The results of the Istanbul elections is still being discussed in Turkey. The clear-cut victory of Ekrem Imamoglu over Binali Yildirim has raised questions on the transformation of voting behavior. Why did a significant number of the Istanbul electorate change their voting preference in just 84 days? Is this change in voting behavior related to a long-lasting social and political transformation in Turkish society? Even though it is not an easy task answering these questions, there are some eye-catching issues that are crucial to find a satisfying answer.

The first critical point is related to the transformation of the profile of the electorate in the last decade. Contrary to a common myth implying that the number of young voters is increasing in Turkey, their number showed a decrease in the last decade. While the ratio of young people between the ages 15-29 consisted of 26.79 percent of the whole population in 2007, this ratio decreased to 24,34 percent in 2015. In parallel to this information, the ratio of young voters is also showing a slight decrease. Thus, it is obvious that the argument on rejuvenation does not explain the reason behind the change of voting behavior.

Contrary to a common myth, the number of young voters in Turkey showed a decrease in the last decade.

Nonetheless, a second more prominent point explains more about the change of voting behavior, especially in regards to the Istanbul elections. This point is the reaction that the electorate gave against the renewal of elections in Istanbul. The Turkish electorate has always been critical against the renewal of elections and the idea of snap elections. However, the ongoing dynamics in political, economic, and social affairs determine the way of reactions. For instance, in 2002, the electorate showed a noticeable reaction against existing political actors because of the ongoing economic crisis. During November 2015, the electorate favored the ruling party in the renewed elections in order to avoid uncertainty arising from political and economic instability, the future of the Kurdish question, and the war in Syria.

When it comes to the Istanbul elections, it is possible to say that the electorate was not convinced about the reason why the elections were canceled in the first place. Therefore, they reacted against the AK Party candidate, Binali Yildirim. Thus, rather than a long-lasting dissatisfaction with the government, the results of the election is substantially related to the post-March 31 period, along with pre-electoral alliances.

The electorate was not convinced of the reason why the elections were canceled, and they reacted against the AK Party.

The reaction given by the 220,000 AK Party supporters who voted for Binali Yildirim on March 31 and who did not vote for him on June 24 should therefore be evaluated within this framework. A certain number of the electorate did not accept the rationality behind the renewal of the Istanbul elections – although it was legally explained.

All political parties will most probably take all issues into consideration when discussing the change of voting behavior in Turkey. It is obvious that there is a need for further studies based on empirical data in order to understand the in-depth reasons behind this issue. It is crucial to understand whether there had been a long-lasting shift in voting behavior of whether the specific conditions of the Istanbul elections created a short-term change in the electorate. Even if the second option is more valid under these circumstances, all political parties need to take necessary measures in order to prepare for the first option.

Following the Istanbul elections on June 23, Turkey’s policymakers will now focus on politics and on particular foreign policy issues of current significance. The upcoming days will most likely show some striking developments in the field of foreign policy, as the S-400 missile case, tensions between the U.S. and Iran and the G20 Summit will be of great importance.

However, before that, a final elaboration from a systematic point of view should be made regarding the political system in general and the recent mayoral elections in particular. The Turkish public went to the ballot every year since 2014 due to both extraordinary situations, such as early elections held in 2015, the failed coup attempt in 2016, the referendum in 2017, and the snap elections in 2018. Added to this list was the re-run of the Istanbul elections on June 23. These experiences give us political scientists a lot of data to analyze Turkey’s continuous political perception of the previous parliamentary system, while the dynamic transformation is continuing into the new presidential system, which was adopted in 2017.

In the new system, the country’s executive organ is led by a single office, namely the Turkish presidency. According to the previous constitutional requirement, the Turkish prime minister had to share the country’s executive organ with the president, which in the past had caused several system-based difficulties and even crises between the two offices. One of my first observations is that despite official opposition regarding the Turkish presidential system by most opposition parties – except the MHP – it seems that opposition circles have increasingly become used to the current system, which eventually enables opposition parties to form a so-called “bloc” or “alliance” in order to win certain offices of great importance.

Of course, the recent mayoral election in Istanbul, where in a de facto manner only two candidates, namely the Nation Alliance’s and the People’s Alliance’s candidates, became actual rivals, cannot be counted as a presidential election. Ekrem Imamoglu’s success was due to the “bloc” formed between former frustrated Kemalist/secular voters and voters that changed their minds, which is an outcome of Turkey’s presidential system, which enables alliances/blocs based on political realities.

In order to become Turkey’s president, one needs either more than 50 percent of all the votes to win in the first round or the majority of votes to gain victory in the second round. This necessity led to alliances during the 2018 presidential elections, which were formed between the AK Party and the MHP and on the other hand between the CHP and its rather heterogenous allies.

To underscore what I’m trying to explain in this week’s column, one has to stress the similar perception, which had been the case in the re-run of the mayoral elections on June 23, and which had eventually been elaborated as a de facto second round for Istanbul’s mayoral office. Under these conditions, it would be perhaps an interesting outcome and even future projection or change to consider an official second-round vote system, in particular for metropoles such as Ankara, Izmir, and Istanbul. By this, it might be a step to 1) boost Turkey’s presidential system through a similar voting system, and 2) increase the acceptance rate for the system itself.

Thus, Turkey’s dynamic political and its own path of democratic experience, which definitely must not be limited to exaggerated comments by foreign correspondents/journalists in Turkey and who are nowadays broadcasting in a very extreme and absurd Imamoglu-backing bias, offers a very good opportunity to examine the recent results in a more comparative and of course, system-based context.

The June 23 Istanbul Election ended with the success of the Nation Alliance candidate, Ekrem Imamoglu. After long-lasting discussions and controversies, Istanbul chose its mayor who will serve for the next five years. Last night also proved that despite all aggressive stigmatizing campaigns, Turkey’s democracy is still very powerful, and that all actors and parties can come to power when they get the support of the electorate.

It is important to analyze the results of the June 23 Istanbul elections in detail. In the cancelled Istanbul elections, the difference between the votes of the two candidates- Ekrem Imamoglu and Binali Yildirim- was only 13,000. The AK Party insisted that the recount of all votes in Istanbul may change the results of the election. Nevertheless, the CHP did not accept the recount of all votes. After a long-lasting and highly-debated process, the YSK cancelled the elections due to presiding officers at ballot stations who were not civil servants, which is against the law.

The increase in Imamoglu’s votes cannot be explained with the change in voter turnout.

On the June 23 elections, the difference between the votes of two candidates skyrocketed to 806.415 according to the unofficial results. Why did the slight difference on March 31 show a significant increase on June 23? Firstly, statistics show that Imamoglu increased his votes especially in 11 districts in Istanbul. While Yildirim got more votes than Imamoglu in these districts on March 31, Imamoglu received the majority on June 23. In total, Imamoglu received 572,120 more votes in Istanbul on June 23.

The increase in Imamoglu’s votes cannot be explained with the change in voter turnout. While voter turnout was 83.88% on March 31, it only increased to 84,44% on June 23. Nonetheless, the number of valid votes was approximately 200,000 higher compared to the March 31 elections. It is obvious that Imamoglu received the support of these 200,000 people in the first place.

Another determinant of the increase in the votes of Imamoglu was the supporters of other political parties. There had been 29 mayoral candidates on March 31 and most of these candidates withdrew their candidacy in favor of Imamoglu. Even though the Felicity Party did not withdraw its candidate, the comparison of the March 31 and June 23 elections show that approximately 56,000 Felicity Party supporters voted for Imamoglu or did not go to the polls on June 23.

All parties should be more careful in understanding the dynamics of the new system in the long-term.

The results of the June 23 elections show a significant decrease in the votes of Yildirim. Compared to the results of the March 31 elections, Yildirim lost approximately 220,000 votes on June 23. Although this number is taken into consideration with the almost stable voter turnout, it is seen that most of these voters changed their decisions and vote for Imamoglu on June 23. It is possible that these voters were not convinced about the cancellation of the Istanbul elections.

All this data shows that the consolidation of all parties against the AK Party is the main reason behind the success of Imamoglu on June 23. This situation is, indeed, directly related to the new pre-electoral alliance system, uniting all parties in a common goal. Thus, all parties should be more careful in understanding the dynamics of the new system in the long-term.

On last Sunday evening, the two candidates in the Istanbul mayoral election race, Binali Yildirim and Ekrem Imamoglu, came together for a three hours-long televised debate. As a highlight right before the re-run election today on June 23, 2019, the debate gathered millions of voters from all over Turkey to watch the potential future mayor of Istanbul. There was no actual winner of the televised debate, but Yildirim reflected more successfully on mayoral issues.

This evening will show by which dynamics and factors the voters of Istanbul were persuaded and on which grounds they elected their new mayor. Unfortunately, on the other hand, the televised debate – just like all other news on Istanbul – was not accurately discussed in the Western media. A simple look at the news and headlines of some media outlets in the U.S., UK, France and Germany reveal the journalistic bias.

The Western media have portrayed Ekrem Imamoglu as an ideal candidate for Turkish politics and have disregarded serious questions and accusations that he faces. They’ve turned a blind eye and a deaf ear to his previous failures, which Imamoglu is consistently asked about. Interestingly enough, Binali Yildirim, the experienced statesman and the joint candidate of the AK Party-MHP alliance, is not given equal attention by the Western media. Even when he is given attention, it’s usually in a negative tone. It is absurd that Yildirim’s previous achievements during both his term as the country’s Minister for Transportation and Communication (2002-2013, 2015-2016) when Turkey’s main highways and high-speed train networks were re-constructed, and his term as the Prime Minister (2015-2018), are not taken into consideration by these media outlets.

Instead of addressing Yildirim’s personality, success and failures, career path, massive infrastructural projects he took, which were not common for Turkey, nearly all Western media outlets editorialized news on Yildirim by silencing him. On the contrary, Imamoglu was presented in the media in a very positive way, disregarding any standards about a minimum level of objectivity. Moreover, he was falsely placed vis-à-vis the AK Party chair and President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, as the de facto rival of the Nation Alliance’s and CHP’s candidate. No need to say that this is not the case.

It is true that President Erdogan has also been delivering speeches along Binali Yildirim regarding the Istanbul mayoral elections. However, this does not mean that journalists from the Western world should disregard the AK Party’s mayoral candidate and his projections for the future of Istanbul. By this, it is weird to observe that most of the pieces that appeared in the Western media about the Istanbul elections focused on Erdogan rather than Yildirim and used a negative discourse, continuing their habit that has been accustomed for about 7-8 years now.

For instance, pieces from France’s leading media platforms and dailies portrayed Imamoglu as a “new hope of Turkish politics” (“nouvel espoir de la politique turque”) while openly disregarding the criteria of objectivity with regard to his rival Binali Yildirim (I,II). Similarly, the British media (III,IV) openly described Imamoglu “as a unifying power to take on Erdogan” without challenging and stressing various accusations towards Imamoglu. Furthermore, particularly media platforms in the United States, openly took positions supporting the CHP’s candidate, and, where also Imamoglu – a person running for being elected as a local politician– received the chance to publish a (Washington Post op-ed) article appealing to international audience (V,VI).

Of course, main support in the Western media still comes from Germany, where nearly every single politician who challenges the governing AK Party – no matter whether ultra-conservative, ultra-nationalist, Kurdish-separatist, etc- received media support without critical journalism. This happened and continues to happen during the 23 June election campaigns. For instance, titles such as “Istanbul candidate Imamoglu: Erdogan’s successor?” (VII) and its content or  articles mainly addressing the CHP’s candidate and President Erdogan (VIII,IV,X,XI) are not delivering satisfactory content about the recent election campaign, which at the end of the day was a quite fruitful period from a socio-political and democratic point of view.

People in Istanbul will decide on who will govern their metropolitan municipality for the next five years. Journalists and editors in Western media outlets continue their manipulative and biased behaviors and thus set a good example for the next generations about how this profession should not be done. Lacking any criteria for objectivity unfortunately is a fact of our post-truth world, no matter what the cost of losing ethical journalist credibility can mean in the long run.

The real cause of the excitement in both Turkey and the West over the Republican People’s Party’s (CHP) Istanbul mayoral candidate Ekrem Imamoğlu has been the thought that he might manifest himself as a new leader and be an alternative to the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Although his performance until the March 31 elections led people to think this possibility, he has proved as from March 31 that he does not have such leadership qualities, and this situation will not change whether he is elected as the Istanbul mayor on the June 23 elections or not.

Of course, Istanbul mayor’s office is a critical position since the city has been the capital of many empires throughout history and reflects Turkey in a nutshell in the current context. Erdoğan became Istanbul mayor 24 years ago and found a chance to become a national leader who can show himself in world politics. He is undoubtedly the most powerful leader Turkey has witnessed as he received more than 50 percent of the vote share in the first round of last year’s presidential election despite being in power for 17 years.

İmamoğlu’s score in the mayoral election with the support of several other parties such as the Iyi Party and the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) unavoidably kept the opposition’s hopes alive since it was similar to the beginning of Erdoğan’s story. Although many names following the same trajectory disappeared from the political scene, such as Nurettin Sözen from the CHP, Ali Müfit Gürtuna from late Necmettin Erbakan’s Virtue Party and Bedrettin Dalan from the Motherland Party (ANAP), dissidents still thought “everything will be great” with İmamoğlu.

While many believed Imamoglu to hold leadership characteristics and be an alternative to Turkey’s President Erdogan, he has proved as from March 31 that he does not have such leadership qualities.

To that end, the CHP has engaged in an activity that is peculiar for political literature and distributed a 50-page booklet entitled “Radical Love Book,” which quoted the words of prominent names in Islamic philosophy and Sufi literature such as Yunus Emre, Rumi and Haci Bektash Veli. The cover of the booklet features a family with two children, with a mother who wears a hijab. The family carries a placard that reads “Love, brothers, sisters…” By employing religious motifs, the booklet warns about negative feelings such as arrogance, hate and grudge, and tells people how they should approach each other and meet on a common ground.

The messages given are not bad. The last page of the booklet reads: “This is an intra-party education material for the local election campaign and has been prepared to contribute to the discourse of the CHP party organization and party volunteers during the campaign process.” The introduction, which was penned by Seyit Torun, the CHP Vice President in charge of local administrations, reads: “I have met many honorable villagers who would not touch a handful of the rice they are entrusted to, they don’t generally vote for our party. […] Some pedantic people who have never seen or met these people insulted them by calling them ‘bribe-takers.’ They even called workers and villagers lazy although these people sweat and work very hard to make a living.”

İmamoğlu has managed to appeal to large masses in Turkey since his profile has been different from conventional CHP politicians and his tone is appropriate for 70 percent of Turkish society, as described in the booklet written by the advertiser İlyas Başsoy. While displaying this profile, İmamoğlu did not experience the handicaps a typical CHP member would have due to his family background. In a similar vein, the CHP also aspired to get away from its conventional stance. But this went so far that the CHP deputies reacted when a Justice and Development Party (AK Party) deputy addressed İmamoğlu as “the CHP’s mayoral candidate” during a televised debate. They said: “you deliberately underlined that he is from the CHP.”

Their election propaganda has definitely reached its target to a certain point. However, for political leadership, one has to have an ideological cause or a political agenda. Over the course of the campaign period, İmamoğlu abstained from remarking any political opinion. If he is a candidate to a grand metropolitan city as Istanbul, then he could have shared whether he had any projects on public works. However, in Turkey’s collective memory, being a CHP member means going against all kinds of operations.

Over the course of the election campaign, Ekrem Imamoglu abstained from clearly manifesting any ideological cause or a political agenda.

The CHP has always opposed the bridges built in Istanbul, new airports, private TV channels and the investments made in the telecommunications sector. This has been a major handicap for İmamoğlu, but the televised debate between the two mayoral candidates, Binali Yıldırım and İmamoğlu, might have presented him a chance to erase this past from people’s minds. The moderator of the debate was a pro-CHP journalist whose license plate is “CHP” and who is employed by Murdoch’s Fox Tv.

İmamoğlu’s opponent in the debate was a prominent and experienced politician who has marked significant projects in transportation, and who served as the prime minister, minister and parliamentary speaker. But as a requirement of the debate format, the new one is always put in a more advantaged position than the other. Despite this, the new one could not predicate his promises on any solid ground. While Yıldırım summarized in 3 minutes what his party have done so far and what they will do and mentioned Marmaray, Avrasya tunnel, highways, rail systems, metro and train lines, İmamoğlu began his words by saying: “We will conduct feasibility works for one year with every wing of the transportation sector,” and did not mention any projects. This means that he and his team did not even conduct a preliminary feasibility work for their promise, which shouldn’t have been the case.

Imamoğlu continued: “We will build a 500-kilometer cycle path, finish the incomplete projects. With an integrated approach, we will work with all the actors such as minibuses, taxis, and shuttle services.” He also promised that he will open 150 kindergartens in Istanbul, but his opponent reminded that he only built one kindergarten when he was Beylikdüzü mayor although he promised to build 11. İmamoğlu also said that a scholarship worth 400 TL will be granted to 75 thousand students for 8 months of the year, to which his opponent responded: “Municipalities cannot grant scholarships. They did it in the past, but İmamoğlu’s party, the CHP, brought it to the Constitutional Court 10 years ago and rendered municipal scholarships impossible.” On the next day, Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality issued an announcement: “Before its cancellation initiated by the CHP, a 122 million 290 thousand TL worth education fund was granted to a total of 202 thousand 750 university students between 2004 and 2008.”

Although the debate has not affected the opinion of the electorate according to the polls, İmamoğlu has proved once again that he does not actually have the leadership qualities people attribute to him. No matter what the result will be on the June 23 election, İmamoğlu could not go beyond drawing the image of a contractor successful in his job who constantly gives all-encompassing and embracing messages despite his inability to give any tangible promise for the future. Is it to early to speak about the future? I don’t think so.  

Turkey’s long-awaited live debate between the two mayoral candidates of Istanbul, Binali Yildirim and Ekrem Imamoglu, took place on Sunday night. Despite high expectations and controversies, the live debate did not end up with any shocking events or scandals. Thus, both candidates showed a decent performance and there was no unfair balance in their appearance at the debate.

After the live debates in the U.S., survey companies conduct an instant survey to show the true winner of the debate. Nevertheless, the format of the program in Turkey was not designed in a way that enabled being able to choose the winner of the debate. Throughout the program, two candidates never engaged in a face-to-face dialogue. Rather than being in direct interactions, the two candidates separately answered the questions of the moderator.

Imamoglu underlined that he had never allowed the sale of alcohol at social facilities during his mayorship in Beylikduzu province. These statements created anger and frustration among his supporters.

Although the public complained that the program was dull and that the moderator ought to have allowed the two sides to interact with each other, there were small incidents that raised tensions throughout the program. The most prominent incident was Ekrem Imamoglu’s statements on the ban of alcohol and gender-segregated pools. Imamoglu underlined that he had never allowed the sale of alcohol at social facilities during his mayorship in Beylikduzu province. He also stated that he built gender-segregated pools in Beylikduzu while he was trying to show his “respect to conservative values.” Nonetheless, Imamoglu’s statements created anger and frustration among his supporters and this issue became one of the most controversial outcomes of the live debate.

Even though a true winner of the debate cannot be declared, there is a public consensus that Binali Yildirim was more successful in answering the questions of the moderator. Indeed, Yildirim showed great success in explaining the reason of the cancellation of the Istanbul elections by emphasizing his demand on a re-count of votes rather than a cancellation. When it comes to Imamoglu, he could not clearly answer most of the questions asked by the moderator. Imamoglu could not make a satisfactory explanation on his humiliation of the Governor of Ordu and his intention to copy data from the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality.

Even though a true winner of the debate cannot be declared, there is a public consensus that Binali Yildirim was more successful in answering the questions of the moderator.

Nevertheless, both candidates have well-prepared projects on resolving the structural problems of Istanbul, such as transportation, traffic, and youth unemployment. Yildirim clearly identified how he was going to find resources to implement his projects on these structural problems. Imamoglu also provided information on his long-term projects on the resolution of green area problems and youth unemployment in Istanbul.

Both candidates had a consensus on the importance of the problem of Syrian refugees in Turkey. However, they had a different road map in the resolution of this issue in the long-term. While Yildirim underlined that refugees would return to their countries after creating conflict-free zones in Syria, Imamoglu spoke about a project on creating a distinct zone for Syrian refugees before sending them back to their countries. It is fair to state that both candidates failed to mention the rise of hate speech against Syrian refugees in Turkey.

It seems that the live debate between the two candidates did not create a huge impact on the electorate. Nevertheless, Yildirim’s performance on the live debate may create an effect on the previous AK Party voters who did not go to the polls on March 31. Beyond all these issues, the live debate was a triumph for Turkish democracy, which indeed, was the true winner of the live debate on Sunday night.

For the re-run of the Istanbul mayoral elections to be held on June 23, the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) mayoral candidate Ekrem Imamoglu’s slogan is “Everything will be fine.” There is a Turkish expression: “The only thing better than this is an apricot in Damascus,” which means that it does not get any better than this. Imamoglu draws such a unique political profile that even our post-truth world hasn’t experienced so far.

His case is reminiscent of a well-known children’s novel, Pinocchio. Once upon a time, there was an old carpenter Geppetto who lived on selling the toys he made and whose only yearning was to have a child. At the moment he lost all his hopes to have one, a miracle happened. One of the wooden puppets started talking to him. Feeling blissful, he clasped the puppet in his arms and said: “You are like a real boy. I will call you Pinocchio.”

Just like Carlo Collodi’s fictional character Geppetto’s wish to have a child, the CHP has been yearning for creating a political hero for decades. Although the party has never come to power alone except for the single party period that continued until 1945, it has been the actual power in Turkish politics due to its ideological stance until recently. As the popular support given to the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan has grown from 30 percent to around 50 percent during his 17 years in power, the governing mechanisms in the country have been normalized in line with democracy. As a result, the CHP started aspiring to win elections and come to power through usual ways. But it was not easy to erase from the collective memory, especially the memories of Muslim conservatives and Kurds, the years when the CHP was ruling the state from behind.

Just like Carlo Collodi’s fictional character Geppetto’s wish to have a child, the CHP has been yearning for creating a political hero for decades and found one: Ekrem Imamoglu. 

Since becoming CHP chairman in 2010, Kemal Kilicdaroglu has lost two referendums, three general elections, two local elections and two presidential elections. In the face of successive failures, the party even tried to nominate a former AK Party politician and proposed the party’s presidential candidacy to former president Abdullah Gul. The irony is, they gave a fight to hinder his presidency with the support of the military and the judiciary back in 2007. But this strategy failed, too. This time, reminiscent of Geppetto’s puppet who comes to life, the CHP caught a success story for the Istanbul mayoral elections thanks to effective teamwork. During the 31 March election that was cancelled by the Supreme Election Council (YSK), Imamoglu enjoyed a vote share that is unprecedented in the party’s history. However, it is very doubtful whether he will be able to achieve the same success in the re-election on June 23.  

It is no longer a secret that politics has a marketing aspect. Today, political leaders work with large staff while deciding on all their acts and manners. Since his first appearance in the election campaign, Imamoglu has drawn a profile that has a secure distance from Kemalist ideology in line with Turkey’s sociological fabric. The features that would not catch attention in any candidate from other parties, such as his performing religious rituals and the visits he paid to the mausoleum of Mehmet the Conqueror, were highlighted in Imamoglu’s case since such acts do not comply with the conventional characteristics of the CHP. But at some point, he started exaggerating giving the implications that he is religious. Although many women in Turkey perform their religious rituals despite not wearing hijab, all female members of the families Imamoglu visited for iftar dinner during Ramadan were wearing hijab. Aside from all the broadcasts and photos from iftar dinners, he served a video to social media on sahur time, the time when a meal is eaten before starting fasting in Ramadan. In the video, he started his speech by saying “I don’t actually like talking on sahur time but…” He also visited a family who named their son after Tayyip Erdogan and said that they will vote for İmamoglu.

Politics has a marketing aspect. But, at some point, Imamoglu started exaggerating giving the implications that he is religious.

Receiving the support of Muslim conservatives alongside the CHP base, İmamoglu also endeavored to address the outlawed PKK’s proponents, jailed nationalists, political Islamists, agnostic/atheist community, Sunnis, Alevis and all the other ethnic and religious identities one can ever think of. He has always portrayed a calm, affectionate and genial profile; but exaggerated the marketing aspect in most cases. People started questioning his image upon that. A left-wing journalist satirized the picture as follows: “Yasin (a sura in the Quran), March of Izmir (which is embraced by nationalists and conventional Kemalists in the country), Bella Ciao, Mehteran, Abdullah Gul, Mustafa Kemal, the pro-Kurdish HDP leader Selahattin Demirtas, PKK… All in one place. He is the hope of Kemalists, PKK/HDP, FETO, ostensibly leftist liberals… He is the hero of our time, which scares me.”

A former AK Party politician also said: “Imamoglu becomes what he is supposed to be in every case,” whereas another leftist journalist asked: “Does anyone know about his ideas on any subject?” After a while, Imamoglu, who refrains from remarking a single word about domestic or foreign policies of Turkey and slurred over such questions (he seems to be right considering his utterly eclectic supporter group!), penned an opinion article for Washington Post. The article titled “How I won the race for mayor of Istanbul — and how I’ll win again” unavoidably caused some reactions. People questioned why he wrote such an article as if he was a candidate for the U.S. mayoral elections. And his image suffered a huge blow after it was revealed in the media that he insulted a governor when he was not allowed into an airport’s VIP lounge.

People started questioning Imamoglu’s image. Does he become what he is supposed to be in every case?

Politics means propaganda, and propaganda tools unavoidably comprise some illusive aspects. Imamoglu has managed to be convincing for quite a long time. For instance, he promised to build a Mecidiyeköy-Mahmutbey metro line in Istanbul through a google ad, which circulated for days and did not face any problem. But, while his image was suffering blows, it was reported that the test drive of this very line has already been made and the line will be opened soon. As this information surfaced, they adopted another strategy and started referring to Imamoglu’s works as Beylikduzu district mayor. In the press meeting when Kilicdaroglu announced Imamoglu’s candidacy, he said: “When I saw that green valley in Beylikduzu, I said to myself: ‘this is how a mayor should work.’ If he improved this place to such an extent with such limited facilities, he can do wonders with the giant budget of the Istanbul metropolitan municipality.”

But after that, it was revealed that 75 percent of the Green Valley was built and opened by former district mayor Yusuf Uzun, while Imamoglu only contributed to the building of the walls, a cafeteria and a pool. Another incident that shook his reliability happened this week. As known, Imamoglu and AK Party’s mayoral candidate Binali Yildirim will participate in a live televised debate on June 16. Regarding the debate, Imamoglu said: “I have heard that Mr. Yildirim asked for going over the questions beforehand.” The moderator, a journalist whose affiliation with the CHP is no secret, refuted his claim: “I haven’t prepared any questions. And Mr. Yildirim has not made such a request,” while Yildirim said: “He should prove it if he has an evidence, and apologize if he doesn’t.” Imamoglu’s answer was: “I probably misunderstood.”

For three months up until the March 31 election, “everything was fine” for Imamoglu, but with this trajectory, “everything might not be so fine” on June 23 despite all the support from his party’s allies, the Iyi Party, HDP and other political parties. The number of people who are questioning his image has been growing.

After long-lasting discussions and controversies, the Istanbul mayoral candidates – Binali Yildirim (AK Party) and Ekrem Imamoglu (CHP) – agreed on holding a live debate with the moderation of anchorman Ismail Kucukkaya. There is no doubt that this live debate will shape the results of the upcoming Istanbul elections and will be one of the unforgettable moments in Turkey’s political history.

When discussions on this issue started for the first time, people kept asking why the two candidates intended on holding a live debate, as this was not so common. It’s true that live debate among politicians during election campaigns has not been an issue for the last decade in Turkey. The last prominent live debate was held between Recep Tayyip Erdogan, leader of the AK Party and former CHP chair, Deniz Baykal, just before the 2002 parliamentary elections.

Even though the Turkish public is not familiar with live debates between politicians, recent examples have attracted a lot of attention from the public. After the two mayoral candidates announced that they were open to discussing their projects on Istanbul in a live debate, various circles discussed the effects that this incident will have on the election results.

The live debate between Binali Yildirim and Ekrem Imamoglu may shape the results of the upcoming Istanbul elections.

Live debates are events that shape voting preferences. A survey result on the effects of live debates on voting preferences shows that 38% of voters are influenced by debates. When it comes to the U.S. example, live debates have become a traditional part of election campaigns since the 1960s. Nonetheless, even though live debates are still very crucial, statistics show that the U.S. audience does not pay much attention to live debates in comparison to how it did before.

Although there is no consensus on the effects that live debates have on elections, it is widely accepted that they are the most powerful determinant on voter preferences – especially on swing votes. Surveys also show that a significant number of voters who tend not to participate in elections change their decisions after live debates.

Due to this, the live debate between Binali Yildirim and Ekrem Imamoglu may be the main determinant of the Istanbul elections. Since approximately 1.7 million voters did not go to the polls and with the almost 300 thousand invalid votes on March 31, the live debate has huge potential to change the direction of the Istanbul elections. At first, it may increase voter turnout by effecting the decision of nearly 2 million people who either abstained from voting, or whose votes were invalid.

On March 31, 1.7 million voters did not go to the polls , the live debate has huge potential to change the direction of the Istanbul elections.

Another effect of the live debate will be on the transformation of Turkey’s political culture in the long-term. Live debates are very popular in presidential systems where pre-electoral alliances are a crucial determinant on election results. Live debates allow voters to become familiar with the candidates of alliances. Furthermore, candidates chosen by the alliance of different political parties have a chance to get the support of voters of these parties in live debates. Thus, it is not an exaggeration to state that presidential candidates may also hold live debates in future elections in Turkey.

Regardless of all these issues, the live debate between Yildirim and Imamoglu this Sunday will be an interesting experience for the Turkish public.

One of Turkey’s well-known center-left parties, the Democratic Left Party (DSP), has once again drawn attention in Turkish politics due to its striking stance regarding the main opposition’s and the Nation Alliance’s mayoral candidate for Istanbul, Ekrem Imamoglu. As a post-1980 political party, which had been established under the leadership of former Turkish Prime Minister and CHP chairman Bulent Ecevit, the DSP symbolized a shift from traditional – and even radical – CHP preferences subsequent to the 1980 military coup. The party had also received its chance to lead the country between 1999-2002, which ultimately ended with an election loss against the newly founded AK Party. Since that date, the center-left DSP has not gained any success. However, it also chose not to close its doors to the politics.

Today, the DSP still remains on the agenda of Turkey’s leftist political circles as it has once again been during the 31 March election campaign. Many former CHP candidates, who had not been nominated as mayoral candidates and had been replaced with other names from the CHP leadership, in particular names close to the CHP chair Kemal Kilicdaroglu, consequently switched as a reaction to the DSP. This happened mostly as a sign of protest against the CHP leadership.

In contrast to the Kurdish-leftist HDP, the DSP announced its own mayoral candidate, Muammer Aydin, for the Istanbul mayoral election on 31 March and did not support Ekrem Imamoglu. Aydin received approximately 30,000 votes out of the eligible 10 million voters in Istanbul. Despite its very little meaning, taking into account the difference between the CHP candidate and the AK Party’s candidate on 31 March, the controversial election results showed a slight margin of just 13,000 votes. Thus, it becomes more obvious how important every single vote is with regard to the upcoming re-run of the mayoral election on 23 June.  

In contrast to the HDP, the DSP announced its own mayoral candidate – Muammer Aydin – for the 31 March elections and did not support Ekrem Imamoglu. 

Interestingly, the DSP’s candidate for Istanbul recently stated that he has withdrawn from the 23 June election by describing the election board’s (YSK’s) decision to re-run the election as unlawful. Consequently, supporters of Ekrem Imamoglu expected the DSP leadership to take a similar stance to the HDP, namely, not announcing its own candidate and supporting the CHP’s candidate. However, the DSP did not share this trend.

The DSP’s party assembly decided not to appoint a new candidate due to the resignation of its former candidate Muammer Aydin. However, party members have officially rejected supporting CHP’s Ekrem Imamoglu although some small parties – including the HDP – had already announced their support.

Despite the party’s decision, it is of course possible that DSP voters could still back Imamoglu in protest of the decision. However, the main points worth analysis are the reasons why DSP members chose not to back Imamoglu. Party chairman Onder Aksakal explained the DSP’s decision by stressing former DSP leader Bulent Ecevit’s heritage. According to Aksakal, the party would go against Ecevit’s heritage if it were to support the same candidate as other political parties, which are not compatible with the specific understanding of leftist politics represented by the DSP. By this, Aksakal implied other leftist parties such as the HDP.

If the DSP were to support Ekrem Imamoglu, it would go against Bulent Ecevit’s heritage as this is regarded incompatible with the DSP’s leftist politics.

As I occasionally try to address, the entire center-left in Turkey faces a difficult but fundamental problem. Even though there is a potential chance to broaden the electorate and even become a serious alternative within Turkish politics in the long-term by becoming a hope for center-left minded voters, the CHP’s expectations and wrong strategies always ends in electoral losses. Thus, it is actually an advantage that due to Turkey’s new presidential system, leftist and center-leftist parties are able to establish alliances. However, it is also becoming apparent that the “left-bloc” does not deliver a stable future projection.

Gathering all left-oriented political parties together does not guarantee a fundamental success along with a populist figure such as Imamoglu himself. Furthermore, it is a strong sign and remarkable element of Turkish democracy that small center-left parties such as the DSP have the courage not to support the CHP’s mayoral candidate due to the party’s own stance – despite continuing heavy pressures from several leftist and media circles. At the end of the day, it might even be the case the voters of small parties will decide whether Ekrem Imamoglu or Binali Yildirim will be elected as the new mayor of Istanbul.

Chair of Germany’s CDU, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer (AKK), has recently addressed the re-run of the Istanbul mayoral elections, scheduled for June 23, 2019. By elaborating on the current developments in Turkey, once again, a leading figure in German politics took a biased position with regard to elections in Turkey by openly supporting the opposition in a foreign country.

It should be noted here that the majority of the German parliament also openly supported the self-declared interim president, Guaidó, in Venezuela, while a report published by an official state-funded service pointed to the fact that the German parliament’s step might cause a situation that could be seen as interference in Venezuela’s internal affairs.

In her recent address during an election campaign in the Western German city of Duisburg, AKK described participation in the upcoming European election in Germany on 26 May as a sign of solidarity with the Turkish opposition. Besides this, AKK stated, “we have seen in Istanbul that a democratic decision has been overturned because the president in Turkey did not like the results.” AKK continued and blamed the Turkish government by stressing, “this shows that a safe and free choice is not self-evident everywhere in the world.” AKK once again referred to the European elections by stating her wish “that a strong turnout on May 26 would set a signal that makes it clear that election, that vote, is worth something, and we vote for everyone in the opposition in Turkey who do not have the freedom to do that. This too is a sign of solidarity.”

It has become habitual for German conservatives to address Turkish politics in a negative way.

Unfortunately, it has become habitual for German conservatives, who are trying to reach for far-right and populist votes, to address Turkish politics in a negative way. Besides the obvious leftist and far-right figures criticizing Turkey, it has become common for conservative members of German politics to criticize Turkey without accurate information, basing their arguments on populism. By this, it’s obvious that other similar election experiences in European states in the past are disregarded and likely deliberately not taken into account neither among conservative nor other left-liberal circles.

Without going into depth, just remember two re-run examples: First, in 2016, the constitutional court in Austria ordered a re-run of the controversial presidential election’s second round. This happened during an era when the rightwing candidate Hofer came close to being the next president of the country. When Hofer lost the race against the left-bloc’s candidate, van der Bellen, Hofer subsequently went to the constitutional court where he succeeded.

Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer signals to differentiate herself from her ally in terms of populist policies and statements regarding Turkish politics.

The reason why the court cancelled the election was: “irregularities in the way postal votes were counted were sufficiently serious to require an unprecedented re-run of a national contest.” Subsequent to this decision, there was no harsh criticism particularly among German politicians. In comparison, one should remember how German politicians and even all Germany-based media outlets criticized the decision to re-run elections in Istanbul and openly supported the Kemalist-nationalist CHP’s mayoral candidate.

AKK, who is known for her close alliance with Angela Merkel, will most likely differentiate herself from her ally in terms of populist policies, statements, and in particular, one-sided elaborations of Turkish politics.

The second example is the Brexit referendum result in 2016, which most Germans and even CDU members did not like. Despite its obvious democratic character, many German politicians either directly or indirectly called for a re-run of the referendum – despite their being no irregularities. Nevertheless, for instance, the Foreign Policy Spokesman of the CDU/CSU, Jürgen Hardt, openly stated, “Brexit will not take place. At the end of the day there will be a second referendum. Then, in fact, the supporters of the British in the EU will gain the upper hand.”

As one can notice, there is quite an ambivalent tendency according to which German policy makers are either able to support the idea of a re-run – even when there are no irregularities – (for instance the Brexit case), or keep silent in terms of decisions regarding irregularities due to postal votes. Of course, these awkward positions among German policy makers may have their own reasons, but why so much prejudice and bias when it comes to Turkish politics?

The German CDU understands the dynamics of Turkish politics very insufficiently.

All in all, it becomes increasingly obvious that the former secretary general of the CDU, AKK, who is known for her close alliance with Angela Merkel, will most likely differentiate herself from her ally in terms of populist policies, statements, and in particular, one-sided elaborations of Turkish politics. By this, she most likely will be inclined to compete with already far-right and leftist circles. Given the continuing use of prevailing anti-Turkish government discourse without any reflection regarding the opposition camp in Istanbul, the German CDU might continue to insufficiently understand the dynamics of Turkish politics. By this, one should stress that there has never come accurate criticism with regard to Turkey’s CHP and its gradually established one-man leadership around Kemal Kilicdaroglu – a leader that is yet to achieve any national success.

Even in a case where the CHP candidate becomes successful on June 23, the fact is that the German government will have to cooperate with the Ankara administration, led by President Erdogan, until 2023. Lastly, one should also not disregard the fact that the CHP and its allies are not the only representatives of Turkey’s opposition.

Since there is only a month left until the June 23 elections, survey companies have begun to publish their results of recently-conducted surveys. The first examples show that surveys do not propose a valid and consistent set of results for the upcoming elections. One of the reasons for this inconsistency is due to the rapid change in voting behavior. Because the election campaign period is relatively short, voters are exposed to various issues that have a potential to swing their vote day-to-day. Thus, it is crucial to merge statistical information with the specific conditions of the Istanbul elections in order to better understand ongoing dynamics in the field.

Firstly, a re-run of elections in Istanbul cannot be a flash in the pan to voters as survey companies have claimed. Since the voting behavior of the electorate is still under the influence of ideological baggage, a significant number of people will vote for the same parties and candidates that they did on March 31. So, it is obvious that the vote difference between the two candidates, the average leading margin, will not be so high.

The fact that AK Party, CHP and Iyi Party voters did not go to the polls on March 31 decreased voter turnout in Istanbul by approximately 6 per cent.

Secondly, understanding the possible voting behavior of voters who did not go to the polls on March 31 is crucial in order to show possible reactions. At this point, decision tree methodology provides a successful method for clarification and protection of data. When this method is implemented on the March 31 election results, almost 60% of voters who did not go to the polls previously had voted for the AK Party at least once. More, around 250.000-280.000 voters who had voted for President Erdogan on the June 24 presidential elections did not go to the polls on March 31 either.

What do these numbers tell us about the upcoming elections? First, it is obvious that a significant number of AK Party voters did not go to the polls on March 31. When examined closely, most of these voters are those in areas such as Gaziosmanpaşa, Pendik, Esenler, Beykoz, Kağıthane and Bayrampaşa districts. Thus, the AK Party must focus on these districts to understand the reasons why these voters did not go the polls.

On March 31, almost 60% of voters who did not go to the polls had previously voted for the AK Party at least once.  

Statistics show that the number of voters who did not go the polls on March 31 from other political parties is also relatively high. A significant number of CHP and Iyi Party supporters also chose not to go to the polls. The increase in the number of these voters decreased the voter turnout in Istanbul by almost 6 percent. Thus, all political parties need to understand why their “loyal supporters” did not go to the polls on March 31.

Some recently conducted surveys are trying to answer some of these questions. For instance, they explain the decrease of voter turnout via reactions of voters against over-politicization. Indeed, it is obvious that Turkish people are more polarized and have become over-politicized in recent years compared to the previous generation, due to extraordinary events that took place. Nevertheless, the same surveys still fail to show the causation between the decrease in voter turnout and over-politicization.

Political parties themselves must conduct field works in order to see the social dynamics beyond these statistics.

Thus, survey results do not properly explain why the vote difference between the two candidates – Binali Yildirim and Ekrem Imamoglu – are low and why parties, especially the AK Party, lost a significant number of their loyal voters on March 31. It is necessary for parties to conduct field works in order to see the social dynamics beyond these statistics.

As is known, Turkey’s Supreme Electoral Board (YSK) announced that the mayor elections in Istanbul will re-run on June 23, 2019. There have been and still are discussions on various reasons behind the decision, which has been addressed in detail by various analysts.

The AK Party and the CHP will have to re-organize themselves and establish a new strategy in order to broaden their electorate. Two of the previous 8 mayor candidates who competed in the March 31 elections (TKP and DSP’s candidates) have resigned in favor of the CHP’s candidate, Ekrem Imamoglu. The left-nationalist Kurdish HDP had already resigned its candidate during the previous election on March 31 in favor of Imamoglu. The HDP announced once again that it will continue its previous decision of supporting Imamoglu.

Under these conditions, it seems clear that Turkey’s entire political landscape will be shaped by an election atmosphere, when the election re-run is just limited to the election of the mayor of Istanbul. This is because Istanbul is Turkey’s most important city and therefore the results are of great significance for all parties, their future strategies and national projections. The creation of a political leader is not that easy in Turkey and there are certain illusions underpinned on social media. By this, I’m trying to stress the interesting increase of Ekrem Imamoglu’s popularity and his actual lack of strategy. With no doubt, Imamoglu is getting pushed into the foreground by both the Turkish public and certain media outlets, along with, interestingly, foreign media and political circles.

Although it’s only Istanbul re-electing its mayor, Turkey’s entire political landscape is shaped by an election atmosphere as the result will shape the future of all political party strategies. 

However, if one actually analyzes Imamoglu’s mostly preferred discourses, statements and his political orientations, one will notice that he is acting like a populist politician with an objective of maximizing his electorate. By this, Imamoglu does not care about his party’s traditional line, party base or political orientation, which actually conflicts with his current actions and discourses.

Subsequent to the initial election on March 31, even though it was not clear whether Imamoglu had actually won the elections and while the YSK had not yet announced any official statement, Imamoglu took a journey to Ankara in order to visit the Mausoleum of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. This is a very popular gesture in particular secularist Kemalist voters and political circles. This was a deliberate move and so was his signing of the official memorial book as “the Mayor of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality.” This act was a violation of the law due to the lack of official mandate, which he had not yet received from the YSK at that time.

Imamoglu acted in a similar way when he recently visited the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, subsequent to the YSK’s announcement that elections will be re-run on June 23. Imamoglu once again signed an official book in Northern Cyprus as “the Mayor of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality,” although he had already given back his official mandate due to the cancellation of elections.

While walking on the corridors of the municipality accompanied by cameras, Imamoglu showed that he will eat the same lunch as all employees do. This was interpreted as dishonest and unconvincing populism.

During his approximately three weeks in office as mayor of Istanbul, Imamoglu continued to behave and act in a populist manner. For instance, while walking the corridors of the municipality accompanied by cameras, Imamoglu had the goal to send the message that he will eat the same lunch as all employees do. This act was also interpreted as an act of dishonest and unconvincing populism.

It is well-known and a global preference that new politicians in particular are biased to populist moves, which is not problematic above all regarding parties such as the CHP or HDP. However, it is worth to analyze and focus on the issue of how Imamoglu and the CHP cadres in Istanbul, who are led by the controversial figure, Canan Kaftancioglu, will shape the party’s future. This question becomes a fundamental one due to several changes in the party’s general orientation, especially in the last couple of months, which also continued subsequent to March 31.

For instance, it was no secret that the HDP, which is the political branch of the PKK, openly supported the CHP’s candidate – although the CHP did not address questions concerning an obvious CHP-HDP cooperation. Not a single CHP politician both on the national or local level dared to criticize this cooperation or to take an open position. Furthermore, Ekrem Imamoglu did not seem to have any problem in admiring the former HDP chairman, Selahattin Demirtas’s political line.

Additional questions, in particular from conservative and nationalist circles who do not see Demirtas as a legitimate politician but rather as a political mouthpiece for the PKK, did not receive any concrete answers from CHP cadres. However, it is actually known that both traditional CHP voters and members challenge this friendly strategy while enduring the situation to the motivation of becoming the winning side in Istanbul. The same counts for the party’s Istanbul provincial chief, Canan Kaftancioglu, and her political views, which are definitely incompatible with traditional CHP notions. Kaftancioglu’s problematic stance regarding several leftist violent groups are disturbing many civilian politicians, also among CHP circles. Despite this, and her previous statements – even supporting a terrorist organization’s leader – Kaftancioglu recently made clear that her views have not changed.

While heading to the elections on June 23, some may argue that the CHP is transforming itself into a more “open” political party. In addition, it might also be suggested that in the long-run, the party will diminish its radical Kemalist-secular stance, which can be counted as one of the obstacles to universal democracy. However, it’s likely that by transforming itself from a Kemalist party into a populist, aggressive and radical-leftist welcoming party, the CHP’s credibility will still continue to decrease in the long-run.

By not addressing issues of national security, such as the PKK and FETO, the CHP does not seem fit to face potential challenges in a particular areas of concern. At the end of the day, the electorate will make its decision whether a rather populist figure such as Imamoglu and his quasi-co-candidate for Istanbul, Kaftancioglu, will be preferred. Or whether there will be a long-term request for the CHP to transform into a stable, social-democratic political party. The realization of the latter seems to be very difficult to deal with both in terms of content and method. It’s up to the CHP electorate.

After the Electoral Supreme Court (YSK) made the decision to re-run mayoral elections in Istanbul, political parties and their candidates re-started their preparations for the upcoming elections. Since the campaign period is quite short – there are only 40 days until the elections – political parties have accelerated their ordinary election campaign process. Thus, they made a snap decision to finalize the details of their electoral strategy.

At this point, it is crucial to ask the following question: What are the basics of the electoral strategies political parties are pursuing for the upcoming Istanbul elections? The answer to this question is that it’s too early to tell, since we are still in the early phase of the process. Nevertheless, there are some significant issues that political parties pay attention to in the early phase. Firstly, it is obvious that political parties are trying to mobilize their electoral base. Both candidates who previously ran in the election, Binali Yildirim for the People’s Alliance and Ekrem Imamoglu for the Nation’s Alliance, had a close number of votes. Thus, it is seriously important for the candidates to preserve their electoral base in order to obtain the majority of votes on June 23.

The AK Party’s emphasis on “Turkey’s Alliance” is an outcome of the attempt to broaden its electoral sphere.

Secondly, candidates have to broaden their electoral sphere in the following days in order to get to an advantageous position. It seems that both candidates have realized this and are focusing on it nowadays. There are some options for both candidates to achieve this target. For instance, they are trying to attract the attention of voters from other political parties. As a result of this, both candidates tend to have a more inclusive perspective on the aftermath of the June 23 elections. Rather than focusing on issues that divide society, they underline issues that can connect them to broader society. The AK Party’s emphasis on “Turkey’s Alliance” is also an outcome of this broader perspective.

Another eye-catching issue in the electoral strategy of political parties is the fact that they are giving special attention to voters who did not go to the polls in the previous elections. As I emphasized last week, the voter turnout in Istanbul was 83,88% and approximately 1.8 million people did not go to vote on March 31. As a result, political parties are trying to analyze the socio-economic background of these voters. Members of both alliances are trying to reach to these voters in order to gain their support in the upcoming elections. It is not an exaggeration to state that the support of people who did not vote in the March 31 election will be the main determinant of the election on June 23.

Rather than focusing on all voters, political parties seem to pay attention to the voters who did not previously go to the polls.

Hometown organizations in Istanbul also seem to be another target for both candidates. Since most of the electorate in Istanbul migrated from other provinces, political parties may conduct back-channel diplomacy with the representatives of these organizations. For example, the MHP chairman, Devlet Bahceli, seems to focus on interacting with these organizations in order to receive support from members. This strategy may be one of the basics of the MHP and People’s Alliance’s electoral campaign.

To sum up, political parties will compete to broaden their electoral sphere effectively in the upcoming days. Rather than focusing on all voters, they seem to pay attention to the voters who did not previously go to the polls. Since the process is full with ambiguities, it needs a little more time for parties to clarify their strategies.

In Turkey’s largest city Istanbul, 8 million and 850 thousand voters went to polls in the March 31 local elections. During the vote count, the difference between the vote shares of the two alliances’ candidates was very small but the People’s Alliance still seemed ahead. Then, the People’s Alliance mayoral candidate Binali Yildirim announced that they won the Istanbul election. Half an hour later, the Nation’s Alliance candidate Ekrem Imamoglu issued a statement: “According to the data we’ve obtained, our vote share is 50.36 percent while our opponent’s is 46.70 percent based on the votes counted in more than 80 percent of ballot boxes.”

After the results turned out to be in favor of Imamoglu, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan also made a brief statement. Before departing from Istanbul to Ankara to deliver his traditional balcony speech, Erdogan said: “As the AK Party (Justice and Development Party), we have won the election by landslide as we have always been the first party by landslide since the election on 3 November 2002. Of course, the AK Party and the People’s Alliance have won or lost some municipalities, this is how democracy works. So, the results are required to be accepted.” Hinting Istanbul and Ankara Metropolitan Municipalities, Erdogan also remarked: “Although we have lost the metropolitan municipalities, we have achieved a great success in district municipalities of these metropolitan cities.”

Several hours later, the Nation’s Alliance candidate Imamoglu issued another statement and said that he has won the election by receiving 29 thousand more votes. On the following day, Turkey’s Supreme Election Council (YSK) Chairman Sadi Guven said: “We have shared the official reports of the results obtained from more than 80 percent of the ballot boxes, poll sheets and final district reports with the parties. 31.102 ballot boxes have been registered in the system, while 84 ballot boxes have not been registered yet due to objections. Accordingly, Ekrem Imamoglu’s vote number is 4.159.650 and Binali Yildirim’s is 4.131.761.” In other words, although the gap between the number of votes was not 29 thousand as Imamoglu claimed, he still won the mayoral election with a difference of 27 thousand 889 votes.

So, what happened next? Why did the AK Party’s provincial organization claim beginning from the first night of the election that there have been some irregularities in the election and filed objection appeals and complaints regarding the election results once the official objection process started? Did they really think of smearing the opposite side by making up lies and rumors about gerrymandering as claimed by the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP)? Could the party venture to do that while Imamoglu and his bloc was maintaining a successful operation of shaping minds even before Imamoglu received his election certificate? The Western capitals who were looking forward to Erdogan’s defeat were blissful, and the media represented Imamoglu as a victor. For what or in spite of what did the AK Party and its ally Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) claim that the election was rigged? How did the process lead to the final decision of the YSK that ruled the cancellation and rerun of the Istanbul mayoral election? 

Why did the AK Party’s provincial organization claim beginning from the first night of the election that there have been some irregularities and filed objection appeals and complaints regarding the election results once the official objection process started?

Vote counting procedures in Turkey operate in an almost a perfect way. The vote number of each candidate in every ballot box is reported by the balloting committee and its lead officer. After all the votes are counted, the ballot committee conveys the reports to the district electoral board. At that point, the district electoral board compounds the reports submitted by all the ballot boxes into a single report. Finally, they are conveyed to the provincial electoral boards by a team consisting of the district electoral board president and at least two members of the board. A copy of each report is delivered to the political parties and independent candidates simultaneously.

According to the election law; during the ballot counting, reporting, and compounding the data into a single report by collecting all the ballot box reports in the district electoral board, the candidates and observers representing political parties can monitor the whole process. Meanwhile, sorting and compounding activities are made openly. All these steps are under the responsibility of the district electoral boards. The boards comprise two government officials and political party representatives and are chaired by the judge of the highest seniority in the district. In other words, the political party representatives participate in this process as either board members or observers.

As of the election night, the AK Party filed appeals to several district electoral boards on the grounds that the final report was registered wrong, seals were missing in some ballots, and unlawful voter registration was made in some districts. For instance, in the ballot box no 1487 in Arnavutkoy district, Binali Yildirim’s vote number was registered as 1 in the final report although his actual vote number in the ballot box has been found to be 182. In 3 districts and 4 ballot boxes, the voter lists, final reports and vote counting sheets were missing. While the CHP argued the presence of “errors of fact” for such problems, the AK Party claimed that such errors are dubious.

The AK Party filed appeals to several district electoral boards on the grounds that the final report was registered wrong, seals were missing in some ballots, and unlawful voter registration was made in some districts.

As a result of the appeals filed by the AK Party, the difference between the two candidates fell to 19.700 as the deficiencies and errors were corrected. As the AK Party resumed filing objection appeals, the vote difference narrowed in favor of Yildirim. In the first phase, the objections filed for 39 districts were accepted by only 6 district electoral boards. In the second phase, the objections filed for all the districts were conveyed to the provincial electoral board to ask for the recount of all the votes. But the provincial electoral board refused the AK Party’s appeal and accepted the recount of only invalid votes. Meanwhile, the party appealed to the YSK for the recount of all the votes, which was also refused.

Eventually, in line with the accepted objections, “the ballots cast for metropolitan municipality in only 6 of 33 districts” and “the invalid votes in 33 districts” were recounted in the glare of cameras and all the political parties. So, 10 percent of the ballots in Istanbul, which has 8 million 850 thousand voters, were recounted. According to the statement of the YSK issued on April 17, the vote difference between the two candidates fell to 13.729. AK Party’s candidate Yildirim organized a long and comprehensive press conference with broad participation, including the foreign press. He said during the conference: “If we have won 16 thousand votes after the recount of the 10 percent, you can easily calculate the result if all the votes are recounted. This is enough to demonstrate that the election has been rigged; the votes were unfortunately registered irregularly in favor of the opposite side, indicating an organized gerrymandering. The results of the election would be different had all the votes been recounted and the CHP had consented to that.” He went on to ask: “If there really is a very small difference between our vote shares, then why did the gap not remain the same but changed in my favor after 10 percent of the ballots were recounted?”

As Ekrem Imamoglu was awarded the election certificate of Istanbul mayoral election 17 days after the election and preparing to take the mayor’s office, the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) filed an extraordinary objection to the Supreme Election Council (YSK) to interrogate the question posed by the AK Party’s mayoral candidate Binali Yildirim: “Why did the number of votes I received increase by 16 thousand after 10 percent of the ballots were recounted and the vote difference between the two of us fell to 13.729?” In the petition presented to the YSK, the cancellation and renewal of the Istanbul metropolitan mayoral election was requested on the grounds of “the unlawfulness and the closing gap in the vote difference between the two parties as a result of the incidents and circumstances effective in the results and impartialness of the election.”

According to the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) deputy chair and spokesperson Faik Oztrak: “AK Party’s objection comprised the re-submission of the subjects already resolved by the YSK rather than the incidents and circumstances effective in the election results and impartialness.” President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said: “Whether we like it or not, the YSK is authorized to rule the final decision.” Then, both sides have issued various statements, harsh or reasonable, on what the YSK ruling must be.

Eventually, the YSK ruled its final decision with 7 out of 11 votes. The Council found the AK Party’s objection right and decided for the rerun of the Istanbul mayoral election on June 23. In light of the AK Party’s objections, it was ruled that “225 balloting committee leads and 3.500 balloting committee members were found to be not employed by the government despite the explicit provision in the election law and the ballots cast in these ballot boxes were effective in the vote difference.” The YSK also ruled for “filing criminal complaint against the district electoral board chairs and members and ballot board leads who made unlawful assignments.”

A storm was raised after that point. The CHP Chairman Kemal Kilicdaroglu declared the list of the judges who opted for “yes” in the YSK ruling, saying: “The YSK has become the address of injustice, unlawfulness, inequality and remorselessness. They cannot usurp democracy, justice and rights by hiding behind their juridical titles.” These words that target the YSK caused reaction from the institution. This time, the YSK issued a statement on behalf of all its members, not referring to the decision given with 7 out of 11 votes. The statement condemned all the remarks that contained threats and insults and pointed out that “it is unacceptable to personally target or defame the judges due to their decisions.

The YSK, which was founded in Turkey in 1950 and has been responsible for the general conduct and supervision of elections, has always performed this duty honorably.

Nevertheless, the YSK, which was founded in Turkey in 1950 and has been responsible for the general conduct and supervision of elections since then, has always performed this duty honorably. Even during the period of military tutelage that started in the early Republican period and continued until quite recently, the parties not favored by the system could manifest themselves in elections and managed to come to power. These parties were tried to be rendered ineffective with innumerable methods with the support or direct appeal of the CHP or through the judiciary, the most important leg of the tutelage regime. There are at least 50 different examples of this for the past 50 years.

The parties upholding Muslim conservative traditions, such as late Necmettin Erbakan’s Welfare Party, Virtue Party, and pro-Kurdish parties such as the Democracy Party (DEP), the People’s Democracy Party (HADEP) and the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) were closed. Their governments were dissolved with coups while their political leaders were imprisoned. Despite all, the one with popular support has always been obvious. Late Adnan Menderes’ Democrat Party (Menderes was executed during the 27 May, 1960, coup with the support of the CHP), Erbakan’s Welfare Party (On 28 February, 1997, the party’s government was overthrown with a coup supported by the CHP, the party was closed, and its leader and members were banned from politics), and Erdogan’s AK Party have confronted various closure cases, memorandums, and cancelled elections ever since their establishment. But still, they won the elections thanks to the healthy functioning of the election mechanism.

So, in such an order, the CHP is the only unrivaled party in Turkey in objecting to the election results. The party filed its first objection in 1946, when the multi-party system had just been introduced, in an election environment based on “open vote, secret counting.” Since then, it has become almost traditional for the party to blame each winning party for gerrymandering and the electorate for being ignorant and stupid in every election. The CHP has also lately claimed that President Erdogan’s presidency is illegitimate irrespective of the fact that he was elected president in the first round of elections with a 52 percent vote share.

In the 2014 local election, the mayoral elections in 14 places, including Yalova and Agri, were renewed with a YSK decision. In the renewed Yalova election, the municipality changed from the AK Party to the CHP.

Of course, throughout history, a number of parties objected to election results in Turkey with claims of “errors and irregularities,” which can be been observed in every corner of the world, including the U.S. and Europe. The objections were answered in accordance with the popular will within a system that thoroughly examines each determinant within the laws. In the 2014 local election, the mayoral elections in 14 places, including Yalova and Agri provinces, were renewed with a YSK decision. In the renewed Yalova election, in which 75.813 voters cast ballots, the municipality changed from the AK Party to the CHP. The same year, BDP (former name of today’s Peoples’ Democratic Party-HDP) candidate Sirri Sakik won the Agrı mayoral election by receiving only 10 more votes, to which AK Party objected with the claim of irregularities. Agri provincial electoral board ruled for the recount of some ballot boxes. The provincial electoral board also accepted the BDP’s objection and the election was rerun. Sakik was elected as Agri mayor in the renewed election by increasing the vote difference from 10 to 2851. In a nutshell, the system always functioned in favor of the people’s will.

Despite this history, the CHP has been voicing claims that democracy suffered a blow since the announcement of the YSK’s decision to cancel and renew the Istanbul mayoral election. This is not a surprise, neither the reactions from the West. But the most curious reaction came from former President and AK Party co-founder Abdullah Gul, who tweeted: “What I felt in 2007 when the Constitutional Court made its unfair 367 ruling, that is what I felt yesterday when another high court, the Supreme Election Council, made its decision.” What was the 367 ruling? Are these two incidents really similar? Although Gul’s motivation was different while saying these words, he activated Turkish society’s collective memory on the subject of coups against democracy amid the CHP’s claims of “unfair elections, blow on democracy.”

The 367 ruling: what happened in 2007?

According to Article No 102 of the Turkish Constitution at the time, the president could be elected with a maximum of four parliamentary rounds of voting. The decisional quorum was a qualified majority of two-thirds (367 votes) of full membership for the first two rounds, and an absolute majority (267 votes) for the third and fourth rounds. In an interview he gave to Cumhuriyet newspaper on 26 December, 2006, former Supreme Court of Appeal prosecutor Sabih Kanadoglu argued that the qualified majority of 367 votes was not only the decisional quorum but was also the necessary quorum for the opening of the session, claiming that the decision would be invalid unless at least 367 parliament members attend the voting. Following him, then Chief of General Staff Yasar Buyukanit said that he hoped the next president would be faithful to the republic not only in words but in deeds.

While Kemalism rallies were organized all over the country and the media covered a slew of threat messages that instilled fear, then Prime Minister Erdogan decided not to run for president. In other words, the leader of the party that enjoys the largest popular support in Turkey could not run for president in this atmosphere of pressure and nominated Abdullah Gul instead. The first round of the elections was held on 27 April, 2007. There were two parties in the parliament at the time. The CHP did not attend the session, 357 votes were cast, and Gul received 352. Following the voting, in spite of the explicit constitutional article that is comprehensible for any literate person, the CHP appealed to the Constitutional Court for the objection of the election with the 367-ruling argument. In the evening of the same day, a press release that would later be referred as “e-memorandum” was published on the official website of the General Staff, which stated that Gul’s candidacy was not wished. With its decision issued on May 1, the Constitutional Court ruled the presence of at least 367 parliament members in the Plenary Session, and cancelled the first round of the parliamentary voting. So, the relevant constitutional article, despite its explicitness, was violated by the Constitutional Court due to the pressure of the military and the appeal of the CHP.

Upon that, the AK Party decided for an early election and 27 June, 2007, was determined as the election date. The ruling party won the election by receiving 47 percent of the vote. But although it was de-facto against the constitution, there was a scandalous condition that ruled: “367 parliament members must attend the session.” The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) entered the Parliament by exceeding the election threshold in the early election. The crisis was eventually solved when MHP leader Devlet Bahceli said: “The AK Party can nominate whomever it wishes. As we have entered the Parliament, the 367 obstacle will be overcome.” Receiving 341 votes in the first round and 337 votes in the second round, Abdullah Gul was elected as the 11th president of Turkey by receiving 339 votes in the third round of the parliamentary voting, which was attended by 448 parliamentarians.

Of course, there is no similarity between the “367 ruling” and “the decision of rerunning the elections upon the objection appeals of a political party on the grounds of irregularities.” What really matters is the motivation of the CHP leader Kilicdaroglu, who once signed that scandalous appeal. Enjoying the support of the military and the judiciary at the time, the CHP organized secularism rallies, threatened people and made the election cancelled by appealing to the Constitutional Court despite its 19.2 percent vote share. The discrepancy between the two cases is evident but Kilicdaroglu insists on ignoring this. There is one more sentence in Gul’s tweet: “We haven’t made any progress since then.” Of course, Gul uttered this remark by targeting the AK Party, with which he parted ways a long time ago, but his words allowed the CHP an opportunity to give an account of a past deed. While even the former president from the AK Party, whose presidency was once hampered through illegitimate ways, is siding with the CHP now (the party even offered him presidential candidacy for the 2018 elections), the CHP must issue an explanation at least for the 367 ruling even if they cannot explain or justify what they have done against democracy throughout the Republican history. Then we may make progress.

Since its foundation, the AK Party has rightfully been designated as a ‘political party of public service’ as the AK Party’s leadership has always focused its political energy on Turkey’s public administration deficit. During the first decade of its political power, a steady economic growth had been accompanied with various ameliorations primarily in the fields of transportation and health. From the problem of overcrowded classrooms in education to the revolutionary changes for the benefit of disabled citizens, the AK Party’s politics of public service has achieved significant success in various fields of social life.

Thanks to its organizational and communicational capabilities, which were directly inherited from the Welfare Party, the AK Party has been in political power for 17 years. As Recep Tayyip Erdogan has successfully been taking the leading role, the rest of the AK Party’s cadres seems to be successful as well. However, the AK Party’s reliance on Erdogan’s leadership for winning general and local elections has concluded with the weakening of the AK Party’s organizational structure and the linkage between the electors and the political party.

The AK Party’s reliance on Erdogan’s leadership for winning elections has concluded with the weakening of the AK Party’s organizational structure.

Learning the need to remain close to the people from the AK Party’s political success, Ekrem Imamoglu draws himself away from the hate discourse of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and instead adopts a much more moderate political discourse that mainly relies on projects and services. Nonetheless, people will not find Imamoglu’s political discourse credible and convincing until the CHP itself abandons its discriminatory and exclusionist political discourse.

Although Imamoglu’s political promises influences Turkey’s young voters, mature voters hesitate about the CHP’s sincerity due to its negative political record. Being highly discontented about its political history, Turkish electors cannot easily be convinced to vote for the CHP even though they personally feel sympathy for its municipal candidate. Highly valuing the AK Party’s policies and public services, Turkish electors are inclined to vote for the ruling AK Party if only the linkage between the candidate and the electors could have been restored.

Populism or public service?

In the recent years, populism has become one of the most controversial and frequently-used concepts of politics. Amongst the leftist political parties, Bulent Ecevit was the most populist political leader. Holding up Ecevit as an example, Muharrem Ince appealed to populist political discourses both in his struggle for the CHP’s chairmanship and Turkey’s presidency. As soon as his candidacy for Turkey’s presidency was announced, Ince had adopted a populist language to convey his political message to large masses of people. Yet, his politics backfired due to the insincerity of his attitudes and expressions.

People still hesitate to vote for Imamoglu as the CHP never adopts a service-based political vision and neglects political sensitivities of the people in forming its alliances.

With reference to his inclusive and reconciliatory discourses, Imamoglu adopts a populist political attitude as well. As opposed to the CHP’s exclusionist political discourse, Imamoglu’s electoral campaign aimed at appealing to large masses of people, including the AK Party’s voters. In the printed bulletins, Ekrem Imamoglu has even adopted a cunning electoral strategy by emphasizing his surname ‘Imamoglu.’ In other words, he appears to imitate the AK Party’s political discourses which has always been criticized by the CHP for abusing the religious feelings of Turkey’s electorate. Nonetheless, people still hesitate to vote for Imamoglu, as the CHP never adopts a service-based political vision and always neglects political sensitivities of the people in forming its alliances with other political parties.

In contrast, the AK Party has succeeded to strengthen its political discourses by changing the sociology of Turkey’s electorate and creating a new class of electors, and taking the resolution of Istanbul’s urban problems (such as urban poverty, lack of infrastructure, population density) into the center of its political agenda. Yet, as the AK Party won both general and local elections thanks mainly to Erdogan’s strong leadership. The linkage between the people and the AK Party has weakened. As Turkey’s economic problems exacerbate, Turkish electors have begun to adopt a new electoral attitude that is separated from political ideologies and allegiances.

As Turkey’s economic problems exacerbate, Turkish electors have begun to adopt a new electoral attitude that is partly different from political commitments.

In such a political and economic milieu, Imamoglu strives to gain the support of Turkey’s public opinion by adopting a moderate and inclusive political discourse. Imitating Binali Yildirim’s moderate political stance and the AK Party’s public service-based political vision, the CHP aims at gaining the votes of those electors who are less political and who could have voted for different political parties. Nonetheless, the CHP’s political sincerity is still open to dispute.

Consequently, winning Istanbul’s municipal elections is almost equal to winning Turkey’s elections. Therefore, political discourses pertaining to Istanbul’s governance that are developed by the competing candidates for the local elections of June 23 will certainly shape Turkey’s political future.

After a controversial and long-lasting process, Turkey’s Supreme Electoral Board (YSK) cancelled the Istanbul mayoral election on May 6. As can be understood from YSK’s brief explanation, it cancelled the mayoral election since some polling stations were not appointed from among public officials. According to Turkish law, this situation is the reason for cancellation of the elections.

YSK is the supreme institution regulating elections in Turkey and its decisions cannot be appealed. When one examines the history of Turkey’s democracy, it can be clearly seen that YSK has played a crucial role in this process. The main reason behind YSK’s crucial role, in comparison with many political and social institutions, is that it was established according to Turkey’s own dynamics. YSK is an institution established in the period of 1946-1950, in the transition to a multi-party democracy. The most important feature of YSK is not only the control of elections, but the regulating of elections has been left to the judges. That’s why, the elections in Turkey, since 1950, have been regularly carried out although there have been a few exceptions.

YSK is an institution established in the period of 1946-1950, in the transition to a multi-party democracy.

As a legal judgment, the YSK’s decision will naturally be subject of discussion. Many lawyers and politicians expressed their positive or negative opinions about the decision. While the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and National Movement Party (MHP) have welcomed this decision, the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) and Iyi Party strongly criticized it. CHP Chairman Kemal Kilicdaroglu described YSK members who voted for an election re-run as “gang members.” Before the announcement of YSK’s decision, Engin Altay, who is CHP’s group deputy chairman, almost threatened YSK members. The words of Altay, ‘You cannot walk in Kizilay,’ were much debated. Kilicdaroglu also targeted 7 YSK members by announcing their names one-by-one during the party caucus. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Devlet Bahceli, have criticized Kilicdaroglu’s explanation. 

CHP Chairman Kemal Kilicdaroglu described YSK members who voted for an election re-run as “gang members” and announced their names one-by-one during the party caucus. 

Kilicdaroglu’s criticism is at a point that could damage the corporate identity of YSK. As Imamoglu, who is the CHP candidate in Istanbul, declared again and again on the 31 March election night, YSK is one of Turkey’s most respected institutions. In comparison with CHP’s previous allegations, YSK has duly performed its duties in local and general elections. In the 2014 local elections, YSK also cancelled the Yalova election because of CHP’s appeal, which later followed with a CHP victory. On the other hand, YSK not only cancelled the elections in Istanbul, but also gave the CHP mayors its mandates in places such as Ankara and Antalya.

The rerun election will be held on 23 June, 2019 in accordance with YSK’s decision. According to many polls and political analysts the main reason why Imamoglu won the Istanbul mayoral election is that he and CHP officials conducted a moderate campaign. But immediately after 31 March the attitudes of Imamoglu and CHP significantly changed and instead of this moderate position, Imamoglu maintained a more aggressive and impatient attitude. One example of such aggressive attitude can be observed in his reaction to the decision, which he described as a ‘treacherous decision.’ While he frequently declared his confidence in the YSK on the 31 March election night, after the YSK announced to rerun elections, he began to sharply criticize the institution. All explanations show us that the moderate style of Imamoglu is not based on a realistic foundation.

After 31 March, the moderate attitudes of Imamoglu and CHP have significantly changed and Imamoglu maintained a more aggressive and impatient behaviour.

All sides of political terrain must respect the YSK’s decision. The process of appeal is part of Turkey’s democratic culture and means of appeal are frequently used by the main opposition party, CHP. YSK’s decision on the mayoral election can be discussed in terms of both a legal and political dimension. However, there is a crucial point in this context; the objection and criticism to YSK’s decision should not reach to the dimensions that would harm the corporate identity the institution. Also, the targeting of YSK member by singing their names one-by-one may constitute a criminal offense. There must be a difference between criticizing a judiciary institution on the one hand and criticizing its decision on the other, let alone criticizing a political party for which the CHP always chose a harsh one. Specifically, it would be serious harm to the YSK to describe its members as ‘gang members.’ Instead of this accusation, all parties should respect the decision and design their electoral campaign and programs.

After a long-lasting controversial legal process, Turkey’s Supreme Electoral Board (YSK) finally announced its decision on the Istanbul elections. According to the YSK’s final order, the March 31 mayoral elections in Istanbul have been cancelled due to presiding officers at ballot stations who had to be civil servants according to the law. The YSK has also found some other misconducted activities. As a result, the mayoral elections in Istanbul will re-run again on June 23, 2019.

At this point, it is crucial to examine the AK Party’s allegations on the Istanbul elections and why these allegations were effective on the final decision. After the March 31 local elections, the first results showed that Ekrem Imamoglu (CHP candidate), had approximately 27,000 more votes than the AK Party’s candidate. After the AK Party requested for a re-count in some districts due to miscalculations affecting the result, invalid votes had been re-counted and the difference between the AK Party’s Binali Yildirim and Ekrem Imamoglu decreased to approximately 13,000.

If the candidates of other political parties withdraw their candidacy in favor of either the AK Party or the CHP, this will be one of the main determinants on the election results.

The second part of the AK Party’s allegations was related to the illegal appointments of presiding officers at ballot stations. The AK Party also claimed that restricted voters, who could not vote in the elections according to the law, had voted in the elections. After the YSK’s preliminary investigation, it was approved that approximately 1000 restricted voters had voted in the election.

It is now certain that voters in Istanbul will re-cast their votes to elect the new mayor of Istanbul on June 23. The previous eighth candidates of political parties will run in these elections. Binali Yildirim for the AK Party, Ekrem Imamoglu for the CHP, Necdet Gokcinar for the Felicity Party, Muammer Aydin for the DSP, Selim Kotil for the BTP, and three other candidates from the DP, the Patriotic Party, and the TKP. These candidates can withdraw their candidacies on two occasions – either death or personal resignation. This means that small parties could force their candidates to resign in favor of another candidate in the upcoming elections.

The voter turnout in Istanbul was 83,88% and 1,704,325 voters did not go to the polls. Even a slightest increase or decrease in these numbers will determine the next mayor of Istanbul.

Another eye-catching issue for the following days is how political parties and candidates will mobilize their voters. Firstly, if the candidates of the Felicity Party, the DSP, the BTP and others withdraw their candidacy in favor of the AK Party or the CHP, this will be one of the main determinants on the election results. Secondly, voter turnout may be another determinant on the election results. During the March 31 local elections, the voter turnout in Istanbul was 83,88%, slightly lower than the average of the country, and 1,704,325 voters did not go to the polls. It is obvious that even a slightest increase or decrease in these numbers will determine the next mayor of Istanbul.

All these determinants show that Istanbul will go to the polls in a closely contested election on June 23. Since the difference between the votes was very low, the parties and candidates will try to broaden their sphere of influence to get the position. Furthermore, small parties and their support for the candidates of the AK Party and/or the CHP will be one of the hot topics of discussion in the election process. In any way, Turkey is about to witness another critical election in the following days.