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hen Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan says he does not want to see “a new conflict in the Horn of Africa,” he is not making a throwaway remark about a distant region. He is speaking after high-level talks in Addis Ababa and phone calls that range from Abu Dhabi to Mogadishu, at a moment when Red Sea tensions, Ethiopia’s search for sea access and Somalia’s first offshore drilling project are all converging. I don’t read this as a routine diplomatic line. To me, it is a sign that, for Ankara, stability from Ethiopia to Somalia has become a strategic test of its broader foreign policy narrative.

Over the last few years, Türkiye has steadily expanded its footprint along the Red Sea–Gulf of Aden corridor. Somalia hosts Turkish trainers, engineers and aid workers. Ethiopia has become one of Ankara’s largest investment destinations on the continent. Sudan, Djibouti and even Eritrea now enter Turkish debates about sea lanes, energy routes and security risks. Erdoğan’s latest message simply makes explicit what policy choices have already been saying quietly: the Horn of Africa is no longer a side file.

That matters because the region sits at the intersection of several fires at once. Civil war in Sudan, unresolved tensions inside Ethiopia, maritime insecurity in the Red Sea and the persistent threat of al-Shabaab in Somalia all blur into one another. For a country that sees itself as both a regional stabilizer and a rising middle power, ignoring this arc of instability is not really an option.

From a “Somalia file” to a regional vision

Türkiye’s entry point into the Horn of Africa was Somalia. What began as humanitarian aid during the 2011 famine turned into a long-term relationship that combines military training, infrastructure projects, and political support. Ankara built roads, hospitals and schools in Mogadishu, opened an embassy when many others stayed away and later established a major military training base to support Somali forces fighting al-Shabaab.

Over time, this “Somalia file” stopped being just about one fragile state. Turkish diplomats and security officials increasingly framed it as part of a wider picture that stretches from the Suez Canal to the Indian Ocean. Turkish Airlines routes, port projects and naval deployments all reflect the same logic: what happens around the Bab el-Mandeb strait and the Gulf of Aden directly affect Türkiye’s trade, energy security and diaspora connections.

As Ethiopia’s leadership began to talk more openly about its need for sea access, and as Sudan’s war threatened to fragment another coastal state, Ankara’s calculus shifted again. It was no longer enough to work only with Mogadishu. Relations with Addis Ababa deepened around investment, defense cooperation and discussions on how Ethiopia could secure access to ports without triggering a wider conflict. The message coming out of Erdoğan’s meetings has been consistent: any solution on sea access should be based on regional consensus, not unilateral moves that risk pulling everyone into a crisis.

This is happening in a crowded field. The United States, Gulf countries, Egypt, the European Union and China all have their own military bases, port concessions and political projects in and around the Horn. Türkiye is not the biggest player in terms of money or firepower. Its difference lies in what it is not: it has no colonial history in the region; it presents itself as a partner from the Global South and it speaks the language of both security and development at the same time.

Security that tries to reduce, not export, risk

Erdoğan’s Horn of Africa message is rooted in very concrete security concerns. Ethiopia is still managing the aftershocks of internal conflicts. Sudan’s civil war threatens to spill over into Chad, South Sudan, and the Red Sea. Eritrea remains a closed but influential actor. In Somalia, al-Shabaab has not disappeared, even as security forces have made gains. Across the water, Yemen’s conflict and Houthi attacks on shipping lanes have turned the Red Sea into a zone of permanent alert.

In such an environment, escalation rarely stays local. A border clash between Ethiopia and a coastal neighbor, a miscalculation in Sudan or a major attack on shipping could quickly draw in Gulf states, Western navies and regional rivals. Trade routes, energy flows and migration patterns would all feel the shock.

Türkiye’s answer has been to invest in local capacity rather than posture as a front-line power. In Somalia, Turkish officers train army and police units, while naval forces contribute to anti-piracy and maritime security missions. The aim is to help local institutions stand on their feet, not to replace them. The same logic applies to Ethiopia and Sudan, where Ankara stresses respect for territorial integrity and advocates political dialogue even as it supplies equipment and technical support.

From Ankara’s perspective, stability in the Horn is tied directly to its own security. New refugee flows, disrupted shipping in the Red Sea, or the spread of extremist networks would quickly reach the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond. At the same time, a more stable Horn offers opportunities: safer trade corridors, energy cooperation with Somalia, and a friendlier environment for Turkish investment in Ethiopia and Sudan.

Ports, planes and people-to-people ties

Security is only part of the equation. The Horn of Africa has also become an economic and diplomatic laboratory for Türkiye. Turkish companies are active in ports, construction and logistics projects, seeking a role in upgrading infrastructure that links landlocked states to global markets. Every port concession, every logistics hub has a dual meaning: commercial opportunity and geopolitical leverage.

For a middle power with limited resources, every naval mission, every training base and every trade deal has to serve more than one purpose. A presence in Mogadishu is not only about counterterrorism; it is also about giving Turkish firms a foothold in a market that others have long ignored. Investment in Ethiopian manufacturing is not only about cheap labor; it supports a political partnership that Ankara hopes will last through leadership changes on both sides.

Soft power runs alongside these hard interests. Scholarship programs bring Ethiopian and Somali students to Turkish universities. Development agencies support health, education and agriculture projects in remote areas. Turkish NGOs operate clinics and schools that often outlast news cycles. In quiet times, these efforts build goodwill. In moments of crisis, they provide channels to actors who do not always sit at official tables.

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resident Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Ethiopia is both symbolic and strategically significant, coinciding with the 100th anniversary of relations between the two countries. The opening of Türkiye’s first permanent embassy in Sub-Saharan Africa in Addis Ababa in 1926 marks a crucial milestone demonstrating the historical depth and institutional continuity of bilateral relations. However, the significance of this visit lies in the strategic direction outlined by the two leaders in their joint press conference, reflecting on the past and the direction of relations into the second century.

Following the discussions, deepening economic partnership, cooperation in defense and security, and emphasizing dialogue and stability in the face of regional crises stand out as the most important topics. When these three areas are considered together, it is seen that Türkiye-Ethiopia relations have now transcended the framework of a classic bilateral relationship and have acquired the character of a strategic partnership that can affect the geopolitical balance of the Horn of Africa.

The timing of the visit is also noteworthy in this respect. The Horn of Africa has become an area where both regional competition and global power struggles intersect. Developments across the Horn of Africa are transforming the region into an area of ​​multi-layered geopolitical fragility. Erdoğan’s visit to Addis Ababa is significant precisely because it reaffirms Türkiye’s pursuit of stability and balance in the region amidst this climate of uncertainty.

The new phase of relationships: From quantity to quality

President Erdoğan’s emphasis on expanding economic cooperation in his speech is consistent with the overall direction of Türkiye’s Africa policy. The presence of over 200 Turkish companies operating in Ethiopia and the employment they provide demonstrate the scale of economic relations. However, at this point, it is crucial that, along with increasing investment digits, these investments become production-based, technologically integrated, and connected to global supply chains.

For Ethiopia, this relationship presents a significant opportunity for economic diversification and increased production capacity. With a population approaching 130 million and being the second-largest country in Africa, Ethiopia has the potential to become a major manufacturing hub thanks to its large domestic market and young workforce. However, structural challenges such as foreign exchange shortages, access to finance problems, and bureaucratic processes remain decisive factors in ensuring the sustainability of the investment environment. The fact that the two leaders directly addressed these issues underscores the goal of establishing a more institutionalized and predictable economic cooperation in the second century of this relationship.

In this context, the transformation of economic relations into a structure that increases mutual interdependence along with trade volume and connects production networks stands out as one of the most important areas that can increase the strategic depth of relations.

Security cooperation and regional balance

The second noteworthy aspect of the visit was the messages regarding cooperation in the field of defense and security. Given the increasing security risks in the Horn of Africa, internal conflicts, border disputes, and intense competition from external actors, the strategic importance of this area becomes even more apparent.

Ethiopia is considered a central country in the region due to its population, economic weight, and geographical location. However, this central position also brings significant risks. Internal political tensions, economic pressures, and the structural disadvantages of being a landlocked country are leading the Addis Ababa administration to pursue a more active foreign policy aimed at both maintaining internal stability and increasing its regional influence.

For Türkiye, security-focused cooperation does not only mean military technical support. Ankara’s approach in the region is based on capacity building, institutional cooperation, and the goal of generating long-term stability. This framework stands out as one of the key elements that distinguishes Türkiye’s security engagement in Africa from other actors.

The issue of maritime access and diplomatic balance

Although not directly stated in the leaders’ remarks, considering the regional context of the visit, Ethiopia’s pursuit of access to the sea and the resulting diplomatic tensions play a significant role in the background. The sensitivities with Eritrea and the past crises with Somalia demonstrate that this issue goes beyond mere commercial or economic matters, encompassing security and sovereignty dimensions.

Türkiye’s facilitating role in this process reveals a significant aspect of Ankara’s regional policy. Its approach of addressing Somalia’s territorial integrity concerns and Ethiopia’s economic needs within the same diplomatic framework reflects a search for a balanced solution rather than zero-sum competition. This approach points to a broader strategic perspective aimed at managing bilateral crises and preventing tensions in the Horn of Africa from impacting Red Sea security.

Given that political tensions in the Horn of Africa directly affect Red Sea security, the risks that onshore instability could pose to maritime security and global trade routes become clearer. Therefore, Türkiye’s simultaneous handling of the Horn of Africa and Red Sea issues emerges not as a preference, but as a strategic necessity.

In recent years, the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea basin have become strategically important regions, both regionally and globally. One of the main reasons for this is its location at the intersection of global energy and trade routes. This characteristic places the region at the centre of the struggle for influence among regional and global actors, while it simultaneously experiences a high level of political uncertainty and an unstable security environment due to instability and external interventions. While some of these actors exacerbate instability through destructive actions, others contribute to stability and development goals through constructive policies.

Türkiye, a pioneer in constructive policies towards the region, has recently intensified its stabilizing efforts and prioritized cooperation with other regional actors. In this context, Ankara appears to favor a foreign policy that prioritizes coordination over competition, particularly with Cairo and Riyadh, with regard to the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. This approach suggests that Türkiye is attempting to utilize its cooperation-oriented bilateral relations to contribute to resolving crises in third countries.

While this strategy has the potential to evolve into an inclusive alliance among the involved parties, it also demonstrates the possibility of cooperation in specific areas and the potential for these partnerships to yield tangible results. Indeed, it reveals that, in a global political landscape where complete alignment of interests is challenging, it is possible to achieve common interests through the coordination of foreign policies. In this context, it can be said that Türkiye aims to significantly impact the political landscape of these countries by coordinating its policies more closely with Egypt regarding Somalia and with Saudi Arabia regarding Sudan. It should also be noted that the gradual normalization process with Cairo, and the strengthening of the alliance with Riyadh following the establishment of trust, played a significant role in reaching this point.

Coordinated engagement in Somalia

In this context, Somalia is one of the countries in which foreign policy partnerships are most commonly observed. The country has long struggled with issues such as state-building, establishing security, creating a national army, and achieving political unity and integrity. These difficulties have been exacerbated by the privileged relationships established by certain external actors with local factions, which have undermined the central authority. Somaliland and Puntland, two federated regions of Somalia, are treated as independent actors by regional and global powers, separate from Mogadishu. This is considered a serious threat to Somalia’s national sovereignty.

Therefore, for many years, Türkiye has been working closely with the Mogadishu government to take the necessary steps to protect Somalia’s national integrity and achieve stability. In this regard, Türkiye’s military training support, infrastructure investments and humanitarian aid activities have been of great importance in strengthening Somalia’s institutional capacity. Recognizing that Somalia’s stability is vital for security and political stability in the Horn of Africa, Ankara has maintained a clear stance against any threats directed at the Mogadishu government.

A similar approach can be seen in Egypt’s recent policy towards Somalia. Indeed, Egypt views policies such as Ethiopia’s disregard for Somalia’s national legitimacy and Israel’s recognition of Somaliland as threats to regional stability. In this context, Cairo has begun to pursue a foreign policy aligned with Ankara’s on Somalia. Egypt’s prioritisation of Somalia’s territorial integrity and stability in the context of Red Sea security provides a rational basis for Ankara and Cairo’s converging policies on Somalia.

This approach has undoubtedly been made possible by the recent steps taken by Egypt and Türkiye to align their foreign policies in various areas and enhance coordination. These steps have revealed areas in which they can cooperate on foreign policy, while also helping to identify threats that need to be combated. Consequently, cooperation in Somalia is one of the most tangible outcomes of the rapprochement between the two countries since 2021. This is evident in both countries’ statements regarding actions against Somalia’s sovereignty, their stance on strengthening its central institutions, and the steps taken against actors that could undermine Somalia’s stability.

In the coming period, it is inevitable that Türkiye and Egypt will take more decisive steps in line with their common interests, in response to political, diplomatic, economic and military initiatives that could destabilize Somalia. This increases the likelihood that diplomatic steps will be taken first to resolve crises and that military options will only be considered if diplomatic efforts fail. For all actors wishing to strengthen their relations with Somalia, it is critically important to adopt an approach that promotes unity, not division, among local elements within the country. Comprehensive policies on vital issues for Somalia, such as political stability, economic development, counter-terrorism and maritime security, will benefit all parties, especially Somalia.

The Sudan crisis and the balance of power in the Red Sea

A similar scenario can be said to apply to Sudan, which has been experiencing a civil war for the past three years. Türkiye has long been making intensive diplomatic efforts to prevent instability in Sudan from worsening, but has been relatively isolated in this regard. The direct or indirect intervention of certain regional actors in the Sudanese conflict has exacerbated the situation in the country, resulting in a serious humanitarian crisis. However, Türkiye’s consistent approach, particularly its engagement with key regional stakeholders, has recently begun to bear fruit.

Furthermore, the resolution of the political crisis with Saudi Arabia and the rapid rapprochement process that followed has impacted foreign policy in Sudan. In other words, the normalization of relations between Türkiye and Saudi Arabia has paved the way for bilateral coordination on the Sudan issue, making the Sudanese crisis one of Ankara and Riyadh’s shared foreign policy agendas.

Indeed, the political crisis and instability in Sudan could have consequences that affect not only the domestic balance, but also the entire Red Sea region. Egypt and Saudi Arabia, a maritime neighbor of Sudan, will undoubtedly be directly affected by these developments. The Riyadh administration has made previous attempts to resolve the crisis in Sudan, as it is increasingly concerned about the situation. These diplomatic initiatives and mediation efforts were primarily aimed at preventing the conflict from escalating into a regional proxy war. This scenario poses risks for Saudi Arabia, which lies just across the Red Sea. Similarly, Türkiye is concerned about the potential for the regional crisis to spread, and aims to prevent the deepening of humanitarian tragedies. It has therefore made efforts to protect Sudan’s territorial integrity.

Resolving conflicts rather than competing with each other

Therefore, recognizing their overlapping foreign policy priorities regarding Sudan, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia have begun to demonstrate a willingness to combine their forces in resolving the conflict rather than competing with each other, leveraging their diverse instruments and the actors they interact with. While this approach has not yet caused those responsible for the destructive effects in Sudan to back down, the rebel actors in Sudan are being forced to retreat, particularly due to the deployment of military instruments. The joint stance of Türkiye and Saudi Arabia, as well as Egypt’s support for these initiatives, has been key in determining the outcome of this process.

In conclusion, the relationship that Türkiye has developed with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, prioritizing coordination over competition, has yielded positive results for all parties on a pragmatic, mutually beneficial basis, producing concrete policy outcomes. These dialogue-based relationships could usher in a new era of cooperation in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea basin, replacing competitive policies. This could weaken external factors that fuel instability and create a deterrent effect for those pursuing negative agendas.

Rather than regional actors clashing over their interests in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea basin, it would be more positive and realistic for them to manage these interests through shared foreign policies and coordinated crisis management. Examining the cases of Somalia and Sudan, it can be seen that such a strategic choice is feasible, but the involved parties must also demonstrate their willingness to do so. While it is acknowledged that local actors are the primary subjects of these processes, the abandonment of competitive policies by external powers involved in regional politics is also a key requirement for achieving lasting stability.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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n December 26, 2025, Israel became the first United Nations member to officially recognize Somaliland’s independence, significantly transforming the geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa. This move marked a crucial shift in how global powers vie for influence over the Red Sea, one of the world’s most disputed maritime routes. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu framed the decision within the framework of the Abraham Accords, linking this recognition to a broader network of Israeli-Gulf Arab cooperation aimed at containing Iran and promoting regional cohesion.

However, this action is perceived as the projection of Israel’s tumultuous Middle Eastern policies onto the Horn of Africa, a region already plagued by ongoing conflicts. It also signifies a potentially misguided reassessment of power dynamics in an area where critical maritime chokepoints, terrorist movements, and shifts in strategic alliances intersect. The repercussions will echo well beyond the agreements of individual states.

Israel’s move was a clear violation of international norms, prompting a swift and categorical international response. The African Union, Arab League, Gulf Cooperation Council, Egypt, Türkiye, Somalia, Djibouti, and the UN Security Council issued coordinated statements rejecting the move.

The African Union’s chairperson, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, explicitly invoked the 1964 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Border Inalienability Principle, a cornerstone of continental stability, warning that the recognition “sets a dangerous precedent with far-reaching implications for peace and stability across the continent.” However, this overwhelming diplomatic consensus obscures the fact that this move will accelerate instability and conflict in a region already teetering on the brink of catastrophic fragmentation.

To understand why Israel moved at this precise moment, we must examine two overlapping calculations: First, maritime security and the strategic importance of the Red Sea. Second, the role of the UAE as an architect of fragmentation in the Horn of Africa.

The Red Sea as a strategic pivot

The Red Sea is no longer just a shipping lane. It has become a critical arena where the balance of power between the traditional, Western-led maritime order and emerging threats to global trade is being contested. For example, since November 2023, the Houthis in Yemen have attacked over 190 commercial vessels, forcing hundreds of ships to reroute around South Africa. This has increased transit times by up to 50 percent and imposed costs of an estimated $180 million per month in protection fees paid to shipping agents, according to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies.

The Houthis’ main justification for these actions was to demand an end to the genocide in Gaza. However, analysts contest this claim in the context of a possible Israeli move into Somalia, as there are reports suggesting that Israel plans to evacuate Palestinians to Somaliland in exchange for recognition. When discussing the strategic importance of the Red Sea, it is important to mention the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. This 70-mile-long chokepoint, which separates Africa from Arabia, processes approximately one-third of global maritime commerce, including critical energy and container shipments.

Therefore, Somaliland renders the northern region of Somalia strategically indispensable to any actor seeking to project power over this maritime domain. Somaliland’s coastline along the Gulf of Aden positions it as a natural complement to Israeli objectives in three critical ways. First, it could serve as a naval logistics hub, offering berthing capacity for Israeli vessels seeking a continuous presence in the Red Sea. Second, it could counterbalance Houthi control of Yemen’s coastline. Third, it could provide a tangible foothold in the evolving geopolitical architecture of the Abraham Accords, as well as in the developments of world powers in the Horn of Africa.

According to a 2025 Institute for National Security Studies memo, Israel explicitly frames the Red Sea as “a distinct strategic arena where geopolitical and economic maneuvering, rather than security alone, is a fundamental component of Israel’s national security strategy.”(P. 16) Recognizing Somaliland operationalizes this doctrine, positioning Israel as a legitimate power broker in East African maritime governance. Previously, this posture was unavailable without some form of diplomatic entrée into the region.

The UAE’s involvement

Conducting this analysis without including the UAE’s involvement in this critical issue will be less imperative. Understanding Somaliland’s recognition requires examining the UAE’s footprint in the Horn of Africa over the past fifteen years. Since 2010, Abu Dhabi has systematically pursued a strategy that could be called “port-based imperialism”: establishing commercial and military footholds in strategically important harbors to project power while maintaining commercial legitimacy.

The UAE’s relationship with Somaliland exemplifies this doctrine perfectly. In 2016, DP World, a Dubai-based port operator majority-owned by the Abu Dhabi government, invested $442 million to develop the Port of Berbera. This secured a 30-year concession with an automatic 10-year renewal, effectively ensuring Emirati control over one of the Red Sea’s most critical deep-water facilities for the next four decades. Initially, the UAE sought to establish a military base in Berbera. However, facing international pressure and clear objection from the Somali government, the UAE recalibrated in 2019, presenting the arrangement as purely commercial. This is a textbook example of how great power competition in the 21st century operates through obfuscation rather than direct colonialism.

The strategic importance of this arrangement lies in its deniability. By linking Somaliland’s economic viability to Emirati port investments, the UAE established a structural dependency that grants influence without exercising formal political control. For example, when Ethiopia sought recognition of Somaliland in exchange for maritime access to Berbera in early 2024, it was not negotiating with an independent state with an autonomous foreign policy. Rather, it was responding to incentive structures designed by an external power that manipulates regional actors toward fragmentation.

A security paradox

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is more than just a cause for concern about the country’s and the wider region’s future stability. It will undoubtedly create a security paradox that transforms recognition into an operational advantage for transnational terrorist movements.

Recognition of Somaliland coincides with a critical security development. Documented evidence shows that Al-Shabaab and Yemen’s Houthis are coordinating more closely. In February 2025, United Nations investigators reported that, in 2024, the two groups had progressed from communication to physical meetings and materiel transfers. The Houthis provided al-Shabaab with weaponized drones, ballistic missiles, and specialized training. This collaboration could intensify if Israel’s intention to transfer Palestinians to Somaliland is discussed.

The collaboration between these organizations generates multiplied threat cascades across the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Al-Shabaab’s extensive network of smugglers, fighters, and sympathizers provides the Houthis with expanded logistics corridors for transporting weapons from the Indian Ocean to the Gulf of Aden. In return, al-Shabaab gains access to precision weaponry and drone capabilities, exponentially increasing its ability to strike fixed military targets and high-value civilian infrastructure.

The implications for maritime security are catastrophic. Currently, the Houthis extract an estimated $180 million per month from shipping companies that pay protection fees. This figure would increase substantially if al-Shabaab successfully integrated maritime piracy into a coordinated regional attack strategy. Fundamentally, the geographic distribution of threats—the Houthis controlling Yemen’s western coastline, al-Shabaab controlling Somalia’s central territory, and Puntland in northern Somalia hosting ISIS members—creates a zone of contested sovereignty where traditional maritime law enforcement becomes impossible.

Somaliland’s separation from Somalia, formalized by Israeli recognition, undermines the already fragile unified maritime response to this threat. Somaliland operating as an effective client state of the UAE—with its port under Emirati concession and its foreign policy oriented toward maximizing external investment rather than regional security—becomes another vector through which external powers pursue influence while ignoring the security implications of this multiplication.

Security and political implications for the Horn of Africa

The preceding analysis reveals the facts and strategic rationale behind Israel’s recognition of Somaliland. The critical question for analysts is: What will happen next, and why does this specific move pose an exceptional danger to regional stability?

Scenario 1: The Somaliland legitimization trap

Israeli and Emirati strategy seems to be based on the idea that recognizing Somaliland’s statehood will increase their regional influence and presence. This logic is fundamentally flawed. The Horn of Africa region requires stability through the establishment of moderate, democratic, and cooperative governments. Otherwise, Israel’s move will be fallacious. Recognizing Somaliland without simultaneously resolving Somalia’s political fragmentation creates a perverse incentive structure. Resources that would otherwise strengthen Somalia’s central capacity are instead invested in Somaliland’s infrastructure, widening the development gap between north and south.

More critically, recognizing Somaliland solidifies Ethiopia’s strategic calculations regarding maritime access. Ethiopia has been negotiating with Somalia and Somaliland regarding port access and trade corridors. The formalization of Somaliland’s independence will likely accelerate Ethiopia’s strategic alignment with Somaliland. This could include formal recognition and military cooperation arrangements, which would further isolate Somalia’s federal government and create more conflict and competing power centers within the region.

Scenario 2: Al-Shabaab’s opportunistic expansion

Al-Shabaab has begun to analyze and discuss the Somaliland recognition narrative as a recruitment and legitimacy tool. Through encrypted channels and propaganda platforms, the group’s messaging emphasizes that foreign powers are deliberately fragmenting Somali territory to prevent unified resistance against terrorism and maintain conditions of state weakness that enable exploitation.

This narrative has substantial credibility in recruitment contexts. Young men in areas contested by Al-Shabaab observe that their government is fractured and that external powers are carving up their nation’s territory. They see that the only cohesive institutional force that can offer them structure, purpose, and material incentives is the insurgency itself.

Scenario 3: Maritime Instability as the New Normal

If Somaliland achieves de facto independence and aligns strategically with Israel and the UAE, the Red Sea will be divided into multiple competing maritime jurisdictions: Houthi-controlled Yemen, politically unstable Somalia with competing authorities, UAE-aligned Somaliland, and an expanding Israeli naval presence. Managing maritime security in such an environment would become exponentially more complex.

Houthi attacks on commercial ships already pose challenges to global trade routes and create shipping delays that affect global supply chains. These attacks would likely intensify if the Houthis perceive an Israeli military presence in Somaliland as a direct escalation. Alternatively, operational coordination between the Houthis and al-Shabaab could extend maritime threats southward from the Bab el-Mandeb Strait toward other maritime states in the region, such as Kenya and Djibouti, creating what military strategists call “distributed threat zones,” where conventional maritime security approaches are inadequate.

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he rise of terrorism in the Sahel has created an atmosphere of instability that has led to military interventions in Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, and, most recently, Niger. The states of the Sahel and the Horn of Africa share certain characteristics that make the emergence of terrorism possible: the states in these two regions are weak, non-institutionalized, while the lack of transparency and accountability continues to hamper effective governance processes.

The rise of terrorism in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa is a major concern, not only for the well-being of citizens in these regions, but also because of the impact of instability on neighboring countries and regions. The Sahel region typically includes Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad. The Horn of Africa includes Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, and Djibouti. Frequent intrastate and interstate conflicts in these regions create an environment conducive to terrorist activity, and the 2011 crisis and overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya made the Sahel a center of terrorism in Africa.

After participating in the conflict in Libya, Tuareg fighters returned to Mali in 2012 and joined the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) as part of its efforts to create a breakaway state. Violent extremist groups have also taken advantage of the political instability in Mali to expand their operations into Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad. This has been achieved with the help of DAESH and al-Qaeda. In the Horn of Africa, al-Shabaab also received support from DAESH to expand its operations from Somalia into Kenya.

Terrorist threats in the Sahel

The countries of the Sahel are struggling with bad governance, economic decline, and complex processes of state development. Various efforts to achieve growth and development have been hampered by the rise of violent extremism perpetrated by terrorist groups. The main terrorist groups supporting violent extremism in the Sahel include Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM).

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) was formed in 2006. It was led by Abdelmalek Droukdel until 2020, when he was killed. AQIM was mainly made up of dissidents who had participated in the Algerian civil war in the 1990s. In the 1990s, the group was called the “Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat.” In the 2000s, the GSPC pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda and aligned its operations with it. As a result, it adopted the name “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb” in 2007. Between 2007 and 2010, AQIM operated almost exclusively in Algeria, with some limited operations in Mauritania in late 2007 and Niger in 2008. AQIM was involved in alliances with the Tuareg. In 2012, it led the MNLA against Malian forces.

Al-Qaeda’s activities have far-reaching implications for regional and global politics. As a transnational terrorist organization, al-Qaeda benefits from the use of violence to advance its religious-political agenda. The ever-expanding characteristics of this non-state armed group and its ability to adapt and mutate in different geographical locations make it increasingly difficult to combat. Between 2008 and 2014, AQIM is estimated to have generated $125 million from kidnappings. The ambiguous nature of AQIM’s operations makes it increasingly difficult to track the exact amount of money generated from arms, human trafficking, and kidnapping. Whatever the case, the funding from these illegal activities has allowed the groups to strengthen their fighting capabilities by purchasing modern weapons and attracting young followers.

Violent extremism in the Horn of Africa

Almost all countries in the Horn of Africa have experienced terrorist activity with al-Shabaab standing out as the region’s most significant terrorist group. Al-Shabaab emerged in Somalia in 2004, and in addition to its terrorist activities there, it has also carried out attacks in the neighboring countries of Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia. The aim of al-Shabaab is to overthrow the government and establish an Islamic state governed by Sharia law. The group has exploited the weakness of the Somali government to establish bases which it uses to prepare and launch attacks against civilians and the military.

In 2013, al-Shabaab attacked a shopping mall in Kenya, killing 67 people. In 2015, another 148 people were killed in an attack by the group on a university in Kenya. The group organized 14 hotel attacks in Nairobi in 2019. Al-Shabaab’s terrorist activities remain a major concern in Somalia as well. In 2019, the group carried out truck bombings that killed 80 people, while car bombings in Mogadishu killed more than 100 people in 2022.

What is more, both Ethiopia and Eritrea face internal ethnic and political tensions, further complicating regional security dynamics. Yemen may not be part of the region but its proximity means that the Sahel is also vulnerable to the spillover effects of the conflict there.

Counterterrorism efforts

Various efforts are being made to counter the threat of terrorism in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. Operation Serval was one of the first counterterrorism operations launched by the French army in Mali in 2013. It succeeded in preventing AQIM, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA), and Ansar Dine from taking over the Malian capital, Bamako. The operation included numerous air strikes against jihadist groups.

Operation Barkhane, which followed Operation Serval in August 2014, is now responsible for counterterrorism operations in Mali, Niger, Chad, Mauritania, and Burkina Faso. These countries cooperate on security along the G5 Sahel coast. France deployed around 5,100 troops at the height of Operation Barkhane. In Operation Sabre, France deployed special forces and also led the multinational Takuba Task Force, which included special forces from Sweden, Estonia, and the Czech Republic.

The joint multinational task force was established in 2014 to counter the threat of Boko Haram, banditry, and organized crime. The Takuba Task Force was composed of Benin, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, and Nigeria. In 2017, the Sahel states of Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, and Niger came together to form the G5 Sahel Force mentioned above. This regional counterterrorism force has gathered more than 5,000 troops to neutralize militant groups in the Sahel. In the case of the Horn of Africa, the United States launched a special operation against al-Shabaab.

U.S. forces conducted air strikes, provided military intelligence, and built the capacity of local partner forces to conduct ground operations. This counterinsurgency operation significantly reduced al-Shabaab’s influence. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) also played an important role: AMISOM’s operations created the security conditions that allowed humanitarian organizations to operate outside Mogadishu. Between 2011 and 2012, AMISOM was able to reduce the areas under al-Shabaab control.

This March, the accident that blocked the maritime traffic in the Suez Canal for several days renewed the attention on the impact that straits have on international politics and economy. To begin with, a strait is an arm of water between two lands that connects two contiguous water basins. Maritime shipping is a core element in globalized trade and therefore, straits offer a key advantage in this context.

The Suez Canal is a man-made sea passage in Egypt, connecting Europe and Asia through the Red Sea. Its geographical position makes it one of the most important routes for trade of energy, oil and hydrocarbons, commodities, and consumer goods from Asia and the Middle East to Europe and the U.S. Its relevance can be measured by the fact that around 50 vessels travel the strait on a daily basis, amounting to roughly 18,900 in 2020. Given that more than 80% of global trade is moved by sea, about 12% of it passes through this waterway.

Without this canal, other routes for global trade would be possible but would involve a much longer shipping time, greater fuel consumption, and higher ship-operating costs. Certainly, the strategic position of straits is not taken for granted. Whoever controls the straits is careful to make the most of the almost “mandatory” passage of thousands of cargo ships per year, by charging tolls. Therefore, straits represent a significant source of national income. In the case of the Suez Canal, the traffic of vessels provides Egypt with about $5 billion a year in revenue.

The crisis in the Suez was caused by the grounding of the 400-meter-long Ever Given, carrying 18,000 containers headed to the Netherlands, engendering tailbacks and blocking the traffic of 400 other vessels. At the time, Lloyd’s List estimated that the cargo strand cost around $9.6 billion per day.

The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is, indeed, considered one of the most strategic gateways of maritime transport.

To make up for estimated losses, the Egyptian authorities sued the vessel’s owner, Shoei Kisen Kaisha Ltd., for almost $1 billion over profit and reputational losses, underlining the centrality that this channel holds not only in terms of international politics but also for the Egyptian national economy and politics. However, the final negotiation reached an agreement of approximately $200 million.

As the Suez Canal was finalized in 1869, another strait gained key importance in the geopolitics of the region. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is, indeed, considered one of the most strategic gateways of maritime transport. This strait offers a way to connect the Arabian and Red Seas to the Mediterranean Sea, connecting Europe and Asia.

Moving a little further east, the Strait of Hormuz plays a particular role in the oil trade and in the geopolitical dynamics between Iran on the northern coast and the United Arab Emirates and Musandam, an exclave of Oman, on the southern coast. The 20.3 million barrels of oil moved via the Strait of Hormuz per day in 2017 represented nearly a third of worldwide maritime oil commerce.

More to this, this sea passage represents the world’s most strategically important choke point, as a third of the global gas and almost 25% of oil takes this route, while also considering that an important part of the oil-dependent international economy’s wealth is situated there.

As in the previous cases, Hormuz is subject to intertwining national interests and geopolitical dynamics. While the Strait of Hormuz is regulated by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Iran has only signed the convention but not ratified it. Furthermore, important and traditionally held interests in the strait, which Iran has acted upon in order to protect, have often resulted in standoff situations, leading to fear escalation between Iran and the West.

At this point, the logic behind the Turkish government’s decision to build a new canal in Istanbul becomes clear. Turkey already enjoys the presence of two straits in its territory, namely the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles Straits, which connect Europe and Asia through the Black Sea basin. However, as has been shown with the Suez Canal, the efficiency of the straits is undermined by the occurrence of accidents often due to intense traffic, security issues, and political and national interest entanglements.

To redress this issue, in 2011, the Turkish government started planning the construction of a third canal between the Black Sea and the Marmara Sea, and approved the project last year despite several dissident voices, which raised questions regarding the environmental impacts of the Canal Istanbul.

The construction of this new canal could bring forward some dynamics linked to national interests. Indeed, Turkish authorities declared that they are not willing to review the 1936 Montreux Convention nor place the new canal under its provisions. Russia was thus worried that this could lead to an increased presence of NATO-flagged ships in the Black Sea basin.

Nonetheless, it seems more likely that Ankara will use the Canal Istanbul in order to increase its own standing as a central player in the region. Furthermore, the Canal Istanbul will allow Ankara to regulate the maritime traffic passing through the new waterway at its own discretion, and to charge a fee for the passage – a factor of significant importance for the Turkish economy and for its influence in the region.

The construction of straits is not a new strategy, but perhaps it will become ever more beneficial for international actors to have better access and control over a sea passage, in view of an increasingly complex and globalized world order.

As long as the perception of extra-regional and extra-continental solutions are given priority, the fight against piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the western coast of the Indian Ocean will remain on paper.

International actors that lead the maritime security operations in the Gulf of Aden and the western coast of the Indian Ocean have often used the issue of piracy as a security pretext to realize their hidden interests of maintaining hegemonic power.

Overall, on different occasions, their involvement in the counter-piracy operations on the Somalia coast has been portrayed as a morally justified act to maintain law and order in the strategically important waterway through which more than 33,000 ships navigate annually.

Maritime piracy has existed since ships first went out to sea. However, the issue has been making headlines since the late 1990s, reaching a peak between 2005 and 2008.

The dramatic escalation of maritime piracy along the coasts of Somalia in the 2000s posed a great challenge to the international community which passively stood by and watched.

Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Western Indian Ocean has certain distinguishing characteristics. The first and foremost difference is that unlike pirate attacks in other parts of the world, such as the Straits of Malacca (located between Malaysia and Indonesia), pirate assaults in the Horn of Africa mostly target large vessels and bulk carriers that often transport coal and iron ore, and tanker ships that transport petroleum, chemicals, and crude oil.

In other words, in the Horn of Africa, larger and strategically important ships on international waters are targeted more frequently than smaller vessels.

Certain news outlets associated the acts of piracy in the Gulf of Aden with local governments. Undermining the capacity of regional actors in the fight against piracy serves ulterior motives.

Additionally, the Horn of Africa region was depicted as a lawless region and the regional powers’ commitment to maritime law enforcement was questioned. Certain news outlets associated the acts of piracy in the Gulf of Aden with local governments. Undermining the capacity of regional actors in the fight against piracy serves ulterior motives.

As efforts to develop regional and continental plans to ensure the Gulf of Aden’s maritime security faded away and some earlier initiatives failed, the military presence of international actors was strengthened.

There are two reasons behind the intentions of international actors to establish military bases in the Gulf of Aden. The first motivation is the presence of oil and the Gulf of Aden’s geopolitical significance.

The second is the Western perception of the continental powers’ innate inferiority. Western powers perceive themselves as superior, as redeemers, and as the guarantors of maritime security in the Gulf of Aden and the western coast of Indian Ocean. This, in turn, further legitimatizes their guardianship of the Horn of Africa’s regional actors.

While regional attempts to solve the piracy problem in the Gulf of Aden proved unsuccessful due to legal and political complications, the Western media outlets, political elites, and academics magnified the weak law enforcement, economic desperation, and the absence of a workable legal system in the region, creating the image of an environment in which international actors could and should intervene.

They ignored the capacity of regional powers such as, among others, Ethiopia, Kenya, Eritrea, and Sudan, in the fight against piracy.

In addition, the international actors’ active maritime law enforcement activities in the coast of Somalia have not been sufficiently observed. Political administrators in Mogadishu, for example, were not empowered by global powers so as to be able to strengthen their country’s internal stability.

So far, the political havoc in Somalia is used as a leverage to justify non-regional global actors’ presence in the western coast of Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden.

The piracy in this region is still a challenge for maritime security and regional and global stability. If not halted, it is likely that piracy in the region will sponsor terrorism.  However, the appropriate solution to overcome the maritime security problems in the Gulf of Aden and the western coast of the Indian Ocean is not the military deployment of global powers.

Rather, a final solution to the long-standing maritime security problem of the region could be achieved through the empowerment of the regional authorities. Meanwhile if the binaries of superior/subordinate and weak/strong are not left behind, politics will continue to generate self-created differences that will not solve the maritime security issue of the Gulf of Aden and the Western Indian Ocean  or any other issue for that matter.