethiopia and Sudan.

Ports, planes and people-to-people ties

Security is only part of the equation. The Horn of Africa has also become an economic and diplomatic laboratory for Türkiye. Turkish companies are active in ports, construction and logistics projects, seeking a role in upgrading infrastructure that links landlocked states to global markets. Every port concession, every logistics hub has a dual meaning: commercial opportunity and geopolitical leverage.

For a middle power with limited resources, every naval mission, every training base and every trade deal has to serve more than one purpose. A presence in Mogadishu is not only about counterterrorism; it is also about giving Turkish firms a foothold in a market that others have long ignored. Investment in Ethiopian manufacturing is not only about cheap labor; it supports a political partnership that Ankara hopes will last through leadership changes on both sides.

Soft power runs alongside these hard interests. Scholarship programs bring Ethiopian and Somali students to Turkish universities. Development agencies support health, education and agriculture projects in remote areas. Turkish NGOs operate clinics and schools that often outlast news cycles. In quiet times, these efforts build goodwill. In moments of crisis, they provide channels to actors who do not always sit at official tables.

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resident Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Ethiopia is both symbolic and strategically significant, coinciding with the 100th anniversary of relations between the two countries. The opening of Türkiye’s first permanent embassy in Sub-Saharan Africa in Addis Ababa in 1926 marks a crucial milestone demonstrating the historical depth and institutional continuity of bilateral relations. However, the significance of this visit lies in the strategic direction outlined by the two leaders in their joint press conference, reflecting on the past and the direction of relations into the second century.

Following the discussions, deepening economic partnership, cooperation in defense and security, and emphasizing dialogue and stability in the face of regional crises stand out as the most important topics. When these three areas are considered together, it is seen that Türkiye-Ethiopia relations have now transcended the framework of a classic bilateral relationship and have acquired the character of a strategic partnership that can affect the geopolitical balance of the Horn of Africa.

The timing of the visit is also noteworthy in this respect. The Horn of Africa has become an area where both regional competition and global power struggles intersect. Developments across the Horn of Africa are transforming the region into an area of ​​multi-layered geopolitical fragility. Erdoğan’s visit to Addis Ababa is significant precisely because it reaffirms Türkiye’s pursuit of stability and balance in the region amidst this climate of uncertainty.

The new phase of relationships: From quantity to quality

President Erdoğan’s emphasis on expanding economic cooperation in his speech is consistent with the overall direction of Türkiye’s Africa policy. The presence of over 200 Turkish companies operating in Ethiopia and the employment they provide demonstrate the scale of economic relations. However, at this point, it is crucial that, along with increasing investment digits, these investments become production-based, technologically integrated, and connected to global supply chains.

For Ethiopia, this relationship presents a significant opportunity for economic diversification and increased production capacity. With a population approaching 130 million and being the second-largest country in Africa, Ethiopia has the potential to become a major manufacturing hub thanks to its large domestic market and young workforce. However, structural challenges such as foreign exchange shortages, access to finance problems, and bureaucratic processes remain decisive factors in ensuring the sustainability of the investment environment. The fact that the two leaders directly addressed these issues underscores the goal of establishing a more institutionalized and predictable economic cooperation in the second century of this relationship.

In this context, the transformation of economic relations into a structure that increases mutual interdependence along with trade volume and connects production networks stands out as one of the most important areas that can increase the strategic depth of relations.

Security cooperation and regional balance

The second noteworthy aspect of the visit was the messages regarding cooperation in the field of defense and security. Given the increasing security risks in the Horn of Africa, internal conflicts, border disputes, and intense competition from external actors, the strategic importance of this area becomes even more apparent.

Ethiopia is considered a central country in the region due to its population, economic weight, and geographical location. However, this central position also brings significant risks. Internal political tensions, economic pressures, and the structural disadvantages of being a landlocked country are leading the Addis Ababa administration to pursue a more active foreign policy aimed at both maintaining internal stability and increasing its regional influence.

For Türkiye, security-focused cooperation does not only mean military technical support. Ankara’s approach in the region is based on capacity building, institutional cooperation, and the goal of generating long-term stability. This framework stands out as one of the key elements that distinguishes Türkiye’s security engagement in Africa from other actors.

The issue of maritime access and diplomatic balance

Although not directly stated in the leaders’ remarks, considering the regional context of the visit, Ethiopia’s pursuit of access to the sea and the resulting diplomatic tensions play a significant role in the background. The sensitivities with Eritrea and the past crises with Somalia demonstrate that this issue goes beyond mere commercial or economic matters, encompassing security and sovereignty dimensions.

Türkiye’s facilitating role in this process reveals a significant aspect of Ankara’s regional policy. Its approach of addressing Somalia’s territorial integrity concerns and Ethiopia’s economic needs within the same diplomatic framework reflects a search for a balanced solution rather than zero-sum competition. This approach points to a broader strategic perspective aimed at managing bilateral crises and preventing tensions in the Horn of Africa from impacting Red Sea security.

Given that political tensions in the Horn of Africa directly affect Red Sea security, the risks that onshore instability could pose to maritime security and global trade routes become clearer. Therefore, Türkiye’s simultaneous handling of the Horn of Africa and Red Sea issues emerges not as a preference, but as a strategic necessity.

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thiopia is hosting a secret training camp for thousands of fighters from Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF), according to officials, diplomats and satellite imagery reviewed by Reuters, in what analysts say is a major sign that Sudan’s civil war is increasingly pulling in outside powers.

The site lies in the remote western Ethiopian region of Benishangul-Gumuz, not far from the Sudan border. If confirmed, the development would mark the clearest indication yet of Addis Ababa playing a direct role that could significantly bolster the paramilitary group as new fronts open in Sudan’s south.

Ethiopia’s government, its military and the RSF did not respond to detailed requests for comment. Sudan’s army also did not reply.

Eight sources, including a senior Ethiopian government official, said the United Arab Emirates financed construction of the camp and helped provide trainers and logistical assistance. An internal Ethiopian security memo and a diplomatic cable reviewed by Reuters described similar arrangements.

Reuters said it could not independently verify the UAE’s involvement or the exact purpose of the camp. In response to questions, the Emirati foreign ministry denied it was a party to the conflict or involved “in any way” in the fighting.

Sudan’s military has long accused Abu Dhabi of arming and funding the RSF, allegations that U.N. experts and some U.S. lawmakers have previously said they find credible. The UAE has repeatedly rejected those claims.

What the satellite images show

Imagery indicates the camp was carved from forested land near the district of Menge, roughly 32 km from Sudan. Initial clearing began around April, followed by construction of permanent structures to the north. From October, large numbers of tents began appearing.

By late November, images showed hundreds of small tents, heavy machinery and transport vehicles. A January 22 photo captured further expansion, new earthworks and rows of shipping containers ringing the compound.

Based on tent numbers and size, defense intelligence firm Janes estimated the camp could house several thousand people, though it said imagery alone could not prove the site was military.

As of early January, around 4,300 RSF fighters were undergoing training there, according to the Ethiopian security note. Several officials said the total capacity might be far higher.

Two senior military figures who spoke to Reuters described seeing long truck convoys in November heading toward the camp, each vehicle believed to be carrying dozens of recruits. Reuters could not confirm who was inside the trucks.

Six officials said trainees included Ethiopians as well as Sudanese and South Sudanese nationals. A senior figure from the SPLM-N, a Sudanese rebel movement, denied his forces had any presence at the facility.

According to the sources, many of those trained are expected to reinforce RSF operations in Blue Nile state. Some fighters had already crossed the border in recent weeks, two officials said.

Ethiopian command role

The internal memo identified General Getachew Gudina, head of the Ethiopian National Defense Force’s intelligence department, as the official responsible for establishing the camp. A senior government figure and several diplomatic and security sources confirmed he played a central role.

Getachew did not respond to requests for comment.

Roughly 53 km away, Asosa airport has also seen extensive development since mid-2025. Satellite imagery shows new hangars, paved areas and equipment that outside experts say resembles drone ground-control infrastructure.

Ethiopian officials said the military aims to strengthen air capabilities along its western flank, partly to guard against potential instability spilling over from Sudan and to protect strategic projects such as the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).

Other analysts and diplomats, however, said the upgraded airport has become an important hub for supplying the RSF across the frontier.

Some sources alleged Emirati financing for the works, though Reuters said it could not independently verify that.

Wider regional implications

Sudan’s war erupted in 2023 from a struggle between the national army and the RSF during a stalled transition to civilian rule. The conflict has driven millions from their homes, pushed parts of the country toward famine and drawn accusations of ethnically targeted violence.

Both sides are widely believed to receive varying degrees of foreign support, raising fears the war could evolve into a broader regional proxy fight.

In early January, Ethiopia and the UAE issued a joint statement calling for a ceasefire in Sudan while highlighting close security cooperation between the two countries.

Diplomats say the reported emergence of the Menge training camp is likely to intensify scrutiny of that relationship – and heighten concern about how far the conflict may spread.

(Source: Reuters)

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thiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has built a global reputation around grand national projects — from completing the massive Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) to planning Africa’s largest airport and preparing the groundwork for a nuclear power plant. Yet as the landlocked nation pushes for its most contentious ambition yet — direct access to the sea — fears of a new conflict are rapidly escalating.

In a triumphant address to parliament in late October, Abiy hailed Ethiopia’s transformation. Addis Ababa has been reshaped by a development boom, while the GERD’s inauguration in July was billed as a milestone that could free Africa’s second-most populous country from reliance on foreign aid. But despite these achievements, Ethiopia faces mounting headwinds that could upend its fragile recovery.

Rising tensions with Eritrea

A central flashpoint is Ethiopia’s demand for Red Sea access, lost when Eritrea seceded in 1993. Although the two countries made peace in 2018 — a breakthrough that won Abiy the Nobel Peace Prize — relations have deteriorated sharply.

In June, Eritrea accused Ethiopia of harboring a “long-brewing war agenda” to seize its ports. Ethiopia denies any aggressive intent, insisting it seeks sea access “peacefully,” but has accused Eritrea of supporting rebel groups and “actively preparing to wage war.”

Magus Taylor, deputy Horn of Africa director at the International Crisis Group, described the situation as volatile. “There’s a possibility of mistakes or miscalculation,” he warned. “And the situation could deteriorate further in the coming months.”

Tensions also remain high with Egypt, which relies almost entirely on the Nile for drinking water and views the GERD as a threat to its survival. After years of stalled negotiations, Cairo hardened its stance following the dam’s inauguration.

In September, Egypt declared it reserved “the right to take all necessary measures” to protect its vital interests. Cairo has strengthened security ties with Eritrea and signed a pact with Somalia — moves interpreted by Ethiopia as attempts to exploit regional frictions.

Somalia reacted angrily last year when Ethiopia signed a port agreement with Somaliland, the breakaway region Mogadishu claims as sovereign territory.

Ethnic violence erupts across Ethiopia

Internally, Ethiopia remains deeply unstable despite the 2022 peace agreement that ended the devastating Tigray war. New conflicts have exploded in the Amhara and Oromia regions, where the Fano militias and Oromo Liberation Army accuse the federal government of repression.

Massacres, kidnappings, and extrajudicial killings have been reported by multiple witnesses. Humanitarian agencies say insecurity has made aid delivery dangerously difficult.

Even in Tigray, peace is fragile. Southern areas have seen clashes between regional forces and militias aligned with Addis Ababa. Tigrayan leaders accuse the government of breaching the peace deal after a drone strike on their forces — and federal officials now allege Tigray is colluding with Eritrea.

Economic reforms clash with rising inequality

This instability contrasts sharply with the optimism in Addis Ababa, where Abiy’s government has poured billions into parks, museums, bike lanes, and new commercial districts. The prime minister aims to turn Ethiopia’s capital into a continental tourism and investment hub.

Major reforms — floating the currency, opening the banking sector, launching a stock exchange — helped secure a $3.4 billion IMF bailout last year. But investor confidence remains fragile as insecurity persists and conflict risks grow.

Meanwhile, poverty has surged. Around 43% of Ethiopians now live below the poverty line, up from 33% in 2016, according to the World Bank. Rising food and fuel prices, alongside increased defense spending, have deepened hardship.

The uneven distribution of prosperity fuels resentment. “Abiy has a firm grip on the country at the center,” Taylor said, “but the periphery conflicts are driven by feelings of injustice — that they are poor and the center is rich. So we expect instability to continue.”

As Ethiopia pursues mega-projects and seeks a return to the sea, the stakes — economic, political and military — are rising. The question now is whether Abiy’s sweeping vision will propel the country forward, or ignite a new era of conflict in the Horn of Africa.

(Source: The Associated Press)

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n a strong statement on Sunday, January 21, 2024, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi affirmed that Egypt would not tolerate any threat to Somalia’s security. This declaration follows Ethiopia’s consideration of recognizing Somaliland’s independence in a deal that includes access to a strategic seaport.

The remarks indicate Egypt’s potential involvement in a dispute that has heightened tensions in the Horn of Africa, where it already maintains frosty relations with Ethiopia.

Somaliland declared independence from Somalia in 1991 but has not gained international recognition. The proposed port lease deal, yet to be finalized, would provide landlocked Ethiopia access to the sea through the port of Berbera on the Gulf of Aden. The deal has sparked outrage from Somalia and now draws Egypt into the geopolitical fray.

Egypt will protect Somalia

“Egypt will not allow anyone to threaten Somalia or affect its security,” President Sisi stated during a joint news conference with Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. He warned against attempts to challenge or threaten Egypt, particularly if its intervention is requested by its brothers.

In a memorandum of understanding signed on January 1, Ethiopia expressed its willingness to consider recognizing Somaliland’s independence in exchange for the port access. The agreement includes a lease of 20 km of coastland around the port for military and commercial purposes over 50 years. Ethiopia’s primary port for maritime exports is currently located in Djibouti.

President Sisi emphasized the need for cooperation on development rather than attempts to seize land, suggesting a more strategic and peaceful approach to resolving conflicts. Ethiopia rejected criticism from Egypt, characterizing the deal as a commercial agreement aimed at securing sea access rather than an annexation attempt.

Tension

The tension surrounding the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal further complicates relations between Egypt and Ethiopia, already strained due to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam constructed on the Blue Nile. Talks over the dam’s operation and water release have yet to yield an agreement, contributing to ongoing disputes between the two nations.

As Somalia rejects the deal and seeks international support, the involvement of Egypt introduces a new dimension to the complex geopolitical landscape in the Horn of Africa. The situation underscores the broader implications of regional conflicts on global diplomacy and stability.

Sources: Reuters, and Aljazeera

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he Nile River basin is shared by eleven riparian states. The vast portion of the river course originates from Ethiopia’s Blue Nile, or Abbay River, while Egypt and Sudan are the predominant consumers of the Nile River’s waters. As a result, the Nile’s key riparian states are Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan.

After several attempts to deal with integrated basin-wide watercourse management, in 2010, the three states along with the remaining eight riparian states, namely Burundi, D. R. Congo, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda, were able to craft the first-ever inclusive legal regime known as the “Agreement on the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework” that would lay the ground for establishing a basin-wide commission.

Unfortunately, the states were unable to reach a consensus, however, on the fate of the major colonial treaties, mainly the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and its extended 1959 Egypt-Sudan agreement, as Egypt and Sudan insist on their continued enforcement while Ethiopia and other upstream riparian states assert otherwise.

Save the basin-wide deadlocked negotiations on The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) that is awaiting minimum ratification to enter into force, the three riparian states have been in dispute over various issues concerning the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which is being built on the course of the Abbay River since 2011.

Since the commencement of the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, the three riparian states have held on-and-off talks regarding the references that would create a conducive environment for their roundtable negotiation over the dam. Accordingly, despite the intermittent nature of the talks, the decade-long negotiations have borne fruit in establishing various technical committees, such as the International Panel of Experts (IPoE) in 2012 and the National Independent Scientific Research Group (NISRG) in 2018. The negotiations also brokered the “Declaration of Principles on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam” in 2015, which is applauded for laying a fertile ground for the forthcoming negotiations, especially, for talks over the dam’s first filling and operation.

With the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam as a corner stone, the three riparian states have agreed to be bound to, inter alia, the principles of cooperation, development, no significant harm rule, and equitable and reasonable use per Article I, II, III & IV of the “Declaration of Principles,” respectively. Furthermore, Article V dictates that the three riparian states respect and act as per the outcomes and recommendations of the technical committee. Although the three states have endorsed the IPoE’s final report, they could not agree to do the same for the studies of the other technical committees. Especially, the NISRG, which was tasked with providing alternative procedures on the first filling and operation of the GERD, made promising progress; however, it failed to come to terms with the baseline scenarios, which dragged them toward the colonial agreements.

The African Union and the GERD

Even though the trilateral and/or AU-led negotiations have not been exhaustively utilized, Egypt internationalized the issue and requested the intervention of the UN Security Council. Ethiopia objected to the request stating that the GERD is a regional matter, which procedurally should either be resolved through tripartite negotiation or be dealt with under the auspices of the AU. The UN Security Council backed down and dictated that the three countries come together and solve their differences amicably.

For the last couple of years, negotiation over the GERD has been put on hold due to the conflict in Ethiopia and political instability in Sudan. Although the three riparian states have not issued an official communiqué, there are reports indicating several confidential negotiations have taken place in the United Arab Emirates, but with no significant progress.

Recently, after Ethiopia’s prime minister vowed to delay the fourth filing of the dam until September 2023, a joint statement was issued following a meeting with the Egyptian president in Cairo in early-July 2023. It was agreed to re-initiate tripartite negotiation over the GERD and a pledge was given to conclude negotiations in four months. Despite the unrealistic ambition of the statement given the track record of the last ten years, the statement shows the ambition, willingness, and commitment of the riparian states to solve the sticking issues quickly. The move is a big step and could be a huge relief if the three states pursue the negotiation in good faith, compromise their interests, and come to agreeable terms in a win-win manner.

Currently, more than a month after the joint statement, it was not clear yet where and when these negotiations were going to take place, until it was made public that the negotiations commenced on August 27, 2023 in Cairo, Egypt. Moreover, recalling the ongoing war in Sudan, it is naïve to assume Sudan is going to engage proactively in tripartite negotiations. What is more, the joint statement was issued by two riparian states, and primarily Ethiopia. Thus, the talks are practically going to be bilateral, notably between Ethiopia and Egypt.

As the move impliedly ignores Sudan, it raises trust issues. Reports have already started indicating that Sudan is dismayed by the move. Although Ethiopia and Egypt are the two major riparian states, Sudan’s concerns should not be ignored given its geographical location midstream, and its role and significance in the tripartite negotiations.

There is little doubt that states are free to negotiate openly or secretly whenever and/or wherever they want in the presence or absence of a third party. The three riparian states might openly or secretly pursue their negotiations either in their respective state/city, under the auspices of the AU, in a third country like the U.S. or UAE or agree otherwise and negotiate accordingly. What matters the most is whenever and wherever talks are going on, it has to be pursued in a good faith whereby their respective national interests, tripartite negotiations, and basin-wide cooperation are prioritized in a balanced manner.

Against the above context, before the actual commencement date was made public, there was an assumption that negotiations might have already confidentially begun in the UAE given the experience of the last two years. Recalling the two downstream riparian states’ mechanisms to pressure Ethiopia, and the Arab League’s position on the GERD, there could be scenarios in which the UAE, using its economic leverage, might pressure Ethiopia to sign a binding deal. Had the assumption been true although the UAE, like the Washington-led negotiations, is not expected to pursue an active role in the negotiation process, it would be unwise to rule out such a possibility.

Now that the whereabouts of the negotiations over the GERD are public, the riparian states need to pursue their talks in a way that would address the remaining unresolved issues on the filling and operation of the grand dam. Most importantly, they should consciously pursue their negotiations in such a way that would not affect future basin-wide negotiations over the equitable and reasonable use, and the fair share of the entire Nile River course among all riparian states.

Furthermore, in the past, the AU has sponsored the GERD matter and has not issued a communiqué indicating any new developments. Thus, the righteous approach would be to continue negotiating under the AU. The riparian states need to pursue the dogma of “African solutions to African problems,” retain the GERD matter under the AU, and transparently walk the talk under its chairmanship.

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gainst the backdrop of the Nile’s flowing currents, a complex struggle unfurls between Egypt and Ethiopia, each driven by their distinct needs and aspirations. As the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) nears completion, tensions rise, underscoring the challenge of balancing development and preservation in a region with scarce water supplies. The Nile River, one of the longest rivers in the world, passes through eleven different countries from south to north, and its appears that Ethiopia and Egypt are unwilling to share it. Egyptians cannot live without the Nile, and they depend on it completely for water. Ethiopia also needs GRED for development.

Throughout history, Egypt has had a profound connection to the Nile. The country consists of more than 90% desert and the Nile is called the “Gift of the gods.” At the same time, Ethiopia needs the Nile water to fill GERD and help the country supercharge its economy. More than 60% of Ethiopia is not connected to the power grid, which is something the government wants to change.

This is where the tension begins between the two countries. Mohammed Mahmoud, director of the Climate and Water Program at the Middle East Institute, warns, “Folks have never actually gone to war just because of water.” “Now, we could be at the point in history where that changes.”

What will Ethiopia gain from GERD?

With a budget of $4.2 billion, GERD is in the western Benishangul-Gumuz region and has been a source of contention between Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt since the beginning of its construction in 2011.

Sudan and Egypt fear the Ethiopian project could reduce their share of the Nile waters. Ethiopia insists the dam is the key to its economic development: the dam is Africa’s biggest hydroelectric project to date and is expected to generate over 5,000 megawatts of electricity, doubling the nation’s electricity output when it has been fully completed.

More than 60% of Ethiopians cannot access electricity. Prime Minister of Ethiopia Abiy Ahmed stated that “Ethiopia doesn’t have any intention to cause harm to Sudan and Egypt.” “But we also don’t want to live in darkness,” he added. Currently, 90% of construction has been completed.

What has caused the Nile waters crisis?

Egypt is in the grip of a water crisis caused by an increasing population and a limited water supply. The country has less water per person each year and is already below the United Nation’s water poverty threshold. By 2025 the UN predicts that Egypt will be approaching an “absolute water crisis.” Climate change, poor water management, recurring droughts, and the new Ethiopian hydropower dam on the Nile River are worsening the water crisis in the country.

In a report by Fast Company Middle East, Mohamed El-Kamel, the managing director of Alashanek ya Balady Association for Sustainable Development (AYB-SD), mentions a combination of factors that make Egypt susceptible to drought such as diminished rainfall, exacerbated by the increase in greenhouse gas emissions which leads to elevated temperatures. These changes also contribute to a shift in the distribution path of water. The escalating temperatures and impacts of climate change further cause water evaporation and decrease the water levels in Egypt’s lakes and rivers.

Depending solely on the Nile presents a heightened challenge in mitigating water scarcity for the country. The shrinking of the Nile is a result of increasing temperatures and prolonged drought periods. During the Cairo Water Week, Egypt’s Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation Dr. Hani Sewilam underscored the country’s significant reliance on the Nile for nearly 97% of its irrigation and drinking water, outlining the interconnected transboundary risks.

Egypt is deeply concerned by the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in terms of its water security. According to Dr. Sherine Ahmed El Baradei, associate professor at the Civil Engineering Program at the German University in Cairo, “Filling the reservoir over a more extended period would be a beneficial approach, as Ethiopia’s reservoir filling every five to seven years could lead to a reduction of Egypt’s water share by approximately 12 to 25% during the filling period.”

How to solve the water crisis

With a population that exceeds 109 million now, Egypt’s population is predicted to more than double within 50 years. The population problem is exacerbated by a lack of natural resources and habitable space, although Egypt extends over one million square kilometers. Most Egyptians live in just 7% of the country, mainly along the Nile and the Nile Delta. Due to overpopulation, the government began a family planning campaign to reduce birth rates and control overpopulation, dubbed “Two children are enough.” The government believes that this campaign will be a solution to Egypt’s pending water crisis.

Rice plays an important role in Egyptian cuisine with annual rice consumption standing at 67.5 kg per capita. Egypt switched from a rice exporter to a rice importer following governmental measures reducing rice-cultivated areas due to the water shortage crisis. According to the Global Agricultural Information Network (GAIN), the country approved a law to circumvent illegal rice cultivation.

If a farmer is found to be planting rice outside of the allotted rice growing area set by the government, they could face a fine ranging from EGY 3,000 to EGY 10,000, or face a maximum six-month prison sentence. This was another government measure to combat water scarcity. 

Due to climate change, increasing human population pressure, and Ethiopia constructing a giant hydropower dam on the Nile, Africa is facing a water crisis. However, this crisis poses particular challenges for Egypt as the river provides nearly all Egyptians with drinking water. Without water, there can be no Egypt. As part of Egypt’s national strategy to improve accessibility to drinking water, a seawater desalination plant in New Mansoura recently began operations. The project is a part of the first phase of Egypt’s strategy which aims to build 21 seawater desalination plants that will reduce water extraction from the Nile.

The proposed desalination plants will be able to provide the water-stressed nation with an additional 3.3million m³/d of water that can be used to irrigate crops or for public water supply. Once the second phase is completed, the plants are expected to increase the country’s desalination capacity by 8.8 million m³/d at a total cost of $8 billion.

Is a water crisis imminent?

The citizens of Ethiopia are suffering from lack of electricity and hope to remedy this with the Rennaisance Dam. Furthermore, the completion of the Renaissance Dam will boost Addis Ababa’s economy by exporting electricity. However, countries like Egypt, at the end of the trail that receives the water, are worried about not having enough water to survive.

Egyptians have always depended on the Nile for their survival. Meanwhile, the construction of Ethiopia’s dam is currently 90% complete, and many meetings, agreements, and discussions between Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan have been held with no mutual agreements.

Egypt and Ethiopia are unlikely to budge as both countries want what is best for their future. At the same time, Egyptians and Ethiopians want a suitable alternative to the impasse – and the sooner the better.

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hile enjoying a relative peace following the resolution of the Tigray dispute, Ethiopia today finds itself on the verge of yet another conflict, this time for a different reason: the demolition of mosques. In recent weeks, the government of Ethiopia has been under heavy fire from Ethiopia’s Muslim population over claims that it has been targeting Muslims and destroying their places of worship.

What happened? 

The area in question, where most of the mosques are situated, is on the outskirts of Addis Ababa, the capital city. The area has long been a part of Addis Ababa’s administration, and the region has been expanding for years through land purchases and other means, which the government claims are all “illegal.” The Ethiopian government planned to demolish the “illegal” settlement this year and replace it with a new metropolis named “Sheger City” as part of an urban planning initiative that will put the area under the jurisdiction of the Oromia region.

To carry out the project, the Ethiopian government began demolishing houses, mosques, and churches with no title deeds to provide a new space for investment and transformation, turning the area into government property.

However, as the new urbanization process unfolded, the Muslim population expressed dissatisfaction with the approach, leading to tensions. Muslims asserted that among all the places of worship, mosques were being targeted more severely by the government. The Mejlis (Ethiopian Islamic Affairs Supreme Council), an organization in charge of the country’s Islamic affairs which is frequently tasked with addressing such issues by interacting with the government, emphasized that they were already discussing matters with the government and urged people to be patient.

Although the Mejlis stated that it was attempting to deliberate with the government to stop the ongoing demolitions, the Ethiopian government was unwilling to engage in any form of dialogue. Hence, Muslims became enraged and decided to stage peaceful protest on May 26 after the Friday prayer at the Grand Anwar Mosque in Addis Ababa. The Ethiopian security forces responded by firing shots and using tear gas, which led to the deaths of at least two citizens, and dozens of injuries and arrests.

The protest’s organizers remain unknown. Even though there were no organized protests on the following week, there were reports of government security officers allegedly acting aggressively again and employing excessive force against individuals calmly leaving the mosque after praying. It is alleged that this violent crackdown caused the death of at least eight people, and many criticized the Ethiopian security officers’ unnecessary use of force, which caused the incident to become viral.

Who is wrong?

First, it is imperative to scrutinize the urbanization process. Even though the matter gained greater attention and prompted widespread outrage and indignation when mosques were involved, people’s discontent with the government’s actions was already present.

Setting a goal of demolishing at least 400,000 homes in the future, the Ethiopian government has already destroyed close to 110,000 and has declared that it will keep doing so. It’s interesting to note that these homes pay their water and electricity bills to the state. Additionally, the area has grown so much over the past few years that many people have moved there and constructed their places of worship, indicating that state authorities have been involved in land and real estate transactions.

Mosques are no exception to this construction activity: there are over 300 “illegal” mosques and the Mejlis has been unable to legalize them due to bureaucratic restrictions. At the same time, other religious institutions like churches have been legalized without any difficulty, accounting for the disparity. The Ethiopian government asserts that it is not targeting mosques; however, the visible disproportion of demolished mosques, which have reached 22, has infuriated the Muslim community, sparked a dispute, and attracted widespread attention.

Some claim that the government’s targeting of mosques gives the impression that a significant portion of the demolishment is motivated by Islamophobic sentiment. Regardless of the grandiose intentions behind creating a new metropolis, it is imperative to avoid forcibly displacing individuals from the housing they have called home for decades and demolishing places of worship.

There are also allegations that this initiative is part of a plan to alter the area’s demographics as  most current residents are not Oromos. The towns surrounding Addis Ababa’s outskirts that would become Sheger City are under the authority of the Oromia government.

Nevertheless, following a subsequent discussion, the Ethiopian government and the Mejlis released a statement last week stating that they have a plan in place for mosques and churches that will satisfy the needs of the various religious groups. The timing and way this decision came about raises the question of why it was not announced from the very beginning. Why didn’t they act more forthrightly and explain the plan, reassuring the public with their pledge?

Another question is why they attacked and retaliated violently against defenseless and unarmed individuals who were expressing anger and frustration. The government’s actions raise ethical concerns. The Ethiopian government could have taken a different approach by communicating and carrying out its urbanization plan without provocation and unnecessary violence.

Following months of political strife, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed marched to the front in the first week of December 2021, deployed defensive forces, and declared victory, stating that the government had recaptured the key Amhara and Afar Regions previously seized by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). However, the proclaimed triumph was nothing more than a political gambit and a premeditated pullback to facilitate future steps, according to the TPLF.

Although the violent conflict began in November 2020, it took a dramatic turn about a month ago when the TPLF, which is strategically allied to the Oromo Liberation Army, claimed to have seized control of the critical towns of Kombolcha and Dessie, both located on a strategic highway leading to Addis Ababa. Despite Abiy’s claims that he had recaptured these areas, the TPLF’s subsequent replies pose troubling doubts about the country’s social, political, and economic future.

The aftermath of the Tigray war appears not to be limited to a humanitarian crisis that has resulted in millions massacred, starved, and forced to flee their homes, as other consequences such as increased political polarization, economic crisis, and diplomatic challenges are slowly unfolding in the country.

Among the far-reaching consequences are the absence of aid, the war spreading to other towns in the country, war-induced economic disintegration, and an exponential drop in the country’s GDP. Additionally, the decision to close at least 30 embassies due to alleged financial losses, as well as the destruction of the Amhara and Tigray Regions, which would take at least 30 years to recover, highlight the country’s gradual collapse as a result of the conflict.

War of visions

Now more than ever, Ethiopia appears to be at a significant ideological and political crossroads. When we hold up to view the root causes of many internal Ethiopian disputes before and after the country became a federalist state in 1995, we see diversity, ethnic nationalism, and divergent political visions. Tigray is no exception. The TPLF ruled the country for three decades before Abiy’s election in 2018.

Their rule maintained a quasi-federalist leadership style that partially succeeded in bringing people together under the banner of ethnic federalism yet failed to implement the actual tenets of ethnic federalism, resulting in grievances and high tensions between the government and the people, and ultimately leading to the party’s demise. 

However, tensions did not dissipate when Abiy Ahmed came to power, owing to the conflicting visions of the preceding actors who once held political leverage. The TPLF favored a more absolutist approach to diversity, with Amhara being more assimilationist and Oromo more secessionist. On the other hand, Abiy attempted to put the country through a significant transition to centralization by introducing the idea of the Prosperity Party, a new pan-Ethiopian party established to supersede the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) coalition.

Following the outbreak of the war, the habit of resolving issues through talks in parliament or systematic governmental procedures has now shifted to using arms and weapons to achieve goals or attain desired outcomes, thus defying the sanctity of state authority and federal legitimacy. One example that explicitly demonstrates that anyone with access to firearms can act without regard for the law lies in the Amhara nationalists’ forceful annexation of Welkayit and Tegede/Tsegede, allegedly seized from them by Tigray in 1991.

Unfortunately, with Abiy Ahmed’s declared victory against the TPLF, the route to dialogue and negotiation is deteriorating.

Furthermore, the TPLF’s decision to disregard regional sovereignty and send soldiers into the neighboring Amhara and Afar Regions indicates that guns- and armament-generated legitimacy is the current trend. Even the government has taken the unprecedented step of requiring regular citizens to take up arms to combat the TPLF, going so far as to allow them to seize firearms from them. Arms proliferation has also been seen among minority ethnic groups. These groups have shown a lack of faith in the political regime, leading them to view taking up arms as the ultimate silver bullet to their concerns.

What awaits Ethiopia: reconciliation or utter annihilation? 

The chance of averting the months-long conflict and maintaining peace in the nation mainly depends on the ability of the parties involved in the atrocities to negotiate and find common ground. However, this seems highly improbable due to the unforeseen moves and gambits by the parties involved in the conflict. Unfortunately, with Abiy’s declared victory against the TPLF, viewed by the TPLF as yet another tactical step towards a better strategy, the route to dialogue and negotiation appears to be quickly deteriorating.

If the conflict continues in this direction, the resulting humanitarian crisis and human toll will leave the country in a terrible state, with little hope of medium- or long-term progress or recovery. Moreover, with more ethnic-based organizations joining the Ethiopian army or the TPLF, the probability of severe consequences resulting from the war appears imminent.

These consequences can only be avoided if these groups strive to integrate diverse ideological positions and establish a vision for cooperative administration or negotiate on the provided terms.  

Even if the TPLF and Abiy decide to terminate the war, ethnic nationalism and other competing ethnic interests will continue to give rise to tensions. However, if the conflict is brought to an end, aid may reach the Tigray Region, partially helping alleviate the critical conditions of those suffering the consequences of the war. Nonetheless, the damage done is indelible and is predicted to have a long-term impact on the country’s economic and sociopolitical fabric.

On the last weekend of May, Addis Ababa Stadium was filled with thousands of energized demonstrators, protesting foreign interference in Ethiopian internal affairs.

The event was meant to be directed at growing American pressure (including sanctions) on Ethiopia to end its war in Tigray, but Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) dispute with Egypt also featured large.

Speeches were made in Arabic and posters about Ethiopia’s right to use the Nile were abundant in an event that appeared directed as much at Egypt as it was the United States.

Whilst the demonstration was ongoing, Sudan hosted a military exercise with Egypt which included the land, naval, and air forces of both countries, not so subtly dubbed “Guardians of the Nile.”

The tensions between Ethiopia and the downstream countries over the Nile have drastically increased as Sudanese officials accuse Ethiopia of beginning its second filling of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam scheduled for this month.

Sudan has said the second filling threatens its national security, with Egyptian President al-Sisi ominously warning of “unimaginable instability” if Ethiopia proceeds without an agreement.

Earlier in June, Egyptians were angered when Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed said his country plans to build hundreds of more dams across Ethiopia prompting a sharp verbal riposte. But Sudan and Egypt have long gone beyond limiting their responses to words.

Sudan’s civilian & military leaders appear to have adopted a twin policy of military pressure at the border in the al-Fashqa region (with Egypt’s encouragement) alongside attempts to expand the number of actors which are party to negotiations to find a solution. Sudan has however recently dialed back, signaling its openness to an interim agreement.

Egypt’s efforts, however, have been far more comprehensive. Last week the Arab League was convened by Egypt and Sudan in Doha at the ministerial level where Egyptian FM Shourky was successful in soliciting the support of Arab countries to raise the issue with the United Nations Security Council.

Just as Ethiopia mobilized its mufti’s to give religious legitimacy to its position, Egypt’s Al Azhar, one of the Muslim world’s most prestigious institutions, has also sprang into action sharply condemning Ethiopia’s policy with an argument also couched in Islamic terms.

“Depriving others from benefiting from these natural resources is an act of oppression and aggression on Allah’s provisions” said Shaykh Ahmed al Tayeb.

But whilst the clerics probe the religious legitimacy of these policies Cairo has also thrown its full weight behind re-developing political, military and humanitarian ties with Ethiopia’s neighbors in a diplomatic blitzkrieg to isolate it.

Following the 2013 military coup which overthrew former president Mohammed Morsi, Egypt had years of diplomatic absence in African forums and indeed the Middle East. Cairo turned inwards, generally following the lead of Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, whilst paying less attention to its own neighborhood.

Veteran Egyptian diplomat and Arab League Secretary-General Ahmed Abou Gheit would describe those as “lost years.”

Abdal Fattah al-Sisi, unlike Morsi, put more faith in negotiations with Ethiopia, initially dialing back the rhetoric. In 2015, the countries signed the Declaration of Principles of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which was expected to lay the foundation for a broader agreement with then Ethiopian PM Hailemariam Desalegn.

When Desalegn told al-Sisi that “the Renaissance Dam will not cause any damage to our three states and especially to the Egyptian people,” al-Sisi apparently believed him.

Faith in that promise remained despite a seismic shift in Ethiopian politics when Abiy Ahmed became prime minister in 2018. During a light-hearted press conference, shortly after he assumed office, the Egyptian president asked Ahmed to repeat the following in Arabic: “By Allah, by Allah we shall not cause any harm to Egypt’s water.”

That approach however didn’t appear to yield the results Cairo wanted drawing sharp criticism. Mohammed Ali, an influential Egyptian opposition figure in exile, called upon Egyptians to take to the streets in a “Nile Revolution” and overthrow Sisi’s regime for not protecting Egyptian water rights.

Outsourcing its foreign policy to countries which didn’t share Egypt’s primary security concerns left Egypt facing serious threats which it hadn’t prepared itself to manage, and ultimately forced Egypt to review its approach.

Egypt’s decision to begin normalizing relations with Turkey earlier this year was an indicator that things were beginning to change despite hiccups on that front. “Egypt is realizing it is its own man; it cannot rely on any ‘big brother’ whether it be Abu Dhabi or anyone else,” Jalel Harchaoui said.

Egypt appeared to be the loser in regional shifts which took place in 2018 & 2019.

Eritrea, a country closely allied with Egypt, signed a peace treaty with Ethiopia with which it fought a brutal war in the late 90s leading to a standoff that Ahmed overcame in a gesture which won him the Nobel Peace Prize.

In Sudan a revolution swept away the regime of Omar Bashir, with civilian rule emerging initially as a distinct possibility which Abiy Ahmed supported through mediation.

In early April, the Egyptians signed an intelligence sharing agreement with Uganda explicitly referencing the challenges in the Nile. In the same month, Egypt also signed a military protocol with Burundi. Egypt and Sudan deepened their military cooperation in March this year.

Egypt’s charm offensive hasn’t just been in the military domain, however. In late May, al-Sisi visited Djibouti, the first visit of an Egyptian head of state to the country, following which Egypt sent medicine, medical supplies and food aid. After the meeting Djibouti’s president called for a “fair and binding legal agreement” on the Nile dispute, an Egyptian demand that Ethiopia has rejected.

Egyptian aid packages have also been regularly delivered to South Sudan, which al-Sisi visited in November last year with his head of intelligence to meet his counterpart Salva Kiir. That was also a first for an Egyptian head of state.

An unverified report quickly denied by South Sudan’s government also said Egypt intended to establish a military base in a South Sudanese town near the Ethiopian border.

Whilst President Biden has attempted to adopt a more constructive and balanced approach than his predecessor, Egypt’s efforts to broker a ceasefire between Hamas and Israel will almost certainly endear al-Sisi to Washington.

Ethiopia on the other hand appears increasingly isolated. This comes at a time where relations between Washington & Addis Ababa have sharply deteriorated because of the violence of the Tigray war & American sanctions on Ethiopian officials.

Talks to find an amicable solution to how these countries will share the Nile have gone on for over a decade without a workable solution. Egypt and Sudan want a legally binding agreement which protects their share of the Nile, whilst Ethiopia argues that such an agreement would infringe on its sovereignty.

How the talks are to be conducted have also been subject to dispute. Sudan and Egypt want outside powers to take part including the EU, the UN & the U.S., whilst the Ethiopians prefer the African Union umbrella.

The Biden administration has appointed Jeffrey Feltman as its special envoy to the Horn of Africa, and solving GERD is one of his top priorities as he shuttles between the region’s capitals to lobby and build consensus for a path forward. If he can succeed where others have failed is yet to be seen.

Whether he does or doesn’t however, one fact is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore. Egypt is no longer likely to sit idly as its water interests are threatened and is taking matters into its own hands.

Mutual suspicion and unresolved border disputes have been major issues in the Ethiopia-Sudan relations for the past several decades. These problems heat up when there are developments in the region, such as the dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam with Egypt (GERD), and calm down when the disputes are resolved.

Domestic politics in Ethiopia and Sudan fuel the conflict and the border disputes, which are also conditioned by the geopolitical developments in Northeast Africa.

The most recent border dispute between Ethiopia and Sudan erupted when Sudan’s military took control of Al-Fashqa, a fertile agricultural area in Gonder, in northwestern Ethiopia. Dina Mufti, the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry spokesperson, recently stated that his country is “running out of patience with its neighbor’s continued military buildup in a disputed border area despite attempts to diffuse tensions with diplomacy.”

The spokesperson of Sudan’s Sovereign Council, Mohamed Al-Fakki, said that his country “doesn’t want war with Ethiopia,” adding that Sudan is “capable of protecting our lands and restoring those left with Ethiopia.”

It is vital to notice that the Khartoum-Addis Ababa border tension is happening while the latter is occupied with the law enforcement operation in Tigray. There is fear that the growing tension and hostility might escalate to a conventional war. There is also considerable fear that the border tension will affect the Egypt-Ethiopia-Sudan negotiations over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.

Colonial roots of the border tension

In most cases, colonial agreements are used as a reference in the process of border negotiations between African countries. However, the difference in understanding and/or interpretation of colonial agreements sparks disputes, which can lead to full-scale wars between conflicting parties.

Despite this, Ethiopia has chosen to use the 1900 and 1901 agreements as a reference for the negotiations to demarcate their mutual borders, while Sudan favors the Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1902 and the 1903 and 1909 Gwynn surveys as a basis to initiate the demarcation.

Ethiopia emphasizes over and over again that the 1903 and 1909 Gwynn surveys were non-participatory and unilateral, and, therefore, they don’t bind Ethiopia.

Ethiopia emphasizes over and over again that the 1903 and 1909 Gwynn surveys were non-participatory and unilateral, and, therefore, they don’t bind Ethiopia. Additionally, the country invoked the necessity to respect the June 1966 status quo accord between the two countries that forbid either side to employ any unilateral action that would affect the de facto situation along the borders until the issue of demarcation is solved.

Why is the current border tension different?

The current confrontation between Addis Ababa and Khartoum is, however, different from the past ones for the following reasons. First, the current confrontation is happening after Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia and South Sudan gained independence from Sudan. Therefore, if not managed properly, the border confrontations between Ethiopia and Sudan might escalate to include Eritrea and South Sudan, which will have similar complications for Ethiopia and Sudan respectively.

Second, the current confrontation follows the Ethiopia-Egypt confrontation over the Nile River, which shifted from veiled animosity to overt hostility following the official beginning of the construction of the GERD over the Blue Nile in 2011. Third, in the current tension, the military, political and economic roles of emerging actors such as China, Turkey, UAE, and Saudi Arabia are increasing in the Horn of Africa and Northeast Africa regions as never before. So, if a full-scale war breaks out, the possibility of causalities are higher than ever before.

Why Sudan turned its back to Ethiopia

Ethiopia and Egypt, which view each other as natural foes, look at the political activity in Sudan with suspicion and compete to get Sudan on their side. At no time in history has Sudan not been the center of gravity of the Ethiopia-Egypt competition. The ills of internal politics and the weak economic situation in the country created a fertile ground for Egypt and Ethiopia to exploit the weakness of Khartoum for their own political advantage. Particularly Egypt openly uses its economic strength, military superiority, and political dominance in the Arab world to influence Khartoum and to widen the gap between the latter and Addis Ababa.

It is also vital to note that the last decade of the rule of former Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir was comparatively good for Ethiopia. This is true because al-Bashir’s approach to Ethiopia was based on good neighborly relations in regard to the two countries’ water and border issues. Whereas now Abdalla Hamdok and Al Burhan turn their back on Ethiopia and prefer the hardline approach towards these two complicated issues. As a result, Sudan’s forces entered deep into the disputed territories between the two counties violating the 1966 accord that obliged the two countries to respect the status quo until the demarcation process is completed.

Since the beginning of construction of the GERD in 2011, Khartoum has been playing a balancing role in the Ethiopia-Egypt water diplomacy battle. However, recently Khartoum has turned its back on Ethiopia and is favoring Egypt.

The following developments are behind Khartoum’s decision to turn its back to Ethiopia (i) Sudan’s new leaders insist on protecting their rule from Cairo’s subversive role toward the new administration in Khartoum; (ii) Sudan’s new leaders will probably benefit from Cairo’s economic, security, and diplomatic capacity to aid their fragile economy and security; (iii) the new administration in Khartoum might be disappointed because of Ethiopia’s bilateral negotiation with Egypt on the “Trump Deal”; and/or (iv) Sudan’s attachment to Cairo most likely stems from the power rivalry between the pro-Egypt military wing and the civilian administration in Sudan.

The other reason that has been suggested for Sudan violating the status quo and occupying the fertile agricultural region of Al-Fashqa stems from Sudan’s view of Ethiopia as a “weak other” because of the unfolding domestic civil war. History shows that in the 1970s Sudan under the leadership of Jaafar Muhammad Nimeiry made a similar move while Ethiopia was fighting the Ogaden War with Somalia. Further back in history, in 1880s, Sudan attacked Ethiopia while the latter was in confrontation with Italy.