After the recent death of senior Daesh operative Abdurakhmon Uzbeki as a result of a US Special Forces raid in Mayadin, in eastern Syrian near Deir ez Zor, the complexity of the threat exposed by Daesh towards Turkey, has once again been proven. A US military statement acknowledged that Uzbeki was the “facilitator” of the Reina Nightclub attack on New Year’s Eve. Furthermore, he was a “close associate” of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the self-proclaimed “Caliph” of the terror group and he had a “key role” in the coordination of external terror plots and the movements of foreign fighters as well as organizational funding activities.

Involvement of such a high-profile operative in an attack on Turkey implies that Daesh operations in Turkey have a firm chain of command directed from the headquarters in Syria or Iraq. Leadership decapitation, generally, has great contributing effects over the dissolution of terrorist organizations, however, Daesh has been known as a group which endures this type of damage because of its strategic flexibility. The rejuvenation of the leadership cadre would maintain the danger that Daesh will be able to pose in its external military operations, meaning that leadership coordinated and sleeper-cell supported Daesh attacks may still be a great danger for Turkey’s national security, stability, and social harmony, as was the case with the Reina attack. Therefore containment of that sleeper cell threat is the most pressing national security issue that must be resolved before it becomes too late.

The Threat after Losing Territorial Control

Sleeper cells committed to Daesh would be the most significant threat in the aftermath of a Daesh defeat in Iraq and Syria. They have already proved how real that danger is by carrying out surprising and shocking attacks in the eastern parts of Mosul where Iraqi forces thought that Daesh elements were cleared. A similar incident occurred in Kirkuk in October 2016, when hidden Daesh militants equipped with sniper rifles, machine guns, and suicide vests launched a very surprising attack on the city.

Operation Euphrates Shield has ensured that no Daesh militant will be able to slip across the Turkish border into the country. The extraordinarily long period of time without a Daesh attack in Turkey between August 20 and January 1 has demonstrated the group’s ability to launch attacks has been diminished by the much stronger security along the Turkish-Syrian border, preventing militants and weapons from slipping across to Turkey. But the neutralization of Daesh activities along the border, inextricably, increased the significance of sleeper cells for the terrorist group.

Sleeper cells are different from hit squads, which infiltrate the target country shortly before launching the attack. A sleeper cell, however is well-placed and integrated into the social fabric. A Sleeper cell consists of a small group of militants who maintain their lives in ordinary ways, and seems legitimate in order not to be detected, and lay in wait for appropriate circumstances to take action in order to result in the best outcome from the attack. For instance, Turkish police operations after the Reina attack revealed that the members of the uncovered cells were posing as doctors, business men, dentists, or artisans.

A sleeper cell may be an autonomous structure, however, they take action in response to incoming orders, most of the time. Members of sleeper cells, generally, have no ties to each other, and are unknown to other cells in the country, in the case that if all militants in one cell were arrested, a militant does not transform into an informant.

The Reina Nightclub attack was carried out by a sleeper cell-supported professionally trained Daesh foreign fighter staying in Turkey for about a year, rather than highly mobilized hit squads who pass into Turkey from Syria shortly before carrying out the attack, as was the cases for most of the previous Daesh attacks in Turkey. It is remarkable that Abdulgadir Masharipov has taken a wide range of support from sleeper cells based in Konya, Izmir, and Istanbul when planning and conducting the attack. Therefore, the nightclub attack was a definite Daesh operational shift with strategic national security implications and more importantly it could represent the specific pattern of future attacks in the country.

The Character of the Threat and Turkey’s Counter-terrorism Efforts

Daesh sleeper cell members in Turkey seem to have varying backgrounds in terms of both nationality, and of organizational status. The geographical proximity of Turkey to the inner circle of Daesh, the region encompassing both Syria and Iraq, caused this diversification. That situation, simply, exacerbated the threat by mixing all types of elements of Daesh. These cells include group leaders, veteran fighters, as well as Turkish recruits.

Group leaders are generally responsible for the coordination of these sleeper cells according to the directives coming from the headquarters, and veteran fighters are battle-hardened militants who are the potential perpetrators of future attacks, while Turkish recruits facilitate the operation with their local knowledge for the creation of appropriate conditions in order to carry out the attack. Although it is not possible to identify a certain type of sleeper cell profile in Turkey because of the lack of concrete evidence, it is safe to claim that most of them comprise of Syrians and Iraqis. However, it is also a noticeable trend that groups from the Caucasus and Central Asia have increasingly been targeted by police operations in the country.

Turkey’s security operations against Daesh in the homeland have been a major component of the counter-terrorism strategy in the country. Especially after the Reina attack, the intensity and scale of the operations have skyrocketed. Many leaders were captured and imprisoned while lots of terrorist cells were uncovered. However, it is no doubt that the terrorist group still has a significant capacity to strike Turkey and the sleeper cells would possibly be the most vital instrument for doing that.

In order for Turkey to meet this volatile threat, some crucial steps may be implemented or intensified. Closely tracking the movements of militants and weapons, tracing the communication between group members, cutting off cash flows, and obtaining intelligence from arrested militants are the measures that have already been implemented by the national intelligence agencies and security forces. These measures may simply be boosted and widened.

In the past, it was seen that rapid collection of intelligence, increasing readiness among police forces, and the execution of joint special operations have ensured effective results against the terrorist cells in the country. Furthermore, raising awareness among Turkish society would have a great impact on counter-terrorism efforts by building social resilience, especially in the longer-term. It is already seen that several police raids have been conducted recently thanks to the information and intelligence obtained. Thus, the maintenance and broadening of the current policies and developing awareness among society would no doubt constitute a significant aspect of containing the possible Daesh sleeper cells in the country.

Daesh, the world’s most modern and sadistic terrorist organization – known for putting people into cages and burning them, selling women they have captured as slaves, lining people up and beheading them one by one – has courteous relations with one country: Israel. Israel’s former Minister of Defense Moshe Ya’alon raised eyebrows this April by saying “There was one case recently where Daesh opened fire and apologized.”

Committing terrorist acts all across the globe and killing hundreds in Australia, Canada, Kenya, Italy, Yemen, Tunisia, Russia, Malaysia, Bangladesh, the US, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Belgium, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Denmark, France, Sweden and Turkey, Daesh apologized to Israel as shots were fired from a territory under its control. This incident mentioned by Ya’alon was also acknowledged by the Israeli military last November. Israeli officials said that one of their patrols was attacked with rockets and light weapons in the southern portion of the Golan Heights, a region Israel controls. In exchange, Israel announced it hit the vehicle carrying the Daesh members with an airstrike. The same statement highlighted that during the attack, which was claimed by the Daesh-linked group Yarmouk Martyrs, no Israeli citizen was killed, while 4 Daesh members were killed.

According to the Times of Israel, this incident was kept secret until the former minister’s statement at a cultural festival on April 24 in a town named Afula, in the north of the country. The newspaper explained that the incident was kept secret because it might have “caused shame to both Israel and Daesh.” In the very same statement, Moshe Ya’alon also said the following about Israel’s Syrian policy: “There are many actors in Syria, such as Iran, Russia, Al-Qaeda and Daesh. Under this condition, one has to have a responsible and balanced policy. If Israel intervenes on behalf of any side, this will be in the interests of others. For this reason, we have announced our red lines in this matter. Whoever tries to infringe our sovereignty, they will feel our force.”

Despite Ya’alon’s statement, it is definite that Israel prefers one side to the other. And this is not even a secret. In the near past, while the terrorist organization was called ISIS, Israel had expressed that they preferred Daesh to the Assad regime. The head of Israel’s Military Intelligence Herzi Halevy took it even further last summer: “Israel doesn’t want the Syrian crisis concluding with Daesh’s defeat.” Speaking at the Herzliya Conference, where Israeli security and defense policies are discussed, Halevy elaborated on why they don’t want Daesh to be defeated, after talking about the challenges Daesh faced during the first three months of the so-called caliphate: “Withdrawal of super powers will put Israel in a tight spot against Hezbollah and Iran. For this reason, we have to do whatever we can to evade this kind of a situation.”

Daesh’s disposition towards Israel since the beginning has been intriguing. This situation was also intriguing while I was shooting a three-part documentary on Daesh, interviewing European and Turkish academics, military and intelligence personnel. Known for his work on Daesh, Princeton researcher Cole Bunzel said that he followed all the announcements, both vocal and written, from ISIS and that the terrorist organization never mentioned Israel as a target, even though they designated Middle Eastern governments and Shiites as their targets. There were other peculiar incidents as well. For instance, the “founding father” of Daesh and Iraqi Al Qaeda Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s escape from Afghanistan and finding shelter in Tehran, Iran. However, this is not our subject; it’s about Daesh’s relations with Israel and their approach to Palestine.

As one of its first heinous crimes, Daesh had attacked the Yarmouk Camp seven kilometers from the center of Damascus, where 200,000 Palestinians sought refuge after they were forced to leave their lands with Israel’s foundation in 1948. Today, 20,000 Palestinian refugees still at Yarmouk Camp are under attack by both regime forces and Daesh. French sociologist Olivier Roy, whom I have interviewed for the Daesh documentary, indicated that Daesh wasn’t following a pragmatist politics, and their attack on Yarmouk Camp was an example of this. After noting that the Palestinian issue is what motivates most young Muslims today, he said: “They [Daesh] attacked Yarmouk Camp near Damascus and beheaded all Hamas members there. Therefore, they’re not seeking any kind of political compromise. For instance, they don’t even try to establish a political alliance with Hamas; on the contrary, they see Hamas as an enemy. This is because those who are not a part of Daesh are their enemies.”

According to one claim, Daesh is terrified by Israel. German journalist Jürgen Todenhöfer who spent 10 days with Daesh militants in Mosul in 2015, wrote that Daesh members were terrified by only one country and that was Israel. A former CDU deputy between 1970 and 1992, Todenhöfer made some interesting remarks in his interview to Jewish News: “Daesh members are terrified by only one country: Israel. In fact, Israel is the only country they don’t even think about conquering in the Middle East. Daesh militants have repeatedly expressed that Israel is too powerful for them.”

While it’s unclear whether they do it out of fear, strategy, or friendship, it’s definite that Daesh doesn’t attack Israel. Furthermore, the destruction Daesh caused in the Islamic world is also definite. Despite their terrorist attacks and videos they publish, their real enemies are Muslims, not Christians and Jews. They have declared Muslims who are different from them infidels; this means, in their opinion, 1.5 billion Muslims are infidels. They have killed thousands of Muslims, starting in Iraq. Through Daesh’s actions, Islamophobia has been on the rise in the US and Europe, and it has become normalized.

Moshe Ya’along, who resigned from his post last year due to disagreements with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, revealed a secret. Beyond not posing any threat to each other, it seems that Daesh and Israel have some kind of a dialogue going on between them. Moreover, the whole world witnessed that Daesh apologized to a country, that country being Israel. What’s more interesting is that Western media didn’t carry Ya’alon’s statements in the headlines, even though Daesh massacred and continues to massacre thousands of people. If these words were uttered by another country’s minister of defense, I’m not talking about only Muslim countries but any country, it would have been discussed for days and the said country would be accused of being a proponent of Daesh. None of this happened. International media outlets just published a brief piece on it and let it be.

Why? Because it is Israel and they can do whatever they want. They can occupy any land, openly state they don’t want Daesh to be defeated, and accept the apology of Daesh. Does anyone dare to remind Israel of their claim to being a democratic state of law? No. The world is shaped in accordance with their perception of threats. Recently, Israel announced that they have banned tourists who visit Jerusalem from going to Palestinian cities and the West Bank. It’s an attempt to prevent people who witness Israel’s cruelty and oppression from telling it to others, I guess. However, those who have seen it are so horrified that they can’t even tell it to others. Moreover, even if they tell the tales of cruelty and oppression, who would care?

Turkey has long been in search of strengthening its border security and protecting its military bases, and for sure high value facilities, scattered in the mountains of south eastern Anatolia. Terrorist organizations based in Iraq and Syria, including the PKK/KONGRA-GEL/PYD/YPG/DEASH, frequently attempted to infiltrate Turkish territory either for attacking Turkish citizens or in a quest for gaining local support in the region. Turkey deployed its military and security forces along the border to prevent such undertakings while equipping troops with high-tech surveillance systems.

However, Turkey failed to enrich its UAV inventory via foreign procurement through Western, in particular Israeli, aviation firms as the primary suppliers, at the beginning of the 2000s. This era was a disappointing period for Turkey as the country had to confront a highly politicised Western defence industry. Without doubt, the invasion of Iraq, by US-led coalition forces, was a clear challenge for Turkey’s quest to procure intelligence and security assets. Turkey’s democratic choice not to participate to the invasion of Iraq hampered its desire to acquire these assets to counter terror threats. Persistent Threat Detection Systems (PTDS), or in Turkish military literature “surveillance balloons,” were one of these kinds of assets.

The initial efforts to acquire PTDS for the Turkish Army’s inventory were based on importing these systems from foreign suppliers, mainly US-based manufacturers. But the project could not be finalized until because of bureaucratic challenges stemming both from the US and Turkish decision-making mechanisms. A security expert claims that, in order to defend against casualty risks, there was an increasing demand on military intelligence assets to provide security for outposts facing imminent terror threats. This concern encouraged young and talented officers as well as non-commissioned officers of Turkish Armed Forces Intelligence School to build their own surveillance balloons by recycling scrapped equipment with a budget of just 1,100 TL (about $450 at the time). They had aimed to construct a cost-efficient system with simplified operating procedures that could be operated by regular soldiers with basic training.

Initially, dedicated Army soldiers conducted an experiment with a weather (meteorology) balloon on which they mounted re-purposed camera parts. They attached the balloon to a simple ground station with a cable that was bought in a local market. Although this first try was a failure, it was a big step. They replaced the balloon with the one made of a stronger fabric and upgraded the equipment with something more functional. The aim was simple: to have the altitude of the balloon be fixed at maximum of 500 meters and monitor any individual within a distance of 6 km. After unofficial consultations with the young soldiers, the Turkish technology giant ASELSAN agreed to sponsor the local amateur project.

ASELSAN provided old domestically manufactured equipment such as video cameras at no expense. With the aid from ASELSAN, a more sophisticated surveillance balloon could now be designed with a higher altitude and increased payload capacity. One problem left to be solved was having the balloon continue its surveillance task even if it was shot by light rifles. The shooting test was very successful after a private Turkish company in Ankara, OTONOM, manufactured a persistent and long lasting balloon. The balloon, which stayed aloft despite seven bullet holes in it, was also stabilized against harsh weather conditions by integrating additional fixing materials and software. Actually, the adventure of Turkish soldiers in building a surveillance balloon has pushed domestic private companies to start partnerships and pool their manufacturing capabilities to meet the needs of the Turkish Armed Forces. Hence, the project was in the hands of these companies afterwards.

The ASELSAN and OTONOM partnership produced surveillance balloons named “Global” (Küresel), a small balloon with 500 meters altitude, and the “Water Drop” (Su Damlası) with a maximum altitude of 1,000 meters. Apart from the ASELSAN-OTONOM partnership, Turkish satellite and cable network firm TURKSAT also developed another surveillance balloon with 800 meters altitude, which might be described as a medium-size PTDS in the defence market. TURKSAT, making deals with the foreign firms, enriched the competition in the emerging balloon sector.

The payloads of these Turkish surveillance balloons can be enhanced depending what the surveillance mission requires. Standard payloads include day and night cameras, laser pointers and radio relay systems. It is possible to integrate them to early warning systems used by ground troops in order to compliment, in other words “cueing,” other information collection efforts by integrated software. Furthermore, acoustic radar can also be mounted to detect explosions and movements of any sorts of vehicles. ASELSAN offers a great inventory of surveillance systems that can be integrated to any sort of these balloons.

Another option for the Turkish Army is the procurement of the PTDS from the Western defence market. In this context, Turkey is about to acquire two PTDS assets from the U.S. Army as a pledge. The U.S. Government granted two PTDSs from Lockheed Martin to the Turkish Army for countering illegal border crossing, especially by DEASH terrorists. The deal entails U.S. donation of the two PTDS assets at no expense for Turkey, but leaves maintenance responsibilities to Turkey. These PTDSs, most probably, will be have been used previously in Iraq or Afghanistan, and can be described as old and worn out. In order to maintain these systems, Turkey will need to meet their costs, and will be dependent on importing spare parts from abroad for them. Besides, the huge size of the balloon requires a huge amount of helium gas to run it, which reveals another challenging problem for the Turkish Army. However, this dependency creates an unwillingness within the circles of the Turkish Army to include these systems into its inventory or at least accept using them for urgent short-term needs until they are no longer functional.

The exploitation of the U.S. PTDS in Afghanistan is an indicator for whether it will meet the needs of the TAF and to see its efficiency. The PTDS was a distinguished intelligence asset for monitoring urban areas with its sensitive payload.  On the other hand, similar to small surveillance balloons, the PTDS of Lockheed Martin was strictly limited by harsh weather conditions; mainly wind, humidity, atmospheric pressure, cloud, and atmospheric electrical charge (including thunderstorms). Due to these shortcomings, the balloons were often grounded and fixed to command trailers. As in Afghanistan, harsh weather conditions along the border of Iraq and to some extent Syria, will hinder the effective exploitation of the U.S. PTDS.

Although the same weather conditions will certainly effect the functionality level of the Turkish surveillance balloons, their loss would be much more tolerable because they are domestically manufactured and cheap. The affordable cost of Turkish systems makes them more attractive than other PTDS products in the Western market. For instance, the cost of a PTDS manufactured by Lockheed Martin is around $15 to $20 million, which is prohibitive when it comes to usage in the rugged terrain conditions of Turkey. Thus, in order to cover the harsh terrain, security forces would probably demand additional PTDS assets over time. A comparison of terrain features of the U.S.-Mexican border and the Turkish-Iraq border illustrates this dilemma. The U.S. border is rather flat, so PTDS can serve for detecting illegal border crossings. On the contrary, the Turkish border with Iraq is full of rugged creeks, therefore several PTDS assets cannot provide either physical or border security since imagery intelligence (IMINT) assets require line of sight. Hence Turkey needs cost-efficient of surveillance balloons that could cover wide ranges that excludes the expensive PTDS.

As the Turkish Army’s priority is not solely based on border security, but also the force protection of ground troops, the needed surveillance balloons should be positioned for monitoring roads, neighbouring villages, and key terrain in the vicinity of military bases. For this purpose, the Turkish Army needs to procure small, mobile, easy to use surveillance balloons in large numbers. Basic military tasks such as target acquisition, directing fires, and location capturing ought to be the main capabilities of the surveillance system. The Turkish surveillance balloons offer such functions using simplified software. Software can be enhanced depending on the regional needs of Turkish Army in comparison to complicated and fixed software. Another advantage of the Turkish PTDS is the small number of operating personnel it requires. Just three personnel for each shift can run the system, which makes the entire 24 hour crew just nine personnel. On the other hand, the U.S. PTDS needs at least 10-12 personnel for each shift to run properly, corresponding to 30-36 operators over a 24-hour period, excluding team leaders.

Consequently, the indigenously developed surveillance balloons by ASELSAN-OTONOM, and to some extent TURKSAT, seem appropriate for the operational needs of the Turkish Army in comparison to the ones of outer market. They are mobile, small and simple systems to conduct surveillance and reconnaissance tasks in potential combat zones. Turkey’s technology is respondent to develop surveillance balloons and export to the other countries in need. Additionally, coast guard, police and gendarmerie forces, can also acquire these Turkish surveillance systems to complement existing threat detection systems, in order to monitor critical urban areas while countering crime.

One of the most important debates of the modern world is the issue of balance between freedom and security. The norms that existed in the traditional world alluded to a political environment, in which freedom is restricted in favor of security. In society itself, there is a continuity that establishes an environment balancing the duality between freedom and security. In today’s world, the balance between the two has moved away from restricting liberties towards enhancing them, but there still continues to be a significant debate.

Twitter and Facebook, the most popular social media platforms, release periodic transparency reports to inform the public at large about their activities. Since 2013, Facebook has released reports every six months called “Publishing Information about Government Requests to Facebook.” These reports contain official requests made to Facebook regarding content removal and account information as well as Facebook’s responses to them. The company has recently shared the “Government Requests Report” with the public at the end of December 2016, discussing the issue in the context of restricting liberties.

How does Facebook evaluate government requests for information and content restriction?

The process, which began with government officials’ requests for information from Facebook as part of legal investigations, has entered a new stage. As governments find content violating their domestic laws, they contact Facebook and request limiting access to the content subject to their complaint. Having checked for legal sufficiency of government requests, Facebook may require greater specificity for legal grounds on requests.

Facebook then carefully investigates the request to determine whether the content violates the domestic law. If the content is proven to be violating the domestic law, the access to it is limited only in the involved country or region. In this regard, Facebook gives the example of Germany, where the denial of the Holocaust is illegal according to its laws, which, in turn, affects the outcome of these requests. In case a person in Germany shares content on his/her Facebook account denying the Holocaust, German officials report the issue to Facebook and the company restricts the related content.

How do governments rank according to Facebook’s transparency report?

According to the statistics on data inquiries, the United States is ranked first with 23,854 requests during the first six months of 2016. It is followed by India with 6,324 and the United Kingdom with 5,469 requests. It is noteworthy that European countries such as France, Germany and Italy follow these three, while Turkey holds the ninth place with 993 request. As for content restriction, France leads the list with 2,213 requests and followed by India, Germany, Brazil, Israel and Austria. Turkey is in 7th place with 861 requests in this category.

Behind the content restriction requests of France, which leads the list, “terror attacks” constitute the major reason. Out of a total 3,763 requests, France applied for 2,213 content restriction cases to Facebook, the reason being the 2015 terror attacks in Paris and the conjecture formed in the aftermath. It is important to note that more than half of the restriction requests made by France were on the grounds of sharing photos relating to the November 2015 Paris attacks. Additionally, in France, where the denial of the Holocaust is illegal, it seems that the content restriction requests in this direction are welcomed. In Germany, 940 content restrictions were related to the denial of the Holocaust. Only the number of content restrictions in this issue is more than 861, the total number of content restrictions in Turkey in the last period.

How should Turkey’s social media applications be seen in terms of its global position?

Besides content restriction, governments also demand various other forms of information from Facebook. Due to transparency concerns, since 2013, the company’s officials present the public with a detailed account of governments’ requests. Accordingly, Turkey made 993 “data requests” and 861 “content restriction requests.” Despite harsh criticism against Turkey in the previous years for restricting the freedom of expression in social media and thus being anti-democratic, the Facebook transparency report tells another story in the light of the available statistical data. After the report is released, Turkey’s requests for content restriction were approached from a different angle.

Behind the change of attitude, there is a fact that terror has found its way into Western countries. The terror attacks in French and Belgian capitals paved the way for Western governments to take a more cautious stance on the subject. Consequently, France became the leading country in the number of content restriction requests, while the U.S. is the leader in the total number of requests. Likewise, the U.K. and Germany held the leading position in terms of content restriction and data requests. To stop terror propaganda on social media, Western governments made a concerted effort to cooperate with social media platforms.

Following the report’s release, Jean-Claude Junker, President of the European Commission, told Mediengruppe, a German media outlet, that social media networks should boost cooperation with governments and expressed the need to avert misinformation. German Chancellor Angela Merkel also made statements regarding the necessity for struggling against social media accounts and websites that support terrorism and spread disinformation.

When restriction of liberties at the expense of security in extraordinary situations, such as terror attacks, is concerned, then, long-term criticisms against Turkey on the grounds of restricting social media become problematic. Turkey is facing a challenge of multi-faceted terror wave: to the PKK’s terror activities is now added Daesh and FETO. Any judgement on Turkey must take this reality into consideration, without which concerns of the Turkish government cannot rightly be understood, if that is indeed the real intention.