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n a dramatic turn of events, Israel conducted a drone strike in Beirut, assassinating Hamas deputy leader Saleh Arouri. The strike, which took place on Tuesday, has ignited fears of the Gaza conflict spreading beyond the Palestinian enclave.

Arouri, 57, was the first senior Hamas political leader to be assassinated since Israel launched a comprehensive air and ground offensive against the group nearly three months ago. The conflict began with a surprise attack by Hamas into Israeli settlements on October 7, resulting in a devastating war.

Lebanon’s Hezbollah, a key ally of Hamas, has been engaged in near-daily clashes with Israel across Lebanon’s southern border since the Gaza war started. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah issued a stern warning to Israel against further assassinations on Lebanese soil, promising a “severe reaction.”

Israel has not taken responsibility

Israel neither confirmed nor denied the killing, but Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari, the IDF’s military spokesperson, emphasized Israel’s focus on combating Hamas. Israel has long accused Arouri, a co-founder of Hamas’ military wing, of orchestrating attacks in the Israeli-occupied West Bank.

Arouri played a crucial role in Hamas’ operations in the West Bank, masterminding them from various locations, including Syria, Turkey, Qatar, and finally Lebanon. As the group’s senior official in Lebanon, he strengthened Hamas’ ties with Hezbollah and Iran, the primary backers of both groups.

While Israel’s motivations behind Arouri’s assassination are rooted in its allegations of his involvement in attacks against its citizens, a Hamas official revealed that Arouri was central to negotiations conducted by Qatar and Egypt regarding the Gaza war’s outcome and the release of Hamas-held Israeli hostages.

Iran condemns the killing

Iran condemned the killing. Nasser Kanaani, spokesperson for Iran’s foreign ministry, stated that Arouri’s death would ignite a surge in resistance against “Zionist occupiers” not only in Palestine but also in the broader region.

In response to Arouri’s killing, hundreds of Palestinians took to the streets in the West Bank, condemning the act and chanting slogans seeking revenge. Meanwhile, Houthi rebels in Yemen, backed by Iran, declared their intention to continue attacking shipping in the Red Sea until Israel halts the conflict in Gaza. They also warned of targeting U.S. warships if their group is attacked.

The situation has prompted the U.S. to announce an international maritime task force to protect shipping in the Red Sea, a critical route leading to the Suez Canal, responsible for approximately one-third of global container cargo.

As the Gaza genocide persists, with the latest Gaza health ministry report indicating 207 Palestinians killed in the past 24 hours, the international community faces a challenging humanitarian crisis. Israel has accused Hamas of embedding fighters among civilians, while the targeting of Gaza City’s Al Shifa hospital has raised global concerns.

The implications of killing Saleh Arouri

The killing of Saleh Arouri adds another layer of complexity to the ongoing conflict. Hamas’ response to an Egyptian-Qatari ceasefire proposal, delivered by its paramount leader Ismail Haniyeh, remains a critical factor in shaping the trajectory of the conflict. Israel, on its part, has vowed to continue fighting until Hamas is eradicated, leaving the prospect of an independent Palestinian state uncertain.

In Washington, the State Department condemned statements by Israeli cabinet ministers advocating for the resettlement of Palestinians outside of Gaza, calling them “inflammatory and irresponsible.” These statements have fueled concerns about Israel’s long-term intentions regarding the Palestinian territories.

The region now stands at a crossroads, with the assassination of Arouri intensifying tensions and raising the specter of a broader conflict. The international community watches anxiously as the situation unfolds, grappling with the complexities and challenges of mediating a lasting and just resolution to the Gaza crisis.

Source: Reuters

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lthough there has been a collective impulse among Israeli politicians to act and make decisions in order to win the war against Hamas, the Israeli public is not united along the same lines: the nationalist-religious groups support all the army’s actions without exception, while a minority in the left call for an immediate ceasefire.

On October 7, at 6:30 a.m., an intense rocket attack on Israel began from Gaza. Since the day of Israel’s creation, Israelis have become accustomed to being in conflict with the Palestinians, who have been permanently prevented from establishing a sovereign state. Little did they know, however, that October 7 would be different from other attacks.

That morning, as rockets rained into Israel, Hamas and Islamic Jihad militants rode armed on motorcycles and pickup trucks through Erez, one of the border crossing points separating the Gaza Strip and Israel. They raided the Nahal Oz and Re’im military bases near the border, and then raided towns close to the Gaza Strip. The offensive resulted in 1,140 Israelis being killed, 3,300 being wounded, and 239 people, including soldiers, taken hostage into Gaza in what is believed to have started as an organized raid and then evolved into spontaneous clashes.

The picture that emerged as time passed did not only shock Israeli citizens but government officials as well. The shock of these attacks, which were already unexpected for the public, was multiplied by the fact that they coincided with the Sabbath, a day of religious observance for followers of the Jewish faith. As the Israeli army took time to recover from its shock and took action, families hiding in shelters in the raided towns called the security forces for help and the whole world witnessed the events through social media before an intervention took place.

Governmental silence

In these difficult hours, the silence of the government officials until they issued a statement felt like years to Israelis. The statement read: “This morning Hamas made a fatal mistake and started a war against the state of Israel. The soldiers of the Israel Defense Forces are fighting the enemy in all areas where there are infiltrations.” The statement proclaimed that Israel will win this war. Then, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu appeared in front of the cameras and addressed Israeli citizens. “This is not an operation or a mutual attack, this is a war. Hamas has launched a bloody surprise attack against Israeli citizens since the morning hours. We have been involved in it since the morning hours.” Netanyahu added that he had ordered the army to “fight the enemy with unprecedented force.” In subsequent statements, he reiterated that they would leave no stone unturned in Gaza and will take revenge.

In retaliation for Hamas’s Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, Israel launched Operation Iron Swords, whose declared aim was to destroy and liquidate Hamas’s military capacity, and ravaged the northern Gaza Strip with airstrikes unprecedented in the 21st century. The indiscriminate bombardments and disproportionate use of force have so far killed 19,532 Palestinians.

Of course, the Israeli authorities could not stand by without taking action to protect their citizens, and in the aftermath of the attacks, Israel received support from the international community on the grounds of its right to self-defense. However, Israel’s targeting of civilians and bombing of mosques, churches, schools, and United Nations buildings, which are forbidden under the laws of war, instead of conducting a targeted retaliation or counterterrorist operation like a defending state, was a violation of international law. Consequently, the Israeli army has been condemned for causing a humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza.

While Israeli society was dealing with this political-social crisis at home, the attacks were seen by some as the realization of claims by certain quarters that the instability caused by Netanyahu’s stubbornness in the face of the demonstrations left the country open to external threats. As the days passed and Netanyahu remained silent in the face of the question posed by Haaretz, the same quarters began to argue that the war in Gaza, which is being waged at his behest and whose legitimacy is diminishing, was not for Israel’s security but for his own political career.

According to Haaretz, Netanyahu’s policy of annexing the West Bank was designed to make a two-state solution impossible. In fact, Netanyahu strengthened Hamas, thus weakening both the Palestinian authority and the prospects for peace. Haaretz asserted that Netanyahu must take responsibility and resign.

The October 7 attacks also triggered the horrors of the Holocaust in the Jewish collective memory, and many Israelis perceived the attacks as the last of the pogroms that Jews have suffered throughout their history. In this respect, the attacks were seen as a ray of hope that could unite a society that was polarized by all the above. Although the reflex to put aside differences, and act and make decisions together in order to win the war against Hamas emerged among politicians, the Israeli public did not share such sentiments: already existing social divisions were reinforced by the attacks on Gaza.

Ultranationalist and religious support for the war

The ultranationalist and religious groups supported and justified all the army’s actions without exception, while the left/liberal secularists called for an immediate ceasefire, labeling the attacks as war crimes. The latter groups were denounced by others as traitors and demonstrations calling for a ceasefire and the return of the hostages were suppressed by the security forces.

Prime Minister Netanyahu, who has been accused of refusing to agree to a ceasefire for the return of hostages since the attacks began, finally reached a deal that allowed the return of Israeli civilian hostages in exchange for Palestinian women and children in Israeli prisons. However, in the evenings, crowds continue to gather outside his Jerusalem residence, calling for his resignation. Netanyahu is no longer seen as a leader who can rally the whole country behind him. In fact, the moment the Gaza operations cease, we are likely to see many more and angrier Israelis on the streets than during the protests against the judicial reforms. Such protesters believe that the real cause of these horrific attacks are the continued occupation, the unwillingness, and the inaction to resolve the conflict with the Palestinians.

This is why the anger against Netanyahu is even more intense than before, fueled by the fact that the hostage families have been ignored, the prime minister has yet to take responsibility, and he went as far as to issue a statement blaming the army and Shin Bet, the Israel Security Agency, for the attacks. The families of the hostages even wrote a letter to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan asking him to take steps to bring them back. Addressing far-right Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir, Gil Dickman, a spokesperson for the hostage families’ platform, expressed the sharpness of the disagreement when he said, “Your concern is killing Arabs.” Ben-Gvir had called for the withdrawal of a Knesset bill to introduce the death penalty for “terrorists,” and Dickman responded out of fear that such a step would endanger the lives of the hostages.

The other side of Israeli public opinion

At the same time, there is a public opinion made up of far-right ultranationalist and religious groups that applaud the Israeli army’s ground offensive in the Gaza Strip, calling for “Death to the Arabs” and celebrating the return of the Jews to “God’s promised land.” A song about the war in Gaza, produced and circulated by Ofer Rosenbaum, owner of the publicity company Civil Front, was sung by children and included the words, “In a year we will destroy everyone and return to sow our fields.” Shortly after, Rosenbaum placed an installation at Dizengoff Square in Tel Aviv. In memory of the victims of the October 7 attacks, the structure features angel wings covered with photographs of the Israelis killed in the Hamas attacks and a rope gallows between the wings. The installation is called “October Massacre Terrorists to the Gallows.”

Palestinians in Israel were also targeted by these groups. Ben-Gvir, in particular, did his best to make Palestinians feel insecure. One of his campaigns that made headlines on social media was the arming of Israeli civilians to provide local security. Under his command, law enforcement authorities not only disallowed demonstrations in the Israeli-Palestinian towns of Umm al-Fahm and Sakhnin, but detained Palestinian civil society leaders who questioned this decision, arresting some on charges of making statements “supporting the enemy.”

One of the first public figures to appear in the first hours after the Hamas attacks was Ra’am party leader Mansour Abbas. He called on both the Israeli and Palestinian communities in Israel to refrain from violence and to act responsibly, in a way conveying to the appropriate authorities that the Palestinian citizens of Israel should not be held responsible for Hamas’s actions. Ayman Odeh, the leader of the Hadash-Ta’al list, showed similar restraint and responsibility, saying, “The best revenge against the enemies of peace is to work for peace; this is the right choice.” The condemnation of the Hamas attacks and the restraint shown by Palestinian leaders in Israel have prevented the anti-Arab demonstrations that were likely to take place on the streets of Israel. Alternatively, it was possible to see a repeat of the events of May 2021.

Palestinian citizens of Israel are still afraid to send their children to demonstrations in the face of what the far-right, anti-Arab government in Israel might do, fearing that even a peaceful demonstration could result in the police treating them as “terrorists” and shooting them. Yet, since the evening of October 7, civil society organizations that have been trying for years to inculcate the values that make Arab-Jewish coexistence possible have worked together to strategize and show solidarity to prevent such violence from occurring. Thirty such local groups came together after October 7 in Jerusalem to form a chain of solidarity. The steadfastness of the Palestinian people in Gaza and Israelis lack of support for Netanyahu could bring the end of the genocide in Gaza closer.

Lately, a self-righteous trend of asking Palestinian speakers and guests ‘Do you condemn Hamas?’, in light of the organization’s Operation Al-Aqsa Storm on October 7, is sweeping across Western media outlets. While Palestinians have differing opinions about Hamas, the question hits a nerve even with those who do not support the organization. Ideally, it should be needless to say that this question is both insensitive, and comes off as ill-willed.

To Palestinians, who have been traumatized by the dynamics of the Israeli occupation and apartheid, years of collective punishment, and prolonged silence from the international community, it is difficult to provide an answer to a trap question asked by a press that looks for a cue to demonize Palestinians and justify their deaths and suffering by pointing to the actions of Hamas.

So, what is Hamas? Is Hamas a terrorist organization or a liberation organization? Officially, Hamas, or the Islamic Resistance Movement, is a Palestinian political and military organization that has played an increasingly pivotal role in the contentious dynamics of the Palestinian-Israeli issue. Understanding the fuss about Hamas requires delving into its origins, ideology, tactics, rise to power in Gaza, and the broader context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Founded in 1987 during the First Intifada, Hamas has evolved into a multifaceted entity. While it holds governance over a population exceeding two million Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, Hamas is most widely known for its armed opposition against Israel.

Hamas is recognized as a terrorist organization by numerous countries, some classifying the whole entity, while others just the military faction as such. It has fired rockets and mortars into Israel since the group took over the Gaza Strip in the mid-2000s in claims of resistance against Israeli occupation.

The most striking assault in terms of strategy and scale is the recent Operation Al-Aqsa Storm, which was launched as a reaction by the organization against the increasing harassments on the Al-Aqsa Mosque, the intensifying systematic nature of the occupation, and the trend of normalization between the countries of the region with Israel, according to experts.

A majority of the literature focusing on Hamas is through a simplistic western lens. This month’s bundle attempts to provide books that reflect mixed views about the organization, covering both journalistic and scholarly perspectives. Here’s what to read to gain a deeper and nuanced understanding of Hamas’s place in one of the most enduring crises of our time.

Where to begin? In an updated and fully revised edition of Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide, professor of Middle Eastern Studies, Northwestern University in Qatar Khaled Hroub provides an easily approachable introduction to Hamas in a straightforward Q&A format. This book takes readers through Hamas’s history, core beliefs, and its political agenda, offering valuable insights that are often missing from conventional news reports.

Hroub meticulously covers major events that have shaped Hamas’s trajectory, such as the crucial January 2006 elections, the evolving relationship with Fatah, and the 2008 Israeli Gaza offensive. Furthermore, the book delves into the intricacies of Hamas’s ideology by closely examining its charter, socio-economic strategies, and stance on Israel. Hroub goes beyond mere facts and figures and explains the underlying reasons for Hamas’s popularity, shedding light on the nuanced aspects of this influential organization.

Khaled Hroub, Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide (Pluto Press, 2010) ISBN: 9780745329727, 224 pages

Hamas Contained provides a thought-provoking perspective on an organization that has long been a subject of controversy and oversimplification. Author Tareq Baconi challenges the prevailing narrative that has demonized Hamas in both media and policy debates. Rather than resorting to simplistic accusations, he offers an in-depth exploration of this controversial organization. Baconi’s work, based on interviews with Hamas leaders and internal publications sheds light on the organization’s evolution over three decades.

He argues that Hamas cannot be neatly classified as either a democratic political party or a terrorist group. Instead, that it emerges as a complex liberation organization deeply rooted in the Palestinian nationalist cause. This perspective calls for a more comprehensive understanding of Hamas and its role in the Palestinian struggle.

Baconi traces Hamas’s transformation from a fringe military resistance group to a political entity attempting to govern. He emphasizes the need to challenge the conventional understanding of Hamas, highlighting how the group’s ideology, at times, poses a threat to the broader Palestinian cause and to its own legitimacy.

Crucially, the book scrutinizes Hamas’s reliance on armed struggle as a means of achieving liberation. It argues that this strategy has faltered in the face of a relentless occupation designed to fragment the Palestinian population.

Under Israel’s strategy of managing the conflict rather than resolving it, Hamas’s demand for Palestinian sovereignty becomes effectively neutralized, especially in the confines of Gaza. This stalemate perpetuates a cycle of brutality, allowing for the collective punishment of millions of Palestinian civilians. The book raises important questions about the impact of ideology, governance, and armed resistance on the quest for Palestinian self-determination.

Tareq Baconi, Hamas Contained: The Rise and Pacification of Palestinian Resistance (Stanford University Press, 2018) ISBN: 9781503632622, 368 pages

In The Foreign Policy of Hamas, Leila Seurat conducts a comprehensive analysis of Hamas’s international relations based on extensive fieldwork and interviews with Hamas officials across different locations, and insights from video conferences involving West Bank, Gaza, and Diaspora Palestinians.

Despite international boycotts following its 2006 electoral victory, Hamas has emerged as a significant global player. The book explores how Hamas strategically uses Palestinian internal issues to gain international legitimacy and competes with political rivals on the Palestinian stage through its interactions with non-Palestinian actors.

Seurat’s work reveals the strong link between Hamas’s foreign and internal policies, both driven by the quest for global recognition. The book dissects Hamas’s political strategies in dealing with Israel and other nations. It covers pivotal moments, such as the Trump administration’s ‘deal of the century,’ Israel’s Jordan Valley annexation plan, the impact of the UAE-Israel normalization accords and the COVID-19 pandemic.

Leila Seurat, The Foreign Policy of Hamas: Ideology, Decision Making and Political Supremacy (I.B. Tauris, 2022) ISBN: 9781838607449, 312 pages

Paola Caridi, an Italian journalist and historian, provides a compelling account of the rise of Hamas in her book Hamas: From Resistance to Government. When the organization scored a victory on the 2006 elections, it sent shockwaves through the Western world. Caridi delves into the critical questions that arose at the time: How did a majority of Palestinians come to support an organization often labeled as extremist, and how would Hamas’s newfound political power impact the broader Israel/Palestine conflict?

Caridi offers an understanding of the complex sentiments among Palestinians who rallied behind a government that endorsed armed resistance. Through on-the-ground research and interviews with Gaza residents and Hamas leaders, the book traces the history of Gaza from its golden age as a bustling port city to the formal emergence and gradual militarization of Hamas. The book strikingly includes a chapter on Operation Cast Lead, startling revelations from WikiLeaks, and the Cairo Revolution.

Paola Caridi, Hamas: From Resistance to Government (Seven Stories Press, 2012) ISBN-10 1609803825, 416 pages

Hamas: A History from Within delves into the multifaceted goals of Hamas, both in the short term and long term. In the immediate sense, Hamas aims to expel Israeli forces from the West Bank and Gaza, employing a combination of tactics that include attacks on Israeli military personnel, settlers in the Occupied Territories, and, more controversially, targeting civilians. Simultaneously, it nurtures the long-term ambition of establishing an Islamic state encompassing historic Palestine.

Hamas gained power and influence, particularly as Israel systematically dismantled the power structure of the secular Palestinian Authority led by Yasser Arafat. As a grassroots organization, Hamas has garnered significant respect among Palestinians due to its perceived lack of corruption.

Tamimi also delves into Hamas’s relations with Jordan, documenting Hamas’s constrained relationship with the Jordanian government. He traces the origins of Hamas within the Muslim Brotherhood, shedding light on the influence of its exiled leadership located in Syria and other regions. It also clarifies the internal structure and political objectives that guide the organization.

The book divides the organization into two main sections, with one responsible for establishing crucial institutions like schools, hospitals, and religious centers, while the other oversees military operations and acts of terrorism through its covert armed wing, the Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades.

Azzam Tamimi, Hamas: A History from Within (Olive Branch Press, 2007) ISBN-10 1566566894, 372 pages

Hamas comes as a paradoxical organization, recognized as a terrorist organization employing terror tactics all the while securing democratic mandate to govern Gaza. It promotes the concept of an Islamic state while conducting its own internal democratic elections with the organization’s leadership largely composed of secular professionals. Moreover, Hamas vocally calls for the destruction of Israel, yet it has reluctantly committed to honoring previous peace agreements.

Jeroen Gunning’s insightful analysis in Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence reveals that many of these apparent contradictions arise from Hamas’s ideology, its local support base, and the unique political landscape of Israel/Palestine.

Drawing on interviews with members of Hamas and its critics, as well as a decade of close observation of the organization, Gunning provides an exploration of Hamas’s dual commitment to ‘God’ and ‘the people.’ This book offers an examination of what Hamas’s political practices reveal about its stance on democracy, religion, and violence.

Additionally, Hamas in Politics delves into Hamas’s internal organization; the methods by which its leaders are selected, and the decision-making processes within the group. Through this comprehensive examination, Gunning sheds light on the complex blend of ideology and realpolitik that characterizes Hamas’s role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Jeroen Gunning, Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence (Hurst Publishers, 2010) ISBN 9781849040297, 312 pages

Although not necessarily about Hamas, Loren D. Lybarger’s Identity and Religion in Palestine: The Struggle between Islamism and Secularism in the Occupied Territories is a refreshing break from the two-dimensional thinking about Palestinian politics.

Lybarger’s provides a deeply insightful exploration of how dynamics between the Islamist movement and secular-nationalist factions within Palestinian society dynamics have transformed the identities of ordinary Palestinians. Identity, Religion, and Palestine takes the reader through the turbulent landscape of Palestinian life, starting with the first Palestinian uprising, or intifada, of the late 1980s, through the subsequent Oslo Peace Process, its disappointments, and the resurgence of violence during the second intifada in 2000.

Lybarger rejects of simplistic dichotomies that often plague discussions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He doesn’t force Palestinians into the oversimplified categories of pragmatists willing to accept territorial compromise and extremists advocating for armed struggle.

Instead, he takes the approach of listening to Palestinians themselves and, in doing so, uncovers layers of internal conflicts and divided loyalties that exist among individuals. Lybarger’s nuanced analysis humanizes the Palestinian experience, emphasizing the diverse array of opinions and aspirations that shape the identity and trajectory of the Palestinian people.

Lybarger’s research highlights a notable transformation in the core beliefs and group loyalties at both the individual and collective levels. It underscores how the convergence of identity and allegiance, coupled with the reshaping of convictions in the years following the intifada, has paved the way for an increased occurrence of shifts in factional memberships and loyalties. This model offers valuable insights into the dynamics that drive these changes and provides a deeper understanding of their causes.

(Originally published in 2007)

Loren D. Lybarger, Identity and Religion in Palestine: The Struggle between Islamism and Secularism in the Occupied Territories (Princeton University Press, 2012) ISBN: 9780691155425, 295 pages

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urkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, addressing a massive pro-Palestinian rally in Istanbul on Saturday, October 28, denounced Israel’s role in the ongoing bombardment in Gaza. He stated that Turkey would introduce Israel to the world as a war criminal.

The “Great Palestine Meeting,” organized by Turkey’s governing Justice and Development (AK) Party, saw hundreds of thousands gather at Istanbul’s Ataturk airport to protest Israel’s continuous bombardment of the Gaza Strip and advocate for a ceasefire.

Erdoğan emphasized that the Western world has been instrumental in legitimizing the massacre in Gaza, stating, “Israel is committing war crimes.” He also referred to Israel as an “occupier” and underscored Turkey’s independent stance by remarking, “West owes you, but Turkey does not owe you.”

In a powerful declaration, Erdoğan reiterated that Hamas is not a terrorist organization and that Israel’s main grievance lies with the West, which he accuses of being the real instigator behind the devastation in Gaza.

President Erdoğan said: ‘We are on the side of the oppressed’ and rebuked Israel. During his speech, which caused an outcry among the public, Erdoğan said: “From now on, we will continue on our path with the motto that we may suddenly knock on your door one night.”

A sea of flags

The pro-Palestinian rally also featured demonstrators chanting slogans in support of Palestine, waving both Turkish and Palestinian flags. Alongside the vast public turnout, leaders from various political parties, media, and sports figures marked their presence.

Erdoğan was unwavering in his address, placing blame on Western powers as “the main culprit” behind Israel’s actions.

Following Erdoğan’s statement, Eli Cohen, Israel’s Foreign Minister, said diplomats in Turkey have been ordered to return so Israel “to reassess Israel-Turkey relations.”

The situation in Gaza continues to deteriorate. The Health Ministry reported that Israeli strikes have resulted in the death of at least 7,703 Palestinians since October 7, with a significant number being civilians, including children.

As global concerns grow, other parts of the world are echoing calls for peace. In London, thousands took to the streets demanding the UK government call for a ceasefire.

Global concerns

In Berlin, authorities cracked down on pro-Palestinian rallies, resulting in arrests and confrontations between the police and the demonstrators.

The international community remains divided on the issue, with nations calling for a ceasefire while others push for humanitarian pauses, emphasizing the need to provide aid to the affected people in Gaza. The ongoing conflict underscores the urgency for diplomatic intervention and a sustainable resolution to ensure peace in the region.

Sources: AA and Aljazeera

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lthough the Palestinian question started after the emergence of Zionism as a political movement, it has been at the center of Middle East politics for a long time due to the consequences of the Arab-Israeli Wars and the Israeli occupation after the establishment of the state of Israel. Relegated by many to the background due to developments focusing on Iran and the Persian Gulf since 1979, the Palestinian question has continued as an unresolved “problem,” and today, it is again the most important item on the agenda in the Middle East and the world at large.

The most important reason for the emergence of Palestine as a “problem” is the Israeli occupation and unless the occupation ends, all paths to a solution will be blocked. The current tension and Israel’s disproportionate attacks are being analyzed through Hamas and the Al-Aqsa Flood operation. However, it should not be forgotten that Hamas was founded in 1987 while Palestinians have been fighting for their rights for more than a century and will continue to do so if a solution is not reached.

Paradoxical as it may seem, Israel actually holds the key to a solution not only for the Palestinians, but also to its own security. If there were no settlements to perpetuate the occupation, if Israel withdrew from the occupied territories, including East Jerusalem, if millions of Palestinians expelled from their homeland were granted the right to return, and if a full-fledged Palestinian state with recognized and respected sovereignty was established, there would be no “Palestinian problem” and Israel would be able to live within secure borders.

Therefore, if the United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967 is fully implemented today, perhaps the suffering of the past will not disappear, but it will be possible to prevent future traumas. Of course, these conditions are unlikely to be realized in the short term, but no solution will be realistic unless efforts are made in this direction.

Palestinians are ignored, but they are there

The main reason for the continuation of the Palestinian conflict is ignoring the rights, existence, and demands of the Palestinians. So much so that with the latest Gaza attack, there is a possibility that Israel will actually define itself as a “Jewish State,” which has been voiced by Netanyahu since 2008 and adopted in 2018 as the “Nation-State Bill”. The law upholds that the concept of the “nation-state,” which first appeared in literature at the time of the emergence of modern states but which has never inferred the existence of a single “nation” in practice, s being implemented in an exclusionary and racist way in a globalized world.

At the time of writing the Israeli ground operation has yet to start and the Palestinians in Gaza, which has been under heavy bombardment for days, have nowhere to go. One of the scenarios being discussed, based on the statements of Israeli officials, is the complete destruction of Gaza and the expulsion of the Palestinians from the territory to Egypt. However, this so-called solution, which Cairo strongly opposes, would only be palliative, since even if expelled, the Palestinians would continue to live next door to Israel. The scenario of a buffer zone between Gaza and Israel would also be useless. This measure would aim to prevent Palestinian groups from infiltrating Israel by land, but as Operation Al-Aqsa Flood has demonstrated, paramotors and especially missiles can easily penetrate a buffer zone.

Moreover, even if Israel solves its “problem” in Gaza, it still faces the reality of East Jerusalem and the West Bank. Although settlements have been established to perpetuate the occupation with a population of more than one million settlers in the said region, it is unclear to what extent the Palestinians of the West Bank and East Jerusalem, who feel the pressure of the occupation more and more every day on the streets of Palestine and especially at the Al-Aqsa Mosque, will continue to tolerate it. Even if Israel tries to solve the West Bank problem by expelling the Palestinians to Jordan—a scenario that Jordan has announced that it will never accept—Palestinians will continue to live next door to Israel’s borders.

Israel is also concerned about an internal reality, namely the two million Palestinians who are Israeli citizens. At this point, the Nation-State Bill  has two visible and invisible purposes. The first is if the Palestinian problem is ever resolved, to block the possibility of the return of millions of Palestinian refugees who have been displaced in the Arab-Israeli Wars and have scattered all across the world, especially in neighboring countries. The second purpose, which may sound like an impossible goal in practice, is to deactivate the citizenship of Israeli citizens of Palestinian origin in the event of a possible settlement.

Whichever of these scenarios is realized—or even if both materialize—it is impossible to ignore the Palestinians by separating them internally, by exploiting their political differences, or by taking advantage of conjunctural developments at the regional level. Ignoring the Palestinians living in the occupied territories and other countries, totaling more than 14 million, is not a solution; it is the lifeblood of the spiral of insolvency, resistance, and violence.

Does the latest wave of violence and the support it has received offer a solution?

Operation Al-Aqsa Flood has created a huge shock effect in Israel. Israel’s first two weeks of heavy bombardment and attacks on Gaza without any military targeting have exposed the fact that is has no contingency plans for responding to events beyond its “routine” reactions. In other words, apart from the fact that Mossad was not able to foresee and/or prevent such an operation from an intelligence point of view and was not able to counter it, it seems that it did not have a comprehensive plan in place for the aftermath of such an attack. If it really had a comprehensive plan, instead of bombarding Gaza intensively and massacring thousands of civilians, it would have announced its purpose, scope, and exit strategy to the world, especially to its own public, and implemented it gradually.

Conversely, on the first day of Al-Aqsa Flood, Israel took steps to exploit the sympathy shown to it by public opinion, specifically Western public opinion, which is sensitive to the killing of civilians. Many Western leaders, particularly in the U.S., sent consecutive messages of support to Israel. When Israel’s disproportionate reaction and the questioning and reaction to the massacre in Gaza started to develop, the same leaders lined up, so to speak, this time, to visit Israel.

There are many questions to be asked at this point, but I will choose three: First, does Israel’s policy of violence in Gaza provide a sufficient solution to ensure its security? Second, what are the consequences of this step by countries, especially the United States, which have declared their unconditional support for Israel? Third, when the wave of violence goes beyond the Palestinian/Israeli borders and becomes regional and global—and there is a serious risk of this happening—what will the parties to the conflict and the actors whose support fueled the spiral of violence do?

The answer to the first question is quite clear, and, unfortunately, this answer has been given repeatedly in the bloody history of the Palestinian issue. Despite the tens of thousands of Palestinians who have lost their lives through Israel’s policy of violence, and despite the fact that the lives of Palestinians have become increasingly difficult, Palestinians have not given up seeking their rights. It is clear that they will continue to seek their rights in the future with different means, different structures, and different resistance bodies. As long as Palestinians do so, it is very difficult for Israel to ensure its security, even at a perceptual level.

The answer to the second question is actually closely related to the first answer. Countries that declare their unconditional support for Israel and its policies, although in the short term may seem to ease Israel’s hand and provide legitimacy to its actions, in the medium and long term, are actually harming Israel and themselves. The damage to Israel is that the Palestinian problem is still “inside and next to” Israel. The damage to those supporting Israel is that they dynamiting the norms they have idealized for decades, such as human rights, responsibility to protect, and democratic values, and applying these only to themselves and the actors that suit their interests. The more civilians continue to be massacred in Gaza and the more there is no objection to these massacres, the less credible these states will be in the eyes of the international community, especially in the Middle East.

The answer to the third question is a possible scenario that should not be dismissed out of hand. The first two weeks of the recent spiral of violence have gone beyond the Israeli/Palestinian dimension and have begun to affect regional countries and the countries that support Israel. It is only a matter of time before Israel faces a two-front war, or even a wider one, and it is highly likely that Israel and its unconditional supporters such as the U.S. will once again face asymmetric threats.

At this point, the initiatives of the countries in the region, especially Turkey, to reduce tensions, to avoid targeting civilians, and to meet urgent humanitarian needs gain value. Before solving the Palestinian question, it is urgent to reduce the current spiral of violence and tension. In the second stage, in order to prevent similar tragedies from occurring again, it is essential to work for the establishment of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, to ensure the full sovereignty of this state free from arbitrary interference, and to guarantee this situation through various mechanisms.

The realization of the second stage, in particular, seems difficult in the short term, but not impossible. It is obvious that the Palestinian question is unsustainable, and that Israel cannot easily manage the security threats it perceives as Hamas’s Al-Aqsa Flood operation on October 7 and the trauma it has caused have proven beyond a doubt.

It must be emphasized once again that Israel holds the key to the solution of the Palestinian issue, and it will continue to live in insecurity unless it seeks a long-term permanent solution. At this point, the attempts by the countries in the region, especially Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, to reduce the tension and solve the problem should be taken into consideration by Israel and the countries that unconditionally support it. Otherwise, we will continue to deal with new Palestine-centered crises and traumas in the future.

I

n light of the escalating conflict in Gaza, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced on Wednesday, October 25, that he has canceled his planned visit to Israel. The revelation came during the Justice and Development (AK) Party’s parliamentary group meeting in the Turkish capital.

Before the outbreak of the conflict on October 7, President Erdoğan had scheduled a trip to Israel. However, given the recent turn of events, he decided against it. Emphasizing Turkey’s stance, Erdogan clarified that Ankara cannot condone the atrocities committed in Tel Aviv.

The Gaza Strip has been experiencing intense Israeli bombardment since the onset of Operation Al-Aqsa Flood. Initiated by Hamas, this surprise multi-faceted attack involved a slew of rocket launches and infiltrations into Israel by various means – land, sea, and air. The operation is said to be a retaliatory act against the storming of the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the escalating violence from Israeli settlers.

The Israeli military initiated a rigorous air campaign targeting the Gaza Strip. The repercussions of this extended conflict are grave, with death reported to be around 7,200, including at least 5,791 Palestinians and 1,400 Israelis.

Immediate ceasefire

President Erdoğan called for an immediate ceasefire between Israeli and Palestinian forces. He further emphasized the collaborative role Muslim countries need to adopt for lasting peace in the region. Reiterating his disapproval of the “inhumane” war tactics used against Palestinians in Gaza, Erdoğan said, “We had a plan to go to Israel, but it was canceled, we will not go.”

During his speech, Erdoğan presented his perspective on Hamas, calling them liberators fighting for their land. Advocating for peace, Erdoğan stressed the cessation of missile attacks from both sides and underscored the urgency of providing humanitarian aid to Palestinian territories.

The humanitarian crisis in the region is intensifying. Gaza’s 2.3 million residents are facing severe shortages, including food, water, medicines, and fuel. Despite aid convoys being sent to the beleaguered region, the supplies are merely a fraction of the actual requirements.

Drawing attention to past peace talks that failed to yield tangible results, the Turkish President pitched the idea of a new round of Palestine-Israel peace conferences. He asserted that the unity among Palestinians is pivotal for the success of such diplomatic endeavors.

Source: Anadolu, Daily Sabah, Arab News

I

n a move that offers a glimmer of hope amidst escalating tensions, Hamas released two more hostages on Monday, October 23. However, this still leaves over 200 individuals in captivity, underscoring the grimness of the current hostage situation between Israel and Hamas.

The recent releases were identified as Nurit Cooper, 79, and Yocheved Lifshitz, 85. Hamas’s military wing indicated that the release was facilitated due to “compelling humanitarian” reasons. This move was coordinated with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which took responsibility for safely transporting the hostages out of Gaza.

Daniel Lifshitz, the grandson of one of the hostages, voiced his relief at the news of the release, and he, along with many others, expressed hope that all hostages, especially those from the Nir Oz kibbutz, will be safely returned.

Not all hostages are under Hamas

Since the Hamas attack on October 7, Israel and Hamas have been engaged in a deadly face-off. Israeli airstrikes have, so far, resulted in the deaths of more than 5,700 Palestinians, as per Palestinian Ministry of Health records.

It’s essential to note that not all hostages are under Hamas; some are believed to be with the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, another Gaza-based group.

While Israel is insistent on the unconditional release of all hostages, Hamas’s stand is that civilian hostages will be released only when Israeli airstrikes in Gaza cease. This standoff has garnered international attention, with nations and leaders from across the globe calling for an immediate resolution.

Another significant release took place three days prior when two American citizens, Judith Raanan and her daughter Natalie, were released by Hamas. The Raanans, were visiting relatives in Israel when they were taken captive. The dual U.S.-Israeli citizens were later safely transported out of Gaza by the ICRC.

Israel’s approach to hostages not helpful

A recurring concern is Israel’s approach to this crisis. As they prepare for a possible ground invasion of the Gaza Strip, many fear this could further endanger the hostages’ lives. The U.S. has reportedly advised Israel to hold off on this invasion to allow time for hostage negotiations and humanitarian aid delivery.

The humanitarian situation in Gaza is dire. Israel’s measures, including cutting off essential supplies like food, water, fuel, and electricity, have taken a toll on Gaza’s 2.3 million residents. The consistent airstrikes have destroyed entire neighborhoods, making the living conditions in Gaza untenable.

While the release of Cooper and Lifshitz offers some consolation, the fact remains that hundreds are still held captive, waiting for a chance to reunite with their families. At the same time, more than 7,000 Palestinians are held captive by Israel, which Hamas hopes it will be able to exchange them for the hostages.

As this conflict continues, the international community watches closely, hoping for a peaceful resolution that will see the safe return of all hostages and captives and an end to further bloodshed.

Source: Aljazeera, NBC, and CBS.

The attack on Israel launched by Hamas on October 7 marked an unprecedented escalation in both scale and ferocity. The incursion, dubbed as “Operation Al-Aqsa Flood” by Hamas, resulted in the loss of hundreds of lives and the capture of more than 200 individuals.

The prevailing state of tension in the Middle East erupted into open conflict when Israel launched Operation Iron Swords in response to Hamas’s Al-Aqsa Flood. Despite its seemingly abrupt launch without advanced intelligence or warning, Operation Al-Aqsa Flood can be traced back to decades of simmering hostilities between Israelis and Palestinians.

Why did Israeli intelligence fail to anticipate this attack, having Mossad, often hailed as one of the world’s most formidable intelligence agencies, among its ranks? Before answering this question, it is imperative to review the basic structure of Israeli intelligence which comprises three primary agencies: Shin Bet, responsible for domestic intelligence; Mossad, entrusted with foreign intelligence; and Aman, an integral part of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).

All three intelligence agencies failed to detect and thwart Operation Al-Aqsa Flood. This reality has led some to speculate about various conspiracy theories. While some of the speculation may seem plausible, none of it has been substantiated by concrete evidence.

Failure of Israeli intelligence

In the context of the failure of Israeli intelligence, it is crucial to examine the multiple factors that contributed to this outcome.

Intelligence agencies, despite their importance, are not infallible entities, and are prone to error and miscalculation. Intelligence failures and shortcomings are more common than one might think. Israeli intelligence is no exception to this reality, exhibiting a degree of overconfidence that can lead to operational setbacks. In addition, Israeli intelligence has cultivated an aura of invincibility, propagated in part by portrayals in Hollywood films, documentaries, digital series, and selected academic literature.

This cultivated image serves as a deliberate psychological tool of deterrence used against potential adversaries. While Israeli intelligence is undoubtedly a powerful and effective entity, it is not an all-encompassing, all-controlling apparatus. It has had notable successes, but, as has been pointed out, it is not immune to failure. For example, Mossad’s 1997 operation against Hamas politburo leader Khaled Meshaal ended in failure, culminating in Mossad’s operatives falling into the Jordanian intelligence’s custody. The botched mission escalated into a major diplomatic crisis.

Has Hamas been learning?

Operation Al-Aqsa Flood clearly shows that, like a boxer who has learnt to take blows, Hamas has now acquired the ability to strike back effectively. Hamas has demonstrated an ability to learn from its past mistakes and has shown extensive preparation for this operation. Visual records of the ensuing conflict show Hamas members in high spirits and displaying a remarkably professional demeanor.

Hamas managed to conceal the planning of Al-Aqsa Flood mainly due to the limited number of individuals who were privy to the full scope of the operation.

Israeli intelligence may have a significant number of agents within Hamas, however, it appears that these agents are not within the core leadership structure that was privy to the primary plan. These agents have clearly not been able to infiltrate the upper echelons of the Hamas leadership cadre.

At the same time, aware of the presence within its ranks of individuals working as agents for Israel, Hamas has taken steps to identify and recruit double agents from among these individuals. It deliberately manipulates Israeli intelligence with misleading information, thereby fostering the perception that Israel underestimates Hamas’s capabilities. In this context, Netanel Flamer has insightfully explored Hamas’s methods of undermining Israeli intelligence in a 2022 article.

Thus, Hamas has become adept at implementing effective counter-espionage strategies, developing safeguards against technical intelligence, and even deliberately spreading false information through communication channels to manipulate Israel.

Divided Israel

The turbulent and tense political atmosphere surrounding the judicial reforms in Israel have led to factions and infighting within the intelligence apparatus. Israeli intelligence has become politicized, distracted from its core mission, and struggling to focus on its basic duties and responsibilities.

Meanwhile, given the advances in current technological developments and increased accessibility, preparing for such a full-scale attack may not have taken Hamas as long as originally thought.

Reports have circulated on social media claiming that Egypt gave Israel ten days’ notice of the impending attack. In the world of intelligence, information received from a foreign intelligence service is known as “outsourcing.” Outsourced information must always be corroborated or refuted using national resources to prevent any manipulation.

Even if this report is accurate, Israeli intelligence still failed to use its corroboration and refutation mechanisms effectively. Other social media accounts have claimed that Israeli intelligence had foreknowledge of Hamas’s attack, but misinterpreted it as a large-scale exercise due to faulty intelligence analysis. This situation clearly underlines the failure.

In conclusion, Operation Al-Aqsa Flood was a success for Hamas and a colossal failure for Israel—this much is obvious. The Hamas operation cannot be attributed to any conspiracy theory. The IDF can regain lost territory, but the image of invincibility that Israeli intelligence has cultivated for decades in the eyes of the world has been shattered. Restoring that image will be a formidable challenge.

H

ostage-taking is the enforced sequestration of persons as a means of pressuring a government. It is prohibited under international law. The most famous recent instance was the sequestration of diplomats of the United States 1979-1981 in Iran.

But whether diplomats or not, hostage-taking is unlawful. Hamas is bound by the laws of warfare, which protect civilians. From Hamas’ vantage point, the hostage-taking is justified by the widespread incarceration of Palestinians by Israel. Israel arrests and holds large numbers, some under a procedure that does not require that the person be charged with a particular crime.

Hostages must be treated humanely pending their release. They are not to be made the objects of ridicule, or be used in a public way to promote the interests of those holding them. The release of hostages may require negotiation and compromise.  Those held in Iran beginning in late 1979 were released only in early 1981.

Hostage-taking brings into play the rights of the states of nationality of the persons held. Those states have a legitimate basis for demanding release. The situation is more complex when the hostages hold more than one nationality, but not fundamentally different. Any of the states whose nationality a person holds can ask that the person’s rights be respected.

In Israel, many of its nationals also hold a nationality in Europe or North America. Those European or North American states thus are in a position to make demands. To that extent, these dual-national Israelis gain an extra layer of diplomatic protection. And from the standpoint of other states in the region, Israelis, at least those who are dual nationals, therefore hold a privileged position.

Even where a person is a permanent resident of a state, that state may decide to take up their case. Increasingly, human rights are regarded as matters in which all states have an interest, thus, that they too may ask that rights be respected. International human rights organs may take up a hostage-taking situation.

So a hostage-taking situation may become internationalized. In 1979, the United Nations Security Council took up the hostage-taking in Iran and called for release. While all this international activity may help to gain release, it also gives a stronger hand to the more powerful countries in relations with other countries.

T

he nature and extent of Iran’s involvement in Operation Al-Aqsa Flood have been the subject of divergent interpretations. Some argue that Iran played a direct role in the initiation of the conflict, while others suggest that Iran’s influence was more indirect, aiming to leverage the conflict for its geopolitical interests. As the war escalated, however, Iran’s impact on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict became more discernible.

Iran has greatly improved its relations with Hamas in recent years. Tehran provides Hamas with political, military, and financial support and Iran’s role in Hamas’s ability to carry out such a sophisticated and large-scale operation is undeniable.

In this vein, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian met with the head of the political bureau of Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh, in Doha a week after the clashes started. Iran also enjoys advanced relations with other armed Palestinian groups, such as Islamic Jihad. While the Hamas-Iran relationship is a marriage of convenience as Hamas seeks external support, the Islamic Jihad-Iran connection is ideologically based.

Senior Iranian government officials have vehemently denied allegations that they were involved in the planning stages of the operation. Iran’s official position seems to be to provide political support after the operation has started. In this manner, Iran seems to have avoided the risk of a direct military confrontation in legal terms and opted for a confrontation with Israel through its proxy forces.

Despite the official statements from Iranian authorities, the security bureaucracy in Iran, especially the Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), acts independently of the government. It is known that Hamas has been meeting with Iranian military officials regularly before this operation. It is also true that this operation coincides with Iran’s long-term strategic interests.

At the end of the day, it would be naive to think that Hamas, with all the support it receives from Iran, would engage in something radically contrary to Iran’s regional policy. While it cannot be said that Iran is directing Hamas’s chain of command, it is also not completely out of the picture.

Iran’s aim is to target the normalization between Israel and Arab countries. Indeed, after Hamas’s attack, Ali Akbar Velayati, one of the advisors of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, said that “those who are trying to normalize [relations] with Israel should take lessons from these developments.”

Meanwhile, Israel’s airstrikes in Syria have caused serious losses for Iran and the Hamas attack served as a deterrent against Israel in this sense. It is always in Iran’s interest to keep the confrontational motivation against Israel alive in the region; after all, Iran refers to Israel as “Little Satan” (the U.S. being “Great Satan”) and gives it a central position in its ideological propaganda.

T

he adeptly prepared attack by Hamas from air, sea, and land on October 7 has revealed that traditional threats persist for Israel. Specifically, Hamas at the local level and Iran at the regional level pose an existential threat to Israel.

In addition, although the existence of terrorist threats has always posed a security risk for Israel, further indirect security threats for the country have arisen from the recent coups in Africa, which have created instability; the strengthening of terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and DAESH; and and the presence of factions of the latter across the African continent. In this context, Israel’s security policy in Africa focuses on effective measures against terrorist threats and the expansion of radicalization.

In recent years, Israel has sought to increase its security cooperation by developing relations with African countries through deepening diplomatic ties. Israel maintains cooperation with various new partners in Africa through security intelligence, counterterrorism, border control, and arms transfers. In this way, it aims to gain significant advantages both to ensure its own security more effectively and to increase its legitimacy in the international community.

Africa’s strategic location, especially East Africa, has the potential to offer Israel significant support in combating regional threats. Iran’s growing presence in Africa and the rise of radicalism and terrorism in the continent in recent years have shaped Israel’s approach to the continent in the context of security.

African countries’ positions on the Israel-Palestine conflict

Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni expressed regret over the renewal of violence in Israel-Palestine, emphasized that the issue was the failure to implement the two-state solution and called for restraint. He stated that the targeting of civilians should be condemned. Like Uganda, the governments of Nigeria, Senegal, and Tanzania have also called for restraint.

The South African government stated that the continued illegal occupation of Palestinian territories, the expansion of settlements, the desecration of Al-Aqsa Mosque and holy sites, and the oppression of the Palestinian people are the main reasons of the current events. South Africa, it must be noted, suffered under an apartheid rule for many years.

It also emphasized the need for a two-state solution and a credible peace process that will fulfill previous United Nations resolutions for a just and comprehensive solution for both sides. He went on to express the necessity of establishing lasting peace by creating a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital and its territorial integrity intact based on the 1967 borders.

Moussa Faki Mahamat, chairperson of the African Union Commission (AUC), stated that the denial of the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people, in particular the denial of an independent and sovereign state, is the main cause of the persistent Israeli-Palestinian tension. North African countries, among them Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt and Djibouti have also voiced their support for Palestine.

Kenya described the terrorist attack on Israel as “despicable.” It expressed regret over the carnage and senseless loss of life in the region and condemned those who had a hand in the planning, financing, and execution of the attack. Finally, Kenyan representatives emphasized that although Israel has the right to retaliate, it is seeking a “peaceful” way out.

President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo Felix Tshisekedi stated that the attack on Israel was an act of terrorism and that his country would always cooperate with Tel Aviv in the fight against terrorism. Zambia was also among the countries supporting Israel with a statement condemning the Hamas attacks and emphasizing a diplomatic solution.

Possible scenarios

Ethiopia and Kenya are two of the most prominent countries in the region in terms of Israel’s interests in East Africa. Israel’s development of bilateral relations with Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan, and Uganda has the potential to promote the idea of an “alliance” in the face of the unstable and threatening reality that currently characterizes the Middle East. Meanwhile, Israel has embassies in Ethiopia, Kenya, Eritrea, and Rwanda in East Africa, and its interests in the Horn of Africa are more salient in the regional subsystem.

In 2006, Hamas’s victory in the elections in Gaza was perceived as a precursor of the wind of change in the Middle East. Since then, local actors have voiced rumors that Hamas would launch a major offensive. However, Hamas’s Al-Aqsa Flood Operation on October 7 was a great shock for Israel, similar to the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

In the past, Israel has responded to attacks with retaliation. After recovering from the shock, Israel is likely to continue its intensive bombardment and attacks on Gaza, which it frames as deterrent measures, for a prolonged time. In this process, it seems possible that actors such as Hezbollah, Hashd al-Shaabi, and Houthis will support Hamas in different ways due to the magnitude of the attack on Gaza.

In this scenario, there is also a risk that the war will move from an Israel-Hamas dimension to a regional dimension. Even in the mid-term, if not in the short term, various groups in Africa may support this war from different standpoints. In Nigeria, for example, Sheikh Ibrahim Zakzaky, the Shiite leader of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN), has long had close ties with Iran.

If the war gains a regional dimension, it is possible that Zakzaky may mobilize in support of Palestine. Yet, different problems may arise at this point: just as the IMN wants an Islamic state based on Islamic law in Nigeria, Boko Haram, which declared its allegiance to DAESH, also wants an Islamic state based on Islamic law.

The existence of this common desire gives rise to the possibility that Boko Haram, which is effective in Nigeria and its surroundings, may declare a global jihad. As a matter of fact, the coups that have been taking place in the Sahel for a long time and the instability caused by these coups have created power vacuums in the region, which various terrorist organizations have attempted to fill.

Meanwhile, the involvement of al-Shabaab in Somalia and the Al-Qaeda affiliates in Africa, especially in the Sahel, in line with the call for a global jihad may also arise. However, even if a global jihad is declared, Hamas will not welcome another non-state armed actor fighting alongside it in Gaza.

Considering the presence of DAESH in Morocco and at certain points in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, as well as the current environment in Libya, a conflict with Israel over the Sinai Peninsula should also be considered among the possibilities.

Therefore, this situation may make it possible for the above actors to attack Israel through different geographies. If there is a possibility of radical groups and terrorist organizations in Africa attacking Israel, it is likely to happen in two ways:

• From the Sahel Belt, through Libya to the Egyptian-Sinai Peninsula and east through Port Sudan to the Red Sea to reach the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula.
• A direct threat to Israel with access to the Gulf of Aqaba.

H

amas’s Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, as the name suggests, was motivated by a central focus on the Al-Aqsa Mosque and Israeli aggression against the holy sites. The aim of the operation is to put an end to the 15-year blockade of Gaza and the related status quo in the Palestinian arena. It can be said that Hamas has achieved this goal at a tactical level in a short period of time. This operation has shaken global public opinion and forced it to take a position.

Although the operation carried out by Hamas’s armed wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, has been hyperbolically described as “Israel’s 9/11,” it would be more accurate to characterize the al-Aqsa Flood as a successful deception operation in which Hamas skillfully managed to conceal its military plans by convincing Israel that it no longer wanted war.

Hamas meticulously continued its preparations for this operation while Israel, with an unexpected naiveté, thought that it was keeping Hamas under its control. It has even been claimed that during the preparation process, Hamas deliberately reduced the tempo and frequency of its actions against Israel. Military experts have claimed that the operation was the most surprising attack since the Yom Kippur War with some describing it as an unprecedented intelligence maneuver.

Why was Israel taken by surprise?

The timing of the operation, which coincided with the Sabbath, the Jewish day of worship and rest, created a shock factor that made it difficult for the Israeli forces to react immediately. Moreover, infiltration from multiple points (air, land, and sea) took the Israeli defense by surprise.

Hamas decided on the details of the operation with a very limited group of people in order to prevent leaks from within its ranks. Some analyses have also pointed out that recently Israel shifted its focus on the steps to be taken to normalize relations with Saudi Arabia and away from Hamas.

An analysis of the tactical phases of the operation reveals that as the rockets launched from Gaza caused surprise, infiltrations were carried out with motorized parachutes and hang gliders in the shadow of the rockets. The initial infiltrating elements and elite units of Hamas were seen fortifying area control and security which facilitated attacks on the concrete barriers reinforced with electronic systems. This allowed buldozers, motorcycles, and land vehicles to breach the barrier system, enabling more elements to infiltrate.

Drones carrying improvised explosive devices (IEDs) disabled the electro-optical systems of the Israeli watchtowers. At the same time, the communication line with the Israeli army headquarters was disrupted, limiting the ability to respond to the attack immediately.

The kidnapping of Israeli prisoners into Gaza will provide Hamas with political leverage to increase its bargaining power in future prisoners’ exchange.

Finally, it is argued that the Israeli army made a strategic mistake in deploying its troops mainly in the West Bank, which was one of the factors that facilitated the execution of this operation.

An urgent task is awaiting us: considering the progression of events, we must quickly liberate ourselves from the limits and confines placed on the Afghanistan discourse, which have been imposed by US-centered Western propaganda for over 20 years, and counting. A first step is that we must not allow the future political discourse pertaining to this very subject to remain hostage to American priorities – successes, failures and geostrategic interests.

For this to happen, the language itself must be confronted. This is critical if we are to truly glean valuable lessons from Afghanistan and to avoid a repeat of the previous failure of comprehending the U.S. defeat in Vietnam (1955-1975), the way it should have been understood, not the way Washington wanted Americans – in fact, the whole world – to understand. Vietnam was not merely an American ‘debacle’, and did not only culminate in an American ‘defeat’. It was also a Vietnamese victory and the triumph of the will of the people over the U.S. imperialist war machine.

In U.S. mainstream media and, to a large extent, academia, the Vietnam War history was almost entirely written from an American point of view. Even the anti-Vietnam war version of that history remained American-centric.

Alas, in the case of Afghanistan, many of us, whether in journalism or academia, whether wittingly or otherwise, remain committed to the U.S.-based discourse, partly because the primary sources from which our information is gleaned are either American or pro-American. Al Akhdar al-Ibrahimi, former United Nations Peace Envoy to Afghanistan, from 1997 to 1999, and again from 2001 to 2004, had recently, in an interview with French newspaper, Le Monde, reminded us of the importance of using proper language to describe the unfolding events in Afghanistan.

The Rise and fall of the ‘Terrorists’ Discourse

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 had a massive impact, not only on the geopolitical map of the world but also on relevant global political discourses. As the USSR, its Warsaw Pact and global alliances began to disintegrate, the U.S. quickly moved into action, asserting its dominance from Panama (1989) to Iraq (1991) to elsewhere. The American objective was not merely a violent declaration of its triumph in the Cold War, but a message to the rest of the world that the ‘American century’ had begun and that no form of resistance to U.S. stratagem could be tolerated.

In the Middle East, in particular, the new narrative was in full display, with clear and repeated distinctions between ‘moderates’ and ‘extremists’, friends and enemies, allies and those marked for ‘regime change’. And, per this new logic, anti-colonial forces that were celebrated as liberation movements for decades fell into the category of the ‘terrorists’. This definition included Palestinian resistance groups, Lebanese and others, though these groups sought liberation from illegal foreign occupation.

Years later, the discourse on terrorism – summed up by George W. Bush’s statement in September, 2001, “Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists” – became the yardstick in which the world, according to Washington, was to be divided: freedom-loving nations and terrorists, extremist regimes. The latter category was eventually expanded to include Iraq, Iran and Syria. On January 29, 2002, North Korea was also added to Washington’s so-called ‘axes of evil’.

Afghanistan, of course, topped the American list of terrorist states, under various pretenses: initially the harboring of Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaeda and, later, the mistreatment of women, and so on. Eventually, the Taliban became a ‘terrorist’ group, leading an ‘insurgency’ against the ‘democratically-elected’ Afghan government in Kabul. The last 20 years were spent in the construction of this false paradigm.

In the absence of any strong voices in the media demanding an American withdrawal and defending the Afghan people’s right to resist foreign occupation, there was a near-complete absence of an alternative political discourse that even attempted to raise the possibility that the Taliban, despite all of their questionable strategies and practices, may, in fact, be a national liberation movement.

The reason we were discouraged from considering such a possibility is the same reason why U.S.-Western-Israeli propaganda insisted on removing any distinction between ISIS, Al Qaeda, Taliban, Hamas, Hezbollah, Al-Houthis and many other such groups. On the one hand, discussing the particularities of each movement requires real knowledge of the history and formation of these groups separately, and the political circumstances through which they continue to operate. This kind of knowledge is simply non-existent in the cliche, soundbite-driven mainstream media.

On the other hand, such understanding is inconvenient, as it complicates the deception and half-truths necessary for the U.S., Israel and others, to depict their military occupations, unlawful military interventions and repeated wars as fundamental to some imagined global ‘war on terror’ and, as some European intellectual circles prefer to dub it, a war on ‘radical Islam’.

However, unlike al-Qaeda and ISIS, Hamas, Hezbollah and the Taliban are not trans-border militant groups fighting a global agenda, but national liberation movements which, despite their emphasis on religious discourses, are political actors with specific political objectives confined largely within the borders of their own countries – Palestine, Lebanon and Afghanistan, respectively.

Regarding Hamas, London-based author, Daud Abdullah wrote in his just-released volume, ‘Engaging the World: The Making of Hamas Foreign Policy’ that “Hamas sees foreign relations as an integral and important part of its political ideology and liberation strategy. Soon after the Movement emerged, foreign policies were developed to help its leaders and members navigate this tension between idealism and realism. This pragmatism is evident in the fact that Hamas was able to establish relations with the regimes of Muammar Gaddhafi in Libya and Bashar al-Assad in Syria, both of whom were fiercely opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood.”

Consequently, it was also Abdullah who became one of the first to draw the parallels between Palestine and Afghanistan as soon as the Taliban declared victory in Kabul. In a recent article in the Middle East Monitor, Abdullah wrote, “Palestine and Afghanistan are salient examples. Throughout history, their peoples have witnessed numerous invasions and occupations. After two decades the U.S. has finally run out of stamina. Similarly, they will eventually realize the futility of supporting the Zionist occupation of Palestine.”

For four decades, the Islamic regime in Iran has sought to gain legitimacy in the Arab world by portraying itself as a defender of the Palestinians. The latest events in May in the West Bank and Gaza, however, signal that a resurgent Palestinian resistance along the lines of nationalism, is threatening the ability of external actors — including Tehran — to co-opt the cause for its own benefit as it has in the past, including via proxy actors.

Paradoxically, while the regime in Tehran has historically sought to portray itself as working against Israel, it remains dependent on Israel’s actions to accomplish its objective of gaining moral legitimacy in the Arab world. At the same time, Israel depends on Iran to jump over the ever-lingering Palestinian question and mold ties with Arab neighbors who are paranoid of Iran’s expansionism.

A Prized Highjack

Since the Tehran regime’s founding in 1979, the question of Palestine has offered it an opportunity to extend its ideological influence into both the Islamic and Arab world. Following the overthrow of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the last shah of Iran, the newly installed regime headed by Ayatollah Khomeini found in the centrality of the Palestinian cause a way to win over hearts and minds of large swaths of people in the region. It also found a springboard to grow its influence beyond borders — and indirectly fulfill its stated goal of “exporting the revolution.”

Khomeini attempted to appeal to the Umma by deliberately bypassing the leaders of the Sunni-Muslim states, but results were underwhelming. Soon after the 1979 revolution, the Iranian regime began intervening in neighboring countries, and justified this as necessary to liberate Palestine. As early as the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, the regime in Tehran raised the ingenious slogan, “The path to Jerusalem passes through Karbala.” After the war, the Quds Force, ironically, became an overreaching military and intelligence arm in neighboring countries, as it realized that it could justify maintaining a presence in Arab countries so long as it claimed to defend the Palestinians.

While the regime in Tehran raised anti-Zionist slogans as a layer of its broader anti-American doctrine, it remained – paradoxically – dependent on Israel to accomplish its objectives. Israel remained a de-facto partner of the Islamic Republic in its anti-Saddam war throughout the ’80s, bombing Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981 and supplying Iran with arms throughout the war. Israel’s unjust and unlawful treatment of Palestinians, also, presented Iran with a golden ticket to keep intervening.

At the same time, the claim of fighting Israel allowed Iran to extend its reach. Tehran’s rhetoric and the sectarian nature of its newly founded regime also allowed it to establish a foothold among the Shia community in south Lebanon and to set up Hezbollah, its most prized asset overseas. The heavily armed Lebanese militant group became the most advanced point of the “Iranian influence archipelago” – sharing borders with the Islamic Republic’s ultimate foe, Israel.

Iran actively worked to vilify the PLO and went as far as labeling Palestine’s most iconic leader, Yasser Arafat, a “traitor.” In a fiery speech in Beirut’s suburbs in 1998, Hezbollah’s secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah, went as far as calling for the assassination of Arafat by invoking the example of Khaled Islambouli, an Islamist officer who assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981. “Is there no Palestinian who can do what Khaled Islambouli did and say that Arafat’s presence on the face of this Earth is shameful to Palestinians and Muslims?” Nasrallah asked.

By overcoming Iran’s strategic isolation as a Shia revolutionary regime in a Sunni-dominated conservative region and extending its security perimeter to Lebanon and the Palestinian territories, Iran managed to brand itself as a pan-Islamic force fighting, first and foremost, for the Palestinian cause. The message was that Iran-backed Shias were fighting to liberate Palestine while Sunnis had abandoned it. Nasrallah made sure to echo this rhetoric and continuously peddle it in his speeches by raising the slogan, “We, the Shia of Ali ibn Abi Talib in the world, will never abandon Palestine, nor the people of Palestine, nor the sanctities of the Ummah in Palestine.” So, for Iran, it was the Shias that carried the torch of Palestine and Jerusalem, while Sunni states normalized.

Hamas Missiles on Jerusalem

During the latest round of violence, Iran relied on its historic formula of seeking to co-opt Palestinian resistance to increase its moral standing in the Arab world. It did this in two ways: by attempting to link itself to Hamas’s action, and by rallying Hezbollah to ramp up its rhetoric. Yet these attempts instead showcased the relative independence of Hamas as a Palestinian group, and the growing complexity of the Lebanese political scene, Hezbollah’s primary field of operation. It also highlighted the rise of a uniquely Palestinian nationalism that is leading resistance against Israel.

When Hamas started lobbing missiles on Jerusalem on May 10, 2021, following through on the May 5 warning of its armed wing to Israel over its attacks on Palestinian residents in occupied East Jerusalem, Hezbollah — with the support of Iran — found itself in a bind: on the one hand, they wanted to lay claim to what was happening, but on the other, they could not easily claim credit for Hamas’ actions. In the end, though, this seemed not to matter. The streets cared less about Hamas’s relations with Tehran and mobilized in full support of the Palestinians in general, who were also engaged in a unique moment of unity.

Part of the problem, for Iran, was Hamas’s relatively autonomous moves away from Tehran’s direct objectives, and its relative independence, underpinned by diversified sources of financial and military backing, in contrast to other sectarian-aligned ideological Iranian proxies. Meanwhile, Iran actively sought to tie both Hamas and Jerusalem (al-Quds) to its so-called axis of resistance.

Hamas’ relations had soured greatly with the axis as a result of its position on the Syrian uprising and its refusal to back the Syrian regime in its bloody crackdown on its own revolting civilians. By the time the war broke out in May this year, the process of fully reintegrating Hamas into the axis and improving ties with members of the axis had not been fully accomplished despite a visit by Hamas’s leadership to Bashar Al-Assad in Syria and the Palestinian group’s honoring of high-profile Houthi official Mohammed Ali Al-Houthi in Sanaa.

Hamas had to apologize for the photo-op between its representative in Sanaa and the Houthi leader due to the uproar it caused, specifically among Yemenis who are supportive of Hamas but opponents of the Iran-backed Houthis. The incident offered an idea of how challenging it will be for Hamas to retain wide support throughout the region if it continues to play on its dichotomies thinking it can outsmart all stakeholders.

Iran has also sought to co-opt the events in Palestine by tying the missile attacks on Israel to Qassem Soleimani, the Revolutionary Guard’s ex-Quds Force commander who was assassinated in January 2020 in an American drone strike in Baghdad. It had been Soleimani’s plan to build the missile capabilities of the Iran-funded and equipped sectarian militant groups in the region with the plan to overwhelm Israeli defenses when a conflict breaks out.

Around the time of the conflict, Iran-backed Iraqi sectarian militias and the Houthis in Yemen had all ramped up their anti-Israel rhetoric, suggesting that they may be involved in a “next conflict.” But again, this rhetoric earned little traction in the Arab world, that instead remained transfixed by the mobilization of a new generation of young Palestinians, such as the Sheikh Jarrah activist twins Muna and Muhammad El-Kurd, who deployed social media to call for unified Palestinian resistance against Israel’s evictions and its bombardment of Gaza.

Mobilizing Hezbollah

Hezbollah’s response to the latest round of violence has showcased the complexity and difficulty of the situation the party finds itself in at the moment in Lebanon. Although Hezbollah is Iran’s most prized overseas asset – and the only militant group to ever give Israel a bloody nose in the 2006 July war – it was not able to make much of an impact with regard to recent events.

Following the outbreak of violence, the group resorted mostly to ramping its rhetoric to compensate for its inability to occupy center stage during the recent escalation, – something it has always sought to do, as a strategy of cooption and domination of the conflict with Israel. The party organized marches to the Lebanese-Israeli borders and called for mosques to raise prayers in support of Palestinians. Its anti-Israel statements have increased in frequency since the war in Syria was mostly concluded in favor of Bashar Al-Assad, the head of Syria’s regime, following the involvement of Iran, Russia, and Hezbollah to prop him up. Thus, Hassan Nasrallah’s speeches started emphasizing that they “are closer than ever to liberate Jerusalem.”

During May 2021, increasing tension between Israel and Hamas raised the issue of the ongoing armed struggle between them. A country with a solid defense industry and military capacity like Israel struggles to stand firm and unharmed against a small-scale military organization like Hamas or Islamic Jihad. What causes this vulnerability, even with an asymmetrical non-state actor as the belligerent? The answer to this question lies in Hamas’s and, indirectly, Hezbollah’s powerful rocket and missile inventory.

The military operations in Syria and Lebanon enabled Hezbollah to develop a substantial inventory of rockets with varying radiuses from 70 mm to 300+ mm. Today, it can be observed that Hezbollah’s rockets or the local productions created by smuggling critical parts such as warheads, fuses, aiming pods, etc. are frequently used against Israel. One aspect of the Hezbollah attacks against Israel runs through the Al-Qassam Brigades and Hamas.

These rockets and attack missiles are military elements that weigh 45-750 kg in total and carry a warhead in the 10-150 kg interval, often without a stand-off guidance system. These types of missiles generally have a circular error margin of 5 m. Their primary operational capacity is to provide fire advantage/superiority in attacks against locations determined by other elements, harass the rival ground forces, and gain maneuver space for subsequent operations.

What are the measures Israel has developed against these missiles? It has developed the Iron Dome, a low-altitude ballistic missile defense system, which is unique in the world. Moreover, the THEL laser protection system, a high-energy laser technology developed in recent years, has been actively used against guided missiles. The main reason for the search for alternative protection is the cost of deterring rockets by Hamas by using Iron Dome missiles to destroy them.

The Tactical High-Energy Laser (THEL) system has the potential to affect the course of this conflict in the next decade significantly, considering that the cost per laser shot is less than $5,000. However, considering the current balance, Hamas and Islamic Jihad have proven many times that they can attack Israel with nearly 200 missiles and rockets within one hour.

As of today, it is thought that there are more than 40 Iron Dome batteries in Israel’s hands. Considering that there are 3 or 4 launchers in each battery and 20 Tamir missiles in each launcher, Israel has the capacity to defend itself against 800 low-altitude rockets and missiles. However, a number of batteries can be saturated through intensified attacks from specific directions instead of reaching full saturation.

Since the batteries are distributed over various locations and can only protect an area of ​​maximum 60 square kilometers, when one defense line is under intense rocket and missile fire, it can no longer defend the territory. This is the offensive-defensive strategy of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which have a minimal inventory in numerical terms. Its effectiveness can be seen in the fact that Israel cannot prevent the permeation of its airspace and land, which is protected through many layers of defense systems.

Missile defense is not limited to air defense systems. The military satellites that are in orbit continuously search for preparations of an attack to thwart it before it even begins. The Israeli Air Force executes these operations with the help of ground forces and satellite images for precision. The big picture presents a state army with eyes on the atmospheric level and missiles with great precision, and yet Israeli land is not secure from the missiles with a radius of less than 100 km.

Most of the rockets and missiles that Hamas and Islamic Jihad can smuggle and use are without any stand-off guidance system, which means the missile can only explode without any destination guidance regarding a destination. This is functional if the only goal is to harass the enemy forces and deprive them of a sense of security. The only promising technology for the Israeli side is THEL, with its ability to thwart threats with low cost and a higher level of precision.

Therefore, Hamas and Islamic Jihad will be forced to invent alternative ways other than relying on the suppressive missile attacks as a military tactic as it becomes ever more challenging for asymmetric forces to continue the struggle as states become more experienced in non-state conflict.

The next decade will burden non-state armed actors like Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah with higher costs for security, education, logistics, and fewer opportunities actually to harm the targeted army.

States are organic entities that learn from experience. This is the main advantage of any state that is struggling with a non-state armed actor. From its foundation, Israel has been in conflict with several actors attacking it with an array of military tactics. What might seem like a superiority for the non-state groups today, may enable the targeted state to gain experience and learn to defend itself.

This process is the locomotive behind all military inventions which have imposed changes in the battlefield. Thus, Hamas and Islamic Jihad are bound to keep looking for weak points, and seek out and discover alternative methods and tactics to survive against a very superior military organization.

The technological edge, which usually defines the entire narrative in a military struggle, is always going to be enjoyed by states. This asymmetry offers states a tactical superiority, but at the same time makes them vulnerable due to a higher reliability on energy sources and raw material.

Non-state armed actors improvise based on available sources, usually find a loophole, and continue posing a certain level of risk to the target state. What is essential in this cycle is to update the information, intelligence, and technology used as frequently as possible.

In what seemed a surprising move, the Palestinian Authority (PA) president Mahmoud Abbas issued a decree on January 15, announcing that general elections will take place in Palestine this year. The elections, which are the first of their kind in 15 years, will be held on three phases: Palestinian Legislative Elections (PLC) on May 22, 2021; presidential elections on July 31, 2021; and Palestinian National Council (PNC) elections on August 31, 2021.

The move was welcomed by Hamas, Abbas’s main rival. It was a surprise for many Palestinians who have witnessed Palestinian reconciliation talks taking place over the last 14 years in several capitals, including most recently in Istanbul and Cairo, with no tangible results.

The election decree by the PA president raised many questions in terms of its timing and practicality. Is it possible to hold elections in a Palestine under occupation, including Jerusalem, without ending the Palestinian national rift? The answer is “yes” according to the decree, but this plan will likely face many challenges on the ground.

Will Israel Allow Elections in Jerusalem?

Israel, which won a long-awaited U.S. recognition of its sovereignty over Jerusalem, will most likely decline the PA’s request to hold the election there. Israel approved the Palestinian elections in Jerusalem in 2006 under U.S. pressure, which will not be the case this time. In 2006, the U.S. plan was to include Hamas in the political process in an attempt to tame it, which proved unsuccessful – to the contrary, Hamas has grown more stubborn over the years.

The Palestinian elections this year, unlike 2006, will be held according to the list proportional representation system, where voters will choose whole lists of political parties rather than individual candidates in specific electoral districts.

In 2006, the voting system was 50% candidate-based and 50% proportional representation. The reason why both Hamas and Fatah agreed to this system is because it reinforces partisan politics, where the electorate votes for a specific political party, rather than candidates, who might be independent or from the other party.

Hamas is worried it might lose many of the votes it won in 2006 in Gaza, and Fatah is equally worried it might lose many of the votes it won in 2006 in the West Bank.

This system was in favor of Hamas in 2006, where Hamas won nearly 45.4% of the party list votes, and 69.7% of the candidate lists. Hamas is worried it might lose many of the votes it won in 2006 in Gaza, and Fatah is equally worried it might lose many of the votes it won in 2006 in the West Bank. The full proportional representation system is the way out for both groups.

Irony and Obstacles

There have been speculations that both parties, Hamas and Fatah, might run for the election in a single united list. Although it sounds ironic, considering the division and the history of hostility between the two parties, this reveals how they view this election: it is all about managing the division rather than ending it.

Another challenge to these Palestinian elections is how both parties, and other smaller parties, will ensure that the losing party accepts the results of the election. In fact, there is no guarantee that the elections will not be forged considering the environment of security repression which has resulted from 15 years of rift politics where security forces have always had the final say and the upper hand in domestic politics.

The proportional representation system also aims to crush smaller political parties and groups that will not be able to get enough votes to pass the election threshold easily. This translates into reproducing the division and reinforcing Hamas and Fatah as the only political parties in charge of Palestinian politics.

Other smaller political parties, both from the left and right, along with many Palestinians, especially the younger generation, will choose not to vote. Today, many Palestinians no longer believe that their votes in an election under occupation and without solving the political split will matter.

What is the value of an election under occupation? Elections are meant to choose representatives of a system that is supposed to have sovereignty over a territory.

They know too well that their votes will not improve their living conditions and that major political parties have long decided to adapt to division rather than solve it.

Elections or Liberation?

In the first place, what is the value of an election under occupation? Elections are meant to choose representatives of a system that is supposed to have sovereignty over a territory. Palestinians don’t have any sovereignty over their land and resources, and without an Israeli permit, the head of the Palestinian Authority can’t move in and out of the West Bank.

In other words, Palestinians need to focus on liberation and independence rather than having a pseudo-state under occupation that only serves as an excuse for Israel, the occupying power according to international law, to abandon its responsibilities towards the Palestinians. The titles of presidents and members of parliament in the Palestinian context do not count, nor do they make any sense under occupation.

The Abbas decree noted that the Palestinian National Council (PNC) elections, which matter the most, will be held “where possible.” This vaguely worded statement means that the PNC elections, which are supposed to include Palestinians of the diaspora, could be held in a limited number of countries, depending on whether the host countries will allow the elections or not.

An election that does not fully include the Palestinian diaspora is a vote over self-autonomy under occupation. Wasting too much time thinking about statehood under occupation will not serve the Palestinians, and today, what Palestinians need the most is a unified approach to end the Israeli military occupation and a call for full equality.

What Palestinians Need to Do

In fact, calling for equal votes with Jewish-Israelis under the system Israel established between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River would be more pragmatic for the Palestinians than holding elections most probably without Jerusalem and some areas of the West Bank.

This is especially true in light of the current reality of military occupation, which Israeli human rights group B’Tselem described recently as apartheid (whisper: Palestinians have been saying this for a long time). In other words, Palestinians need to address the roots of their reality today, rather than looking for elections that will only serve to reinforce division and give the false impression that they have a sort of statehood and sovereignty under occupation.

The Palestinian elections might take place as planned in May 2021, but a large number of Palestinians will boycott them and a larger number will not be represented in them. Elections that do not include Jerusalem and much of the Palestinian diaspora sound more like municipal elections of self-autonomy under occupation.

Such elections will only deepen the divide among the Palestinians and falsely proclaim before the world that Palestinians have a state and can hold free and fair elections. The only thing that Palestinians have today is Israeli military occupation and any attempt to bypass this truth is misleading.