The elections held in India and Indonesia this year have attracted considerable attention from scholars and practitioners, particularly in the context of security issues linking the regions to regional and international politics in the Indo-Pacific. The two countries are among the most important political actors in the region that are expected to be able to exert decisive influence, especially amid the prevailing rivalry between the United States and China.

The victories of Narendra Modi in India and Prabowo Subianto in Indonesia are not only indicative of domestic development priorities. They also reflect a new international behavior that can be interpreted as a reorientation of policy in the face of the urgency of engagement, stability and security in the Indo-Pacific region.

Questions about government conduct on this issue are not new. Historically, the geography of India and Indonesia on the Indo-Pacific map has been the most strategic, not only in terms of population and economic growth, but also in terms of relations with global powers. The parliamentary majorities formed by the newly elected president in Indonesia and prime minister in India and, lastly, the military capacity, have put these two countries in the limelight.

For all their potential power, the question remains whether Indonesia’s newly elected president and India’s newly elected prime minister will play an effective role in the global politics of the Indo-Pacific. Will the national leadership achieved by Prabowo Subianto and Narendra Modi transcend a union commitment to the projection of security and stability in the Indo-Pacific?

Mapping of the Indo-Pacific Concept

The Indo-Pacific extends from regions in the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean. It precisely encompasses in the tropical land of the Indian Ocean which includes India, Sri Lanka, African nations on the western side of the Indian Ocean and Yemen up the northern side of the Indian Ocean. At the other end, lies central-western part of Pacific Ocean which includes Australia, Japan and South Korea. Between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean are all the ASEAN member states and their water zones, as well as the currently disputed South China Sea.

The Indo-Pacific concept emerged at the beginning of this century through strategists’ projections. Prioritizing economic cooperation and security between states, the growth spurt accelerated in the second decade. In the 2010s, the effects are being felt by all member countries across the region. It is now common knowledge that the introduction of the Indo-Pacific concept is directly linked to the strategic economic and security strategies of China, which is seeking a global role as a great power.

Under the leadership of the U.S. administration, especially in the face of the U.S.’s multiple disagreements with China, which have noticeably increased after Xi Jinping’s presidency in 2013, a new military alliance structure has been introduced in the Indo-Pacific in the last decade, similar to the Anglo-Saxon geopolitical entity. Australia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and later Japan and India are the states united in a military alliance, as seen in the case of the U.S.-led QUAD and AUKUS, and predominantly determined by the Anglo-Saxon geopolitical worldview that triggered the return of the ‘West’ to global security expansions from the Asia-Pacific to the Indo-Pacific outlook.

The electoral victories in India and Indonesia have once again raised the question of whether the countries’ fate in the growing Indo-Pacific rivalry is destined to be a historical repetition, or whether both countries will intensify their economic and military engagement in the Indo-Pacific by aligning themselves with one of the power orbits.

The Strategic Reefs of India and Indonesia

So what is the position of India and Indonesia in the emerging security and economic imagination of the Indo-Pacific? To answer this question, one must recognize the existing reefs that serve the natural rationale and strategy that guide directions in both countries’ foreign relations approach within the great power rivalry in the Indo-Pacific.

India is strong but also fragile. This means that the basic social and political infrastructures of the country, which include very diverse societies divided by ethnicity, religion, caste and ideology, demand equal human rights and distribution of wealth within the political framework of the nation-state. Ideally, the hurdles to securing these demands could mean that the Indian central government could be prevented from becoming a strong actor in the international arena. This situation goes beyond the Hindu majority-Muslim minority dichotomy. It leads the country’s political elite to give priority to improving their position in domestic decision-making.

Given its inward-looking domestic politics, this does not mean that India has sidelined proactive engagement in international politics. The trigger for engagement is based solely on a realist approach, where it sees its nation’s security at stake. It was triggered by several cases. A long-standing border dispute with China in the Himalayan region is one example. Another is the maritime infrastructure projects that China is developing in connection with the Maritime Silk Road project from the west to the east of the Indian Ocean, i.e. from Myanmar to Djibouti, as well as the Pakistan-China border infrastructure at the Khunjerab Pass and the Gwadar-Kashgar crude oil pipelines, which are seen as having the potential to serve as a decisive pattern organ that would allow the weakening of India’s influence as a regional power.

Despite these signals, Narendra Modi’s response has been a barking tree. For example, in the recent open battle between China and India in the Himalayas, in which 20 Indian soldiers died, there were hardly any strong decisions taken by India, which was under the so-called strong leadership of Narendra Modi and a government dominated by Hindutva, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). On the other hand, there is another concern surrounding the recent statement made by the Indian authorities. The competition between India and China for minerals in the Indian Ocean, such as cobalt, which is now being eyed by China and Sri Lanka, has led India to claim that the Indian Ocean is the ‘Indian Sea’, which requires official confirmation of territorial sovereignty due to China’s denial. Looking at the two examples above, it is quite early to say that India has failed to portray itself as a content regional power, especially in the rising global rivalry in Indo-Pacific affairs.

The natural strategic reef that Indonesia is facing is similarly displayed through the disputes in the oceans involving the South China Sea, Natuna Island, economic ventures with China, and military strengthening partnership with the U.S. Although Prabowo Subianto will officially hold the seat of the presidency in November 2024, numerous media outlets and critics highlight his realist and constructivist approach, equipped with a strategy to gain a position in international politics, as a higher priority compared to that of his predecessor, who focused heavily on achieving domestic goals rather than international recognition. In the last two months alone, his visits to Malaysia, Singapore and the meeting with the US Secretary of State in Jordan have given the impression of his commitment to active participation in international affairs.

His realism and constructivist approach in considering international engagement comes from his military background as Defence Minister during Joko Widodo’s second term (2019-2024), his entire career in the army and war experience since the Soeharto era, his entry into national politics four times as a presidential candidate, and his role as spokesman of certain opposition circles in the country speak volumes about what Indonesia would serve to international states and communities. The dispute over China’s nine-dash line claim played a role in the victory of Prabowo, who was known as an efficient and responsive actor during China’s possible encroachment on Indonesia’s Natuna Islands. Prabowo, who was then Defence Minister, initiated an important military construction in Riau Province that provides an eagle view of the military engagement that could result from the South China Sea dispute.

However, as much as Prabowo may be a realist and constructivist, good economic relations with China and the U.S. in recent decades would prevent any lone ranger from strategizing a move. Like India, Indonesia would probably seek to balance and hedge its foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific, forcing the Prabowo administration to first strengthen and leverage cooperation with ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and the United Nations before aligning with any of the Indo-Pacific power blocs.

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n a move that underscores China’s expanding influence in the Pacific region, uniformed Chinese police officers have been quietly deployed to Kiribati, a remote atoll nation situated in the Pacific Ocean near Hawaii. The initiative, not publicly disclosed by Kiribati authorities, is part of Beijing’s broader efforts to strengthen security ties in the Pacific Islands, heightening its rivalry with the United States.

Kiribati, with a population of around 115,000, holds strategic importance due to its proximity to Hawaii and its control over one of the largest exclusive economic zones globally, spanning more than 3.5 million square kilometers. The nation hosts a Japanese satellite tracking station.

According to Eeri Aritiera, Kiribati’s acting police commissioner, the Chinese police collaboration involves community policing, martial arts (Tai Chi) Kung Fu training, and assistance in developing the country’s crime database program. However, Aritiera emphasized that there is no official Chinese police station in Kiribati.

Police assistance

“The Chinese police delegation team works with the Kiribati Police Service – to assist on Community Policing program and Martial Arts (Tai Chi) Kung Fu, and IT department assisting our crime database program,” stated Aritiera in an email response.

The Chinese embassy in Kiribati has not provided an official comment on the role of its police. In a January social media post, the embassy did acknowledge the leader of “the Chinese police station in Kiribati.”

Aritiera, who attended a meeting in Beijing between China’s public security minister Wang Xiaohong and several Pacific Islands police officials in December, revealed that Kiribati had requested China’s policing assistance in 2022. A group of up to a dozen uniformed Chinese police officers arrived last year for a six-month rotation.

A secret security pact

While China’s security and trade proposals were rejected by the Pacific Islands Forum in 2022, the Chinese government has since established a police presence in the Solomon Islands under a secret security pact. This move drew criticism from Washington and Canberra for potentially undermining regional stability.

According to Graeme Smith, a Pacific expert from the Australian National University, China’s deployment of police abroad serves to extend its reach over the Chinese diaspora and provides valuable insights into the domestic politics and diplomatic partnerships of host countries.

“Australia and the United States are concerned about that prospect, in Kiribati and around the region, and are taking measures to protect their position,” said Meg Keen, Director of the Lowy Institute’s Pacific Islands Program.

From Taiwan to Beijing

Kiribati, which switched diplomatic ties from Taiwan to Beijing in 2019, has seen increased Chinese investment in infrastructure. China’s efforts also include plans to rebuild a World War Two U.S. military airstrip on Kanton Island, raising concerns in Washington.

While Kiribati’s Kiritimati island is approximately 2,160 km south of Honolulu, the United States has responded to China’s activities by pledging to upgrade the wharf on Kanton island and expressing a desire to open an embassy in Kiribati. Australia has been providing security support, donating two patrol boats and contributing to major upgrades in Kiribati’s policing infrastructure.

Papua New Guinea, another Pacific Island nation, recently rejected a Chinese offer of police assistance and surveillance technology amid concerns from traditional security partners, the United States and Australia.

Source: Reuters

Military assistance to Ukraine and its NATO membership are two separate matters. In fact, there is almost complete consensus among Alliance members to provide military assistance to Ukraine. Although some NATO members, such as Germany, were initially reluctant, they have come around to Washington’s line under pressure from their domestic public opinion, Europe, and the United States.

In the early stages of the Russia-Ukraine war, Berlin was only prepared to provide Ukraine with troops, but it has now supplied the country with Leopard 2 tanks and advanced air defence missiles. From this point of view, NATO, which has organized itself very quickly and decisively to support Ukraine militarily, will continue this support until it achieves its goals with regard to Russia.

There are already problems with the production of ammunition for certain weapons due to their intensive use on the Ukrainian front, yet, one of the most important factors determining the course of the struggle between NATO and Russia will be the production of weapons and ammunition, given that Russia is experiencing similar problems to a much greater extent.

The issue of Ukraine’s NATO membership, which is expected to be one of the main items on the agenda at the Vilnius summit, has caused serious disagreement between member states. Some, particularly the Baltic and several Eastern European countries, argue that Ukraine should become a member of NATO quickly, while others, such as the United States and Germany, where there is intense internal debate on the issue, oppose such a quick decision.

Those in favor of a more cautious approach suggest to wait until the end of the war to decide on the issue, fearing that Ukraine’s possible NATO membership during the war would draw them into direct armed conflict with Russia and would also complicate peace negotiations with Russia. They are considering postponing a decision in the hope that, at the end of the war, there will be a weakened Russia unable to oppose Ukraine’s NATO membership. Therefore, it seems unlikely that a decision on Ukraine’s NATO membership will be taken at the Vilnius summit.

However, given the establishment of a NATO-Ukraine Council and the strong likelihood that Ukraine will not be required to meet the preconditions of the Membership Action Plan for the accession of new members, such as the fight against corruption, which was previously included in the Membership Action Plan adopted at the Bucharest Summit, the door will be left open for Ukraine’s membership in the medium term. This issue will be closely linked to the development of NATO’s Russia policy and the outcome of the war. Moreover, Russia’s policy towards the West will be crucial to Ukraine’s NATO membership.

For NATO members, such as Italy and Spain, which have not yet resolved their economic problems caused by the Euro debt crisis, increasing their military spending from 1.5% to more than 2% would mean additional problems for their budget balances. In addition, the military spending of NATO members such as Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, and Ireland remains well below the Alliance’s target. It should be recalled that NATO has set the 2% limit as a minimum target, and Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has persistently called for more than 2% military spending in the member states he has visited.

While Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has created a strong motivation for NATO to increase military spending, the disruptions it has caused to energy and food supplies, and prices, and the resulting economic challenges have left many members struggling to find the financial resources to increase their military spending. It is worth noting that NATO members, especially those with growing economic problems, will find it difficult to meet the Alliance’s targets for increasing military spending.

Meanwhile, the U.S. administration wants to see its NATO allies on its side in the fight against China, just as it has done with Russia. Yet, it is no secret that there are members who have reservations about this; Germany, France, and Turkey are among such countries, albeit for different reasons.

In the aftermath of the Trump era, European NATO members are struggling to trust the United States, making it difficult for them to follow Washington’s lead, especially when it comes to a policy towards China. The same reluctance was also present about a policy towards Russia; however, the Russia-Ukraine war helped to remove this reluctance and align countries behind the U.S. Now Washington wants to capitalize on this shock momentum and rally its European allies behind its line against China.

In addition to the shock effect of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, the U.S. has another advantage in rallying the Europeans behind it: “American friends” in Europe. These “American friends,” commonly known as Atlanticists, are everywhere in Europe. They are in power in countries like Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland, and are partners in coalition governments in countries like Germany.

Given that China has not made a mistake similar to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, but instead is trying to create a sphere of influence for itself through economic cooperation, and given its close economic ties with some European countries, it will not be as easy for Washington to rally NATO members behind its fight against Beijing as it has been to rally them against Moscow.

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he Taiwan Strait has emerged as a geopolitical hotspot, garnering significant attention due to the escalating tensions between the United States and China. This narrow body of water, separating the island of Taiwan from mainland China, has become a focal point of power struggles and competing interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

China’s rise as a global power, both economically and militarily, has fueled concerns over its pursuit of reunification with Taiwan, which currently enjoys de facto independence from China. President Xi Jinping has made reunification a cornerstone of his administration, employing a combination of diplomatic pressure, military posturing, and economic incentives to isolate Taiwan diplomatically and erode its international standing. China’s military modernization, including the development of advanced weaponry and naval capabilities, has increased its capacity to forcefully assert its territorial claims. Meanwhile, the U.S. engages with Taiwan in a way China views as provocative. Should we be concerned?

In War and Peace in the Taiwan Strait, Scott L. Kastner delves into the increasingly tense relationship between China and Taiwan. As fears of a potential military conflict loom large, Kastner offers readers a comprehensive and nuanced analysis of the factors that could lead to hostilities while emphasizing that the situation should not be exaggerated. This book not only sheds new light on the prospects for cross-strait military conflict but also explores the pathways that could either lead to or help prevent such a crisis.

Kastner begins by examining the complex implications of deepening economic integration between China and Taiwan. While economic ties have historically been seen as a stabilizing force, the author delves into the potential risks that arise as a result of this interdependence. He further explores the shifting balance of military power in the region, considering the implications of China’s military modernization efforts and the potential impact on Taiwan’s defense capabilities. These dynamics, coupled with uncertainty surrounding the future of U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s security, contribute to the complex landscape of the Taiwan Strait. A crucial question Kastner considers in his book is whether the United States would come to Taiwan’s defense.

The author also highlights the significance of domestic political changes in both China and Taiwan. By analyzing the internal dynamics within these two entities, Kastner provides readers with a deeper understanding of how domestic factors can shape cross-strait relations and potentially impact the likelihood of military conflict. Kastner delves into an in-depth examination of the intricately intertwined economies of Taiwan and China, as well as their historical background and the significance of freedom in the Taiwanese context.

While the risks of conflict are indeed real, Kastner’s analysis offers a more tempered perspective, emphasizing that war in the Taiwan Strait is far from inevitable. He argues that there are multiple distinct pathways that could lead to hostilities, and the mechanisms that may mitigate one type of conflict might not necessarily be applicable to others. However, the book underlines the presence of powerful mitigating factors, combined with plausible steps to reduce the likelihood of military conflict, providing a glimmer of hope for avoiding a catastrophic outcome.

Combining international relations theory with meticulous empirical analysis of regional trends, Kastner presents readers with valuable insights into the potential occurrence of war in the Taiwan Strait and, more importantly, how such a conflict can be averted. The book equips policymakers, scholars, and interested readers with the knowledge necessary to navigate this complex geopolitical landscape.

War and Peace in the Taiwan Strait is a timely work that provides a comprehensive examination of the risks and possibilities surrounding military conflict in the region. Kastner’s expertise and meticulous research contribute to a vital perspective that not only deepens our understanding of the Taiwan Strait issue but also provides valuable insights into maintaining peace and stability in the region.

Scott L. Kastner, War and Peace in the Taiwan Strait (Columbia University Press, 2022) ISBN: 9780231198653, 272 pages

Written by Dilara Özer

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he Pacific is heating up. The rise of China rocks the balance of power making room for an emerging new order. In this month’s book bundle, we present eight books about the hottest topic of international affairs: the U.S.-China rivalry. What awaits the world as tensions rise? This selection approaches the topic from comprehensive and diverse angles ranging from international relations theory assumptions to the most outstanding topics of the U.S.-China rivalry such as economic leadership and information war.

The competition between the two great powers has overtaken the world agenda and is shaping foreign policy decisions globally. Therefore, this book bundle was compiled with special attention to the reactions of middle and smaller powers in the face of this competition, aiming to give the reader a broader perspective to interpret what awaits the world more holistically.

Will the shift in the balance of power between the U.S. and China lead to a war? International relations theory predicts that shifts between a hegemon and a rising power may trigger actions with such consequences. Steve Chan examines how many of these theories hold true in the case of U.S.-China relations with Taiwan remaining a flash point for a possible Sino-American conflict.

Rumbles of Thunder: Power Shifts and the Danger of Sino-American War further explores the risk-oriented popular narratives on the topic with sound and well-grounded judgement, considering whether several factors that can raise or lower international tension apply to the current situation. Chan criticizes overly mechanistic frameworks and shows that power shifts do not predetermine violent outcomes—and neither does their absence ensure peace. In fact, many factors like domestic politics, international political economy, and the choices of individual leaders come into play.

Rumbles of Thunder demonstrates that claims of a “rising China” catching up and overtaking the United States are alarmist, and Chan predicts that American structural advantages will endure for some time to come. Contrary to popular belief, Chan does not maintain that China acts like a revisionist power seeking to overturn the system or that the U.S. is defending the international order. Rumbles of Thunder brings a fresh analytical outlook to the table and challenges conventional wisdom on the likelihood of war between the United States and China.

Steve Chan, Rumbles of Thunder: Power Shifts and the Danger of Sino-American War (Columbia University Press, 2022) ISBN: 9780231208451, 336 pages

In Accidental Conflict: America, China, and the Clash of False Narratives, Stephan Roach argues that the conflict between the U.S. and China wouldn’t have emerged were it not for a needless clash of false narratives, and that much of the rhetoric on both sides is dangerously misguided, amplified by information distortion, and should be seen more like a reflection of each nation’s fears and vulnerabilities than a credible assessment of the risks they face. The U.S. blames its trade and technology threats on China yet overlooks its shaky saving foundation. Meanwhile, China blames its growth challenges on the alleged U.S. containment of market-based socialism, ignoring its failed economic rebalancing.

Accidental Conflict: America, China, and the Clash of False Narratives provides an analysis of both nations’ economies, politics, and policies, and offers a new road map for restoring a mutually advantageous relationship. The book will be available in paperback on June 6, 2023.

Stephan Roach, Accidental Conflict: America, China, and the Clash of False Narratives (Yale University Press, 2022) ISBN: 9780300259643, 448 pages

Kevin Rudd, a former Australian prime minister who spent more than forty years in China, puts the turbulent relationship between the U.S. and China under the spotlight with insightful analyses based on his firsthand understanding of the mindsets of the leadership whose judgment will determine whether the future course of events will escalate to a war.

Rudd provides context as to why the U.S.-China relationship rests on a seismic fault: cultural misunderstanding, historical grievance, and ideological incompatibility are all pivotal antecedents. The antagonism between the two superpowers is starkly visible, among others, in the field of military, intelligence, technology, and trade, while either country’s capacity to draw the last straw grows daily.

Against this gloomy backdrop, Rudd constructively argues that the relationship is not doomed to escalating tension and war. If both sides can sustain a “managed strategic competition” by coexisting without betraying their core interests, conflict could be avoided. However, the opposite could be catastrophic. The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict between the US and Xi Jinping’s China demystifies the actions of both sides, explaining and translating them for the benefit of the other.

Kevin Rudd, The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict between the US and Xi Jinping’s China (PublicAffairs, 2022) ISBN-13 9781541701304, 432 pages

As the U.S. faces the first real challenge to its economic hegemony with the rise of China, The United States vs. China: The Quest for Global Economic Leadership sees experienced policymaker, economist, and scholar C. Fred Bergsten analyze the two great powers’ competition from the scope of global economic leadership. Is economic conflict beyond the existing trade war inevitable between China and the U.S.? Will their clash produce a new economic leadership vacuum? What can the consequences of a world economy adopting Chinese characteristics be?

According to Bergsten a confrontation between the two would be calamitous. He further argues that it would be self-defeating for the U.S. to attempt to “decouple” from its rival. Bergsten advices the U.S. to pursue “conditional competitive cooperation” to lead, rather than destroy, the world economy instead of a policy of containment. As for China, he recommends exercising constructive global leadership.

Fred Bergsten, The United States vs. China: The Quest for Global Economic Leadership (Polity Press, 2022) ISBN-13 978-1509547357, 384 pages

Is China really a threat to the U.S. or just a threat to its unilateral superpower status? According to Paolo Urio, the U.S. has historically disguised the true nature of its relations with the nations that have stood in the way of its ambitions, often projecting fear of harm from other nations even as it was expanding its dominion over them. America and the China Threat: From the End of History to the End of Empire revisits and debunks the idea of the universality of U.S. values, and the perception of the imperial, dictatorial, and state capitalist character of today’s China. It provides a historical analysis of the divergent ideologies of the U.S. and China, and reveals the source of strain the U.S. faces in adapting to the changes occurring in the international system that has moved beyond its exceptionalism and uncontested leadership, now challenged by China.

Urio challenges the U.S. proclamation that it alone can assure stability and prosperity in the international system, while demonstrating that Chinese ideology has achieved greater flexibility by integrating values imported from the West and several Confucian values. Urio argues that China is better able to adapt its public policies to changes in the national and international environments. America and the China Threat: From the End of History to the End of Empire further addresses China’s significant military and economic advances and its new investments.

Paolo Urio, America and the China Threat: From the End of History to the End of Empire (Clarity Press, 2022) ISBN-10 1949762505, 476 pages

Information War: How Artificial Intelligence Is Driving U.S.-China Military Competition addresses a crucial variable shaping the intensifying confrontation between the U.S. and China: the struggle to control information. How will modern technology be wielded in a rising conflict between the two superpowers?

Technology and national security expert Tom Stefanick argues that the two contemporary superpowers will base their security competition primarily on the fight to dominate information and perception. How will the adversaries attack the other’s information architecture while protecting their own? Stefanick highlights that the way each country chooses to employ information countermeasures will determine the amount of friction and uncertainty in the conflict.

Stefanick draws attention to artificial intelligence, which will play an important role. Information War: How Artificial Intelligence Is Driving U.S.-China Military Competition reviews the recent Chinese research and trends in AI to determine how it will approach the conflict, and provides a sober view of how artificial intelligence will be weaponized in the new information war.

Tom Stefanick, Information War: How Artificial Intelligence Is Driving U.S.-China Military Competition (Brookings Institution Press, 2022) ISBN-13: 9780815738824, 280 pages

China expert Andrew Small offers an eclectic view of a rivalry ranging far beyond “great power” politics. He provides the inside story of a revolution in the China policy of countries from around the world. The Rupture: China and the Global Race for the Future explains a diverse range of topics such as how many of the Western politicians and business leaders closest to Beijing have now become its sharpest opponents, how the COVID-19 pandemic dramatically accelerated this trend, and why 5G represents the first test case as to whether China can win the race for the future.

As competition grows between systems, the Western model itself is transforming given that China’s rise changes both the balance of ideas and the balance of power. Small traces U.S. efforts to recast relations with old allies, examining Europe’s growing role in the technological and economic contest, and Beijing’s attempts to build a coalition of its own.

Andrew Small, The Rupture: China and the Global Race for the Future (Hurst Publishers, 2022) ISBN 9781787387782, 304 pages

What path does a middle power take when engrossed in the competition between great powers? Do they get caught up between the two or forge a path of their own? In the heating U.S.-China rivalry, what are the strategic responses of middle powers in the Asia-Pacific? The Strategic Options of Middle Powers in the Asia-Pacific examines these questions through the specific case studies of South Korea, Australia, Japan, India, Taiwan, and Vietnam from their local perspectives.

With each chapter, written by experts, the book provides comprehensive studies of the regional powers in the Asia-Pacific with an in-depth examination of the contemporary geopolitics of the region, including the impact of both the Trump and Biden administrations, Beijing’s “wolf warrior” diplomacy, cross-strait relations with Taiwan, and the influences of Japan, Vietnam, Australia, and South Korea. The Strategic Options of Middle Powers in the Asia-Pacific reveals that regional middle powers actually exert influence on the direction of regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, and develops theories of foreign policy analyses, forming a systematic framework through initiating crucial concepts, including reluctant hedging, economic statecraft, and strategic position-taking.

Chien-Wen Kou, Chiung-Chiu Huang, Brian Job, The Strategic Options of Middle Powers in the Asia-Pacific (Routledge, 2022) ISBN 9781003156314, 278 pages

To liberate Asia Pacific from Japanese Imperialist Forces during the Second World War, the United States devised an “island hopping” strategy meant to secure as many islands as possible, with the aim of forcing the enemy back to its home soil.

Two battles were crucial to the Allies’ success: the Battle of Midway in 1942, where the U.S. Navy inflicted mortal wounds on its Japanese counterpart, and the Battle of Guadalcanal spanning 1942 to 1943, where the U.S. Army and Marines defeated Japanese land forces in the Solomon Islands.

A full 80 years later, the Solomon Islands has suddenly become the centre of superpower confrontation once again, but this time between the United States and an ever-increasingly militaristic and imperialistic China.

Unlike, Japan, however, China has effectively seized the South Pacific country, comprising six major islands and hundreds of smaller islands, without firing a shot. This Chinese move has left the U.S. and Australia, along with their regional allies, in a state of frenzy rage because the islands, particularly Guadalcanal, are a choke point connecting the U.S. to Australia and New Zealand, which is why Japan wanted the islands eight decades ago, and why China wants them today.

If the U.S. is cut off from Australia and New Zealand, then it is essentially cut off from the South Pacific, giving China a huge leg up in its ambition to dislodge the U.S. from the entire Western Pacific and Asia. Suddenly, the memory of Japanese submarines torpedoing Australian vessels in Sydney Harbor, and Japanese warplanes bombing the Australian city of Darwin in 1942 has invoked a security crisis in Canberra and Washington DC.

Australian Strategic Policy Institute executive director Peter Jennings predicts Chinese warships and warplanes could arrive in the Solomons within weeks, saying, “Their model is what they’ve done in the South China Sea, which is to move quickly and decisively before people are able to gather their thoughts and resist,” adding he expects Beijing to move while Australian policy elites are distracted with the national election, scheduled for May 21.

Solomon Island’s Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare has given verbal assurances he will not allow China to construct a military base on its soil, but nobody in Canberra or Washington DC is buying it, given the deal was revealed only after details of it were leaked; revelations Sogavare has allowed Beijing to secretly bring dozens of weapons into Honiara; and because Beijing has essentially bought the Solomon’s parliament by paying $40,000 to parliamentarians who voted for Sogarvare.

On Friday, a U.S. delegation by Indo-Pacific envoy Kurt Campbell arrived in the Solomon Islands to discuss concerns the U.S. and its allies have over the security pact with China, which they fear will extend China’s military presence in the region, igniting a new regional arms race. Australia has also shuttled diplomats to Honiara, with Japan announcing it will do likewise later this month, and New Zealand and Tonga saying they will raise their concerns at the forthcoming Pacific Islands Forum.

Chinese state media has slammed opposition to Beijing’s security pact with Honiara, even accusing Australia of having a “colonialist mentality,” while Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Zhao Kijian said Australia and US should “respect the sovereign and independent choices made by China and the Solomons and not instigate confrontation.”

But these claims and statements are patently absurd, given the Australian government, unlike its Chinese counterpart, has not sought to bolster its relationship with the Pacific Island country by bribing and extorting its political class.

Moreover, Australia’s Pacific “Step Up,” which has allocated $2 billion to building infrastructure in the region, does not saddle countries with unrepayable debt, unlike China’s debt trap diplomacy, or what is known as its One Belt Initiative.

“In Mr. Sogavare, the Chinese government has found a willing partner. And his commitment to such a secretive deal has shown how a single politician cosying up to Beijing in a small country can create geopolitical risks worldwide,” observes the New York Times.

Most significantly, Solomon Islanders view the move as anti-democratic, with recent polls showing 90 percent of the country wanting closer ties to the U.S. and Australia over China, and 79 percent opposing financial aid from Beijing. They also remember that the country was rocked by anti-Chinese violence in November of last year, after it was revealed Sogavare used Chinese government money to sway votes in the parliament.

The country’s opposition leader, Hon. Mathew Wale, slammed the China deal, calling it does not represent the interests of Solomon Islanders, but “for the personal and self-interests of the Prime Minister.”

“His election campaign was said to be funded by PRC state-owned companies. The payment of members for his political survival in November was also bought with PRC money. This personal secret military deal with the PRC is no different. This deal is not for the military protection of Solomon Islands. There are no external threats to Solomon Islands. The deal is to maintain Sogavare’s hold on power and to undermine the democratic freedoms available to Solomon islanders,” he said.

The opposition leader also called out the Prime Minister over promises closer ties to China would herald a flood of Chinexe investment, which, until now, have not materialized.

While most analysts believe the Solomon Islands can be persuaded to walk back the China deal, Jennings says it will take a “focused effort” on Australia’s part and “more money than we would like to spend,” but it’s a price Canberra and its regional allies must be prepared to pay if they do not wish a repeat of the same threat they endured from an expansionist Japan eighty years ago.

A virtual summit for democracy was held on December 9-10, 2021, upon the invitation of the United States. At the summit, Joe Biden renewed his call for democracy and the fight against authoritarianism and corruption. Amongst more than 110 invited countries, 89 showed up. The question now is why the Biden administration initiated the Summit for Democracy. Let me address some important issues and their consequences in what follows.

The general assertion is that the summit was initiated in order to respond to the rhetoric that American democracy is in decay and crisis – a debate which has gone global. One of the key denominators of the democracy crisis in the U.S. has been the horrific attack on Capitol Hill on January 6, 2021 following the results of the U.S. presidential elections.

On August 30, 2021, this was followed by the withdrawal of the U.S.-led NATO forces from Afghanistan, another evident U.S. failure. These and similar events brought the image of U.S. democracy into question before a global public. In this context, the Summit for Democracy was designed to rectify the image of the U.S. both domestically and globally.

The exclusion of major U.S. partners

China and Russia were not invited to the Summit for Democracy as they are regarded as the ideological rivals of democratically ruled countries. There were also countries from the Asia-Pacific and Africa that were not on the invitation list: Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, which are considered de facto allies of the United States, were among the ASEAN members not invited.

China and Russia were not invited to the Summit for Democracy for they are regarded as the ideological rivals of democratically ruled countries.

Although Singapore and Thailand might not be fully democratic, and Vietnam has a single-party rule, they uphold – to a certain degree – democratic practices such as civil society organizations and a rule-based administration. They also have closer ties with the U.S. in fields including not only economy but also culture, academia, and the defence sector. Not only this, but they have been approached by the U.S. to adopt policies against China. Indeed, this is closely related to the well-established Asian pivot policy by former U.S. president Barack Obama.

The invitation of only Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines from the ASEAN region to the Summit for Democracy has led to speculations. Is there a rift between the rest of the member countries of ASEAN and the United States due to a widening ideological gap between democracies and non-democracies? Or is it because of these countries’ sociopolitical or socioeconomic alliances with U.S. rivals? If the former turns out to be true, there is definitely a certain degree of miscalculation by the Biden administration.

There is no doubt that the U.S. is losing credit as the leader of global democracy along with its capacity to defend democratic principles and values. Political elites in ASEAN member states, which rely on Western democracy as an ideal, can no longer satisfy or silence emergent anti-Western sentiments as now critical voices even within the ruling circles in Europe increasingly emerge and question the credibility of the U.S. “democratic” engagements abroad.

Concern over the Lack of Engagement

Japan is a highly acclaimed U.S. ally in the Asia-Pacific region and approached the U.S. decision not to invite certain ASEAN countries to the summit critically.

No doubt that the U.S. is losing credit as the leader of global democracy.

Japanese political commentators were in favor of inviting all ASEAN members, not only some, to the summit. According to them, direct U.S. engagement with ASEAN is essential to sustaining the security in the Asia-Pacific against China. The Japanese commentators seem right to criticize the imposition of a definition of democracy technically contrived by the U.S. alone.

On the subject of the exclusion of Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, Japan has implicitly reacted by expressing its concern about how to improve democratic rules in ASEAN without the U.S. facilitation and engagement through political, economic, and cultural mechanisms.

To highlight additional concerns, it should be emphasized that Singapore, a U.S. ally, and Vietnam, a potential partner of the United States, were not invited to the summit. Taking into consideration that Barack Obama was the first U.S. president to visit Hanoi after the Vietnam War, the exclusion of Vietnam from the summit is not an encouraging move for enhancing the partnership between the two capitals.

Categorizing certain Asia-Pacific countries as “non-democratic” may be true in principle. Nevertheless, the imposition of a Western-based democracy model may not be acceptable by a number of regional countries.

This miscalculated approach by the U.S. administration can potentially trigger more controversy among non-democracies in the Asia-Pacific, and may result either in an attempt to copy the model of the U.S. democracy, which could potentially end up in failure, or push them further towards strengthening their ties with China, the world’s second superpower.

Step Forward

The question remains whether the composition of the countries invited to the Summit for Democracy consisted of a wider alliance or the U.S. was simply playing the leadership role by marking its influence on democratically ruled countries. Then, the subsequent question is whether the U.S. administration intends to divide the world into democratic and undemocratic rules. If the latter is true, it is not difficult to guess the existence of a larger division and separation of countries by the United States as democratic and non-democratic ones.

The lack of U.S. engagement with Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, as member states of ASEAN, can deter the democratization processes further if the United States’ formal involvement remains ineffective. The influence of democratic principles has decreased significantly around the globe in the last decades. This includes Western countries, where democracy was born, as has become evident in the treatment of people of color and migrants.

The task of major democratic countries such as the U.S. is not to judge other democracies apathetically, but rather to galvanize democratic engagements with countries that are undergoing democratic challenges by paying a degree of respect to their existing democratic institutions.

Under American hegemony, Asia Pacific has experienced the longest period of peace since the start of the Industrial Revolution, but the emergence of China as a rival power has created a sense of insecurity not felt in the region since Imperial Japan invaded Nanjing in 1937, and then soon after the rest of southeast Asia.

In response, Australia, United Kingdom and the United States have formulated the AUKUS security alliance to challenge what it and its Asian allies, including India, South Korea and Japan, perceive to be an increasingly militaristic and hyper-aggressive China.

But when security analysts talk about the “China threat,” they mean the direct military threat it poses to Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, India, the Philippines and Vietnam, among others, but not the three AUKUS signatories – Australia, U.K. and U.S.

In fact, China is not only Australia’s number one trading partner, but also has never threatened Australia militarily, or implied such a threat. Moreover, the UK is located on the other side of the planet, while the US maintains a huge and ever-expanding lead over the Asian power’s military capabilities.

So, who’s insecurity is this trilateral security partnership meant to resolve?

Well, if you listen carefully to American security elites, AUKUS is President Biden’s way of outsourcing some of the heavy lifting that will be required to deter or prevent a Chinese invasion of Taiwan at some point in the next two to three decades, with the construction of eight-nuclear powered submarines in Australia the centrepiece of his strategy.

Should a shooting war between China and the U.S. materialize, the Pentagon anticipates Australia’s submarine fleet will allow it to lighten the burden of its Pacific Fleet, especially given Canberra has established a track record of blindly following the U.S. into every war since and including World War Two.

Expectedly, Beijing has responded by calling Australia “brainless,” and warning it has made itself a target.

Expectedly, Beijing has responded by calling Australia “brainless,” and warning it has made itself a target.

“Armed with nuclear submarines, Australia itself will be a target for possible nuclear attacks in the future,” Victor Gao, the vice president for the Centre for China and Globalization, told ABC’s China Tonight.

“The watershed moment will be if Australia will be armed with nuclear submarines to be locally produced in Australia. That will mean Australia will lose that privilege of not being targeted by nuclear weapons to other countries and that should be a wake-up call for all Australians.,” he said.

This is exactly the blowback some of Australia’s top security elites have warned, including the venerable Professor Hugh White, who stated, “[Prime Minister] Scott Morrison has tied Australia to a deal that undermines our sovereign capabilities, overspends on hardware we can barely be confident of operating, and drags us closer to the frontline of a war we may have no interest in fighting.”

That said, China’s unlawful actions in the South China Sea has put it into direct conflict with no fewer than a half-dozen countries, and there’s no doubt China is guilty of violating international maritime law, and therefore threatening the freedom of the seas and the world’s busiest shipping lanes, including those which so many Asian countries depend upon for their energy needs.

So, Beijing has only itself to blame for escalating tensions in the region. The question is whether AUKUS encourages security or heightens tensions in Indo Pacific, but there are already clear warning signs it has formalized a regional Cold War and incited a new arms race.

The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is the fruit of competitive international trade affairs in the Asia-Pacific that has been dominating world trade and investment environments in the past few decades. The treaty authorizes the member countries’ rational choice to stand between protectionism and free trade.

A treaty pact was signed on November 15, 2020 with virtual participation of the leaders of 15 member countries who represent almost 2.2 billion people and 30% of the world’s GDP. The anticipated greater plan and its practical gain will pump $200 billion into the global economy.

With the RCEP representing a bit less than one-third of the global economic output, this agreement is expected to have a great impact on the global economy. As observed in the last four years, more than half of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China have constantly shown annual growth of more than 6-7%.

In recent years, the ASEAN countries have not only displayed a galvanizing productivity in logistics supplies and international trade, but have also gradually improved and showed an engagement with the dominant capitalist economic principals in the form of freer commercial activities.

This development, triggered by determinant geo-political narratives in the Asia-Pacific region, effectuates creation of certain trust among members of nations and the global investors.

The spirit of the ASEAN

The terms of the agreement provide a functional vehicle to eliminate the internal differences of member countries so as to reinvigorate production and trade affairs, while obtaining gains from this regional development.

There are three major aspects which can be considered as crucial developments. The first is the ASEAN-centered expansion of trade and investment activities.

The second is related to the East Asian nations, such as China, Japan, and South Korea, that have agreed, for the first time, to comply with mutual trade rules. Without a doubt, this will have a greater influence on the region’s peace and stability. In particular, the East and South China Seas will reclaim the status of mutual waterways for all the nations adjacent to them.

The US: Inside or outside the game?

The RCEP resonates with signs of effort toward the gradual reconstruction of economic growth in the Asia-Pacific. It poses novel problems for the new U.S. administration that add to the distress of a presumed isolation. Thus, U.S. President-elect Biden may desperately search for alternatives for repositioning his country on the global stage, and, in particular, in the Asia-Pacific.

However, the grave challenge the Biden administration will face is how to convince the U.S. Senate to rebound the country’s leadership in the Asia-Pacific region. Rather, the U.S. may opt to revive the relationship with regional powers and the ASEAN.

Biden will have no other choice but to reinitiate the active presence of the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific since the U.S. is already in a declining standing on the eco-political scene.

Since the United States lost an opportunity by rejecting the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) four years ago, the new administration will potentially be excluded from the RCEP, and President-elect Biden will experience a great dilemma.

When one closely revisits the first term of the Obama administration, it becomes apparent that the Eastern and Southeastern Asian countries, which serve as major drivers of global growth, intended to restructure regional trade affairs.

Liberalization is currently being experienced by the emerging regional powers. A larger regional trade agreement such as the TPPA or, as clearly proven today, the RCEP was expected since the beginning of this century, because of the changing nature of global business and trade.

When soft enforcement was used by certain regional powers such as Japan and Singapore to convince the Obama administration to sign the TPPA, it took half a decade to reach a consensus, which finally arrived in 2015. Therefore, it is not astonishing that an almost similar process began in 2012 for the regional countries in the Asia-Pacific to reach a similar pact.

Biden will have no other choice but to reinitiate the active presence of the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific since the U.S. is already in a declining standing on the eco-political scene.

Thus, the new U.S. administration is likely to take a step to create a peaceful environment on the global stage in order to gain the support of its allies, some of whom feel abandoned and others politically distanced. A better-case scenario would see the U.S. invest creatively in soft power rather than refocus on the competition with China as it has done in the previous years.

India’s Lack of Self-Reliance

India preferred not to sign the RCEP in order to protect its domestic market from the “invasion” of Chinese goods.

Although growth figures show that the country has progressed in the last half decade, the Narendra Modi government preferred to lean on restricted trade borders. But the major argument is that India is yet to conceive its regional power role.

Since U.S. President-elect Joe Biden and the Indian government dubbed the RCEP a new emerging power, there is an alternative for a new geopolitical structure in the Indo-Pacific.

Biden and Vice-President-elect Kamala Harris have professed a desire to engage with India. There are strong signs that Harris has been perceived positively by Indians. Harris’s ancestral link may be instrumentalized for the U.S. in the use of soft power towards India in order to help the country regain its lost presence in the Asia Pacific region.

The RCEP is the end product of the long negotiation processes among the member countries that have dominated global trade and economic activities in recent decades. If this treaty is successfully applied, there is little doubt that it will mold trade affairs on a global scale.