Bilateral relations between Turkey and Germany witnessed relative calm in 2019 compared to previous years. Cooperation at the government level and newly-generated mechanisms for dialogue prevented moments of tension from escalating further, despite continuing differences in both countries’ approaches to domestic and foreign affairs.

So, what were the most striking developments between Turkey and Germany in 2019? Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s official visit to Berlin in September 2018 undoubtedly boosted the profile of bilateral relations, despite widespread negative coverage of the trip. In 2019, numerous German politicians paid official visits to Turkey, while Turkish delegations visited Berlin on various occasions. For instance, Germany’s Federal Minister of the Interior, Horst Seehofer (CSU) met his counterpart in Ankara where they held bilateral talks on migration. Turkey’s Minister of Industry and Technology, Mustafa Varank, visited Berlin to host the German-Turkish Conference on Artificial Intelligence together with his German counterpart, which gave high-ranking industry representatives the opportunity to share their views on the economic potential of artificial intelligence in business. Dialogue has also continued at the highest level, with the Turkish President and German Chancellor meeting on several occasions during 2019. Nonetheless, four main issues have been potential sources of tension and, unfortunately, bilateral relations have been tested on several occasions due to the ambivalent reactions of members of the German coalition government to these specific issues.

First of all, German media and opposition parties continued to criticize Turkey’s military operations against the PKK terrorist organization both domestically and abroad. However, German media representatives and even politicians also criticized Turkish police when they arrested potential PKK-affiliated sympathizers from Germany who had entered Turkey. This reaction and the criticism of Turkish security forces, indicating that Germany had not seriously considered the reasoning behind these measures, gave a strong impression that German authorities and the German public did not respect Turkey’s security concerns or its legal procedures.

Second, German media outlets and nearly all its political factions criticized the Turkish authorities’ decision not to renew the accreditation of certain media representatives. Related to this incident, Germany’s Foreign Ministry went so far as to consider calling for a limited travel warning for people planning to visit Turkey. Nevertheless, open channels of communication made it possible to resolve the problem before it escalated.

However, the third and most striking controversy concerned Germany’s active position during Turkey’s local elections on March 31, 2019 and in particular during the re-run of the Istanbul mayoral election on June 23. Although German officials and politicians had previously warned Turkish politicians not to interfere in German elections by influencing Turkish voters living in Germany, in March nearly all German political camps supported candidates in Ankara and Istanbul from Turkey’s main opposition party, the CHP.

The majority of German media coverage of the CHP’s Istanbul mayoral candidate gave a one-sided view of the CHP, even presenting Imamoglu as a future presidential candidate for the opposition. This assumption gave Germans the impression that a nationwide general election was taking place in Turkey – which was not the case. Similarly, German reactions to the Supreme Electoral Council’s decision to annul the election do not seem particularly diplomatic. Partisan statements, such as the decision of high-profile members of the German government to openly send messages of “solidarity”, had the potential to negatively affect the course of bilateral relations.

And the fourth issue that caused a slight souring of Turkish-German relations occurred during Turkey’s military operation in Northern Syria where it fought PKK-YPG terrorist elements along Turkey’s 900km southern border. Germany openly opposed Turkey’s military operation both at the political level and in the media. This happened despite the fact that moderate politicians, media representatives and German think-tanks acknowledged the link between the PKK and YPG terrorist groups. However, in addition to the federal government’s decision to ban the export of arms to Turkey, a major German company that had been planning to invest in the country cancelled, or at least postponed, its final decision on constructing a plant in Turkey – most likely due to political pressure in Germany.

President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and German Chancellor Angela Merkel tour the garden of Vahdettin Mansion after holding a joint press conference in Istanbul, Turkey on January 24, 2020. AA

Moreover, in an unexpected move, the German Defence Minister called for the creation of a safe zone in Northern Syria under international control. The proposal eventually failed for two reasons. Not only did she make a miscalculation at the international level, because no leading country took this proposal seriously and supported it, but she also failed to inform her own country’s Foreign Minister, Heiko Maas, who learned about the proposal from the media. Maas, the chief person responsible for Germany’s foreign affairs, subsequently travelled to Turkey to personally consider the Defence Minister’s proposal with his Turkish counterpart. This led to a very uncomfortable situation for the federal cabinet, in which the German Foreign Minister openly ruled out the Defence Minister’s proposal, describing his colleague’s idea as unrealistic.

In spite of these controversies in 2019, both formal and informal channels of dialogue remained open on both sides. This made it easier for representatives from the two countries to clarify any misunderstandings, although the German media continues its efforts to escalate tensions. Another positive point has been the calm and diplomatic leadership skills of the heads of both governments. Economic cooperation has facilitated communication between the two countries. Informal channels, through think-tank cooperation and joint events, also contributed to maintaining bilateral relations.

Nevertheless, the overall attitude of German media outlets continues to be a source of negativity and misunderstanding. If Germany refrains from making partisan statements, bilateral relations would be expected to remain positive. Turning a deaf ear to Turkey’s legitimate fight against the PKK terrorist organization has the potential to increase tensions, as does disregarding Turkey’s legal rights in the Mediterranean, as seen in responses to the recent case of Turkey’s agreement with the internationally recognized government of Libya. Initial positive steps in this regard were visible during the Berlin Conference on Libya on January 19, 2020. In addition, the plan to finally open Turkish schools in German cities such as Berlin, Cologne and Frankfurt has the potential to positively boost bilateral cooperation. However, biased media reporters have already started a negative campaign to discredit these moves, despite the existence of German schools in Turkey, which have deliberately been downplayed in public discourse.

As long as formal and informal channels of dialogue are kept open, and a fair, reciprocal and unbiased relationship is established between German and Turkish authorities, then, there is always the chance to overcome difficulties.

Former Turkish Ambassador to Somalia, Dr. Olgan Bekar, was named Turkey’s special envoy in the Somalia-Somaliland talks early this year. He is a well-known diplomat in Somalia and the larger East Africa region. He served as the Turkish Ambassador in Mogadishu – Turkey’s largest diplomatic mission in Africa – from 2014 to late 2018. He oversaw a diplomatic mission that played a crucial role in acting as a trusted mediator in Somali politics – often arbitrating between the Federal government and the mutinous and unruly Federal member states in Somalia – and channelling the global humanitarian attention and focus to Somalia in the event of menacing droughts and national disasters like Al-Shabaab terrorist attacks.

Over the years Turkey has emerged as a solid, reliable, and benevolent diplomatic interlocutor in Africa since president Erdogan paid that maiden visit to Somalia in the hey-days of the 2011 detrimental famine that engulfed the whole of East Africa. The humanitarian programs were swift, precise and worthwhile. They saved vulnerable lives and communities in Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia and Djabouti. In the days since then, Turkey’s image as a historical and genuine partner of African states was explicit and apparent to the political classes and the masses.

The geopolitics of the Somali peninsula and the larger East Africa region are shifting swiftly and arbitrarily. Regional players, the Gulf nations, the EU and the U.S. are watching Turkey’s diplomatic and humanitarian initiatives closely. Turkey’s role in the Somalia-Somaliland talks will be consequential. The Somaliland issue is capricious, volatile and topsy-turvy: the stakes are high; violence and emotions are rampant; the political elites are armed with self-serving rhetoric and non-negotiable positions and principals. However, hope in renewed talks isn’t over: earlier this month Somalia’s president reaffirmed his commitment to the Somalia-Somaliland talks spearheaded by Turkey.

Somaliland: Swinging between tribalism and a ‘statehood’?

Since the collapse of the Somali Nation’s state in the ouster of Siad Barre in 1991, no strong or stable authority emerged to fill the political lacuna that emerged. Warlord zones, rebel territories, Islamist militias and tribal fiefdoms scattered the country. However, two rebel groups (predicated on tribal interests and sentimentalities) that played a central role in deposing the military regime of Siad Barre successfully formed autonomous administrative zones: Somaliland and Puntland. The rest of Somalia was under the mercy of brutalizing warlords and tribal militias that tried to over-run each other – elongating the civil war as the international community watched.

Somaliland was formed right after the Somali civil war showed no signs of abating. Tribal elders from the respective tribes coalesced around the tribal militias, and penned down a consensus to establish a peaceful administration. This local grass-root effort brought stability and peace to the North-Western regions – that were named British Somaliland, a courtesy of Colonial heritage and legacy. Ironically, the tribal leaders and elders named the newly formed administration Somaliland, instead of finding a more culturally relevant name. In its initial phases of establishment, secession was not in the agenda and in the consensus framework agreed upon by the elders; in-fact its first leadership cadre was filled with veteran Somali nationalists, freedom fighters and Siad Barre regime military and intelligence officers.

The Eritrea independence referendum of 1993 bolstered the confidence and secession voices within Somaliland. The administrative framework that was established to maintain peace and harmony – unlike the southern parts of Somalia – morphed into a political administration seeking independence and self-determination. This agenda was propagated by tribal elites while other tribes and communities in the peripheries of the administration were indifferent or sceptical of the success of such a political dispensation. Since then, Somaliland was a success story. Carrying out every socio-political step the South of the country could not achieve.

Somaliland had successfully held democratic local and presidential elections, the region prospered under the peaceful bliss economically and socially. Administrative organs are efficient and functioning and the region exudes an image of a state. However, rancid tribalism and violence are not out of the picture, freedom of the press and unionist voices and sentiments are brutally suppressed. Markus V. Hoehnea Somali studies scholars observe how, British Somaliland, once a vibrant epicentre of Somali nationalism and Somaliweeyn ideology has become the burial place of all these ideals that thrived in the 1920-50s.

Precursory talks: Chevening house declaration to the Ankara Communique

Relatively productive and substantial talks between the Somalia and Somaliland administration occurred during the transitional government periods. The first of such talks were held in June 2012 in the United Kingdom. The then UK government, along with the EU and Norway undertook efforts to bring the two sides to talk and open a national discourse on their respective political positions. The meeting took place in the famous Chevening house and a general framework was declared to maintain and enhance talks. The then UK foreign secretary, William Hague termed the Chevening declaration as a landmark, and congratulated ‘‘the Somali Transitional Federal Government and Somaliland representatives on agreeing the Chevening House Declaration yesterday.’’

This initial meeting was followed by a subsequent meeting in Dubai. The president of Somalia, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed met the president of Somaliland administration, Ahmed Silanyo. This was the first time that the leaders of the two sides met. Somaliland maintained its position of secession, whereas Somalia reiterated that the talks be continued so as to ventilate the issues. Then a year later, the two leaders met in Ankara in the presence of former Foreign Minister Ahmed Davutoğlu. The Ankara communiqué was signed on 13 April, 2013. In the communiqué, the Chevening and Dubai declarations were to be upheld, commitment to dialogue was strengthened, inflammatory language was to be avoided by both parties and a meeting was proposed to be held in Istanbul.

Turkey and the international community are incessantly putting effort for the Somali regime and the Somaliland administration to continue the talks despite the entrenched differences. Both sides are adamant about their positions: Somalia outright rejects any form of secession and Somaliland considers political independence its own right. Turkey’s role in the talks are crucial and paramount for the whole Somali nation and East Africa’s ever contested issues of secessions, sovereignty and political autonomy. Challenges are in abundant in the Somaliland issue. But Turkey is a trusted and reliable mediator.

Since the 2013 Ankara communiqué the Somalia-Somaliland talks had stalled. Lack of political will and the intervention of a trusted third party contributed to this surcease. Turkey offered a life-line to the talks by appointing a special envoy. Both sides welcomed this diplomatic gesture by Ankara. Other regional powers are also manoeuvring their course of actions. The Saudi-UAE axis that is worried by Turkey’s influence in East-Africa and the red-sea and Somalia’s neutrality in the Qatar blockade are watching closely. Somaliland administration president Musa Bihi travelled to Dubai on 10 March for bilateral talks – and definitely Turkey’s role and the talks will be inevitably discussed by the Emiratis.

Somaliland’s perspective in the talks are crystal clear. They anticipate full political recognition at all costs. They are aware of Turkey’s stand in the Iraqi Kurdistan referendum and the Catalan referendum of 2017. But they are aware that Turkey has so far dealt with Somaliland fairly: they have received humanitarian, capacity-building and scholarship opportunities just like any other Somali region. Turkey’s commitments are also apparent, being the only nation with a special envoy for the talks. The international community’s interests in the Somaliland issue is dwindling; Turkey is offering a life-line for the talks and an amicable solution in the long-run.

The way forward: Turkey’s consecrated arbitration role in East-Africa

The Somaliland issue has become complex over the years: it is enmeshed and entangle with both regional and international geopolitics and interests. Somalia and the Somaliland administration are aware of this and leveraging the situations against each other. Somaliland has depicted itself as a bastion of peace, stability and democracy in the global stage – and this is undeniable. Moreover, the administration offers itself as an alternative to the Somali government (often releasing counter-statements whenever Somalia does in geopolitical issues>); this has interested the gulf and regional nations who view they lost Somalia and Djibouti geopolitically to Turkey and China. Gulf nations, the UAE in particular is undermining the Somali government in Mogadishu and the Somaliland administration is propped-up as a more-friendly geopolitical partner – the UAE even courts and woos other Somali states in the Federal government.

Moreover, Somaliland is even getting more complex internally. Unionist voices are clearly making their stand in rejecting any form of secession: the Maakhir region incorporated itself into the neighbouring arch-rival Puntland; the Khaatumo region and its populations turned out to be staunch Somali nationalists; whereas in Boorama and Zeila, secession sentiments are drying-up. A resurgent Somali state in Mogadishu (though with all its challenges and short-comings) has worried the Somaliland administration. Internationally recognized secession is absent, and if there is no solution to this dead-end, Mogadishu would ultimately come to impose its political and geographical sovereignty in Hargeisa.

Furthermore, the Somaliland issue is quite ironical: its population flocks to Garowe to get Somali national passports and travel with it globally; they are represented in the Somali parliament and government (the deputy prime minister and speaker of the senate being from Somaliland); yet the political elites in Hargeisa beat the drums of secession. Tribal elite interest is at the nexus of the Somaliland issue: the secession argument is a top-down formulated political agenda; the presence of politicians, artists and intellectuals in Mogadishu underlines this; and within Somaliland, the secession issue is indexed to tribalism and regionalism – the Maakhir, Khaatumo and Awdal states issue confirms this. It is these ambiguities that made the international community to hesitate from recognizing Somaliland – the Eritrean dictatorial regime and the South-Sudan civil war made matters even worse for Somaliland’s prospective secession.

The Somaliland issue is extremely delicate and complex. Numerous power centres have vested interests. Turkey, through its envoy Olgan Bekar, will have to tread a tight rope. The political elite’s interests are crucial in the Somaliland issue. Somalia has to guarantee constitutionally, a fair share of power-sharing scheme with the elites in Hargeisa and have them integrated into the national politics. Somaliland is economically huge and vast in population; it can even become the political engine of Somalia and shape the nation’s future body-politics. The possibilities for fruitful results are high and miscalculations can equally result in detrimental gridlocks. Turkey plays a significant and important role in Africa, now it can bring Somalia and the Somaliland administration to the table and arbitrate a long-lasting solution for all.

The Middle East has undergone a massive transformation since the Arab uprising erupted in 2011. The Arab uprising initially rooted from people’s search for democracy, equality, and justice, noting that none of them have ever been at the core of politics since the Western intervention in the region took place. However, the nature of the Arab uprising dramatically transformed itself towards pervasive insecurities and chaos in the Middle East, especially after the spread of radicalization — particularly in the case of Daesh, the conflict-spillover effects of the Syrian Civil War, and the fall of democracy in the Arab world.

Today, from Libya to Yemen, the main characteristic of the new disorder in the Middle East is the proliferation of violent non-state armed groups, the deterioration of state structure, the rise of radical extremism, and the deepening geopolitical antagonism among states, ethnic, and religious groups. This new phenomenon resulted in state insecurity, regime insecurity, societal insecurity, and most importantly, in human insecurity across the region. Each of these outcomes indicate that the very nature of the Middle East order has been undermined by internal, regional and international actors. The new stage highlights that we are at a point where the Middle East is gradually falling into a new wave of crisis, especially after Trump’s accession to power in the U.S.

Trump and his so-called comrades in the Middle East are destroying the region that we know. This is the rise of a new geopolitical era in the Middle East political landscape that has been undergoing a transitional period of a new regional order without principles, rules, and norms. The new order in the Middle East is a product of reckless diplomacy of the Trumpian narrative of international politics. At the very heart of this Trumpian diplomacy lies diplomacy working without diplomats and law functioning without the international norms assembled around the United Nations after World War II.

The Palestinian case is an excellent textbook example to see how Trumpian diplomacy works without diplomats and law without paying respect to international norms in the Middle East. Trump’s decision to relocate the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Al-Quds and the recognition of Jerusalem as the eternal capital of the so-called Jewish State signifies the very nature of Trumpian diplomacy. Additionally, the presence of Trump’s daughter, Ivanka Kushner, and her husband, Jared Kushner, at the opening ceremony of the U.S. embassy manifested how U.S. diplomacy is withdrawing itself from the scene and giving its place to Trumpian diplomacy without diplomats.

As it is mostly believed, Trump’s Israel policy is not a construction of the U.S.’s realpolitik interests in the Middle East; it is a product of the global civilizational conflict perception in which the Christian right, evangelical/fundamentalist Christians and the Orthodox Jewish community in the U.S. are at the center of. The evangelical pastor Robert Jeffress’s invocation at the opening ceremony showed how the judgment above portrays the very nature of this perception. Many people can easily recall Jeffress addressing Muslims as “heretics” in several of his speeches. At this stage, it is not necessary to examine how Trump disregards international law and norms, since Trumpian diplomacy does not consult international norms.

The way in which Trumpian diplomacy destroys the Middle East is not limited to Trump’s messianic decision about Al-Quds. The U.S. secession from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), or the Iran Deal, sealed by the international community, in which the U.S. was an integral part, are other outrageous examples that demonstrate how Trumpian diplomacy undermine  international norms. The Iran deal was a diplomatic success in 2015. Now it invokes a diplomatic ignorance caused by U.S. policy in the Middle East. However, this time round, diplomatic ignorance is not only caused by Trump himself – it is also the consequence of an intra-regional antagonism implemented by Israel to undermine the existing intra-regional balance against itself. For sure, Iran is not the champion of regional stability, but the termination of the Iran Deal is not the best realistic way to contain Iran’s destabilizing role in the Middle East. Calling off the Iran nuclear deal also attempts to undermine Iranian people. It accelerates Iranian politics towards a more radical line.

Another example to see how Trumpian diplomacy destroys the Middle East is the commitment to protect the PKK-YPG’s (which is listed as a terrorist organization by the U.S. itself) interests in northeastern Syria. This commitment indicates the Trump administration’s way of doing diplomacy without diplomats, as well. While the role of military disagreements in Turkish-American relations, particularly the case of the U.S.-PKK connection, shows the decline of diplomacy, it also demonstrates how a tactical concern can become a guideline for overall diplomatic strategy. In addition to that, the increasing rapprochement between the U.S. and the PKK proves the cliché of international politics that one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.

These three examples clearly demonstrate that Trump is demolishing the Middle East that we know by undermining the nature of diplomacy firstly, and secondly, by triggering the regional antagonism among the countries in the region. While destroying the historical status of Al-Quds makes the region more conflictual, demonizing Iran generates more instability for Middle Eastern countries. On the other hand, undermining Turkey’s national security by supporting a terrorist organization endangers U.S. interests in Syria and Iraq. Trump’s diplomacy is the new reality for the Middle East, which has perhaps struck the region via a new wave of crisis. Trump and his team are against international law, norms and diplomacy. The people who serve Trumpian diplomacy are ultra-radical, neocon and pro-interventionists. This is very dangerous for the Middle East. When the other ultra-radical leaders in the region are taken into consideration, the region’s future does not appear to be bright.

During the vote on a resolution proposed to the United Nations General Assembly on December 21, 2017, which condemned U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to declare Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, we witnessed the triumph of humanity’s conscience over power in spite of all threats coming from the U.S. administration.

While an overwhelming majority of U.N. member states who attended the vote voted in favor of the resolution, dismissing Trump’s decision as null and void, only seven countries alongside the U.S. and Israel voted against the resolution. These seven states include four small countries located in the Pacific, Togo in Africa and Guatemala and Honduras in the U.S., which is a clear demonstration of the extent to which Washington and Israel have become isolated in world politics in relation to this decision.

Many comments can be made upon the proposed resolution, and a great deal have been made already. However, it is important to assess the meaning of the resolution in regards to U.S. hegemony in international politics.

The decision drawn from the U.N. General Assembly is the accomplishment of Palestine, Yemen and Turkey, who brought the issue to the agenda of the organization. Turkey exerted serious and determined diplomatic efforts in order to enable support for the draft resolution despite pressure from Washington. Ankara’s position on this issue is a tangible result of “the world is bigger than five” discourse, which has been repeatedly asserted by the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. In other words, the Jerusalem issue became a platform in which Turkey was able to utilize its long-standing discourse of objecting to the privileged positions of certain U.N. members who hamper solutions for international conflicts – initially going against the main reason why the organization was established. Turkey addressed the conscience of the international community and achieved to impose substantial political pressure on the Trump administration by conveying the draft that was vetoed by the U.S. at the U.N. Security Council to the U.N. General Assembly, which has a relatively fairer decision-making mechanism.

Apart from Muslim countries, major components of the Western alliance such as France, Germany, Britain and Italy voted in favor of the resolution, which is reflective of the fact that Europe has been experiencing a divergence in the face of the Trump administration. By supporting the resolution, European leaders uncomfortable with Trump’s “I say I do” mentality, not only underlined their discomfort but also stood against the U.S. President’s decision to drag the Middle East into greater chaos. Unlike the United States, the European Union neighbors the Islamic world through the Middle East and North Africa, and therefore the bloc tends to refrain from taking steps that would lead to a crisis in current relations. This does not change the fact that most of the European countries side with Israel in the Arab-Israeli conflict – they just prefer to do this without causing a stir like Trump.

Aside from opting to use military and economic power, another fact revealed by the U.N. General Assembly’s Jerusalem decision is that diplomacy can be a very effective tool in international relations. Although the U.S. – the greatest military and economic power in the world – tried to intimidate U.N. members, it only received support from seven countries. This very fact demonstrates the extent to which diplomacy can be influential against power-bullying.

Many Christian countries supported the resolution much more than a number of Muslim countries. This illustrates that forming various alliances within foreign policy is a more functional approach in comparison to a standard generalized point of view. In this framework, Turkey achieved what the U.S. – who has immense diplomatic power – could not do. Through its effective diplomatic efforts, Ankara managed to gain support from other leading countries across the world on the issue of Jerusalem, thus leaving Washington to squabble in a substantial political defeat.

It is reasonable to assert that as long as Washington maintains its arrogance and as long as other countries continue to stand against this attitude, the Jerusalem issue may possibly bring the end of U.S. hegemony. If Muslim countries end the conflicts between them and join forces around the issue of Jerusalem, they can stabilize U.S. military and economic power, and if they form alliances against the arrogant policies of Washington, they will suffice to bring the end of American hegemony in world politics and will find themselves respectful positions in the new system.

During her time at the UN General Assembly, British Prime Minister Theresa May urged for UN reform.

The Prime Minister threatened to hold back 30 percent of her country’s UN contributions unless the world body undertakes relevant reform.

“If this system that we have created is found to no longer be capable of meeting the challenges of our time, then there will be a crisis of faith in multilateralism and global cooperation that will damage the interests of our peoples,” May said before the General Assembly in New York.

The UK is the second largest UN funder and May stated that the withheld funds will be dispersed “only to those parts of the UN that achieve sufficient results.”

“Despite our best efforts, we are not succeeding. We must do more,” she said, urging for reform.

May praised the UN-centric international system, calling it “the amplifying force that allows countries to cooperate and live up to these standards in words, spirit and deed.”

However, in pointing out its shortcomings, May pointed her finger to Russia when she called out a Security Council member who she said has used its veto power as many times in the past five years as during the second half of the Cold War.

“In so doing, they have prevented action against a despicable regime that has murdered its people with chemical weapons,” she said. “As a result, in Syria, the United Nations has been blocked.”

No, Theresa

During her stay at New York, Theresa May also raised the issue of Iran’s nuclear weapon program with President Trump.

The US President refused to share with world leaders his final decision on whether to scrap an international agreement made with Iran on its nuclear program, Rex Tillerson told reporters on Wednesday.

When asked by British PM to share his decision on the deal with Tehran, the US President accordingly “said no.”

Secretary Tillerson looked surprised when a reporter informed him that the President had already told the press that he had arrived at a final decision, signaling the disconnect between the head of state and a top diplomat – a problem the Trump administration has faced since the beginning of the President’s tenure.

“I didn’t know he was going to say he made a decision,” Tillerson said. “I knew he had, but I didn’t known he was going to say he had.”

Tillerson held the press briefing following a meeting with the parties to the deal, known officially as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

Secretary Tillerson further conceded that reports from the UN nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), “continue to confirm that Iran is in technical compliance with the agreement.”

He added that however in the broader context, “the aspirations” of the deal had not been met.

During his first UN address as President, Trump unleashed a stern rebuke of Iran, calling it a “rogue regime” and that the nuclear deal was “an embarrassment to the United States.”

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani retaliated during his address at the General Assembly on Wednesday by calling Trump a “rogue newcomer to the world of politics,” without naming him.

The Operation Euphrates Shield (OES) which was launched on August 24, 2016 in order to clear the presence of terrorist organizations along Turkey’s southern border and to prevent the illegitimate PKK entity in Syria, seems to have reached its major objectives. While Turkey has carried out an intense counter-terrorism campaign at home in recent years, she has also adopted a strategy of eliminating terrorist threats at their roots by increasing military activism abroad. Along with the waves of frequent terrorist attacks in the country, the rapid proliferation of terrorist groups with the exploitation of the civil war in Syria made this strategy shift imperative.

Although it is often claimed that the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) would face capability problems in case of a military operation in foreign lands due to the discharges after the July 15 coup attempt, the OES was successfully completed on March 30, 2017. The OES, planned and implemented with the concept of Joint Operations, has demonstrated that the TAF has the level of capacity and readiness, capable of dealing with hybrid terrorist threats in foreign lands as well as in urban environments. The fact that the operation was carried out with the Free Syrian Army (FSA), is an experience that further raises the value of the success and makes the OES an exemplifying campaign. However, it is understood that hybrid warfare practices and innovative terrorist tactics encountered in the theatre of war have created some problems for the course of the OES.

Military and Tactical Experiences

During the operation, the biggest threats faced by OES elements were Suicide Vehicle-Born Improvised Explosive Devices (SVBIED) and anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM). A significant number of the martyrs given during the operation was the result of SVBIEDs, and many of the destroyed armored vehicles are of those ATGMs. Particularly in the western and northern parts of al-Bab, the tanks were repeatedly exposed to ATGMs allowing SVBIED attackers to become more able to reach the OES base areas. The fact that suicide attackers instantly had car bombs ready in their present location at the time increased the shocking effect of the threat, exacerbating  the obstruction of the attack.

Smashing the enemy defense lines with the maneuverability and the fire power of the armors and mechanized units was a vital component of the OES. However, the high level of armor losses calls attention to the necessity of a number of regulations and developments in the tactical deployment, use, and handling of tanks in the hybrid warfare environment. On the other hand, due to limited TAF personnel at the beginning of the operation, the armor advances that were heavily dependent on the FSA infantry capacity, has come to a standstill due to the problems originated from the FSA components in adapting to the rapidly developing battle environment. This situation was only improved after the deployment of the Turkish Special Operations Forces (SOF) and Commando Teams to the battlefield at increasing rates. Furthermore, the lack of close air support was felt in many cases, in particular when the armored units were in vulnerable positions against the sudden attacks.

It was observed during the OES that DAESH evaluated the timing factor in the theatre of war. The time slot in question is the period of temporary fragility of the OES elements during deployments in liberated areas immediately after it was captured. In that time slot, which generally came across the early hours of the morning, DAESH resorted to its traditional counter-attacks with raids and hit and runs. SVBIED, guided missile and mortar attacks were followed by the close engagement of small DAESH teams into OES elements. During these raids, it was observed that DAESH provided effective cover for its attacking militants as well as putting pressure on the OES elements by suppressive fire via ZSU-23 Shilka anti-aircraft weapons. DAESH militants also harassed positioned tanks through these weapon systems, aiming tanks to leave their positions and to turn them into open targets for guided missiles. Another significant factor that created difficulties in DAESH counter-attacks was the weather conditions. Particularly the serious fall of visual range due to the dense fog made it inevitably difficult to counter asymmetrical and sudden threats.

The Necessity of Stable Diplomatic Relations

It should be noted that the inability to overcome some diplomatic problems is another critical factor that slowed down the operation. After rapid acquisitions in the early days of the OES, the Manbij became a target of the operation. However, it was forced to halt by the US’s manipulation and intimidation strategy. Afterwards, the OES continued towards the western direction. Another development was that in the time period between the capture of Dabık and the preparation stage for the al-Bab operation, both Syria and Russia created various problems with military threats by means of air forces, which caused the operation tempo to be adversely affected. In the same period, the US-backed YPG/PKK attacked elements of the OES in the vicinity of Mare, rapidly multiplying and complicating instant security threats. The fact that the Russian Air Forces hit Turkish soldiers on the 9th of February shows the seriousness of the whole complexity. Therefore, stable dialogue between interstate relations is a necessity for the military initiatives carried out on thin diplomatic lines.

Population Centric Counter-Terrorism and Intelligence

Through the OES experience, it became clear that counter-terrorism strategies must be population-centric. The reason for this is due to the fact that public acceptance of the OES components was not only essential for the successful completion of the operation but also for its long-term returns. In respect to counter-terrorism, it can be suggested that Turkey has succeeded in the activities of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) during the operation. The most crucial factor that contributed to this success was the support of the local people. While the evaluation of HUMINT during the OES highlights its success, it can be stated that technical intelligence activities should be intensified and surveillance in general should be upgraded to a stronger technological infrastructure.

Military Operation with a Local Partner

By allying with the local opposition groups, Turkey initiated the OES as an alternative model of Joint Operations. Conducting a military operation in a different geography, operating in an environment in which the dominant language is different and variations in socio-cultural dynamics in the region made Turkey more reliant on FSA forces during the operation. While combating hybrid threats, operations with local partners require a number of improvements in terms of motivation and battle performance.

On the tactical and organizational level, an ideal military cooperation that overcomes the principal-agent problem can be achieved through an integrated approach to the concepts of initiative, intelligence, and integration between units and services, leadership, motivated soldiers and learning. However, in these phases, it is inevitable not to encounter structural problems. First of all, local partners participating in the operation may need to conduct patrol and ambush operations outside the garrison and at night, so that an operation against irregular/terrorist elements can be successfully carried out. Disruptions in the implementation of these tasks may slow down the operational tempo and may even cause retreatment of the forces. At this stage, taking into account the components of the FSA forces, it should be noted that the traditional warfare culture of FSA is different from the TAF. In the light of this information, it may be necessary for the FSA forces to be trained at a tactical level regarding the necessities of the battlefield.

Secondly, in areas of complex conflicts like the Syrian Civil War, the advantage of local opposition groups is to have a deep and strategic knowledge of the population and local conditions. However, being deprived of this advantage or reducing it to a minimum can have vital consequences. In order for intelligence regarding the  population and local conditions to be beneficial for the operation, it is important to integrate intelligence gathering as well as analyzing and spreading capabilities and general knowledge of acquired knowledge. However, most of the time, information may not be shared among armed actors formed by the integration of several different groups such as the FSA, and informational disparities between the units may have negative consequences on the scene. In this context, it is necessary to establish a common ground between the commanders and the units to provide trust and information sharing.

Thirdly, in order to ensure complete control and security of an area in the operation, it is necessary for the forces participating in the operation to have the ability to work together. Besides, when unexpected resistance by terrorist elements are detected, reinforcement of forces may turn out to be a necessity. In the case of OES, the FSA forces formed an important part of the offensive force, while the armored units supported the FSA forces. This situation increased the role and significance of the FSA in the operation, as the main offensive force in the elimination of potential anti-tank units targeting armored troops.

Establishing Dynamic Coordination

On the other hand, the collaboration of commanders with leadership qualities among local partners constitutes a more dynamic coordination of the co-operative forces. From time to time disagreements among the commanders of the components of the FSA, and the suicide attacks of DAESH on these commanders have been one of the major problems affecting the course of the operation during the OES.

Moreover, the disagreement between the local partner and the protecting power may lead to motivation problems. For a long time, Turkey tried to persuade the opposition forces, who perceive the Syrian regime as the primary threat, to fight against DAESH instead of the regime. With the change of this threat perception of the FSA towards DAESH, the integration of the groups with low motivation to the operation posed a trouble in the conduct of the OES.

There is no doubt that tactical training is intended for conventional military operations. However, operations such as the OES, which are conducted with a local partner against irregular/terrorist elements, will require continual learning for conventional and hybrid threat operations, moving beyond high-level skills and standard procedures.