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onths after the sudden demise of its founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in a plane crash, the Wagner paramilitary group has recommenced its recruitment drive in several Russian regions, local media sources confirm.

In a significant shift, the group is now operating under the Russian National Guard, or Rosgvardia, and is spearheaded by Pavel Prigozhin, the 25-year-old son of the late Yevgeny Prigozhin. Local news site 59.ru reported these details, which were later corroborated by several independent news outlets.

Journalists have observed announcements of the recruitment revival on Wagner’s Telegram channel, specifically targeting the Perm and Novosibirsk regions. These announcements came with specific requirements for potential recruits, emphasizing the need for a Russian passport, family records, and vaccination certificates.

A clean criminal record

Interestingly, there’s now a stipulation for a clean criminal record and no history of drug abuse to be recruited for Wagner, a departure from their past practices where they were known to recruit individuals with criminal backgrounds.

However, recent reports suggest the Wagner Group has been absorbed by the Russian Guard or Rosgvardiya, a branch that handles internal security threats and is directly under President Vladimir Putin’s purview. This move has prompted speculation among military analysts and experts on the future role and direction of the group within Russia’s broader defense and security apparatus.

Despite the controversies surrounding the group and its operations, the resurgence of its recruitment drive signals its intent to remain a prominent player in Russia’s security dynamics.

“We are coming back”

In posts titled “We’re coming back,” they said those hoping to sign a contract will need a Russian passport for operations outside the country, records of their families and close relatives, and vaccination certificates.

Further cementing these rumors, a Telegram channel named ‘Prigozhin 2023,’ believed to be affiliated with Wagner, has been endorsing Pavel Prigozhin as the natural successor and future leader of the group.

Additionally, recent reports from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) suggest that some ex-members of the Wagner mercenary company were seen fighting in Ukraine, but now under the banner of the Russian military.

The Wagner Group, known for its covert operations in regions such as Africa and Ukraine, has garnered international attention in recent years. With the recent changes in its leadership and the renewed recruitment drive, it remains to be seen how the group will navigate its future in the international security landscape.

Sources: Business Insider and Anadolu Agency

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olitical assassination is the oldest trick in the book for getting rid of determined opponents. Assassination methods range from poisoning to shooting, and even a world war broke out following a political assassination: World War I erupted when Gavrilo Princip, a Bosnian Serb, assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne. Despite the risks involved, political assassinations continue to occur across the world today.

Yevgeny Prigozhin, the leader of the Wagner Group, died in a plane crash on August 23, 2023. Two months before his death, Prigozhin, also known as “Putin’s chef” due to his involvement in restaurants and catering services that served the Kremlin, launched a munity against the Russian government. He released a video and a series of audio recordings on Telegram claiming that the Russian military leadership was “evil” and needed to be stopped. He called for the dismissal of the Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu.

On June 24, Putin made a televised speech in which he claimed that Prigozhin had committed an act of treason and betrayal, and he promised to crush what he called an “armed mutiny.” Just as the situation in Russia was escalating, particularly with Wagner’s forces seizing the city of Rostov-on-Don, Prigozhin ordered his mercenaries to halt their advance on Moscow to avoid “shedding Russia’s blood.” He also agreed to live in exile in Belarus, a result of Belarusian mediation.

However, he never got that far and was found dead in a plane crash north of Moscow, leaving the future of his mercenary group unclear. Many have accused Putin of being responsible for Prigozhin’s death, given his reputation for using assassination to eliminate his opponents. Not surprisingly, the Kremlin has denied any deliberate involvement in the Wagner boss’s death.

Putin’s reputation for assassinating his rivals

The Roman emperor Domitian was famously paranoid about being assassinated. He used to joke: “It’s a terrible thing to be an emperor, because everyone thinks your paranoia about being assassinated is groundless – until you’re actually assassinated.” In fact, he was proven correct, when he was assassinated.

Putin also fears being assassinated or overthrown by his opponents. Earlier this year, there was a drone attack on the Kremlin, and unsurprisingly, Putin claimed it was an attempt on his life. In the words of Simon Sebag-Montefiore, best-selling author of Jerusalem and the Romanovs, Putin has “every reason to fear assassination.”

It is not surprising that many critics of Putin and his policies have been murdered, and many speculate that the Kremlin is behind these murders because of two common denominators among the victims: public criticism of Putin and their sudden deaths. The latest is Prigozhin, who had rebelled against Putin two months before his death. He joins a list of victims who are believed to have been murdered by Putin in order to be silenced.

Anna Politkovskaya, 2006

Anna Politkovskaya was a Russian journalist for NG who advocated for human rights in Russia. She reported on political and social events in Russia, especially the Second Chechen War. She was a critic of the Russian regime, and as a result of her writings, was arrested by the Russian military forces in Chechnya.

In 2004, she was poisoned while flying from Moscow to help resolve the 2004 Beslan school hostage crisis, which forced her to fly back to Moscow for medical treatment. She is also known for her 2004 book Putin’s Russia, which offered a description of Russia from her perspective for Western readers. She was murdered in the elevator of her apartment building on October 7, 2006. In June 2014, five men were sent to prison for her murder, but it remains unclear who ordered or paid for the hit.

Alexander Litvinenko, 2006

Alexander Litvinenko was a British-naturalized Russian defector, who was a former FSB officer in charge of tackling organized crime. He was a prominent critic of Putin and was the first to coin the term “mafia state” to describe Russia under Putin’s regime. He fled to London and became a journalist and consultant for the British intelligence services.

Litvinenko wrote two books, Blowing Up Russia: Terror from Within and Lubyanka Criminal Group, in which he accused the Russian secret services of orchestrating the 1999 Russian apartment bombings and other acts of terrorism on Putin’s orders.

He also accused Putin of ordering the assassination of Anna Politkovskaya. On November 1, 2006, a month after the death of Politkovskaya, Litvinenko was hospitalized after being poisoned by polonium-210. He died from the poisoning on November 23.

Andrey Lugovoy, a former member of the Russian Federal Protective Services (FSO), and Dmitry Kovtun, a former KGB agent, were the main suspects in the British investigation of Litvinenko’s death. The two suspects were never captured. In 2021, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the Russian regime was behind his assassination in the Carter v. Russia case and ordered Russia to pay 100,000 euros in damages.

Natalia Estemirova, 2009

 Natalia Estemirova was a human rights activist and board member of the human rights organization Memorial. She was known for her criticism of the Second Chechen War. Being a widow of a Chechen policeman, she gathered evidence on human rights violations since the beginning of the Second Chechen War.

Estemirova produced thirteen short documentaries about victims who suffered at the hands of Russian law enforcement. On July 15, 2009, she was abducted from her home in Grozny, Chechnya at approximately 8:30 a.m. Eyewitnesses reported that she was pushed into a car while screaming that she was being kidnapped. The Russian authorities later announced that they found her body, along with her belongings, in a wooded area at 4:30 p.m. Memorial claimed that “state terror” was behind her assassination.

Sergei Magnitsky, 2009

Sergei Magnitsky was a tax advisor who was responsible for exposing the Russian regime’s corruption and misconduct against Hermitage Capital Management. He claimed that the Russian government conducted large-scale theft against the company, which was sanctioned and carried out by Russian officials.

He was arrested in 2008 and died in prison before the expiration of the one-year term for which he could legally be held without trial. He became the first person in Russia to face a posthumous trial.

Stanislav Markelov & Anastasia Baburova, 2009

Stanislav Markelov was a Russian human rights lawyer. He was the attorney for Elza Kungaeva’s family, a Chechen woman who was kidnapped and murdered by Russian colonel Yuri Budanov. Budanov was released from prison on January 15, 2009.

On January 19, 2009, Markelov was assassinated while leaving a news conference in Moscow, which was less than 800 meters from the Kremlin. Anastasia Baburova, a journalist for NG who tried to rescue Markelov, was also shot and killed in the attack.

Boris Berezovsky, 2013

 Boris Berezovsky was a Russian business oligarch who made his fortune in Russia in the 1990s. It’s believed that Berezovsky was instrumental in Putin’s rise to power but that since he couldn’t exert any influence under the new leadership, he fell out with Putin. This eventually led to his self-exile to the United Kingdom, where he promised to bring Putin down.

Berezovsky accused the Kremlin of ordering the killing of Alexander Litvinenko. He was assassinated in the UK inside his bathroom, which was locked. A noose was found around his neck, leading to speculation about death by suicide; however, the cause of his death remains a mystery.

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he Wagner Group, a private military company based in Russia, has been making a name for itself in the global system since 2014. Wagner’s leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, a close figure to Putin, is also known as “Putin’s cook.” Prigozhin announced that he founded Wagner specifically to support Russian forces in the Donbas Warin May 2014. Wagner has a presence both in Russia and across the world, including the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and Latin America. The group is a major player in various conflict zones around the world, including Libya, Syria, Ukraine, the Central African Republic, and Mali.

In line with Russia’s interests, Wagner is active in at least 15 countries around the world, at least 10 of which are in Africa, providing military services, including the necessary personnel, training, and logistics. Wagner operates as a private military company, and until the crisis, i.e., the June 23 mutiny, there was no official claim that its activities were carried out in line with national interests and the Russian government.

The leader of the Wagner group, Yevgeni Prigojin, claimed that Russian airstrikes on Wagner camps had caused the deaths of thousands of militiamen. However, the Russian Ministry of Defense dismissed these claims as provocations. The Federal Security Service, on the other hand, accused Prigojin of trying to start an internal conflict and called for his arrest. The Kremlin stated that Putin was aware of Prigojin’s actions and had taken the necessary measures.

In the process, Putin emphasized that those who took up arms would be punished. Prigojin and the Wagner group claimed that a crisis had begun. However, before the crisis escalated, Belarusian President Lukashenko intervened, easing tensions, and the Wagner forces withdrew. Thus, the case against Prigojin was dropped and he was sent to Belarus. As a result, the Wagner fighters were prosecuted and had the option to sign contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense.

The Wagner Group is said to have close links with Vladimir Putin. The mutiny, which began on June 23 and lasted only a short time, has therefore deeply affected Russia. Especially in recent years, Wagner had become an important actor due to the expansion of its sphere of influence in Africa, its influence on the resources in the regions where it is located, and global security reasons. Wagner’s mutiny has thus raised questions about Russia’s domestic and security dynamics as well as the future of its global policy. Although Wagner’s presence in Africa is linked to civil wars, conflicts, and security issues, it is the natural resources and mining activities in the resource-rich regions in which it operates that attract the most attention.

Wagner as an instrument of influence in Africa

With close ties to the Kremlin, Wagner’s role in Russia is characterized by active involvement in crisis zones and regions where global and regional tensions are high. Wagner’s operations in African countries such as the Central African Republic, Mali, Sudan, and Libya have had a ripple effect enabling Russia to establish a presence in strategic regions and play an active role across the continent.

Wagner is known to be present in Mauritania, Algeria, Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Madagascar, and Mozambique. Russia’s policy through Wagner helped increase Russia’s influence in Africa, allowing it to achieve its geopolitical and strategic goals. However, the mutiny led by Prigozhin raises questions about the rationality of this policy.

Wagner’s strategic goals in Africa: Political instability and mining

As in the past, Africa’s natural resources and reserves are of strategic importance to many actors today. These resources have the potential to influence the geopolitical interests of global actors and shape regional and global balances of power.

Wagner’s mutiny will have a major impact not only on Russia’s domestic politics and its Africa policy, but on global politics as well: Wagner provided military services and training in African countries, and held lucrative economic interests far beyond military services by being actively involved in trade with African countries.

From an economic perspective, it is well known that Wagner played an active role in the mining sector. Its involvement in countries with natural resources such as gold, diamonds, and cobalt reinforces the perception that it acted in line with Russia’s economic interests and ensured security of supply for Russia.

After the mutiny, Russia, which had consolidated its presence in Africa through Wagner, will have to revise its African policy. It is likely that Wagner’s role in Russia’s Africa policy will be gradually eliminated and replaced by another private military company; Prigozhin will be taken out of the equation; Wagner will be integrated into a position under the Ministry of Defense; and Putin will maintain direct control over Wagner.

Wagner’s future in Africa

Given the economic gains it has made from the natural resources in the regions it controls, Wagner will not want to withdraw from Africa. Most probably, Russia will conduct a “purge” within Wagner, whose long-standing relations with different social structures in African countries should also be taken into account.

In order for Wagner to operate in Africa, a continent with diverse cultures and social structures, it has had to cooperate with the locals. For example, it is known that gold mines and mining operations are concentrated in Kordofan and Darfur in Sudan, Kidal and Sikasso in Mali, and the Bambari-Bria line in the Central African Republic along the country’s western border.

Given that some ethnic elements in these regions have attempted to rebel against state authority in the past, Wagner is likely to view these groups, and anti-government groups in general, as a tool to be used against the current administrations.

Wagner will possibly attempt to protect the areas under its control by incorporating or militarily strengthening potential elements within these groups. The realization of such a scenario could pose a threat to existing governments and disrupt domestic political balances. This could lead to further instability and conflict, and exacerbate regional tensions and global rivalries.

On February 27, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky called the citizens to create the “International Legion of Territorial Defense of Ukraine.” This call was answered by more than 20,000 volunteer fighters, especially from Europe, whose governments accepted the mobilization of a number of their citizens.

On the opposite side, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced before the Russian National Security Council on March 11 that Russia would also accept volunteers who want to fight against Ukraine. He called fighters who would join the Russian army “volunteers” and those joining the Ukrainian army “mercenaries.”

Russian defense minister, Sergei Shoigu, announced on March 11, 2022, that 16,000 fighters showed interest in fighting along with the Russian army in the Donbas region of Ukraine.

The Ukrainian diplomatic missions in Washington, D.C. set conditions for accepting applications, the most important of which is prior combat experience, and a number of applicants have been refused for lack of said experience. Ukraine published a QR code on social media for embassies to download a commitment form. A website has been set up explaining the seven steps one must take to be enlisted to defend Ukraine.

Foreign fighters reportedly came from 52 countries including the United States, France, and Japan. The Ukrainian diaspora worldwide is reportedly involved in the fighting too. The Black African Defense League (LDNA) made calls to show solidarity with Ukraine and to send volunteer fighters.

U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson warned their citizens who travel to fight that they could be prosecuted under anti-terrorism legislation. During his visit to Estonia, Johnson stated, “I can understand why people feel as they do, but we have laws in our country about international conflicts and how they should be conducted.”

African countries such as Senegal, Algeria, and Nigeria warned their citizens not to join the Russia-Ukraine war. “Nigeria discourages the use of mercenaries anywhere in the world and will not tolerate the recruitment,” Nigeria’s foreign ministry said in a statement.

The rules of international law criminalize the use of mercenaries. The Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1949) and its Additional Protocol criminalize the use of mercenaries and prevent them from being called or treated as prisoners of war.

The UN Security Council has adopted a number of related resolutions, including Resolution 1373 (2001), Resolution 2178 (2014), and Resolution 2396 (2017) on the prohibition of the use of mercenaries.

Appearing for the first time in 2014 at the border with Ukraine and controlled by Yevgeny Prigozhin, the Wagner Group is engaged in a number of conflicts. Syria and Libya were two countries where Russia’s involvement in civil wars and alleged employment of Wagner Group proxies were most visible.

In April 2012, when then-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was asked in the Russian Duma about whether he supported the idea of creating a network of Russian private military companies, he replied positively and emphasized that PMCs could be tools of influence abroad, allowing the realization of national interests without the direct involvement of the state.

Mali

As reported by the Associated Press, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken cautioned Russia’s Wagner Group on Saturday against meddling with attempts to foster democracy in the West African country of Mali.

Mali “remains a linchpin for future stability in the Sahel and we have deep concerns about that stability and deep concerns about the extremism and terrorism that is spreading tentacles in the region,” Blinken stated during a joint press conference with Senegal’s foreign minister, Aissata Tall Sall. The Sahel region of West Africa encompasses a wide territory south of the Sahara Desert, where extremist organizations are battling for control of the region.

The French government on December 23, 2021 criticized the decision by the Malian transitional authorities to authorize the deployment of the Wagner Group, and accused Russia of sponsoring the private military company’s employment of mercenaries in the West African nation.

In a statement, the Western nations warned that the deployment of Wagner mercenaries could “lead to an aggravation of the human rights situation in Mali [and] threaten the agreement for peace and reconciliation” in the conflict-torn country.

Central African Republic (CAR)

The United Nations issued a report  on June 25, 2021, in which it accused Russian instructors in the Central African Republic’s armed forces of being engaged in massive indiscriminate killings, looting, and enforced disappearances. The report was authored by a panel of specialists. Despite the fact that the report to the United Nations Security Council makes no reference of those instructors being Wagner associates, news reports and the United Nations’ working committee on mercenaries establish the connection.

In order to train Central African Republic troops, President Touadéra has sought the assistance of the Russian government, and a Russian official serves as the president’s security advisor. Some analysts believe that this is part of a trend of Russian military involvement spreading throughout Africa.

As reported by the United Nations specialists group on March 31, 2021, the Russian contractors collaborate closely on a UN peacekeeping deployment that has been stationed in the Central African Republic since 2014. It is the purpose of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) to protect civilians while also creating an atmosphere that would enable the nation to establish long-lasting institutional structures.

The 13,500 UN forces are tasked with protecting civilians and preventing armed groups from inflicting harm on the populace. They helped secure the election, but they are helpless to disarm the rebels and are often attacked by the rebels themselves. Some have also been accused of sexually abusing children.

The commander of the EU training missions, General Jacques Langlade, stated that “Due to the control exerted by the mercenaries of the Wagner group over the CAR armed forces, the European Union, keen to respect international humanitarian law, has decided to temporarily suspend training”.

“This blurring of the lines between civil, military and peacekeeping operations during the hostilities creates confusion about the legitimate targets and increases the risks for widespread human rights and humanitarian law abuses,” said Jelena Aparac, Chair-Rapporteur of the United Nations working group on private military contractors.

To understand the changing structure of global intelligence, we must keep the following concepts and terminology in mind: technology-centered development, the increasing cyber espionage capacity of intelligence services, the developing relations between intelligence services and private intelligence companies, new-generation threats and risks that emerge with the rise of social media, open-source intelligence (OSINT) collection methods, and the concept of intelligence diplomacy.

Today, technology affects every walk of life. The speed of life has increased by the spread of the internet and social media. Daily lives, public spaces, and commercial activities are digitized, while the COVID19 pandemic gave a great push to this process. However, our dependence on technology and digitization also increase the risk of cyber espionage.

Governments and global companies carry out a significant part of their activities through internet-based technologies, and this brings important challenges with it regarding the privacy of information. Confidential information belonging to governments, global companies, and individuals is disclosed via manipulative tools created for cyber espionage operations which leak information to the public through various means. This forces intelligence services to increase their capacity to conduct sophisticated cyber espionage operations and to increase their cyber defense capabilities.

The increasing relationship between private intelligence companies and intelligence services brought about a significant change to the classical structure of intelligence. Private intelligence companies have been playing an important role, especially within the United States intelligence structure for decades. On the other hand, Russian intelligence services have been active in this field in recent years through the private intelligence company Wagner.

Commercial capacities of private intelligence companies increased with “the war on terror” doctrine as formulated by the United States after 9/11.

Commercial capacities of private intelligence companies increased with “the war on terror” doctrine as formulated by the United States after 9/11. Private intelligence companies refashioned their activities in accordance with the changing threat perceptions, asymmetrical threats, and the global demand for risk analyses needed for international investments. Private U.S. intelligence companies operate with the support and guidance of the state secret services. The U.S. private intelligence market with increasing trade volumes and profitability paved the way for global companies to invest further in the field.

It has been claimed that a private intelligence and security company such as Blackwater had close commercial ties with the CIA including carrying out assassinations, interrogation activities, kidnappings, and other technical and physical pursuits in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq to combat radical terrorist elements. This commercial relationship could also breach fundamental human rights and freedoms.

Users can hide their real identities in social media and this helps criminal and terrorist organizations to access and spread information flexibly and cheaply. In parallel with the increase in the use of smartphones in daily life after 2010, criminal and terrorist organizations make effective use of social media.

Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations are ably using social media in action planning, propaganda, and internal training.

Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations are ably using social media in action planning, propaganda, and internal training. The smartphone application ByLock that was used by the Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETÖ) allowed the encrypted identification of anonymous users and is another good example of how a terrorist organization can use the internet infrastructure to plan terrorist activities.

The PKK propaganda to defame the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) on social media during Turkey’s Peace Spring and Olive Branch Operations are two other good examples. For example, during these military operations, PKK militants and sympathizers made great efforts to serve the world public opinion fake news on social media that the TAF killed, tortured, and forced innocent civilians to migrate within Syria.

The concept of intelligence diplomacy is frequently discussed in recent years. In this context, the role of certain countries’ intelligence service directors within the scope of foreign policy decision-making can be analyzed. For example, the negotiations by former director of Mossad Yossi Cohen, in 2020, within the scope of the normalization of relations between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Israel can be given as an example of intelligence diplomacy. At the end of Cohen’s covert and secret contacts throughout 2020, the UAE officially declared its recognition of Israel on August 13, 2020.

The meetings held in Russia in November 2021 by CIA Director William Burns, who has served successfully as a diplomat for many years, can be evaluated within the scope of intelligence diplomacy. During his visit, it was leaked to the public that Burns warned Russia within the scope of the Ukraine Crisis and made secret negotiations with the Russian side regarding this issue.

It is known that Hakan Fidan, director of Turkish intelligence (Millî İstihbarat Teşkilatı, MİT), has played a very active role in the decision-making processes of Turkish foreign policy. For example, in the past years, Fidan held secret meetings about the normalization of Turkey’s bilateral relations with Egypt and Israel in the two countries respectively. Nowadays, it is speculated in Ankara political circles that all three countries are ready to take steps to normalize relations.

Mercenaries have been a part of war since humans first started to coordinate and live amongst each other in societies. In the classical era, Xenophon of Athens recounted how his mercenary force, “The Ten Thousand”, helped Achaemenid prince Cyrus the Younger in his failed attempt to usurp the Persian throne from his brother Artaxerxes II. This extended through to the famous mercenary armies of the Renaissance period, famously criticized by writer and philosopher Niccolo Machiavelli for being a threat to their employers.

However, and despite numerous national laws forbidding mercenary activity in the militarily advanced Western world, mercenaries have continued to flourish and thrive in the battlefields and cities of Iraq and Afghanistan – the two countries who suffered the most from the American imperial footprint in the 21^st century.

With the United States now openly stating that it intends to disengage from both countries, it is likely that, rather than reduce the number of mercenaries deployed, it will instead increasingly rely on its army of private military contractors to secure its interests.

The case of Iraq

As one of the world’s most fossil fuel-rich nations, Iraq has been blessed (and cursed) with bountiful natural resources. This has obviously attracted the avarice and attention of massive international energy companies who wish to exploit Iraq’s oil stocks and also its burgeoning natural gas fields.

ExxonMobil, one of the world’s largest oil and gas companies headquartered in Texas, operates two subsidiaries in Iraq, one of which deals with the Northern Iraq Region and one of which specializes in contracts relating to the richer oil fields in the Iraqi south. ExxonMobil is currently the lead contractor at the West Qurnah oilfield in cooperation with China’s PetroChina.

ExxonMobil’s operations have been targeted several times by pro-Iran Shia jihadist groups who were seeking to make the U.S. presence in Iraq as inhospitable as possible in order to give Tehran the diplomatic leverage it needed against Washington elsewhere. The American oil giant had to evacuate its employees on several occasions, including after rocket attacks struck their compound near Basra in 2019.

This will have the effect of emboldening mercenary companies as they know they can acquire billions in contracts while operating in a murky world devoid of accountability in a corporate war environment where violence equals profit.

The Iraqi experience is largely replicated in the Afghan theatre, with mercenary companies running logistics to various American and NATO bases.

The case of Afghanistan

The Iraqi experience is largely replicated in the Afghan theatre, with mercenary companies running logistics to various American and NATO bases, providing highway security for supply routes, guarding embassies and government installations, and even providing training to the Afghan police.

However, a series of scandals involving contractors using deadly force and engaging in corruption and black market smuggling operations caused enough of an uproar to force then-President Hamid Karzai to ban several mercenary companies, including Blackwater.

However, and commensurate with Karzai’s status as a president of an occupied country, international pressure forced the Afghan government to backtrack and they decided to allow mercenaries to simply rebrand themselves not as private security but as “risk management” companies. This was after NATO countries doubted the Afghan Public Protection Force’s capabilities of providing security in the country they were apparently sovereign over.

With the Taliban currently ascendant and the U.S.-installed Afghan government facing an existential threat, it is highly doubtful that the United States will entirely cut their losses and withdraw from Afghanistan. China has recently made a number of overtures by formally hosting Taliban officials and this will raise concerns in Washington as they already face off against Beijing in other strategic theaters around the globe.

It is therefore likely that the U.S. will want to secure the Afghan government by allowing international mercenary companies to continue to operate as “advisers” who will provide training. This may have the effect of allowing the Afghan government to maintain control over Kabul and other major population centers, effectively controlling islets surrounded by a sea of Taliban control in rural Afghanistan. Naturally, Kabul will pay through the nose for the pleasure of hosting mercenaries to ensure their survival.

Across Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, the U.S. Department of Defense has confirmed that, as at the fourth fiscal quarter of 2020, it had engaged the services of 27,388 contractors in these three theaters. Considering there are around 2,500 troops in Afghanistan, 2,500 in Iraq, and around 900 or so in Syria, one begins to appreciate the sheer scale of the “contractor” economy and how reliant the U.S. and its allies are on it.

While the approximately 30,000 contractors will obviously not all be combat oriented (about 10-20 percent are in combat roles while the rest offer support functions), a significant proportion of them will be armed and will be protected under U.S. federal laws that allows them to use “deadly force against enemy armed forces only in self-defense”.

This means that, with the U.S. drawing down uniformed personnel, this already extant addiction to hiring soldiers of fortune is not going to reduce, but in fact the U.S. will become ever more dependent on them to remain relevant in theaters of war they have been forced to abandon.

Mercenaries are back. No one knows how many billions of dollars slosh around this illicit market. All we know is that business is booming because when you need something absolutely, positively done in war, you call the private sector. Missions once conducted by special operations forces or the CIA are now outsourced — I know because I did them.

Mercenaries are deadlier than most people realize, a grave oversight. In 2018, a group of U.S. Army Rangers, Delta Force, Green Berets and Marines — America’s most elite troops — were pinned down in Syria. Attacking them were 500 mercenaries, hired by Russia. They were not the cartoonish rabble depicted by Hollywood movies. This was the Wagner Group, a high-end mercenary outfit with artillery, armored personnel carriers, and tanks.

The American commandos radioed for help. Warplanes arrived in waves, including Reaper drones, Apache helicopters, F-22 fighter jets, F-15 strike fighters, B-52 bombers, and AC-130 gunships. Scores of airstrikes pummeled the mercenaries, but they did not waver.

Four hours later, the mercenaries finally retreated. No Americans were killed, and the U.S. military touted this as a big win. But it wasn’t. It took America’s best troops and advanced aircraft four hours to push back 500 mercenaries. What happens when they have to face 1000? 5000? More? Even an undefeated military can lose.

Mercenaries are the second oldest profession, and their return is no surprise. Since 2015, mercenaries have flourished in Yemen, Libya, Nigeria, Ukraine, Syria, Iraq, Somalia, Mozambique, Central African Republic, and Venezuela. There are even cyber-mercenaries called “hack back” companies.

The UAE hired mercenaries to kill Houthis during the War in Yemen. Some of these were allegedly U.S. military although most came from Latin America.

There are many reasons why mercenaries are returning now. In fact, they have been gradually reappearing over the past three decades, but always in the shadows and that’s by design. Rich clients with a small or no military can swipe a check and wage war. The UAE hired mercenaries to kill Houthis during the War in Yemen. Some of these were allegedly U.S. military although most came from Latin America. After six failed years of fighting Boko Haram, Nigeria hired mercenaries to push the terrorist group out of their country, which they did in a few weeks. Libya is a mercenaries-on-mercenary war. Perhaps someday ExxonMobil will have its own army, too.

But why do states with big militaries use mercenaries? Because warfare is changing — it’s getting sneakier. We live in an information age, and weapons that provide plausible deniability, like mercenaries, are more important than raw firepower. In 2014, Russia invaded Ukraine, not by blitzkrieg but through deception. They covertly deployed Spetsnaz special forces, mercenaries like the Wagner Group, Little Green Men, and fake pro-Russia militias. Dense propaganda, troll factories, and other active measures further concealed the truth, until it was too late. While the West stood befuddled about what was going on, the Crimea was a fait d’accompli.

Moscow created the fog of war, and moved through it for victory. Mercenaries ooze plausible deniability. If they are caught, the client can disavow them. Not so for army soldiers. Plus, Russian citizens (like U.S. ones) hate seeing their dead soldiers coming home in body bags, but do not care about dead contractors. Owing to this, Putin can engage in risky military operations with minimal domestic political consequence. For the first time since the Cold War, Russia has launched expeditionary operations in the Middle East and Africa. The weapon of choice? Mercenaries, like the Wagner Group.

Private warfare is a growing trend with alarming implications, yet few in the West seem to care. Perhaps they assume international law will take care of the problem, but this is magical thinking. Who will go into Libya and arrest all those mercenaries? The UN? NATO? Nobody. Worse, mercenary can shoot law enforcement dead. The market for force literally resists regulation.

Privatizing war changes warfare in profound ways modern generals do not comprehend.

A world awash in mercenaries means more war and suffering. History teaches us that unemployed mercenaries become bandits and racketeers, preying on people and sometimes taking over whole kingdoms, as happened to Milan in the 15^th century. Soldiers of fortune can start and elongate war for profit, and avoid outbreaks of peace. This is one reason why the Thirty Years War (1618-48) in Europe took so long, as mercenaries fought for all sides in great numbers. By the time it ended, Germany lost a greater percentage of its population than in WWII.

Privatizing war changes warfare in profound ways modern generals do not comprehend. If conflict is commoditized, then military and marketplace strategies apply to war. It’s like General Patton goes to the souk. You can win wars by outbidding your enemy for mercenary services, bribing your enemy’s mercenaries to defect, or not paying your mercenaries when the war is over. However, it’s a dangerous game because your enemies and mercenaries can do the same to you, and there is no reliable way to enforce contracts.

Treachery is the watchword of private warfare. The 14^th century Florentine, Niccolò Machiavelli, was ripped off by his own mercenaries in 1500 and 1506, during a war with Pisa, causing Florence to lose to its diminutive neighbor. A few years later, he writes in his book The Prince, that mercenaries are: “disunited, ambitious, without discipline, unfaithful; gallant among friends, vile among enemies; no fear of God, no faith with men.”

Private force will also change world order. Offering the means of war to anyone who can afford it will transform warfare and the future of war. If money can buy firepower, then large corporations and the super-rich will become a new kind of superpower. This will rewrite the rules of global order. Who, how and why people fight will change, and there will be wars without states, accelerating global chaos.

This trend will grow, fueled by a free market for force that generates war but cannot regulate it. Today’s militaries have forgotten how to fight private wars, leaving us all exposed. We must increase our strategic IQs to deal with this problem before it becomes a crisis.

There is good news. Mercenaries are as old as war, yet the world did not devolve into anarchy, as is often portrayed by critics of private force. In fact, they can even do good, if hired to do so. If the industry were properly vetted and transparent, they could support UN peacekeeping operations, stop impending genocides, rescue civilian populations from human predators, hunt crime lords, and launch humanitarian operations quickly to save lives — something the international community cannot do. Mercenaries are like fire: they can burn down the house or power a steam engine. It’s a question of how we use them, so let’s use them for good.

On September 27, 2020, responding to constant shelling of its villages and cities, the Republic of Azerbaijan began military operations in Karabakh. Within 44 days of the military campaign, the Azerbaijani army was able to inflict a heavy defeat on Armenia and Karabakh separatists, liberating several occupied territories. Based on the peace agreement signed by the Azerbaijani president, the Armenian prime minister, and the Russian president, hostilities ended on November 10, while Armenia withdrew its forces from three more occupied territories. During the conflict, there were many allegations of Armenia using mercenaries from various countries. Several reports and articles indicated that Yerevan relied on the help of various mercenary groups including the PKK terrorist organization. This opinion article will elaborate on these claims and shed light on the use of mercenaries in Karabakh.

The first report on Armenian use of mercenaries in Karabakh came from Russian journalist Ilya Azar in the newspaper Novaya Gazeta. He was the first to report on foreign mercenaries in Karabakh fighting for the Armenian side. In his article, he interviewed French citizen Artur Oganisyan, who came to Karabakh to fight on the Armenian side. After the interview, Azar was expelled from Karabakh. Reuters also interviewed Lebanese-Armenians fighting in the war and claimed that there are dozens of mercenaries coming from Beirut to fight in Karabakh against Azerbaijan.

The PKK in Karabakh

For a long time, experts in international relations have warned that non-recognized territories can become rogue states, and therefore sources of terrorism and criminal activities. These territories are de facto independent but not bound by any international treaties. They have their own armies, law enforcement, and political institutions, but lack financial viability which may force them to earn money through weapons sales, drug trafficking, and hosting insurgent training camps. Karabakh, for example, was one of the most militarized areas in the world. That safe haven attracted members of the PKK terrorist organization as well. Discussions of relocating some PKK groups to Karabakh started in the early 2000s. Karabakh separatists also began a process of settling Armenians, mostly from Syria and Lebanon, in Azerbaijani occupied territories.

The PKK’s decision to move some of its groups to Karabakh was a pragmatic choice for both sides. Karabakh is the only territory in the Middle East and the Caucasus where Turkey seemed less likely to engage in military action. Most of the countries in the region would hardly risk hosting PKK members for fear of Turkey’s military wrath. Even for Armenia, it would be suicidal to establish PKK camps on its territory. Yerevan would need to give explanations to the international community and could face sanctions for doing so. But Karabakh is a different story – the Turkish army was unlikely to chase PKK terrorists there. Any Turkish military activity in that area would involve the Armenian troops deployed in Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenian participation in a conflict would automatically bring Russia into it as the guarantor of the security of its southern ally. Thus, for many years, this territory was a safe haven for PKK groups.

Armenian soldier Albert Mikaelyan, captured by the Azerbaijani army during the recent military operations, stated during a press conference that while serving in an anti-tank unit, Mikaelyan noticed the presence of Kurdish-speaking mercenaries in the barracks, up to 1,500 of them. “They get paid $600. They are divided into teams of 10-15. They have been learning local conditions and preparing for deployment to the battlefield,” Mikaelyan added. Meanwhile, the Azerbaijani president’s aide, Hikmat Hajiyev, stated that Armenia is using the PKK terrorists on the front lines in Upper Karabakh. He expressed concerns about the use of the PKK in Karabakh and mentioned that there are terrorists in the ranks of the Armenian armed forces. Essentially, they were deployed on the front line of the Armenian armed forces. In a statement, Turkish President Recep Erdogan noted the presence of 2,000 PKK terrorists fighting alongside Armenia against Azerbaijan in Karabakh.

Armenian soldier Albert Mikaelyan noticed the presence of Kurdish-speaking mercenaries in the barracks, up to 1,500 of them.

Reportedly, Armenia transported most of these terrorists from Suleymaniyah, a stronghold of the PKK in Iraq. There were several flights from this Iraqi city to Yerevan before and during the recent military confrontations. Meanwhile, a separate group of YPG militants, regarded by many as the Syrian wing of the PKK, were sent to Nagorno-Karabakh from the Qamishli region on the Syrian-Iraqi borders. Azerbaijan, in turn, reported that dozens of PKK terrorists were killed in Karabakh during the military operations.

Despite the Armenian reliance on mercenaries, they were hardly able to change the course of the war. The Armenian side expected that the war would start and continue in a traditional way, using conventional weapons and tactics. Instead, Azerbaijan relied on technology, completely neutralizing the Armenian competitive advantage of using mercenaries. Thus, by the end of the military operation, Armenians suffered heavy casualties mostly caused by Azerbaijani armed drones and artillery attacks.