Turkey’s main opposition party the CHP is experiencing another intra-party conflict. Although the CHP has faced many internal conflicts during the past decade, the latest conflict differs from previous ones and clearly reveals the existence of splinter groups within the party. The press conference of the CHP’s 2018 presidential candidate, Muharrem Ince, revealed that the party is facing a crisis in uniting the splinter groups within the party, and the most recent incident may cause a serious intraparty opposition movement in the upcoming days.

So what happened? Rahmi Turan, a journalist writing for Sözcü newspaper, wrote in his column that one of the candidates planning to run for the CHP’s chairmanship had a meeting with President Erdoğan. According to Turan’s claims, the President promised to help this candidate win the chairmanship of the CHP in the upcoming party congress.  

Although the public did not pay much attention to Turan’s claims in the beginning, the CHP Chairman Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu went on to state that Turan’s claims were indeed true. After Kılıçdaroğlu’s statements, there were some speculation that it may have been referring to Muharrem İnce or Metin Feyzioğlu, the Head of the Union of Turkish Bar Associations. At this point, Turan made another statement claiming that it was Muharrem İnce who met with President Erdoğan.

It did not take much time to discover that there was in fact no meeting held between President Erdoğan and Muharrem Ince, and that they were groundless claims. Thus, the question arises: what were the reasons for making these unfounded allegations? And why didn’t Kılıçdaroğlu reject the claims in the first instance?

It is certain that this latest incident is related to the ongoing conflict between two splinter groups within the party. The Kemalists/nationalists and the leftists. The party has been experiencing a struggle between both groups over the last decade. While Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the Chairman, and his team active in the party administration are drawn from the leftist circle within the party, Muharrem Ince and his followers represent the Kemalist/nationalist bloc. Both groups are struggling over the party’s administration.

The struggle between the two groups is clearly seen during the party’s congresses. There have been four extraordinary and three ordinary congresses in the last decade under the chairmanship of Kılıçdaroğlu. In each congress, the Kemalist/nationalist circle within the party have tried to win the party administration. Ince himself ran against Kılıçdaroğlu two times, in 2014 and 2018, and lost both elections.

Nevertheless, the June 24 presidential elections empowered the position of Muharrem Ince within the party. Since Ince received  31% of the votes as a presidential candidate of the CHP against Erdoğan, while the CHP only recieved 22 % of the votes in the parliamentary elections. Ince later started another intraparty opposition movement after the elections. However, he suspended his initiative because of the local elections.

It is obvious that Muharrem Ince is the only threat against Kılıçdaroğlu’s chairmanship and the leftist circle’s hegemony within the CHP. Ince clearly underlined this conflict between the two groups during his press conference. Because of this,, this latest incident was an effort to discredit Ince’s position before the upcoming congress, and to prevent the rise of an intraparty opposition movement against Kılıçdaroğlu. Nevertheless, it seems that the initiative of the leftist bloc has already failed and the conflict between the two groups will continue until the congress.

In the past couple of days, Turkey’s political agenda has mainly been shaped by the upcoming local elections scheduled for March 2019. Understanding the importance of the local elections from a foreign point of view might be difficult if one disregards some crucial points. Although there is still over four months until election day, it won’t be wrong to focus on the main dynamics of the upcoming elections in Turkey.

The local elections planned to be held on 31 March, 2019, will be the first elections subsequent to the final establishment of the Turkish presidential system on 24 June, 2018. The previous local elections in all 81 provinces of Turkey were held in March 2014 when besides the mayors of the Turkish provinces, all other leading local offices had been elected as well. Furthermore, the 2014 local elections symbolized a key importance due to the prior judicial coup attempts by FETO members, who infiltrated the Turkish judiciary for over years.

Despite several moves and FETO-related – or manipulated – media supported campaigns, Turkish citizens did not accept a tutelage-like scenario by FETO and thus the ruling AK Party, led by then Prime Minister Erdogan, won the local elections without any heavy losses. Actually, this day could be thought of the acceleration day of the end of FETO, which even in this subsequent process tried to execute a bloody coup on 15 July, 2016, which also failed due to the people’s will that prevented the putschists.

After re-joining the party, President Erdogan, who was once the Mayor of Istanbul, pushed for reform within the local cadres of the AK Party. 

In regards to the 31 March, 2019, local elections, there are some important points that have been taken into account by both the AK Party and the MHP. As one remembers, both parties had created an alliance during the 24 June presidential and parliamentary elections, which symbolized Turkey’s ultimate switch to a new system of government. Interestingly, despite some disagreements in the afterward concerning some certain policy issues, it became clear last week that both parties will once again cooperate during the local elections – this time in a limited range but still covering Turkey’s three provinces with the highest population. Thus, this time the alliance will focus on certain cities such as Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. It has to be stressed that approximately 25 million of Turkey’s total – 81 million – population, live in these three cities.

Following this path, during his speech on Saturday, MHP leader Devlet Bahceli stated, “No matter who the Justice and Development Party nominates in the three biggest provinces, we will provide full support. There has been no bargain, collusion or give-and-take in making our decision.” Bahceli also added by addressing the continuing importance of the presidential system while stating “Whoever aims to destroy the presidential system will find us standing against them. This is about the People’s Alliance, the presidential system and the composition of local administrations in line with that.”

Highlighting his support for an alliance during the local elections in Turkey next year, MHP chair Devlet Bahceli stated, “Whoever aims to destroy the presidential system will find us standing against them. This is about the People’s Alliance, the presidential system and the composition of local administrations in line with that.”

On the other hand, the AK Party, actually began the renewal of its local cadres in 2017 when President Erdogan was able to re-join the party after the constitutional ban. On the day he was able to join the party, President Erdogan stated, “We will update all of our provincial, district and town organizations by the end of the year (2017) because there is a fatigue. We have to overcome this. With more dynamic teams, we have to prepare for 2019 [elections].”

It was no surprise that once again Erdogan himself, who was the mayor of Istanbul between 1994-1998, had realized the urgent need for certain reforms within the AK Party with regard to the upcoming local elections.

By elaborating on the motivation of the opposition parties regarding the local elections, one should particularly keep in mind that the main opposition party, the CHP, is once again seeking some rationality absent alliances, as it had tried during the 24 June elections by bringing together all opposition parties under the same umbrella. By this, the CHP, aims to come together with the conservative Saadet Party, secular-nationalist Iyi Party and is trying to find other ways to cooperate with the Kurdish nationalist HDP. But whether these ambivalent moves will find a reflection and positive reaction among the CHP constituent is another question. The main point all opposition parties share is the rejection of the newly established presidential system. If the opposition parties gain any success in major cities such as Istanbul or Ankara, they will most probably trigger a questioning of the legitimacy of the presidential system.

The CHP is trying to come together with the conservative Saadet Party, secular-nationalist Iyi Party and is trying to find other ways to cooperate with the Kurdish nationalist HDP.

In addition, and interestingly, Kemal Kilicdaroglu – the CHP chair – who has lost 9 elections since he became the party’s leader in 2010, still insists on keeping his position and has ignored harsh calls made by close party circles for him to step down by actively preventing party conventions. Moreover, the party’s presidential candidate during the June 24 elections and potential new chairperson of the CHP, Muharrem Ince, is testing for new opportunities in order to achieve his main purpose to become the successor of Kilicdaroglu. For this, he currently seems to have a new short-term strategy, namely, becoming the CHP’s candidate in Istanbul. Whether this will happen and what Kilicdaroglu is planning will become clearer in the upcoming weeks.

Kemal Kilicdaroglu – the CHP chair – who has lost 9 elections since he became the party’s leader in 2010, still insists on keeping his position and has ignored harsh calls made by close party circles for him to step down by actively preventing party conventions.

All in all, it can be guessed that the campaigns regarding the local elections will be held in a rather general elections atmosphere as has been the case in previous local elections in Turkey.

Although two months have passed since Turkey’s June 24 elections, the main opposition parties are still struggling with intra-party conflicts. Despite all efforts to consolidate leadership before the upcoming local elections, the latest situation reflects that these conflicts will continue to escalate and de-escalate for quite a while. The latest developments in the CHP reflect the fact that the party administration refuses to face reality, which makes it impossible for the party to keep their votes together in the upcoming elections. So, the CHP administration may face a sharper opposition after March 2019.

Last week, the ongoing crisis within the CHP re-surfaced again. The party’s assembly convened in order to evaluate the outcomes of the presidential elections. Surprisingly, the presidential candidate of the party, Muharrem Ince, was not invited to this meeting. In other words, the party discussed reasons behind the failure in the presidential elections without inviting its presidential candidate – the person who, is most likely, to know the reasons behind this failure better than other participants.

Indeed, the agenda of the meeting was shifted to the possible outcomes of the ongoing intra-party opposition and their reflections on the local elections. Kemal Kilicdaroglu – leader of the party – explained the background of their discussions with Ince after the elections. He admitted that he accepted to hand over the chairmanship of the party to Ince after the party’s failure in the parliamentary elections. Nonetheless, he claimed that Ince’s attitude after the elections did not give him any confidence and that he was worried about the possible dissolution of the party within a week had he quitted.

Kilicdaroglu’s statements are in fact contradictory and far from the reality when we look at the background of the latest division within the party. Firstly, Kilicdaroglu did not explain which attitudes of Ince changed his decision to quit the chairmanship. It seems that these attitudes were not only related to Ince’s statements to reporters about a private conversation between the two. If Kilicdaroglu wants to convince supporters of the CHP about his position against Ince, he needs to put more effort in doing so.

Another contradiction with what Kilicdaroglu has been saying is about his stance against leadership change in the party. In his statements at the Party Assembly, Kilicdaroglu accepted his role in the failure of the party during the elections. Even though he accepted to quit the chairmanship, he changed his mind after Ince’s attitudes in the post-election period. However, Kilicdaroglu does not regard leadership change as a necessity to the party’s success. If Kilicdaroglu was really ready for a leadership change, there would be no trouble in finding a suitable candidate. This situation reflects that the issue of leadership change is a win-lose game for Kilicdaroglu against his rival Ince. If it was to be a principal issue, he would meet the requirements of the situation.

Despite his failure in fighting for party chairmanship, Ince is still active in bringing the opposition within the party together. After the meeting of the Party Assembly, Ince refused accusations made by Kilicdaroglu and accused him of lying to the public in order to protect his seat. In addition to Ince, the meeting also cause disappointment among party supporters. A majority of party supporters even announced that they will not go to the polls in the upcoming elections if Kilicdaroglu continues to blame the critical voices  harshly and accuse them of intentionally supporting the AK Party.

The latest meeting of the CHP drove a bigger wedge between the CHP leadership and the party’s supporters. If the party cannot find a cure to heal this relationship, it may face a larger intra-party split in the following days.

An analysis on Turkish elections was published in Foreign Policy, entitled “Turkey’s Opposition Lost to Erdogan, Then It Lost Its Mind.” The article reads: “Since June 24, when Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan celebrated his thirteenth consecutive electoral victory, his opponents have been in a headfirst free fall. Their sad state captures the fundamental problem of Turkish politics: The opposition is out of ideas and lacking in inspiration and its leaders care more about keeping their seats than keeping their country afloat.”

It is an entirely different discussion as to whether the opposition had a mind to lose, but it is obvious that their current situation is saddening. Ever since Kemal Kilicdaroglu became the chairman of the main opposition, Republican People’s Party (CHP), on May 23, 2010, he changed the Central Executive Board of the party nine times, organized five conventions, renewed the party assembly numerous times, and assigned a total of 300 new names throughout this period. But all these changes did not save Kilicdaroglu from facing nine election defeats within eight years. And this time, the party did not only lose the election but also took a heavy blow despite the CHP’s presidential candidate Muharrem Ince earning eight points higher than the vote share of his party in the presidential elections.

I assume that they are referring to these factors when they say that the opposition is out of its mind. On the night of the elections, the party’s deputy chairmen argued on televised programs that the presidential election would definitely make it to the second round according to the results they obtained. When Ince could not be reached for a long period after the results were announced, it was claimed that Ince was abducted by Erdogan, and most of the electorate believed this absurd claim. Ince said: “I was not abducted. Those claiming or believing such a thing must be schizophrenic.” A week later, the deputy chairmen of the party had to admit that they lied during the election night and were in fact already informed about the results after some party members exposed what happened that night.

However, it is true that Ince’s vote share in the presidential election was eight points higher than the CHP’s vote share in the parliamentary election, which naturally led Ince proponents to demand a change in the leadership and call for an extraordinary convention in the party. Kilicdaroglu blamed Ince by arguing that the latter only cares about his seat, to which Ince responded: “I do not care about my seat, but organizing a convention is essential.” Upon that, the party’s head office suggested holding the convention if 615 signatures could be gathered amongst the delegates. For a couple of weeks, several deputy chairmen of the CHP and Ince quarreled through Twitter. Kilicdaroglu proponents blamed Ince for being “rude and shallow” and being a “denigrator,” to which Ince responded: “If I am to get elected, I will be your chairman, too. I understand that you are under pressure.”

Two weeks later, Ince proponents announced that they gathered the required number of signatures to organize the convention. However, the head office stated that “Out of 618 signatures, four are duplicated, five do not belong to a delegate, 31 are revoked, 4 are forged, and 5 are not signed in the relevant date. Consequently, the sufficient number of signatures could not be collected and thus the convention will not be organized.” When the revoked signatures triggered speculations that Kilicdaroglu exercised pressure on the delegates, the head office said: “They revoked their signatures just as they signed, which is very natural.” After this statement, eight Ince proponents went on a hunger strike. They waited with placards reading “I love living and keeping everything alive. But I am hopeless. Either I die, or I will see the convention. The choice is yours.” But they ended the strike when the head office did not give any response.

Sad, isn’t it? The CHP and its leader Kilicdaroglu, who faced nine election defeats, did everything to hinder Ince’s competing in the convention although they had presented Ince as the presidential candidate only two months ago. Amid all the debates, Kilicdaroglu contented himself with changing the Central Executive Board for the tenth time.

Meanwhile, the oppositional Good Party (Iyi Party) Chairwoman Meral Aksener left the first party meeting after receiving a 7.29 percent vote share despite all the hype revolving around her in both the national and international media. On the next day, she announced that she had left her seat and would not become a candidate in the party convention. But she returned only a week later. The party members did not know that Aksener would leave, and they did not know whether she would run for chairperson when she returned, and now they are not sure if she will stay even if she becomes the chairwoman. According to rumors, Koray Aydin, one of the leading figures of the Iyi Party, will join the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) while several other members are said to join the CHP or the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party). According to another rumor, Aydin will not join the MHP but become the chairman of the Iyi Party while the other party members will either remain independent or join other parties.

This is the current state of the parties and their leaders who vowed to make a change and govern Turkey only two months ago.

The ongoing leadership crisis within CHP reached a deadlock after recent developments. Muharrem Ince, CHP’s candidate in the latest presidential elections, started to collect signatures from the delegates to conduct an extraordinary congress to run for the party’s chairmanship.  As a result of strenuous efforts, Ince and his team announced that they gathered 630 signatures and fulfilled the required threshold. In retaliation, current leadership of CHP made an official announcement and claimed that the number of submitted signatures were not enough to call for an extraordinary congress. All of these developments triggered an enormous crisis within the CHP and divided the party into factions.

It is obvious that the future of the party will be shaped in line with the positions and interactions among these factions. The biggest opposition faction in the party consists of those in favor of Muharrem Ince taking lead. Even if Ince’s supporters were passivized in the party by Kilicdaroglu during the election campaign, they became successful in convincing delegates to sign for the extraordinary congress. Whether they reach a certain number of signatures to conduct the congress or not, the results indicate that they have convinced almost half of the delegates. It is no longer possible to ignore these delegates demanding change in the party’s chairmanship. If CHP’s existing leading cadre chooses to ignore these demands, it can create an even bigger schism in the party structure soon. Moreover, if this group builds an influence over other dissatisfied delegates in the party-a small but effective group organized around Selin Sayek Boke and Ilhan Cihaner-, they may have a chance to recall a congress in the future.

Another possible strategy of this faction is applying to court to solve the signature crisis. Even if this strategy requires time and energy to succeed eventually, some prominent figures in the party have already supported applying to court. Nonetheless, the leader of this group, Muharrem Ince, announced that he did not prefer to apply to court because he wanted to protect the honor of the party. Thus, Ince and his group seem to prefer alternative methods in their continuing struggle.

One of the alternative methods discussed at this point is the splitting of CHP into two parties. Some supporters of Ince want him to establish another party as an alternative to CHP. These supporters defend the idea that it is not possible for CHP to seize power because of the settled perceptions about it. This group believes that if Ince founds a new party, he may have a chance to run for power. Nonetheless, it seems that Ince and his supporters will persist in their struggle within the party until the last minute.

Beyond all these factors, the most powerful group in the party is Kilicdaroglu’s supporters who are loyal to his chairmanship. It is a well-known fact that after coming to the chairmanship, Kilicdaroglu created his own team both among the leading cadre and the party delegates. Whether he is successful or not, this group loyally supports his leadership without any reservations. In other words, even if CHP’s votes showed a very significant drop in the latest elections, this group would remain supporting him without hesitation. Thus, it seems unlikely to see a change in the party’s chairmanship in the short term.

Regardless of whether he will ultimately be successful or not, Ince’s stance in the party will affect the party’s position in the upcoming term. If this crisis remains unresolved until the local elections, CHP would most probably continue losing votes. Will the factions within CHP come up with different strategies in the following days? Well, this is the matter of curiosity nowadays.

Since the elections held in Turkey on June 24, Turkey’s “social democrats” have been – once again – facing internal chronic problems. It was merely just a matter of time and how a new power struggle within Turkey’s main opposition and oldest political party – the Republican People’s Party (CHP) – would occur again.

Previously, my elaboration was that Muharrem Ince’s nomination as the party’s presidential candidate was only a strategic maneuver by the party leadership and Chairman Kemal Kilicdaroglu himself in order to exclude Ince in the long run from the party’s future. It was clear that Kilicdaroglu knew that neither his party nor the party’s alliance was going to achieve a majority in parliament. He was also aware that his party’s candidate was not going to win the presidential race. Indeed, Ince lost in the first round.

Nevertheless, Ince subsequently described himself as successful by comparing his 51-day performance with the performance of the CHP. Kilicdaroglu refuted these claims indirectly, while not addressing his party’s overall disastrous election results. In this sense, the current CHP chairman, who lost nine elections in eight years, still insists on keeping the party’s chairmanship, while accusing Ince without directly calling out his name.

Kilicdaroglu also slammed his party fellows ironically for “selfish interests,” stressing his criticism with the words, “some people eye for upper positions, which is unacceptable.” Furthermore, the demand for an extraordinary party congress by the so-called supporters of Ince has ultimately revealed the already known competition between Kilicdaroglu and Ince. Although supporters of Kilicdaroglu reject a congress by arguing that the party should focus on the upcoming local elections in 2019, others – and particularly CHP sympathizers on social media – are calling for “change.” Within these circumstances, party officials have been carrying an inner-party struggle for over two weeks.

But what’s the main problem in Turkey’s main opposition party, which used to be called a “social democratic” political party? If one focuses on the party’s membership and electoral profiles, one notices the striking fact that in contrast to its “social democrat” label, CHP voters prefer attributions and descriptions such as so-called Ataturk-focused ultra-nationalism and a historically well-known aggressive secularism (perhaps similar to the French laïcité). But, do these two components count as enough to describe the party as social democratic in a modern and contemporary sense?

Most of the CHP electorate do not have any problem with being described as “left-nationalist secularists.” However, in the sense of a universal understanding of social democracy, this kind of definition may not be well-fitting. In addition, when focusing on the country’s voter dynamics, it seems that elitist circles and capital owners in particular prefer the CHP as a harbor of political identity, and not as an instrument to pursue social democratic objectives – as it is usual in an average democratic country. With regard to its policies concerning, for instance, refugees, the CHP unfortunately resembles European far-right parties, aiming to forcefully send refugees back to their war-torn countries.

It seems that one of the main problems within the CHP and in particular some other Turkish parties, which insist on being an identity party, is the fact that regardless of losing elections, their party chairperson does not leave office. If one compares this phenomenon with, for instance, the German social-democrat chairpersons in the last 13 years, one notices that following losses in the general election, most of the leaders resigned. Just recently former SPD leader resigned due to his lack of success in the 2017 elections. This happened despite his “success” to form a subsequent coalition government with the Christian Democrats. The party decided that he ought to step down, which may not be imaginable for Turkey’s CHP – even though the Turkish social democrats permanently point to German or Western democratic standards. In such cases though, the practices of global social democrats are dis-regarded.

“Even if Ismet Inonu or Bulent Ecevit were to lead the party today, its votes would not exceed 35 percent”

In regards to the CHP, the main problem is not solely the person who leads the party. As one pro-CHP surveyor once stated>; “even if Ismet Inonu or Bulent Ecevit were to lead the party today, its votes would not exceed 35 percent.” This may be true due to the party’s historical and political “baggage.” Thus, what can be done to solve this chronic perception? If the CHP wants to overcome its permanent crisis, a comprehensive self-criticism regarding the party’s past, its existential meaning and its future goals seem indispensable. However, transforming the Kemalist and left-nationalist CHP into a modern social-democratic political party seems very difficult. This is because denying the party’s anti-democratic past is perceived as unacceptable for most CHP sympathizers. Though, Turkey’s societal dynamics and the majority of political preferences of the country’s voters regularly point out this fact.

Thus, perhaps a better option could be dissolving the party, as Atilla Yayla, professor for political science, proposed in 2013:

“The CHP does not allow, for instance, being democratic such as the German social democrats. Neither does it allow the transformation into a democratic social democratic party, nor does it give the opportunity to other movements to create a strong left-democrat party. Regarding such a party, there is no meaningful and legitimate place in a democracy. The CHP has to be closed down. I do not imply that the Constitutional Court should ban the CHP but the CHP should dissolve itself. The CHP should either transform itself into a foundation or a museum concerning the “single-party-regime.” Then, the void left from the CHP should be filled by real democratic social democrats who start a strong political movement.” (Atilla Yayla, August 1, 2013)

Last week, sentimentalist remarks and tweets of some politicians from the U.S. and Turkey pervaded the agenda for some reason. Maybe it was the summer heat. I am mentioning the U.S. President Donald Trump, Turkish politician Meral Aksener who assumed that she would be the President of Turkey up until the June 24 elections, and Muharrem Ince, who believes that he will be the chairman of Turkey’s main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP).

According to the sources close to Washington, the tweet posted by Trump in address to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was an emotional reaction as Trump wanted normalization with Turkey as opposed to the Neo-evangelists who favor taking harsh measures. It was said that the U.S. President had a great disappointment and posted that tweet when pastor Andrew Brunson was put under house arrest in Turkey and that Secretary of State Mike Pompeo was also surprised by the tweet. In his tweet addressing Erdoğan for the release of Brunson, who is subject to trial in Turkey on the allegations of military and political espionage and abetting a terror group, Trump said: “The United States will impose large sanctions on Turkey for their long time detainment of Pastor Andrew Brunson, a great Christian, family man and wonderful human being.”

But the expressions in the tweet are utterly emotional, and can even be called romantic. A person who is tried for the allegations of espionage and abetting terrorism may also be “a great Christian, family man.” It is only natural that his family need him, well, a family is such a thing. Apparently, what seems totally normal for the U.S. President can be terribly wrong for Turkey as the U.S. insists that the Gulenist Terror Group (FETO) leader Fetullah Gulen, who orchestrated the 2016 coup attempt in Turkey, did not do anything wrong. Gulen and his operatives can freely live in the U.S. without being subject to any criminal investigation. Given the present conjuncture of the world, almost the entire world will soon regard what the U.S. considers right as wrong, except for Israel. But this is not the topic of this article.

Sources from Washington stated that the U.S. President threatened North Korea Leader Kim Jong-un with a tweet after the latter announced that he will not halt the country’s nuclear missile programs, but they reconciled six months later. It seems that such sentimentalism can be seen in politicians of each scale. It has also affected the İyi Party Chair Meral Aksener, who received 7.26 percent of the vote in the presidential and parliamentary elections held in Turkey. In a party meeting in which the reasons for their defeat were discussed, Aksener allegedly said that she genuinely believed that she would make it to the second round in the presidential race.

Apparently, she made herself believe that she would be the next president of Turkey in a blindfolded way and also convinced those around her. But as the meeting continued, a party member allegedly told her that she left them in the lurch, saying in a tweet that “You have not only lost the election, Madam. You have lost people’s belief in you,” in response to which Aksener was incensed and left the room. She said to her staff: “Everyone in our culture knows who is called madam. Brothel mistresses are called madams. You left me alone, you did not bring that disrespectful person to line.”

The next day, Aksener posted a tweet saying that her party will convene, and that she will not run for the chairmanship of the party. Upon this, the party’s supporters incessantly asked her to turn back via twitter. Speaking to no one throughout the process, Aksener gave a responding tweet two days later: “I will not become a candidate in the convention, this is my final decision.” Then, the partisans tweeted that Aksener would like to draw interest so the proponents must not lose their interest in the subject. Everyone can get a bit sentimental sometimes. In the Iyi Party’s case, two people chained themselves to the entrance of Aksener’s house while a group of provincial party chairs attempted to stand on a vigil in front of her house. This emotional overload continued and culminated on Saturday last week: Upon the party’s call, the partisans coming from all across Turkey gathered in front of Aksener’s house, crying “face us” by altering the party slogan “face the sun.”

Meanwhile, the main opposition CHP and its presidential candidate Muharrem Ince have also been undergoing some emotional crises. It seems that Ince did not believe that he could be the next president of Turkey unlike Aksener but he apparently believed that he would be the chairman of the CHP while running for the presidency. As his vote share in the presidential election was 8 points higher than the vote share of the CHP in the parliamentary election, he has been posting emotionally charged tweets addressing his party’s base and Turkey for the last couple of weeks. While he is tweeting things such as: “The ones glued to their seats go all lengths to stay there,” to satirize the CHP Chairman Kemal Kilicdaroglu, he is also writing messages implying that he wants to see the support of Turkish people to compete against President Erdogan.

As the ballot boxes were closed at 5.00 p.m. in the June 24 presidential and parliamentary elections, everyone started waiting for the results impatiently. The elections marked a turning point in Turkey’s history since the new governance system was to be introduced after that. So, the voter turnout was around 87.5 percent. As from 6.30 p.m., early results of the counting started to be announced on television channels. Only a few hours later, it became certain that Recep Tayyip Erdogan would win the presidential race by a landslide and thus there would not be any need for a second tour of the presidential elections. But the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) administrators argued against this.

The pro-CHP broadcaster Halk TV only released the number of the opened ballot boxes and ignored the overall results for hours as opposed to other broadcasters. At 8.00 p.m., the CHP Election Monitoring and Coordination Committee members Bulent Tezcan, Tuncay Ozkan, Muharrem Erkek and Onursal Adiguzel organized a press meeting at the party’s head office. During the press conference, the CHP Deputy Chairman Tezcan said: “Muharrem Ince’s vote share is around 40 percent while Erdogan’s is 46 percent. Ince will win the election, we will disclose all the rigs.” The other members standing beside Tezcan during his speech did not utter a single word, but only threw strained glances with a crooked smile glued on their faces.

Two hours later, the same team issued another statement. The vote shares were not announced this time: “Some groups began celebrating too soon. We are closely monitoring the results. The figures show that the presidential election will wrap up in the second round.” And one hour later, an array of baseless allegations started to circulate on social media. Firstly, CHP supporters wrote tweets which suggested that Fox TV’s broadcasting was cut off, which were shared and retweeted by thousands of people.

In the midst of these rumors, Fox TV’s live broadcast was ongoing. After a while, a second tweet that would be shared by thousands were tweeted. This tweet claimed that even the Justice and Development Party’s (AK Party) Supreme Electoral Council members resigned in the face of the rigged elections while Erdogan called Ince and threatened him to walk out of the presidential race by telling him that his wife was abducted. Ince did not make any public appearance in the meantime. So, the CHP electorate rushed to the party’s head office and started waiting anxiously.

Then, a new development was announced by Fox TV, which supported Ince throughout the electoral process. Fox TV anchorman Ismail Kucukkaya said that he wrote to Ince on WhatsApp to ask his whereabouts, upon which Ince answered: “The man has won.” By that time, the other broadcasters had already announced Erdogan’s victory, being the latest of his unremitting victories since the first election he ran for in 1994, in which he was elected as Istanbul Mayor. As a result, President Erdogan’s vote share was 52.6 percent while Ince’s was 30.6 percent.

The following day, Muharrem Ince appeared before the press: “First of all, I would like to begin with the false news running on social media. They are all lies. The claims such as the abduction of my wife and a group of colonel’s hostage-taking me are the products of a bunch of schizophrenic minds. But taking them seriously is another problem. There is no such a thing. There are 10 million votes between [me and Erdogan]. We are not evading, we are not being threatened. Erdogan is the winner of the elections.” Ince also congratulated Erdogan, adding that he aimed to double his vote share in the future.

However, Ince’s announcement did not change the situation. Many CHP proponents, who, considering their social media profiles, are most probably university graduates and professionals, started spreading another rumor on twitter: “Ince’s statements have already showed that he is being threatened.”

The CHP Chairman Kemal Kilicdaroglu was also incensed. Apparently, he was furious at Ince, whose vote share in the presidential election was seven points higher than the CHP’s vote share in the parliamentary election. He defended the exact opposite of the bare truth in his statement: “The AK Party is the only losing party in the elections. The party has become a lame duck. Also, a dictator cannot be congratulated.” Kilicdaroglu, who has lost eight elections during his chairmanship, answered the resignation calls as follows: “In our party, we have no place for those who only care about remaining in office.”

A series of confessions began to be made within the party following Ince’s statement. They explained the backdrop of the party deputy chairs’ announcements during the election day. One of the most striking statements were issued by Hakan Bayrakci, the president of pro-CHP surveying company SONAR: “The results were evident in the polls but they would have crucified me had I declared that Erdogan would win.” The latest poll announced by Bayrakci before the elections suggested that the presidential race will wrap up in the second round.

The trauma experienced by the CHP electorate since the election day is surely in the realm of psychiatry. However, an odd picture is revealed considering the reason for the CHP deputy chairs’ announcements, the claims of rig and the following confessions, and some groups call upon people to take to the streets.

The main opposition party CHP faced with the rise of an intraparty opposition after the elections. Indeed, this phenomenon is not new for the CHP. After every failure in parliamentary and presidential elections, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the chairman of the party, was criticized harshly and was put under pressure for resignation. Nonetheless, the party delegates, who were appointed by Kilicdaroglu, re-elected him in each congress despite criticisms. The opposition in CHP got into action again after the June 24 elections with the demand of changing the party leadership.

Despite all the similarities, there is a significant difference between the latest mobilization of the opposition movement and the previous ones. The opposition movement now has a popular candidate for leadership who attracted the masses more than Kilicdaroglu: Muharrem Ince. Even if Ince was defeated by President Erdogan in the presidential elections, he got 30.6 percent of the votes which is approximately 8 percent higher than what the CHP got in parliamentary elections under the leadership of Kilicdaroglu. Some prominent names of the party interpret these results as an indicator of the de facto leadership of Muharrem Ince in the CHP.

Actually, Ince already ran for the chairmanship of the party against Kilicdaroglu twice. His first candidacy for chairmanship was in 2014 but he got only 415 votes against Kilicdaroglu’s 740 votes. The second one, on the other hand, was more recent. Just two months ago from the decision of snap election, Ince once again became a candidate for chairmanship of the party against Kilicdaroglu. During his short-term candidacy process, Ince blamed Kilicdaroglu for threatening delegates who supported him and forcing them to withdraw their signature to support Ince’s candidacy for chairmanship. At the end of the congress, Ince was defeated by Kilicdaroglu again.

While Ince was maintaining his criticisms towards Kilicdaroglu, the decision of snap elections totally changed the direction. Even though Kilicdaroglu worked hard for the joint candidacy of Abdullah Gül, he nominated Ince as the presidential candidate of the CHP at the end of the process. By this way, Kilicdaroglu passivized his main rival in the CHP. Ince’s failure in the elections would mean a decline in his competition against Kilicdaroglu. Additionally, while Ince was conducting his election campaign, Kilicdaroglu dissolved the names close to Ince in the CHP and prepared the candidate list for the parliamentary elections in accordance with this aim.

Nevertheless, Ince gained high popularity among the masses during the campaign process. He obtained sympathy among not only supporters of the CHP, but also the supporters of other parties. In the same period, Kilicdaroglu lost his authority within the party supporters. For instance, the CHP announced that Kilicdaroglu and Ince were going to organize joint meetings in some provinces. However, Ince’s supporters in the party reacted against this decision that they perceived an action damaging Ince’s image among the masses. As a result, these joint meetings were canceled.

After the elections, Ince underlined his success by highlighting his 30.6 percent – a figure the CHP has not reached in 41 years. He also criticized Kilicdaroglu. First, Ince stated that rather than persuading other parties to support the candidacy of Gul, Kilicdaroglu could have announced his nomination for the presidential elections earlier. Secondly, Ince criticized Kilicdaroglu for not congratulating Erdogan and his approach to the results. In this point, Ince stated that Kilicdaroglu should try to find the reasons of the decline in the votes of the party rather than emphasizing the decrease in the voting rates of the AK Party. All these indicators show that Ince may run for the chairmanship of the party again. Whether the support of the delegates will be enough for Kilicdaroglu to keep his chairmanship will be clear soon.

After weeks of intensive campaigning and eager anticipation, Turkey successfully accomplished yet another test of democratic maturity by holding the combined general and presidential elections last Sunday. The fact that these elections constituted a milestone for the paradigmatic transition towards the presidential government system ensured that they were fiercely fought by both the government and the opposition parties with the notable addition of public relation initiatives by the presidential candidates. These were the first general elections that were held in the aftermath of the failed military coup attempt on July 15, 2016, and as such they represented the dawn of democratic normalization and a potential end to the state of emergency that was declared after the coup.

Despite all the hype and misinformation in mainstream international media accusing President Erdogan of authoritarianism and the government for suppressing the political opposition, pretty much all the stakeholders agreed that the elections were held in an open, free and fair environment. The campaign trail was peaceful and turned the whole country into a festival zone via vibrant promotion endeavors by the parties and candidates.

On election day, voter turnout was around 87 per cent which represented one of the highest participation rates in Turkey’s democratic history, comfortably surpassing most of the established democratic polities in the world. Electoral alliances ensured that the ten per cent threshold for entry to the parliament was not applied and almost 99 per cent of the votes cast for political parties were reflected as parliamentary representation.

The incumbent Justice and Development Party (AK Party), the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), the Republican People’s Party (CHP), the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), the Iyi Party, the Democrat Party (DP), the Felicity Party (SP) and the Great Union Party (BBP) will be represented in the forthcoming parliament. The parliament will be one of the most representative and inclusive parliaments in Turkey’s political history. So there is no discussion concerning the procedural validity or democratic legitimacy of the election results.

When it comes to gauging the winners and losers of the elections, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan emerged undoubtedly as the biggest winner with yet another crystal clear victory over his political opponents. He received over 52 per cent of the total votes and was successfully elected in the first round as the first president of Turkey under the new presidential government system. Being the dominant political actor who placed his mark on Turkey’s political, economic and social transformation over the course of the 2000s, Erdogan managed an effective campaign and confirmed once again that he retains the confidence of the Turkish electorate going forward as the most credible leader.

Erdogan has been in power as Prime Minister and President for the last sixteen years without interruption and managed to record thirteen election victories. Despite risks of democratic fatigue and popular reaction to some of the government actions by certain social groups, the personal political popularity and societal approval of Erdogan seems to withstand the toughest tests of time. While clinching his latest landslide victory in the presidential elections, he managed to receive nearly eleven million votes more than his closest rival Muharrem İnce. It is really very difficult to cite another political leader in the modern democratic world with such strong and consistent democratic credentials.

The reluctance of Western media to understand and analyze the uniqueness of the deep bond between Erdogan and the Turkish society lets them to confuse unrivaled democratic legitimacy with authoritarianism. The Turkish President displays exceptional capacity to create a popular blend of socio-economic stability, structural transformation, improved public services, increased living standards and identity politics which is translated into sustained electoral success.

But it was also interesting to note that for the first time in these elections there was a ten per cent gap between Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (52 to 42 per cent) which indicated a performance divergence. Although the People’s Alliance, comprising the AK Party (295 MPs), MHP (49 MPs) and BBP (1 MP), which was born out of the popular resistance to the July 15 coup attempt clinched a clear parliamentary majority, Erdogan in his traditional balcony speech on election night frankly expressed that he received the ‘message of the electorate’ and will oversee a thorough post-election analysis.

So far, taking electoral demands, reactions, or signals swiftly into account through rational and well-researched analyses has been one of the greatest strengths of Erdogan. Therefore, it is pretty likely that he will gather detailed reports concerning the dynamics that affected AK Party votes in certain cities as a result of candidate selections for the parliament, performance of local administrations, or certain economic policies. Therefore, the post June 24 process will witness Erdogan’s multifaceted attempts to oversee a great transformation in the institutional structures of the Turkish state, while keeping the electoral strength of his AK Party in check going forward to the municipal elections next March.

Sunday’s elections also opened a new chapter in Turkish politics as the new electoral regulations allowed alliances between different political parties, thereby making the ten per cent national threshold obsolete. As voters made it absolutely clear that local representation is important to them, legal reforms could be made to lower the national threshold or create some form of single-member district system in the near future. Incidentally, strategic voting which implied certain shifts among allied political parties was one of the most important factors leading to surprising results in view of preceding public opinion polls. As the presidential government system becomes more institutionalized, it is highly likely that strategic voting and issue-based alliances among different political groups will become more pronounced. Therefore, leading political parties and their leaders will have to adopt their ways in line with the emerging patterns of pragmatic voting behavior.

The Nationalist Action Party (MHP) clearly gained from its alliance with the AK Party and the rising national sentiments in the wake of military operations in northern Syria, gathering critical parliamentary representation with 49 MPs. The leader of the MHP, Devlet Bahceli, was among the winners of the electoral process by managing to keep his party above the eleven per cent mark and maintaining his strategic alliance with Erdogan despite the recent internal division within his party which gave birth to the Iyi Party. In the context of the strong executive that will be formed with the presidential system, MHP has great potential of acquiring a degree of political effectiveness that goes much above its numerical presence.

Another winner who came stronger from the campaign trail and election experience was Muharrem Ince who ran as the presidential candidate of the CHP. Ince, a long-time domestic opponent of CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu, was nominated as the presidential candidate in an almost futile race against the towering figure of President Erdogan probably in an attempt to undermine his future party leadership aspirations. Yet Ince as a pragmatic figure who could address the radical secular groups that characterize the backbone of the CHP as well as relatively conservative voters in central Anatolia displayed a surprising performance and personally received eight points higher than his party.

Differing from Kilicdaroglu in his more mature reactions, Ince congratulated Erdogan’s election victory and declared that he will continue his public meetings after the elections, signalling a leadership clash within the CHP. Both CHP and Kilicdaroglu were among the main losers as the party vote stood around a disappointing twenty two percent, while their strategic moves aimed at keeping the Iyi Party and the PKK-affiliated HDP above the ten per cent threshold caused numerous criticisms from within the party organization.

Meral Aksener, the leader of the newly established Iyi Party was another loser as she received unlimited public support from international media during the campign as the chief candidate that could undermine Erdogan’s authority. But despite all the media hype, Aksener’s personal electoral support did not even reach to the ten percent mark and her fragile party might well disintegrate in the parliament. Finally, HDP was another loser as the support for its leader Selahattin Demirtas fell three points to seven per cent, while party votes reached eleven per cent with the controversial tactical support of CHP supporters which was later criticized for legitimizing a terror-affiliated group.

As soon as election results were declared President Erdogan adopted a reconciliatory tone and expressed that the institutionalization of the presidential system will proceed through an inclusive process with the contributions of different social sectors, business actors and NGOs. He is keen to embark on a democratic normalization and development endeavor through which the state of emergency will be gradually lifted, structural reforms in the economy will be swiftly implemented and new productive synergies will be created to galvanize Turkey’s position as an emerging power in the global system. If the Western world decides to support this endeavor by accepting respectable and equitable forms of interaction with Turkey rather than portraying Erdogan as an ‘old-school third world dictator’ and blackmailing him through political or financial means, a positive environment of win-win situations could emerge sooner rather than later.

On 24 June, Turkish voters re-elected President Recep Tayyip Erdogan with 52,6 percent of the votes. His closest rival, the CHP’s candidate Muharrem Ince, received only 30,6 of the votes. By this, Erdogan got 11 million votes more than Ince, who consequently congratulated Erdogan on Monday due to his victory. The CHP Chairman Kilicdaroglu, however, rejected to congratulate Erdogan while stating that the AK Party is the loser of the elections. However, in the parliament, the People’s Alliance, which consists of the AK Party and the MHP, received more than 53,6 percent of the votes and thus achieved a majority with 344 seats in the parliament (AK Party 295 seats and MHP 50 seats, of 600). Interestingly, even Erdogan addressed his party’s parliamentary vote by stressing “we got the message,” while on Tuesday, CHP Chairman Kilicdaroglu, with no surprise and as expected, did not step down even though his party’s parliamentary votes decreased from 26 to 22 percent.

It’s perhaps too early to analyze all components of the election results in depth, but it’s quite possible to address some striking issues. First of all, these elections symbolize the ultimate transformation of Turkey’s system of government into a Turkish type of presidential system. The first step had been initiated in 2016 as the AK Party and MHP proposed a constitutional change, which was accepted by a majority in the referendum held on 16 April 2017. Now, the majority of Turks once again voted in favor of the new system by rejecting the opposition parties’ offer to turn back to a parliamentary one.

The majority of Turks once again voted in favor of the new system by rejecting the opposition parties’ offer to turn back to a parliamentary one.

The second striking issue concerns Turkey’s political stability. Apart from the fact that now eventually eight political parties will be represented in the parliament and cause a democratic diversity, the strict division of the executive and legislative branches will not cause any problems for the executive presidency. Furthermore, the fact that the President’s ministers cannot be selected from MPs anymore will cause a rather professionalization of a rapid and effective governmental acting.

The third issue is about the chronic wishful thinking of foreign media representatives. During the recent election period, we witnessed once again that several foreign media outlets disregarded various fact-based issues while supporting above all CHP’s candidate Muharrem Ince and his political campaign. It’s also not a secret that HDP’s candidate Demirtas and recently the Iyi Party’s leader Mrs. Aksener were supported by both foreign media outlets and politicians.

Although Iyi Party entered the parliament, Mrs. Aksener herself, due to not being an elected MP, will be out of the parliament and most probably her leadership will be questioned by other party leaders.

Although Mrs. Aksener’s party entered the parliament, she herself, due to not being an elected MP, will be out of parliament and it is most likely that her party leadership will be questioned by other party leaders. Thus, foreign analysts may also stop trying to manipulate their own audience by disregarding, for instance, populist and baseless statements by Muharrem Ince while permanently promoting him. Turkish voters have rejected populist and anti-refugee statements whereas Western voters increasingly favor similar promises – a fundamental difference between Turkish and Western ways of persuading voters.

Election results shows that Turkish voters reject populist and anti-refugee statements whereas Western voters increasingly favor such discriminative promises – a fundamental difference between Turkish and Western ways of persuading voters.

The fourth striking phenomenon is about the CHP’s chronic problem; that is to say, its lack of credibility. Even though the CHP tried to build a legal “National Alliance” and a de facto alliance with the HDP, it has been unsuccessful in persuading –in particular– Turkey’s conservative voters. It’s obvious that Turkey’s oldest party will never be as strong as to build the government due to its chronic problem of lacking self-criticism with regard to its radical secular past. If the CHP does not make any self-criticism in various fields there is no possibility to win any general election in Turkey. This has been proved once again.

CHP, Turkey’s oldest party, will never win any general election in Turkey if it does not face its chronic problem that of lacking self-criticism.

By not understanding Turkish voter dynamics and their preferences, it’s useless to count on foreign media support that build on baseless populism. But it seems that in the upcoming days the CHP will face a power struggle in order to elect a new party leader. By this, it’s typical for the CHP, that a person, who lost nine elections within eight years, still insist on the party’s chairmanship while commenting on the party’s presidential partial successful candidate Ince by saying that the voter turnout for him had been “below expectations.”

Turkey has entered a new era with a new system of government. It would not be wrong to state that the main objective of the opposition parties, which was to block Erdogan from winning in the first round and to cause a “divided government” between the legislative and executive branches ultimately ended in a fiasco.

Sunday’s elections in Turkey have finalized the transition to the presidential system with the victory of President Erdogan and his party. Erdogan has advocated and campaigned for this system change since his years as the Prime Minister, arguing that Turkey needed a political system based on the people’s will not on the will of the civilian and military bureaucratic elites. Having handled serious domestic and foreign policy crises over the years, including party closure cases and a failed coup attempt, Erdogan’s campaign for the presidential system has been accepted by the Turkish electorate. Sunday’s elections results are a proof of this reality.

The AK Party has passed legislation in the past year to prepare and adjust to the new system but there will be more work to be done in order to restructure the executive branch. The AK Party’s seats in parliament is short of a parliamentary majority, which means that it will need to recruit the support of other parties, starting with the MHP, to implement the party program and election promises. The MHP has worked with the AK Party and entered into an alliance in the elections, which provides a ground for further cooperation. As I wrote before the elections, the parliamentary distribution will not hamper the creation of the cabinet and functioning of the executive branch.

As the presidential system requires the restructuring of the political system and fine-tuning of the relationship between the executive and the legislative branches, many details have yet to be worked out. But, President Erdogan has created the necessary groundwork to implement his agenda effectively by striking an alliance with the MHP, which has achieved better than expected results in the election. For major legislative action as well as budget negotiations, Erdogan will likely seek support from the MHP. The MHP will continue to be a key role in the legislative process as it has in the past.

One of the most serious consequences of the elections might be the leadership question in the CHP. The CHP’s presidential candidate Ince has openly challenged the current party leader Kilicdaroglu in the past for electoral failures. Sunday’s results show a large gap between Ince’s votes (%30.64) and the CHP’s electoral showing (%22.64). Ince’s relative success and the party’s perceived failure can pave the road for Ince to challenge Kilicdaroglu once again. However, if there is an understanding between the two leaders that the party voters would vote strategically to ensure that the HDP passed the electoral threshold, such a inter-party rift may not be imminent. However, the 8% discrepancy will most likely force yet another debate around the CHP’s leadership.

While the adjustments to the new system are implemented, the March 2019 local elections will be just around the corner. Political parties will enter the new year in campaign mode and the local elections results can serve as an indicator of party performances. Local elections in Turkey always have a different dynamic than general elections, as they can depend much more on local politics. The March elections will not be different but it will have less impact on the executive branch. It will serve more as an indicator of satisfaction with party performances in parliament. Political parties will focus on agenda items that will help them in local elections. This could mean that parties would have more incentive to strike a compromise with President Erdogan to show the electorate that they are in the business of delivering their election promises instead of obstructing.

The June 24 elections are historic not only for sealing the deal on the adoption of the presidential system but also providing political stability for the next five years. There will always be crises and spoilers that will test the new system. However, in this last election, the Turkish public has spoken definitively.

The June 24 parliamentary and presidential elections resulted in a great victory for President Erdogan and the leading AK Party. While the party got 42.5 percent of the votes, President Erdogan has been selected to become the first president of Turkey under the presidential system by winning 52.5 percent of votes.

The MHP, the alliance partner of the AK Party, got 11.2 percent of the votes and passed the 10 percent threshold contrary to the claims of opinion polls. As a result, the People’s Alliance got the majority of seats in parliament. On the contrary, the Nation Alliance consisting of the CHP, the Iyi Party, and the Felicity Party faced with a disappointment because of the results.

The alliance could not get the majority in the parliament and none of the presidential candidates of this alliance succeeded in the elections. While the members of this alliance were aiming to push President Erdogan into a second-round runoff against Muharrem Ince, the presidential candidate of the CHP, the elections ended in the first round with the victory of Erdogan. Above all, the turnout in the elections was higher than 85 percent, which proves the health of Turkish democracy compared to other democracies in the world.

While the results of the elections are analyzed, it is seen that despite the sixteen years of experience in office, the AK Party is still the only party who can manage to get votes from various circles of society. Except from Igdir, Tunceli, and Hakkari, the party got MPs from all provinces, which show that the AK Party is the only party successful in bringing different groups together. Additionally, the party increased its votes in 17 provinces most of which are in Eastern and Southeastern regions of the country. Thus, contrary to some claims, the party still gets the great majority of votes from these two regions and Kurdish people support the AK Party governments in majority.

Nonetheless, the party experienced some decrease in its votes in the parliament especially in Istanbul, Ankara, Konya, Bursa, and Kayseri. During his balcony speech, President Erdogan stated that they had received the message of voters and would evaluate the results in order to understand the reasons lying behind this fall. In any case, the party obtained a significant victory in its 13th election in the last 16 years.

Another striking result of the election was the success of the MHP in parliamentary elections. While pre-election surveys were claiming that the party would get around 5-8 percent of the votes, the party got 11.2 percent and showed that it was still representing the center for nationalist voters. As its splinter party, the Iyi Party got 10 percent of the votes and fell behind the MHP. These results prove that despite all the manipulations and maneuvers of the Nation Alliance, the MHP can consolidate its voters in elections.

Last but not least, it is obvious that the CHP is the most unsuccessful party in the elections. The party faced with a sharp decline and lost approximately 4 percent of its votes. Because of the ongoing campaign among CHP voters, a significant amount of CHP supporters voted for the HDP in the parliamentary elections. The HDP substituted losses from Kurdish voters with the supports of the CHP and passed the threshold. Nonetheless, the results of the elections show that the CHP is in a crisis now and the gap between the party’s and Ince’s votes creates ambiguity in the future of the party. Thus, the results of the elections show that the leader of the CHP, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, is going to face challenges in holding the party’s chairmanship and controlling party organs in the next days.

On 24 June, Turkey’s presidential and parliamentary elections will be held. Subsequent to the declaration of the date of the snap elections, on 18 April, political parties in Turkey started their campaigns and published their election programs. The upcoming elections represent a final switch to Turkey’s new system of government which was accepted by a referendum on 16 April last year. The elections to take place in the next four days are also the first elections in Turkish history according to which both elections are executed simultaneously.

To get a clear perception of the recent election period, I’ll try to point out some crucial issues.

First of all, even though Western media outlets do not address this issue, the presidential elections are conducted in a diversified political atmosphere. There are six presidential candidates representing different political and societal expectations striving for the country’s highest political position. This is actually a diversity covering most of Turkey’s dominant political camps. In addition, ten political parties are participating in the parliamentary elections. The very interesting issue during this election period is the fact that at least six parties will definitely be in the parliament subsequent to the elections due to the new law on election alliances. According to this law, which was approved by a majority vote led by the ruling AK Party and the MHP in March 2018, the country’s 10 percent electoral threshold will still be in place but it will apply to the sum of the votes of the parties in the alliance. Thus, the number of MPs will be determined according to the sum of the votes of the election alliance. Interestingly, this issue which gives the possibility also to small political parties to join the parliament, is not addressed by foreign media due to the fact that this step has been initiated by the AK Party and MHP.

Furthermore, apart from President Erdogan and his party’s campaign, one has noticed that among the opposition only the CHP’s presidential candidate, Muharrem Ince, was able to make some striking statements. President Erdogan, for instance, while conducting his campaign, stressed the need for a strong executive and legislative organ in the upcoming period. Thus, he asked the people to vote for him as well as his AK Party in parliament. On the other hand, Ince insisted on an election campaign which differentiated itself from previous CHP discourses and biases. By this, Ince tried to portray himself within a rather conservative Muslim circles-friendly and pro-HDP image, which, however, totally contradicts the CHP’s traditional positions. It’s also fascinating that while Ince has been appointed as the party’s presidential candidate, CHP Chairman Kemal Kilicdaroglu excluded all MP candidates, who are known to be close to Mr. Ince, with regard to the upcoming parliamentary elections. This image actually displayed who has the control of the party and who has concrete and real expectations from the election results.

By focusing on the other parties presidential candidates and their campaigns, its seems that no candidate was able to neither determine nor influence the political discourse during the recent two months. For instance, the MHP-split Iyi Party’s leader Meral Aksener, who runs as the Iyi Party’s presidential candidate, had no concrete proposal for Turkey’s future despite rather populist statements. For Mrs. Aksener, it’s also very frustrating due to the fact that President Erdogan did not address her once during the entire election campaign. To be honest, it cannot be said that there is public support regarding the Iyi Party even though Western politicians supported her as well.

The Kurdish left ethno-nationalist HDP’s presidential candidate Selahattin Demirtas and his party HDP, though, are extraordinarily supported by foreign media and even foreign political circles. By taking the HDP’s propaganda into consideration, the misleading conclusion above all in Western circles occurs, such as the false portrayal of the party as a quite liberal-leftist party that allegedly prioritizes human rights etc. By this, the party’s actual closeness and even links to the PKK terrorist organization is disregarded by foreign media and HDP supporters. For instance, it’s even ironical that the HDP’s presidential candidate, Selahattin Demirtas, was publicly supported by his brother Nurettin Demirtas, who lives as a PKK-terrorist in Iraq’s Qandil mountains. Of course, besides various statements and positions which do support the PKK, this fact has also been disregarded by HDP supporters and Western media.

Other performances of presidential candidates, such as the Felicity Party’s Chairman Temel Karamollaoglu and the Patriotic Party’s Chairman Dogu Perincek, have been also very low. Neither certain statements of these leaders were seriously taken into account by other leaders nor their election programs seem to persuade and do excite the electorate.

Thus, it’s quite obvious that the AK Party dominates the election campaign while the CHP seems to be divided into two parts. On the one hand, Muharrem Ince is trying to win the presidential election while Kilicdaroglu sets a focus on the parliamentary election and a potential inner-party rivalry subsequent to the elections. On the other hand, it’s striking that Ince makes use of populism by not explaining several promises in depth. For instance, Ince declares that he has no problem with women who wear headscarves while he does not explain his previous and well-known anti-positions just some years ago. The same counts for his populist statements with regard to HDP voters.

The AK Party stresses the new Turkish presidential system in the upcoming period while the CHP –and all other opposition parties except the MHP– do not explain how they schedule to switch back to a parliamentary system. This issue gets even more complex when Ince states that he wants to lead the country as an executive president while Mrs. Aksener calls for a rapid future plan. Finally, it’s also very bizarre that the dominant opposition parties do not address Turkey’s fight against terrorist organizations such as the PKK, FETO  in depth – neither in the candidates’ nor the parties’ program.

As Turkey is heading for elections on June 24, the presidential candidates of all major parties and their election manifestos have been announced. Even though the Republican People’s Party’s (CHP) presidential candidate, Muharrem Ince, is currently facing a tactical move by CHP chairman Kemal Kilicdaroglu, who actually excluded most of the current MPs close to Ince from the party’s new candidate list, it seems that Ince has postponed the so-called micro power struggle within the CHP until elections are over.

Apart from that, some positions and statements made by Ince during his campaign give rather the impression of a European far right party’s ambitions instead of a social democratic party, which aims to form the government. By focusing on Ince’s general standpoints, one notices that in order to win the votes of the Kurds in a less likely second round of the presidential election, he concentrates on the Kurdish issue. However, in addition to not mentioning any concrete suggestions regarding the Kurdish issue, he similarly tries to persuade the country’s conservative voters with some conservative and even Islamic symbols or habits. But as an equilibrium with regard to these two positions, he aims to consolidate his own secular and left-nationalist party base through populist promises – a move due to his controversial promises, which are perceived as concessions toward conservatives and Kurdish (nationalist) voters.

For instance, Turkey’s historical headscarf problem, which has finally been solved by the AK Party in recent years, has been addressed by Ince a couple of times during his speeches. While Ince argues that nobody has to fear that the headscarf ban will return, he seems unconvincing in the eyes of the conservative and religious voters due to his party’s anti-Islamic attitudes in the past. Ince’s current liberal position in this point is also not perceived with sincerity due to the fact that he does not apologize for any previous positions of his own and his party. It’s quite obvious that people still have in memory that even Ince himself once stood for his party’s radical positions like banning women with headscarves from all universities and public offices. What changed and why did this alleged change occur in the mind of CHP’s candidate?

Despite his liberal rhetoric, Ince has not yet apologized for his party’s radical positions that he himself stood for, such as the headscarf ban in public places. The public memory is still alive in this regard.

A similar issue concerns Ince’s attitude towards Turkey’s Kurdish issue. As stated above, Ince most probably plans to achieve the second round and hopes to win the votes of Kurdish nationalists who generally prefer the HDP. But one should keep in mind that some years ago the CHP even described the “solution process” as treason. Furthermore, Ince, as an individual representing the nationalist wing of the CHP, may have troubles to persuade Kurdish voters with sufficient promises. Even if he was to be successful, he will anger the nationalist base of the CHP and even the Iyi Party, whom he takes into consideration with regard to any possible second-round vote. But even if there was a second round one must not miscalculate that HDP voters would actually have to decide between the AK Party’s and CHP’s candidate.

A couple of years ago the CHP – Muharrem Ince then representing the nationalist wing of the party – described the peace process “treason.” Thus, Ince may have real troubles in persuading the Kurdish electorate.

As a reaction, equilibrium or a kind of reparation with respect to the CHP’s left-nationalist voters, who are somewhat angered and irritated due to Muharrem Ince’s conservative-friendly and pro-Kurdish discourse, Ince makes use of populism. By this, he targets the Syrian refugees in Turkey while stating that he plans to send them back to Syria when he is elected president. In addition, Ince underlines his words by promising that he will open a Turkish embassy in Damascus and start to talk with the Assad regime.

Ince’s populist promises and statements particularly concerning and even targeting Syrian refugees in Turkey does not fit in the universal perception of a social democratic party.

Thus, Ince’s populist promises and statements particularly concerning and even targeting Syrian refugees in Turkey actually do not fit in the universal perception of a social democratic party. Unfortunately, by having these standpoints and preferring very controversial statements he rather resembles the position of racist parties in Germany, Austria and the Netherlands. By targeting Syrian or any other refugees, the rise of xenophobia and far right sentiments among certain circles may be triggered. Nevertheless, it has to also be mentioned that in contrast to recent European examples, it’s rather unlikely that the high majority of people in Turkey, where approximately 3.6-4 million refugees currently live, will fall into a trap of anti-migration based populism.

As the June elections are getting closer, the picture is becoming fuller with each passing week. First, we saw the nominations of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Muharrem Ince, and Selahattin Demirtas, respectively, by the AK Party, CHP, and HDP. Then, the candidates of the parties that do not have a group in the parliament started to collect signatures in order to be eligible for the presidential elections. Finally, over the past few days, Meral Aksener (from Iyi Party), Temel Karamollaoglu (from the SP), and Dogu Perincek (from the VP) received over 100 thousand signatures and can now run for the elections. While the picture is complete for the presidential elections, the list of candidates for the parliamentary elections is yet to be completed.

Last week, this column argued that Erdogan and Demirtas are likely to split the votes of Turkey’s Kurds in the first round of the presidential elections. If Erdogan cannot win the race in the first round, his probable rival in the run-off stage will probably be the CHP’s Ince. In such a scenario, Erdogan seems to be much closer than Ince to victory in Turkey’s eastern and southeastern cities where Kurds live en masse. While this reality is present to everybody, Ince also seems to be aware of this plain fact. Very likely for this reason, Ince has spent the last week by sending numerous positive messages to the Kurdish electorate of Turkey. Amongst them, two came forward: Ince’s visit to HDP’s presidential candidate and ex-leader Demirtas in Edirne prison and his speech at a rally in Hakkari the next day.

Nevertheless, Ince’s “Kurdish opening” is a double-edged sword. He is running for a party, which is split between pro-Western progressive leftists and secular nationalists. The more he approaches the former group, the less he is attractive to the latter, which favors the rightist opposition candidate Aksener. The more he approaches to the latter group, the less he is attractive to the former, which favors the leftist opposition candidate Demirtas.

With his visit to Demirtas in Edirne prison and his speech at the Hakkari rally, Ince bothered his secular nationalist constituency. Many social media users and numerous secular nationalist media outlets targeted Ince for this last move. Why then has Ince made this move? What does he expect to gain from such a move? It seems like Ince’s strategy rests on the assumption that no candidate, including Erdogan, will receive 50% plus one votes. Hence, he expects, or hopes, the elections to be carried to the second round, which will be a run-off stage. As the candidate of the main opposition party, he is quite sure that he will be the one to challenge Erdogan in the second round. In such a scenario, Ince’s plan seems to rest on a second assumption: with his “Kurdish opening,” he will gain new Kurdish votes in the run-off stage and he will also receive back the votes of the secular nationalist constituency, which he might, in part, lose to Aksener in the first round. In other words, he thinks that Aksener’s votes in the first round will turn to him in the second round. He further expects to receive the support of HDP voters in the second round.

While this is a rational move, the assumptions are quite weak. Against the first assumption, one can also expect Erdogan to receive over 50% of the votes in the first stage. Against the second assumption, one can also expect HDP’s constituency to be divided in the second round. Some of HDP’s constituency might vote for Erdogan in the second round, some others might boycott the second round, and only a third chunk might go for Ince. The assumption that Aksener’s votes in the first round are granted for Ince in the second round is also problematic. As Ince continues his appeal to HDP voters, Aksener’s constituency and the secular nationalist CHP constituency will also distance themselves from Ince. Under such circumstances, the odds for Ince are still too low to expect a victory against Erdogan.

Two weeks ago, I pointed out that the opposition parties have to decide whom they will nominate as their candidate for president in the upcoming elections and what their ambitions are regarding the elections on June 24. Now, it seems that at least the presidential candidate issue has been solved among the opposition parties. In the process of finding a presidential candidate, the most discussed option was to nominate a person who will run as a common candidate of all major opposition parties. However, several maneuvers and attempts to persuade each other ultimately failed, which then consequently caused a situation in which all opposition parties nominated their parties’ own candidate and even each party’s leader with one exception – the Republican People’s Party, CHP.

Even though CHP’s MP Muharrem Ince challenged the CHP’s incumbent chairman Kemal Kilicdaroglu, who lost eight elections in eight years, twice, he has been nominated as the party’s presidential candidate. Interestingly, Ince had stated during the last party congress in February that, “the CHP’s chairman is the party’s natural presidential candidate… If you want to rule the party while someone should rule the country, then, why are you the chairman?”

Nevertheless, it seems that in contrast to other opposition party leaders, the CHP chairman did not dare to compete as a candidate against the AK Party’s candidate, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. While all major Turkish political parties nominated their de jure or de facto party leader as their presidential candidate, the CHP preferred a strange move that does not aim to win the elections but rather to guarantee Kilicdaroglu’s political future. It’s likely that the CHP leader does not want to risk his position as both a future MP in the new assembly and party chairman. Kilicdaroglu’s move to nominate Ince may though hamper his future ambitions. As Burhanettin Duran stressed, independent from the election results, Ince may cause serious troubles for Kilicdaroglu. Actually, it’s very unlikely – but – if Ince gains any success as a presidential candidate, he will directly try to control his party by challenging Kilicdaroglu’s one-man party leadership.

Besides these political anomalies among the left-nationalist secularists of Turkey, one statement by Ince during his speech at his nomination ceremony was striking. Ince said he would not only represent the CHP’s supporters but all of Turkey’s 80 million citizens. By this, Ince removed his CHP lapel pin to put on a Turkish flag pin as a symbol for neutrality by stating, “We will be impartial/unbiased. We will be independent.” On the other hand, he called his party supporters by saying, “This time we want the ruling power!” Consequently, all the CHP supporters echoed in the hall “power, power, power…”

First of all, it’s quite absurd to have the ambition to win the executive presidency in a presidential system by stressing the party as “we want…” while on the other hand promising to be unbiased or impartial. Thus, the question arises as to how an unbiased president will appoint his ministers? Or even more concrete, how does a Kemalist MP since 2002 plan to rule the country without preferring his party fellows in the next five years and who will believe in these dubious statements?

Moreover, in both democratic presidential and semi-presidential systems, the head of state is the executive lead of the government, who, as a consequence, actively rules the country by following a concrete government program. For instance, neither Mr. Trump as an example of the presidential system nor Mr. Macron as an example of the semi-presidential system are impartial personalities. In addition, Mr. Macron is the de facto leader of his presidential party “En Marche!” holding the majority in the French parliament, too. Stressing an alleged unbiasedness to any party means that the party or the person has no concrete perception of what will be done in the next period.

As I already addressed above, the CHP has to decide what the party actually wants to achieve. Either winning the presidential elections –and the parliamentary majority– to govern the country under the new system by offering Turkish citizens a certain program, or, trying to bring back the old system in which previous presidents also used alleged “impartial” discourses, but preferred strong pro-tutelage positions. Nevertheless, at the end of the day, Ince may challenge the incumbent CHP leader Kilicdaroglu due to his –rather unlikely– limited success during the presidential election. This would be a miscalculation by Kilicdaroglu who wants to get rid of Ince by nominating him as the party’s presidential candidate. On the other hand, in the case of a rather obvious unsuccessful experience for Ince, that is to say, if the CHP loses the presidential race, Kilicdaroglu will most probably still stay in the new parliament as the party’s leader while Ince will quit his political career. The next month and a half will show us more.