Last week, Germany’s main conservative party, the Christian Democrats (CDU), surprisingly achieved some important success in certain areas of political significance. On the one hand, former defense minister and a close ally of Angela Merkel, Ursula von der Leyen (CDU), was elected as the new European Commission President. On the other hand, the CDU’s chairperson and another close ally of Merkel, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer (AKK), was appointed as the new defense minister in Merkel’s current coalition government, succeeding von der Leyen.

Merkel has made some tactical moves. Although these moves were not aggressive in nature, they do eventually promise success. Merkel is ambitiously preparing the CDU for the post-2021 era, when she will ultimately quit active politics, as she had already declared at the beginning of this year. Besides her moves of domestic political significance, Merkel also supported a very well-known name on the EU platform- that is to say, von der Leyen- in order to become the European Commission President for the next five years. A real success.

Of course, there has been heavy criticism with regard to both Ursula von der Leyen- even from the coalition partner, the Social Democrats- and also regarding AKK as the country’s new defense minister. The liberal FDP criticized AKK on the basis that she had recently declared she will not join Merkel’s cabinet and only focus on her task as party chairperson. However, according to FDP’s defense expert, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, AKK undermined her credibility by doing the exact opposite. Some voices also casted doubt on AKK’s expertise and experience as a minister of defense and in the specific field in general, while some academics and military officers addressed the issue with a rather critical perspective.

These critical voices may be taken into consideration while Germany’s military is also being criticized domestically and abroad for its lack of capacity, which became public during the last years under Ursula von der Leyen.

The main controversial statement however came from the far-right and populist AfD. The AfD’s parliamentary group leader in the German state of Rhineland-Palatinate (Rheinland-Pfalz), Uwe Junge, who was a former officer in the German military until he quit his job in 2016 for a career in politics stated, “If this (AKK) is the best personality of our old parties with regard to one of the most important offices of our #nation, this says a lot about the state of our country! When will it come finally to the uprising of the #generals?” (“Wenn das die beste Personalie der alten Parteien für eines der wichtigsten Ämter unserer #Nation ist, sagt das viel über den Zustand unseres Landes aus! Wann kommt endlich der Aufstand der #Generale?”)

As expected, Junge’s statements received harsh criticism from some circles that perceived it as a call for a military coup. According to Junge, though, the German word “Aufstand” cannot be counted as a call for a coup against the defense minister. Nevertheless, one has to clarify some basic points before elaborating such difficult statements, which is not something that occurs often in German politics – at least since 1945.

Interestingly, last week, I addressed in this column whether another military coup could occur in Turkey while analyzing the recently July 15, 2016, coup attempt. However, it seems that a potential putschist mentality or mentalities that ignore the democratic civilian control of the military may occur anywhere in the world, no matter what degree of democratization the country has achieved.

Regarding Junge’s statement one should also mention that he was a military officer (lieutenant colonel) of the so called PsyOps (psychological operations/Zentrum Operative Kommunikation der Bundeswehr).

How can one elaborate on these –not entirely representative of the AfD- but very controversial statements with regard to civil-military relations, which are believed to be on a very democratic standard in Germany? It would be, no doubt, a mistake to take a single statement of an AfD member and accuse it of being representative of the whole party, even if the party is located on the far-right. However, the continuation of the party’s (in general) controversial, racist and deliberately manipulative statements with double-meanings contributes to the image of how a potential AfD government in the future could look like. This and several other controversial statements and even scandals illustrate what kind of democracy understanding is currently present among AfD members and what it might evolve into in the future.

It is not legitimate to call any members of the military for an uprising or rebellion against the country’s legitimately appointed defense minister. If this basic point is not accepted by any politician, then something is definitely wrong. By this, I do not mean any concrete factual statements, legal recommendations or reports by army members about certain fields that concentrate on their expertise and where of course a minister’s expertise may lack. The call for an uprising (Aufstand) is, however, an expression with an absolutely extreme controversial content. Whether the Chancellor’s decision is wrong or right, this does not give current or former military personnel the right to react in this way against the democratically elected and legitimate Chancellor’s mandate.

Nevertheless, the statements made by alleged “moderate” AfD members could be taken as a notice as to how a potential future government constellation with the AfD will end.

A study and a report have been published recently covering the increasing numbers of far-right activities and negative attitude towards refugees in Germany. Although this news did not receive much attention among the public and political platforms in Germany, it might be important to stress the continuing danger of such developments, particularly right before the EU elections to be held on 23-26 May, 2019.

The first one is a study conducted by the social-democratic Friedrich Ebert Foundation, according to which Germans have increased their negative stance against refugees although there has been a decrease in the number of asylum seekers in the country. The study has been regularly conducted since 2002 and saw a peak with 54.1% symbolizing Germans who hold negative attitudes towards asylum seekers. This number was higher than the figures during the peak of the refugee crisis in 2015-2016.

Negative attitudes during 2014 was 44% and in 2016, 49.5%. The study becomes even more interesting if one notices that the number of asylum seekers arriving in Germany has continuously decreased since 2015 – due to the refugee deal between the EU and Turkey. While 900,000 refugees arrived in Germany – particularly from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, in 2015, this figure decreased to 300,000 in 2016 and 200,000 in 2017. Another interesting point of the study is the negative attitude particularly concentrated on Muslim refugees – those coming from Muslim-majority countries. Furthermore, the report found that people began to criticize sexism more negatively in comparison to previous years. As one can note, an anti-stance against a specific type of “discriminated ones,” namely against Muslims, is particularly striking.

In addition to these deteriorating perceptions against Muslim refugees, a recent report is also noteworthy. While the official report has not yet been published, the Welt am Sonntag weekly newspaper recently referred to it by stating that according to a secret report of Germany’s domestic intelligence service, terrorism tendencies are increasing within the different types of far-right circles in Germany. The report points to terrorist tendencies and the potential of violence has also been observed among those right-wing extremists. All in all, the report warns that the number of extremist and fringe groups in Germany have increased by 50 percent in the last two years. According to the report “traditional extremist groups have fragmented in recent years, giving way to fringe groups and potential lone-wolf attackers” while “exchanges between such groups over the internet heightens the risk of “mobilization and conspiracy.”

The number of extremist groups in Germany have increased by 50% in the last two years.

It is with no doubt good to conduct such studies and publish official reports – or to share its results – with the aim of warning citizens and politicians of the potential dangers and mounting threats of right-wing attacks in Germany. It is also a good tradition to address problems by their names no matter what through the means of social media, digital or printed media outlets, or even through political circles. However, these steps are not satisfactory enough and do not discourage or prevent people who are already among the extreme circles.

Far-rightists still expand this kind of or similar other extreme positions with an obvious anti-Muslim motivation. Thus, the task of particular political and media circles should be to focus on what can or should be done under these circumstances and in the short and mid-term to prevent the increasing radicalization of these ideas and organized tendencies, as is stated in the intelligence report. The question is not only directed to politicians but also towards schools/teachers, universities, media representatives, NGOs, civil society and similar other reasonable addresses.

Until now, far-right rhetoric has been perceived as harmless by most citizens as the threat has not yet targeted the majority of society.

Action needs to be taken by politicians who are currently too busy trying to reach out to the far-right in order to ensure their vote. Since 2015, reasonable politicians have also been making use of anti-refugee vocabulary, which has been praised by their electorate. But the fact is that no problem can be solved by imitating positions of the far-right AfD. Eventually, recently published reports and studies such as the Friedrich Ebert Foundation’s study or the domestic intelligence’s report should trigger a societal awakening and mobilization against discrimination – especially the increasing discrimination against Muslims. This also needs to take place in the bureaucratic state apparatus, where structural discrimination against certain people with migrant backgrounds is still prevalent.

Far-rightist discourse and populist voices have become a part of usual politics in the Western world, also represented in all kinds of German parties. This must not continue. Until now, this far-right rhetoric has been perceived as harmless by most citizens in the center (center-right or center-left) because of the fact that these threats have not targeted the majority of society. But one should not disregard that such conditions might change immediately. Consequently, the problem has to be faced as early as possible in order to boost democratic standards and a long-lasting participatory society.

When does an individual who holds the citizenship of a democratic country finally count as an equally accepted citizen? By this, the constitutional and legal conditions are not meant primarily. To the features of such a person, one might add, for instance, the ability to speak the country’s official language, even at a higher standard than other native societal groups. In addition, the person would be known for having a good educational background both in that country or even additional education experiences in other similar country’s renowned institutions. And ultimately, let’s say, this person would have a legitimate mandate in the way of being elected as an official representative (in the local, federal, or state level), which is actually one of the most fundamental components in a democratic country.

Sometimes though, these features are not enough as preconditions in order to be accepted as equal as a native citizen, or even as an “individual.”

During last week’s meeting in one of Germany’s state parliaments, that is to say in a “Landtag,” which is the legislative body of a federal state in Germany, a member of the far-right AfD party triggered a tumult. The main reason behind this uncomfortable happening was the AfD deputy Stefan Räpple’s statements and behavior during his speech in the assembly. The debate was initiated by the AfD on abortions and “left ideological influences” in German kindergartens, which the AfD opposes. At the end of the interruption, the Landtag President excluded two AfD deputies from the meeting while both initially refused to leave the assembly and whereupon the police had to accompany them.

Although Muhterem Aras is the Landtag president, is she accepted into German society? 

Actually, I won’t repeat all details of the dispute between the AfD MPs and the Landtag President, Muhterem Aras, a woman with Turkish roots. But one sentence of the other AfD deputy, Wolfgang Gedeon, has to be addressed a bit more in depth. Subsequent to some warning words by the President, Gedeon attacked the President by stating “she could lead a parliament that way in Anatolia, but not in Germany” (“So können Sie ein Parlament in Anatolien führen, aber nicht in Deutschland”). Consequently, but actually due to his previous behavior, the President excluded Gedeon also from the meeting while mentioning that his stressing on “Anatolia” is discriminatory and not acceptable. Even though Gedeon also refused to leave he was then accompanied by the police from the assembly.

Nevertheless, the good thing was that despite these provocative statements by AfD members, all other party factions represented in the assembly of the Baden-Württemberg state supported the stance of the Landtag President with Turkish roots, who is a politician of the Green Party and who was stated in German media in 2016 as “the first Muslim woman president” of the Baden-Württemberg Landtag.

AfD’s Wolfgang Gedeon attacked Landtag president Muhterem Aras by stating, “she could lead a parliament that way in Anatolia, but not in Germany” (“So können Sie ein Parlament in Anatolien führen, aber nicht in Deutschland”).

Thus, despite such a career path, the remark of the AfD with an emphasis on “Anatolia” in a deliberate negative meaning is unfortunately racist and discriminatory. First of all, even though people with a migration background have a constitutional and societal acceptance, usual racists cannot prevent themselves from problematizing a person’s family background. That is the reason why Aras is being connected to “Anatolia” though she is the President of a German states’ parliament. This is merely how racists function. They always search for “actual reasons” in order to either criminalize, accuse, discredit certain persons or just deflect from actual issues.

This recent event touched upon here is just a recent example of how people are subject of discrimination in Germany or across Europe – daily experiences that have now become entrenched in society. Of course, in comparison to say the 80s or 90s, there is a much better societal sensitivity today with respect to similar reflexive statements. And in the long future, the hope and awareness with regard to avoid such ideas is existent too. However, one has to keep in mind the necessity of always defending these values above all in times when the discourses of the AfD dominate the political mood.

The second point that is also problematic within this context was the use of the term “Anatolia.” As stressed earlier, it’s wrong, discriminatory, and even racist to evaluate any Germany-based politician by relating them to a –in this context- foreign country that has nothing to do with the topic at all. Actually, the preference of the term “Anatolia” also hides a racist tone per se. Namely, it implies that “Anatolia” is a place where democracy, or even (Western) civilization standards do not exist.

Unfortunately, while most Germans criticized the AfD, no one really problematized the defamation of Anatolia. Thus, the struggle against racism and discrimination has to be continued on all platforms and in the general mindsets; not just where it’s comfortable. Otherwise, ambivalent or shifting approaches might entail disastrous mentalities right into society’s center in the format of “normality.”

The isolationist and protectionist policies of the U.S., the rising influence of Russia and the rise of China are considered as clear signs that the current global system is in a serious crisis. The operational weaknesses of international organizations such as the UN as well as increasing attempts at finding alternatives to them shows that international organizations are also under stress. The Eurozone crisis, the ongoing fiscal crises in Italy and Greece and the matter of refugees have lead people to think that Europe as a whole is also in crisis.

While social and political movements have increasingly gained momentum in Germany, the existing dominant structures and political parties have continued to lose power and influence. It’s the first time since the Weimar Republic that the German public are mentioning a crisis of democracy and the liberal system this often. As a result of the waves of refugees that were caused by the Syrian Civil War and especially Merkel’s “We will manage” principle and open door policies, the public no longer refers to a “refugee problem” but a “refugee crisis.” Thus, this crisis led to a fast erosion of power for centrist parties leading German politics, the CDU and SPD, and Merkel from losing their positions.

The peculiar aspect of this situation is that while Germany seems to be in a period of economic prosperity with low unemployment rates and a high budget surplus, it is reflecting the image of a country under many crises. Especially at this point it can be said that Germany, which has managed to maintain its stability even through the 2008 crisis, is not undergoing an economic but a social, political, and ideological crisis. The leading indicator of this crisis is the faltering trust in the existing political power structure and the shift in public preference towards political and social movements that present themselves as alternatives to the existing system and centrist political powers such as the CDU and SPD, which have failed to find themselves an ideological orientation and identity.

The leading indicator of the crisis in Germany is the faltering trust in the existing political power structure and the shift in public preference towards political and social movements that present themselves as alternatives to the existing system.

Loss of trust and a search for alternatives: Has liberal democracy reached its limits?

Unlike the 20th century, it cannot be stated that any great social movement or political change has occurred in Europe in the 21st century. However, anti-establishment social movements of this age, considering them as being results or parallels of recent far-right parties in Europe and social movements such as Five Star in Italy and Pegida in Germany, have at their heart nationalist, protectionist, and far right doctrines. According to a poll in Germany, the results of which were announced in October, AfD has for the first time reached 18% of total votes, and with SPD’s votes decreasing to 15%, the AfD has become the second most popular party in Germany after the Christian Democrats.

It is now better understood that AfD’s success in the 2017 general elections was not a one-off and temporary political reaction. Taking into account fundamental changes in the global arena, the rise of far right and nationalist discourse as well as isolationist policies, not only in Germany through AfD, but in Europe and around the world, can be considered not a temporary phenomenon but a manifestation of the objection and distrust felt towards the existing political, social, and economic order.

The ideological aspect of the political crisis in Germany also needs to be considered. It can be seen that the public is gravitating towards peripheral parties developing new discourses, offering the public something new on the basis of ideology and identity, rather than parties offering to maintain the status quo.

According to a poll in Germany, the results of which were announced in October, AfD has for the first time reached 18% of total votes, and with SPD’s votes decreasing to 15%, the AfD has become the second most popular party in Germany after the Christian Democrats.

The loss of trust in existing centrist parties among the German public is a clear expression of a desire for change. The strength of this desire for change can be evaluated by looking at the successes of peripheral political organizations that offer the public no solid program but merely project an image of being new and an alternative option. This is how AfD, despite offering no concrete programs or solutions for the problems of the country in its party program, has managed to become the second most popular party among the public. Similarly, the fact that the Greens, which had once emerged as an alternative, is again on the rise can be explained by this framework of “search for an alternative” discourse. While far right groups politically blame the centrist parties, socially they prey on the weakest and culturally most distant groups – namely, foreigners and refugees – in order to project an image of unity and belonging.

According to the Indian intellectual Pankaj Mishra, author of the book Age of Anger, both far right organizations around the world that question the existing political structures, as well as terrorists and people with radicalization tendencies, reflect the anger of individuals and societies that feel betrayed by liberal democracy. According to the author, who claims that while liberal Western democracies promise that “Everyone can live in prosperity and have equal rights” they’ve failed to make this a reality, such pursuits are aimed at the liberal democratic stance and institutions that have failed to deliver on their promise. Among those who have lost their trust and faith in these structures, those who seek a solution within the system gravitate towards the most “alternative” and new among the existing movements, while those who seek a solution outside the system and feel relatively powerless tend towards terror and radicalization.

Crisis of representation: “The public” or “the economic, media and political elite”?

While talking about the crisis of democracy in Germany, it can be said that this in some part is a crisis of representation and is not only happening in Germany but also in other European countries governed by liberal democracy. The plainest way to explain this crisis of representation is that great masses of the public are unable to see their influence exerted on political decision mechanisms and ultimately political actions.

The current crisis in Germany is a representation of what is also happening in other European countries governed by liberal democracy. The explanation for this is because the public do not see themselves as part of the decision making mechanisms. 

It can be stated that the effects of elections and ruling parties on political decisions has been continuously decreasing. The fates of people living in European countries are determined more by decisions made in EU commissions than by their national parliaments, moreover pressure is exerted on elected governments by international financial centers, experts, courts and the bureaucratic elite, “independent” NGOs financed by certain groups and the media.

On this issue some political scientists in the west talk about the “democratization of democracy.” Arguments such as the claim that existing institutional political tools and mechanisms, along with the media cartel, are only being used to manipulate democracy by a small group of financially powerful people to maintain the current system for their own interests, are gaining traction.

Considering that global-scale decisions are shaped according to the opinions of certain groups with shared interests and credit centers, public masses that think their own interests are not represented in this system tend to prefer far right organizations such as the AfD, which presents itself as an alternative rather than the centrist parties which have been enablers of the system.

The social contract

It is known that the idea of liberal and modern democracy is built upon the ideal of a “social contract.” Liberal democracies foresee that under a legal unity and a social contract, groups with heterogeneous political, social and economic beliefs can peacefully coexist. Habermas’s thesis of “Deliberative Democracy” emphasizes this culture of discussion and consensus, stating that democracy in essence is better characterized by the process of reaching a consensus through discussions among the public with contribution from groups with differing interests and social statuses, than simply voting to approve predetermined decisions.

But considering the fact that conventional media tools, which are controlled by certain powerful families operating on the global scale, paint a surprisingly homogeneous picture of reality, along with the existence of a monopoly on manipulation and information, the culture of discussion Habermas has foreseen cannot be said to be functioning today. For example, had it not been for the anti-refugee campaigns of the German mainstream media that turned the refugee matter into the refugee crisis, would an average German person still be as afraid of Muslims, foreigners and refugees as they are today? According to a poll conducted by FORSA, 84% of the German public have not experienced a problem with their foreigner neighbors. Specifically in Germany, the discussions on Leitkultur are important in that they show the limitations of the ideas of freedom, liberalism and the neutral state.

On one hand, individuals separated from their traditional social structures are being promised freedom and equality by the liberal system and modernism, on the other hand within the framework of a social consensus and constitution they are expected to find unity.

Had it not been for the anti-refugee campaigns of the German mainstream media that turned the refugee matter into the refugee crisis, would an average German person still be afraid of Muslims, foreigners, and refugees as they are today?

What then will be the values that are supposed to keep the public and society united? Will individuals separated entirely from their tradition via enlightenment and promised freedom, equality and rule of law be able to find anything other than an image of a common enemy, foreigners, to reunite themselves as a nation?

Within this context, through AfD and other far right groups, the discussions on how much democracy can “democracy” tolerate and the limitations on the ideas of freedom and equality have been rekindled. While the rule of law and a binding constitution are supposed to ensure that democracy will prevent movements against it, if one day far right organizations such as the AfD become partners of a ruling coalition through elections, no one will be able to object to the situation by claiming that it is against democracy.

Thus while some experts work to determine the limits of democracy by the rule of law format, the rule of law itself needs to be built on democratic and liberal principles. At this point, the claim of the Enlightenment that the hegemony of mind will be shaped by rational governments and rational demands of mature citizens seems shaky.

Similarly, the immigration of new social groups who make religious references in their everyday life, which has no rationality according to European society, to Europe presents a new dilemma for the secular-liberal Western democracies. While this clash can for now temporarily be ignored, this is not a possibility in the long term. The greatest example of this is how Muslim minorities are only able to gain their democratic rights via vegans who have established a place for themselves on the basis of rationality, and some of their freedoms through laws passed for the interests of LGBT groups.

It does not seem possible for the current crisis of the liberal system and democracy to be resolved within the framework of the rule of law and by ignoring the far right element without re-directing the system into a new direction and developing an alternative, new discourse.

On 14 October, parliamentary elections in the German state of Bavaria will be held. Bavaria is one of Germany’s most important political and economic federal states. The south-eastern German state is a fundamental part of Germany’s strong economy and is an attractive destination for many people due to the quality of education that it provides. Between 1966 and 2008, Bavaria has been ruled by a single party – the Christian Social Union (CSU).

As one may guess, the citizens of the federal state are more conservative in contrast to other parts of Germany. Following a coalition government with the Bavarian FDP (liberals) between 2008 and 2013, the CSU once again gained a majority enough to form a government on its own. Since 2013 the CSU has been ruling Bavaria alone. However, this will most probably change with the elections on Sunday.

The point with the so-called Bavarian conservatives is that on the federal level, the CSU is the sister party of the Christian Democrats (CDU). Accordingly, the CDU is represented in all other 15 federal German states, except in Bavaria, where the conservatives are quasi represented only by the CSU. On the other hand, the CSU is the usual ally of the CDU on the federal level. For example, one of the most important offices of the current federal government is in the hands of CSU Chairman Horst Seehofer. Seehofer was the previous state prime of Bavaria until he was challenged by Markus Söder, particularly during 2017.

Following, Seehofer decided to change to the federal level, and thus became his party’s main candidate in the 2017 federal elections. Subsequently, he was appointed as the country’s Federal Minister of the Interior by the CDU leader and Chancellor Angela Merkel. In this context, Markus Söder became Bavaria’s new state prime, while Seehofer is still continuing his efforts to become chair of the CSU.

Even though the CDU and CSU have many similarities, there are a lot of disputes between the leading figures and bases of both parties. Without getting into too much detail, it ought to be underlined that a serious disagreement, what one can actually call a dispute, arose between the former Bavarian state premier Horst Seehofer and Chancellor Merkel.

It’s no secret that Markus Söder, Seehofer, and the CSU in general, are at odds with Merkel due to a decision she made in 2015 to open Germany’s borders to over one million Syrian refugees and migrants. Since then, Seehofer and the CSU insisted that no other country is able to take in unlimited numbers of migrants and refugees. Thus, the federal decision-makers had to do something against this policy of Merkel, which ultimately happened.

Besides, several other disputes occurred within the cabinet, especially in the last 6 months, after the new fragile government consisting of the CDU/CSU and SPD had been formed as a final option. These include disagreements with regards to issues such as refugees in Germany, Islam as a part of Germany and recently the case of Hans-Georg Maaßen, the former chief of Germany’s federal intelligence.

The CSU is currently struggling to win the elections in Bavaria on Sunday. The party is increasingly shifting to the right due to the rise of the far right and populist AfD, which will most likely enter the Bavarian parliament, as it has not already entered the federal parliaments of various states but has also entered the federal parliament of Germany, the Bundestag.

By aiming to limit the loss of votes to the far-right AfD, the CSU on the one hand prefers more populist discourses and quasi nationalistic reflexes. However, on the other hand, the party tries to stress its differences with the AfD by addressing that the CSU stands for liberal values and does not tolerate anti-Semitism, xenophobia, or right-wing extremism.

However, despite all maneuvers resembling far-right populists, according to recent polls, the CSU has achieved a historic low. Under these current conditions, it does not seem possible for the CSU to form a single-party government in Bavaria. Theoretically, it is even possible for a potential coalition government of 4 parties in Bavaria – except the AfD – to come together to form a new coalition government. Of course, on Sunday evening we will see whether the polls rightly prophesied the historical defeat of the CSU. Currently, the CSU still rejects to build a potential coalition government with the AfD.

Thus, it does not, and should not, surprise anyone that the party’s leader Seehofer and the state prime Söder are currently looking for a scapegoat. While Seehofer has been trying to highlight that he does not make any campaigns for the Bavarian elections, Söder has been claiming that tensions on the federal level have contributed in a negative way for the CSU’s image in Bavaria. It’s quite obvious that both politicians do not want to take any future responsibility.

The main problem is that the AfD is increasing the number of its voters on both the federal and state levels. The Bavarian elections will thus have a crucial role in the long-term future of German politics and whether the pressure to build a potential government, in which the AfD might also exist, will become true.

There is some hope in the German public and media that the AfD will neither become the second strongest party nor the main opposition party. However, the more the CSU or other parties in Germany resemble AfD discourses, and even imitate similar stances, the more likely it is for people to vote for the original base of these ideas – the AfD.

The elections to be held on Sunday will show how the future of conservatives in Germany will be shaped, how the fragile federal government led by Merkel will react to a major success of the AfD, and how the people will elaborate a likely shift to a more far-rightist and populist type of politics in general.

Approximately two weeks ago, the head of Germany’s domestic intelligence, Hans-Georg Maassen, had doubted the authenticity of a video showing racist violence in Chemnitz. Subsequent to this, the social-democratic members of the current grand coalition government called for Maassen’s dismissal.  However, the conservative wing of the government, which includes the extreme conservative Interior Minister Horst Seehofer (CSU), took Maasen under protection. Most of the opposition parties, apart from the far-right AfD, argued that Maassen has discredited himself and therefore he had to resign.

Following the event, the public discussed the issue and many German media outlets were frustrated with Maassen’s statements and urged Mrs. Merkel to dismiss him. Due to the first wave of public outrage, the coalition government agreed on a weird “deal.” Accordingly, Maassen would give up his job as the head of domestic intelligence, but would be appointed as a new Undersecretary at the Federal Ministry of the Interior and Homeland. This is the ministry of which Horst Seehofer is the head. Responses were not so welcoming. The public began to question why an individual – who made wrong decisions – would receive a pay rise and a new job.

The story becomes even more absurd as one remembers Maassen’s concrete statements. He had actually  harbored far rightist’s wrong narratives about the Chemnitz mob. Maassen did not also revise his statements. He just emphasized that he was misunderstood but he still insisted on his stance.

Due to the fact that the majority of the German public did not accept such a new job creation for Maassen and continued to problematize the issue. Heads of the three coalition parties had to discuss the case once again during the weekend. And finally, interior minister Horst Seehofer stated that the leaders agreed for Maassen to work in the ministry in the future, but that he would not receive a pay rise. Seehofer stressed that Maassen would be a so-called special advisor focusing on European and international tasks. That is to say; the government revised its previous decision.

As addressed two weeks ago, the head of Germany’s domestic intelligence Maassen has been transferred to a senior post of the secretary of state/undersecretary of the interior but the decision had caused an outrage among both citizens and political circles.

But what’s the main disturbing point in this issue?

The first question that arises is whether it is normal for a person, who is not even a politician – neither a rightist or leftist – but a high-profile bureaucrat, or even “the country’s spymaster,” to address certain sensitive topics by contradicting the country’s ruling Chancellor and the person whose authority he is working under.

Despite the lack of persuasiveness with regard to the Chancellor’s recent maneuver regarding Maassen, another fundamental question arises. One should remember that the head of Germany’s foreign intelligence, Bruno Kahl, who took a similar strange position in March 2017 by addressing the failed coup attempt of 15 July 2016. In his interview with the German magazine Der Spiegel, Kahl stated that he does not believe that Gulen was behind the coup attempt. Subsequently, Kahl received harsh criticism by German media representatives who accused him of either lack of knowledge regarding the order or deliberate manipulation and protection.

Thus, Maassen recently acted in a political way – in addition to his lack of authenticity during issues such as the NSU case – which he shouldn’t have done. But as a consequence, he has been ultimately -at least- “transferred” from his office as head of domestic intelligence. He was not fired and still holds an official position. The federal government most probably thinks that the public will buy this “maneuver.” However,  there is another case with the head of Germany’s foreign intelligence, Bruno Kahl.

Kahl spoke very similarly in a political way and deliberately disregarded or ignored a NATO ally’s official position regarding a top security issue. But no serious political voice in Germany warned him of not stepping beyond his bureaucratic borders. If the federal government is sincere in its actions, alongside Maassen, Kahl should have also been dismissed from office. Maybe then Germany’s domestic offices of security and bureaucracy may have been able to re-gain trust and confidence.

Nowadays such decisions not only support the decline of trust in the state’s domestic institutions, but also render the fragile coalition government weaker. At the end of the day, the winner seems to be the AfD and its political stance. AfD is a far-right political party, which according to recent polls is the second strongest party in Germany.

The German political party landscape may for sure be undergoing seismic changes but it seems fair to ascertain that they are far from any shift of a tectonic nature at least as of yet. Granted, some additional post-election fault lines are clearly visible and in particular so as a far-right movement – Alternative für Deutschland, (AfD) – entered the Bundestag for the first time. There are others, for instance, it is very untypical for Germans to spend eight weeks trying to form a coalition government without anything coming out of it.

SPD U-turn would be logical, but will it happen?

When Martin Schulz, in his capacity as a leading candidate and party chairman of the Social Democrat Party (SPD), declared on September 24, 2017 that the SPD would not be willing to continue the grand coalition with the Christian Democrat Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) many observers were surprised. Seldom do party leaders refuse to join a potential coalition or government before they were even asked. His argument and justification for his refusal on pursuing a coalition was that the grand coalition was voted out by the public. Yet mathematically it had a majority. It was only a matter of time until the party’s influential center-right Seeheim Circle would knock on Schulz’s door to ask for a reconsideration of his decision.

Then the ‘Jamaica’ talks began, which aimed at forming a coalition out of the CDU/CSU, the Green Party and the Free Democrat Party (FDP). Now this option was shelved for good by the FDP just over a week ago – although I dare say other parties could have pulled the negotiating chair away from the table at a later stage, too.

Originally after the election, only three subsequent scenarios were legally possible: Chancellor Merkel who, albeit in an acting role only still the chancellor, could ask the Bundestag to be elected with a simple majority in a third round of voting and as long as President Frank-Walter Steinmeier would approve she could form a minority government. Alternatively, after a similar parliamentary voting protocol and in the case of no government being ready to take control, the president would dissolve parliament and snap elections would be called upon within a maximum time-frame of 60 days. Finally, a remake of the current grand coalition could be agreed upon leading to an absolute majority of whoever is presented as chancellor and thus automatically being approved by the president.

At first the SPD once more categorically ruled out the latter option. Actually, so did Mrs. Merkel, who said that after all she heard from the SPD, snap elections would be her favorite solution. After the president spoke with party leaders and following Thursday’s meeting with Mr. Schulz and a night marathon at SPD headquarters, it became obvious that at least the above mentioned Seeheim Circle of the SPD is up for a U-turn. Only late night Sunday 26 November, 2017 did the CDU/CSU do the same, rejecting snap elections and asking the SPD to consider coalition talks. Thus as it stands, whilst penning this article, a continuation of the grand coalition has at least become a viable solution once more.

But some SPD members are now hinting at the possibility of a fourth option, untried, but technically speaking, legally possible: forming a type of cooperative government short of a formal coalition agreement, where two or more parties agree on an issue-by-issue basis about policy.

Yet knowing German politics for a fair number of years if there is one thing most voters and politicians dislike, it is instability. Both a minority government, as well as the SPD’s fourth way would promise exactly that.

Is anything going to change for the three million + citizens of Turkish background?

Let us assume for the purpose of this short analysis that Germany opts for what is assumed to be a stable government. The good news is that as status quo oriented by nature any grand coalition would be, it does not seem unlikely that such a CDU/CSU-SPD re-run would become a policy initiator instead of merely a policy administrator, as there are many hot issues that need urgent attention: Europe, energy, education and immigration to only name a few. As the AfD is poised to continue to play the anti-immigrant card and as imitating right-wing rhetoric did not lead to a huge bonus at the ballot box for more center based parties, this time round one should expect a more welcoming set of policies towards, in particular, the just over three million citizens of Turkish background living in Germany.

Adopting anti-multicultural and anti-integration rhetoric will only make extreme movements even stronger in the long run, as ultimately voters tend to prefer ‘the real thing.’

Deep down both the CDU/CSU and SPD will have realized that misusing an entire nation as focus of unfair negativity – which is what had happened with Turkey during the run-up to the 24 September vote – was completely wrong and put citizens of Turkish origin into a very difficult, if not outright dangerous, situation. After all, if a government declares a country no longer welcome, how would you feel living in that same country being of that very nation’s origin?

A modest suggestion would be catching votes by employing negative rhetoric vis-à-vis Turkey out, winning votes by sidelining extremists in – that could be a logical way forward.

Grand coalition – only route to stability

Good bi-lateral contacts rely on sound policies between two nations’ leaders, mutual trust between their business communities and of course amicable relations between both populations. The Turkish government, her businessmen, businesswomen and her citizens were and are ready. Ever since early, Turkey has become an outward looking, enterprising, and a successful nation in the last one and a half decades. Ankara rightly complained when the German response to this outreach was to put it mildly, not always visible.

Not fully grasping the struggle against heinous criminals who aimed at destroying Turkish democracy by means of a military coup attempt on July 15, 2016 is one point. Turning the back on Turkish leaders who wish to meet their fellow citizens on German soil, another. Moreover, it is disappointing to watch such a model democratic nation as Germany – and in particular so having learned from history, for example the threats domestic anti-democratic movements and individuals can pose to herself before and during World War II, as well as during the later Red Army Faction terror campaign – that right after the July 15 coup attempt until this very day members of the Fetullah Gulen inspired criminal cult have found refuge in Germany. It would be a timely gesture for Berlin to reconsider Ankara’s very real concerns.

If we then pair this with what I label a totally non-logic, and non-understandable personal expression of hate against the Turkish president, which in some instances, for example the Green Party under Mr. Özdemir, went so far as to say no EU membership talks as long as President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is in power, which is a direct interference in Turkey’s domestic politics by inciting hatred in society, the picture looked not promising at all.

However, every winter is followed by a new spring and summer. A grand coalition composed of seasoned politicians from both German mainstream political movements is the best bet to achieve exactly that. High-level political dialogue meetings should precede more direct investments by German companies. Turkish exports into Germany could then rise further, which would lead to an increase in two-way tourism levels.

If the grand coalition is established and if it takes into consideration Ankara’s on-going willingness to cooperate more closely with Berlin, and thus materializes this opportunity, the German business community as well as her citizens will benefit from this to a great deal. As for Germany herself, it seems that any alternative scenario other than such a grand coalition would apparently force the country into a prolonged state of political crisis.

With no surprise German Chancellor Angela Merkel won the federal elections on 24^th September while major parties, including her own, suffered the worst-ever losses in German political history since 1949. In her early statements subsequent to the initial projections of the election results last Sunday, Merkel commented on the results with the words “we reached the strategic goals of our election campaign.” During a time period where Europe and so-called “Western values” are facing populist and right-wing challenges, Chancellor Merkel’s Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) will once again become the only group able to build a coalition government in order to rule Europe’s most ‘powerful’ country for an additional four years.

Due to the deficit of the German parliamentary system, the building of a coalition including the negotiation process can last until Christmas of this year, or even longer. Merkel, who just started a new election campaign on the state level in Lower Saxony with regard to the elections on 25 October, will once again arrange a new coalition government. On the federal level, it is currently impossible to build a coalition government against the Christian Democratic parties by all the other five parliamentary groups. By gaining only 32,9% of the votes, Merkel’s Union will have 246 seats while the Social Democratic SPD (20,5%) 153 seats, the right-wing populist AfD (Alternative for Germany) party (12,6%) 94 seats (92 without Frauke Petry and Mario Mieruch who recently quitted their party), Free Democratic FDP (10,7%) 80 seats, the left-wing Linke (9,2%) 69 seats and the Greens (8,9%) 67 seats in Germany’s Federal Parliament, the 19^th German Bundestag.

With regard to the current number (709) of deputies in the parliament, the support of at least 355 MPs is required in order to elect the Chancellor of the new federal government. Another important result of the recent election is the fact that the two major parties reached just 53 percent of the total vote, which is the lowest combined share ever in German political history (for instance in 1987: 81,3%; 1998: 76%; 2013: 67,2%). The rationale behind this can be elaborated as a new trend according to which the German electorate diminish their traditional party allegiance and vote for other, small and even extremist parties.

Since its establishment in 1949, Germany has been governed by Christian Democrat Chancellors for approximately 48 years. For instance CDU leader Merkel has been governing the country for twelve years – and will most probably l continue her job as Chancellor for an additional four years. On the other hand, the Social Democrats have only occupied the powerful Chancellor position for 20 years in total. Generally the federal governments in Germany consisted of two party coalitions with a major and junior partner; or, as was recently the case, between 2005-2009 and 2013-2017, of a so called “grand coalition,” which is a constellation of the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats.

With the disastrous election results for both major parties, a new debate started whether a grand coalition undermines the efficient political culture in Germany. Even though Merkel still considers a potential grand coalition, the Social Democrats do not share the same feelings towards Merkel’s such ambition. According to the current election result, the SPD ruled out joining any grand coalition due to the fact that the AfD –as the third largest parliamentary group– will become the main opposition party. A no-go in post-war Germany? According to the SPD the answer to this question is yes. However, Angela Merkel did not speak against this possibility. Actually, it is too early to predict a concrete government constellation. An additional reason for the harsh position of the SPD is most likely the fact that the Social Democrats’ two worst election results since WWII have come directly on the heels of playing the role of CDU/CSU’s junior coalition partner (2009 & 2017). Consequently the SPD, still led by Martin Schulz and who took the responsibility for the worst election of the party after WWII, does not prefer to join Merkel’s government once again.

Although the SPD is tendentious to become the main opposition in the Bundestag, Angela Merkel called the Social Democrats to rethink their decision. However, Schulz rejected this offer by elaborating it as ‘waste of time.’ It is interesting to observe that mainstream media, in particular left-wing voices, also insist on preventing such a ‘grand possibility.’ The German political elite, German mainstream media, business circles and big companies call for a so-called “Jamaica Coalition” – despite its difficultness and differences with regard to the involved parties’ programs. A ‘Jamaica Coalition’ – so called because of the three parties’ colors black-yellow-green – seems to be the only likely government constellation consisting of the CDU/CSU, Liberals/FDP and the Greens. This will be a first in German history as there has never been a three-party coalition forming government on the federal level. This option is also problematic as was reflected in the recently established Jamaica coalition in Schleswig-Holstein, where the parties needed several months to reach a coalition agreement.

While the German political system does not provide a deadline for a coalition to be set,  the new 19^th Bundestag must come together by 24^th October. Within this instability, Merkel is ruling out the option of holding a second election by emphasizing respect for “the German voters’ decision.” With regard to a Jamaica coalition, it is likely that the first negotiations with party representatives of the CDU/CSU, FDP and the Greens will be postponed until the end of the state elections in Lower Saxony on 15 October.

The 24 September federal election also revealed some interesting issues with regard to the German political environment and particularly concerning some leaders’ approaches.

For instance, while not resigning from the party leadership position, SPD’s Schulz took responsibility for the party’s defeat and made it clear that he will not act as the party’s parliamentary group leader. If one examines his statements, it becomes apparent that Schulz still appears very aggressive for instance by addressing Chancellor Merkel. For instance, during the “elephant round” which generally takes place right after the election, Schulz was actually in a fighting mood against the Chancellor. For some minutes Schulz harshly attacked Merkel by literally calling her as “the biggest loser.” Furthermore, Schulz charged Merkel with being responsible for the AfD’s strong result by stating “Ms. Merkel has led a scandalous election campaign.”

The same can be said for the newly elected SPD parliamentary group leader Nahles who attacked her former Cabinet colleagues from the CDU/CSU by stating “Starting tomorrow, we’ll be right in their face.” It also seems that members in the SPD do not have courage to criticize and speak up against Schulz’ over-confident decisions and sharp statements. Nevertheless, the current situation of the SPD suggests that the party will become a platform of competition between Nahles and Schulz in the course of the upcoming party congress in December this year, where Schulz, once again, will aim to run for party leadership.

As a result, it can openly be stated that the entering of AfD into the Bundestag is a federal reflection of the German political reality, which is currently the case in 13 of 16 German federated state parliaments. With the federal election on 24 September, the contemporary reality ultimately reached the federal capital of Germany. Thus, despite the disappointment and frustrated statements on media outlets and in political circles, it is not true that this result caused an actual shock wave in German society. Moreover, instead of being surprised the mainstream parties have to reorganize and create efficient approaches and alternatives.

To some extent, the result was predictable and now this has to be addressed seriously without an overestimation of the AfD. With no doubt the striking number of right-wing, extremist and populist AfD deputies in the federal parliament is perceived as a new challenge for the German political elite in Berlin. Thinking about the potential total number of MP assistants and other AfD-employees of each AfD deputy, who will also enter into the Bundestag,  it becomes clear that the political mood in Berlin will be tense when trying to communicate with far-right politicians and affiliated employees. Nevertheless, Berlin-based political scientist Oskar Niedermayer states that the AfD in parliament should not be overrated; above all due to the fact that no political group wants to build a coalition with the far-right populists. However, Niedermayer also emphasizes the possibility that the Bundestag’s debate culture could be worsened due to some racist-nationalist AfD deputies’ actions and behaviors. In the context of the AfD, some polls revealed that more than 60 percent of current AfD voters cast a protest vote. Thus, this vote should not be considered as an expression commitment to the AfD’s party program. In addition, 50 percent of AfD voters described themselves as critical of the party for not doing enough to distance itself from the far right.

That is to say; first of all, the AfD should not be overrated as previously stated. Secondly, the right-wing populists should be prevented from dominating the Bundestag by abusing several mechanisms. Whether this will be possible is one of the main challenges the main parties, above all the government parties, the main opposition party and some key figures have to think about. Under these circumstances, the wrong path for mainstream parties would be imitating AfD’s racist discourses and populist statements. Unfortunately this was the case when CSU leader Horst Seehofer blamed the CDU/CSU for having left “the right flank open,” which, according to him, made it possible for this gap to be exploited by the AfD. But seriously, what should have been done? Be more racist than a racist party? Or solve the problems of the electorate by accurate and reasonable solution approaches? Preferably, the latter. As it is rightly stated, if a country accepts that right-wing extremists entered the parliament due to 890.000 refugees who came to Germany, what will this country do if a real crisis arises? This question has to be taken into consideration by all; not just by political parties.

The September 24, 2017 parliamentary elections in Germany seem to have a striking result. For the first time since the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949 a party defined as neo-Nazi by most German politicians was able to surpass the 5% electoral threshold and hold seats in the parliament; this could be regarded as the most astounding feature of the elections. While perceiving itself as the insurance of the EU and successfully protecting itself from far-right movements, the victory of the xenophobic, anti-immigrant and Islamophobic Alternative for Germany (AfD- Alternative für Deutschland), which received 12.6% of the vote and obtained 94 seats in the Federal Parliament, marks a new era in Germany.

Besides being xenophobic, anti-immigrant and Islamophobic, AfD’s desire to revert Germany to its nation-state structure, thus standing against the EU, means that Berlin’s role within the union will be increasingly questioned. Seeing itself as the defender of European values and the leader of the EU, while being criticized by many European countries like Poland, Italy, Hungary and Greece for patronizing other countries, Germany will have a hard time maintaining its bid for EU leadership after AfD’s rise. Building extreme right pressure in Germany, similar to France, indicates that the worst is yet to come for the EU, which is already facing the risk of dissolution.

Another significant result of the election is that a three-way coalition government has become imperative for the first time since 1957. As it seems highly improbable that a coalition consisting a center-right, a liberal and a leftist party could be established, let alone stay intact for 4 years, it would not be unrealistic to suggest that serious instability awaits Germany. After 60 years, Germany is once again preparing for a three-way coalition government. While it may be asserted that the country already has a tradition of coalitions as it has constantly been governed by them since 1957, what is important to note is that they have always been two-party coalitions. Bringing business-minded FDP together with the leftist Greens and making them cooperate will be a challenging task to accomplish for the CDU/CSU – the greater partner of this coalition.

Moreover, CSU, the smaller partner of the Christian Union Parties, being in crisis and having issues in communicating with CDU are other factors that could cause instability. Lastly, having 6 parties in the parliament for the first time in 60 years could also cause instability resulting from the distribution of political power between these groups.

Centrist parties are losing power in Europe

Another significant trend reflected by the election results is that the centrist political parties in Germany are continuing to lose votes, as is also the case in other European countries. Although they are still the most powerful parties, unlike those in France, the Netherlands and Austria, Germany’s two powerful centrist parties have lost around 13.8% of the vote in comparison to the previous election. Their combined vote, 53.4%, is the lowest in Germany’s history. This should be regarded as an indicator that confirms the worries of those that fear of Germany’s instability.

Social Democratic Party (SPD – Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) receiving 20.5% of the vote, thus the lowest in their history, is another astounding result of the election. SPD’s votes, declining since Gerhard Schröder’s resignation from the Chancellorship and party chairmanship in 2005, could partially be explained due to the party sharing its voter base with other leftist parties like The Left (Die Linke) and Greens. Left votes in Germany declining to 38.5% signifies that leftist parties, especially the SPD, are unsuccessful in persuading German voters. When considering that the left had received more than half of the total votes in the 2002 election, which carried Schröder to power, the dissolution of Germany’s left becomes evident. SPD’s votes being distributed between the extreme left Die Linke and the extreme right AfD indicates that this is not an issue only about the German left. On the contrary, it is an issue concerning the whole country and Europe.

Another reality marked by the results of the election is that competing with far-right AfD in xenophobia and Islamophobia, along with competing amongst themselves in anti-Turkey sentiments, did not yield any benefits for centrist parties. AfD, tripling its vote and becoming the third most successful of the election, has shown other parties that advocating their own policies and principles instead of imitating AfD’s xenophobic and anti-immigrant sentiments would have been more credible for their voter base. As a result of the media’s editorial policy, which pumps insecurity, fear and concern, voters who maintain negative views towards migration and foreigners have found AfD’s anti-immigrant discourse more realistic.

Similarly, following the trend of The Left and Greens in terms of anti-Turkey sentiments, centrist parties CDU/CSU and SPD were unable to wrest any benefits from their hostile discourse towards Ankara. The power struggle these parties entered into with Turkey displeased voters who believe Germany is a country of commerce that ought to stay out of any conflict. The antagonistic policies towards Turkey, developed especially by leftist parties, were also punished by conservative voters of Turkish origin. Meanwhile, the anti-Erdoğan and anti-AK Party perception created through the smear campaign carried out by the media served AfD.

Effects of the election results on Turkish-German relations

According to the results of the election, there were two possibilities regarding a coalition. The most probable was the continuation of the “Grand Coalition” (between CDU/CSU and SPD) which was preferred by Chancellor Merkel. However, after SPD Chairman Martin Schulz stated that his party is to become the opposition, the only alternative is the coalition between CDU/CSU-FDP-Greens, which is also known as the “Jamaica Coalition.” Considering that all parties oppose a coalition with AfD, that the leftist parties lack seats to form a “leftist coalition,” and that the CDU/CSU categorically reject a coalition with Die Linke, the Jamaica Coalition becomes the only available option.

Formation and maintenance of this coalition is indeed challenging. Yet, how would this coalition affect Turkish-German relations?

Firstly, the Greens, who alongside Die Linke, have led an ideological hostility towards Turkey claiming that if they were to become partners of the coalition they would issue travel warnings as to wreck Turkey’s tourism. In an attempt to increase economic and political pressure on Turkey by claiming that Ankara only understands from stern language, it should be underlined that a party who has maintained this negative discourse sharing political power in a coalition will have negative consequences for Turkish-German relations. Considering that the party consorts Turkey’s domestic affairs into Germany’s agenda through anti-Turkey diaspora members and negatively affects Berlin’s policies towards Ankara, the Greens might exacerbate existing issues between the two countries if they maintain these policies when part of the coalition government.

In such a scenario, potential coalition partner FDP’s intervention and assertion that Germany is a commerce country which should refrain from constructing foreign policy based on ideology gains importance. It is highly likely that the CDU/CSU’s ideological approach towards Turkey was influenced during the election campaign due to Die Linke and the Greens. Within this framework therefore, the FDP ought to take duty in pulling the government back onto a rationalist doctrine.

Future relations between Germany and Turkey will be shaped by a possible Jamaica Coalition, whose major political lines will be determined by either the Greens’ ideological foreign policy or FDP’s expected pragmatism along with Merkel’s CDU/CSU’s approach to these two options.

Ankara’s position is clear. Turkey expects Germany to accept it as a sovereign and equal partner and to halt support to PKK and FETO as a requirement of the NATO alliance.

While Germany’s Angela Merkel has secured a fourth term as Chancellor after Sunday’s election for a new Bundestag (the federal Parliament), her authority has undoubtedly diminished. The radical rightwing AfD has entered Parliament as the third-largest party, institutionalizing the rise of far-right ideology in Germany.

Merkel’s conservative block gained 32.9 percent of the vote, a decrease of 8.6 percent since the 2013 elections. The social democrats have also decreased their vote by 5.2 percent, leaving them with 20.5 percent of the vote. While the CDU/CSU secured 34.7 percent of seats in Parliament, the SPD remained at 21.6.

In analyzing the results and the decline of the two major blocs, it can be stated that the vote has been shared between the FDP, who are pro-business, and who increased its vote by 6 percent. However, the real deal is the fact that AfD entered Parliament with 12.6 percent of the general vote, securing 87 seats in Parliament.

This now means that Merkel’s new real opposition is the far-right.

AfD entrance not warm welcomed

With its increase of the national vote and seats in Parliament, hundreds of protestors gathered in the cities of Berlin, Hamburg and Frankfurt to show opposition to the hard-right party.

The protestors gathered at Berlin’s Alexanderplatz on Sunday, near a victory party for AfD and chanted slogans including “racism is not an alternative,” “AfD is a bunch of racists” and “Nazis out!”

“The whole of Berlin hates the AfD!” was also heard at the protest.

Riot police were alarmed and ensured to prevent the protestors from approaching the building where the AfD victory party was being held.

Turks once again under-represented

Considering the fact that Germany is home to 3 million Turks, the current under-representation in the new German Parliament raises questions regarding ethnic representation.

Only 14 lawmakers with a Turkish background have been elected to the 709-seat Bundestag, where the AfD have become the third largest group.

While the CDU/CSU and FDP have no Turkish members, the SPD has managed to draw the largest number of lawmakers from the Turkish community.

Ahead of the elections, the Turkish Community in Germany (TGD) association called on political parties to take measures, including setting quotas, in order to increase the representation of citizens with an immigrant background in the Bundestag.

With parliamentary elections coming in 2017, the party conference under the motto “Unsere Werte. Unsere Zukunft” (Our Values. Our Future) was the prime opportunity for Angela Merkel to show that she was willing to struggle against the opposition within and outside her party. Many asked what the most pertinent election tool to get back the votes and support which was lost could be. For this purpose Islam was an appropriate target. Parallel societies, Sharia Law and the face veil were the particular themes she addressed. “Law and Order should be and shall remain as the foundation for us living together,” Merkel said. “Over here in Germany the laws of our country are applicable for everyone in the same way without any exception…Our proposal declares that we do not want parallel societies and where they exist we have to go against it. Our law has priority before honor codes, tribal or family rules and the Shariah.”Surprisingly, the chancellor had made a u-turn when it came to her position towards the legal conformity of the face veil. “This also means that in inter-human communication, which plays a fundamental role, we show our face. Therefore the face veil is not appropriate over here and it should be banned wherever it is legally possible. It does not belong to us,” Merkel said. Her demand and appeal to the legal experts of her government was underpinned by standing ovations by her fellow party members, and it seemed to have a higher priority than the economic and political crisis within the European Union (EU) or the rising xenophobia in Germany, if measured by the intensity of the applause. Just a few weeks before the party conference Merkel sounded radically different. In September she was defending the freedom of religion, even if some practices or manifestations in public “may appear strange to us,” she said then, arguing against a total ban of the face veil.

Of course the attitude against the face veil is not a unique German phenomenon. Today it fits into safeguarding and implementing “European Values” for some member states of the EU. Already in 2010, France banned and even criminalized the burqa. The “burkini” ban was a heated debate in 2016, and the European Court of Human Rights upheld France’s burqa decision in 2014 in which the art of “living together” (vivre ensemble) was seen as a legitimate reason to ban the face veil from public.

Other countries, such as Belgium, Bulgaria, and just recently the Netherlands, followed suit. Lately the cabinet of Germany approved a ban for the face veil for public servants. Merkel seems to have figured out that making Islam a key theme in the election campaign would win back votes that were lost to the AfD. But the AfD should not be seen as the main perpetrator for the current right-wing political tendency. Within the CDU there are politicians who used similar Islamophobic vocabulary and arguments, even before the AfD was founded, personalities such as Heinz Buschkowsky, Jens Spahn, Katharina Klöckler or Wolfgang Bosbach.

The young party members in the circle of the CDU (the Junge Union) seem to act in the same manner. Jenovan Krishnan, President of the youth organization linked to the CDU, the Ring of Christian Democratic Students (RCDS) – a child of Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka who came to Germany in the early 90s – was one of most persistent voices calling for a face veil ban. In general the youth organization of the CDU – the Young Union – pledged against the will of Angela Merkel, for a reintroduction of the duty to choose between citizenships, and took a stance against the concept of multiple citizenships, which was subsequently abolished in 2014.

It seems, even though German society becomes ethnically, religiously and culturally more diverse, the political trend goes back to the idea of the so called Leitkultur (meaning core or dominant culture), a social philosophy which stems from the Syrian political scientist Bassam Tibi, an academic in the line of neo-conservative thought on the likes of Samuel P. Huntington. His idea of Deutsche Leitkultur states that there have to be certain superior norms that are binding on everyone, but especially immigrants, on the cultural level, such as adopting the dominant language and a number of other cultural practices. The final aim, which resembles the American “melting pot,” is to assimilate “the stranger.”

With the rise of Leitkultur at the end of the 1990s, a more liberal approach was developed around the concept of multiculturalism, which the Americans described as the “salad bowl.” Hereby the cultural, ethnic and religious identities of people are respected and people live side by side as the pieces of a mosaic. Since the beginning of the year 2000, these two models seem to be the two extremes of dealing with diversity. It can be said that after 9/11 the idea of Leitkultur is the dominant but not sole political instrument. In 2010, Merkel famously stated that multiculturalism has failed, even as the other option of Leitkultur was praised silently.

But today Leitkultur has even become an integral part of a legal document. The integration law of Bavaria, which was passed just recently, literally mentions the importance of Leitkultur and the respect and obedience immigrants have to show for it. Without exaggeration, it can be said that both models are far from being satisfactory. While the one assimilates, the other deepens the crisis of relativism, due to the fact that a common good, the standard goal for how immigrants must assimilate, is nearly impossible to define.

In the search for a societal model which correlates with Germany’s Zeitgeist of the present, it should be the one framed by the sociologist Dolf Sternberger, a disciple of Karl Jaspers, in the 1970s and advanced by Jürgen Habermas, which is called Verfassungspatriotismus (constitutional patriotism). According to this idea the highest commonly binding norm is the constitution, and diversity has its limits within the rights and responsibilities of this legal document as well its order of values. The constitution as a modus vivendi for its people has to be seen as the benchmark for everyone. Logically, the Constitutional Court of Germany is the key actor and provides the final word in the debates around integration, diversity and a peaceful coexistence. The court demands the state be the homeland of all its citizens. Therefore the statement “my Leitkultur is the constitution”, in the words of Guntram Schneider, former Minister of Integration of North-Rhine Westphalia, could be reasonable for everyone.

The recent decisions by the Constitutional Court – including granting permission for state employees to wear the headscarf at German state schools and kindergartens – are in the spirit of constitutional patriotism and Germany’s sociological reality today. How should a possible face veil ban be seen in this context? Prof. Christoph Möllers, a legal philosopher from the Humboldt-University of Berlin, asked in an article for the Süddeutsche Zeitung for a valid reason for a burqa or full face veil ban, as not a single one was provided by the policy’s political proponents. The civil rights of other people, Möllers pointed out, don’t seem to be violated. Could societal discomfort from sharing a public sphere with women dressed like that be a valid argument? In terms of public or constitutional law, this is untenable, with the consequence that there is no legal justification for a full face veil ban in public.

Another fallacy is that the political measures against the face veil are often presented as directed only against an extreme form of an Islamic dress code, and not against the majority of law abiding and integrated Muslims in Germany. But even not outwardly identifiable Muslim members of the CDU felt offended by this idea at the party conference in Essen. Neda El Saghir, managing director of CDU’s Union der Vielfalt (Union of diversity) said that: “It was surprising how the people reacted when she [Merkel] spoke about the face veil. I’m fed up to speak about this topic over and over again. I am myself a Muslim and we talk about a few women. There are much more important topics than the face veil. And to see how we reacted to that frightened me a little bit at that moment to be honest.”

Germany, a country known for creative neologisms, names debates like the one on the face veil as Stellvertreterdebatte (meaning dummy, or substitute debate). However in reality it is a statement against a marginally visible form of Islamic appearance, without social or factual relevance. The goal of these debates is still to spark a debate about Islam in general. While it is understandable that showing the face, making eye contact, and using the natural tools of gestures is a common practice in many Western countries, the question of actual women wearing the burqa (the full face veil) or the niqab (partial face veil, in which the eyes can be seen) show us the minuscule relevance: an estimated 300 women in Germany wear a niqab which is about 0.01% of the German Muslim population. The most publicly visible women wearing niqab are the wives of rich Saudi citizens, who regularly shop in expensive stores, especially in cities like Munich.

The parliament of Saxony-Anhalt just refused a burqa ban for a simple reason – the obvious lack of necessity for such a law. In a press conference, the spokesperson of the government was asked if any data was available regarding the actual number of women who wear a full face veil in Germany. The answer at the end was that no actual statistic is available. To help the government, it should be pointed out that the percent or concrete number is plain and simple: zero.

Constant change is one of the elementary factors of the nature of life and the world in which we live. In the last three centuries many important revolutions transformed almost every country on the planet. Great thinkers in history, such as Ibn Khaldun and Arnold J. Toynbee, saw civilizations in their historical processes as a sort of body that periodically undergo the segments of regular human organisms – from growth to death. In this line, German philosopher and historian Oswald Spengler published his influential book, Der Untergang des Abendlandes (The Decline of the West). Herein, Spengler presented an alternative model to the rational and enlightened idea of constant progress by pointing out that a decline of a civilization is a common, final, and natural result. But, more importantly, according to Spengler, the age of the decline of the West was already in progress at the beginning of the 20th century. Based on this, it may not be surprising that ideological terminologies such as “downfall” or “clash of cultures” have been used disproportionately in the political arena. A popular word in German political literature, for example, is the so-called clash of cultures, or Kulturkampf, which also belongs to the historic experience of Otto von Bismarck’s controversy with the Catholic Church. In the process of unifying German provinces into a single nation he saw the Catholic Church as a big threat, which led to an antagonism between the state and the church. These concepts matter for us as they are the ideological backbones of a neo-conservative worldview under construct today.Such cultural pessimism has been revived by the advocates of the new right wing in Europe. For more than a decade they have created hysterical or malevolent concepts such as “Eurabia,” “Londonistan,” or “Dhimmitude.” They have taken to the streets with their activist allies, such as the EDL (English Defense League) or the far more effective PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of Europe), recently winning political influence in various parliaments with their political representatives, the FPÖ, Front National, or the AfD (Alternative für Deutschland), or even creating their own terrorists such as Anders Breivik. With these activities, Islam is their main focus. To the right wing, Muslims are seen as the main threat to Judeo-Christian Western traditions, and their public symbols as objective proof of the Occident’s downfall. This fear can also be seen in various polls conducted in Germany between 2014 and 2015, in which 57% of Germans saw Islam as a threatening religion, 52% were worried about the increasing influence of Islam in Germany because of Muslim refugees, and 72% were afraid of terrorist attacks.

These results can be seen as typical manifestations of the German Angst. However, a view of Europe’s current political landscape proves the opposite. Fear seems to be a regional, or even continental, attitude towards the now-visible Muslim community. But this concept of fear is not a mere expression of an uncomfortable emotion. It has become a major social challenge and even a research field in various academic disciplines: Islamophobia and xenophobia represent the irrational fear of “the other” by having prejudices and creating a discriminatory image of Muslims or other minorities. So, it is not surprising that some European states have revived the “mission to civilize” by banning the burqa and burkini (as in France), or even forcing Muslim students to eat pork (as in Austria). Society and demographics are changing as new types of people are appearing today, such as the German with a migration background or the “New Germans” (Prof. Herfried Münkler). What many populists or plain racists conceal is that change is not a synonym for downfall. As mentioned earlier, the concept of change has its own and sometimes unpredictable logic. It would be naive to believe that a country such as Germany still has the same homogenous populus it had in the 1920s. In places such as Berlin’s Kreuzberg, multi-culturalism is the norm, as it is in many world capitals and in other cities such as Offenbach, where 60% of the inhabitants have a non-German background.

Finally, it should be pointed out that fear can block rational thinking and thereby question ideas that have been fundamentally protected in legal documents for many centuries. As an example, the AfD’s questioning of whether or not Islam belongs to Germany is an irrelevant question in terms of the German Constitution. But the presence of fear, human rights, and constitutional guarantee create an oxymoron such that, for example, if religious freedom is a right provided by the constitution, then it is an essential element of the social contract between the people and the state according to social contract theory. One can add vague legal concepts such as living together (vivre ensemble) to this. But the burqa case in France provides a flexible tool for conservative approaches to limit the freedom of Muslims and move closer to the concept of assimilation. The president of the German Constitutional Court, Prof. Andreas Voßkuhle, referred to the German Constitution as the “constitution of the middle.” This seems to be a wise approach and should be a plea to lead discussions and debates regarding refugees, Islam, and demographic changes; a path advisable for those who represent either of the two extremes: Thomas More’s Utopia on the one hand or John Stuart Mill’s Dystopia on the other.