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aiwan has conducted its most comprehensive civil defense and wartime preparedness exercise to date, simulating a cascading national emergency that began with a Chinese blockade and earthquake before escalating into cyberattacks, sabotage, civil unrest and a full-scale military invasion. The drills, observed exclusively by Reuters, underscore Taipei’s growing efforts to strengthen national resilience as military pressure from China continues to intensify.

Held over two days in central Taiwan’s Nantou County, the exercise brought together more than 370 government officials, military officers and emergency responders. Organizers described the scenario as a realistic test of the island’s ability to maintain essential government functions during a complex, multi-dimensional crisis.

The exercise reflected President Lai Ching-te’s broader strategy to prepare Taiwan’s civilian institutions for conflict, drawing lessons from the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, where attacks on civilian infrastructure, information warfare and prolonged disruptions have become defining features of modern warfare.

Officials participating in the drill confronted a rapidly deteriorating scenario beginning with a Chinese naval blockade coinciding with a magnitude 6.8 earthquake that killed dozens of people and damaged critical infrastructure. According to the exercise, Beijing exploited the natural disaster to launch cyberattacks, spread disinformation, hijack television broadcasts and sabotage key facilities before initiating a full-scale military assault.

Rare access to the closed-door exercise

Reuters, which was granted rare access to the closed-door exercise, reported that officials were required to coordinate responses across multiple agencies while simultaneously maintaining emergency services, public order and communications under wartime conditions.

“Our adversary is right on our doorstep, just across the Taiwan Strait. That is very close,” Chi Lien-cheng, Taiwan’s minister without portfolio overseeing the exercise, told Reuters.

“If you don’t defend your own country, who else will defend you?” he added, while acknowledging that Taiwan still faced significant shortcomings in resources and preparedness.

The drills represent a shift from Taiwan’s previous emergency exercises, which had often been criticized as overly scripted and symbolic. This year’s program was designed to expose weaknesses and force officials to make decisions under increasingly realistic battlefield conditions.

The first day focused on a lengthy tabletop simulation, while the second featured field exercises that included counter-drone operations, emergency food distribution and coordination between civilian authorities and military reserve forces.

One scenario involved a Chinese drone strike on the county’s emergency response headquarters, forcing officials to activate a backup command center after 75 personnel were declared missing.

Emergency responders also rehearsed protecting power stations, maintaining healthcare services and restoring communications while coping with widespread infrastructure failures.

Civil-military coordination takes center stage

A key objective of the exercise was strengthening cooperation between Taiwan’s civilian institutions and its armed forces.

Military reserve units coordinated directly with local governments, while officials monitored unfolding events through advanced tactical mapping systems and interactive digital platforms that tracked emergency resources in real time.

Lin Fei-fan, deputy secretary-general of Taiwan’s National Security Council, said demonstrating societal resilience was intended to strengthen deterrence against Beijing.

“The message to our adversary is clear: when they know Taiwan’s society is prepared, they will have to think very carefully about whether to launch such a costly war against Taiwan — one that may not succeed,” he said.

Taiwanese officials have increasingly argued that modern conflicts require not only military readiness but also the ability of civilian governments, businesses and communities to continue functioning during sustained attacks.

Lessons from Ukraine have featured prominently in Taiwan’s planning, particularly regarding the importance of decentralized command structures, resilient communications networks and maintaining essential public services.

This year’s drills included moving hospital operations underground, testing backup government facilities and inviting professional cybersecurity experts to attack official networks in simulated cyber warfare.

Participants also faced extensive information warfare scenarios.

In one simulation, local television broadcasts were replaced with Chinese propaganda while false information spread rapidly through social media and printed leaflets. Officials were required to identify disinformation, hold emergency press briefings and reassure the public.

Community leaders also took part in the training

Lee I-yuan, a 75-year-old borough chief who participated in the exercise, said the simulations highlighted the growing importance of combating false information during crises.

“If the other side attacks, they will definitely use AI to spread false information,” he said.

The drills assigned Nantou County, Taiwan’s only landlocked county, a strategic wartime role as a logistical rear base where civilians fleeing frontline regions could seek shelter while government agencies relocated critical operations inland.

Local officials were questioned extensively about emergency preparedness, including the availability of food supplies, infant formula, reserve manpower and medical resources.

Some participants struggled to answer detailed questions as commanders deliberately increased pressure throughout the exercise.

“We can’t actually put them through a real war, so we can only use scenarios to help them understand that war is extremely cruel — all situations will be severe and urgent,” one official involved in the exercise told Reuters.

China, which considers democratically governed Taiwan part of its territory, has never ruled out using force to achieve reunification.

While the resilience exercise concluded, Taiwan’s defense ministry reported that China had simultaneously conducted another combat readiness patrol around the island involving warships and at least 22 military aircraft, including nuclear-capable H-6 bombers.

Beijing accused President Lai of escalating tensions across the Taiwan Strait.

Chinese Foreign Ministry and Taiwan Affairs Office officials said Lai’s policies were increasing the risk of conflict, describing him as a “creator of crises” in cross-strait relations.

Taiwan rejects China’s sovereignty claims, insisting that only the island’s 23 million people can determine their future.

As military activity around Taiwan continues to increase, Taipei hopes its expanding civil defense program will strengthen national resilience while reinforcing its message that any attempt to seize the island by force would face not only military resistance but also a prepared and functioning civilian society.

(Source: Reuters)

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rms sales by the United States to Taiwan have once again become a focal point of tensions between Washington and Beijing following reports that President Donald Trump has delayed signing a $14 billion weapons package approved by Congress.

The issue gained renewed attention after Trump’s summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping earlier this month, during which Xi reportedly warned that Taiwan remains the most sensitive issue in relations between the two powers and could become “a very dangerous situation” if mishandled.

While Trump described the proposed arms package as a valuable negotiating tool in discussions with Beijing, Taiwan’s Defense Ministry said it had not received any official notification of a delay in military sales.

The debate highlights a long-running dispute that has shaped U.S.-China relations for decades and remains central to regional security in East Asia.

Taiwan relations act underpins US support

The foundation of U.S. military support for Taiwan dates back to 1979, when President Jimmy Carter switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the People’s Republic of China.

The move ended Washington’s formal defense treaty with Taiwan, officially known as the Republic of China. In response, Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act, requiring the United States to provide Taiwan with defensive weapons and maintain the island’s capacity for self-defense.

Beijing views Taiwan as part of China and has never ruled out using force to bring the island under its control. Chinese leaders strongly oppose U.S. arms sales, arguing that they interfere in China’s internal affairs and encourage Taiwanese resistance to reunification.

The United States, while recognizing Beijing diplomatically, maintains unofficial relations with Taiwan and continues to supply military equipment under the Taiwan Relations Act.

American officials have repeatedly stated that U.S. policy remains unchanged despite tensions over recent weapons sales.

Delays and backlogs shape Taiwan’s defense planning

Since 1979, Taiwan has purchased tens of billions of dollars in American military equipment, including fighter jets, warships, tanks, missile systems, and advanced defense technology.

However, many purchases have taken years to arrive.

Analysts estimate Taiwan currently faces a weapons backlog approaching $30 billion. Some major systems approved years ago remain under production or awaiting delivery.

For example, 108 M1 Abrams tanks ordered in 2019 required nearly seven years to arrive. Meanwhile, advanced F-16V Fighting Falcon jets approved the same year are still undergoing production and testing.

Taiwan’s Defense Ministry says that among 23 major U.S. weapons packages approved over the past decade, only five have been fully delivered, while most remain in production.

The latest $14 billion package reportedly includes air-defense systems such as Patriot Missile System batteries and counter-drone capabilities. Analysts note that even if approved immediately, production timelines mean some systems would not reach Taiwan until 2028 or later.

The delays have intensified debate within Taiwan over whether it should continue purchasing expensive conventional platforms or focus more heavily on a so-called “porcupine strategy” emphasizing domestically produced drones, anti-ship missiles, and other asymmetric weapons designed to deter a larger Chinese military.

Why China opposes the sales

For Beijing, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan represent more than a military issue. Chinese leaders see them as political support for a government they consider part of Chinese territory.

China argues that American weapons transfers violate past understandings between the two countries and undermine efforts toward eventual reunification.

Washington rejects that interpretation, maintaining that it has never agreed to end arms sales to Taiwan and that decisions regarding military support are made independently under U.S. law.

As strategic competition between the United States and China intensifies, Taiwan remains at the center of one of the world’s most sensitive geopolitical disputes. While military sales are intended to strengthen the island’s defenses, they continue to provoke strong objections from Beijing and remain a recurring source of friction between the two superpowers.

(Source: CNN)

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hina has deployed large numbers of obsolete fighter jets converted into attack drones at air bases near the Taiwan Strait, according to a new report that highlights Beijing’s evolving military strategy toward Taiwan. The study, published by the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, draws on satellite imagery and open-source intelligence to show rows of modified J-6 aircraft positioned at six bases across Fujian and Guangdong provinces, both located close to the strategically sensitive waterway separating mainland China from Taiwan.

The J-6, a Chinese-built version of a 1950s Soviet fighter, was once a core part of China’s air force but has long since been retired from frontline service. Analysts now say that hundreds of these aging jets have been repurposed into unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), designated as J-6W drones. By removing onboard weapon systems and installing automated flight controls and navigation technology, the Chinese military has transformed these legacy aircraft into expendable strike platforms capable of carrying out high-risk missions without endangering pilots.

According to the report’s author, former U.S. naval intelligence officer J. Michael Dahm, China may have converted more than 500 of these aircraft into drones, with at least 200 already deployed near the Taiwan Strait. He told Reuters that these drones are likely to play a key role in the opening phase of any potential military operation against Taiwan. Rather than functioning like conventional remotely piloted drones, they are expected to operate more like cruise missiles—launched in large waves toward predetermined targets.

Overwhelming Taiwan’s air defense systems

Military experts believe the primary purpose of these converted drones would be to overwhelm Taiwan’s air defense systems through sheer volume. By sending large numbers of relatively inexpensive drones toward high-value targets, China could force Taiwan and its allies to expend costly interceptor missiles. This tactic, often described as a form of asymmetric warfare, seeks to exploit the imbalance between the low cost of offensive systems and the high cost of defensive countermeasures.

A senior Taiwanese security official, speaking to Reuters, said the threat posed by these drones is significant precisely because of this cost imbalance. “To prevent strikes on critical infrastructure, we will inevitably face the challenge of using expensive missiles to intercept them,” the official said. In response, Taiwan is accelerating plans to acquire new counter-drone technologies designed to neutralize such threats more efficiently.

The development comes amid rising tensions between China and Taiwan, which Beijing considers part of its territory despite strong opposition from the island’s government. China has not ruled out the use of force to achieve reunification, while Taiwan maintains that its future should be decided solely by its people. Although recent assessments by the U.S. intelligence community suggest that China is not currently planning an invasion by 2027, other defense analyses indicate that Beijing is rapidly building the capabilities needed to carry out such an operation if it chooses to do so.

A diverse mix of airpower

Experts say the deployment of J-6 drones is only one component of a broader Chinese military strategy that emphasizes a diverse mix of airpower. In a potential conflict scenario, waves of drones could be launched alongside ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, advanced fighter jets, and long-range bombers, all arriving at different speeds and altitudes. This multi-layered assault would complicate defensive efforts and create what one analyst described as an “air defense nightmare.”

Peter Layton, a former Australian air force officer and visiting fellow at Griffith University, said such an approach would aim to saturate defenses and create confusion. “There would be a lot of diverse threats all coming at once,” he said. “The goal is to overwhelm the system so that some weapons inevitably get through.” He added that the J-6 drones, despite being based on outdated technology, would still require advanced and expensive missile systems to intercept due to their speed and size.

The increasing reliance on drones reflects broader changes in modern warfare, where unmanned systems have become central to military operations. Conflicts such as the Russia-Ukraine War have demonstrated the effectiveness of deploying drones in large numbers for reconnaissance, targeting, and direct attacks. These systems can often be produced quickly and at relatively low cost, making them well-suited for sustained, high-intensity conflicts.

Stealth UAVs and carrier-based unmanned systems

China has also been investing heavily in more advanced drone technologies, including stealth UAVs and carrier-based unmanned systems. Analysts believe these newer platforms could be used in conjunction with converted legacy aircraft like the J-6, creating a layered drone force capable of both high-end precision strikes and mass saturation attacks. In addition, there are indications that China is experimenting with using drones in deception operations, potentially to confuse adversaries and test defensive responses.

Despite their potential effectiveness, the deployment of J-6 drones is not without risks. The air bases where they are stationed are located relatively close to Taiwan and could be vulnerable to preemptive strikes in the event of a conflict. Nevertheless, analysts suggest that their role as expendable assets means they would likely be launched early in any military campaign, reducing their exposure to counterattacks on the ground.

The report underscores the growing complexity of the military balance in the Taiwan Strait and the increasing importance of drone warfare in shaping future conflicts. As both China and Taiwan continue to adapt to these evolving threats, the risk of miscalculation remains a concern for regional stability. For now, the presence of these converted drones serves as a stark reminder of how even outdated technology can be repurposed into a significant strategic tool in modern warfare.

(Source: Reuters)

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ensions between Japan and China escalated sharply in November 2025, plunging the two countries into one of the most serious diplomatic crises in recent years. The crisis was triggered when Japan’s new prime minister, Sanae Takaiçi, stated that a potential Chinese attack on Taiwan could threaten Japan’s survival and provoke a military response. Beijing responded with unusual severity by imposing flight and tourism restrictions, banning imports of Japanese seafood, canceling cultural exchanges, and increasing military activity around Japan.

Thus, the crisis evolved from a mere rhetorical dispute into a multidimensional competition involving historical memory, national identity, military deterrence, and geoeconomic pressure. This analysis evaluates the diplomatic, military, and ideological causes of the crisis and its effects on Asia-Pacific geopolitics, particularly regarding Taiwan and alliance balances, as well as on geoeconomics. Additionally, it examines the position of the United States in the context of its alliance diplomacy and Indo-Pacific strategy.

Causes of the crisis: Diplomatic, military and ideological dimensions

The Moment of Diplomatic Rupture: The crisis began with Prime Minister Takaichi’s November 7, 2025, parliamentary statement on a potential Chinese blockade of Taiwan. Takaichi stated that China’s use of force against Taiwan, particularly against U.S. interests in the region, could create a “life-threatening situation” for Japan. According to Japanese security law, this concept refers to a critical threshold that permits the Self-Defense Forces to intervene under the umbrella of collective self-defense. In this respect, Takaichi is notable as the first Japanese leader in office to explicitly link a Taiwan crisis to Japan’s direct security interests. Consequently, her statement was perceived as signaling a shift away from Tokyo’s traditional strategic ambiguity on Taiwan, which China viewed as “disruptive to the status quo.”

Beijing’s strong reaction and normative framework: China defined Takaichi’s words as “a serious provocation,” accusing Japan of “violating the fundamental norms of international relations.” Beijing’s fundamental claim is that Japan’s rhetoric and potential actions regarding Taiwan interfere with China’s internal affairs and contradict the “One China” principle. The diplomatic rhetoric became excessively harsh during the crisis. The threatening statement shared on social media by the Chinese Consul General in Osaka, which later was deleted, reflects a radicalization that goes beyond diplomatic norms. Furthermore, China’s rhetoric has systematically invoked historical memory. Claims that Japan is questioning the “victorious outcomes of World War II” have been raised at the UN, and emphasis has been placed on Japan’s “resurgence of militarism.”

This ideological framework is closely linked to Beijing’s framing of the Taiwan issue as both strategic and a “core interest” at the heart of its narrative of regime legitimacy and national rebirth. Indeed, Xi Jinping’s assessments that place Taiwan at the center of his “national rejuvenation” vision reinforce Beijing’s intolerance of external intervention.

Tokyo’s rationale: Meanwhile, Japan has emphasized that Takaiichi’s statement does not alter its official “One China” policy, and the approach based on the 1972 agreement remains in place. Nevertheless, Takaiichi’s remarks reflect an increase in Japanese strategic concerns. Taiwan’s geographical location is critical to the lines connecting Japan to Southeast Asia and wider maritime trade routes. If China were to establish control over Taiwan, it could pose serious risks to Japan’s energy supply and trade flows. At the same time, Japan is reevaluating its defense doctrine due to China’s increased military capacity and more aggressive air and maritime activities in the region.

Takaiichi’s “security-oriented” approach (emphasizing stronger defense, constitutional debates, and deterrence) aligns with this trend. Perceptions of China in domestic politics have also become more negative. Notably, Takaiichi’s hard line on Taiwan enjoys broad public support, reducing the likelihood of a retreat. Therefore, the crisis highlights a significant clash between the two sides’ definitions of “core interests”: China considers its claim to sovereignty over Taiwan to be indisputable, while Japan considers the Taiwan scenario to be an integral part of its national security.

Military Dimension and Escalation Risks: The crisis has quickly spilled over into the military sphere. Japan has reported high-risk incidents involving Chinese fighter jets locking fire control radars onto Japanese aircraft, though China has denied some of these claims. China’s intensification of air and sea patrols around Japan increases the risk of accidental conflict, and the weakening of communication channels heightens the possibility of miscalculation. Given these conditions, the crisis is not merely “temporary diplomatic tension” but rather a manifestation of broader security competition.

Impact on Asia-Pacific geopolitics

The crisis in the Asia-Pacific region has further hardened the Taiwan-focused security architecture and increased pressure on regional actors to take sides. Taipei has acted cautiously and kept a low profile to avoid exacerbating the situation. However, Tokyo’s explicit deterrence signal complicates Beijing’s strategic calculations. The likelihood that the use of force against Taiwan would draw the US and Japan more visibly into the conflict has increased. While this may increase deterrence in the short term, it may also fuel China’s hardening response, creating a “new normal” in which crises recur more frequently.

Alliances and regional alignment: The crisis is testing regional alliances and partnerships. South Korea has avoided taking sides and has called for dialogue between the two countries. This reflects Seoul’s attempt to balance its economic dependence on China with its security alliance with the US. However, there are signs that Washington is pressuring Seoul to take regional scenarios, particularly those involving Taiwan, more seriously. Similarly, ASEAN countries are apprehensive. Most maintain the One China policy while limiting themselves to calls for regional stability. In contrast, Japan’s more assertive stance could strengthen the deterrence of China within frameworks such as the Quad (the United States, Japan, India, and Australia).

Tensions in Multilateral Diplomacy: The conflict has spilled over into platforms such as the United Nations. China and Japan have “internationalized” the dispute by sending letters and making strong statements to the UN. China’s UN representative, Fu Cong, implied that Japan’s possible military intervention would be considered “aggression.” However, Japan found these claims “unacceptable.” This demonstrates that the crisis has the potential to erode not only bilateral relations, but also regional norms and institutions.

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s global attention has been absorbed by Trump’s obvious foreign policy manoeuvres from renewed interventionism on Venezuela to provocative remarks on Greenland, other, less theatrical but strategically weightier developments have unfolded with far less scrutiny. Last month, U.S. President Donald Trump went on television to announce a sweeping $11 billion arms sale to Taiwan. Unprecedented in both scale and financial weight, the decision reopened the Taiwan file, one of the most sensitive fault lines in U.S.–China relations and predictably triggered sharp condemnation from Beijing, and recently Chinese sanctions on American defense companies. More importantly, it marked a deliberate escalation in Washington’s competitive posture toward China, raising the likelihood that the Taiwan Strait will witness more frequent and more assertive Chinese military activity. The waters of the Indo-Pacific, already unsettled, are heating up further.

What makes this sale different and why it matters

Valued at roughly $11 billion and structured across eight separate deals, this package is not merely larger than previous arms transfers; it is qualitatively different in strategic intent. At its core lies a clear ambition to furnish Taiwan with a Ukraine-style defensive shield, particularly in air and missile defense. The package includes 82 HIMARS launchers, 420 ATACMS missiles, self-propelled howitzers, drones, advanced military software, Javelin and TOW anti-tank systems, helicopter spare parts, and refurbishment kits for Harpoon missiles.

What makes this sale escalatory is not volume alone, but the convergence of three distinct effects. Materially, the systems supplied are optimised for denial rather than signalling, complicating PLA operational planning by raising the costs of achieving air and missile dominance. Politically, the scale of the package signals a deeper U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s long-term defense posture rather than episodic reassurance. From a reputational vantage point, it narrows Beijing’s room for calibrated response by framing restraint as weakness at a time when Taiwan has been elevated by Chinese leadership into a core marker of national resolve.

The scale is telling. This single sale exceeds the $8.4 billion in arms transfers approved over the entirety of the Biden administration, underscoring a sharp recalibration in Washington’s approach to Taiwan’s defense. It also aligns closely with Taipei’s own reassessment of threat perception. President Lai Ching-te pledged to raise defense spending to 3.3 per cent of GDP by 2026 and to 5 per cent by 2030, which are levels more commonly associated with states preparing for sustained strategic pressure rather than abstract deterrence. Parallel to this, Taiwan plans to develop a $40 billion, multi-layered air defense architecture, the so-called “T Dome”, between 2026 and 2033.

Beijing’s response and the erosion of old guardrails

Beijing does not view the Trump administration’s arms package through the legal framework Washington prefers to cite. The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which authorises the provision of defensive weapons to Taiwan, carries little weight in China’s interpretation. Instead, Beijing frames such sales as interference in its internal affairs and a destabilizing provocation threatening regional peace. Its preferred reference point remains the 1982 Joint Communiqué, which envisaged a gradual reduction in U.S. arms sales to the island.

Yet, this argument rests on selective memory. President Ronald Reagan made clear at the time that any reduction would depend on China’s behaviour in the Taiwan Strait. That behaviour has moved decisively in the opposite direction. PLA exercises in 2025 reveal the maturation of a far more expansive hybrid warfare doctrine, one that is no longer confined to symbolic naval signalling. On April 1–2 alone, 68 of 135 Chinese aircraft crossed the so-called median line in the Taiwan Strait, marking the most brazen incursion since Nancy Pelosi’s 2022 visit to Taipei.

Beyond air activity, China has conducted simulated precision-strike drills targeting Taiwan’s energy and logistics networks, rehearsed attacks on civilian infrastructure, and expanded coast-guard operations into adjacent zones. Together, these actions indicate a strategy aimed at stretching operational boundaries while gradually reducing Taiwan’s strategic space. Against this backdrop, Beijing’s indignation over U.S. arms sales rings increasingly hollow.

Escalation amid constraint: why pressure has not delivered results

None of this suggests that Beijing faces an unconstrained path toward military action. A Taiwan contingency would impose severe economic costs, risk accelerated technological decoupling and potentially undermine China’s carefully cultivated relations across the Global South. Despite notable advances, uncertainties and limitations persist regarding PLA joint-force integration, amphibious lift capacity, and the ability to sustain high-tempo operations under contested conditions.

Nevertheless, these constraints have not produced restraint. Instead, they appear to have incentivised a strategy of sustained coercive signalling short of war. Repetitive military exercises, however, have failed to deliver meaningful deterrence. If pressure alone were sufficient to coerce Taiwan toward unification, or even to dissuade it from pursuing new arms acquisitions, China would have achieved that outcome long ago. It has not. The uncomfortable reality for Beijing is that its familiar playbook is no longer producing results, even as it increases the risk of miscalculation.

Residual deterrence in an era of U.S. strategic retrenchment

Warnings from U.S. War Secretary Pete Hegseth that China could be militarily ready to invade Taiwan by 2027 should therefore not be dismissed as alarmism. In the current strategic climate, they resemble less a worst-case fantasy than a plausible scenario of Indo-Pacific risk. The picture grows more complex when Japan enters the equation. Long at odds with China over the Senkaku Islands, Tokyo has sharpened its rhetoric, with Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi last month stating that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would constitute a survival threat to Japan. With a binding mutual defense pact linking Tokyo and Washington, Japan’s potential role in a Taiwan contingency remains a critical and unresolved variable.

Complicating matters further is the release of the new U.S. National Security Strategy, which reframes Washington’s global priorities in striking ways. Rather than doubling down on an Indo-Pacific–first posture, the document restores a Western Hemisphere–centred strategic hierarchy, explicitly committing the United States to enforcing a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine. Homeland security, border control, hemispheric primacy, and economic reindustrialization dominate Washington’s strategic bandwidth. China is no longer framed as the singular or “pacing” threat, but primarily as an economic competitor and a supply-chain risk, with the Indo-Pacific ranking below the Americas in priority.

This shift raises an uncomfortable but necessary question. Do recent arms sales and heightened signaling toward Taiwan reflect genuine preparation for confrontation, or are they better understood as residual deterrence measures operating alongside a broader U.S. strategic retrenchment toward its traditional sphere of influence? If American attention and resources are increasingly oriented toward Latin America, the credibility of extended deterrence in the Taiwan Strait may rest less on intent than on perception, precisely the ambiguity that fuels instability.

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he dramatic U.S. capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro has dealt a setback to China’s strategic interests in Latin America, even as it has ignited intense debate on Chinese social media—where some users are hailing the operation as a potential blueprint for Taiwan.

China and Venezuela have long maintained close ties rooted in shared ideology and opposition to U.S. influence. Their relationship was formalized as an “all-weather strategic partnership” in 2023, backed by billions of dollars in Chinese loans, infrastructure projects and preferential access to Venezuelan oil.

That partnership was thrown into doubt after U.S. special forces captured Maduro in Caracas, abruptly removing one of Beijing’s most reliable regional partners. China has been Venezuela’s largest crude buyer in recent years, with analysts estimating that up to 80% of Venezuelan exports in late 2025 went to China, largely at discounted prices attractive to smaller independent refiners.

While energy analysts say the loss of Venezuelan crude is unlikely to seriously disrupt China’s oil supply, the move raises broader questions about Beijing’s political and economic influence in a region Washington has traditionally viewed as its backyard.

Official condemnation, online nationalism

Beijing swiftly condemned the U.S. action, accusing Washington of acting as a global policeman and violating international law. President Xi Jinping appeared to take a veiled swipe at the United States by denouncing “unilateral bullying” that undermines the international order.

State media echoed the criticism, portraying the operation as proof of what it called U.S. hypocrisy over a “rules-based international order.” Accounts linked to China’s military warned that weak defense capabilities invite foreign coercion.

Yet on Chinese social media, the reaction was strikingly different. Topics related to Maduro’s capture drew hundreds of millions of views on Weibo, with some users openly asking whether China could one day carry out a similar operation against Taiwan’s leadership.

“If the U.S. can snatch a leader in its neighborhood,” one common refrain went, “why can’t China?”

Taiwan comparisons rejected

Chinese authorities have avoided endorsing such comparisons. Analysts and officials in Taiwan were quick to dismiss them as unrealistic.

“China is not the U.S., and Taiwan is not Venezuela,” said Wang Ting-yu, a lawmaker from Taiwan’s ruling party, arguing that Beijing lacks feasible means to replicate such an operation across the Taiwan Strait.

Security experts agree that while nationalist fervor online is notable, it is unlikely to alter Beijing’s calculus. Decisions on Taiwan, they say, depend on China’s domestic economy, military readiness, Taiwan’s internal politics and U.S. policy—rather than events in Latin America.

Broader implications

Still, analysts warn the episode could contribute to a shifting global norm. The use of military force to pursue foreign policy objectives, they argue, may increasingly be seen as an option rather than an exception.

For China, the priority is likely to be damage control—protecting its investments and economic interests in Latin America—rather than escalating direct geopolitical competition with Washington.

For Taiwan, the lesson may be more sobering. As one analyst put it, the episode underscores the need for stronger deterrence in a world where powerful states appear more willing to take extraordinary risks to advance their interests.

(Source: CNN)

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hina has launched large-scale live-fire military exercises around Taiwan, deploying warships, fighter jets, troops, and artillery in drills that Taiwan says threaten regional stability and democracy.

According to China’s Eastern Theatre Command, the exercises—named “Justice Mission 2025”—include live firing, simulated strikes on land and maritime targets, and drills aimed at blockading Taiwan’s major ports and encircling the island. The drills are taking place north and southwest of the Taiwan Strait and are set to continue for at least two days.

Taiwan responded by mobilizing its military, placing forces on high alert and conducting “rapid response exercises” designed to counter a sudden attack. Taiwan’s defense ministry also released footage showcasing its weapons, including U.S.-made HIMARS rocket systems, which could strike targets across the strait in China’s Fujian province if conflict erupted.

A senior Taiwanese security official said dozens of Chinese ships and aircraft were operating around the island, with some vessels deliberately approaching Taiwan’s contiguous zone, just 24 nautical miles from its coast.

China’s sixth major of military exercise around Taiwan

This marks China’s sixth major round of military exercises around Taiwan since 2022, following heightened tensions after high-profile foreign support for Taiwan and 11 days after the United States announced a record $11.1 billion arms package for the island. Beijing condemned the arms sale and warned it would take “forceful measures” in response.

Chinese officials said the drills were meant as a warning to “Taiwan independence separatist forces” and foreign interference, while analysts warned that such exercises increasingly blur the line between routine training and preparations for an actual attack—potentially reducing warning time for the U.S. and its allies.

Taiwan’s coast guard and aviation authorities said they were working to minimize disruption to shipping routes, fishing areas, and air traffic, after China designated temporary danger zones for live-fire exercises near Taiwanese airspace.

(Source: Reuters)

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he United States has announced a major package of arms sales to Taiwan valued at more than $10 billion, a move that has prompted a sharp response from China and heightened tensions over the island’s security.

The State Department said late Wednesday that the package includes eight separate arms sales agreements aimed at strengthening Taiwan’s defensive capabilities. If approved by Congress, it would be the largest U.S. weapons package ever provided to Taiwan, surpassing the $8.4 billion approved during former President Joe Biden’s administration.

Missiles, Artillery and Drones Included

According to U.S. and Taiwanese officials, the package totals about $11.15 billion and includes 82 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and 420 Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) worth more than $4 billion. It also covers 60 self-propelled howitzer systems and related equipment valued at over $4 billion, as well as drones worth more than $1 billion.

Additional sales include military software valued at more than $1 billion, Javelin and TOW anti-tank missiles worth over $700 million, helicopter spare parts, and refurbishment kits for Harpoon missiles.

The State Department said the sales serve U.S. national and security interests by supporting Taiwan’s efforts to modernize its armed forces and maintain a credible defensive capability, helping preserve regional stability and military balance.

China Condemns Move as Provocation

China’s Foreign Ministry condemned the arms sales, saying they violate diplomatic agreements between Washington and Beijing and undermine China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Beijing warned that the move would push the Taiwan Strait closer to military confrontation.

China claims Taiwan as its territory and has vowed to reunify the island with the mainland, by force if necessary. The U.S., while not formally recognizing Taiwan as a sovereign state, is legally obligated under U.S. law to assist the island in maintaining its self-defense.

Taiwan’s Defense Ministry welcomed the announcement, saying the arms sales would help maintain sufficient defensive capabilities and strengthen deterrence. Taiwan’s foreign minister also thanked Washington for its long-term support, calling it essential for preserving peace and stability in the region.

The announcement comes as Taiwan plans to increase defense spending to 3.3% of its gross domestic product next year, with a goal of reaching 5% by 2030. President Lai Ching-te has also proposed a special $40 billion, multi-year budget for arms purchases, including the development of an advanced air defense system.

The arms sales were previewed in recent U.S. defense legislation passed by Congress, which China has criticized as unfairly portraying it as an aggressor.

(Source: Reuters)

Taiwan will propose a landmark US $40 billion supplementary defense budget aimed at accelerating major arms purchases from the United States and dramatically boosting deterrence against China, President Lai Ching-te said in an op-ed published in the Washington Post.

The proposal — one of the largest single-year boosts in Taiwan’s defense spending — underscores Taipei’s urgent push to modernize its armed forces as Beijing intensifies military pressure around the island, flying record numbers of fighter jets across the Taiwan Strait median line and expanding grey-zone tactics in surrounding waters. China claims Taiwan as its own territory, rejecting Lai’s repeated calls for dialogue and branding him a “separatist”.

Lai said the new package would fund “significant” arms acquisitions from the United States, including systems focused on asymmetric warfare — a strategy that prioritizes mobile missile units, drones, mines and air defenses to counter a much larger adversary.

“This landmark package will not only fund significant new arms acquisitions from the United States, but also vastly enhance Taiwan’s asymmetrical capabilities,” Lai wrote. “In doing so, we aim to bolster deterrence by inserting greater costs and uncertainties into Beijing’s decision-making on the use of force.”

The United States is legally obliged under the Taiwan Relations Act to provide Taipei with the means to defend itself. However, defense experts note that American production lines remain stretched, and long-standing backlogs in arms deliveries to Taiwan — estimated at more than US $19 billion — have raised concerns in Taipei.

Since President Donald Trump returned to office in January, his administration has so far approved only one new Taiwan arms package: a US $330 million sale of fighter jet and aircraft parts earlier this month. Lai nevertheless praised Washington’s posture, saying “the international community is safer today because of the Trump administration’s pursuit of peace through strength.”

Defense spending set to break long-standing threshold

Taiwan has steadily increased defense spending since 2020, but the new proposal marks a dramatic escalation. Government budget documents show that Taiwan intends to raise annual defense spending to T$949.5 billion (US $30.25 billion) in 2026 — roughly 3.32% of GDP and the first time Taipei has surpassed the 3% threshold since 2009.

Lai said he hopes defense spending will reach 5% of GDP by 2030, a level that would put Taiwan closer to front-line states such as Israel. Washington has long urged Taipei to invest more in self-defense, mirroring similar U.S. pressure on European allies within NATO.

Analysts say the scale of the package signals that Lai’s administration now expects China’s military coercion to intensify further. The People’s Liberation Army has spent the last five years conducting near-daily pressure campaigns around Taiwan, including large-scale encirclement drills in 2022 and 2023.

China did not immediately respond to the op-ed, but Beijing typically denounces major shifts in Taiwan’s defense posture as “provocations” or “moves toward independence.” Chinese state media have intensified attacks on Lai since his inauguration, and PLA aircraft have repeatedly broken new records for incursions near Taiwan.

Western officials say China is unlikely to launch a short-term attack but warn that the PLA is moving steadily toward a position where a blockade or coercive campaign becomes more feasible.

Lai reiterates offer of talks — but warns democracy is “non-negotiable”

Despite the massive new defense investment, Lai emphasized in the op-ed that his government remains open to dialogue with Beijing. China has rejected all such overtures since Lai took office, demanding he first accept its position that Taiwan is part of China — a condition Lai refuses.

“While we will continue to pursue opportunities for cross-strait dialogue, with the understanding that our democracy and freedom remain non-negotiable, we remain grounded by more than wishful thinking,” Lai wrote.

Taipei’s dual strategy — boosting deterrence while maintaining political outreach — echoes the approach of Lai’s predecessor, Tsai Ing-wen. But analysts say the proposed US $40 billion package signals a far more ambitious military reshaping, one aimed at making any future Chinese attack prohibitively costly.

(Source: Reuters)

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apan is facing its most severe diplomatic crisis with China in more than a decade after an unscripted remark by newly appointed Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi triggered a furious reaction from Beijing, prompting economic retaliation and plunging bilateral ties into uncertainty.

The dispute erupted after Takaichi, responding spontaneously to a question during her first parliamentary grilling, suggested that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could lead to a Japanese military response. The comment broke with years of strategic ambiguity maintained by successive Japanese leaders and immediately infuriated China, which views Taiwan as part of its territory.

According to two Japanese government officials familiar with internal deliberations, the remark was neither planned nor designed to signal a major policy shift. “It would have been better not to say it, but it’s not incorrect,” one official said, acknowledging that Tokyo now has little room to walk the comment back. “We can’t retract it.”

China moves quickly to apply economic pressure

Beijing wasted no time demonstrating its displeasure, announcing a set of measures designed to hit Japan’s economy, the world’s fourth largest. These include a halt to Japanese seafood imports, cancellation of cultural exchanges, and a boycott on travel to Japan that could strip billions from the tourism sector. Some official meetings have also been abruptly suspended.

Economists warn the impact could be severe. China’s travel boycott alone is estimated to cost Japan more than $14 billion annually, according to Nomura Research Institute economist Takahide Kiuchi. A wider consumer backlash within China, similar to the one that followed Japan’s 2012 nationalization of disputed islands, could reduce Japanese corporate sales by the equivalent of 1% of Japan’s GDP, analysts say.

Perhaps more worrisome for Tokyo is the possibility that China could curb exports of rare earth minerals, critical to Japan’s electronics and automotive industries. Despite efforts to diversify supply chains, China still accounts for around 60% of Japan’s rare earth imports.

Diplomacy turns frosty, symbolism sharpens

Attempts by Tokyo to calm tensions have, if anything, only underscored the deepening divide. Talks in Beijing this week between senior foreign ministry officials were described by Chinese diplomat Liu Jinsong as “solemn”. Images aired by Chinese media showed Liu standing with his hands in his pockets — an intentional gesture of defiance in a formal setting.

Even Liu’s attire drew attention: he wore a five-button, collarless suit associated with the May Fourth Movement of 1919, a student-led protest against Japanese imperialism. Chinese state media highlighted the symbolism, casting it as a pointed reminder of historical grievances.

The diplomatic chill has already led Beijing to rule out a potential encounter between Takaichi and Chinese Premier Li Qiang at this weekend’s G20 summit in South Africa. Analysts say the freeze could last throughout Takaichi’s tenure. “Takaichi inadvertently boxed herself in,” said Jeremy Chan, a senior Northeast Asia analyst at Eurasia Group. “There really is no immediate off-ramp.”

Domestic backing holds, but regional risks rise

Despite the turmoil, Takaichi’s comment has not dented her popularity at home. Opinion polls show her approval ratings remain robust, with many voters viewing her stance as a firm response to regional security concerns.

Her office has insisted that Japan’s official policy on Taiwan has not changed. “Japan remains open to various forms of dialogue between the two countries,” a spokesperson said, adding that her remarks did not contradict existing government positions.

But in Beijing, the rhetoric has hardened dramatically. A Chinese diplomat appeared to allude to Takaichi’s beheading in a now-deleted post, while nationalist commentators branded her an “evil witch”. A cartoon posted by China’s military on social media depicted her burning Japan’s pacifist constitution.

With no signs of compromise on either side, officials and analysts increasingly fear the dispute could deepen further before any thaw becomes possible. “Right now, there’s not even a starting point for improvement,” a Japanese official said.

A senior U.S. diplomat in Asia added that a near-term resolution is unlikely unless Beijing seeks to mend ties with Washington and uses Japan as a diplomatic bridge. “Until then,” he said, “we’re looking at a long winter in Japan–China relations.”

(Source: Reuters)

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apan is scrambling to contain a rapidly escalating dispute with China after comments by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi about the possible use of military force in a Taiwan conflict triggered a fierce backlash from Beijing, rattling markets and raising fears of deeper geopolitical instability in East Asia.

The diplomatic row erupted after Takaichi told lawmakers earlier this month that a Chinese attack on Taiwan that threatened Japan’s survival could, under existing security laws, pave the way for a Japanese military response. The remarks, unusually explicit for a Japanese leader, touched one of the most sensitive nerves in regional politics: Japan’s potential involvement in a cross-strait conflict.

Previous Japanese administrations have avoided publicly discussing the circumstances under which Japan might intervene, wary of provoking China, which claims Taiwan as part of its territory. But Takaichi, who became Japan’s first female prime minister in 2025 and has taken a firmer security stance than her predecessors, insisted she was simply describing a scenario already embedded in Japan’s legal framework.

“Strategic recklessness”

Beijing, however, reacted sharply. China’s foreign ministry accused Tokyo of “strategic recklessness” and warned Japan against “dangerous provocations.” Its Consul General in Osaka, Xue Jian, posted — and then deleted — a social-media message declaring that “the dirty neck that sticks itself in must be cut off,” prompting Japan to lodge an official protest and summon China’s ambassador.

The rift deepened last week when China issued an unusually blunt travel warning urging its citizens to avoid travel to Japan due to “security risks.” Japanese officials said the advisory had no factual basis and risked undermining the “mutually beneficial strategic relationship” that both countries publicly committed to restore during recent high-level exchanges.

In an effort to de-escalate tensions, Japan is dispatching Masaaki Kanai, director general of the Foreign Ministry’s Asia and Oceania bureau, to Beijing this week. According to Japanese media, Kanai will clarify that Takaichi’s remarks do not reflect a change in Japan’s security policy and will call on Chinese officials to refrain from steps that further damage the relationship.

“Various channels of communication are open,” Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi told reporters on Monday. He added that China’s travel warning was “incompatible” with the direction both governments had agreed to pursue.

The Group of 20 summit in South Africa

Takaichi may also have an opportunity to speak directly with Chinese Premier Li Qiang during the Group of 20 summit in South Africa later this week—an encounter that could determine whether the diplomatic freeze begins to thaw or hardens further.

Taiwan’s newly inaugurated president, Lai Ching-te, waded into the dispute on Monday, urging China to “exercise restraint” and accusing Beijing of launching a “multifaceted attack” on Japan. Taiwan, located just over 110 kilometers from Japan’s southwestern islands and surrounded by key shipping routes, sits at the centre of Japan’s strategic concerns.

Japan also hosts the largest concentration of U.S. military forces outside the United States, making the country a critical forward base in any potential conflict over Taiwan. Washington has so far limited itself to pointed but measured comments. U.S. Ambassador to Japan George Glass criticised Xue’s remarks on social media, calling them “unprofessional” and adding over the weekend that the episode should now be put to rest.

But the rhetoric from China has continued to intensify. On Friday, Beijing warned that Japan would face a “crushing” defeat if it intervened militarily in a Taiwan war, and criticized Tokyo’s “ambiguity” on its longstanding pledge not to possess or host nuclear weapons. A recent Reuters investigation found growing political debate in Japan over potentially revising that pledge, long considered taboo in the country that suffered the world’s only wartime atomic bombings.

The Senkaku Islands

Tensions spilled onto the seas on Sunday when a formation of Chinese coast guard vessels sailed through waters near the Senkaku Islands — known as the Diaoyu in China — a contested chain in the East China Sea. Japan said its coast guard drove the ships away, echoing a pattern of maritime confrontations that have surged since Japan nationalised the islands in 2012.

The diplomatic fight is already having economic repercussions. Analysts warn that if Chinese tourist arrivals were to fall by 25% — the scale seen during the 2012 Senkaku dispute — Japan could face a significant shock. Takahide Kiuchi of the Nomura Research Institute said such a decline would dampen growth by “more than half of Japan’s annual expansion.”

Investors braced for that possibility on Monday. Shares of tourism-sensitive companies slumped, with department store chain Isetan Mitsukoshi plunging more than 10% in early trading and Japan Airlines falling over 4%. Retail and leisure stocks also slid amid fears of a prolonged downturn in Chinese visitor numbers, a key pillar of Japan’s post-pandemic economic recovery.

While both Tokyo and Beijing say they want stable relations, their worsening dispute over Taiwan underscores how quickly East Asia’s strategic environment can deteriorate. With China increasing military pressure on Taiwan and Japan adopting a more assertive defense posture, the diplomatic turbulence may prove difficult to reverse — unless both sides seize upcoming opportunities to step back from the brink.

(Source: Reuters)

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n a statement on April 3, the U.S. State Department’s Deputy Secretary, Kurt Campbell, hinted at a potential link between the AUKUS submarine project and deterring Chinese aggression towards Taiwan. The AUKUS initiative, a partnership between Australia, Britain, and the U.S., was introduced in 2023 to bolster defenses against China’s expanding influence in the Indo-Pacific region.

Campbell’s remarks, made during a session at the Center for a New American Security think tank, underscored the strategic implications of the AUKUS submarine capabilities in maintaining peace and stability, particularly in the Taiwan Strait. While the three countries involved have been cautious about explicitly connecting AUKUS to tensions surrounding Taiwan, Campbell’s statement marks a departure from this approach.

The AUKUS project entails Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered attack submarines, a move aimed at strengthening the allies’ collective defense posture. Campbell emphasized that collaborating on defense initiatives not only enhances diplomatic ties but also contributes to overall peace and stability in the region.

China and AUKUS

China has expressed concern over the AUKUS pact, labeling it as dangerous and warning of a potential arms race in the region. However, the Biden administration has been actively seeking to bolster partnerships with allies in Asia, including Japan and the Philippines, in response to China’s military expansion and assertiveness in territorial disputes.

Ahead of a summit with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. scheduled for April 11, President Biden aims to strengthen cooperation among the three nations, particularly in addressing challenges posed by China. Campbell highlighted plans for trilateral engagement, including closer coordination in the South China Sea, where tensions have escalated due to maritime disputes.

Moreover, Campbell discussed the evolving security partnership between the U.S. and Japan, emphasizing the importance of joint development and potential co-production of military equipment. Regarding the situation in Ukraine, Campbell revealed U.S. assessments suggesting Chinese assistance to Moscow in bolstering its military capabilities following initial setbacks in the conflict.

Campbell’s remarks signal a strategic alignment among the U.S. and its allies in the face of growing challenges posed by China’s assertive actions in the Indo-Pacific region. The AUKUS submarine project, along with enhanced trilateral cooperation, underscores efforts to uphold peace and stability while addressing evolving security threats in the region.

Source: Reuters

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ai Ching-te, the Democratic Progressive Party candidate, is Taiwan’s new president.

Taiwan’s 13^th presidential and legislative elections were concluded on Saturday, January 12, with the victory of Lai Ching-te, the candidate of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).

With a voter turnout of around 70% in Saturday’s elections, DPP candidate Lai Ching-te, who received more than 40% of the vote, will govern the country for the next four years, according to the Central Election Commission (CEC).

Hou Yu-ih, the candidate of the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang-KMT) and former mayor of New Taipei, received 33% of the votes, and the candidate of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), Ko Wen-je, received 26% of the votes.

Victory of de facto status

While this electoral result is the DPP’s third consecutive electoral victory, it is also possible to evaluate this development as a victory of the de facto reality on the ground. This election results signify the strong attachment to the autonomous political stance of the DPP governments since 2016 and their emphasis on equality in terms of sovereignty with mainland China.

Taiwan’s elections are more significant in regional and international politics than in domestic politics. In this regard, the successful implementation of Taiwan’s electoral process is a driving force for democracy in the regional and global spheres.

During the campaign process, DPP Chairman Lai Ching-te stated that, if elected, he would continue the administration’s policies, including those in foreign policy, that have been sustainably implemented by former President Tsai Ing-wen since 2016.

This means that in the next four years Taiwan will continue to draw closer to and develop existing relations with the United States and the European Union, as well as with Japan and Australia, the representatives of this bloc in the region, not politically but in the context of “cooperation and exchange.”

Parliamentary landscape

It is not difficult to predict that although the DPP won the presidential election, it lost the majority in Taiwan’s 113-seat parliament, the Legislative Yuan. Thus, the DPP will have to negotiate with opposition parties on various issues during the legislative process.

The Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), which has emerged as a new political movement in Taiwan, should be considered a new voice in the island’s politics with its 26% vote share. So much so that we can predict that after the DPP loses its majority in parliament, it will move closer to the People’s Party, which, unlike the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang-KMT), is drawing attention with its emphasis on democracy.

Elections and global powers

The success of the elections deserves to be considered valuable not only by Taiwanese society, but also by defenders of global peace.

Obviously, the third consecutive election win by the DPP, which has governed the island since 2016, was closely followed by the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for different but directly related reasons.

However, the aggressive pre-election political discourse that forced and necessitated the evaluation of the elections held on Saturday outside of Taiwanese society and politics is that of these two global powers. This is true at least at the level of discourse and despite all the dilemmas experienced.

Democratic channel in election victory

The 64-year-old Lai hailed the election victory as the “victory of democratic societies” in his statement after the results were announced.

The emphasis on “democratic societies” in the plural is not limited to reiterating the demand of Taiwanese society to be governed by “democratic ideals.” It also explicitly refers to similar societies in the region and around the world that uphold democratic values and practices.

This context is not necessarily only related to Taiwan’s domestic politics, namely in the context of the opposition Nationalist Party’s (KTM) policy of rapprochement with mainland China, or simply the significant support of the U.S. government to the DPP government since 2016.

Behind this statement, there is an emphasis that targets the political regime and policies of Mainland China, especially the developments in Hong Kong since 2013.

The “heavy emphasis” of the the mainland Chinese political elite over Taiwan, by considering it part of mainland China, caused a significant part of the Taiwanese people to vote for the DPP, which adopted the “democratic” form of government, and to adopt democratic discourse and principles in the social structure. It should be evaluated as a reflection of their strong expressions and theory and the applications of these positions in real political life.

Possible developments

It is impossible to expect any change in mainland China’s political and territorial sovereignty claims over the island in the face of Taiwan’s democratic development. After all, Taiwan means “national sovereignty and territorial integrity” for the Chinese mainland.

Nor is it possible for Taiwan to accept any developments regarding Beijing’s direct pressure and control over democratic governance and ideals and the island’s “autonomous” structure.

However, as inherent in the de facto phenomenon, a continuation of the current Cold War situation can be foreseen for both Taiwan and mainland China.

On the other hand, it is worth considering whether the two different political perspectives mentioned above, which are directly related to each other, have the flexibility to evolve into a new constructive policy for both sides. Overall, it is debatable whether President Xi Jinping will initiate a new policy that opens the doors to direct negotiations with Taiwan.

Ultimately, the Xi Jinping administration must reconsider the proposal of “equal-status talks” that former President Tsai Ing-wen insisted on with Beijing during her last eight-year term.

It should not be seen as a weakness if Jinping engages with Taiwan through a new policy initiative. Such an initiative is expected to limit the U.S. military presence in the region, reduce political mistrust between the countries, and mitigate any potential direct conflict in the Asia-Pacific.

Apart from its global impact, Taiwan’s sustainable social and political life based on democratic ideals can be seen as a moral support for the people in the Chinese autonomous regions such as Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet, and some sections of the Chinese population with democratic tendencies in mainland China in general.

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s the globe continues to navigate through a myriad of conflicts, the rising tensions between the United States and China over Taiwan are drawing serious warnings from experts about the risk of a broader global confrontation. David F. J. Campbell, an associate professor at the University of Vienna, cautioned that any military skirmish over Taiwan could be a tipping point for world peace, potentially leading to a third world war.

Speaking at the Stratcom Summit in Istanbul, Campbell underscored the precarious state of global affairs with existing conflicts such as the Russia-Ukraine war and the recent escalations in Gaza. He indicated that the world’s focus should remain on de-escalation, especially in East Asia, where the stakes are alarmingly high.

Taiwan remains a contentious issue with its strategic geopolitical position and its ambiguous political status. China asserts sovereignty over the island, while the US supports Taiwan with arms under a policy of strategic ambiguity. Campbell highlighted the potential dangers of this delicate balance being disrupted, stating, “If there is a direct military confrontation between US and Chinese forces, then perhaps a World War III might be on the table.”

The nuclear capabilities

Campbell also alluded to the nuclear capabilities of both nations as a significant deterrent, referencing Albert Einstein’s sobering prediction about the destructive potential of a third world war. He further discussed the Budapest Memorandum’s role in the denuclearization of Ukraine, pondering if Ukraine’s relinquishment of nuclear arms made it a more accessible target for Russian aggression.

Moreover, Campbell noted the rationality he believes exists within the leadership of both China and the US, suggesting that both are aware that an altercation over Taiwan could spiral out of control. “Chinese and American leaders are realizing that any conflict over Taiwan would perhaps be the final straw before a World War III,” he explained.

Navigating positions in the Taiwan Strait

This stark warning comes at a time when both superpowers are carefully navigating their positions in the Taiwan Strait, with the US continuing to assert freedom of navigation and China expressing its discontent with such maneuvers.

The global community watches closely as the situation in East Asia unfolds, with the hope that diplomatic efforts will prevail over military action and that the specter of a large-scale war can be avoided.

For now, the status quo remains, but the expert’s caution serves as a reminder of the fragility of peace and the interconnected nature of regional conflicts in our global landscape.

Source: Anadolu Images

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ecent polling data suggests that U.S. public support for military intervention in defense of Taiwan has seen a decline from its peak in 2021, as global focus shifts to the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East.

According to Russell Hsiao of the Global Taiwan Institute, despite President Joseph Biden’s repeated affirmations of support for Taiwan, American public opinion seems to be swaying under the pressure of global military engagements and emerging war fatigue.

The disconnect between the articulated positions of U.S. leaders and the less-visible sentiments of the American public represents a notable challenge in foreign policy discourse. While officials often communicate their stances through formal declarations, the collective opinion of the populace—on issues like the defense of Taiwan—tends to be more nuanced and diffuse, making it harder to gauge and incorporate into policy formulation.

Changing public sentiment amidst global unrest

With President Biden at the helm, the United States has seen a shift in public opinion regarding foreign military support, especially concerning Taiwan. Biden has affirmed defense support for Taiwan on multiple occasions, a stance seemingly at odds with recent trends in American public opinion.

The Chicago Council on Global Affairs has conducted polls that reveal a decline in support for the use of troops to defend Taiwan, from 52% in 2021 to a lower 44% in 2022, and further down to 38% in a 2023 Reuters poll.

The downward trend in support for military intervention over Taiwan may be linked to the U.S. engagement in the Ukraine war, which has sparked intense debate over national military commitments and resource allocation.

The U.S.’s withdrawal from Afghanistan and ongoing conflicts in the Middle East contribute to the complex backdrop against which American public opinion on foreign policy is shaped.

Bipartisan support for Taiwan persists despite trends

Despite these trends, bipartisan support for Taiwan among U.S. policymakers remains robust. The Republican party, traditionally seen as more supportive of Taiwan due to its anti-communist stance and advocacy for democracies, continues to show strong backing for the island nation’s defense.

However, generational differences have emerged within the party, with younger Republicans showing less inclination towards an assertive foreign policy.

The implications of these shifts in public opinion are significant for Taiwan, which relies on U.S. support as a deterrent against potential aggression from the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

The evolving public sentiment underscores the need for Taiwan to maintain and strengthen its international alliances and not rely solely on verbal affirmations of support.

The Global Taiwan Institute’s report concludes that while U.S. public support is an important factor, it is not yet at a tipping point, and Taiwan remains a top concern for Americans.

The future of U.S. involvement in Taiwan’s defense will likely continue to be influenced by global events and domestic opinion, highlighting the need for vigilant and adaptable foreign policy strategies.

Source: Global Taiwan Institute

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he Taiwan Strait has emerged as a geopolitical hotspot, garnering significant attention due to the escalating tensions between the United States and China. This narrow body of water, separating the island of Taiwan from mainland China, has become a focal point of power struggles and competing interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

China’s rise as a global power, both economically and militarily, has fueled concerns over its pursuit of reunification with Taiwan, which currently enjoys de facto independence from China. President Xi Jinping has made reunification a cornerstone of his administration, employing a combination of diplomatic pressure, military posturing, and economic incentives to isolate Taiwan diplomatically and erode its international standing. China’s military modernization, including the development of advanced weaponry and naval capabilities, has increased its capacity to forcefully assert its territorial claims. Meanwhile, the U.S. engages with Taiwan in a way China views as provocative. Should we be concerned?

In War and Peace in the Taiwan Strait, Scott L. Kastner delves into the increasingly tense relationship between China and Taiwan. As fears of a potential military conflict loom large, Kastner offers readers a comprehensive and nuanced analysis of the factors that could lead to hostilities while emphasizing that the situation should not be exaggerated. This book not only sheds new light on the prospects for cross-strait military conflict but also explores the pathways that could either lead to or help prevent such a crisis.

Kastner begins by examining the complex implications of deepening economic integration between China and Taiwan. While economic ties have historically been seen as a stabilizing force, the author delves into the potential risks that arise as a result of this interdependence. He further explores the shifting balance of military power in the region, considering the implications of China’s military modernization efforts and the potential impact on Taiwan’s defense capabilities. These dynamics, coupled with uncertainty surrounding the future of U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s security, contribute to the complex landscape of the Taiwan Strait. A crucial question Kastner considers in his book is whether the United States would come to Taiwan’s defense.

The author also highlights the significance of domestic political changes in both China and Taiwan. By analyzing the internal dynamics within these two entities, Kastner provides readers with a deeper understanding of how domestic factors can shape cross-strait relations and potentially impact the likelihood of military conflict. Kastner delves into an in-depth examination of the intricately intertwined economies of Taiwan and China, as well as their historical background and the significance of freedom in the Taiwanese context.

While the risks of conflict are indeed real, Kastner’s analysis offers a more tempered perspective, emphasizing that war in the Taiwan Strait is far from inevitable. He argues that there are multiple distinct pathways that could lead to hostilities, and the mechanisms that may mitigate one type of conflict might not necessarily be applicable to others. However, the book underlines the presence of powerful mitigating factors, combined with plausible steps to reduce the likelihood of military conflict, providing a glimmer of hope for avoiding a catastrophic outcome.

Combining international relations theory with meticulous empirical analysis of regional trends, Kastner presents readers with valuable insights into the potential occurrence of war in the Taiwan Strait and, more importantly, how such a conflict can be averted. The book equips policymakers, scholars, and interested readers with the knowledge necessary to navigate this complex geopolitical landscape.

War and Peace in the Taiwan Strait is a timely work that provides a comprehensive examination of the risks and possibilities surrounding military conflict in the region. Kastner’s expertise and meticulous research contribute to a vital perspective that not only deepens our understanding of the Taiwan Strait issue but also provides valuable insights into maintaining peace and stability in the region.

Scott L. Kastner, War and Peace in the Taiwan Strait (Columbia University Press, 2022) ISBN: 9780231198653, 272 pages

Written by Dilara Özer

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he United States’ intense engagement in Taiwan in order to curb China, with which it competes not to lose its global leadership, encircling the latter in the Indo-Pacific, attracts the close attention of the entire world. The escalation of the crisis and the direct attempts of the parties to the dispute to engage in war resemble a disaster scenario for the whole world.

At this point, putting aside the possibility of a direct war between the U.S. and China over Taiwan, with the two great powers having nuclear weapons, it is likely that the U.S. will respond to a possible Chinese operation against Taiwan by increasing its support for Taipei, thus wearing China out. What attitude will European countries have in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan?

Considering the UK’s long-standing special relationship with the U.S., London’s policy towards Taiwan is more important than other European countries. In this context, when we look at the current UK policy towards Taiwan, London does not recognize it as an independent state in accordance with the One-China policy and considers it a part of mainland China. At the same time, the UK maintains its informal relations with Taiwan through its trade and culture office in Taipei, the island’s de facto capital.

Less tensions in the Taiwan Strait

The UK is dissatisfied with the heating tensions in the Taiwan Strait as more than 300 British companies are present on the island and more than 180 Taiwanese companies are present in the UK with investments in various sectors. In this respect, the possibility that these investments will suffer if the tension on the U.S.-Taiwan-China front turns into a war disturbs London. For this reason, adopting a rational approach, the UK is in favor of solving the Taiwan issue through dialogue.

London intends to continue its established policy on the issue, as clearly expressed in a report published by the House of Commons in February of last year. Yet, according to the same report, the UK also supports Taiwan’s participation in international organizations as an observer member. Thus, for the time being, the UK complies with China’s red line regarding Taiwan and is far from adopting an approach that could provoke Beijing; however, its support for Taiwan’s membership in international organizations causes unease in China.

On the other hand, there is a strong expectation that if China launches a military operation against Taiwan, the U.S. will support Taiwan, and the UK will follow in the United States’ footsteps. This expectation must be viewed in light of the special relationship between London and Washington. First, the social, cultural, political, and economic seeds of today’s America were planted by the UK. For this reason, the political relations between the two countries have been shaped based on mutual trust and common interests. As a result, Europeanists, who favor a self-sufficient Europe that is independent from the U.S., perceive the UK as the United States’ European arm. In this spirit, France, the pioneer of this European camp, prevented the UK’s membership in the European Union until 1973.

The UK as a functional actor between Taiwan and China

In addition, the UK transferred its role as a dominant actor in global politics to the U.S. after World War II. Since then, the UK has equated the power of its successor, the United States, with its own and has taken the side of the U.S. in almost every issue that has occupied the agenda of global politics. So much so that the UK has provided the U.S. with the greatest support both in theory and practice in Afghanistan and Iraq, which has had tremendous impacts on regional and global politics for years, and has acted together with the U.S. in the Syrian and Libyan crises. The U.S. included the UK, its most reliable European partner, in the AUKUS military alliance, which it formed with Australia two years ago in order to counterbalance China in the Indo-Pacific. This development seriously damaged the U.S. and UK’s common relations with France and made China very uncomfortable.

In other words, the UK will act as a functional actor contributing to the securitization process of the Taiwan issue by siding with the U.S. In this respect, London will probably send financial and military aid to Taiwan, similar to the support it provided to Ukraine following the Russian invasion. In the same context, UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak noted at the G-20 summit held in November last year that “China poses a systemic challenge to UK values and represents the biggest state-based threat to our economic security. We will consider sending arms to help Taiwan to defend itself in the event of an attack from Beijing.”

In conclusion, on the one hand, the UK does not follow a policy that will directly confront Beijing on the Taiwan issue and does not want the tension in the region to grow further, taking into account the mutual investments in Taiwan and Britain. At the same time, the UK does not hesitate to signal that if China attempts a military intervention against Taiwan, it will follow the U.S. and support Taiwan in accordance with its traditional Atlanticist foreign policy.

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n Thursday, February 2, 2023, the United States and the Philippines signed an agreement which will allow the U.S. to use four additional military bases in the country to face the rise of China, about which both Washington and Manila share concerns. The move will give the U.S. army more access and a strategic footing on the southeastern edge of the South China Sea, allowing it to overlook Taiwan.

A statement by Philippine and American officials noted that the four military bases to be used by the American army are located in “strategic” locations in the country.

The new agreement is part of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) signed between the U.S. and the Philippines in 2014.

After signing the agreement in Manila, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin told reporters: “That’s just part of our efforts to modernize our alliance. And these efforts are especially important as the People’s Republic of China continues to advance its illegitimate claims in the West Philippine Sea.”

China responds to the Philippines move

Mao Ning, a spokeswoman of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accused the United States on Thursday of threatening regional peace and stability, adding that Washington still has a cold war mentality. Ning noted that this mentality is visible through the U.S. military expansion in the South China Sea.

The statement noted that some parties in the U.S. try to use Taiwan as a card to contain China.

The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs affirmed that Taiwan is part of China, calling on the U.S. to respect the One China Policy and to stop its military support for the island.

The U.S. currently uses five military bases in islands across the Philippines, and according to the new agreement, the U.S. will provide these islands with $83 million to boost infrastructure.

The locations of the four new military bases to be used by the U.S. forces is yet to be declared.

The administration of President Ferdinand Marcos is interested in strengthening the Philippines’ ties with the U.S. unlike that of Rodrigo Duterte, which leaned more towards China.

U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris paid a visit to the Philippines in November, where she asserted that her country will support the Philippines against “intimidation” in the South China Sea.

O

n January 2023, experts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) revealed the results of the wargaming simulation report “The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan,” which was designed to analyze the possible scenarios of a Chinese “amphibious” invasion of Taiwan in 2026.

The CSIS simulations have generated striking findings. Among the 24 wargame reiterations, the United States, Taiwan, and Japan were able to defend against a conventional “amphibious” assault effectively, but at a high cost for all parties involved.

China Strikes First

According to the report, the invasion consistently sparked off with a heavy Chinese bombardment that decimated Taiwan’s navy and air forces. The Chinese naval forces would surround the island of Taiwan while thousands of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers cross the Taiwan Strait in both amphibious vessels and aircraft, with troops landing behind beachheads.

“Meanwhile, U.S. submarines, bombers, and fighter/attack aircraft, often reinforced by Japan Self-Defense Forces, rapidly eliminate the Chinese amphibious fleet,” the CSIS experts revealed.

The majority of the scenarios run by CSIS experts came to the conclusion that Taiwan was able to subjugate the Chinese forces, and the decisive factor in Taiwan’s victory was its people’s willingness to fight. “If Taiwan surrenders before U.S. forces can be brought to bear, the rest is futile,” the report revealed.

The report concluded that China’s strike on Japanese and American naval vessels cannot alter the outcome, which is that Taiwan remains autonomous despite Chinese attacks.

U.S. and Taiwan’s “Pyrrhic Victory” and Chinese Defeat

Eric Heginbotham, a security expert at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Center for International Studies, reported that two significant conclusions had been reached.

“First, under most circumstances, China is unlikely to succeed in its operational objectives or to occupy Taipei. Secondly, the cost of war would be high for all involved, certainly including the United States,” he stated.

Compared to the other forces, according to the report, China would suffer the most casualties by losing approximately 10,000 troops, 155 aircraft, 138 major ships, and having an estimated 30,000 Chinese soldiers captured on the island. Military experts at CSIS suggest that such a defeat, along with damages incurred by counterattacks in mainland territories, could endanger the stability of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Meanwhile, the U.S. and its allies would lose a significant number of ships, aircraft, and servicemembers, while Taiwan would experience an economic downfall. Additionally, the losses incurred by all sides would cause severe damage to the global position of the United States.

“The United States might win a pyrrhic victory, suffering more in the long run than the ‘defeated’ Chinese” as a result of the damage to Washington’s international standing, the report revealed.

CSIS experts cautioned that “the rival forces of the United States – such as Russia, North Korea or Iran – are preoccupied and might act aggressively to pursue their agendas which could weaken the U.S. military by incapacitating the forces to maintain the balance of power in Europe or the Middle East after the war.”

“To prevent war, the U.S. and its allies should reinforce their military deterrence capabilities,” they added.

Washington should bolster its military installations and collaborate with allies, particularly Japan, to secure additional bases. The CSIS report recommended that the U.S. should purchase more long-range missiles, specifically anti-ship missiles, as some supplies are critically low, according to the report.

Taiwan’s “Porcupine Strategy”

According to base scenarios that excluded the most extreme outcomes, Taiwan’s air force would lose the majority of its 534 combat aircraft, and its navy would lose 38 major vessels. Taiwan’s army would also encounter around 3,500 casualties, with approximately one-third killed in combat in a local land battle.

CSIS military experts proposed that Taiwan officials adopt a “porcupine strategy,” which entails a smaller military using tactics intended to cause significant destruction to a larger adversary. The think tank experts suggested such an approach would include Taiwan’s deployment of more mobile anti-ship missiles.

The Taiwanese government should prioritize strengthening its ground forces rather than buying costly ships and aircraft that are easily targeted by adversaries, the experts further recommended.

Four Conditions to Defeat the Chinese Threat

To ensure success in defending Taiwan, CSIS experts identified four conditions that must be met. First, Taiwanese forces must “hold the line” and should not allow any room for Chinese expansion. The second condition necessitates the first condition to be met as the location of Taiwan disables the possibility of delivering supplies via an overland route. Under a possible attack, the Taiwanese military may possibly become confined to already-existing supplies until allied forces can resupply armament over the Pacific.

Third, Japan must allow the U.S. to launch combat operations from its soil. “The ability to operate from U.S. bases in Japan is so critical to U.S. success that it should be considered a sine qua non for intervention.”

Fourth, “the U.S. must have enough long-range weapons to strike China’s fleet from outside its defensive zone.” To strike from a vast distance effectively, the Taiwanese navy requires a greater number of long-range anti-ship cruise missiles and bombers, the experts concluded.

Nancy Pelosi, speaker of the United States House of Representatives, visited Taiwan on August 2, and met Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen. As the first visit by a senior U.S. official to Taiwan in 25 years, it was a historic event. The visit was followed online by millions of people, and, according to Flightradar24, flight name “SPAR19” became the most tracked flight of all times.

However, the surprise visit created a tense atmosphere and continues to trigger regional instability pushing certain countries to make statements about Taiwan’s status. Below we take a closer look at the “One China” policy and Taiwan’s political status.

China is the second-largest economy in the world and established itself as Asia’s major superpower. The country asserts that Taiwan is not a country independent from China.

Although the United States claims that it supports the “One China” policy, the tense atmosphere following Pelosi’s visit caused confusion.

Pelosi’s visit

After Pelosi’s visit, China called the U.S. ambassador to Beijing Nicholas Burns to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and protested the visit. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi also condemned Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan.

While the U.S. has yet to go so far as to recognize Taiwan as a separate country, China has recently accused the U.S. of covertly supporting the island’s full independence. According to the statement made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China after the visit, “This is a serious violation of the one-China principle and the provisions of the three China-U.S. joint communiqués. It has a severe impact on the political foundation of China-U.S. relations, and seriously infringes upon China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

However, U.S. officials claim that they have not stopped supporting the “One China” policy despite President Biden’s promises of military equipment/support to Taiwan and regular visits by American lawmakers to the island. Even during Pelosi’s visit, National Security Council Coordinator for Strategic Communications John Kirby said that the U.S. is clear about the “One China” policy and does not support the independence of Taiwan.

He clarified further that the Biden administration has “been nothing but clear with the Chinese about where we stand on the issues and the One-China Policy and our support for a free and open Indo-Pacific.”

A quick glance at the history of Taiwan: “Two China” Era

The “One China” policy dates back to the Chinese Civil War, fought between the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) led by Chiang Kai-shek and the Communist Party led by Mao Zedong, which lasted from 1945 to 1949. In 1949, the nationalists were defeated and withdrew to Taiwan, and the communists formed a government on the mainland. On October 1, 1949, the Chinese Communist Party, under the direction of Mao, proclaimed the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in Beijing.

In December 1949, Chiang designated Taipei as the country’s “temporary capital,” claiming that the sovereignty of the Republic of China (ROC), which was established in 1912, continued in Taiwan.

Ever since the Taiwan government was established in 1949, both mainland China and Taiwan have asserted that they represent China in international organizations. At first, a few nations recognized the Taiwanese government, including the United States, and the Taiwan Republic of China served as China’s representative at the UN.

The debate over which government represents China at the UN remained up to 1971. However, the “Two China” era came to an end in 1971 when many nations voted mainland China into the UN General Assembly, instead of the Taiwanese government, as their preferred diplomatic partner.

Official “One China” Policy

After the UN vote, there were some developments in terms of Taiwan’s position.

Former U.S. President Richard Nixon’s 1972 trip to China marked a turning point in bilateral relations. Nixon’s visit was concluded by the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué, a diplomatic agreement between the two countries. The U.S. declared that the “United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.

The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan.”

US-China ties

U.S.-China relations improved over time, and in 1978, due largely to Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, the Chinese economy started to open up to foreign competition.

In 1979, the U.S. formally established diplomatic ties with Beijing. As a result, the U.S. had to formally sever its ties with Taiwan and close its embassy there. Afterwards, countries around the world that backed mainland China formally severed their ties with Taiwan.

The U.S., which has developed trade and diplomatic relations with China over the years, still maintains its contact with Taiwan. China became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 and continued its rapid growth. Over the years, mutual economic dependence created by U.S. companies manufacturing their goods in China has led to trade imbalances. Bilateral relations were strained by the Trump era trade wars, diplomatic crises, and Trump famously referring to COVID-19 as the “Chinese virus.”

Additionally, the U.S. passed the Taiwan Relations Act in 2022 which is substantial in ensuring support for the island. The act effectuates U.S. support for Taiwan’s self-defense. Consequently, the U.S. has kept providing Taiwan with weapons. According to CNN, more than $1.1 billion in arms sales to Taiwan have been authorized by the Biden administration, a move that is likely to escalate the already high tensions between China and the United States. Up to 60 anti-ship missiles and up to 100 air-to-air missiles are among the proposed sales, which the administration formally informed Congress of on Friday, September 2.

Other Countries and the “One China” Policy

China regards the Taiwan issue as its internal affair and tries to avoid any interference by other countries, urging them to respect China’s territorial integrity.

According to the World Population Review, only 13 Latin American countries—Belize, Haiti, Honduras, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Paraguay, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tuvalu, and Guatemala—and Vatican City recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state.

Following Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, international organizations such as the UN, the Arab League, and countries such as Iran, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, the UAE, and North Korea repeated their support for the “One China” policy. Also, Russia reiterates the “One China” policy as Sergei Lavrov, the foreign minister of Russia, told reporters in Tashkent that “[o]ur position on the existence of only one China remains unchanged.” Lavrov added, “We have no problem with upholding the principle of China’s sovereignty.”

G7 and One China Policy

Furthermore, the G7 Foreign Ministers of Germany, Italy, Canada, Japan, France, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union, reaffirmed that “there is no change in the respective One-China policies, where applicable, and basic positions on Taiwan of the G7 members.”

Despite China’s assertion that Taiwan is a part of the Chinese republic, Taiwan states that it is an “independent country.”

Taiwan’s international status and its formal unification with China remain a complex situation. Since many countries support mainland China and have adopted the “One China” policy, Taiwan’s position in the UN and other international organizations remains uncertain. Today, several countries maintain informal ties with Taiwan through representations, trade centers, or cultural institutions such as the Taipei Economic and Cultural Mission.

As a violation of international law that reneges on its commitment to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty under Article 1 of the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, Russia’s February 2022 invasion is a test case that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is watching closely to assess U.S. resolve. U.S. credibility has been battered in recent years, most notably with the debacle in Afghanistan. Beijing and Moscow believe that further weakening of the U.S.-led order is a geostrategic opportunity to seek world dominance.

The parallels between Ukraine and Taiwan are striking – both have aligned themselves with democracy, even as both countries face powerful autocratic neighbors. Ukraine and Russia, both demographically Slavic nations, have taken different political directions. Since the breakup of the USSR, Ukraine has moved to align its political identity with the democratic transatlantic community. The 2005 Orange Revolution resulted in the downfall of the pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych, who was subsequently impeached after the 2013 Euromaiden Protests that saw Ukrainians seeking alignment with the EU.

The notion of Ukrainian consolidation of its fledgling democracy is anathema to Russian President Vladimir Putin, who is aware that domestic discontent against his regime needs only a neighboring democratic spark to gain momentum for public dissent. It is unsurprising that Putin’s 21 February 2022 speech sought to delegitimize the Ukrainian Government’s democratic credentials and its sovereignty.

Taiwan occupies a status broadly similar to Ukraine. Having broken away from mainland rule in 1949, Taiwan’s democratic transition stands in contrast to the mainland’s authoritarianism. Taiwan illustrates that an ethnic Chinese population is capable of being a mature democracy and a digitally-savvy economic powerhouse.

Whilst the mainland’s attempts to cover up the initial outbreak of the COVID19 pandemic in 2019 led to its worldwide spread, Taiwan has been lauded worldwide for its public health policy response based on trust and transparency between the government and its people.

Taiwan and Ukraine have notable commonality, namely the ambiguity of the international community’s obligations to the sovereignty and security of the two countries.

There is a further notable commonality between the two countries, namely the ambiguity of the international community’s obligations to the sovereignty and security of Ukraine and Taiwan. Ukraine dismantled the nuclear weapons that it inherited from the USSR’s breakup, and participated in NATO-led operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq and the Indian Ocean.

To understand the nature of hybrid warfare tactics, it is necessary to move away from the state-centric paradigm of security that has focused on such quantifiable indices of power such as tanks and troops, and to appreciate that hybrid warfare is based on throwing the defender off balance through a unconventional means that, although falling short of direct military action, is a definitively hostile action seeking geopolitical objectives.

The repertoire of hybrid warfare instruments includes espionage, financially-based influence operations and misinformation, enabling the perpetrator to begin their activation in peacetime as part of a low-visibility, pre-conflict phase of operations, during which the perpetrator can undermine its target from within. Russia’s donation of financial contributions to the British Conservative Party and its injection of misinformation to fuel the Brexit vote in 2016 has resulted in the British Government’s indecisive, ill-prepared response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Russian injection of disinformation during the U.S. 2016 elections skewed the result in favor of Trump, thus polarizing U.S. society. China, too, has embraced hybrid warfare operations. Beijing has utilized its Confucius Institutes to promote the notion that China is a peaceful power, mobilized the United Front Work Department (UFWD) to encourage the Chinese diaspora to identify politically with the PRC and participate in espionage operations, and financed corrupt diplomats and foreign politicians to promote pro-Beijing policies.

Faced with such threats, the greatest concerns should be felt not by the nuclear powers and their treaty allies, but rather the various countries to whom the international community’s diplomatic and security obligations are rather more ambiguous. Such ambiguity can be exploited by Russia and China – after all (from the Russian government’s perspective), if Ukraine is not a member of NATO, what business does NATO have in extending its nuclear umbrella to Ukraine during a Russian ‘peacekeeping operation’ in a Russian ‘sphere of influence’?

Likewise, China can exploit Taiwan’s lack of international diplomatic recognition to block any attempt by the international community to meddle in the mainland’s supposed ‘sovereignty and territorial integrity’. Tellingly, the U.S.’s posture towards Taiwan is increasingly moving away from the past policy of ‘strategy ambiguity’ towards one of ‘strategic clarity’ in underscoring Washington’s will to defend the island.

Furthermore, given the expansionist behavior of China and Russia, other European and Asian countries should heed the implications of the current crisis – particularly those in the vicinity of China and Russia, have strained relations with these powers, and do not have the protection of a nuclear-armed ally. Finland, Moldova and Vietnam spring to mind.

Finland seceded from the Russian Empire in 1917 but was invaded by the USSR in 1939. Present-day Helsinki is an EU member, but not in NATO – even as Finland remains on Russia’s borders. Moldova, a former Soviet Republic that has aligned itself with the EU, should also be wary. The Transnistria region, a breakaway region in northeastern Moldova that borders Ukraine, has a sizeable ethnic Russian demographic, a situation analogous to the Russian communities in eastern Ukraine over whom Russia initiated its separatist insurgency in 2014.

Moldova is not a NATO member, and thus cannot expect NATO intervention in Putin’s ambitions reach Moldova

Yet, having constitutionally committed itself to neutrality, Moldova is not a NATO member, and thus cannot expect NATO intervention in Putin’s ambitions reach Moldova. Vietnam, too, has reasons to be concerned, as it has no nuclear-armed allies and no nuclear arsenal. Given its formidable land warfare reputation, Vietnam is unlikely to face a land invasion by China; rather, the latter is more likely to exploit its overwhelming air-naval superiority and its Maritime Militia to continue encroaching on Vietnamese waters, possibly to the extent of seizing islands that are indisputably part of Vietnam’s territory, but which might be retroactively claimed by Beijing under the guise of ‘historical maps’ of ‘traditional Chinese territories’, from which China may be prepared to present Hanoi with the fait accompli of Beijing’s nuclear arsenal.

Recent months have seen the People’s Republic of China (PRC) adopting an increasingly belligerent posture towards Taiwan, as evident in undertaking aerial incursions into the latter’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in unprecedented numbers and repeated statements denouncing any move by the island toward seeking formal independence.

Concurrent to this, the U.S. has taken an increasingly assertive posture against the PRC. The preceding Trump Administration saw a unprecedented surge in U.S. warships undertaking Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) through the Taiwan Strait; a more recent leak by the Taiwanese authorities has revealed that the Trump Administration authorized the deployment of a training detachment of US troops to Taiwan.

More recently, President Joe Biden affirmed the U.S. commitment to defend the island. In offering a less-than-veiled indication of the likelihood of a U.S. military intervention, Biden’s statement has aroused debate over whether his Administration is abandoning the U.S. policy of ‘Strategic Ambiguity’ toward Taiwan.

‘Strategic Ambiguity’, adopted following Washington’s establishment of diplomatic ties with Beijing in 1979, was drafted with a twofold aim in mind. First, it enabled Washington to hint at Beijing the possibility of U.S. military intervention, if the mainland were to attempt an unprovoked invasion.

Second, strategic ambiguity enabled the U.S. to simultaneously hint to the Taiwanese authorities that unnecessarily provoking the mainland would void the contingent scenario of U.S. military intervention. Such a proviso thus sought to induce caution in Taipei.

We should not be too surprised about Biden’s assertiveness over Taiwan.

Whilst the Chinese Communist Party has reason to be furious over Biden’s statement, we should not be too surprised about Biden’s assertiveness over Taiwan. The ambiguity underpinning the possibility of U.S. intervention to support Taiwan is conditioned on the nature of mainland behavior; in light of the escalatory moves that Beijing has adopted towards Taiwan in recent months, a statement highlighting the Biden Administration’s willingness to defend Taiwan is consistent within the bounds of the policy of Strategic Ambiguity, and a necessary one at that, given the need to warn China against further escalation.

Second, recent developments in Taiwan have elevated the island’s status as a poke in the eye of the CCP’s ego. Whilst the PRC floundered in responding to the spread of COVID19 and was only able to bring the virus under control due to harsh lockdown measures and manipulation of its domestic media, Taiwan was able to suppress the virus through its ‘whole-of-society’ response that underscored the efficiency of the island’s model of governance.

In so providing a high-profile instance of good governance in a democratically-elected polity, Taiwan has earned widespread international praise; combined with the mainland’s repeated attempts to sideline and bully Taiwan over the last several years, the result has been a growing sense of international solidarity with the island, with a growing number of EU delegations to Taiwan.

This was exemplified in September 2020, when President of the Czech Senate Miloš Vystrčil visited Taiwan and, on the floor of the Legislative Yuan, declared in Mandarin Chinese that ‘I am a Taiwanese’, alluding to John F. Kennedy’s ‘Ich Bin Ein Berliner’ speech in 1963.

The combined effects of these developments has been to arouse CCP fears of an increase in pro-independence sentiment in the island that has already been increasing in recent years due to a younger Taiwanese demographic that has little emotional connection to the mainland, as well as growing international scrutiny of the mainland’s human rights abuses, and Beijing’s reneging on its promises to respect Hong Kong’s autonomy as part of the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ model.

The convergent impact of these developments has been to arouse the CCP’s fear that the Taiwanese populace may become further emboldened into seeking formal independence for the island, under which circumstance the CCP’s failure to bring about unification with the mainland would stand as a high-profile policy failure that will undermine the CCP’s domestic credibility.

The CCP’s current sabre-rattling is thus likely intended to coerce the Taiwanese populace against any further actions that would otherwise force CCP’s hand to avoid a domestic crisis of legitimacy.

With no end in sight to the mainland’s pattern of provocations against Taiwan and the Biden Administration affirming the U.S. commitment to Taiwan, the next question concerns the possibility of a Sino-U.S. clash over Taiwan. I do not see such a scenario occurring in the immediate future. As noted above, China is attempting to rely on threats of force to dissuade the Taiwanese populace from seeking formal independence.

The CCP is aware that a clash of arms with the U.S., at a time of clear U.S. military superiority over the PRC, is the kind of gamble that would likely lead to a Chinese defeat, the kind of high-profile failure that the CCP cannot deflect domestic public opinion from.

The next question is about a possible Sino-American clash over Taiwan.

Over the medium-to-long term, however, the picture is less clear, for two convergent reasons. The first concerns the rapid pace of modernization in the PRC’s air and naval power capabilities. In conjunction with Beijing’s investment in cyber-warfare, cruise missile and space warfare technology, U.S. policymakers have expressed increasing concerns that the PRC may close the military gap sufficiently, to the extent that the CCP believes that it might emerge triumphant from a short, armed takeover of Taiwan that would enable Beijing to present Washington with the fait accompli of Chinese control.