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n response to a recent surge in migrants, Finnish authorities have begun erecting concrete barriers topped with barbed wire at select border crossing points with Russia, officials reported on November 22. Finland has announced the closure of three additional crossings, leaving only the Arctic Salla crossing open for migrants seeking asylum.

This month alone, around 600 migrants, largely from the Middle East and Africa and lacking proper visas and documentation, have entered Finland. This figure marks a significant increase from the few dozen recorded in the previous months. The arrivals include individuals from countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Kenya, Morocco, and Somalia.

“We are taking these necessary steps to maintain order and ensure the security of legal border traffic,” stated Tomi Tirkkonen, deputy commander of the Kainuu border guard district.

Suspicions of Russian officials’ involvement

The Finnish government’s recent decision to close four key southeastern border crossings with Russia raised suspicions of Russian officials’ involvement in the migrant influx. Prime Minister Petteri Orpo has indicated that further action may be required, leading to the additional closures of the Vartius, Kuusamo, and Salla crossings. As a result, Raja-Jooseppi will stand as the sole Finnish checkpoint accepting asylum applications from Russian arrivals.

Foreign Minister Elina Valtonen expressed concerns over Russia’s potential use of migrants as part of a hybrid warfare strategy against Finland, stating, “We have evidence that Russian border authorities are not just allowing, but actively aiding individuals without proper documentation to reach the border zone.”

Despite Russia’s denial of any foul play, the Finnish ambassador in Moscow was summoned to discuss the closure of the most actively used checkpoints.

Critical levels at the Vartius and Salla checkpoints

The migrant situation has reached critical levels at the Vartius and Salla checkpoints, with daily arrivals ranging from 30 to 70 individuals. Governor of Russia’s northern Murmansk region, Andrei Chibis, criticized Finnish authorities for not allowing migrants to cross, labeling the situation a “humanitarian crisis.”

The influx has included young men, families with children, and women, with photos and border guard data highlighting the unusual spike in numbers. The EU border and coast guard agency, Frontex, is set to provide assistance to Finland as it manages the situation.

Finland’s decision to join NATO, a direct response to Russia’s actions in Ukraine, is seen by many as the catalyst for Russia’s alleged retaliation in the form of migrant maneuvers. Analysts remain uncertain of Russia’s primary motives behind such actions, as the geopolitical implications continue to unfold.

Source: Associated Press

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aving fought both the Soviets and the Nazis in World War II and suffered territorial losses, Finland declared neutrality at the end of the war and has not joined any military alliances since then. However, with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the fear of Russia in Finland’s collective memory resurfaced. As a matter of fact, in Finland, which shares a 1,340 km land border with Russia, only 20 percent of the Finish people viewed NATO membership positively before the Ukraine war, but this percentage increased almost fourfold afterwards.

In other words, there was a strong expectation among Finns for an expedited NATO accession process that would guarantee the country’s national security. To meet these expectations, the Finnish government applied for NATO membership in May last year together with Sweden. On the other hand, Turkey requested that the two countries end their support for the FETO and PKK terror groups before approving their memberships.

The NATO membership process

Before moving to any detailed assessment of the topic, it should be noted that in accordance with the Washington Treaty (also known as the North Atlantic Treaty) that formed the legal basis of NATO, a country must complete a process consisting of seven stages in order to join the alliance. In the first phase, the parties negotiate a road map for the membership application. In the second phase, the candidate country declares with a letter of intent that it accepts the obligations for NATO membership. In this process, the parties also determine the reform calendar, if necessary. In the third phase, accession protocols are prepared for membership.

In the fourth and most important phase, as a natural consequence of the collective defense principle, every NATO member country must ratify the accession protocols. In other words, for a country to join NATO, it must receive the support of all member countries. In the fifth and sixth phases, the member states that allow the membership of the candidate country declare that they accept the accession protocols and invite the candidate country to the alliance. In the last stage, the candidate country completes the legal process and joins NATO.

Turkey’s approach

After Turkey became a NATO member in 1952, it has always approached the enlargement of the alliance positively and facilitated the membership processes of countries that want to join the alliance. Even today, Turkey, in principle, supports the memberships of Finland and Sweden, which want to join the collective defense umbrella of NATO. However, in accordance with the Madrid Memorandum signed in June last year, Turkey requires these two countries to cooperate with it in the fight against terrorism and to actively support its fight against FETO and the PKK.

Thus, Ankara is right in this regard, because Finland and Sweden have an important role in the European branches of both terrorist organizations. Unlike countries that hinder Turkey’s European Union membership process due to ideological prejudices and political calculations, Ankara does not seek to turn the situation that Finland and Sweden are facing into an opportunity. On the contrary, based on the principle of reciprocity, it desires to protect its own national security in the same way its counterparts protect theirs. In addition, Turkey is trying to strengthen its strategic autonomy on the axis of its own national interests by challenging all kinds of pressures.

Why Finland and not Sweden?

As tension over NATO membership between Turkey and the two Nordic continues, an important development took place last week. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared that Turkey had lifted the veto for Finland’s NATO membership in the meeting with his Finnish counterpart Sauli Niinistö in Ankara. Erdoğan cited Finland’s more sincere attitude towards the fight against terrorism as a reason for Ankara’s policy change.

Taking a closer look at the issue, Stockholm has shown that it is not truly sincere in its fight against terrorism by allowing anti-Islam demonstrations of right-wing extremists and anti-Turkey rallies of PKK militants in recent months. Finland, conversely, showed greater sensitivity by avoiding such incidents on its territories. In other words, Helsinki did not provoke Ankara in this process, and, in return, received Turkey’s support for its NATO membership. In addition, Turkey’s policy of minimizing foreign problems played a positive role in its change of attitude towards Finland’s NATO bid.

Sweden, which applied to NATO together with Finland, made some concrete arrangements on the way to membership in accordance with the Madrid Agreement. For instance, it passed an anti-terror law in November, and the new government has been trying to pass a new counterterrorism bill against the financing, aiding, and propagation of terrorist groups.

Turkey’s expectations

However, none of these meet Ankara’s expectations and to date, Sweden has not taken any serious step to address Turkey’s security concerns. So much so that Sweden still turns a blind eye to the actions of PKK militants on its streets and refuses to comply with extradition requests by Turkey. Moreover, it has allowed anti-Muslim attacks such as the burning of the Qur’an in front of the Turkish embassy in Stockholm.

Ankara is not against NATO enlargement per se. On the contrary, Turkey supports NATO’s open door policy, and this holds true for Finland and Sweden as well. However, since Turkey is determined to protect its national security and interests, it requires from these two countries to take a clear stance against the PKK and FETO, both of which threaten Ankara’s national security.

Turkey removed its veto on Finland’s NATO membership on March 17, 2023, showing that it will reciprocate if its counterparts keep their promises. If Sweden, like Finland, abides by Turkey’s red lines and takes the necessary steps, it also can achieve a tangible gain on the way to NATO membership before the Vilnius summit in July 2023.

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n March 9, the trilateral talks between Turkey, Sweden, and Finland restarted in Brussels. Following the talks, Turkey acknowledged that Sweden and Finland have taken some steps to meet Ankara’s concerns over the activities of terrorist groups in their countries.

On January 21, Turkey had suspended talks as part of the memorandum to ease Finland and Sweden’s accession process until the two countries addressed Turkey’s concerns.

Sweden and Finland applied to join NATO last year to safeguard themselves against possible Russian acts of aggression as such concerns became manifest with the Russia-Ukraine war. Hungary and Turkey are the only NATO members yet to ratify their bids.

In addition to the free movements and activities of terrorist organizations in Sweden and Finland, both countries also impose an arms embargo on the Turkish military industry.

While Turkey has always firmly supported NATO’s open-door policy, it also expects its key concerns to be addressed in the spirit of the alliance.

The PKK is designated as a terrorist organization by the EU, the U.S., the UK, and Turkey, and for four decades has waged a war against Turkey.

A tougher stance?

Ankara also wants Helsinki and Stockholm to take a tougher stance against the FETO terrorist organization, which staged a foiled coup attempt in Turkey on July 15, 2016.

At the moment, Turkey considers Sweden, in particular, too hesitant and lenient in banning the PKK’s fundraising and other activities.

Ibrahim Kalin, President Erdoğan’s spokesperson, said that the meeting on March 9 was held in a positive climate, and that further steps needed to be taken by Finland and Sweden.

“The Vilnius summit in July is presented as a deadline for us. Our security concerns are at stake. Ratification of their bids depends on the steps the Nordic countries will take,” he said.

The suspension came after the far-right Danish politician Rasmus Paludan, an outspoken Islamophobe, burned a copy of the Quran in front of the Turkish Embassy in Stockholm despite Turkey’s persistent warnings to Swedish authorities to prevent it.

Sweden’s chief negotiator for the talks, Oscar Stenström, said that Sweden had met its obligations and that it takes Turkey’s concerns over the PKK militants in Sweden seriously. The Swedish government introduced a new anti-terrorism bill to parliament on March 9.

The new anti-terror law, which the government hoped would come into force on June 1, 2023, was poised to grant authorities greater power to detain and prosecute individuals who back terrorist organizations, through financing or other means. Traveling abroad to assist a terrorist organization will also be punished if the law takes effect.

The Swedish Parliament was scheduled to ratify the new anti-terror law on March 9, but it was postponed to May 3.

Pass to Finland but not Sweden

On January 29, Turkish President Erdoğan said Turkey might approach Finland’s bid differently than Sweden’s.

Although the two countries initially said they would join NATO together, on March 14, the Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson said that the ratifications of the two countries might be at different times and that his country is prepared for such a development.

Finland’s President Sauli Niinistö traveled to Turkey on March 16-17 for a solidarity visit to the earthquake-affected areas and to discuss his country’s NATO bid.

Having visited the earthquake-ridden areas, he met President Erdoğan in Ankara.

On Wednesday, March 22, during Niinistö’s visit, Erdoğan told reporters that they would fulfill their pledge to Finland. Even though he did not give further details, it is interpreted as greenlighting Finland’s NATO bid.

Turkish parliament

Also on Wednesday, two Turkish officials told Reuters that the Turkish Parliament is likely to ratify Finland’s NATO bid in mid-April before the Parliament closes prior to the elections on May 14.

Until recently, Hungary has also delayed Helsinki’s and Stockholm’s NATO bids.

In a letter published on Tuesday, March 14, the Hungarian Deputy Prime Minister Zsolt Semjén requested that a parliamentary session scheduled for March 20 to vote on Finland and Sweden’s membership be postponed to a week later.

Nevertheless, Turkey and Hungary declared that they will ratify Finland’s application for NATO membership.

“We have decided to start the protocol of Finland’s accession to NATO in our parliament,” Erdoğan said during a press conference in Istanbul alongside his Finnish counterpart Sauli Niinistö.

Speaking on Sweden’s application, Erdoğan said Turkey cannot greenlight Sweden’s bid as Stockholm has refused to extradite 120 suspected terrorists.

At a joint press conference alongside German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in Berlin, Sweden’s Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson said, “We believe that we are ready for ratification, but we respect that only Turkey can make Turkey’s decisions.”

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urkey has been an active member of NATO since it joined the alliance in 1952. Although, (1) it was not a neighbor of the Atlantic countries, (2) had an eastern sociopolitical culture, and (3) a weak economy, its desire for positing itself in the West through westernization (and secularization) and the Soviet threat led it to knock on the door of NATO several times. While NATO allies refused the first three applications, they welcomed Turkey in 1952.

Since then, Turkey has become a crucial NATO member, thanks to its positive contributions to the alliance. The first contribution made by Turkey to NATO was prior to its membership, when the Turkish army fought alongside Western countries in the Korean Peninsula. After seeing the capabilities of the Turkish army, the U.S.- and U.K.-led NATO admitted Turkey into the organization. Another reason was that while war-torn Western countries had a total of 32 military divisions ready for combat, the Turkish army alone had the same number as it did not fight in World War II.

With accession, Turkey became NATO’s frontline as it neighbored the Soviet Union. NATO’s land forces, jets, missiles, radars, and intelligence staff were deployed to Turkish territories. Perhaps, the fact that Turkey was a NATO member deterred the Soviet Union from attacking Turkey, but at the same time it transformed Turkish soil into a target in any likely war. Particularly, the storage of nuclear weapons in Turkish bases posed a great threat to Turkey’s security. Yet, throughout the Cold War, Turkish governments took all risks and remained loyal to the NATO Treaty they signed.

Turkey’s contributions to the alliance did not end when the Soviet bloc was dissolved in 1991. Right after the Dayton Treaty that ended the Bosnian War, Ankara sent troops to Bosnia and Herzegovina to uphold peace there. It also participated in NATO’s Kosovo operation and deployed troops after Kosovan territories were liberated.

The Turkish army went to Afghanistan after Americans called on NATO to invoke Article 5 in 2001. Furthermore, the Turkish army supported the Darfur Mission of the UN-African Union as a NATO member between 2005 and 2007. In addition, the Turkish navy has been present in the Gulf of Aden to prevent attacks of Somalian pirates and stop irregular immigration in the Mediterranean Sea.

What is more, the center of NATO’s land forces (LANDCOM) is based in Izmir, and the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) of NATO member states are free to land at Konya Airport. There is also a radar system located in Malatya. Moreover, the Turkish army is the second-largest in the organization, and the Turkish government is among the top five governments contributing to NATO expenses.

Despite Turkey’s evident commitment to NATO, Ankara’s relations with main NATO members, particularly the U.S., are not at the desired level. While the majority of NATO members argue that Turkey distances itself from the West, the Turkish side claims that its allies estranged Ankara with their policies. For instance, Turkey’s procurement of Russia-made S-400 missiles angered the U.S., which in return exerted CAATSA sanctions and removed Turkey from the F-35 program.

Yet, Turkey says it turned to Russia because earlier the U.S. did not sell Patriot missiles to Ankara. In addition, there are undeclared sanctions on the Turkish defense industry. From small guns to tank engines, many components are not sold to Turkish defense firms, with the reasons offered for the sanctions being nonsensical. For example, Turkey’s military operations against the PKK/YPG terrorism are used as an excuse to ban arm sales. Ankara, in turn, views such positions as support for the terrorist groups.

Support for the PKK

Indeed, the U.S. and European countries openly support terrorist organizations fighting against Turkey. While they claim that the support is to defeat ISIS, the weapons they donate are used against the Turkish army. In addition, many members of terrorist organizations live safely in European countries, which claim that the Turkish government abuses the terrorists’ rights, forcing them to flee. The Turkish government sees Europe’s actions as a way of hurting Turkey.

Ankara also has differences with NATO members due to Sweden and Finland’s NATO membership, Greece’s irresponsible actions, and the Ukrainian war. Beginning with Ukraine, unlike other NATO members, Turkey did not cut its relations with Russia in order not to punish the Russian people and not to worsen the situation in Syria, where NATO has left Turkey alone against Russia. On the other hand, the Turkish government sent weapons to Ukraine and has never approved of Russia’s aggression. Moreover, the Black Sea Grain Initiative, facilitated by Turkey and NATO, allowed Ukraine to sell its grains to the world, primarily benefitting European countries who bought the most. So, Ankara’s policy is perhaps not anti-Russian, but is certainly pro-Ukraine, and nobody can deny how this policy has been beneficial to Ukraine.

Regarding Sweden and Finland, the Turkish government asks these two Nordic countries to distance themselves from terrorist groups and extradite certain wanted criminals. Although both countries made a deal to fulfill Ankara’s requests, none of the conditions have been met. What is more, the Swedish government allowed anti-Turkey protests and the burning of the Qur’an at a time when it seeks the approval of Turkey for NATO membership. Needless to say, such acts are disrespectful and insolent, insult Islam, and aim to provoke Turkey and the Muslim world. No NATO member state can ratify candidates who challenge a member state instead of respecting its demands for security.

Greece and NATO

As for Greece, Athens wants to have the same nautical miles (12) for the territorial waters of its islands, which are quite small and only two kilometers away from Turkish shores, as for its mainland. By doing so, it ignores the territorial waters of sizable pieces of Turkish lands. Furthermore, Greece militarizes islands though past treaties ban doing so. Turkey has repeatedly warned Greece that if it does not change its militarization policy and the self-declaration of 12-mile territorial waters, it will declare war.

Since the U.S. is NATO’s leading country, the policy it should follow is to broker between the two countries and end the dispute peacefully. However, instead, the U.S. arms the Greek islands and sells advanced weapons like F-35s to Greece, which it did not sell to Turkey. Moreover, certain U.S. congresspeople and senators, who are under the influence of the Greek lobby’s payroll, violate Washington’s balance policy between Turkey and Greece.

Based on the above analysis, the Turkish government and people feel betrayed by their NATO allies. They question why NATO members did not show solidarity when Turkish jets downed a Russian jet in 2015. Turks also do not understand why the U.S. army allies with a terrorist organization and protects it against its NATO ally, Turkey. They also have difficulties understanding why the U.S. government allows the leader of the July 15, 2016 failed military coup, Fethullah Gülen, to live in Pennsylvania.

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inland and Sweden’s political aspiration to join NATO has been on a rocky and problematic path. After some years of grooming Finnish and Swedish officials on joining NATO, the countries abandoned their individual grand strategies of national survival, used to navigate the geopolitical risks and obstacles of the old Cold War, and opted away from military non-alignment, present on paper only.

Sweden is attempting to opt out of the idea of a Swedish model to be exported to the world and the notion of Swedish exceptionalism, and throw its efforts into joining the declining Western-centric, United States-led unipolar order (together with the institution of Western liberalism). Thus, the Finnish and Swedish governments, of their own free will and volition, have chosen to become objects and not subjects at a point in time that sees a shift and evolution in the global geopolitical order.

It seemed that Finland and Sweden assumed that there will be no obstacles to their anticipated smooth entry into NATO, a product of a sense of self-entitlement and spending too much time in the echo chamber that is the divisive ideological environment of Western liberalism.

There were hints and signs from several NATO members that would or could potentially delay the process. After years of arrogant and didactic lecturing from Sweden to the non-Western world on the ethical righteousness and superiority of Swedish values and norms, their theoretical model of Swedish liberalism (with an “exceptional” twist) met and clashed with the model of Turkish realism.

Western decline?

Western decline is a complex and multidimensional interaction in international relations in an era when the power and influence capabilities and capacities of core Western liberal countries are in a state of relative decay and decline. It includes various dimensions such as ideology versus pragmatism and liberalism versus realism, where a clash of wills and perceptions is taking place in a hyper-politicised environment. In spite of what Finland and Sweden may think, based upon their assumptions of moral superiority, it is Turkey that holds the trump card in this international negotiation.

At a political level, Finland and Sweden have fully committed themselves to the aim of NATO membership, which Turkey can make happen if certain security guarantees are made and kept. The negotiation involves the trade of facilitating NATO membership for Finland and Sweden in exchange for rather concise and concrete assurances for Turkey on the matter of the Kurdish terror group PKK. In the initial round of the negotiation process, Finland and Sweden refused to offer and guarantee those assurances, and thus the initial stage of NATO offering membership was stalled.

Perhaps, coming to the realization that Turkey held the high ground in the negotiation process, there was the appearance of agreement by Finland and Sweden as signaled in official information sources on the NATO membership process. Western mainstream media discourse places the blame on Turkey for delaying the process without engaging in the reasons for the delay. This is also very much part of the negotiation process: using information channels to cognitively coerce Turkey into making concessions for emotional reasons rather than the real underlying pragmatic reasons.

Why are Sweden and Finland hesitant? 

There is a great deal of hesitancy by the Finnish and Swedish governments to meet the Turkish conditions for agreeing to their membership. The source of this hesitancy is found in the level of political risk among the voter constituencies that would react strongly. Although Finland and Sweden acted in bad faith in their negotiations already, they believe and try and present themselves as being the victims and that eventually Turkey will give them what they want.

In particular, it would likely prove to be political suicide for a Finnish or Swedish government to extradite the individuals named by Turkey; the unwillingness to co-operate is instead blamed on legal obstacles. However, the true concern is a political backlash by voters.

This creates a conundrum and dilemma for Finnish and Swedish policymakers. On the one hand, there is the desired “holy grail” of NATO membership and full integration into the Western-centric world from an ideological and political point of view. On the other hand, the likely high political costs of achieving this goal by granting Turkey the necessary assurances. The cost-benefit ratio for Turkey is somewhat different, where the costs of permitting membership are not high from a technical and administrative perspective.

Golden opportunity for Turkey 

For Turkey, this is a golden opportunity to make the best use of its leverage to increase state security. The PKK is a significant state and human security concern for Turkey as the death toll from its terrorist acts continuously increases. Turkey cannot compromise on the issue of security, placing the necessity to concede on Finland and Sweden.

It would appear that the Finnish and Swedish governments are trying to gradually wear down Turkish resolve on the NATO membership question, and based on their presumptive public statements, they assume that time is on their side. However, this would only be valid if Turkey perceived itself at a power and time disadvantage to its counterparts, when the reverse is actually true.

Formal NATO membership is a very high political priority for the Finnish and Swedish governments. There are certain steps to achieve this goal, but the two governments do not want to take the required steps owing to the constraints and restraints of domestic politics. At the same time, provocative public acts of political activism in Sweden are bound to guarantee that Turkey as a matter of honor remains ever more resolute on its terms and conditions.

Alliances are permanent institutions of mutual guarantees to the constituent parties that require long-term, stable, and determined commitments. Once the alliance is set up, the partners invest their faith in survivability. Yet, selecting the party on which to rely for the guarantee of a smooth future should not be a fait accompli. NATO is not an exception to this calculus because each member brings its own interests, security concerns, or complicated geopolitical environment.

The reason for this calculus is the mutual burden on the members of the alliance. The initial calculation is the contributed surplus of the member state to the overall structure of the alliance and other members as well. The second calculation is the structure of, say NATO, and security coverage addressing the individual and collective security concerns. These two give-and-take calculi form the parameters for membership that has pains and gains for the designed collective security architecture.

If the current debates on—or Turkish reservations regarding—the application by Sweden and Finland for NATO membership are reviewed, the calculus of the alliance, per the identified parameters, can expose the pains and gains for these countries, NATO, and, specifically, Turkey.

Sweden and Finland are rather small-sized states in terms of demography and military posture. The Russian aggression in Ukraine, as a potential pattern during the coming decades, has pushed them to review the possibility in case a war escalates in the vicinity. The population of Sweden is a little more than 10 million while Finland’s is around 5.5 million. The median ages are 41.1 and 42.8 respectively, and population growth rates are 0.74% and 0.26% respectively.

The land mass of Sweden is 338,450 square km and that of Finland 447,430. The fit for service military manpower in Sweden is 3.4 million and in Finland 1.9 million. On duty active forces in the militaries of Sweden are 22,000 and in Finland 16,000 except for a small number of paramilitary forces. The defense budget of Sweden is $8.60 billion and Finland’s is $6.03 billion; both are lower than the average defense budgets of NATO countries, except for the very small-sized ones such as Montenegro and Latvia.

Given the above facts and figures, the military capacities of both Sweden and Finland are highly limited to respond to any external conventional threat, which makes the two countries potentially dependent on foreign security guarantees in the realm of Russian conventional and unconventional threats. Meanwhile the contribution of Sweden and Finland to their own security is very limited due to the low level of military preparedness and the geopolitical positioning in the security architecture of the Baltic Sea.

Sweden hosts a considerable number of FETO and PKK/PYD/YPG offshoots that facilitate these organizations’ work with wider Europe against Turkish interests through fundraising, propaganda, and conscription. There are eleven PKK-affiliated organizations in Sweden, besides four media institutions, which receive funding from the Swedish government.

The efficacy of terror propaganda in Sweden is also evident in another significant figure: the number of Swedish conscripts in the PKK which was around 50 in 2017. Furthermore, the PKK had built a Scandinavian Brigade in its cadre under the pretense of fighting DAESH, though these individuals fought against the Turkish military.

Another interesting fact about Sweden is the paradox that makes the current policy of the Swedish government questionable. As Sweden became a safe haven for PKK terrorists in 1984, an internal dispute among them broke out. Due to disagreements among PKK cells, the PKK leadership in Sweden carried out executions against dissident members.

Targeting PKK dissident members mobilized the Swedish government to deport eighteen PKK members which led to the alleged assassination of Prime Minister Olof Palme on February 28, 1986, by the PKK, according to the confessions of Semdin Sakik, an arrested PKK leader. The current Swedish government, from the point of view of the Turkish leadership, tolerates, facilitates, and protects the existence of these PKK cells despite their alleged role in the assassination of Olof Palme.

Turkey is concerned about the Swedish grants to terror cells in the form of direct funding and arms supply at no cost. In 2021, it has been assessed that Sweden granted the PKK/PYD/YPG $376 million—a development that is strongly opposed by Turkey. This funding goes to the PKK/PYD/YPG despite the fact that the PKK and its sister organizations in Syria and Iraq continuously plot terror attacks on Turkish soldiers and Syrian civilians.

Another hotspot is the “hosted” FETO members in these countries. FETO members are gradually offered permanent residence and citizenship while having the privilege of occupying roles at universities and think tanks, mainly provoking malign narratives against Turkey.  Ankara has shared arrest warrants with the Ministries of Justice of these states with adequate proof for indictment, but neither Sweden nor Finland have arrested and deported these individuals.

The second reason for the Turkish reservations about Sweden’s and Finland’s membership is the arms embargo of their governments on the Turkish defense industry. In addition to certain European countries and the U.S. implementation of either overt or covert embargos on Turkey, two additional countries adopt the same policy: Sweden and Finland. The current escalation in Ukraine is a clear indicator that any embargo on Turkey will weaken the defense capacity of NATO.

In this sense, Turkey’s approach is to handle this constraint with all NATO member states and with these two countries. Sweden was very committed to calling for an arms embargo on Turkey in October 2021 due to Ankara’s military campaigns against the PKK/PYD/YPG.

After all, Sweden and Finland will gain more by becoming NATO members whereby they will enjoy a heightened sense of security, especially against potential risks and threats. NATO will bear the burden of their desire to join the alliance, which will have limited gains from their membership. Turkey had to sacrifice the lives of Turkish soldiers in Korea with a 22% casualty ratio in the three years of the Korean War.

Sweden’s and Finland’s quest is to become NATO members leaning on the EU solidarity while taking upon themselves a very limited burden. In this calculus, Sweden and Finland benefit from NATO membership while contributing a very limited military capacity to the alliance. Given the expectation that allies defend each other against all sorts of threats, both hard and soft of the current age, Turkey has lost trust in Sweden and, to some extent, Finland due to their long-lasting, anti-Turkey malign activities.

Consequently, Swedes and Finns must agree to give up their malign activities against Turkey, a future ally, which in turn would commit to sacrificing the lives of Turkish soldiers in order to guarantee their security as NATO members.

When the war broke out in Ukraine on February 24, 2022, many observers were caught by surprise in spite of the dire predictions and warnings in reporting by mainstream Western media. The “old” global crisis of the COVID19 pandemic was quickly relegated to a secondary role and replaced in the headlines with the Russia-Ukraine war.

However, a lot of the reporting and analyses from Western countries have drawn global generalizations based on Western-centric values and interests. These generalizations, in turn, have informed and influenced the Western world’s perception, understanding, and reactions to the events unfolding in Ukraine. In the long run, such reporting concludes that the process may incur unforeseen or unanticipated threats and expose weaknesses for countries seeking to integrate further into the Euro-Atlantic structures as a pre-emptive security measure.

The shock effect of the Russia-Ukraine war

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine caught various international observers by surprise, not the least, owing to the almost universal belief that the various threatened sanctions would mean that costs would outweigh any benefits of a military campaign.

The lack of foresight and predictions hints at a possible divergence in international relations between the U.S. unipolar global order and the countries and civilizations that fall beyond this geopolitical realm. There has been an expected international shock and uncertainty caused by the war, but it has been far from a universal condemnation of Russia for launching its military operation against Ukraine.

What seems to have happened in this increasing global divide between Western and non-Western countries is a growing gap in national interests, values, and perceptions with the process already beginning before the current Ukraine war. The idea of global messianic universalism under Western leadership—especially that of the United States—is fading away as the world grows more diverse and unstable in the wake of Western ascendency after the outcomes of the Cold War.

Although a physical war is taking place in Ukraine, its implications and repercussions are much wider in the context of the United States seeking to defend its global hegemonic position against countries such as China and Russia.

Finland learned a particularly painful lesson in the wake of the Soviet Union’s attack on the country in the 1939-40 Winter War, and the subsequent alignment with Nazi Germany to remedy those territorial loses in the 1941-44 Continuation War, which proved to be disastrous.

A hard lesson was learned on the risks of being a junior partner to a larger military power. Therefore, a more nuanced and independent foreign and security policy was pursued in order to ensure national interests could be protected without foreign entanglements.

However, there have been an increasing number of events and attempts to push Finnish and Swedish public opinion incrementally towards the NATO membership option. NATO has been actively lobbying both countries through diplomatic activities to join the alliance. There were also highly publicized events of the unconfirmed “Russian submarines” in Helsinki Harbor and the Stockholm Archipelago, which increased public support for NATO membership.

Sweden has been increasingly integrating with NATO before the Russia-Ukraine War broke out, for example, by hosting military exercises with NATO forces in Exercise Aurora. These efforts to shift public opinion towards a more favorable view of NATO membership have been based on fear: the fear of something bad happening (see Russian military attack), and that something bad can happen to the citizens of both countries. This is captured in the parting words of former U.S. ambassador to Sweden, Mark Brzezinski, who said that NATO was like an insurance policy for Sweden.

Even though Finland and Sweden are not yet NATO members, they both gave up the policy of neutrality long ago. When the war in Ukraine broke out, Sweden initially rejected any consideration of joining NATO and the Swedish prime minister stated that the country had no such intentions.

The underlying reason given by Sweden for not wanting to join NATO was that to do so would destabilize the Northern European security. This stood in contrast to the Finnish prime minister who promised a quick public debate on the issue of NATO membership.

However, Sweden’s official government position on the NATO question changed to align with Finland’s, with both countries pledging to decide on the matter by the end of June 2022. The war in Ukraine has successfully shaped a slight majority of public opinion in favor of joining NATO in both countries, although this all comes in a time of war and through the use of fear. The Swedish and Finish decision on exploring the NATO option is likely to have been decided before the Russia-Ukraine war at the political level, and it still requires time and circumstance to engineer public consent.

Possible consequences of NATO expansion in the Baltic Sea

The dilemmas of Finland and Sweden are tied to the current environment of politics of perceived risk. These mainly pertain to risk considerations such as Russia’s border politics, lack of hard security capacity, and potential dangers posed by Russia owing to perceptions of unpredictability and lack of reliability.

However, by seeking NATO membership, there are multiple risks. Finland and Sweden joining NATO may be seen as a de facto declaration of war against Russia; they will become entangled in great power politics that is not in their national interests; it is likely to harm bilateral relations and issues of collaboration/cooperation; they will lose the independent ability to influence and manage foreign relations with Russia; and they will be at the frontline of any possible wider armed conflict, if one were to break out.

Certainly, Russia has warned of the consequences of Finland and/or Sweden joining NATO given their perception of security interests being further compromised by the U.S.-led alliance. In addition to a likely Russian military redeployment to take into account the new status of Finland and Sweden, there are also likely to be political and economic consequences of joining NATO.

It would also spell a likely end to initiatives of a non-nuclear Baltic region and negatively impact Sweden’s initiatives to influence the world in a positive direction—for example the obvious contradictions that will arise with its “humanitarian superpower” brand and feminist foreign policy.

A new iron curtain for a new Cold War?

In recent years, as the multipolar order gained strength and influence, there have been increasing discussions and speculations about a “New Cold War.”. Given the global effects on international relations, there seems to be a new Iron Curtain descending not only on Europe but across the entire globe, which divides the Western-centric and non-Western centric powers. This is a point in time when the U.S. seeks to claim back its global hegemony, which increases the risks for everyone owing to a volatile global geopolitical polarization.

There have been a number of worrying public statements that suggest and confirm that the war in Ukraine concerns much more than the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country. In a relatively underexposed moment of clarity, General Curtis Scaparrotti, the former Commander of the United States European Command and NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, Europe,  stated, “We are in a proxy war with Russia. We are using the Ukrainians as our proxy forces.”

More recently, the U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin stated that the U.S. wants to weaken Russia. Messaging of a U.S. proxy war against Russia has been echoed by former U.S. secretary of defense Leon Panetta. In other words, apart from the political and geopolitical repercussions and consequences of the war in Ukraine, there are also strong economic shocks that will be further exacerbated by the Western world’s sanctions against Russia for invading Ukraine.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine stirred up debates and policy decisions regarding defense and security, especially in Europe. Many countries made decisions to increase military spending. Recently, Finland and Sweden, which traditionally take an approach of non-alignment and military independence, face predicaments of policy change with respect to their pacifism and the historic decision of joining NATO.

The Russian aggression and the growing public concerns put pressure on the governments of Sweden and Finland to join NATO. Finland, which shares a border with Russia, seems to be treating the situation with more urgency and plans to join NATO as soon as the summer of 2022. Sweden, which was taking a more cautious path towards membership, also seems to be in favor of following in Finland’s path.

According to local media the Nordic countries will submit their NATO application simultaneously in mid-May, likely the week of May 16. Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs Pekka Haavisto commented that no fixed date has been set but that it would be “useful” for the bid to launch in conjunction. On April 25, Finnish media Iltalehti reported that suggestions from the Swedish leadership about submitting the applications at the same time had met with agreement from the Finnish side, providing Sweden goes ahead with its plan to join NATO.

Why are Sweden and Finland neutral states?

Historically, Finland has been a buffer state. Until the Russian Imperial Army annexed it in 1808, Finland was a part of the Swedish Kingdom. It remained an autonomous buffer state for a century under the Russian Empire, known as the “Grand Duchy of Finland,” and declared independence during the Russian Revolution in 1917. During the interwar period, relations between Finland and the Soviet Union were tense. Later, during World War II, Finland was regarded by the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany to be under the Soviet sphere of influence.

Finland officially adopted neutrality in the Cold War period, and a 1948 treaty with the Soviet Union consolidated its desire to remain out of great power conflicts. The treaty would ensure that Finland would not be hostile towards the Soviet Union and deter any attack on the Soviet Union carried out via Finnish soil by Germany or its allies. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Finland tilted towards the West and finally became an EU member in 1995.

Sweden was a historically non-aligned country and stayed out of both world wars. Although Sweden saw the Soviet Union as a threat and cooperated with NATO during the Cold War period, the country opted for military independence and stayed out of the alliance. It joined the EU the same year as Finland.

Remaining outside of the NATO umbrella— similar to Ukraine—and observing NATO’s limited response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine have provoked Sweden and Finland to rethink their military neutrality and non-alignment policy. With their foundation from earlier training programs, the integration of Finland and Sweden to NATO will not be difficult. Both the U.S. and NATO have given positive signals that their membership request would likely be accepted swiftly; however, the admittance process may take four months to a year. It is also unlikely that the countries would face difficultly fulfilling the unanimous vote requirement to join NATO.

Public opinion and political will in both countries favor NATO membership

The public opinion and political will in both countries are in favor of joining the military alliance. In Finland, the public that had been uninterested in joining NATO now see its importance. Opinion polls show that more than 60% of Finns favor joining NATO, a figure that had remained at 20-30% before the war in Ukraine. In the upcoming weeks, Finland is to come to an official decision as well as an outline to its path to joining NATO.

The ruling party in Sweden, the Social Democrats, released a statement that read, “When Russia invaded Ukraine, Sweden’s security position changed fundamentally.” The party’s position is in favor of following in Finland’s path in terms of NATO membership. However, the Swedish government will face general elections in September 2022 and may want to avoid voter alienation by making such a drastic change, and, therefore, has been treading a more careful path in the past weeks.

Swedish newspaper Svenska Dagbladet reported earlier in April that Magdalena Andersson, prime minister of Sweden, was planning to apply for membership in time for a NATO summit in late June. A poll on April 20 showed that the percentage of Swedes that are in favor of joining NATO went up from 51% in March to 57%, those opposing fell to 21% from 24%, and undecided votes decreased to 22% from 25%. This shows more certainty among the public as Russia increases its threats.

The expansion of NATO was essentially the situation Russia wanted to avoid. Dmitry Peskov, the Kremlin spokesperson, stated that the NATO alliance remained a tool towards confrontation and its expansion would not bring stability. Moscow threatened to readjust the balance at the border and reposition nuclear weapons in the Kaliningrad region between Poland and Lithuania if Finland and Sweden joined NATO (nuclear installations in the region already exist).

Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of the Security Council of Russia, also mentioned that Russia would have to strengthen its land, naval, and air forces in the Baltic Sea.

For now, the accession process of Sweden and Finland to NATO is set to heighten tensions, but the possibility of direct confrontation from Russia is unlikely given that its troops are allocated to Ukraine. Still, nuclear buildup in the Baltic puts the region on edge.

It was not long ago when NATO’s divisions were running deep. Until recently, many in the West were questioning the security alliance’s purpose.

As a presidential candidate in 2016, Donald Trump said that if Baltic states weren’t “paying their bills” the U.S. shouldn’t necessarily protect them from Russia notwithstanding treaty obligations. In 2019, French President Emanuele Macron asserted that NATO was “becoming brain-dead”. The following year, tensions between Greece and Turkey led some experts to conclude that NATO was “paralyzed”.

At that time, 70 percent of Turkey’s population saw the U.S., NATO’s dominant military force, as a threat to their country. Many voices in the West accused Germany of being a “shaky alliance partner” and “NATO’s biggest freeloader.”

But Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February was a geopolitical tsunami that fundamentally changed the strategic stakes for NATO members. Amid drastic changes in Europe’s security architecture, the Western alliance has regained a sense of purpose. Today NATO is more unified and cohesive than it ever has been since the Soviet Union’s implosion in 1991.

“Threat is the glue that binds together a security alliance,” explained John Feffer, the director of Foreign Policy In Focus, in an interview with Politics Today. “When the threat increases–and there is a consensus on the nature of the threat–the alliance necessarily becomes more cohesive. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has served to smooth over a number of disagreements within the alliance.”

The Ankara-based Foreign Policy Institute’s Dr Tarik Oguzlu wrote that “as we witness NATO’s European members awaking from their geopolitical hibernation, NATO is almost returning to its founding mission.”

The war in Ukraine quickly led to a “revolution in German military affairs” with Berlin now committed to a hike in defense spending. The Germans put Nord Stream 2 pipeline on hold. Berlin is also arming the Ukrainian resistance with lethal weapons despite previously opposing NATO’s militarization of Ukraine.

Since 24 February, NATO members “have rallied together and acted quickly with new defence and deterrence measures such as activating the NATO defence plans, activating elements of the NATO Response Force, and approving the deployment of four new multinational battlegroups in Eastern Europe,” Mihai Chihaia, a policy analyst at the Brussels-based European Policy Centre, told Politics Today.

“Reinforcing the Eastern flank has been a top priority and the Allies have shown a very high degree of solidarity. In addition, the strong commitment to Article 5 (mutual defense) has been constantly reiterated.”

Expanding the Alliance

NATO is not only becoming more unified because of a growing common threat perception of Russia. The security alliance might be on the verge of expanding its membership. Sweden and Finland appear close to abandoning their decades-old foreign policy tradition of neutrality and entering NATO. Finland doing so would add 810 miles to the border between Russia and NATO members.

“If Sweden and Finland join, NATO’s presence and coordination in the Baltic Sea area, as well as more broadly in the Nordic and Arctic, will be strengthened, together with NATO’s defense and deterrence posture,” said Chihaia. “Their armed forces would be an asset to the alliance as both Sweden and Finland have been close partners for years, they have invested in modernizing their armed forces, and there is a high degree of interoperability and adherence to NATO standards.”

This deeply alarms Moscow, which has been warning Stockholm and Helsinki about political and military consequences. “Russia has threatened to place nuclear weapons in its Kaliningrad enclave if Finland or Sweden join,” explained Feffer.

“[Russia] has threatened to increase its military presence in the Baltic region to deal with NATO’s extended border with Russia if Finland joins. But I’m not sure that the security architecture will change that much. Sweden and Finland are not members of NATO, but they have coordinated with the security alliance for some time. Russia, meanwhile, has reportedly already placed nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad (according to the Lithuanian government). But it does mean that the space for neutrality in Europe is shrinking,” Feffer added.

The Orban and Le Pen Factors

There are some limits to NATO’s unity, which brings us to Hungary. With Prime Minister Viktor Orban at the helm, Hungary is the Western alliance’s most Russia-friendly member. In the past, he has hailed Russia as a model for his “illiberal” country.

Although Budapest did not veto EU sanctions on Moscow following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine earlier this year, Orban has vowed to block EU sanctions on oil and gas from Russia. The Hungarian leader has also opposed demands to halt the expansion of the Rosatom-financed Paks Nuclear Plant. As the leadership in Budapest sees it, Hungarian citizens should not be burdened by costlier bills because of energy sanctions against Russia.

“Hungary is the problem child of Europe because of the ties [that Russia maintains with] the Orban government. As long as [Orban] is there, Budapest will be a problem,” Dr Theodore Karasik, the former Senior Political Scientist in the International Policy and Security Group at RAND Corporation, told Politics Today. Nonetheless, Budapest is not defending Russia’s violations of Ukrainian sovereignty. “It’s important to note that Orban is not siding with Russia here,” as Feffer pointed out. “He has condemned the invasion.”

The current and latest waves of upheaval in international relations and the global order that have been precipitated by the Russian military operations in Ukraine in the latest iteration of the Ukrainian crisis are likely to have significant implications, even if the war is not yet over. The situation creates a lot of rumors and speculations regarding what will stem from these events in the wider world, beyond the war zone.

How will the Russia-Ukraine War affect the stance of countries that have historically followed a non-aligned or neutral status? Past political and military tensions with Russia have been used to open public discussion in Finland and Sweden, and to lobby for the idea of breaking with the past security identity policy and join NATO.

The Past and Public Opinion in Sweden and Finland on the NATO Debate

Sweden and Finland have a rhetorical tradition of neutrality or at least non-alignment in times of armed conflict. Sweden has adopted this stance after a disastrous series of wars with Russia in the 18th and 19th centuries, culminating in the loss of Finland during the Napoleonic Wars. Finland adopted the non-aligned strategy as a national survival mechanism in the wake of the struggles and challenges of being caught between the geopolitical ambitions of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany during World War II (known as the Winter War of 1939-1940 and the Continuation War of 1941-44). The Swedish stance has evolved over time and circumstances, driven by mainstream establishment politics.

Historically, Sweden has walked a very fine line that defies its claim to neutrality or non-alignment, for example sending arms to Finland during the Winter War, Swedish volunteers serving in the Nazi SS (Protection Squadron), or deporting Baltic civilians and soldiers back to the waiting Soviet NKVD, the predecessor to the KGB. In the wake of the Cold War, Sweden undertook large defence cuts to a self-sufficient military structure created to deter either side, but also drew closer to NATO cooperation.

The Swedish government’s political rhetoric in the 21st century began to move away from the word “neutral” and even downplayed non-alignment as a policy. Conflict events occurring elsewhere were used to try to gauge and manipulate public opinion to be more positive towards NATO membership. The events in Crimea in 2014 were used to shift public opinion, though unsuccessfully. What did shift public opinion was the story of a “Russian submarine” in the Stockholm Archipelago.

Although, the Swedish political elite favors NATO membership, the population is less enthusiastic.

Although, the Swedish political elite favors NATO membership, the population is less enthusiastic. Finland has also faced dilemmas, especially concerning the historical legacy of the country and its attitude towards neutrality or at least non-alignment. There have been periods of NATO lobbying Finland and Sweden to join the alliance, for example, in the wake of the alleged “Russian” submarine sightings near Stockholm and Helsinki (Helsinki – the two countries are the only non-NATO members in the Baltic Sea other than Russia).

But, for now, the issue of NATO membership is still off the table as the countries’ governments lack sufficient parliamentary and public support to push through such a “controversial” security proposal.

Rather, there is the understanding that the Russia-Ukraine War provides the basis for spurring a broader debate. Meanwhile, Finland has adopted what it calls the “NATO option provision,” whereby if it feels that NATO membership is required for ensuring Finnish security, it will begin the membership application process.

The general opinion and consensus of various non-partisan observers on the two countries’ attitude and prospects towards joining NATO is that there is currently limited likelihood of this happening in the immediate future. In spite of the external and foreign environment and pressures that create an increasingly closer relationship between these countries and NATO, there are sufficient divisions and constraints in domestic politics that hinder the pursuit of such a move.

Possible Consequences of the Different Scenarios 

Finland and Sweden’s neutrality/non-alignment status has long been used as a means of regulating and managing their geopolitical security, and to navigate the pitfalls and traps of getting actively involved in the wars of larger belligerent powers. These national foreign policy identities have been successful for both countries in preventing undue foreign interference and manipulation from the time of the Cold War onwards.

The identity of being neutral or at least non-aligned has signaled an independence from what Russia in the last two decades has seen as an increasing threat from NATO. Although there are differences and strains in the diplomatic relations between the two Nordic countries and Russia, the relations are on the basis of what can be classified as a “cold friendship.” Should Sweden or Finland actually join NATO, it would without a doubt change Russia’s security calculations concerning both countries pushing them to an enemy or adversary status.

Consequently, the notion of collective security by joining NATO is likely to have the opposite effect through increasing the collective insecurity of the two countries based on the new relationship that will result from their sovereign choice. It becomes a matter of achieving a harmony between freedom of action and a reasoned security perception that avoids the geopolitical traps experienced by both Finland and Sweden in their respective national histories.