On July 14, 2015, Iran agreed a long-term deal on its nuclear program with a group of world powers known as the P5+1 – the U.S., UK, France, China, Russia and Germany. The agreement was signed after a long period of negotiations and tensions over Iran’s alleged efforts to develop nuclear bombs and missiles. Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran agreed to limit its nuclear activities and allow IAEA to achieve international inspections in return for the suspension of deactivated economic sanctions.

Under the JCPOA, Iran’s 20,000 centrifuges were limited to installing no more than 5,060 of the oldest and least efficient centrifuges at Natanz until 2026. Iran’s uranium stockpile was also reduced by 98% to 300kg – a figure that must not be surpassed until 2031. Iran was also ordered to keep the stockpile’s level of enrichment at 3.67%. More, Iran will not be permitted to build additional heavy-water reactors or accumulate any excess heavy water until 2031.

Sanctions imposed on Iran before the deal by the UN, U.S. and EU, in an attempt to force Iran to halt uranium enrichment crippled the country’s economy, costing the country more than $160 billion in oil revenue from 2012 to 2016. However, under the deal, Iran gained access to more than $100bn in assets frozen overseas and was able to resume selling oil in the international market by using the global financial system for trade.

After two years of stable relations among the parties, relations went sour between the U.S. and Iran as a result of the U.S. withdrawing from the so-called “Iran Deal.” The withdrawal came under the Trump Administration after President Trump announced that the nuclear deal is “defective at its core.”

The first round of renewed U.S. sanctions imposed on Iran as part of Washington’s strategy to apply “maximum pressure” on Tehran over its alleged malign activity came into force on 7 August, 2018. These sanctions prohibited Iran’s purchase of U.S. dollars and precious metals as an attempt to cut the country off from the international financial system. Broad sanctions on Iran’s industry, ranging from carpets to health care and to the automotive and aviation sectors were also re-imposed.

A second chain of U.S. sanctions on Iran’s oil and gas sector was imposed on 5 November. More than 700 Iranian individuals, entities, vessels and aircraft was put on the sanctions list, including major banks, oil exporters and shipping companies. More than 100 big international companies had withdrawn from Iran due to the sanctions, which further escalated tensions between the two countries.

On 8 May, 2019 – the anniversary of the U.S. withdrawal – Iran gave a 60-day deadline to the remaining parties of the deal – China, France, Germany, Russia and the UK – to protect it from U.S. sanctions. Especially Tehran urgently demanded the E3 -France, Germany and the UK- to fully activate the INSTEX, which was founded after the U.S. withdrawal and the re-activation of the sanctions to continue trade with Iran, and to maintain their Iranian crude imports without constraint.

However, the point here is that although E3 announced that the INSTEX is now operational from July 1, 2019, Tehran is still not content with it since the scope of the mechanism is limited to humanitarian goods like food and medicine, does not have any effect on Tehran’s oil trade, which is the most revenue generator sector of its GDP.

Iran had suspended commitments it made under the terms of the 2015 nuclear deal, and Rouhani declared that Tehran would hang on to its stocks of excess enriched uranium and heavy water instead of exporting them. He also threatened to resume enriching uranium in 60 days, above its limit in case the remaining signatories do not make promises to shield the oil and baking sector from further sanctions.

At the end of the 60 days Iran set as a period for the remaining parties of the nuclear deal to make progress on the relief of sanctions, Iran declared it resumed enriching uranium above a concentration of 3.67% and threatened to keep reducing its commitments every 60 days until other parties to the deal could protect Tehran from the sanctions.

After Iran announced that it will break a limit set on uranium enrichment, in breach of the limit set on the 2015 nuclear deal, already existing tensions between Iran and the U.S. escalated to a new high.

On 8 July 2019, Tehran threatened major powers that they will not be able to negotiate a better deal than the landmark 2015 nuclear deal. Iran also threatened to restart deactivated centrifuges and ramp up its enrichment of uranium to 20 percent purity, which will constitute its following potential big moves away from the deal that Washington abandoned last year.On July 8, President Trump warned Iran that it “better be careful,” responding to Iran’s announcement that Tehran has breached the uranium enrichment limit set in the international nuclear accord.

Mike Pompeo also reacted on Twitter: “Iran’s latest expansion of its nuclear program will lead to further isolation and sanctions. Nations should restore the longstanding standard of no enrichment for Iran’s nuclear program. Iran’s regime, armed with nuclear weapons, would pose an even greater danger to the world.”

Javad Zarif, Iran’s foreign minister, asserted that the steps were “reversible” if European states carried their commitments. Zarif also stated that expecting Iran to reduce its uranium enrichment level to “zero” is a “delusion.”

More, White House National Security Adviser John Bolton said on Monday that the U.S. will keep increasing pressure on Iran until it abandons its pursuit of nuclear weapons and ceases its “violent activities in the Middle East.”

New sanctions were about to be imposed on Iranian bureaucrats, especially foreign minister Zarif, after the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned the Iranian Supreme Leader Rouhani’s office in June. İt was said that any further sanction against Iran might put an end to the diplomatic doors between the two countries. However, The United States made a decision, on 11th of July, to hold off the sanctions imposed on the Iranian Foreign Minister Mr. Zarif, which constitutes a positive step towards opening the diplomatic door again amongst the 2 countries.

*Written by Rahma Elfeky

In May 2018, President Donald Trump announced that he will withdraw the U.S. from the JCPOA, which is also known as the Iran Nuclear Deal. During his campaign, he continuously repeated that this was the “worst agreement in the history of the U.S.” and that as soon as he was to become president, the U.S. would no longer be part of it.

On May 8, 2018, as the 45th President of the United States, Trump kept his word and withdrew from the Deal. It became more apparent that the administration would further push Tehran harder when Secretary of State Mike Pompeo declared his famous “12 Demands,” which covers issues from nuclear enrichment to support for terrorist activities. Needless to say, this was also a clear demonstration that Pompeo became one of the leading figures of the current administration’s Iran policy. From that time on, the Trump administration began to pursue a strategy that it thought Iran would follow.

As part of the country’s withdrawal from the deal, the first round of sanctions on some key sectors in Iran – such as automobiles, aviation, and banking transactions – was restored on August 6, 2018. Unsurprisingly, this resulted in the depreciation of the Iranian rial, but this alone was not enough for the Trump administration, which merely aimed to devastate the Iranian economy.

Exactly after a second 90-day period, on November 5, 2018, the most revenue-generating sector of Iran – the oil industry – was placed on the spot. The U.S. Treasury Department began to re-implement sanctions against almost all legal entities operating in the country’s oil trade. Although the State Department had repeatedly said the opposite during the second 90-days, it provided a 180-days waiver to Iran’s eight largest customers– China, India, Turkey, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Italy and Greece – of crude oil to important up to a limited amount. While the Trump administration had sworn to devastate the Iranian economy by cutting its oil exports, as a newly occurring net oil exporter, it also needed to think about the U.S. oil industry and U.S. economy as well.

The amount of crude oil imported from Libya, the U.S., Kuwait, Iraq, the UAE, and Russia in 2018 increased by more than 50 percent compared to the previous year due to Iran sanctions.

As expected, China, India, Turkey, South Korea and Japan continued to import Iranian crude during the 180-days waiver period. As of November 5, China – the largest importer of Iranian crude – sustained its orders. Nevertheless, a change has been observed in the amount of crude imported from many suppliers due to the increase in oil demand by approximately 50 percent compared to the previous year. In 2018, the amount of crude oil imported from Libya, the U.S., Kuwait, Iraq, the UAE, and Russia, increased by more than 50 percent compared to the previous year due to Iran sanctions. According to the latest data, in April, the largest amount of crude oil imports from Iran had been made since 2018, a significant portion of which has been imported by China’s state refineries.

As the second largest importer, India also sustained its orders from November onwards. What’s worth considering is that the oil industry in India is more fragile than the one in China; it is more difficult to find alternative supplies in case it stops importing Iranian crude, since Iran has long been among the top 3 oil suppliers of India.

Unsurprisingly, Japan, the loyal ally in the Pacific, and South Korea, remained close to the U.S. and laid off their Iranian crude imports until January 2019 despite the waivers. The last time tankers carrying Iranian crude delivered to Japan was in March and to South Korea in April.

Following the waivers, the Trump administration announced that three anonymous states ceased to import crude from Iran. According to the tanker trackers’ data and statements from Iranian officials, the two of these countries are EU member states Italy and Greece. The two have halted crude purchases from Iran since October 2018 despite their waivers and calls for participation in ISTEX, which was established by Germany, France and the UK in order to maintain trade relations with Iran. Thus, it is known that the EU is criticized by Iran. The Rouhani administration has always expressed that although the EU promises to remain loyal to the Iran Deal and indoctrinates Iran to do the same, the European bloc is not helping Tehran. This has led to relations between the EU and Iran deteriorate since May 2018.

There are serious rumors that the top five customers – China, India, Turkey, Japan and South Korea – have stopped importing oil from Iran.

Similar to the two European countries, the third country that terminated its crude imports from Iran is Taiwan. It was before the second-round of sanctions, October 2018, when Taiwan had last received crude from Iran.

The situation in Turkey was quite complicated. As is known, Iran has long been a significant exporter for Turkey’s oil industry; it was the number 1 supplier of the Turkish refinery industry in 2017. The administration had always insisted on continuing crude imports from Iran. TURPAS, which is run by a private company in Turkey, was the sole refinery owner in the country until October 2018 and it began to decrease the amount of Iranian crude after the U.S. withdrawal from the Deal and suspended its imports in November. However, purchases started again in December and continued until the waivers expired. Moreover, despite the decreased amounts, Iran remained a significant supplier for Turkey in 2018. Since May, the amount of crude oil imported from Iraq evidently increased, making the country the largest supplier and leaving Iran in second place. Purchases from Russia, Saudi Arabia and Azerbaijan were also increased in order to replace Iranian crude. Countries that were permitted waivers and the ones that continued to import crude from Iran decreased their amounts compared to pre-sanctions times.

As of May 2, 2019, the 180-days expired and the Trump administration decided not to extend the waivers. Before the waivers expired, the U.S. had already declared the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps as a foreign terrorist organization. Consequently, the situation worsened when countries that continued to import crude from Iran were threatened with secondary sanctions.

The Trump administration’s aim is to isolate Iran from the international market, and it is just around the corner from fulfilling this objective.

The demands made by Pompeo have not yet been met and while the Trump administration argues otherwise, Iran claims that it has been loyal to the Deal. Contrarily, the Supreme National Security Council of Iran declared that the country will re-start its nuclear enrichment activities in 90 days unless the remaining signatories would help Iran to continue its trade and stabilize its economy.

In addition, while there is no initial proof, the country was accused of sabotaging Saudi and UAE oil tankers and facilities. However, it is commonly accepted that such behavior would be predictable and a natural outcome of the Trump administration’s maximum pressure policy against Tehran. The remaining signatories have already acknowledged that the U.S. was the one responsible for Iranian aggression.

There is no doubt that economic pressure will seriously serve the efforts to collapse the Iranian economy not only in the short-term but also in the long-run. Although we do not have clear data yet, there are serious rumors that the top five customers – China, India, Turkey, Japan and South Korea – have stopped importing oil from Iran. The Trump administration’s aim is to isolate Iran from the international market, and it is just around the corner from fulfilling this objective. It is fair to state that hard times are waiting not only for the Iranian people, but for the region.

Since the beginning of Trump’s presidency, the U.S. has put enormous effort to contain Iran in both political and economic terms. During his election campaign, Trump pledged to tear the nuclear deal (JCPOA) and his anti-Iran tone was pretty harsh. After his election, he started to realize his election promises one-by-one. His attitude towards international acts and agreements was uncompromising. The U.S. withdrew from the Paris Climate Agreement, Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and UNESCO in 2017. JCPOA, which was formalized in 2015 by P5+1 countries and which began to be implemented in early 2016, was a target too. JCPOA was also binding in terms of international law since it was ratified as a UN Security Council resolution.

Trump’s general policy choice reflects a radical rupture from the priorities of the Obama era, and this is not an exception in the case of the Middle East. The president’s Middle East policy centers around various crucial themes. The most significant of them is containing Iran. For Trump, Iran has expanded its regional influenced during the Obama era thanks to the “worst deal ever made,” also known as the nuclear deal. According to Trump, by giving Iran lifeline support, JCPOA has paved the way for Iran’s “terrorist activities” along the region. Therefore, this should be stopped.

With the Trump administration, the U.S. government has launched a regime change discourse against Iran. The president has employed numerous anti-Iran figures in his team such as Mike Pompeo, John Bolton, Rudy Giuliani, and others.

The U.S. President’s policy is a pillar for other policies related to the Middle East. Saudi Arabia and other anti-Iran Gulf countries desperately seek Trump’s support in their endeavor to confront Iran. In this direction, the U.S. makes billion dollar arms deals with Saudi Arabia and supports every action against Iran in the region. Saudi Arabia’s Qatar move, which was directly against Iran and Turkey, also received U.S. support. The coordinated efforts of Israel and the U.S. function to undermine Iran’s political and economic power. Accordingly, I argue that Trump’s Iran policy has two dimensions – both politic and economic.

The nuclear deal and economic war against Iran

On May 8, Donald Trump announced that the United States has pulled out of the nuclear deal. He also announced that sanctions will be re-imposed by the U.S. soon. The first round of U.S. sanctions came into effect on July 7. These sanctions were primarily targeting Iran’s trade with precious metals, its import of auto parts, and commercial passenger aircrafts. But the most striking sanctions were imposed on November 5. The aim of these sanctions was to cut all oil exports from Iran and devastate the country’s economy. In addition to that, 700 individuals and companies were put on the sanctions list. In order to avoid serious backlash, the U.S. granted waivers to 8 countries, including Turkey. However, these countries will also be expected to cut their oil trade with Iran in a short period of time.

Trump was not alone in his campaign against Iran. Benjamin Netanyahu, the Prime Minister of Israel, also fully supported his decision of exiting the JCPOA. More, prior to Trump’s decision, he tried to persuade the international community that “Iran has lied” about its nuclear activities and that it “cheated.” Netanyahu, in his televised public performance a week before Trump’s announcement of U.S. withdrawal from the deal, claimed that Iran had lied when it said that it never chased after a nuclear weapon. He added that, “Even after the deal was made, Iran continued to preserve and expand its nuclear know-how for use at a later date.” His claim was based on an alleged secret operation conducted by MOSSAD to acquire “atomic archive documents” in a secret warehouse in Tehran. Netanyahu’s efforts were not limited to this performance. Again in September, when he stepped to address the UN General Assembly, he claimed that Israel had discovered another secret nuclear facility in Tehran and that he had proof of it. According to Netanyahu, Iran had equipment for developing a nuclear bomb in this facility.

Regime change discourse, Arab NATO, and the Warsaw Summit

With the Trump administration, the U.S. government has launched a regime change discourse against Iran. The president has employed numerous anti-Iran figures in his team, such as Mike Pompeo, John Bolton, Rudy Giuliani, and others. The State Department’s and Secretary Pompeo’s Twitter accounts work vigorously to disseminate regime change discourse among Iranians, be it diaspora or those living in the homeland. In addition to that, in 2011, the U.S. had launched its first Farsi language Twitter account in order to address Farsi-speaking Iranians directly. Pompeo and his team began to use this account to promulgate their position against Iran. All these efforts are signs of a public relation campaign to create a dominant discourse, which would produce an intended change in the Iranian government’s behavior.

Iranian women took off their hijabs and hang them on a stick during their protests in Tehran. Some Iranian diaspora, however, questioned the authenticity of these protests and the integrity of Masih Alinejad for having ties with U.S. neo-cons.

In this endeavor, the U.S. government takes any opportunity it can. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo met with Masih Alinejad, a famous Iranian-American social media activist. Alinejad runs the #whitewednesday campaign, which encourages women to take off their hijabs in Iran on Wednesdays and record it with a camera. Women share these videos on social media and Alinejad also promotes them on her own Twitter account. These videos go viral and show how Iranian women resist imposed dress codes. During the protests in January 2018, the Iranian women that took off their hijabs and hang them on a stick began to be called the “daughters of Revolution Street,” since their protests occurred on the revolution street of Tehran. However, some of the Iranian diaspora have questioned the authenticity of these protests and the integrity of Masih Alinejad for having ties with U.S. neo-cons. Pompeo’s meeting with Alinejad empowered the arguments of their critics. This move apparently shows how Alinejad’s campaign functions in a certain way in the regime change rhetoric of the U.S. administration.

Another policy that the Trump administration has adopted is trying to pull other countries on their sides against Iran. In that vein, the U.S. and Israel organized an anti-Iran summit in Warsaw on February 14. 60 countries were represented at the Summit. However, EU states sent their low-level diplomats and it disrupted the summit’s intended anti-Iran character. Robert Giuliani, former New York Mayor and one of Trump’s lawyers, said that he was representing Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK) at the summit. MEK is designated as a terrorist organization by Iran. It was once listed as a terrorist organization by the U.S. in 1997, but was then de-listed in 2012. In the recent years, Trump’s team has been coordinating with MEK members and their presence was so visible in so many occasions, including during the Warsaw Summit.

Robert Giuliani, former New York Mayor and one of Trump’s lawyers, said that he was representing Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK) at the anti-Iran summit in February in Warsaw. MEK is designated as a terrorist organization by Iran.

One of the functions of the Warsaw Summit was to create a base for a new regional security alliance against Iran. This has been articulated as the “Arab NATO” by some U.S. officials. Officially known as the Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA), this planned organization would contain Iran militarily through six Gulf countries plus Egypt and Jordan. Netanyahu especially took the chance to bolster his anti-Iran position and convince other Arab countries “to advance the common interest of the war with Iran.” According to Mike Pence, along with Netanyahu, they “broke bread with leaders from Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.” Given the diplomatic gap between Israel and other Arab countries (it only has formal diplomatic ties with Egypt and Jordan), Netanyahu’s efforts were reflecting a significant re-orientation towards Arab countries in order to confront Iran.

Turkey’s stance

Turkey’s approach to the U.S. policy on Iran has not been changed from the very beginning. President Erdogan repetitively emphasized that Turkey needs Iranian oil and gas and that there are no alternatives for Turkey. Erdogan also condemned the re-imposed sanctions on the ground that they are against international law. The president’s remarks have been reiterated by a number of senior figures in the government. Despite the fact that the U.S. and Israel will increase their pressure on Iran, Turkey is likely to preserve its position.

The Middle East has undergone a massive transformation since the Arab uprising erupted in 2011. The Arab uprising initially rooted from people’s search for democracy, equality, and justice, noting that none of them have ever been at the core of politics since the Western intervention in the region took place. However, the nature of the Arab uprising dramatically transformed itself towards pervasive insecurities and chaos in the Middle East, especially after the spread of radicalization — particularly in the case of Daesh, the conflict-spillover effects of the Syrian Civil War, and the fall of democracy in the Arab world.

Today, from Libya to Yemen, the main characteristic of the new disorder in the Middle East is the proliferation of violent non-state armed groups, the deterioration of state structure, the rise of radical extremism, and the deepening geopolitical antagonism among states, ethnic, and religious groups. This new phenomenon resulted in state insecurity, regime insecurity, societal insecurity, and most importantly, in human insecurity across the region. Each of these outcomes indicate that the very nature of the Middle East order has been undermined by internal, regional and international actors. The new stage highlights that we are at a point where the Middle East is gradually falling into a new wave of crisis, especially after Trump’s accession to power in the U.S.

Trump and his so-called comrades in the Middle East are destroying the region that we know. This is the rise of a new geopolitical era in the Middle East political landscape that has been undergoing a transitional period of a new regional order without principles, rules, and norms. The new order in the Middle East is a product of reckless diplomacy of the Trumpian narrative of international politics. At the very heart of this Trumpian diplomacy lies diplomacy working without diplomats and law functioning without the international norms assembled around the United Nations after World War II.

The Palestinian case is an excellent textbook example to see how Trumpian diplomacy works without diplomats and law without paying respect to international norms in the Middle East. Trump’s decision to relocate the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Al-Quds and the recognition of Jerusalem as the eternal capital of the so-called Jewish State signifies the very nature of Trumpian diplomacy. Additionally, the presence of Trump’s daughter, Ivanka Kushner, and her husband, Jared Kushner, at the opening ceremony of the U.S. embassy manifested how U.S. diplomacy is withdrawing itself from the scene and giving its place to Trumpian diplomacy without diplomats.

As it is mostly believed, Trump’s Israel policy is not a construction of the U.S.’s realpolitik interests in the Middle East; it is a product of the global civilizational conflict perception in which the Christian right, evangelical/fundamentalist Christians and the Orthodox Jewish community in the U.S. are at the center of. The evangelical pastor Robert Jeffress’s invocation at the opening ceremony showed how the judgment above portrays the very nature of this perception. Many people can easily recall Jeffress addressing Muslims as “heretics” in several of his speeches. At this stage, it is not necessary to examine how Trump disregards international law and norms, since Trumpian diplomacy does not consult international norms.

The way in which Trumpian diplomacy destroys the Middle East is not limited to Trump’s messianic decision about Al-Quds. The U.S. secession from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), or the Iran Deal, sealed by the international community, in which the U.S. was an integral part, are other outrageous examples that demonstrate how Trumpian diplomacy undermine  international norms. The Iran deal was a diplomatic success in 2015. Now it invokes a diplomatic ignorance caused by U.S. policy in the Middle East. However, this time round, diplomatic ignorance is not only caused by Trump himself – it is also the consequence of an intra-regional antagonism implemented by Israel to undermine the existing intra-regional balance against itself. For sure, Iran is not the champion of regional stability, but the termination of the Iran Deal is not the best realistic way to contain Iran’s destabilizing role in the Middle East. Calling off the Iran nuclear deal also attempts to undermine Iranian people. It accelerates Iranian politics towards a more radical line.

Another example to see how Trumpian diplomacy destroys the Middle East is the commitment to protect the PKK-YPG’s (which is listed as a terrorist organization by the U.S. itself) interests in northeastern Syria. This commitment indicates the Trump administration’s way of doing diplomacy without diplomats, as well. While the role of military disagreements in Turkish-American relations, particularly the case of the U.S.-PKK connection, shows the decline of diplomacy, it also demonstrates how a tactical concern can become a guideline for overall diplomatic strategy. In addition to that, the increasing rapprochement between the U.S. and the PKK proves the cliché of international politics that one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.

These three examples clearly demonstrate that Trump is demolishing the Middle East that we know by undermining the nature of diplomacy firstly, and secondly, by triggering the regional antagonism among the countries in the region. While destroying the historical status of Al-Quds makes the region more conflictual, demonizing Iran generates more instability for Middle Eastern countries. On the other hand, undermining Turkey’s national security by supporting a terrorist organization endangers U.S. interests in Syria and Iraq. Trump’s diplomacy is the new reality for the Middle East, which has perhaps struck the region via a new wave of crisis. Trump and his team are against international law, norms and diplomacy. The people who serve Trumpian diplomacy are ultra-radical, neocon and pro-interventionists. This is very dangerous for the Middle East. When the other ultra-radical leaders in the region are taken into consideration, the region’s future does not appear to be bright.

President Trump announced the withdrawal of the U.S. from the Iran Nuclear Deal. This brief will shed light on several legal implications arising from this historic decision by the Trump administration. First, while the Iran Nuclear Deal connotes an international agreement signed by six states and the Islamic Republic Iran, it does not have the same legal features as an international agreement does under international law. It is a mere political commitment, as opposed to a legally binding international agreement. Former President Barack Obama made considerable efforts to strike this deal. However, he followed the procedure to adopt the deal as an executive agreement, rather than a treaty passed by the Senate. Therefore, this facilitated his successor to withdraw from the agreement, specifically at the international level. Nevertheless, the Trump administration would not have been legally bound to continue with the deal, even if it had been adopted as a treaty.

So, how does the current legislation define the scope of the sanctions regime? Section 3 of the presidential memorandum signed on May 8 provides a to-do-list for the State Department and Treasury Department. According to this section, several executive orders will be “re-issued,” and individuals on the sanction lists will be “re-listed.” The government will re-register more persons and entities on the list of Specifically Designated Nationals (SDN), and this will require more enforcement effort. It will be more likely that a company, whether in the U.S. or overseas, appears on the radar unless they cut their commercial relations with Iran. These increased enforcement efforts can result in more cases that are brought against entities, banks, and companies.

The direct effect against Iranian nationals and entities in the U.S. is not anticipated to be much, since the withdrawal decision was not a surprise for them. They can move all of their assets from U.S. jurisdiction, limiting the territorial effect of the decision. However, the adverse effect will be dramatic for Europe, since U.S. enforcement authorities are not reluctant to exercise their jurisdiction over individuals and entities overseas. The withdrawal decision allows them no option but to cut off their commercial relations with Iran. The memorandum issued on May 8 explicitly instructed the State and Treasury Department “to [prepare the] guidance necessary to educate United States and non-United States business communities on the scope of the prohibited and sanctionable activity.” Hence, the government will make additional efforts to assist business communities around the world to adapt to the changes.

While U.S. authorities will attempt to implement a detailed plan to revive the sanctions against Iran, it is not clear how this will produce far-reaching effects on non-U.S. business. For instance, the high amount of fines will not only jeopardize business, but also create additional political conflict between European countries and the U.S. One notable example was the fine imposed against BNP Paribas in 2014. The amount of the fine did not only harm the French financial system, it caused tension between former presidents Obama and François Hollande. If the scope of the sanctions will be wide, there is much more possibility that this kind of conflict will occur again between Europe and the U.S. If individuals attempt to circumvent the sanction rules by committing other ‘crimes’ under U.S. law, such as conspiring to defraud the U.S., or bank fraud, they are likely to sit as defendants in a criminal trial.

The Iran Deal plays a particular role for Europe, and the trade between Iran and the EU considerably increased after signing the deal in 2015. The efforts made by European leaders, namely President Emmanuel Macron and Chancellor Angela Merkel, stem from interest in their commercial ties with Iran. These efforts include the meetings held in Washington D.C. to convince President Trump to save the deal. On 8 May 2018, European leaders promptly reacted to the decision made by President Trump. President Macron underlined the significant interest in preserving the nuclear non-proliferation regime. In a similar vein, German Foreign Minister pointed out the risk of jeopardizing the long-term relations between Europe and the U.S. Foreign Minister of the U.K., Boris Johnson, expressed his regrets of this decision. A week after the decision of May 8, several European politicians met the Foreign Minister of Iran in order to devise an effective plan. For instance, Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the EU, expressed their willingness to carry out determined work to keep the commitments of the deal.

From a legal point of view, the withdrawal decision does not force any other parties to quit, but the abovementioned extraterritoriality will hamper the ability of others to comply with the deal in practice. For this reason, the European Union plans to use other means to keep the deal alive. For instance, the EU might impose the notorious “blocking regulations.” These regulations, which were adopted in 1996, are intended to protect European companies from the “extra-territorial application of legislation adopted by a third country.” In the past, it was considered effective against the extraterritorial sanctions imposed against Cuba by the U.S.

Another option could be the change of currency. EU members could carry on their trade with Iran by using the Euro, so that U.S. authorities will be less likely to exercise their jurisdiction over these transactions. The rationale behind the extraterritorial application of the sanction regime is that U.S. authorities need to establish the link between an extraterritorial transaction and territory of the U.S., and, once a transaction is made in U.S. dollars, it is sufficient for the U.S. government to exercise its jurisdiction based on this link. The single fact that a bank processes U.S. dollar transactions means that this bank is on the radar of U.S. enforcement authorities, as observed in the case of PNB Paribas. If this bank fails to comply with the sanction regime as part of the domestic law of the U.S., authorities will impose a fine on this bank. In order to mitigate the loss and escape from U.S. jurisdiction, the change of currency offers a useful alternative for the EU, albeit the business between these countries is unlikely to take any legal or financial risk. Similarly, the EU can take the Indian investments in Iran, which are made in the currency of Indian rupee.

Moreover, as the spokesman of the French government suggested, the EU could challenge this withdrawal decision at the World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Unit by arguing it would adversely affect the trade between WTO members. In this case, the EU could attempt to resolve this issue as a trade dispute. Although they could make reasonable arguments before the WTO, a ruling from a panel may not produce an effect powerful enough to force the Trump administration to reconsider the future of the Iran deal.

The U.S. decision will undoubtedly affect Turkey as a major trade partner of Iran. Similar to the EU, this decision can decrease the trade volume between the two countries. Turkish politicians read the situation from the same page, and Turkey is likely to join the resistance against the U.S. decision. From a legal point of view, due to the uncertainty of a criminal trial brought against two Turkish citizens, namely Reza Zarrab and Hakan Atilla, Turkey will act cautiously in their commercial ties with Iran, at least in the early stage of re-instituting sanctions against Iran.

It is most likely that these possible actions within international law are largely ignored by the Trump administration. In his speech, he did not explicitly refer to any issues arising from international law. For example, the future of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 remained unaddressed. While the Trump administration’s decision may cause increased conflict with Europe, the disregard for the international community’s interests and laws was not a complete surprise for the international community, and neither was the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Deal.

The United States President Donald Trump recently announced that Washington has withdrawn from the nuclear deal that was signed between Iran and the international community. The announcement did not cause a serious reaction in Tehran. The main reason behind this unresponsive attitude is the fact that Iranian decision makers have been well experienced to the similar political decisions of the United States. This decision has also allowed Iranian political elites to instrumentalize their strategy of “U.S. antagonism” on which Tehran has based its policies towards the U.S. The U.S.’s decision also led Iranian people, who had to endure U.S. sanctions for years, to grow a deep sense of insecurity towards Washington.

Civil and political actors in Iran have accepted the fact that they have to accustom themselves to the international sanctions against their country, which have been applied since 1979. Because of these sanctions, Iran has limited integration to the international economic system. As a result, sanctions have been accepted as part of daily life and politics in Iran. For this reason, Iranians who have endured U.S. sanctions for many years do not have much concern about the new sanctions that can be applied in the near future.

This is the impression I have observed during my one-week long visit to Iran last week. Throughout the years, Iranians have obviously adapted themselves to life with international sanctions. This is observed from the fact that despite heavy sanctions for years, Iran has a vibrant economic, cultural and social life. The country is perceived as an outsider to the global system, but in reality, it perfectly functions without international connectivity. From municipal services to infrastructure, from cultural life to economic activities, Iran is drawing a more successful picture than most countries in its neighborhood. The vibrant economic life, human mobility and the presence of a dynamic population in all big cities of the country, ensure that Iran is self-reliant despite the years-long sanctions.

On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that Iran is far below its capacity due to the sanctions imposed by the United States and the international community. With its great potential in natural resources such as oil and gas, Iran would have been a regional power if the country had not faced international sanctions for many years. Therefore, it can be argued that the main reason for the U.S.’s insistence on the sanctions imposed on Iran was to keep Tehran at a limited capacity in regional and global politics.

A crucial question here is how Iran’s integration to the international system would transform the country and regional politics. It is obvious that if Iran achieves to integrate itself into the international community, the country would become the key actor in regional politics. Iran’s exclusion from sanctions and achievement of economic growth would allow Tehran to increase its influence in its neighborhood. Despite the sanctions, Iran has followed a strategy of regional expansionism successfully. Without sanctions, Tehran would follow a more aggressive strategy of regional expansionism. In such a scenario, countries like Turkey, Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia would feel the pressure that may be caused from Iran’s expansionist policies. On the other hand, Iran’s increasing economic and military capacities would become a source of concern for regional actors such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Israel. Therefore, it’s of great importance for these countries that Iran is kept at a limited level both economically and militarily.

On the other hand, international actors such as the U.S. and Russia object to Iran’s transformation into a regional power. Together with other major Western players, these countries have contributed to keep Tehran’s capacities at a limited level. The main aim of these actors was to prevent Iran from becoming a stronger actor that can influence the policies of the global powers towards the Middle East. These global actors have also taken into consideration the interests of their regional allies such as Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Due to the demands from these countries, the U.S. has continued its sanctions on Iran.

It can be said that the sanctions imposed on Iran by Western countries have aimed to prevent Tehran from becoming a more powerful regional player. In addition to that, these sanctions protected both the interests of the West and their allies in the region. They also functioned as an instrument for the U.S. to secure the loyalty of its regional allies. Finally, it can be stated that despite the sanctions, Iran will continue to be one of the most important countries of the Middle East with its dynamic and vibrant population as well as significant energy resources.